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Britain, the Berlin blockade and the cold war

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The role played by Britain in the conduct of East–West relations during the formative period of the cold war, from 1945 to 1950, is only now beginning to receive the detailed scholarly attention which the subject merits by virtue of its importance and which the release of the official papers makes possible. In the vast and still rapidly growing literature on the origins of the cold war, attention is focussed on the principal protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union, virtually to the exclusion of all other actors. To the extent that Britain does feature in accounts of the cold war, it is usually treated not so much as an actor in its own right but as an appendage to the United States. Thus it is generally recognized that the withdrawal by Britain of aid to Greece and Turkey in the early weeks of 1947 forced America to assume the lead in the containment of the Soviet Union, but the continuing British impact on Western policy is all too frequently underrated. The tendency to minimize the part played by Britain in the containment of the Soviet Union becomes much more pronounced in respect of the period following America's assumption of the leadership of the free world with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the launching of the Marshall Plan.

It is my view, elaborated elsewhere,[1] that Britain under the leadership of Ernest Bevin played a much more significant and decisive role in organizing the Western world for the postwar struggle for power in Europe than is commonly believed. The aim of the present article is to highlight the nature of that role by focussing on a single cold war crisis, the crisis precipitated by the Soviet blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin in 1948–9. In retrospect it is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that this was the most critical crisis of the cold war. The stakes could hardly have been greater. As Bevin perceived at the time, the future of Germany, the future of Western Europe and the future of the precarious postwar international order all hung in the balance.

The Berlin crisis was not only critical, it was also an unusually long crisis, lasting eleven months, and a highly complex one, requiring actions at the political, diplomatic, legal, military logistical and propaganda levels. As one of the four occupying powers of Germany, with its own sector in Berlin, Britain actively participated, alongside America and France, at all these different levels. That America was the leading actor in management of the crisis on the Western side is not in question.[2] All that is argued here is that for good or bad Britain played a significant role, far more significant than is usually recognized, in forging the overall Western policy of firmness in dealing with the Soviet challenge and that this role can now be usefully re-examined with the help of the documentary record made available by both the British and the American governments.[3] Four aspects of the Berlin crisis

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1. See the author's chapter on Bevin in Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury, *British foreign secretaries since 1945* (London: David and Charles, 1977).

2. For a detailed account of American perceptions and policy, see Avi Shlaim, *The United States and the Berlin blockade, 1948–1949: a study in crisis decision-making* (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1983), reviewed on p. 127 of this issue.

3. For an excellent review of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, see Geoffrey Warner, 'The division of Germany, 1946–1948', *International Affairs*, Jan. 1975, Vol. 51, No. 1.

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are particularly relevant to an understanding of Britain's role and an assessment of Britain's influence: the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the blockade by the USSR; the basic Western decision to stay in Berlin; the mounting of the airlift to supply the Western sectors of the city; the resort to nuclear deterrence and the consideration of other military measures for resolving the conflict.

Britain and the German problem

The Berlin blockade was the climax of the struggle for power over Germany and in a broader sense over Europe in which the wartime allies became engaged in the aftermath of the Second World War. The German problem continued to dominate inter-allied relations in peace as it had done during the war. But instead of treating Germany as a single economic unit to be governed by four-power collaboration through the Allied Control Council as envisaged in the Potsdam agreements, the occupying powers began to impose in their respective zones their own social, economic and political systems. Each was driven by hard necessity to pursue policies which, as a result of their incompatibility, produced a frustrating impasse.

Britain found itself in the most acute predicament. The British zone was capable of producing only 40 per cent of its food requirements. Given the parlous state of the British economy, not to mention popular feelings towards the German nation, Britain strongly resented having to expend its scarce dollar resources, at a time of food rationing at home, on feeding its populous zone in Germany. The British government therefore insisted that ways be found to make Germany pay its own way. Germany's recovery was all the more urgent because it was considered indispensable to the recovery of Western Europe as a whole. Therefore, in the second half of 1946, the British government negotiated the fusion of its zone with the American zone of occupation in Germany, also a deficit area, to form 'Bizonia'.

On the diplomatic plane, the respective positions of the three Western powers and of the Soviet Union on Germany's future grew further and further apart. The meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March 1947 revealed no possibility of a settlement based on four-power agreement. Bevin and Marshall concluded that something must be done, even if it meant a final break with Russia, to arrest the drift towards economic chaos which could only pave the way to the spread of communism in Germany and the rest of Europe. Marshall made his famous offer while Bevin organized the West European response and German recovery got under way within the framework of the European Recovery Programme. Political considerations thus converged with economic necessity to bring about a shift in Anglo–American policy away from the Potsdam agreement which envisaged the creation of centralized agencies for Germany as a whole. The thrust of the new policy was to endeavour to rescue the Western zones of Germany by walling them off against Eastern penetration and integrating them into the international pattern of Western Europe rather than into a united Germany.

The London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in November–December 1947, proved decisive precisely because it decided nothing. The basic question before the conference, as in Moscow in the previous spring, was whether or not the allies could agree among themselves to reunite Germany. And the unequivocal answer was that they could not. Following the anticipated failure of the conference, British and American delegates met to coordinate their next move in what was by now a definite policy of moving towards the creation of a separate West German state. Bevin and

Marshall instructed their Military Governors in Germany to work out plans for a political structure in Bizonia and they also agreed to invite the French to participate by fusing their zone in a trilateral merger.

Trilateral discussions took place in London, with the participation of the Benelux countries, between February and June 1948. The outcome was the London Programme, directed at bringing about the economic revival and the political reconstruction of the Western zones of Germany. Russia's next move, accurately predicted by British and American officials, was to try to delay the implementation of the London Programme by applying pressure to the vulnerable Western enclave in Berlin. The Western allies' failure to secure in writing rights of access to their Berlin sectors in the wartime agreements for the joint occupation of Germany placed them in a very weak position, legally and materially. Soviet pressure, however, did not have the desired effect and may indeed have had the reverse effect of clinching the determination of at least some British and American officials to proceed swiftly with the formation of a West German government. General Lucius Clay, the American Military Governor, and General Sir Brian Robertson, the British Military Governor in Germany, impressed upon their French opposite number, General Pierre Koenig, the importance of proceeding energetically in defiance of Soviet threats and Soviet protests. On 31 March 1948, Robertson said 'if we keep on talking indefinitely, we might wake up some fine morning to find the Hammer and Sickle already on the Rhine'.[4]

The Soviet Union stepped up the pressure to induce the Western powers to abandon their plans by imposing, on 1 April, a partial blockade restricting Western access to Berlin. It was only after this 'mini-blockade' proved inadequate for the task that the Soviet authorities, on 24 June, severed all the rail, road and water routes between the Western zones of Germany and the Western sectors in Berlin. The vulnerability of this Western enclave as a strategic outpost buried a hundred miles deep inside the Soviet zone raised doubts in the minds of some American officials about the feasibility of staying in Berlin and the wisdom of trying to do so. There was also widespread fear in Europe that the blockade of Berlin might be only a prelude to a Soviet military thrust across the Elbe and that it might touch off a third world war. Bevin, however, was confident that the Soviet Union did not plan to resort to overt military aggression to attain its objectives in Europe. What he did fear were the far-reaching political consequences of a Soviet success in forcing the Western powers out of Berlin. From the very outset, therefore, he set his face firmly against any retreat under Soviet pressure and any compromise which smacked of appeasement. The lessons of Munich a decade earlier conditioned his whole approach to the Berlin crisis. From beginning to end he consistently resisted the basic solution proposed by the Russians for lifting the blockade of Berlin in exchange for a Western suspension of the London Programme.

The decision to defend Berlin

The war of nerves waged by the Soviet Union in Berlin had already produced a number of proposals for action prior to the advent of the full blockade. Winston Churchill, leader of the opposition at the time, made privately the most startling proposal for action in April 1948 to the British and American governments. He had

4. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. II: Germany and Austria* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 159. (Henceforth this series will be referred to as *FRUS*.)

already alluded to the temporary nature of the Western monopoly over atomic weapons in a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 23 January. He revealed that he was greatly preoccupied with the shortness of the period during which the atomic bomb would remain 'in safe hands'. His proposal in April was to threaten to launch a nuclear war in order to force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Berlin and eastern Germany. Churchill's views were reported by Lewis Douglas, the American Ambassador to London, as follows: 'When and if the Soviets develop the atomic bomb, war will become a certainty . . . He believes that now is the time, promptly, to tell the Soviets that if they do not retire from Berlin and abandon Eastern Germany, withdrawing to the Polish frontier, we will raze their cities. It is further his view that we cannot appease, conciliate or provoke the Soviets; that the only vocabulary they understand is force; and that if, therefore, we took this position, they would yield.' Douglas himself, however, thought the proposal was full of 'practical infirmities';[5] Bevin and Prime Minister Attlee appear to have ignored it.

The other alternative to Western compromise or withdrawal from Berlin came from General Clay. He favoured an armoured breakthrough on the highway from the Western zones of Germany into Berlin after an earlier attempt to send unarmed trains across the Soviet zone had ended in ignominious failure.[6] With General Robertson he broached the idea of forming an Anglo-American lorry convoy and forcing it through the Russian checkpoint. Robertson reported to his government that he did not see much future in this idea because a few tanks across the road at a defile would soon bring the convoy to a halt, quite apart from the fact that the Russians might get the better of a shooting match.[7] It was precisely for these reasons that the convoy idea met with unalterable British opposition every time it was reopened for discussion by General Clay or the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

By the time the real crisis broke out, with the closure of all the land routes to Berlin, British thinking had crystallized round three points which were to serve as guidelines for British policy until the dispute was resolved. The first point was to maintain the Western position in Berlin; the second was to avoid war; the third was to proceed with the implementation of the London Programme. Point number one effectively ruled out the option of withdrawal and liquidation of the vulnerable enclave inside the Soviet-occupied zone in Germany—an option which found a growing number of adherents in Washington, especially among the military. Point number two precluded the resort to coercive measures, such as that of an armed convoy, to compel the Soviet Union to rescind the blockade. Point number three left Britain virtually no latitude for negotiation because the concessions it could offer were of little interest to the Russians, while the kind of concessions that the Russians were after would have meant halting both the unification of the three Western zones and the establishment of a West German government.

The option of negotiation was implicitly rejected at the outset of the crisis. Russia's terms were spelled out in the Warsaw declaration, issued on 24 June, proposing the restoration of four-power control over Germany, the formation of an all-German government, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the withdrawal from Germany of the forces of all the occupying powers. The French were inclined to agree to four-power talks but the British and the Americans saw the Warsaw declaration as a ploy to sabotage Western unity and gain political control over all of Germany, and

5. *FRUS 1948, Vol. II*, pp 895–6.
6. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (London: Heinemann, 1950), p. 359.
7. Robertson to Foreign Office, 2 April 1948, *FO* 371/70490/C2529/3/18 (Public Records Office, London).

therefore agreed to ignore the communist overture.[8] The deadlock on the diplomatic front was thus complete: the Soviet Union would not lift the blockade unless the entire German question was reopened, and the British and Americans would not reopen the German question to four-power talks so long as the blockade of Berlin remained in force.

The Western allies were not agreed, however, on a positive course of action, and the Americans were unable to provide the lead because they themselves were in a considerable quandary on what position to adopt. In the first few days of the crisis, Washington seemed almost paralysed by uncertainty and fear. 'No one was sure, as yet,' recalled George Kennan, 'how the Russian move could be countered or whether it could successfully be countered at all. The situation was dark and full of danger.'[9] During these few crucial days, London moved with greater speed and decisiveness in making its basic strategic choice to stay in Berlin, in announcing this decision and in prompting the American government to follow suit. Led by its staunchly anti-communist Foreign Secretary, the British Cabinet quickly resolved to do everything to supply Berlin by air and to concert a common policy in this matter with the governments of the United States and France. Much of the inspiration and initiative for the airlift came in fact from the British side. Of all the options under consideration, the airlift uniquely suited the three-point British policy of staying in Berlin, avoiding war and pressing ahead with the London Programme. From the very first day of the blockade, therefore, British hopes and British planning revolved round this possibility.

The airlift

On 25 June 1948, Major-General N. C. D. Brownjohn, the British Deputy Military Governor in Germany, reported to the Cabinet that the British garrison in Berlin could be supplied by air but that food stocks for the civilian population would last only twenty-seven days. In reply to questions he said that it would not be practicable to bring freight trains from the Western zones to Berlin by force. Nor would it be desirable to convoy lorries by road to Berlin, save as a major military operation. Ministers expressed concern at the position that would arise if land communications were not restored before the food stocks of the civilian population were exhausted. They ordered that immediate consideration be given to the possibilities of maintaining supplies to the civilian population in the Western sectors of the city, and in particular to the extent to which supplies could be maintained by air.[10]

Upon receiving these instructions, General Robertson went to consult with General Clay. He had opposed the armed convoy proposal previously as both impractical and too risky, and he saw no reason to change his mind now. Britain, in any case, was not prepared to participate in an action of this kind. As an alternative, Robertson suggested to Clay the possibility of supplying Berlin by air.[11] He himself had already made arrangements for the Royal Air Force to start flying supplies to the British garrison. At first Clay had doubts about the political and technical feasibility of the proposed course of action but he quickly rallied round and on the following

8. Report to Bevin, 'Policy on Germany', 8 July 1948, *FO* 371/70502/C5611.

9. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1967), p. 421.

10. Cabinet Minutes (48), 43rd Conclusions, Minute 3, 25 June 1948 (Public Record Office, London).

11. Cabinet Minutes (48), 44th Conclusions, Minute 4, 28 June 1948; and Jean Edward Smith, ed., *The papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945–1949, Vol. II* (Bloomington, Ind : Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 696–704.

morning, 26 June, the first transport aircraft arrived in Berlin with food for its people. RAF pilots and planes spearheaded the airlift and Robertson continued to coordinate the British part of the joint operation with Clay. The British contribution was thus decisive in improvising the airlift strategy which spared the Western leaders the agonizing choice between an appeal to arms and an ignominious retreat.

Bevin's personal authority was also instrumental in dispelling doubts about the strength of the Western commitment to the defence of Berlin. Their policy must be one of firmness, he told Ambassador Douglas, for the abandonment of Berlin would have serious, if not disastrous consequences in Western Germany and throughout Western Europe. Anticipating a long-drawn-out struggle, Bevin suggested that a tripartite committee be formed in London so that decisions might be taken on the basis of complete information. He also suggested staff talks to make a joint appreciation of the logistical and military situation and wondered whether more heavy US bomber planes could be sent to Europe to disabuse the Russians of the view that the allies lacked determination.[12]

Under Secretary of the US Army, General William Draper, and General William Wedemeyer, his chief planning officer, stopped in London on 27 June for consultations en route to Berlin and Douglas took them to see Bevin. American policy had not yet been settled and once again it was the forceful British Foreign Secretary who took the initiative and gave the lead. Bevin told his visitors that every effort must be made to build up in the shortest possible time an Anglo–American force which could lift at least 2,000 tons a day. Draper replied that the Americans hoped to put in about 1,000 tons a day. Bevin said that this was not enough and that he was convinced that the Americans, with their great resources, could do better than this. Quite apart from the practical task of feeding the inhabitants of Berlin, there would be immense psychological value, he said, in showing not only the Germans but other countries of Western Europe and, of course, the Soviet Union and its satellites, what air power could do. The Americans reacted very favourably to this and said they would do their best to meet the Foreign Secretary's recommendations.[13]

Bevin informed the Cabinet on 28 June that in view of the reports published in the Soviet-controlled press in Berlin about preparations for Western withdrawal, the Foreign Office was issuing a statement confirming the government's intention to maintain its position in Berlin and the United States was being urged to make a similar statement. There could be no question of yielding to Soviet pressure, he said. If the Western allies were forced out of Berlin, the project of Western union would be fatally weakened. The needs of the civilian population in the British sector could be supplied by air alone and every effort was being made to expand the air services into the city. From the Minister of Defence the Cabinet heard that there would be nothing to be gained by attempting to force through convoys by rail, road or water, since the Soviet authorities could interpose effective technical obstacles. Attention must therefore be concentrated on expanding the use of freight aircraft. General Robertson had reported that the Soviet authorities might attempt to interfere with air traffic either by fighter aircraft or by barrage balloons. The Cabinet felt that the risk of interference by fighters must be accepted and that any barrage balloons should be shot down at once.[14]

12. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks (Washington), 25 June 1948, *FO* 371/70497/C5031; and Douglas to Marshall, 26 June 1948, in *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 921–6.

13. Minute by Frank Roberts, 29 June 1948, *FO* 371/70499/C5215.

14. Cabinet Minutes, (48) 44th Conclusions, Minute 4, 28 June 1948.

Having unequivocally made and announced the British commitment to the defence of Berlin, Bevin was relieved to learn that the US government had definitely decided to maintain a firm though unprovocative attitude. A Cabinet committee on Germany, headed by Attlee, had been organized to assist Bevin in keeping the Berlin situation under review and considering means of dealing with it. It was to this committee that Bevin reported, in the afternoon of 28 June, the American decision and the American query on the basing of a group of B-29 heavy bombers in England. The committee approved the proposal to send eighty-two US fighter aircraft through the United Kingdom to their zones in Germany and also three groups of heavy bombers, one of which was to be based in the United Kingdom and the other two in the American zone in Germany.[15]

Staff talks were held in Washington, with President Truman's approval, on 30 June, against a background of growing concern over the military situation in Berlin. Fleet Admiral Leahy, General Bradley, Admiral Denfeld, General Vandenberg and Rear Admiral Glover met with the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Moore, head of the British delegation, said that his government considered the matter of remaining in Berlin as vitally important and that this battle was one which they could ill afford to lose. Leahy responded to this by saying that the President felt that it was very necessary for the Western powers to remain in Berlin. An exchange of information on the air transport capability revealed that the RAF and the US Air Force between them could deliver 2,000 tons per day at the present level of operations and that the RAF could not fly more than 750 tons. In their opposition to any attempt to fight through to Berlin on the ground, the military chiefs of both countries found themselves in agreement. Leahy pointed out in this regard that the United States, either on its own or combined with Britain, would not have sufficient strength to fight convoys through and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered this proposal impracticable. Admiral Moore revealed that orders had been issued to General Robertson to reconnoitre the British zone for additional troop locations to impress the Russians that they meant business and asked if a similar directive could be issued to General Clay. Admiral Leahy and General Bradley ruled out such a move on the ground that the Russians would recognize it as bluff since they knew that the United States had no more troops to send. The British government, reported Admiral Moore, had authorized the shooting down of any balloons that might be put up by the Russians in the air corridors to Berlin and he wanted to elicit the American view on this matter. It turned out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no evidence to suggest that the Russians would attempt to block the passage of their planes in the air corridors and the balloon problem appeared to them to be exaggerated. They thought that in the event of a Russian attempt to obstruct passage with balloons, the US government would probably wish to exchange notes with the Soviet government and thereafter the decision might or might not be to shoot them down.[16] All in all, the meeting did not add substantially to the airlift and bomber-deployment moves already in progress, but it did serve a useful purpose in apprising each side of the plans and intentions of the other. It revealed, too, that on practically every military measure under consideration to hold the Western position in Berlin, the attitude of

15. Cabinet Committee of Ministers on Germany, minutes of meeting held on 28 June 1948, copy in *FO* 371/70498/C5136.

16. Memorandum for the record: 'US Chiefs of Staff meeting with representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, held on Wednesday afternoon, 30 June 1948, by Rear Admiral C. D. Glover, Leahy File, Folder No. 33, Record Group (RG) 218, National Archives, Washington DC; and Kenneth W. Condit, *The history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. II: 1947–1949* (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1976), pp. 136–7, RG 218.

the US Joint Chiefs of Staff was more cautious and more circumspect than that of their British counterparts.

With the guns remaining silent, the politicians moved to the centre of the stage to wage the war of words and nerves which was steadily gaining momentum. In a sustained political offensive to boost morale on their side and to demoralize their opponents, leading Western politicians publicly affirmed their common resolution not to budge. On 30 June a defiant Bevin announced to a packed and cheering House of Commons the British government's decision to maintain its position in Berlin and to place all its resources at the disposal of the common effort to supply the city. 'We recognize', he said, 'that as a result of these decisions a grave situation might arise. Should such a situation arise, we shall ask the House to face it. His Majesty's Government and the Western allies can see no alternative between that and surrender, and none of us can accept surrender.'[17] His Majesty's Opposition pledged its fullest support. Drawing back was unthinkable, proclaimed Sir Anthony Eden in a robust speech, for the effect of doing that on Britain's authority and that of the Western allies in Europe would be catastrophic. 'If ever there was a time to stand firm,' he declared, 'it is now: if ever there was a cause in which to stand firm it is this.'[18] In Washington, on the very same day, and in response to persistent British prodding, Marshall issued a firm declaration of his government's intention to remain in Berlin.

Atomic diplomacy

Identical protest notes were delivered by the three Western powers to the Soviet government on 6 July, although neither the British nor the Americans held out much hope of a satisfactory Soviet reply. Bevin impressed on the Americans that they should be in no hurry to negotiate, but should instead indicate their position by taking military measures such as stepping up the airlift and deploying the B-29 bombers in England. The character of the Soviet reply did nothing to lessen the importance he attached to sending the bombers across the Atlantic and he reiterated his government's willingness, indeed eagerness, to receive them.[19] Throughout the world the B-29s were known as the 'atomic bombers', and their transfer to bases in Britain would have brought them within striking distance of Moscow. The decision to proceed with the dispatch of the B-29s was taken by the National Security Council on 15 July and constituted one of the most significant decisions of the entire crisis. Among the reasons for this decision was the desire to give the US Air Force experience in this kind of operation and also to accustom the British to accommodating American forces. Once the planes were sent, it was calculated that they would become an accepted fixture, whereas deterioration in the situation in Europe was liable to erode the positive British attitude.[20]

That evening Washington announced that the B-29s would leave the following day for RAF bases in Britain.[21] Although the flight was officially described as a routine training mission, it was accompanied by lower-level publicity disclosure that the bombers were atomic-capable and hints that they carried nuclear warheads. The sixty bombers which came to East Anglia on this highly publicized flight from Florida and

17. *House of Commons Debates*, 30 June 1948, Vol. 452, col. 2221–34.
18. *House of Commons Debates*, Vol. 452, col. 2213–8.
19. Memorandum of Conversation, by Under Secretary of State Lovett, 14 July 1948, in *FRUS, 1948*, Vol. II, pp. 965–6.
20. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal diaries* (New York, Viking, 1951), p. 457.

Kansas belonged to the US Strategic Air Command, which had, in 1946, been given delivery responsibility for nuclear weapons. Their arrival led to the establishment of the first US Strategic Air Command base in Great Britain. A comment in a Soviet publication, repeatedly quoted by Churchill, that 'the British Isles had now become an aircraft carrier' increased public awareness that Britain had put itself at the forefront of Western defence.[22] But the Cabinet remained firm and unwavering. Even its most fiery left-winger, Aneurin Bevan, had favoured the boldest retort, once the Soviet challenge had been delivered. Believing that no risk of war was involved, he had argued powerfully in Cabinet in favour of sending a force by land, covered by tanks, as the swiftest way of ending the crisis.[23] When the airlift was chosen instead, the Cabinet was determined to make it a success and agreed to the stationing of the B-29s on British territory without any formalities, conditions or reservations.

This forward deployment of American air power signalled to the Russians that an attempt to seize West Berlin might provoke bomber raids into the Soviet Union. The hitherto implicit threat of nuclear retaliation as an alternative open to the allies in the event of a Russian attack was now made more conspicuous, if not explicit. Moreover, while the deployment of the bombers first in Germany and then in England was conceived as a temporary crisis measure, the crisis itself provided an opportunity for extending the 'atomic perimeter' around the borders of the USSR. The ramifications of the decision, therefore, extended far beyond the particular crisis which occasioned it.

It was not known at the time whether the B-29s despatched to Britain did actually carry any atomic bombs and this uncertainty spawned a good deal of speculation. Airpower rattling was a familiar cold war phenomenon in the form of B-29 flights over various European cities as part of air shows or courtesy visits and the stationing of B-29s in Germany, some of which had flown into and out of West Berlin before the blockade.[24] These B-29s, however, were not capable of delivering atomic bombs. Those which could were not deployed outside the continental United States. The despatch of the two groups of B-29s to Britain in mid-July 1948 was regarded as a momentous event in the history of the cold war because it was generally assumed, by contemporary observers as well as later historians, that these were of the modified type and hence constituted the forward movement of an American nuclear striking force. The only question which puzzled historians was whether these nuclear-capable bombers actually carried atomic weapons in their bomb bays or not. Recently, however, it was casually disclosed by official British and American historians that no atomic bombs accompanied the B-29s and, what is much more surprising, that the bombers themselves were not of the type which could deliver atomic bombs. B-29s of the modified type did not arrive in Britain until the summer of 1949.[25] There was thus an element of bluff in the improvised Anglo–American resort to nuclear diplomacy at the height of the Berlin crisis. But it was a move that probably exercised the desired deterrent effect, to judge by the fact that the Russians did not adopt stronger measures such as interference in the air corridors.

21. *New York Times*, 16 June 1948.

22. Andrew J. Pierre, *Nuclear politics the British experience with an independent strategic force, 1939–1970* (London, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 79

23. Michael Foot, *Aneurin Bevan: a biography, Vol. II, 1945–1960* (London, Davis Poynter, 1973), pp. 229–30. See also D. C. Watt, *Britain looks to Germany: British opinion and policy towards Germany since 1945* (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965), pp. 63–7.

24. George H. Quester, *Nuclear diplomacy: the first twenty-five years* (New York, Dunellen, 1970), pp. 49–50.

25 Margaret Gowing, *Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy, 1945–1952* (London: Macmillan, 1974), Vol. I, p. 311; and Condit, *The history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 139.

At another crucial meeting of the National Security Council, on 22 July, it was decided to eschew a ground convoy and rely on an expanded airlift and a direct approach to Stalin to deal with the unresolved problem posed by the blockade. Charles Bohlen, who was sent to coordinate the approach to Stalin with the British and the French, noted on the part of these allies a growing fear that hasty American action would precipitate a war. His efforts to persuade them that their fears had no basis in fact were not entirely successful. At one meeting Bevin said to Bohlen, only half-jokingly: 'I know all you Americans want a war, but I am not going to let you have it.'[26] Bevin agreed only reluctantly and grudgingly to a personal appeal to Stalin, after arguing that this method had not proved helpful in the past and that it would build up the Soviet ruler's prestige throughout Europe.[27]

The Soviet leaders behaved during the Moscow talks in very much the same way as they had done over Iran in 1945. Stalin would put on an air of congeniality and appear to accept a reasonable basis for agreement while Molotov would whittle down the apparent concessions in subsequent discussion of detail and put forward new and impossible demands.[28] Change in the Berlin currency, ostensibly the reason for the transport restrictions, was the carrot with which the Western envoys tried to tempt the Soviet leaders to lift restrictions. But the Soviet leaders were unwilling to give away their bird in hand, Berlin, for what they regarded as birds in the bush, namely, the principle of a currency change and the prospect of four-power talks on Germany as a whole. Frank Roberts, Bevin's Private Secretary who served as the British representative at the Moscow talks, was forcibly reminded, by Molotov's repeated arguments that until quadripartite control was re-established in Germany as a whole, it was a waste of time to talk about re-establishing quadripartite control in Berlin, of the important Leninist thesis that it is essential to decide the general question first, before one can discuss aspects of it, however important such particular aspects may be. Roberts's line of argument was that by improving the situation in Berlin, they would be paving the way for fruitful discussions on Germany as a whole. This argument, he was forced to recognize, had no appeal to the Russians and 'they would certainly not be moved by it to give up their Berlin pound of flesh'.[29]

Starting from the same premise, General Robertson reached very different conclusions. As the diplomatic discussions were faltering, he confidentially reiterated his opinion that it was not possible to keep Berlin supplied by air through the winter. His conclusion was that if they could find a half-way house, it would be better to accept it rather than admit the breakdown of diplomacy. He was ready to settle for a *modus vivendi* in Berlin which would keep the allied position there in equilibrium pending four-power discussions on Germany.[30] So pessimistic was Robertson's appraisal that Bevin did not simply disagree with it, but ordered that it should not be circulated within the Foreign Office. Evidently he thought that the Military Governor's report showed signs of defeatism and appeasement and he feared that these would spread to other British officials and to the public. 'Much more than Berlin will be at stake,' Robertson was told, 'and I think the Secretary of State will be prepared to contemplate serious and even extraordinary measures within our power in order to

26. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to history, 1929–1969* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p. 174.
27. Record of Meeting held in the Foreign Office, 26 July 1948, *FO* 371/70505/C6250; and Douglas to Marshall, 26 July 1948, in *FRUS, 1948, Vol. II*, pp. 986–8.
28. Roberts to Foreign Office, 8 Aug. 1948, *FO* 371/70506/C6441.
29. Roberts to Strang, personal and confidential, 10 Aug. 1948, *FO* 371/70508/C6725.
30. Robertson to Foreign Office, 10 Aug. 1948, *FO* 371/70506/C6531.

win the day.'[31] Robertson understood that his review of their strength in Berlin was not well received but he felt unable to alter it and pointed out that it had been discussed and agreed by his senior staff. 'I am convinced that in the course of time the Soviets will steal the city from under our noses,' he predicted.[32]

Although he expected the Moscow negotiations to break down, Bevin was determined that the allies should not in any circumstances surrender Berlin. As he told Douglas, he would rather hang on to the bitter end and be driven out if necessary than voluntarily give way. The next two months, before the onset of winter, he said, would be vital and the challenge was to build up the stocks in Berlin substantially by raising the daily delivery to between 7,000 and 8,000 tons. Such a step might save the world, he continued. They should not trouble too much about the cost because the steps which he proposed could not possibly cost a sum equal to a day's war. The Soviet Union's intention had long been, he reminded the American Ambassador, to make the whole of Germany a satellite of the Soviet Union. Because it had failed in that objective, it was the more anxious to turn the Eastern Zone into a Soviet satellite. To frustrate this second objective, it was essential that the Western allies should hold out in Berlin.[33]

The failure of the diplomats to make any progress round the conference table towards a settlement of the Berlin dispute led the Western military planners to concentrate their attention on possible military courses of action. This time it was the American Joint Chiefs of Staff who took the initiative in trying to develop preliminary plans for an allied convoy to supply Berlin. The British Chiefs of Staff, however, replied on 27 August that they were still of the opinion that any attempt to force armed convoys into Berlin would be militarily unsound and politically undesirable. They were also convinced that, whatever conditions might prevail in the future, the fundamental impracticality of the proposal would remain unaltered. They could not, therefore, agree to the initiation of joint plans.[34]

Another subject of inter-allied consultations concerned the nuts and bolts of nuclear deterrence, and here the British were surprisingly forthcoming and supportive. Douglas raised with Bevin 'on a personal basis' the question of the B-29s that were already in East Anglia. He said that the arrangements with the RAF for the first ninety days appeared reasonable. He was, however, very anxious that there should be no difficulties about cost, for example, in accommodating them after the ninety days, since this might lead Congress to raise awkward questions when appropriations were being considered. Bevin promised to keep a very watchful eye on the matter. He did not know what the latest developments were, but undertook to make enquiries.[35]

It is curious, not to say disconcerting, to observe that such complex and sensitive questions, with such far-reaching implications, could be handled 'on a personal basis' between sovereign states, however close and intimate. Some of the questions arising out of the basing of the B-29s are still a matter of burning public interest and vigorous public debate today. In 1948, the Labour government provided the facilities which could be used for the launching of nuclear weapons from British soil, without asking questions, imposing conditions or even requiring that it should be consulted

31. Foreign Office to Robertson, 12 Aug. 1948, *FO* 371/70506/C6531.

32. Robertson to Strang, 11 Aug. 1948, *FO* 371/70508/C6670.

33. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks (Washington), 11 Aug. 1948, *FO* 371/70507/C6611/3/G.

34. Memorandum by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, 27 Aug. 1948, Plans and Operations 381, RG 319, National Archives, Washington DC.

35. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks (Washington), 12 Aug. 1948, *FO* 371/70507/C6625/3/G.

in the event of a decision to use them. To avoid a public debate, a member of parliament who questioned the arrival of the B-29s was told that they were here on a temporary mission of 'goodwill and training'. Even within the Cabinet no serious discussion appears to have taken place, with the result that the facilities were not made subject to a formal agreement between the two governments until 1952. It could hardly have been out of naiveté that Bevin failed to go into the details of his extraordinary offer to turn Britain into a staging post for a possible nuclear attack against the Soviet Union at the height of the cold war. The more likely explanation is that he realized the implications all too well and actively solicited a permanent American military presence in the United Kingdom as a concrete token of American commitment to the defence of Western Europe. Such an attitude was entirely consistent, after all, with his broader strategy of erecting a global balance of power in which America would underwrite the recovery and security of Western Europe and provide an effective counterweight to Soviet power—the strategy, in Canning's phrase, of calling in the New World to redress the balance of the Old.

If the Americans chose to exploit the Berlin emergency in order to extend their atomic perimeter, and there is ample evidence to suggest that this was their intention, Bevin saw no reason to complain. At the time, the American stockpile of nuclear weapons, consisting of less than fifty bombs, some of which were later discovered to be unusable, was itself in a state of considerable disarray. Actual delivery of these unwieldy A-bombs would have taken the best part of a month, since both the unassembled bombs and the aircraft capable of delivering them would first have had to be moved from the United States to bases in England, Okinawa or North Africa.[36]

As war began to loom ominously on the horizon, following the failure of the talks held by the four Military Governors in Berlin, Secretary of Defense Forrestal began to press Truman hard to make the decision to use the A-bomb in time of war. The question was brought up at a meeting in the White House on 13 September of raising with the British government the possibility of constructing huts for housing the components of the bomb on two British airfields (Scunthorpe and Lakenheath), which would mean a net gain of ten days in the event of a decision to use the bomb in an emergency. 'The importance of this decision to us', wrote Forrestal in his private diary, 'is that it will indicate whether or not the British mean business because the equipment of these fields obviously carried with it the inference of the purpose for which they will be used.'[37]

Forrestal—who was to commit suicide while undergoing psychiatric treatment only three weeks after leaving office in March 1949—was obsessed with the fear that Western public opinion might not sanction the use of the A-bomb against the Soviet Union in the event of war. He was particularly troubled by the thought that a war-weary Britain might lack the necessary nerve and resolution in a crisis of the supreme magnitude. For his peace of mind he needed constant reassurance that the British public and their government would support the use of the bomb against their estranged wartime ally in the East. To judge by his diary notes, Forrestal received satisfactory reassurances on this score which helped to put his mind at ease. Winston Churchill, forthright as ever, told him that the United States erred in underrating the

36. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 288–93; Samuel F. Wells, Jr, 'America in the "mad" world', *The Wilson Quarterly*, Autumn 1977, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 60–1, and David MacIssac, 'The Air Force and strategic thought, 1945–1951'. Working Paper No. 8, International Security Studies Program, The Wilson Center, Washington DC, 1979

37. *James V. Forrestal diaries*, 13, 16 Sept 1948 (Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey).

destructive power of the weapon, and that this could only lend dangerous encouragement to the Russians. Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, told Forrestal in the course of an official visit to Washington that 'Britain is placing her main reliance on the development of fighter aircraft to ensure the security of Britain. Britain must be regarded as the main base for the deployment of American power and the chief offensive against Russia must be in the air.' When Forrestal himself visited London in mid-November, Prime Minister Attlee told him that 'there is no division in the British public about the use of the atomic bomb—they were all for its use. Even the Church in recent days had publicly taken this position.'[38]

For Bevin the atomic bomb, under American trusteeship, offered the main counterbalance to the ever-present threat of Soviet military power during the cold war. The invitation to transfer the B-29 bombers to Britain was made, and the Truman administration accepted it before its operational plans for waging war were completed and in advance of formulating a coherent strategy of deterrence. Caught unprepared by a crisis for which its conventional forces on the spot were pitifully inadequate, the administration was forced to improvise by bringing its nuclear monopoly into the overall military picture, and the bombers-to-Britain move was the result. Neither Bevin nor the American leaders expected the move to coerce the Russians into calling off the blockade. Not coercion but deterrence was the vaguely conceived objective of the move: deterring the Russians from escalating in response to the airlift. The allies did not operate with a clear conceptualization of either deterrence strategy or coercive diplomacy. Their notions on the use of force and threats of force as instruments of diplomacy were as yet undeveloped and opaque.

While the juggling around of the B-29s may well have had a salutary effect in discouraging Soviet brinkmanship in the air corridors to Berlin and in inhibiting the exploitation of the overwhelming superiority of Soviet ground forces in Germany, it was the airlift that ultimately defeated the blockade and won the day for the West. With the diplomatic deadlock unbroken but accompanied by a marked decline in the perceived probability of war, the Berlin crisis turned, in the last few months of 1949, into a test of resolution and capabilities within fairly stable ground rules. While this test was in progress, Bevin used his formidable authority to counter any weakening or backsliding on the British and the European side. Above all, he was convinced that they must stay the course and resist every temptation to embark on the slippery slope of appeasement. As he pointed out to his Cabinet colleagues, since 1945 it had been repeatedly shown that any concessions to the Soviet Union would be exploited to the detriment of the Western powers and unless they maintained a firm stand in Berlin, their position in Europe would be hopeless.[39] Yielding to Soviet pressure in Berlin, he underlined in an obvious reference to Munich, would lead to further withdrawals and in the end to war. On the other hand, if they maintained a firm attitude, they might reckon on ten years of peace during which the defences of Western Europe might be consolidated.[40]

Berlin, Germany and the cold war

The test of resolution did not end until May 1949, but it ended as Bevin had hoped: the Russians recognized that they could not drive the Western allies out of Berlin and they agreed to lift the year-old blockade round the former German capital. Berlin had

38. Millis, *The Forrestal diaries*, pp 489–91.
39. Cabinet Minutes (48) 61st Conclusions, Minute 3, 22 Sept. 1948.
40. Cabinet Minutes, (48) 54th Conclusions, Minute 5, 26 July 1948.

been successfully defended despite the precariousness of the Western position there; war had been averted; the airlift had not only been an outstanding technical achievement but a great morale booster for the people of Western Europe. Western unity emerged from the ordeal considerably enhanced and preparations for the establishment of NATO received a great push forward. Most importantly, the Western powers had not sacrificed their long-term plans for Germany for the sake of what could only be temporary relief of Soviet pressure in Berlin. Their plans to make a West German state part of the emergent Western alliance, and to revive the economy of that state within the framework of the European Recovery Programme, had proceeded vigorously and uninterruptedly in the teeth of all Soviet threats and blandishments. The fact that this meant a divided Germany did not unduly disturb Bevin. For, as his biographer observed, 'Bevin preferred a West Germany bound in to the rest of Western Europe to a united Germany which might fall under communist domination or would at least be free to play off West against East. The Berlin experience, however, confirmed his view that there would be no recovery in Europe until confidence that neither a Russian occupation nor a war was inevitable was restored.'[41]

Whether the outcome of this critical cold war confrontation would have been very different had Britain not been so steadfast and had it not been for the toughness and resolution which Bevin brought to bear, there is, of course, no way of knowing. Nor should it be assumed without question that the division of Germany with the anomaly of a small Western enclave isolated in the midst of the Soviet-controlled half of the country was, from the Western point of view, necessarily the best possible outcome of that confrontation. It is at least arguable, as some American officials did, privately, argue at the time, that Berlin was a liability and a strategic trap and that if the division of Germany had to be accomplished in order to seal off the Western half of the country against communist penetration, it was best to take this process to its logical conclusion by quietly withdrawing from the exposed outpost on the other side of the Iron Curtain. After all it was the monumental effort made by the West to save Berlin which, more than any other factor, magnified its importance as a symbol of the cold war and of resistance to Soviet encroachment. It is just conceivable that had it not been for Bevin's insistence on standing firm, Berlin would not have assumed a symbolic value which was so disproportionate with its real importance and that the division of Germany might have assumed a simpler and more logical form. The only point which is now hopefully beyond dispute, and the one underlying this article, is that Britain played a major, independent and highly significant role in the mangement of the Berlin crisis. Far from being a mere appendage to the United States, it exercised, for better or worse, considerable and in some respects decisive influence over the whole course of Western policy during this critical phase in the development of the cold war.

What is even more striking is the discovery that Britain was so much more determined to force the issue in Berlin, more resolute in facing the Soviet challenge head-on, less open to bargaining and compromise, and more willing to accept risks, including the risk of nuclear war, than was its senior partner. Far from restraining and moderating American behaviour, far from acting as the Greeks in America's Roman Empire, the British Labour government was exceedingly hawkish itself and used its influence to stiffen and harden the American posture *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. It is in this respect that the historical record is most strikingly at odds with the conventional wisdom on the role played by Britain in the cold war.

41. Alan Bullock, 'Bevin provided the basis for Western security', *The Listener*, 14 Oct. 1948.

Strategy and 'ethnic chic'

GERALD SEGAL*

Students of the strategy of nuclear weapons have been properly warned to beware of the errors of ethnocentrism.[1] But in bending over backwards to avoid this error, we may be in danger of indulging in the opposite one—'ethnic chic'. To acknowledge that other cultures have different approaches to strategy is undoubtedly important. But to become infatuated with such differences may lead some to reject our own more suitable strategy, and to ignore the important common characteristics of differing approaches to strategy.[2]

No aspect of contemporary nuclear strategy is as crucial as the concept of deterrence. At its most fundamental level, deterrence is said to be the key to preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. Thus it is all the more significant that the Soviet and Chinese definitions of deterrence differ from ours. To adapt a well-known maxim, 'if you want peace, understand deterrence'. But while the Soviet and Chinese definitions may suit their own peculiar needs, it would be poor strategy, and indeed ethnic chic, for us to adopt their mode of deterrence for our own strategy.

However, before we can judge the extent to which we might learn from Soviet and Chinese strategy, it is necessary to return to basics. How do Moscow and Beijing define deterrence? What follows can necessarily only be a preliminary survey of the topic as the 'answer' lies embedded in a mass of partially hidden, confusing and changing sources of strategic doctrine. No simple answers are possible, and certainly none pithy enough to be printed on tee-shirts. In order to begin to sort out these difficulties, it will be necessary to explore the sources of Soviet and Chinese definitions of deterrence. Only then will it be possible to define in some detail the three key aspects of deterrence.

Before proceeding to the heart of the analysis, certain caveats must be offered to satisfy those who point to essential differences between the analysis of open and closed societies. It must be admitted that any assessment of Soviet and Chinese defence policy, both shrouded by secretive societies, is bound to be incomplete. The data that we take for granted in analysing the US Defense Department are largely unavailable in the Soviet case, and even more scarce when studying China. Therefore analysts must necessarily be modest in their judgements and try to construct a 'logic of the situation' based on the study of Soviet and Chinese words and practice.

The peculiar difficulties confronting the analyst of Soviet and Chinese defence policy are compounded by problems found even in the assessment of Western doctrines. It is obvious that strategy can rarely be explained by a single factor. The sources of policy are myriad, ranging from ideology to institutional politics. Single-cause explanations no more explain communist defence strategy than they do Western doctrine. Similarly, strategy obviously changes, and thus to regard any given component of strategy as immutable is to ignore the transformations that have

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1. Ken Booth, *Strategy and ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Colin Gray, 'Strategy and national style', *International Security*, Fall 1981, Vol. 6, No. 2.

2. For a supporting argument see Donald Hanson, 'Is Soviet strategic doctrine superior?' *International Security*, Winter 1982/3, Vol. 7, No. 3.

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gone before. Such alterations in doctrine result partly from strategic debates taking place at the very time that analysts may be confidently assessing the nature of present strategy. Thus it is a further important qualification to suggest that the present nature of strategic doctrine may not be universally accepted within a single state.[3] These three qualifications apply equally to Western and communist strategic policy, but when added to the already limited information available in the Soviet Union and China, should serve to undermine any *hubris* on the part of strategic analysts.

Finally, before some critics jump at the rather loose usage of such terms as 'strategy', 'doctrine' and 'policy', it must be admitted that our problems in sorting out definitions must start even at this basic semantic level. Other analysts have already pointed out the diverse uses of the word 'strategy' in the West,[4] but more importantly, others have pointed to the fact that the Soviet Union and China draw distinctions between 'military doctrine' and 'military science'.[5] The distinction is essentially that a doctrine is 'a system of views on the nature of war and waging it', where no division of opinion is apparent, and military science is a 'unified system of knowledge of the preparation for and conduct of armed conflict' where differences of opinion can be expressed. Whereas the doctrine tends to be set by the civilian leadership in the Soviet Union, military science falls largely within a military sphere.[6] In China, similar distinctions between doctrine and science seem to hold true.[7] What is most important for the purposes of this analysis is that concepts of deterrence relate to aspects of both military doctrine and military science, and since both have a tendency to change over time, so the meaning of deterrence is not static.[8]

Sources of deterrence strategy

Nuclear weapons strategy and deterrence doctrine do not spring from simple or single sources. The reason why one state develops the views it has are numerous, not to mention frequently changing. The specific type of strategy adopted appears to be related primarily to at least three types of sources: geography, ideology, and institutions.

Geography

It would be foolish to adopt Mackinder-like determinism in arguing that geographic realities set enduring features of military strategy.[9] Yet the physical and human geography of a state is relevant, in certain limited but important ways, for the determination of deterrence doctrine.

The United States For the United States, four main aspects of geography remain relevant even for nuclear weapons strategy. (1) The fact that the United States

3. For a timely warning on these problems, see Benjamin Lambeth, 'Uncertainties for the Soviet war planner', *International Security*, Winter 1982/3, Vol. 7, No. 3

4. Lawrence Freedman, *The evolution of nuclear strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1981).

5. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The armed forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1979), pp. 38–9, 68–70

6. David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the arms race* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 32–3.

7. George Tan Eng Bok, 'Chinese military doctrine' in Gerald Segal and William Tow, eds, *Chinese defence policy* (London: Macmillan, 1984).

8. On a similar distinction see Carl von Clausewitz *On war*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), book 2, ch. 3.

9. Colin Gray, *The geopolitics of the nuclear era* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977).

confronts only three contiguous states on land, with none posing important strategic threats to adjoining territory,[10] encourages a less urgent sense of threat. (2) Accordingly, the United States has laid special emphasis on sea power, as its long maritime frontiers on the Pacific and Atlantic provide avenues of access both for a potential attacker and for US expansion. (3) The naval bias is encouraged by the need to protect far-flung territory. Alaska and Hawaii are cases in point, but none is more crucial than the US perception that the defence of Western Europe is vital to American security. Deterring aggressors at these distances poses special problems, even in the nuclear age. (4) The concentration of economic power and population in several key areas makes the United States far more vulnerable to devastating nuclear war than a rural, agricultural economy would be.

The Soviet Union Geography helps determine Soviet deterrence doctrine in, again, at least four important ways. (1) As the world's largest state, the Soviet Union has a vast territory to defend, a problem exacerbated by the elongated shape of the state; so, for the paranoid concerned with the porousness of frontiers, the potential number of threats can seem vast when viewed from Moscow.[11] (2) The observation that the Soviet Union is the only state surrounded by hostile communist states points to the fact that the paranoid in Moscow would have no problem in dreaming up threatening scenarios along those vulnerable frontiers. (3) These frontiers are mostly on land, and access for potential aggressors is seen to be that much easier than for such aggressors confronted with the maritime frontiers of the United States. (4) As in the United States, Soviet population and economic centres are relatively concentrated and therefore are vulnerable to potential devastating nuclear strikes.[12] This weakness in human geography is accentuated by the fact that despite its large size, the vast majority of the Soviet population lives in the Western sector, leaving an underpopulated east open to what is perceived as a hostile China. It is true that these huge expanses provide useful places for nuclear weapons testing, but even in the vastness of these wildernesses it is no longer possible to hide missiles or troops. In sum, from the Soviet perspective, the country's geography may be a source of pride, but it encourages paranoia.

China Geography is equally if not more relevant to the determination of Chinese deterrence doctrine.[13] Once again, four aspects stand out as most relevant. (1) With the world's largest population, the Chinese are less likely to be destroyed entirely in a nuclear exchange. Despite the fact that a percentage of the population not dissimilar to that in the Soviet Union lives in cities, China can have greater confidence in some sort of post-nuclear survival. (2) The Chinese economy is less industrialized than that of either superpower. This is a source of weakness on the one hand, as it would take fewer weapons to destroy Chinese industry, but one of strength on the other, in that the Chinese economy is more rurally based and less vulnerable to nuclear strikes. (3) Despite a lengthy sea coast, marked by thousands of islands, China is primarily concerned with land threats to its security. While this continentalist bias may now be changing,[14] it has certainly been historically true that China has been most concerned

10. Canada and Mexico certainly pose no serious threat. The Soviet Union borders on Alaska, but then the border territory is less than crucial for both superpowers. Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright, eds, *American thinking about war and peace* (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester, 1978).

11. Robert Berman and John Baker, *Soviet strategic forces* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982).

12. Geoffrey Kemp, *Nuclear forces for medium powers*, Adelphi Paper, No. 106 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974).

13. Gerald Segal, 'China's nuclear posture for the 1980s', *Survival*, Jan.–Feb. 1981, Vol. 23, No. 1.

14. Bruce Swanson, *Eighth voyage of the dragon* (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1982).

with its position on land. (4) Like the Soviet Union, China perceives itself as surrounded by hostile states. Its land boundaries, the second longest after those of the Soviet Union, offer more protection than in the Soviet case. Only in the north and west does geography work against China, and then not without grounds for optimism in defence terms.[15] However, unlike the Soviet Union, China is still involved in competition with its neighbours, Taiwan and Vietnam, over irredentist claims.

In sum, China has less cause to be concerned with invasion of its territory or vulnerability to nuclear war. This is not to say that continentalist China has no fears. Indeed, it has major fears of limited threats along its coastal and land frontiers. With a relatively backward economy, it can have less confidence than the superpowers in its ability to respond flexibly to such limited threats.

Ideology

Ideology is not an instruction manual on defence policy for any state, but it is relevant as a prism through which perceptions of the external and internal reality are filtered, and often refracted. Like geography, ideology is best seen not as a rigid determinant of policy, but as one factor helping to shape the end product. In the cases of the Soviet Union and China, where ideology is ostensibly more codified than in the United States, it is especially important to assess its relevance.

The Soviet Union As has already been pointed out, the formulation of military doctrine in the Soviet Union is very much concerned with broad ideological questions. Four aspects of Soviet ideology seem most relevant to deterrence doctrine. First, there is the enduring notion that conflict between the capitalist and communist systems is inevitable. When Khrushchev said 'we will bury you', he did not necessarily mean under a heap of nuclear rubble; but he did mean, as his successors in the Kremlin continue to argue, that the struggle between opposing social systems will continue. To be sure, there have been debates in Moscow over whether this inevitable conflict would necessarily be a military one, and after Stalin the conclusion seemed to be that war need not be inevitable.[16] This optimism about the future makes it easier to cope with the necessity for deterrence in the short term. Given the optimistic belief in the perfectibility of man, it is easier to believe that although deterrence is not peace (and hence is second best) it will not have to be relied on forever.

Secondly, the avoidance of war is believed to be best achieved by preparation for war. Since the Soviet Union confronts an antagonistic force, it must defend itself with countervailing power. As Yuri Andropov said on 22 November 1982: 'Let no one expect a unilateral disarmament from us. We are not naive people. We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the West.' The Soviet Union itself must be the guarantor of its own security, and not rely on anyone else's good will.

Third is the belief that in the end the communist system must triumph and that ultimately, therefore, the Soviet Union must achieve victory, even in nuclear war. However, it now seems to be accepted in the Soviet leadership that such a victory, if achieved through nuclear war, would be Pyrrhic.[17] Hence victory is best sought by

15. Gerald Segal, *The Soviet 'threat' at China's gates*, Conflict Studies No. 143 (London. Insiture for the Study of Conflict, 1983).

16. John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, *Soviet strategy* (London. Croom Helm, 1981).

17. Robert Arnett, 'Soviet attitudes towards nuclear war: do they really think they can win?', in Baylis and Segal, eds, *Soviet strategy*.

non-military means. This conclusion is not universally accepted in the Soviet Union, and in the past has been the focus of important debate.[18]

The fourth tenet is that all wars are of the same character, whether they are nuclear or not. One Soviet source defines war as 'a socio-historical phenomenon, characteristic of the antagonistic class society. In its social essence, war is a continuation of the policy of given self-interested powers and the ruling classes within them using forcible means.'[19] The Western tendency to erect a fire-break between nuclear and conventional war is not accepted by the Soviet Union. Fighting a nuclear war will be like fighting any other war. Once the opponent attacks, the Soviet Union will fight a hard offensive war to win.

In sum, the Soviet Union has no illusions about continuing conflict in international relations. This conflict need not be military in nature, but the best way to prevent war is to prepare for it. Conflicts can only end when communism triumphs and weapons are only one possible tool in that struggle.

China In contrast to the geographical dimension, where the Chinese and Soviet cases appeared very different, on the question of ideology they have recently come to occupy relatively similar positions. The four major aspects outlined in the Soviet case above are also relevant for China. First, the view that conflict between capitalism and communism is inevitable remains unchanged in Chinese doctrine. There was a time when the Chinese were even more vociferous on this point than the Soviet Union, but since 1980 China has moved into line with the Soviet view.[20] Whereas China used to hold that world war was inevitable, it now believes it can be avoided. Conflict will continue, but, as in the Soviet view, it need no longer be of a military kind. Therefore for China, as with the Soviet Union, deterrence of war takes on new importance.

Secondly, China also shares the Soviet belief that the avoidance of war is best achieved by preparation for war. A recent Chinese statement noted that 'peace cannot be gained by prayer, and war cannot be avoided by concessions'.[21] This lesson of maintaining peace through strength was learned not only in terms of East–West confrontation, but also in terms of reliance on someone else's power for China's own security. China's bitter experience with the Sino–Soviet defence alliance was perhaps the prime motive in Beijing's search for its own nuclear capability.

In the third place, China shares the Soviet belief that communism will triumph in the end. However, China was well ahead of the Soviet Union in saying that nuclear war was not a useful instrument for obtaining this objective. China's long-held belief that nuclear weapons were 'paper tigers', and that their decisiveness was exaggerated, suggested that the triumph of communism would be achieved by more traditional and less devastating means.

Fourthly, China, like the Soviet Union, recognizes no dividing line between nuclear and conventional war: the character of war is constant, regardless of the weapons used.[22] Indeed, Beijing has been less infatuated with the novelty of nuclear weapons for far longer than the Soviet Union. There was no Chinese equivalent of Khrushchev's 'nuclear fetishism' and the Soviet Union's relative disregard of conventional power during the early 1960s.

18. Holloway, *The Soviet Union*, pp. 164–6.

19. *Dictionary of basic military terms* (US Air Force translation of the series, *Soviet Military Thought*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), p. 48.

20. Segal, 'China's nuclear posture'.

21. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (henceforth FBIS), CHI-82-206-A1-4.

22. John Wilson Lewis, 'China's military doctrine and force posture' in Thomas Fingar, ed., *China's quest for independence* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1980), p. 153. Also Jonathan Pollack, 'China as a military power' in Ankar Marwah and Jonathan Pollack, eds, *Military power and policy in Asian states* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1980).

In sum, while China and the Soviet Union have at times differed on key ideological aspects of deterrence doctrine, this is no longer the case. Both communist powers have altered components of their ideology as a result of diverse pressures, but whatever the reason, they share a common view that peace must be kept through strength and preeminently a self-reliant strength. Wars can be controlled, but the end of international conflict will only come when the social structures of states are transformed in favour of communism.

Institutions

There has recently been an academic vogue for explaining defence policy almost entirely in terms of institutional or bureaucratic politics. It is more useful, however, to see institutions as only one of several determinants in strategy. Clearly in the US context it is crucial to appreciate the role played by the different military services and the so-called military–industrial complex, but detailed analysis has shown these to be merely a few elements in a far more complicated web of competing pressures in the formulation of policy.[23]

The Soviet Union The role of institutions in the formulation of Soviet strategy can be seen as having four major implications for deterrence doctrine. First, it is clear that the military participates in the policy process and that it is not always in conflict with civilian institutions.[24] Indeed, the military, with its expertise in certain defence fields, is encouraged to take a leading role and its opinions and preferences are regarded as more weighty in areas where it has special knowledge. Thus it should not be surprising that military professionals have a strong tendency to say they can win a nuclear war. After all, like any proud professional, they are unlikely to argue that they cannot carry out tasks with which they are charged.[25]

Secondly, precisely because of this acknowledgement of its specialized role, the military tends to control the flow of information about defence issues. The control of information, especially in a closed society, provides real power over decisions. Without a fairly full and open debate about strategy such as exisrŧ (more or less) in the United States, it is not surprising that in the Soviet Union there is a bias towards meeting the demands of the military. Thus, if the military argues for the need to overinsure, it will be granted greater credence than if counter-information were freely available. Thirdly, it is even too simplistic to speak of 'the military' as if it were a single coherent decision-making body. It would be rare indeed for any single weapons system to be the clear choice of the military as an institution.[27] The weapons composition of Soviet forces is determined by competing design teams and influenced by such unpredictable factors as the success or failure of a particular group in solving intractable technical problems.[28] Thus, for example, the difficulty in deploying solid

23. See most recently Desmond Ball, *Policies and force levels* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

24. Timothy Colton, *Commissars, commanders and civilian authority* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds, *Civil–military relations in communist systems* (Boulder, Col., Westview, 1978)

25. Henry Trofimenko, *Changing attitudes toward deterreme*, ACIS Working Paper No. 25 (Los Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA) p. 22, also Holloway, *The Soviet Union*.

26. Arthur Alexander, *Decision making in Soviet weapons procurement*, Adelphi Paper No. 147–8 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1978–9)

27. Berman and Baker, *Soviet strategic forces*.

28. Berman and Baker, *Soviet strategic forces*; Thomas Wolfe, *The military dimension in the making of Soviet foreign and defense policy* (Santa Monica Rand, 1978); Matthew Gallagher and Karl Spielman Jr, *Soviet decision making for defense* (New York: Praeger, 1972); Edward Warner, *The military in contemporary Soviet politics* (New York: Praeger, 1977).

fuel missiles had more to do with problems in guidance technology than with a clear-cut choice of policy, whether by one institution or by the civilian leadership.

Fourthly, the Soviet economic system as a whole is less geared to innovation than its Western counterparts.[29] The Soviet Union consequently tends to pursue incremental change in weapons, emphasizing follow-on systems, and rarely goes in for dramatic new leaps in technology. It is therefore not surprising that by and large the Soviet Union tends to play 'catch-up' in defence technology and has a greater fear of technological breakthrough than the Western states. Thus the emphasis on overinsurance in numbers rather than quality of weapons is encouraged by the Soviet system.

In sum, the operation of Soviet institutions related to defence has an important role in the formulation of Soviet strategy, but they do not necessarily determine any specific policy outcome. Cleavages of opinion often cut across each other resulting in ad hoc and complex decisions. While this very complexity suggests the impossibility of predicting future doctrine, it also suggests the importance of appreciating the major role of defence agencies and their civilian counterparts.

China Far less is known about the operation of Chinese institutions in the formation of Chinese defence policy.[30] Nevertheless, three aspects of the role of institutions stand out as most pertinent. In the first place, and as in the Soviet Union, the military is not a single coherent institution.[31] Especially when it comes to foreign policy questions, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as with various other groups in Chinese politics, tends to be divided. The resulting debates are no more surprising than they are in the Soviet Union, where cross-cutting cleavages complicate the decision-making process. Secondly, and in part because of these complex cleavages, the PLA has little clear role in the formulation of foreign policy strategy. While it may participate in decisions as does the Red Army in the Soviet Union, Chinese foreign policy choices are more clearly identified as political and not requiring a predominant role for military expertise. This trend seems especially strong in the realm of nuclear weapons strategy, where military involvement is far less direct than in the Soviet Union.[32] China has no institution resembling the powerful Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. The Second Artillery in China might fulfil some of the same roles, but it is far more dominated by civilian public security and scientific experts. The Second Artillery also seems to be far more tied to central foreign policy making and might in some respects be seen as a short cut, obviating the need for large spending on conventional forces. Neither does there appear to be anything like the powerful Soviet design teams and the military–industrial pressure groups involved in determining Chinese strategic forces.[33]

Thirdly, this greater political control in China is made possible in large part by the relatively backward nature of the Chinese defence economy and its strategic forces.

29. Alexander, *Decision making*; Holloway, *The Soviet Union*; David Holloway, *Technology, management and the Soviet military establishment*, Adelphi Paper No 76 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971); Karl Spielman, 'Defence industrialists in the USSR', *Problems of Communism*, Sept.–Oct. 1976, Vol. 25, No. 5; Hannes Adomeit and Mikhail Agursky, *The Soviet military–industrial complex and its international mechanism*, National Security Series, 1, (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for Internal Relations, 1978).

30. Harvey Nelsen, *The Chinese military system, 2nd edn* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1981); Harlan Jencks, *From muskets to missiles* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1982)

31. Gerald Segal, 'The PLA and Chinese foreign policy decision-making', *International Affairs*, Summer 1981, Vol. 57, No. 3; Gerald Segal, 'The PLA as a group' in David Goodman, ed., *Groups and politics in the PRC* (Cardiff: Cardiff University Press, forthcoming).

32. Segal, 'China's nuclear posture'; Segal, 'The PLA'.

33. Jencks, *Muskets to missiles*, ch. 6.

China's 1982 testing of an SLBM was a startling leap into the superpower technology of the 1960s; but while this may be impressive in relation to the underdeveloped nature of the Chinese economy as a whole, such clearly identifiable progress in the defence field is the more easily controlled by the civilian leadership. The evolution of China's defence technology seems therefore to be more a result of precise civilian strategy and less subject to the vagaries of institutional politics. This may well change as China modernizes, but for the present China seems fairly content to persevere with and overcome specific technological problems over a long period rather than embark on expensive and urgent experiments without a clear idea of the outcome. Thus the long-awaited development of a Chinese ICBM and SLBM with solid fuel may have meant that little progress was made for many years in Chinese nuclear forces; however, what was produced in the end was probably what the leadership wanted, and achieved no doubt at a cheaper cost.[34]

In sum, institutions seem to play a secondary role in the determination of Chinese nuclear strategy. This is due less to the complexity of the decision-making process, although that is no doubt part of the story, than to China's relative underdevelopment, as a result of which political control and relative simplicity of doctrine are more easily maintained. This state of affairs may change with trends towards modernization, but this is not necessarily so. It is possible that as a non-superpower China simply does not seek such a massive overkill capacity as possessed by the superpowers. In order to judge this problem more fully, it is time to concentrate more specifically on the nature of the Soviet and Chinese deterrence doctrines resulting from the sources of strategy outlined above.

Defining deterrence

At times there seem to be as many definitions of deterrence as there are types of nuclear weapons.[35] What the definitions share is a belief that deterrence is the prevention of an action by making clear that the costs will outweigh the benefits. It is difficult to be more specific at this stage, because it is the purpose of this paper to argue that beyond such generalities, deterrence means different things to different people and therefore can easily be misperceived.[36] A useful way of getting to the heart of these differences is to assess three key aspects of any deterrence posture. First, is deterrence to be achieved by relying on threats of punishment or by denying the enemy victory? Second, is this nuclear deterrence achieved by using a broad range of types of weapons, or will a few types suffice? Third, does it necessitate a large number of each weapon, or will a few be enough? These questions, applied to the Soviet Union, China and the United States, elicit a different combination of answers in each case. By drawing on the sources of strategy already outlined, the distinctive qualities in Soviet and Chinese doctrine should become more apparent.

Punishment or denial

The most deeply rooted bias in strategic studies literature is to conceive of deterrence

34. For recent insights into China's development process for nuclear weapons see *Xinhua* domestic service, 17 Oct. 1982 in *FBIS*, CHI-82-201-K7-12; *Zhang Aiping* on 18 Oct. 1982 in No. 202-K1, and two *Xinhua* reports of 20 and 23 Oct. in No. 207, K12–15.

35. See, for example, Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence* (London: Sage, 1977); Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in US foreign policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Robert Jervis, *Deterrence theory revisited*, ACIS Working Paper No. 14 (Los Angeles: Center for International Studies, UCLA, May 1978). The Oxford English Dictionary notes that the word was first used in the sixteenth century to mean 'prevention by fear', especially in the context of preventing criminal action.

36. Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence and misperception', *International Security*, Winter 1982/3, Vol. 7, No. 3.

as based on a threat of punishment. Western ethnocentrism in this regard has only recently been counterbalanced by those who have accurately pointed out that although at one time the Soviet Union may have had a similar view of deterrence, it now clearly has a distinct and contrasting doctrine.[37]

The Soviet Union In the Soviet perspective, deterrence is achieved by denying victory to the enemy. Despite an earlier deterrence doctrine based on 'intimidation', the Soviet Union now stresses 'dissuasion' by 'keeping out' the enemy.[38] By emphasizing the defensive component, the Soviet Union moves away from the reliance on threat for effective deterrence.[39] Deterrence by denial in essence relies on the ability to show that you can fight a nuclear war and avoid losing. This is not to say that the 'war-fighting capability' is necessarily aggressive, for it is felt that the best way to prevent war is to show that it would be fruitless. Thus, in the Soviet view, the existence of permanent peace-time alliances (NATO and the WTO) is not unusual and represents a continuation of deterrence by denial. The fact that support for these alliances requires a more integrated political and social approach to military strategy than is generally accepted in the West comes as no surprise in the Soviet Union.

Three tiers of defence measures are therefore deployed to deter by denial. At the most defensive level are such passive measures as civil defence.[40] These are intended to secure the social dimension of strategy by encouraging the people to believe that survival is possible after a nuclear war. This is in keeping with the Soviet (and Clausewitzian) notion that the cause and course of war are necessarily political and not purely military.[41] The second, more active level provides for air defence. The third level is the only one shared with the United States. It is the active deployment of weapons designed to take the offensive to the enemy by inflicting punishment. This third tier—whether in the US or the Soviet view—requires that the nuclear weapons remain invulnerable from preemptive attack and able to inflict unacceptable damage in a second strike.

Why does the Soviet Union stress deterrence by denial rather than by punishment? Three major reasons, as outlined above in the analysis of sources of strategy, can be cited. First, the geographical and historical heritage make it plain that the need to overinsure for defence is deeply felt in the Soviet Union. The country has been too often devastated by war to take a passive view of its consequences. If some defence can be offered, then attack can be better endured and survival made more likely. Secondly, Soviet ideology is fairly clear in its belief that class enemies cannot be relied

37. For an early perceptive view, see Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and defense*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). More recently, see Dennis Ross, 'Rethinking Soviet strategic policy' in Baylis and Segal, eds, *Soviet strategy*; also Booth, *Ethnocentrism*.

38. Trofimenko, *Changing attitudes*, p. 53. He also notes that the Germans emphasize intimidation while the French stress dissuasion. Clearly there is no single meaning of deterrence.

39. Ross, 'Rethinking'; see also John Erickson, 'The Soviet view of deterrence', *Survival*, Nov./Dec. 1982, Vol. 24, No. 6; also John Erickson, 'The chimera of mutual deterrence', *Strategic Review*, Spring 1978, Vol. 6, No 2. As Snyder in *Deterrence* points out, both denial and punishment deterrence are defensive and both seek to prevent war. Thus in some sense calling denial deterrence 'war-fighting' is a misnomer. Denial deterrence denies there is an advantage in a first strike, while deterrence by punishment promises punishment if struck first. Shai Feldman argues that Israel has pursued elements of denial deterrence: *Israeli nuclear deterrence* (New York. Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 28. Indeed, denial deterrence was the dominant variety before nuclear weapons. Only with the massive level of damage inherent in nuclear power did punishment fulfil the 'promise' of the 1930s air war theorists about a 'balance of terror'. George and Smoke, *Deterrence*, pp. 20–32.

40. On Soviet civil defense and its problems, see Fred Kaplan, 'The Soviet civil defense myth', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March, April 1978, Vol. 34, Nos. 3, 4. The argument on the social dimension is made by Michael Howard in *The causes of war* (London: Temple Smith, 1983) pp. 111–2.

41. Holloway, *The Soviet Union*, pp. 33–4.

upon to have the best interests of the Soviet Union at heart. Deterrence by punishment suggests that both states must leave themselves naked to the opponent's forces so as to preserve the balance. This 'mutual hostage' principle in the 'mutual assured destruction' theory is not acceptable to Soviet ideology. As leader of the communist bloc, the Soviet Union must survive any eventuality, and thus must provide for its own defence, rather than rely on the goodwill and sanity of the capitalists. What is more, Soviet ideology, which does not distinguish between the nature of conventional and nuclear war, will be more likely to carry the belief in war-fighting right up the ladder of escalation. Thirdly, the configuration of Soviet institutions provides for a prominent role for the military. Military professionals are likely to argue that they can carry out their obligations to defend the state. Unlike the civilian doctrine in the United States that nuclear weapons are not for fighting with, only for threatening punishment so as to deter, the Soviet military argues that by showing it can fight and not lose, then the enemy will be deterred. This is not necessarily to say that the war-fighting doctrine indicates a belief that victory is possible, only that loss can be avoided.[42]

In sum, the Soviet definition of deterrence is crucially different from that in the United States. Deterrence by denial provides for a war-fighting capability on three tiers. It is a strategy well suited to Soviet needs, real and imagined, but it is not necessarily appropriate for other states.

China For the Chinese, one of the most curious aspects of deterrence—the fact that you hope to obtain your objective by not fighting—is in keeping with its tradition of the indirect approach to strategy. Manipulation of images and perceptions that lie at the heart of modern deterrence was not unknown to Sun Tzu, and features prominently in Chinese military history.[43] Thus deterrence is not in itself an 'unnatural' doctrine to the Chinese.

However, the Chinese do share the Soviet belief that the simple threat of punishment is not sufficient to deter. China seems to believe that deterrence is better achieved by denial than by punishment.[44] Like the Soviet Union, China deploys three tiers of forces, for passive and active defence and for more offensive purposes. While not nearly as extensive as the Soviet programmes in any of the three categories, China does have the two defensive levels virtually absent in the United States.

The sources of this Chinese view are similar, but not identical, to those in the Soviet Union. First, there is the geographical/historical legacy of border threats. Vulnerability is most keenly felt in the north where traditional invaders were to be found; however, more recently the sense of weakness has been associated with threats from the sea, including plundering Western imperialists, Japanese militarists, and most recently the offshore threat from Taiwan with US support. Mao Zedong declared in October 1949 that the Chinese people had 'stood up' and would no longer be molested by foreigners now that the Chinese could defend themselves.

42 Robert Arnett, 'Soviet attitudes towards nuclear war', in Baylis and Segal, eds, *Soviet strategy*.

43. Samuel Griffith, trans., *Sun Tzu, the art of war*, (London. Oxford University Press, 1963)

44. Donald MacMillan, 'Civil defence in the People's Republic of China', *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 1982, No. 8; 'Liberation, army, party', 8 November 1978 in BBC/SWB/FE/5969/B11/8–9, Segal, 'China's nuclear posture' and Lewis, 'China's military doctrine' In the Chinese case there appears to be an important gap between deterrence definitions and deployment of forces. In general China only applies the term 'nuclear deterrence' when describing the doctrine of others. Deterrence in general in China means 'the power to force inaction by frightening' and deterrence in strategic policy is 'to force into a state of fear'. Implicit in these Chinese terms is the word 'contradiction', suggesting the ambiguity of deterrence. It also mirrors China's apparent uncertainty over the concept.

Secondly, as in Soviet ideology, there is no room in Chinese thought for trust of foreigners, be they capitalist or neighbouring socialists (the Soviet Union). One of the more bitter, but well-learned lessons of the Sino–Soviet split and Chinese vulnerability to US nuclear threats in the 1950s was that China had to rely on itself for defence. In addition, as in the Soviet Union, there is no distinction between nuclear and conventional war. Thus a war-fighting doctrine is all the more necessary when it is felt that any conflict is likely to escalate to the nuclear level.

Institutional factors do not add to the desire to develop an across the board war-fighting doctrine. As has already been pointed out, in China the military has no such crucial role as in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, China still seems to have adopted the deterrence by denial notion, and that suggests that pressure by the armed forces in the Soviet Union is not necessarily the main reason for the Soviet posture. Whatever the case, it does seem clear that the Soviet Union and China share at least one key aspect of deterrence, namely the emphasis on denial rather than punishment. Is this similarity carried through to the two other aspects of deterrence?

The range of deterrence

Whether deterrence is by denial or punishment, it may not necessarily require a full range of weapons to meet a spectrum of threats. For example, massive retaliation was a doctrine associated with an overly limited range of nuclear weapon types. But to what extent have the powers now settled on as wide a range of forces as that postulated in the US doctrine of Limited Strategic Options? In other words, how much is enough to deter?

The Soviet Union Deterrence by denial need not imply a full range of forces in the third, offensive tier; but though a limited range of forces may once have characterized Soviet deterrence, this is no longer the case. Like the United States, the Soviet Union now has a fully graduated range of nuclear forces.[45] On the one hand, Soviet rhetoric denying the utility or likelihood of limited nuclear war would seem to contradict the need for graduated forces. On the other hand, it is plain that the Soviet Union now has the range of forces to enable it to fight such a limited war if it so desired,[46] and for a true war-fighting capability such flexibility does seem most logical.

Despite this apparent congruence of the superpowers' range of forces, certain important differences in the specific types of nuclear weapons employed do require explanation. First, at the intercontinental level, the Soviet Union has chosen more land-based rather than sea-based forces. The choice of these heavier and more accurate ICBMs does not necessarily mean that the Soviet Union seeks nuclear weapons superiority, or that it hopes to take advantage of some 'window of opportunity'.[47] Rather, this configuration apparently results from a geographical bias towards land forces, and an institutional preference for heavier and larger forces in lieu of smaller but technologically more advanced systems. Difficulty in overcoming technological problems looms large in this respect.[48] Now that many of these problems have been solved, there are indications that Soviet forces may now be moved more out to sea, and hence make the nuclear balance at the intercontinental level somewhat more stable.

45. Berman and Baker, *Soviet strategic forces*.
46. Jack Snyder, *The Soviet strategic culture* (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand, R-2154 AF, September [illegible]
47. Gerald Segal, Edwina Moreton, Lawrence Freedman and John Baylis, *Nuclear war and nuclear [illegible]* (London: Macmillan, 1983), ch. 1.
48. Berman and Baker, *Soviet strategic forces*. Holloway, *The Soviet Union*.

At the regional level, the Soviet Union's impressive array of forces is superior to that of any other state. This bias results in large measure from acute sensitivity to the existence of a number of regional threats, from Japan and China in the east through to NATO in the west. Thus SS-20s that are mobile and can swing from European to Asian targets are most suitable. Obviously the specific nature of the weapons used for regional purposes has a great deal to do with technological and institutional pressures,[49] but there are objectively sound reasons for acute Soviet concern with this regional level of threat.

The Soviet Union relies less than NATO on tactical nuclear weapons. Once again the reasons are complex, but they are apparently mostly related to the Soviet institutional and geographical/historical bias towards massive overinsurance in land forces. With a degree of conventional force advantage in Europe, there is less need to plan for the early use of nuclear weapons to engineer a breakthrough. This also helps explain the relatively sparse deployment of tactical systems in the Far East where the Soviet advantage is even more pronounced.

There are, then, good reasons why the Soviet Union maintains a wide range of nuclear forces for deterrence. Different levels of threat require different means of deterrence. This is not to say that there can be no change in Soviet force configuration, for what is most crucial is that the weapons must be able to carry out their missions. Therefore, if Moscow feels that the SLBMs provide effective deterrence at less risk than their ICBM force, a shift of this range of forces out to sea is possible.

China China's nuclear deterrence has only recently become as wide-ranging as that of the Soviet Union, and its reasons for developing such a force are similar, but not identical. On the intercontinental level, in the last two years China has tested its first full-range ICBM and a shorter range but more adaptable SLBM force. China's relative neglect of this tier of forces was apparently due primarily to technological problems in guidance and propulsion.[50] There had been expectations of a Chinese ICBM for well over a decade, but apparently the programme did not have top priority in China. The recent advances were no doubt encouraged by a desire to have a nuclear strike potential against the United States as well as against the Soviet Union (already provided by medium-range forces) and a perception that nuclear deterrence was a cheaper defence option than massive spending on dated conventional forces.

Like the Soviet Union, China had long emphasized its deterrent capabilities at regional levels. As most threats were perceived at this level, and few technological problems were raised with weapons delivered by aircraft or medium-range missiles, the needs at this level could be most easily met. Again as with the Soviet Union, the requirements of geography and the limits of technology were the most important factors in the evolution of forces.

At the tactical weapon level, China has only recently begun to extend its capability.[51] Recent discussion in China has made it plain that, like NATO, China sees some utility in deterring Soviet conventional superiority by means of tactical nuclear weapons. Some have argued that China's no-first-use pledge would prevent such an early use of nuclear forces, but it seems more likely that a Soviet invasion would provide sufficient excuse to cross the nuclear threshold first. Whatever the

49. Berman and Baker, *Soviet strategic forces;* Holloway, *The Soviet Union.*
50. Gerald Segal, 'Nuclear forces' in Segal and Tow, eds, *Chinese defence policy.*
51. *Xinhua*, 2 Jan. 1982; *Nanfang Ribao*, 25 Jan. 1982 in JPRS *China Report*, No. 80227, p. 52. *Ningxia Ribao*, 29 June 1982 in No. 81432, pp 14–16. *Xinhua*, 20 July 1982 in *FBIS* CHI-82-141-K2-4. Also *Jiefangjun Bao*, 16 September, 1979 in JPRS, *China Report*, No. 75825, 4 June 1980, pp. 97–9.

case, China is certainly now training for tactical nuclear war, and, like the Soviet Union, has apparently come to see the need for a full range of nuclear weapons. The important difference between Soviet and Chinese forces is to be found in the third aspect of deterrence, concerning the quantity of nuclear weapons.

Massive or minimum deterrence

The range of deterrence forces can be broad without having a large quantity in each category. This third aspect of deterrence is concerned with the second part of the enduring question of how much is enough to deter. Depending on whether the need is perceived for a large or small number of weapons, a state can be said to pursue minimum or massive deterrence. Obviously no state will readily admit that it has too much weaponry and thus all would claim to pursue minimum deterrence. In the context of this analysis, minimum is used to indicate a low number which provides for little overkill. The distinction is clearly one of degree, and unavoidably subjective.

In many senses this aspect of deterrence has been the focus of most debate. When US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara declared that the destruction of 20–33 per cent of the Soviet population and 50–75 per cent of its industry constituted assured destruction, he set one definition of minimum deserrence. But clearly what constitutes a minimum depends on whether the deterrence also involves a broad range of forces and whether it is based on denial or punishment. An understanding of 'how much is enough' might also help explain whether a power seeks parity in deterrence, or superiority.

The Soviet Union The Soviet answer to how much is enough seems to be clearly on the massive rather than minimum side This tendency is evident in several levels of Soviet deterrence.[52] The two tiers of passive and active defence do not seem to be yet able to cope with their task and therefore can be expected to absorb a great deal more money. Secondly, the Soviet ICBM force is far larger and heavier than required for even the tasks of deterrence by denial. The tendency to overinsure with quantity rather than quality has already been explained as coming from a complex series of sources, involving historical, traditional, institutional and technological factors.

In the medium range of weapons there is less evident Soviet overkill as the wide variety of potential threats does seem to justify greater concern. Nevertheless, it is difficult to suggest that the fears of the paranoid should always be gratified. On the tactical level the Soviet Union has even less force, but then it has less need for such weapons than does NATO. This variety of overkill no doubt results from the complex sources including an ideology committed to a war-fighting capability and a powerful military influence in decision-making.

This litany of wasteful weapons is not meant to suggest that the Soviet Union has no desire to limit its massive deterrence force. The twin drives of economic limitations and fear of US technological superiority have encouraged both political and military leaders in the Soviet Union to seek some kind of limit on nuclear arms. But, if left unchecked by the arms control process, there is every reason to believe that in their pursuit of the Soviet definition of deterrence, their weapons inventories will grow in various categories.

China China parts company from the superpowers in that its deterrence doctrine sees no need for massive numbers of weapons. In neither the defensive tiers of its

52. For acknowledgement of high, but 'necessary' levels, see Trofimenko, *Changing attitudes*, p. 13.

denial deterrence, nor in its offensive components, does China seem to embark on massive spending. Not even in its relatively long-established medium-range nuclear weapons has China built up anything more than a minimum capability. The explanation for this minimum deterrence is in three parts.

In the first place, the ideological tenet that nuclear weapons are 'paper tigers' means that they cannot be the decisive force to defeat China. In keeping with the Maoist dictum of 'despising the enemy strategically, but taking him seriously tactically', China sees the threat of nuclear war primarily in the realm of limited war.[53] The Maoist line, still retained in contemporary China, argues that because of the nature of China's huge, rural population, the only way to defeat China is to invade, and such an operation is deterred by non-nuclear 'people's war'. Of course, China's definition of people's war has undergone several changes to take into account 'modern conditions'. Above all, contemporary Chinese strategists stress the need for pragmatism and flexibility in military policy. Thus people's war can credibly deter the general threat to China.[54] To deter limited wars, China then requires only a limited number of weapons, calculating that on lesser issues the enemy will not be prepared to put so much at risk. The wide range of possible threats of limited war requires a wide range of limited nuclear forces for deterrence.

Secondly, the human geography of China makes credible the doctrine of people's war. China's trust in people's war is not entirely misplaced, and has the virtue of making the best of the country's virtually unalterable characteristics. What is more, the relatively poor state of the Chinese economy has tended to encourage Chinese leaders to see nuclear weapons as an economy measure in defence. Thus there is less reason to go in for anything but the most minimal level of nuclear force required for deterrence. Thirdly, the fact that the PLA is less involved in the making of nuclear weapons policy than its Soviet counterpart means that the military is likely to get fewer new toys. After all, the limited war threat assessment for nuclear weapons is primarily a civilian doctrine and is in part designed to save money.

In sum, China differs from the superpowers in adopting a minimum deterrence doctrine. Some might argue that it is thus seriously vulnerable to Soviet (and other powers') threats, but such fear would be misplaced.[55] From Beijing's position, its doctrine is sensible. China is less likely to get involved in nuclear arms control, but then there is far less need for cuts in its capability. It is possible that a growing Chinese economy, and increased professionalism in a PLA more accepted as a participant in policy-making, will lead to a Chinese shift from minimum to massive deterrence. If this were to happen, it would be a great shame, for it is precisely in this distinctive minimum deterrence doctrine that China seems to have the most to teach us.

Conclusions

Deterrence doctrine may be under attack in the West, but it is alive and thriving in the East. Neither China nor the Soviet Union seems prepared to dispense with a

53. Segal, 'Nuclear forces'. This is not a notion entirely peculiar to the Chinese. Bernard Brodie in *Strategy in the missile age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 273, distinguished between basic and more limited deterrence. See also Morgan, *Deterrence*, where he distinguishes between general and specific deterrence.

54. Segal, *The Soviet 'threat' at China's gates*. See also Yang Yong in *Guangming Ribao*, 22 Jan. 1983 in BBC/SWB/FE/7252.

55. For a sardonic view of this point see Alan Neidle, 'Come on you guys over there, cut that out', *International Herald Tribune*, 10 Jan. 1983.

strategy that can claim to help secure the national defence. However, both powers have seen fit to change their doctrine; and above all they do not define deterrence in the same way. The above analysis has tried to reduce the subject to the simplest meaningful components, but no further. Deterrence is not simple.

For the Soviet Union, deterrence is based on denial, using a wide range of forces with large numbers in each category. This doctrine results from a complex interweaving of historical, geographical, ideological, institutional and technological factors. No single aspect determines the specific doctrine adopted. Given that these factors remain largely unchanged, then Soviet deterrence is unlikely to change in a great way. Some components may alter, for example fear of ICBM vulnerability may lead to the shift of ICBM deterrence out to sea in SLBMs, but that will not necessarily alter the basic components of Soviet doctrine. By and large the deterrence based on denial, a broad range of forces and massive numbers suits the specific Soviet needs. To be sure, they are wasting their money on the first two tiers of denial defence, as there is no present practical possibility of preventing the overwhelmingly devastating strikes of a nuclear attack. But what is seen as necessary in the Soviet Union need not be mimicked by the United States. Neither is it necessary to match every Soviet system so as to provide bargaining chips in arms control. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union has incentives enough of its own to enter serious arms control. Negotiations cannot be simple, nor agreements perfectly symmetrical, in large part because of the different definitions of deterrence strategy. But agreements are possible, and indeed necessary.

China sees deterrence as based on denial and a range of forces, but it rejects the need for massive numbers in each category. This distinctive doctrine also results from the particular sources of Chinese policy. As in the Soviet case, these involve a complex mix of historical, geographical, ideological, institutional and technological factors, not one of which on its own explains the resulting doctrine. Also as in the Soviet case, the Chinese doctrine accommodates a large measure of pragmatism and is fairly well suited to the perceived needs of its leaders. Greater spending is perhaps likely so as to secure China's second strike and develop its tactical forces, at least as long as there is no massive spending on conventional arms. Like the Soviet Union, China wastes money on the first two tiers of its denial defence, but the motives for such a policy remain deep-rooted and are unlikely to change. Thus there are both positive and negative lessons to be learned from an analysis of Soviet and Chinese doctrine.

Between ethnocentrism and ethnic chic

It might be best for the West to accept, as the Soviet Union and China do, that nuclear weapons themselves are not the main problem. But it is crucial that while the weapons exist—and they cannot be uninvented—they must be controlled. Control is essential because the weapons can be used, as have other weapons, in political struggles: politics, not merely weapons, is the problem. Some political process is needed to control the danger, and because of the awesome power of these weapons, we must all become Clausewitzians; not in the sense of using nuclear weapons in pursuit of political goals, but rather in accepting that the nuclear danger is due to political conflict, not technology. Clausewitzian theory remains of enduring validity also because he suggested that military policy often served politics in denying military gain to the opponent.[56] Deterrence is therefore also a Clausewitzian principle.

56. Clausewitz, *On war*, book 1, chapter 2.

The doctrine adopted to cope with this political problem in both East and West is deterrence. The fact that deterrence is defined differently in various states does not affect the fact that all accept the need for *some sort* of deterrence. In the United States, deterrence is broadly defined as by punishment, with a broad range of forces and with massive numbers in each category. Since we are asking this deterrence doctrine to help control a dangerous political world, is there anything we can do to improve on the doctrine?

It would be ethnic chic to adopt the Soviet and Chinese version of deterrence by denial. The fact that they waste their money on defence against nuclear attack does not mean that we should have parity in poor judgement. Civil defence is a cruel hoax and those who suggest that it would strengthen the social dimension of Western strategy tend to ignore the fact that social support depends in a democracy in part on credibility, and civil defence is incredible, even in the Soviet Union. Nor should we be attracted by Soviet and Chinese notions of a war-fighting capability that links conventional and nuclear forces as if there were no distinction in danger. While it would make sense to enhance the West's conventional forces, the reason for doing so would be precisely to avoid moving to early use of nuclear weapons. It is true that there would be a social cost in the higher spending this would involve, but as some have pointed out, the social dimension of strategy in a democracy requires that the people believe that their leaders are not dangerous.[57]

Where we can more or less agree with the Soviet Union and China is on the need for a range of types of weapons to deter various threats. For the United States, intercontinental weapons are needed in the strategic calculus, and medium-range weapons are needed to protect the vital European theatre. The need for tactical nuclear weapons is far more dubious. With greater NATO spending on conventional defence, tactical weapons are only needed if the Soviet Union retains them. Both sides could usefully agree to eliminate them; they only help ensure that a war would necessarily escalate to the nuclear level, and although this is accepted Soviet and Chinese doctrine, we do not have to encourage them in their dangerous thoughts. It should of course be recognized that a shift away from tactical forces by the United States and NATO does require increased spending on conventional defence.

However, some lessons can be learned from others, preeminently from the Chinese. The concept of a minimum number of forces in each category has much to commend it. Although the Chinese rationale for minimum deterrence—relative unconcern with the threat of total nuclear war—is not valid for the United States, the idea of keeping nuclear forces to a minimum is useful. Not only could costs of weapons be cut, but above all the level of danger can be reduced. Wars tend to result from a breakdown in stability or a bellicose belief in the utility of force rather than an absolute growth in numbers of weapons. Essentially, all that is required for deterrence is a force of secure and credible second strike weapons threatening devastating punishment to an aggressor. A broad range of weapons, some of great accuracy to deter certain limited war threats, could be based mostly at sea to reduce problems of vulnerability. By keeping the numbers of each type down to a minimum, no threat of a theoretical first strike against the Soviet Union could be imagined. Then reductions in the size of the Soviet force might follow. Deterrence by punishment, across a broad range with minimum numbers, therefore seems most logical for the United States. While this deterrence would not be nuclear peace, it would be the best way of avoiding nuclear war.

57. Howard, *Causes of war*, pp. 111–2.

Irish neutrality: ideology or pragmatism?

RAYMOND JAMES RAYMOND*

The ghostly spectre of Irish neutrality reappeared in the early 1980s to haunt Irish policy-makers with renewed vigour. Unlike most ghosts, this political poltergeist has consistently refused to dissolve into the void. In 1981, the Irish parliament was treated to the spectacle of two bitterly divisive debates on neutrality.[1] The first arose because of two sentences in the official communiqué issued after the Anglo–Irish summit of December 1980, which declared that the 'coming year would be given to special considerations of the totality of relationships within these islands. For this purpose they have commissioned joint studies covering a range of issues including security measures.' These key words aroused suspicions in Dublin that the then Irish Prime Minister, Charles Haughey, was willing to barter Ireland's neutrality in return for a British initiative in Northern Ireland.[2] The second was occasioned by the confirmation of Professor James Dooge as Dr Garret Fitzgerald's Foreign Minister in the latter's first coalition government, an appointment which had become involved with the question of Ireland's attitude towards extending the scope of European Political Cooperation to include defence.

These confusing and often contradictory debates raised the question whether any consistent set of principles has governed Irish attitudes towards neutrality. The prevailing confusion was compounded throughout 1982 by a series of unprecedented public statements by former Irish army officers which advocated abandoning neutrality and joining NATO. What was surprising here was not the sentiment (the Irish army has never been an advocate of neutrality), but its public expression. The Irish armed services have always taken their obligations under the Official Secrets Act very seriously. It was, therefore, especially surprising that retired senior officers should publicly criticize the government's established policy. As Trevor Salmon has recently argued, the main question is whether Irish neutrality is 'permanent' or 'ad hoc'; ideological or pragmatic.[3]

The neutrality issue between the wars

The concept of neutrality has always been a strong component of modern Irish Republican thinking. This strand of thought was particularly pronounced in the period from 1917 to 1922 when, as Patrick Keatinge has argued, the war of independence and Irish opposition to conscription 'all contributed to an instinctive Irish predilection for neutrality', and delimited the options open to later Irish

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1. *Dail Eireann Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 327, cols 1392, 1562.
2. The official communiqué can be found in *Ireland Today*, Dec. 1980/Jan. 1981, No. 972.
3. See Trevor Salmon's valuable article, 'Ireland: a neutral in the Community?' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, March 1982, Vol. XX, No. 3, pp. 205–27.

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leaders.[4] The neutrality issue resurfaced in the Dail in 1926 when it sparked off a vigorous debate. It was then evident that a majority of Irish legislators were deeply concerned as to whether Ireland could remain out of any future war in which Britain became involved. The implications of the Locarno Treaties in particular gave rise to a widespread desire that the government should impress upon all countries that Ireland would not automatically become a belligerent if Britain went to war.[5]

When the Irish parliament discussed the matter again in February 1927, the Imperial Conference had paradoxically marked a step towards full independence and closer defence cooperation. 'We need not blink the fact,' declared Desmond Fitzgerald, Minister for External Affairs, 'that it is quite possible that in the event of an attack on these islands our army must cooperate with the British army.'[6] Yet it was Kevin O'Higgins, the Minister for Home Affairs, who best summed up the mood of his fellow legislators when he said that he was not opposed to neutrality, and that 'it was a consummation devoutly to be wished'.[7]

In the first debate on foreign policy after Fianna Fail's entry to the Dail in autumn 1927, De Valera strongly criticized the Cosgrave government's equivocal position on neutrality. But however much De Valera believed in neutrality, he was equally determined that Ireland should never be used as a base from which any foreign power could attack the United Kingdom. Thus, as early as 1927, he had established the two principles upon which his wartime policy was to be based.

Recently, it has been suggested that by 1935 neutrality was a psychological necessity involving 'that final attribute of sovereignty' denied by the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty.[8] If this is true, it is so only in a very narrow sense. Neutrality was a necessity only for those republicans who were desperately seeking a new symbol of independence after a decade of what they saw as excessive deference to the British. Neutrality may well have been a 'psychological necessity' for these elements of Fianna Fail, but it was not so for large segments of the civil service, where the possibility of remaining neutral was not only ignored, but was often assumed not to exist. De Valera's government had inherited a large British-trained civil service whose political sympathies were anything but republican. Indeed, some of the more senior civil servants made no secret of their view that the whole independence struggle was 'a lot of nonsense'.[9] The official Irish records reveal that throughout the 1920s and 1930s the neutrality question was a bone of contention not only between the civil service and the Cabinet, but also within the bureaucracy itself where the older generation of civil servants clashed with their younger, more anglophobic colleagues.

During the 1920s the neutrality question had become inextricably bound up with the broader issue of economic and military cooperation between the Dominions in the event of war. The historian who wishes to understand the attitude of the 'permanent government' towards neutrality must begin his analysis with the ill-fated

4 My access to these records was part of the process by which the Irish Cabinet Office has been making official documents available in advance of the statutory arrangements

5 'Irish neutrality. an historical overview', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*. 1982, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 27–38.

6. Patrick Keatinge. *Ireland. a place among the nations. issues of Irish foreign policy* (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978), pp. 38, 47

7. *Dail Eireann Parliamentary Debates*, Vol 14, cols 539–550.

8. Patrick Keatinge, *The formulation of Irish foreign policy* (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1973), p. 24

9. For examples of civil service attitudes on this question, see: Memoranda for the Taoiseach, 7 Dec. 1935, Cabinet Secretariat File S 8203, State Paper Office, Dublin Castle (henceforth SPO). J. J. McElligott, Permanent Secretary of the Department of Finance, was particularly outspoken in his criticisms of Fianna Fail's policies. It was not surprising, then, that De Valera was loth to send any civil servants on missions to London. Note of conversation with Mr Dulanty, 26 Aug. 1936, *Cab* 57/527, Public Records Office, Kew, London (henceforth PRO).

interdepartmental Committee on the Supply of Essential Materials, established in September 1930.[10] The purpose of setting up the committee was to examine Ireland's potential economic contribution to any Commonwealth war effort.[11] The United Kingdom had made the original proposal at a special meeting of the Committee on Imperial Defence on 18 November 1926.[12] There, the Irish representatives—Major General Brennan, the Adjutant General, and Colonel O'Higgins, the chief staff officer—agreed in principle to the establishment of a committee similar to those already existing in the other Dominions.[13] During the spring of 1927, the Irish Defence Department examined the merits of the British proposals. On 1 July it presented the results of its deliberations to the Cabinet in a 'secret' memorandum, in which it argued that Ireland must retain the right to decide how it would act in the event of war, but that there were considerable advantages to the proposals from Ireland's point of view.[14] In this regard, the Defence Department emphasized not only the desirability of pooling the nation's resources and preparing emergency plans, but also the vital importance to the Free State of its absolute dependence on Great Britain for essential strategic commodities in time of war. The Department also emphasized that acceptance of the British recommendations would involve important policy commitments, particularly regarding Ireland's future relationship with Britain in a war crisis.[15] Although there is no record of this in the Cabinet papers, the Departments of Defence and External Affairs were authorized to send a secret dispatch to the Dominions Office on 9 August stating that the Irish government was willing to accept the proposed committee in principle.[16]

Over the next three years the Departments of Defence and External Affairs discussed the matter, but no actual measures were taken to investigate the problem or to set up the committee. The reason for this delay was the reluctance of the Department of External Affairs to tackle the thorny question of Ireland's possible neutrality which would almost inevitably have arisen with the establishment of the committee.[17]

The Irish Free State went into the 1930 Imperial Conference determined to crown a decade of struggle with a harmonious constitutional settlement,[18] and Paddy McGilligan, the Minister for External Affairs, was eager to maintain good relations with Britain. He was especially anxious that the supply committee should be set up and should hold at least one or two cosmetic meetings before the Irish delegation left for London. At McGilligan's request, on 2 September 1930 the Cabinet authorized the setting up of the supply committee, and a preliminary meeting was held at the Department of Defence on Tuesday afternoon, 11 September.[19] The meeting was little more than a charade, a face-saving gesture for the Irish delegation in London,

10. Arthur Codling to Frederick Boland, 5 Aug. 1930, S 75/9/30, Department of Finance, Dublin.

11. M. Doolin to J. J. McElligott, 29 Oct. 1938, S 75/9/30, Department of Finance, Dublin.

12. Julian Amery to T. M Healy, 30 March 1927, Cab. Sec S 5400, SPO.

13. Amery to Healy, 30 March 1927

14 Memorandum for the Cabinet, 1 July 1927, Cab. Sec. S 5400, SPO.

15. Memo. for the Cabinet, 1 July 1927.

16. Memo. for the Cabinet, 1 July 1927. The files of the Dominions Office at the PRO contained a great deal of material pertinent to the subject. Unfortunately, all of them are marked 'destroyed under statute'.

17. Arthur Codling to Frederick Boland, 5 Aug. 1930, S 75/9/30, Department of Finance, Dublin Part of this note reads. 'So far nothing has been done due to the pressure in the Department of External Affairs'. The question is, therefore, what was the pressure? The answer becomes clear in the debate between Defence and External Affairs on the British proposals. See: Cab. Sec. S 5400, SPO.

18. David Harkness, *The restless Dominion* (New York, 1970), ch. 8.

19. Minutes of the meeting, 11 September 1930, S 75/9/30, Department of Finance, Dublin.

and it was not surprising that within a few months the committee had terminated its proceedings. This did not prevent J. H. Thomas, the Dominions Secretary, from attempting to revive it, but by early 1931 it was clear even to him that the idea had been dropped in Dublin.[20]

Curiously, the demise of the supply committee coincided with the termination of yet another war-related committee, the interdepartmental committee on censorship, established on 16 December 1930.[21] After a few desultory meetings this committee had ceased to function, and it is clear that the Cosgrave government either did not envisage the remotest possibility of war, or did not wish to grapple with the difficult problem of Ireland's possible wartime relationship with Britain.

Throughout the difficult years of the Anglo-Irish economic war (1932–8), the main civil service departments fought a vigorous battle with their political masters to ease Anglo-Irish tension and foster strategic cooperation. The threat of a major European war was by now much greater, but even as late as December 1935, De Valera's senior civil servants within his own department predicated their recommendations on the assumption that Ireland would not remain neutral.[22]

Up until April 1938, Irish neutrality was merely an aspiration, not a policy. Official Irish records indicate that little or no war planning had begun, and so long as the three Irish ports of Berehaven, Cobh, and Lough Swilly were in British hands, neutrality was impossible.[23] The Anglo-Irish agreements of April 1938 thus marked a crucial point. Under the first agreement, Britain surrendered the harbouring and other naval rights which it had enjoyed under the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. This decision was crucial to De Valera's war planning, because it meant that there was a possibility that Ireland could avoid being drawn into the impending conflict. The return of the Treaty Ports did not guarantee Irish neutrality, but at least it did not preclude it.[24]

The postwar choice: NATO or not?

The complex story of the maintenance of Irish neutrality falls outside the scope of this article and need not detain us here. What is important to note is that even at the height of the war the neutrality policy did not enjoy unanimous support. While the civil service seems to have loyally implemented government policy, new evidence now indicates that the attitude of Fine Gael, the main opposition party, was lukewarm, if not hostile, to neutrality. Secret memoranda written by Cosgrave and Richard Mulcahy, former Minister for Defence, between December 1940 and March 1941, demonstrate an ambivalent attitude towards neutrality and a clear willingness to abandon it for an alliance with Great Britain if the terms were right.[25] Dr T. F. O'Higgins, later the Minister for Defence in the inter-party government of John A. Costello between 1948 and 1951, developed this line of reasoning on 3 March 1941. He wrote:

20. J. H. Thomas to Minister for External Affairs, 12 Feb. 1931, Cab. Sec. S 5400, SPO.

21. Private Secretary, Minister of Defence, to Private Secretary, President of the Executive Council, 22 Oct 1935, Cab. Sec. S 5400, SPO. For the Minutes of the Censorship Committee, see. Cab. Sec. S 8202, SPO.

22. As note 9.

23. This is discussed in two of my forthcoming books: *Prelude to neutrality. the Anglo-Irish talks 1938*, ch. 1, and *The economics of neutrality: the United States, Great Britain, and the genesis of economic planning in Ireland 1935–1945*, chs 1–3.

24. For a comprehensive analysis of the 1938 negotiations, see my *Prelude to neutrality* (forthcoming).

25. These memoranda can be found in the recently opened papers of Patrick McGilligan, University College, Dublin Archives, P 35/C/185.

> Ireland's needs are *overseas supplies* so as to avert economic distress and general unemployment, together with *adequate equipment* for the defence of our island and its people.
>
> In return for the above I would lend or lease harbours and aerodromes on the south and west subject to an American guarantee of their evacuation on the termination of the war—such facilities are necessary for the protection of Irish supplies and Ireland's share of Britain's supplies.
>
> Such a bargain would not necessarily mean a declaration of war by us, nor strictly speaking would it entitle Germany to make war on us. Neutral America has a defensive alliance with belligerent Canada and is Britain's source of supply but is not yet involved as a belligerent. It is probable that Germany would, however, break off diplomatic relations with us and perhaps send some bombers. It cannot however be denied that she will do that any time she finds it expedient to do so, no matter what our policy may be. Strict neutrality has not saved any European country lying in Germany's path and the severity of the bombing was limited only by that country's defences.[26]

James Dillon, deputy leader of Fine Gael, even attacked neutrality in public and was expelled from his party in 1943.

In the immediate postwar era, Ireland's foreign policy objectives were fourfold. The ending of partition was clearly preeminent, closely followed by Ireland's need to restore favourable economic relations with the United Kingdom. The third objective was the restoration of friendly relations with the United States, and the fourth and final was membership of the United Nations.

The achievement of these four objectives was extraordinarily difficult. For one thing, Ireland's relations with the United States and Great Britain were very strained. The main source of the difficulty was the bipartisan determination of Irish leaders to secure American assistance to make the partition of Ireland an international issue, and the equally firm resolve of the State Department and the Foreign Office not to allow this to happen. Ireland wanted to preserve its neutrality, end partition, and be admitted to the United Nations. The United States and Great Britain wanted military (or at least political) cooperation as part of their cold war grand strategy. Neither side got what it wanted.

At a deeper level, Irish foreign policy was beleaguered by conflicting impulses and contradictory premises. On the one hand, the 'successful' defence of neutrality during the Second World War had made the idea of permanent neutrality particularly attractive. On the other hand was a strong desire to reenter the mainstream of European diplomatic life, to abandon the isolation of wartime and to reassert the statesmanlike role which Ireland had played at the League of Nations in the 1930s.[27] This dilemma was rooted in a deeper conflict between ideology and reality; in the inevitable clash between the visionary claims of Irish republicanism and the complex realities of the new global balance of power.

In international affairs, where there is a confusion of thought and feeling or a divorce between convictions and reality, any statesman is confronted with a dilemma. He can act according to his beliefs, with potentially disastrous effects, or merely

26. Papers of Patrick McGilligan.

27. Patrick Keatinge, 'Ireland and the League of Nations', *Studies*, 1970, Vol. 59; C. A. W. Manning, *The policies of the British Dominions in the League of Nations* (London, 1932); William Moore, 'Dominions of the British Commonwealth in the League of Nations', *International Affairs*, May 1931, Vol. 10, pp. 372–91; and Stephen A. Barcroft, 'The international civil servant: the League of Nations career of Sean Lester, 1929–1946', unpublished PhD dissertation, Trinity College, Dublin, 1973.

publicize them, which is often enough to antagonize those countries with whom he conducts his diplomatic business. The other, more difficult, approach is to try to adapt to circumstances. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, successive Irish governments seemed unable or unwilling to come to grips with this problem. As a result, Irish foreign policy in the early cold war era seemed to lurch from pragmatism to dogmatism and back again. Only the threat of Soviet aggression brought any unity of thought; but as the Soviet threat increased, so too did Irish concern with the Anglo–American response.

Increasingly, between 1947 and 1949 Anglo–American objectives and methods were the subject of intense scrutiny by the Irish Department of External Affairs, which made a distinction between the spiritual and material side of the cold war.[28] Ireland feared the sinister methods of the Soviet Union, but was also suspicious of Anglo–American aspirations, and did not want to become embroiled in a confrontation between these conflicting concepts of society. Ireland tended to regard the East–West clash as one between two rival economic systems which, from the Irish point of view, were both materialistic and hence undesirable. Irish diplomats were often heard to say that the only real result of the Second World War was to leave Europe at the mercy of Soviet despotism or the charity of American capitalism.[29] They accordingly believed that it was the role of small nations such as Ireland to cooperate in preventing the struggle against communism from becoming a mere tool of Anglo–American purposes. The Irish seem to have believed that they had a special Christian mission in the world which did not require that they acknowledge the 'high' moral claims of the Western powers. Nevertheless, Ireland remained militantly anti-Soviet, not only because of the strength of the Roman Catholic Church, but also as a result of the traditional conservatism of the Irish civil service to whom communism was anathema. Ireland regarded itself as a leading antagonist of Marxism and welcomed any move which would weaken the Soviet system; it might, therefore, have been expected to throw in her lot with the Western alliance without any equivocation. But in the first and only postwar test of the neutrality policy, on 7 January 1949, Ireland refused America's invitation to join NATO.

'The reason why Ireland is not participating with the signatories to the Treaty . . . is Partition', announced the Irish Department of External Affairs.[30] Doubtless partition was one consideration in the Irish government's decision, but it was not the main reason why Ireland refused to join the Atlantic alliance. This is not to imply that Ireland's refusal to adhere to the alliance can be attributed to any concept of permanent neutrality; quite the contrary. Rather, it is to suggest that political expediency, along with financial and strategic considerations, kept Ireland out of the North Atlantic Pact. The use of partition as a reason was merely in legitimation of a policy dictated by political expediency. To understand this, we have to examine the composition of the inter-party government, the relationships among its constituent parties, and the way in which Eamon De Valera outmanoeuvred them all.

De Valera's government fell in February 1948, largely on economic issues.[31] In the

28 Memorandum by Vinton Chapin, 7 Oct. 1948, Record Group (henceforth RG) 84, Box 702, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland (henceforth WNRC); Garrett to Secretary of State, 27 June 1949, Box 703, WNRC, and confidential official source.

29. Confidential official source

30 Texts concerning Ireland's position in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty (Dublin, 1950), P. No. 9934, presented to both Houses of the Irish Parliament by the Minister for External Affairs on 26 April 1950 See also *Dail Eireann Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 327, cols 1392, 1562

31. See John Murphy, 'Put them out' parties and elections 1948–1969', in J. J. Lee, ed., *Ireland 1945–1970*

wake of his electoral defeat, however, the ex-Prime Minister embarked on a tour of the United States, Australia, and Great Britain to put 'an anti-partition girdle' round the earth. This anti-partition campaign did little to help Irish reunification, but a great deal to define the foreign policy options of the newly formed inter-party government. As Conor Cruise O'Brien has written, 'There was now an anti-Partition wave; De Valera was on the crest, while the Coalition was in the trough. By immediately placing the greatest possible emphasis on Partition as a burning question, he made it far more difficult for the new government to edge towards a Western alignment or Alliance.'[32]

The government now facing the decision whether or not to join NATO was a loosely-knit coalition composed of the conservative Fine Gael, with thirty-one seats in the Dail; the equally conservative Farmers' party, Clann na Talmhan, with four seats; the Irish Labour party with nineteen; and Sean McBride's republican socialist party, Clann na Poblachta, with ten.[33] McBride's party had fought the 1948 election on a programme which advocated economic planning, the provision of comprehensive health and social security measures, the ending of partition, and the severing of the link with sterling.[34] Fine Gael was the dominant party, but it was dependent on the smaller parties, particularly McBride's Clann na Poblachta, for a majority in parliament. Unlike the Labour party, which showed little interest in foreign policy, Clann na Poblachta and Clann na Talmhan were in positive disagreement with Fine Gael's foreign policy positions.[35] This fact and the consequent precariousness of the parliamentary majority deprived the inter-party government of the confidence necessary to pursue statesmanlike policies which might leave it vulnerable to attack from the opposition Fianna Fail party. Much of its programme was directed not so much towards the national interest, but towards depriving Fianna Fail of issues which could be used as a basis for a vote of confidence.[36]

The most serious issue was partition, for all partners in the coalition knew that if they had to fight an election against De Valera on an international issue involving partition and neutrality, they would undoubtedly lose, for as a result of his 'successful' conduct of neutrality, De Valera's judgment on international affairs was widely respected. Moreover, popular perceptions of the coalition's effectiveness and credibility appear to have rested primarily on the direction and results of its foreign policy.[37] The inter-party government had little confidence in its ability to survive a sustained attack by De Valera on major foreign policy issues.[38] It therefore tried to protect itself by taking the initiative in proposing to repeal the External Relations

(Dublin, 1979), pp. 1-14; Tom Garvin, 'Continuity and change in Irish electoral politics, 1923-1969', *Economic and Social Review*, April 1972, III, pp. 350-63.

32 'Ireland in international affairs', in Owen Dudley Edwards, ed., *Conor Cruise O'Brien introduces Ireland* (London, 1968), pp. 126–7.

33. See Martin McGovern, 'Clann na Poblachta', unpublished MA thesis, University College, Dublin, 1980; Maurice Manning, 'Clann na Poblachta', in his *Irish political parties* (Dublin, 1972), pp. 101–6, Michael McInerny, 'Irish politics', unpublished MSS in possession of Brian Farrell, Department of Ethics and Politics, University College, Dublin, ch. 5. (I am grateful to Mr Farrell for access to this material.)

34. Sean McBride's draft report to the National Executive of Clann na Poblachta, 10 Feb. 1951, McBride papers, in possession of Brian Farrell, Sean McBride, 'Clann na Poblachta Economic Policy', *The Clann*, 14 Dec. 1947, National Library of Ireland.

35. British observers were particularly quick to notice this trend. See Neil Pritchard to Norman Archer, 7 March 1949, Dominions Office Records, *DO* 130/99, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to Philip Noel-Baker, 19 May 1949, *DO* 130/99; Laithwaite to Commonwealth Relations Office, 10 Feb. 1949, copy on *FO* 371 79225, PRO.

36. As note 35; see also: Garrett to Secretary of State, 4 March 1949, RG 84, Box 703, WNRC.

37. Garrett to Secretary of State, 4 March 1949, RG 84, Box 703, WNRC.

38. Laithwaite to Noel-Baker, 19 May 1949, *DO* 130/99, PRO.

Act which had been passed by De Valera at the height of the 1936 abdication crisis, and which had created an ambiguous relationship between Britain and Ireland under which the British King was authorized to appoint Irish diplomatic and consular representatives on the advice of the Irish government. The result of the coalition's initiative was disastrous. Not only did the government appear to be breaking its election pledges, but the Prime Minister's reputation for political integrity was also called in question.[39] This proposal to repeal the act elicited a predictable northern loyalist demand for a British guarantee of their constitutional status. During the Dail debates on the repeal of the act, the inter-party government committed itself to ending partition as the next step. The months that followed were marked by the setting up of an all-party anti-partition committee and the collection of subscriptions designed to influence the 1948 elections in Northern Ireland.[40]

During the summer and autumn of 1948, as De Valera toured the United States and Australia, members of the inter-party government repeatedly expressed confidence that the end of partition was nearer than it had ever been, thus increasingly committing itself on the issue. When in November 1948 the British government began to take legislative notice of the guarantee to Ulster, the loosely-knit Irish government had no choice but to go at least as far as De Valera in their protests against the British guarantee and to associate itself with his attitude in the fullest and most emphatic way, regardless of the consequences. Any attempt to take a more moderate line, to damp down public feelings, to deal with the issue on its merits, or to attempt to understand the considerations which the British government had to take into account, would have exposed the coalition to the charge of being less patriotic than Fianna Fail. The consequent increase in prestige to De Valera might well have led to the disintegration of Costello's fragile coalition.[41]

Viewed in the proper perspective, the decision on whether or not to join NATO was but another episode of statesmanship yielding to political opportunism. For Sean McBride, the energetic Irish Foreign Minister, the NATO decision was a particularly difficult one.[42] He had played a prominent role in the OEEC and was a leading advocate of European integration.[43] There is also some evidence that McBride favoured Irish military cooperation with the Western alliance.[44] But De Valera's anti-partition campaign put McBride in a very difficult position. As leader of a republican party, he could hardly be less insistent than De Valera on the problems of

39. Laithwaite to Noel-Baker, 19 May 1949.

40. *Dail Eireann Parliamentary Debates*, Vol CXIII, cols 347–724, 24–6 Nov. 1948, and Vol. CXIV, cols 323–6, 23 Feb. 1949.

41. The coalition already had a very disunited Cabinet with each minister simply carrying out his departmental duties. Author's interview with Noel Browne, Dublin, 18 Jan. 1978. There was also considerable division within the government over foreign policy right from the very beginning. See McBride to J. H. Whyte, 21 Jan. 1969, Sean McBride papers, MSS in possession of Brian Farrell, Department of Ethics and Politics, University College, Dublin. See also 'Note of Report to the National Executive of Clann na Poblachta,' by McBride, 10 Feb. 1951, McBride papers (Farrell).

42. For one thing, McBride was intensely pro-American; transcript of RTE interview of McBride by Pronsias McAonghusa, 15 March 1972, McBride papers (Farrell); for evidence of McBride's favourable orientation towards the Atlantic Pact, see memorandum of conversation between McBride and Dean Acheson, 11 April 1949, RG 84, Box 703, WNRC, Department of State Intelligence Memorandum No. 111, Office of Intelligence Research, 3 August 1948, RG 84, Box 703, WNRC; Central Intelligence Agency Report SR-48, biography of McBride, p. 38, Harry S. Truman papers, President Secretary's File, Intelligence File, HSTL

43. Author's interview with Sean McBride, 30 June 1978; Department of the Taoiseach S 14106J contains extensive memoranda and correspondence by McBride on European integration.

44. Memorandum of conversation between McBride and Acheson, 13 March 1951, Dean Acheson papers, Box 66, HSTL; memorandum of Garrett/McBride conversations, 17 May 1949, RG 84, Box 703, WNRC; CIA Report SR-48, McBride biography, p. 38, Harry S. Truman papers, President Secretary's File, Intelligence File, HSTL.

partition. Moreover, as McBride later acknowledged in confidential talks on 17 May 1949 with his friend George Garrett, the United States Ambassador, the inter-party government had been looking for an issue on which to bolster its sagging fortunes.[45] During these talks McBride gleefully reminded Garrett of the opposition cries of 'hear, hear' when he made it known in parliament that Ireland would not join the Pact. Never since the government came to power had the opposition supported him as they did on this issue.[46] In addition, McBride and his fellow ministers were equally aware that the focussing of all energies on the partition question was a useful smokescreen against critics of delays in the implementation of the government's social services programme or its inability to pursue imaginative schemes of economic development.

But what the inter-party government very quickly found out was that its decision against NATO membership in fact proved unpopular with significant elements of Irish society, including the Roman Catholic Church, the military, and the intellectual community, and with a substantial body of backbench opinion on both sides of the aisle.[47] The government was forced to legitimize its decision, and in such a nationalistic country as Ireland, it was politically necessary to argue that the decision was taken solely because of partition. De Valera's long political experience and great astuteness had enabled him without much effort to manoeuvre the inter-party government into a position in which it took the politically unpopular and diplomatically embarrassing decision against NATO membership.

Official Irish records indicate that there were a number of other considerations which might have precluded Irish membership of NATO even if partition had not been in existence.[48] The first of these was economic. Membership of NATO would inevitably have involved a complete reversal in the level and pattern of public expenditure. It would have involved additional military expenditure of the order of Ir £14–20 million in order to bring Irish defence spending into line with that of other member countries of the alliance. Clearly, this figure was unacceptable to the inter-party government which had come into power on a programme of economic and social development, implicitly at the expense of the military. Moreover, given the fact that the inter-party government had recently cut the defence budget by an unprecedented three-quarters of a million pounds in the 1948 financial year, it was inconceivable that it would now reverse policy and increase defence expenditure.[49]

The financial burden of NATO membership would also have been politically divisive. Sean McBride had brought Clann na Poblachta into the coalition only after he had received written assurances that social and economic development would be the government's highest priorities.[50] The financial burden of NATO membership—

45. Memorandum of Garrett/McBride conversations, 17 May 1949, RG 84, Box 703, WNRC.

46. Garrett/McBride conversations, 17 May 1949.

47. See Survey of Irish opinion on NATO incorporated in Vinton Chapin's (First Secretary at the Dublin Legation) perceptive memorandum of 7 October 1948, RG 84, Box 702, WNRC. On Catholic opposition to the government's decision, see: Garrett to Truman, 10 July 1950, OF 218, HSTL; for further coverage of the discontent, see Garrett to Secretary of State, 8 April 1949, RG 84, Box 703, WNRC. See also: editorials in the *Irish Times*, 24 and 29 January 1949 and 24 March 1949; article by its military correspondent, 9 April 1949; articles by Professor James Hogan, University College, Cork, *Sunday Independent*, 6 March 1949; and Brigadier Dorman O'Gowan, *Irish Times*, 19 February 1951.

48. Confidential official source; Garrett to Secretary of State, 24 May 1949, RG 84, Box 703, WNRC.

49. This reorientation of the patterns and level of public expenditure towards economic and social development was fundamental to McBride's decision to join the inter-party government. See Sean McBride to J. H. Whyte, 21 Jan. 1969, Sean McBride papers, in possession of Brian Farrell, University College, Dublin. (I am grateful to Mr Farrell for access to this material.)

50. As note 49.

although it would probably be offset by some American military aid—would have destroyed the precarious unity of the inter-party government.

In addition to the financial burden of NATO membership, there was also the loss of independence in foreign policy. In Ireland, unilateralism had always been the corollary of neutrality, and with the growing harmonization of NATO member countries' foreign policies, Irish officials feared the loss of independence.[51] For a nation which had struggled so long for independence, and to whom neutrality was almost a religious symbol, it was inconceivable that any government should surrender one iota of its independence in foreign policy.

Finally, there was a strong fear that membership of NATO would inevitably involve the installation of NATO bases in Ireland and that their presence would make Ireland a more likely target for Soviet air attack. The Department of External Affairs conceded that these bases would give employment and might even result in an improvement in transportation facilities. Nevertheless, the prevailing consensus within the civil service was that the danger outweighed the advantages.

The above discussion makes it clear, therefore, that even if partition had not existed, Ireland might not have joined the Atlantic alliance. It is impossible to speculate whether the arguments advanced by the Department of External Affairs would have outweighed any political or strategic considerations, but it seems safe to conclude that they did constitute an important obstacle to NATO membership. These arguments were clearly significant in 1949. But by November 1959, when the Irish government began considering the strategic implications of membership of the European Economic Community, official Irish records indicate that these residual considerations had lessened in importance. There is also clear evidence of a new internationalism and a pronounced willingness to reassess old assumptions. Indeed, an examination of the advice being submitted by the Department of External Affairs leaves one in no doubt that in 1961, if NATO membership had been a prerequisite for EEC membership, Prime Minister Lemass and his officials would have swallowed hard and abandoned neutrality.

Conclusions

Observers of contemporary Irish foreign policy should not be surprised or puzzled by Ireland's equivocal attitude towards neutrality. Recent declarations on neutrality are perfectly consistent with the past. Irish neutrality has always been ad hoc; Ireland's claim to be a 'traditional' neutral is an extremely dubious one. In recent years all that has happened is that the doubts and uncertainties which have always existed have not come to the surface. Official British and Irish records demonstrate that the neutrality policy was hastily cobbled together in 1938–9 and was almost abandoned in 1949. Moreover, the historical record also indicates that there was considerable opposition to neutrality within both the civil service and the Cabinet, and that political expediency, not partition, was the primary determinant of Irish decision-making. Given this historical background, and the degree to which Ireland is now drifting towards support for some kind of European defence community, the troubled spectre of Irish neutrality may soon be exorcised forever. Whether Dr Garret Fitzgerald, now Irish Prime Minister, is willing to play the role of exorcist must remain an open question.

51. Confidential official source.

Security in the Third World: the worm about to turn?

Mohammed Ayoob*

In the literature on international relations, the term 'security' has traditionally been defined to mean immunity (to varying degrees) of a state or nation to threats emanating from outside its boundaries. In the words of Walter Lippmann, 'a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by such victory in such a war'.[1] According to Arnold Wolfers, Lippmann's definition 'implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. This is in accord with the common usage of the term.'[2] Expanding on the concept of security as protection of core values, in the context of small Third World states, Talukder Maniruzzaman has stated that: 'By security we mean the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation: political independence and territorial integrity.'[3] This position is one that we can readily identify as the *realist* position in the Western and Western-influenced literature on international relations.

However, some authors have differed significantly from this exclusively state-centric realist perspective. They have viewed the problem of security from the perspective of the international system and have focussed on what has, of late, come to be called *international* security. By adopting this system-centred perspective they have tried to mitigate some of the more Hobbesian characteristics of the realist position. They have taken their cue from views such as those expressed by Martin Wight, who had argued that 'if there is an international society, then there is an order of some kind to be maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of a collective interest, and security acquires a broad meaning: it can be enjoyed or pursued in common. Foreign policy will take some account of the common interest. It becomes possible to transfer to international politics some of the categories of constitutionalism.'[4]

Proponents of the system-oriented approaches to security have taken the society of states ('anarchical' though it may be, to use Hedley Bull's phrase)[5] as a relevant object of security. They have argued that the security of the parts of the system is inextricably intertwined with that of the whole. Indeed, the earliest of modern systemic analysts of security—the idealists of the inter-war period—refused to distinguish the security of the parts from that of the whole system. The post-Second World War breed of system-centred scholars has been more discriminating than its predecessors. These have argued from the assumption that the various segments of the international system are so far interlinked that they are 'interdependent'.[6] While

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1. Walter Lippmann, *US foreign policy: shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), p. 51.
2. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord & collaboration: essays on international politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150
3. Talukder Maniruzzaman, *The security of small states in the Third World*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 25 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1982), p. 15.
4. Martin Wight, 'Western values in international relations' in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, *Diplomatic investigations* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 103.
5. Hedley Bull, *The anarchical society* (London: Macmillan, 1977).
6. For example, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

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much of the initial impetus for this line of argument came from the economic problems facing the Western industrialized states from the early 1970s onwards, the increasingly awesome concentration of weaponry (particularly nuclear weaponry) in the hands of the two superpowers gave further strength to the 'interdependence' argument by overlaying it with such emotion-charged slogans as 'cooperation or extinction', thus making the physical as well as the economic security of the international system the object of this intellectual exercise.

However, what is most interesting for our purpose is the fact that all these contending schools of thought tended to define the concept of 'security' in external or outward-directed terms—that is, external to the commonly accepted unit of analysis in international relations: the state. This definition and the process by which it was reached were both understandable and ethnocentric in character. They were understandable because they were the products of a particular intellectual tradition which faithfully reflected a particular process of historical and political development which could be traced back at least to the Peace of Westphalia if not to an earlier period. Moreover, between 1648 and 1945 the natural development of the 'system of states' symbolized by, if not established at, Westphalia, and its interaction with the domestic political processess of the major European powers, led to the legitimation both of the system and of the individual participants therein. These two trends—of interaction among sovereign states on the one hand and greater identification of individuals with their respective states on the other, the latter helped along tremendously by the increasing correspondence between national and state boundaries and by the increasingly representative character of the governments concerned—therefore strengthened each other and in doing so firmly laid the foundations of the intellectual tradition in which, at least in terms of political analysis, the security of individuals and of groups came to be totally subsumed within the category of state security. Therefore, while there has been much debate about the compatibility or incompatibility of state security and the security of the international system and on the measures that could be taken to reconcile the two demands, the security of units below the level of the state has rarely, if ever, been an important point at issue in Western discussions and analyses of the concept of security.

Developments since 1945 have strengthened these Western notions of what security is all about. In dividing the Western world into two halves and in stabilizing that division by means of a mutual balance of terror, the cold war (and its latter-day manifestation, detente) has frozen the predominant Western connotation of 'security' in a bi-polar mould. The concept of 'alliance security'—whether of the Atlantic alliance or of the Warsaw Treaty Organization—has therefore been superimposed on the concept of national or state security, while its essential externally-directed thrust remains unchanged. Moreover, by making the security of the major Western states, whether capitalist or socialist, the central concern of the security of the international system as a whole (by the mutual assured destruction doctrine and because the security of their European allies is considered by both the United States and the Soviet Union as indispensable to their own security) the dominant strand in Western strategic thinking has increasingly obliterated even the distinction between the 'realist' (state-centric) and 'idealist' (system-centric) approaches to the study of international security, indeed to the study of international relations as a whole.[7]

7. The coincidence of the two approaches is probably best reflected in Leonard Beaton, *The reform of power: a proposal for an international security system* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972).

Third World 'insecurity': the worm within

To turn to the Third World, however, is to find a different situation altogether.[8] The three major characteristics of the concept of state or national security in Western states—namely, its external orientation, its strong linkage with systemic security and its binding ties with the security of the two major alliance blocs—are, in the Third World, if not totally absent, so thoroughly diluted as to be hardly recognizable. The primary aim of this paper is to analyse how and why they are radically different in the context of the Third World and what are the implications for the international system as a whole that follow from these differences.

To take the first and, in one sense, the fundamental attribute of the Western concept of security (in that it is a corollary of the doctrine of state sovereignty in its pure and pristine form), namely, external directedness, one can immediately see that, despite the rhetoric of many Third World leaders, the sense of insecurity from which these states—and, more particularly, their regimes—suffer, emanates to a substantial extent from within their boundaries rather than from outside. This does not mean that external threats are totally absent, for they are not. But the 'mix' of internal and external sources of threat to these state structures, and particularly to their regimes, is quite often heavily weighted in favour of internal sources. Moreover, external threats quite often augment the problems of insecurity that exist within state boundaries and, in many cases, would be quite ineffective if internal threats and domestic fissures did not exist within Third World societies. Any perceptive observer of the South Asian scene in 1970–1 would have realized that the Indian 'threat' to Pakistan was very secondary to that posed by East Bengali nationalists; also that the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 would either not have been fought, or, if fought, would have had a very different outcome if the bulk of the East Bengali population had not been disenchanted with the then existing structure of the Pakistani state.[9] Similarly, Iran's ideological and political 'threat' to Iraq after the Islamic revolution of 1979, which led Saddam Hussein to launch his invasion of Iran, would not have reached the proportions it did in the Iraqi regime's perception had the government in Baghdad been more representative of the majority of its population and had it not been as narrowly based as it is today. Its invasion of Iran was largely designed to pre-empt an anticipated popular movement against it from within—a movement that would have owed much to the exemplary success of the Iranian revolution.[10]

On occasion, a regime—and I make no distinction here between so-called 'right-wing' and 'left-wing' regimes—will 'externalize' threats directed at it, in order

8 The term 'Third World' is used in this article in a generic sense, and deliberately so. It is undoubtedly true that there are diverse elements within the Third World, it is also true that there are intramural problems, conflicts and antagonisms within it. However, these countries share enough in terms of their colonial past and their unequal encounter with the European powers following the Industrial Revolution to set them apart from the European states which have traditionally formed the 'core' of the modern system of states. They also share attributes of economic underdevelopment and social dislocation, which are at least partially attributable to their encounter with the West (and which have continued even after the formal process of decolonization has been completed). They are still inadequately linked to the issue areas which dominate the international system as it is constituted today, despite all the rhetoric that surrounds such debates as those regarding the New International Economic Order. Some of these arguments are foreshadowed in my chapter, 'Autonomy and intervention: superpowers and the Third World' in Robert O'Neill and D. M. Horner, eds, *New directions in strategic thinking* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 104–16.

9. For a systematic account of growing East Bengali disenchantment with the concept of Pakistan, see Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: failure in national integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

10 I have argued this at some length and related it to the history of state formation and the pattern of elite recruitment in both Iraq and Iran in my chapter, 'Regime security or regional security? perspectives from the Gulf' in Donald H. Macmillen, *Asian perspectives on international security* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming).

both to portray such threats as 'illegitimate' (in the sense that they emanate from abroad and violate the norm of state sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention by other states) and to portray its repressive actions—often repressive in the extreme, as any student of Latin America or Africa, or even of Syria and Iraq, would immediately recognize—as 'legitimate'. By turning a political (and quite often a social and economic) problem into a military one, and by presenting the military threat as coming from external sources, regimes in the Third World quite often try to choose an arena of confrontation with domestic dissidents that is favourable to themselves, namely, the military arena. While this strategy might work well in the initial stages of such confrontations, it usually leads to much bigger conflagrations within a decade or two of the initial, usually unorganized, outbursts of political dissent.

This characterization of the security problem as faced by the Third World states and its differences from the pattern of security issues faced by developed Western states has dealt so far only with what one may call the 'symptomatic' level of the question, the above-mentioned differences being merely the symptoms of a much deeper divergence in the respective experiences of Western and Third World states. These differences are related to two major variables: (a) the history of state formation in the Third World as compared to its counterpart in the West, and (b) the pattern of elite recruitment and regime establishment and maintenance in the Third World as compared to the same processes in the developed states. These major variables have their own corollaries which will be analysed as the discussion proceeds, but it is essentially the differences in these two broad interrelated areas between Western and Third World states—differences not so much in absolute and culture-based terms as in relative and time-based ones—that determine the differences in the primary security orientations of the two sets of states.

As a result of a centuries-old process of development, modern states in the industrialized Western world (which we will call the European world, for short, and which includes North America and Australasia) have reached a position which can be referred to as one of 'unconditional legitimacy'.[11] Moreover, not only are the prevailing state-structures in the European world legitimate, they are also strong and cohesive. In fact, the two attributes complement each other. Western states are, therefore, *strong states* (although all of them may not be strong powers they are strong in terms of their state structures). By contrast, state structures in the Third World in the present form do not enjoy 'unconditional legitimacy' and are *weak as states* (once again one must be careful to distinguish weak states from weak powers).[12] There are more reasons for this major difference in respective strengths. The first is related to the time factor. Most states in the Third World are only recent participants in the modern system of states, which is European in origin and in its defining characteristics. Until a few decades ago they were mere 'objects' rather than 'subjects' in international relations. Even after the conclusion of the decolonization process, because of the enormous time gap between the development of modern state structures in the Third World and the development of the same structures in Europe,

11 For a most valuable account of the origins and growth, both in geographical and chronological terms, of the modern system of states centred on the European states, see Martin Wight, *Systems of states* (Leicester. Leicester University Press, 1977), chs 4 and 5. Also, for different perspectives, see Joseph R. Strayer, *On the medieval origins of the modern state* (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 1970), Leonard Tivey, ed., *The nation-state: the formation of modern politics* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), and Ralph Pettman, *State and class* (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

12. For a discussion of the concepts of weak and strong states as opposed to weak and strong powers, see Barry Buzan, *People, states and fear* (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester, 1983), pp. 65–9.

their capacity to act effectively in a system which is defined primarily by its state-centric character is low. The economic gulf between the developed Western and developing Southern states, with limited and partial exceptions, adds to the latters' ineffectiveness as participants in the system. One can, therefore, even in the 1980s, speak with some justification of two types of actors in the international system: the *primary* actors (the original European members of the system and their offshoots in North America and Australasia) and the *secondary* actors (the late-comers, the bulk of the Third World).

This late development of modern state structures has meant they still lack legitimacy (in their present form) in large parts of the Third World. Defined, as they have been, primarily by boundaries drawn by the colonial powers for the sake of administrative convenience or in some form of trade-off with colonial competitors, these structures have not yet developed the capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their populations with their respective states and the regimes that preside over these post-colonial structures within colonially-dictated boundaries. It is no wonder, therefore, that internal dissent and lack of identification pose such a strong threat to the structures of Third World states.

The problem is drastically compounded when one looks at the level of consensus on fundamental social and political issues within Third World societies. Western societies reached the current high level of consensus on such issues of social and political organization after centuries of internal conflict and upheaval (the Cromwellian episode in Britain and the French Revolution are two outstanding examples). Having gone through these turmoils, and having had the luxury of doing so over centuries—a luxury no longer available to Third World states—the present high level of consensus has been attained. For, despite the (sometimes extreme) rhetoric of the various political groupings in the West, their positions on vital political and social issues vary only marginally from each other. This is why, no matter how heated the debate and how 'real' the differences among the political parties in Britain, the Tory victory in the June 1983 elections has not led to any of the opposition leaders going underground to launch a campaign of subversion and insurgency against the 'Thatcher regime'. However, with certain limited exceptions (maverick Third World states like India for example, and one is not sure for how long they will continue to be exceptions) this is a norm that does not prevail in the Third World. Since fundamental issues of political, social and economic organization are involved in political contests they become, literally, life and death issues for the contestants. With so much at stake the ferocity of their attitudes towards one another also becomes understandable.[13] But from the point of view of the security of Third World societies this has extremely negative consequences. The divisions, both vertical and horizontal, within these societies are exacerbated and the level and intensity of internal threats to state structures (which are identified with the ruling groups) escalate. This is one of the major reasons why in most Third World societies open political contests are banned.

This brings us to another major difference between Western and Third World states. In the absence of a consensus on fundamental issues and of open political debate and contest, most of these states are ruled by regimes with narrow support bases—both politically and socially—which usually came to power by means of a *coup d'état* and which hang on so tenaciously to office that they have to be, more often than

13. Bangladesh, Biafra, Cyprus, Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala all testify to this pattern.

not, physically liquidated to pave the way for any form of political transition.[14] (Once again, there is no major difference between 'rightist' and 'leftist' regimes on this score.) Since it is these regimes, and their bureaucratic and intellectual hangers-on, who define the threats to the security of their respective states, it is no wonder that they define it primarily in terms of regime security rather than the security of the society as a whole. Security, as stated above, has traditionally been defined as the protection and preservation of core values. However, in the case of most Third World states, the core values of the regime—with self-preservation at the core of the core—are often at extreme variance with the core values cherished by large segments of the population over which they rule.[15] Once again, given these discrepancies in the definition of core values and, indeed, of security itself, it is no wonder that major threats to the security of these regimes emanate from within their own societies.

Uneven economic development, great, growing and glaring disparities in wealth and income, communal and ethnic tensions—all these factors contribute to the lack of societal consensus on fundamental issues, and to the unrepresentative and repressive character of most Third World regimes and, therefore, to the internal threats to their security and to the security of the state structures over which they preside. One cannot deny that some of these schisms exist in developed societies as well, for example, in racial tensions in the United States, denominational antagonisms in Northern Ireland, uneven economic development as between northern and southern Italy and ethno-linguistic differences in Canada. However, the scale and intensity of these fissures when measured against the overall identification of a state's population with the concept of that particular state and its unconditional acceptance of the legitimacy of the particular government in power are minimal, and certainly manageable. This is a state of affairs that does not prevail in most Third World states and therefore the proportions of the problem, in terms of scale and intensity, are different.

In addition to the sources of friction and conflict that exists within Third World states, the economic and social dimensions of nation-building have been made more difficult by the workings of an international economy (reflected in the operation of national economies in the Third World) which increases economic disparities in both absolute and relative terms between the developed and underdeveloped states and between the rich and the poor within Third World states.[16] This makes elite–mass identification within Third World countries a task virtually impossible of achievement, and correspondingly increases the alienation of large segments of society both from their ruling elites and, quite often, from the state structures over which these elites preside. This, in turn, creates a double source of insecurity for those who claim to represent states in the Third World, for both their legitimacy and the legitimacy of the state structures are open to challenge. The dimensions of the security problem, and of the concept of security itself, in the Third World are, therefore, very different from those applied to, and common in the literature of, the developed West.

The international context: war by proxy?

This, however, is not the end of the story. There is also a remarkable difference

14. Again, the examples are numerous, ranging from Iraq under the Hashemites to Nicaragua under Somoza.

15. Sometimes even the maintenance of existing state boundaries is not considered a core value by important segments of the state's population.

16. Among other sources on this subject, see the two reports published by the Brandt Commission. *North–South: a programme for survival* (1980) and *Common crisis, North–South: cooperation for world recovery* (1983), (both London, Sydney: Pan).

between the respective relationships between the security concerns of the Third World states on the one hand, and those of the developed countries on the other, to the security and stability of the international system as a whole. This has grave adverse effects on Third World states as far as the systemic inputs into their security problems are concerned. I have argued earlier that the developed states' security concerns are so firmly interlinked with those of the international system as to make them virtually indistinguishable. Any major threat to the security of a developed state immediately takes on the character of a crisis for the whole system, particularly since it has the potential to destabilize the dominant global balance of power between the two superpowers—a balance which in turn forms the underpinning of the stability and security of the international system as it is currently organized.

This is far from the case when one considers the security problems, external or internal, of Third World states. (The possible exception to this concerns some of the major oil exporters, though even in their case the linkages between their security concerns and those of the system or of the dominant powers appear to be of an ephemeral and very limited character. There is no commitment in the developed world to the security of these states *as states*: the only commitment seems to be to the security of access to their oil resources.) Even in the case of the most important and the largest countries of the Third World, the link between their security and that of the system as a whole (a link that is defined, whether one likes it or not, by the dominant powers in the system) is very fragile, if not totally non-existent.

This means that conflicts, whether internal or intra-regional, or even, sometimes, cross-regional, within and among states in the Third World are considered permissible by the dominant powers, as long as they do not threaten to draw the latter into direct confrontation with each other. The only conflict in the Third World with this sort of potential is the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly if the balance of power in the Middle East were to change dramatically to Israel's disadvantage. But this is not a typical Third World conflict, for the simple reason that Israel, in terms of its ideological origins, its pattern of colonization in Palestine, the organization of its society and polity, the composition of its elite (even under Likud), its links with strong and important European and American constituencies (both Jewish and Gentile) and the intensity of one superpower's commitment to its external security (some would argue its expansion), is a European state. Israel may be physically located *in* the Third World but it is not *of* the Third World. Therefore Israeli security is linked directly to issues of systemic security, which is not the case with any other African or Asian country.[17]

17. One could argue that Afghanistan on the one hand and South Africa on the other probably have or could have similar degrees of importance to the USSR and the United States respectively. However, the Soviet refusal to commit more than about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan despite its contiguity to the Soviet Union and the continuing insurgency is an indication that this may not be the case in this instance. Moreover, when the Soviet Union moved its troops into Afghanistan, it was sure that it was not risking a direct military confrontation with the United States. In fact, the very decision to do so signified that the conflict in Afghanistan was not directly related to the central concerns of the superpower relationship. South Africa does not threaten as yet to become an area of direct superpower confrontation. However, when the nationalist struggle in South Africa escalates to what are considered dangerous proportions, the United States may decide to incorporate its security into the US vision of systemic security. It would do this not so much because of the country's mineral resources or strategic location as because the currently dominant elite shares many characteristics with its Israeli counterpart which make both of them basically 'European' states and provide them with powerful constituencies in the Western world. It is interesting to note in this context that despite the American commitment of over 500,000 troops in South Vietnam, Saigon could be so easily abandoned. The only satisfactory explanation is related to the lack of a societal consensus in the United States regarding the security of South Vietnam and its ruling elite and the realization that, after all, what happened in Vietnam did not directly affect the superpower balance in the long term. This consensus is certainly and strongly present in the United States in Israel's case, and one suspects in South Africa's also.

Thus, while setting limits to Third World conflicts (the limits being determined by the superpowers' refusal to enter into direct confrontation over what are considered peripheral issues), the stability of the central balance not only permits local (intra-state or intra-regional) conflicts in large parts of the Third World, but may in fact even encourage the eruption of such conflicts, partially as a way of letting off steam to help cool the temperature around those core issues which are considered directly relevant and vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the international system.[18]

The fragility of political institutions and state structures in the Third World permits such encouragement, because it allows internal issues to take on international dimensions. Fragile polities are by definition easily permeable. Therefore, internal issues in Third World societies not only get transformed into inter-state issues quite readily, they also lend themselves easily to political and military intervention by the superpowers. Traditional inter-state rivalries, compounded by the complex disputes introduced as a result of colonially imposed boundaries, when added to the internal political fragilities of Third World states provide very fertile ground for superpower rivalry to be played out in the relatively 'safe' areas of the globe without the imminent threat of direct confrontation between Washington and Moscow. In the process, however, they exacerbate the problem of security—no matter whether it is defined in maximalist or in minimalist terms—for vast parts of the Third World.[19]

There are a number of secondary factors which lead the superpowers to tolerate and, quite often, encourage conflicts in the Third World; for example, these conflicts (a) keep the arms industry of the developed world in business, pay for a substantial proportion of R&D investments, and help recycle petrodollars into developed economies; (b) provide convenient testing grounds for new weapons systems which can than be improved upon in the light of combat experience; (c) provide a relatively safe instrument for testing the limits of the adversary's tolerance and a rough and ready measure of its 'will' to resist political and military encroachments; (d) provide opportunities for 'linkage' between issues, thereby allowing a superpower which finds itself in a disadvantageous position in one context to choose another point, where it is more favourably placed, to put pressure on its adversary; (e) provide the superpowers with the opportunity to demonstrate their 'credibility' to those allies (in Europe and the Pacific) which are considered vital to the superpowers' own security; and (f) provide one way of ensuring access to strategic raw materials, such as oil and minerals, which are considered essential for the security of the superpowers and their vital allies.

In the process of achieving these aims, the superpowers—and therefore the systemic variables as a whole—impinge upon the security of Third World states in a fashion extremely deleterious to those states. This is exactly the reverse of what the systemic factors achieve in the case of developed polities, when they tend to augment the security of individual states by making it virtually indivisible from the security of the whole system. In the case of Third World states, the systemic inputs add to the already destabilizing internal dynamics of Third World polities to render these states and their regimes extremely insecure. The two processes, in fact, feed upon each other to create a vicious cycle of insecurity which has become nearly impossible to break.

18. This argument has been developed in Sisir Gupta, 'Great Power relations, world order and the Third World', *Foreign Affairs Reports*, Jul./Aug. 1977, Vol. 17, Nos. 7–8.

19. For details of this argument and case studies demonstrating its validity, see Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *Conflict and intervention in the Third World* (London: Croom Helm, 1980).

The effects of weak state structures, weak domestic political institutions, lack of societal consensus, distorted economic development and lack of regime legitimacy on the one hand, and the adverse way in which systemic variables impinge on the security problems of the Third World states on the other, create an environment of insecurity and instability in which inter-state rivalries, encouraged as they are by the policies and actions of external forces, are relatively easily transformed into overt military hostilities. Inter-state tensions and conflicts in various regions of the Third World, the obverse side of the regional security coin, are different in character from inter-state conflicts in the Western world. The former are much more complex and directly related to domestic divisions within societies than is the case with the latter. Moreover, given the weak linkage between the security of Third World states and central issues of global security in the nuclear age, war as an instrument of policy, whether for domestic or external reasons, is still a realistic option for many regimes in the Third World. Again, given the stalemate in the central balance, wars by proxy (within defined limits) in the Third World appear to be a realistic option for superpower decision-makers.

A corollary of the abovementioned factors is that both superpowers have developed a vested interest in maintaining insecure regimes, which lack legitimacy and are founded on narrow social bases, in power as their clients in many parts of the Third World. However, their commitment to the maintenance of these regimes and the systems over wnich they preside is far more limited than their commitment to maintain the political systems and governments in power in what can be called their 'core' allies. Washington's commitment to Somoza or the Shah was qualitatively different from its commitment to Western Europe from the days of the Marshall Plan. Similarly, despite the expansion of Soviet capabilities in the 1970s, Moscow's commitment to Mengistu in Ethiopia or the MPLA in Angola is qualitatively different from its commitment to the ruling parties in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Afghanistan is the exception that proves the rule and its contiguity to the USSR might have made the critical difference. But even in Afghanistan, the commitment of Soviet resources is paltry as compared to what Moscow would have been willing to commit had such a situation arisen for example in Bulgaria, not to speak of East Germany. This paradox of massive political and military investment (the latter largely in the form of arms transfers and military advisers) in insecure regimes on the part of the superpowers, which nevertheless stops short of a final commitment to save them when the chips are down, adds substantially to the problems of insecurity that many Third World regimes face; for it makes these regimes more reckless, more repressive and less flexible on the mistaken notion that they would be bailed out by their superpower patrons when in dire straits.[20] Explanations of this phenomenon, pointing to the lack of superpower capability in specific situations even if the will existed, as well as to the autonomous and massive nature of the revolts against client regimes (as in Iran), while valid, do not detract from the superpowers' responsibility for creating an atmosphere and expectations that lead, in the final analysis, to increasing insecurity at the individual, regime and regional levels.

Implications of a shifting balance

Such policies on the part of the superpowers have the potential to create an even more

20. The late Shah of Iran's bitterness towards the United States after his overthrow was the result of the false assumption that it would protect him (paticularly since it had put him in power in 1953) irrespective of the massive nature of the opposition to his rule.

dangerous situation. So far, the limited success that both Washington and Moscow have achieved in winning friends and influencing regimes in the Third World through their parallel policies of investing in insecure regimes has resulted from the insulation, as argued above, of the central balance against the negative effects of Third World conflicts and proliferating insecurities. However, this insulation has been a function of the relative stability of the central strategic balance, as a result of which the relationship between the superpowers on the one hand and the Third World on the other has so far been, by and large, a one-way street, in which the superpowers, jointly or separately, have dictated the limits to which regional insecurities could or could not affect their bilateral relationship.

However, the stability of the central balance itself is largely dependent upon technological factors. For the last three decades the balance has not tilted dangerously against either one of the contestants because the technological equilibrium between the superpowers has been, by and large, maintained. The overall American advantage in technological achievement has been neutralized in the military–nuclear field by greater Soviet investment in military-related technologies at the expense of other sectors of society. One cannot, however, pretend that this situation will last for ever. Given the inherently escalatory nature of modern technology—a phenomenon we have witnessed since the Industrial Revolution—one cannot rule out serious disequilibrium in the military–technological balance in the near future. Destabilizing technological escalation may take one of two forms, and the two scenarios reflect the apprehensions of the hard-liners in Washington and Moscow respectively. Either the Soviet Union may, by a combination of increasing investment in miltary R&D (of course, at greater domestic cost) and greater political use of its conventional superiority in Europe, attain a position whereby it is able to make serious political, if not military, inroads into Western Europe; or the United States, by the sheer momentum of its overall technological lead, may reach a stage where it is not only able to counterbalance Soviet conventional superiority in Central Europe but also, and more important, effectively to neutralize the Soviet Union's strategic capability to strike at the North American continent. In both cases the stability of the central balance will be seriously compromised and all the current wisdom about nuclear deterrence would become irrelevant.

Even if the final stages of either scenario are not reached, growing evidence of a trend towards either conclusion would introduce an element of grave uncertainty into superpower calculations. In fact, in this case, as in others in international relations, the perceptions of a situation by the parties concerned are more important than the actual situation itself. It would not be wrong in this context, therefore, to note that there are increasing signs, if one looks at the recent rhetoric coming out of the White House and the Kremlin, that perceptions both in Washington and Moscow tend towards the more alarmist scenarios propounded in the United States and the Soviet Union. These alarmist perceptions, in my view, are directly linked to the uncertainties in the minds of superpower policy-makers and the relevant foreign policy elites regarding the long-term effect of technological escalation in the strategic arms race. The entire arms control exercise has been primarily related to minimizing if not eliminating these uncertainties. However, given the current state of mind prevalent in both Washington and Moscow it is apparent that these attempts at arms control and limitation have not had significant, long-term psychological effect. The failure of the US Senate to ratify SALT II and the general deterioration in Soviet–American relations since then, particularly the periodic breakdowns in

bilateral communication, have more than neutralized any benevolent effect that SALT I may have had on the psychological atmosphere surrounding superpower relations.

Given this context, one can readily imagine that in a period of equilibrium transition (which would itself be a function of perceived instability in the central balance), that is, before the superpower strategic balance stabilizes at a new and higher level of technological equilibrium, the two global powers, increasingly apprehensive of the final outcome, would suffer from something of a 'state of nerves'. This is a period which we may be entering in the second half of the 1980s, if we have not done so already. In a state of great nervous tension, superpower policy-makers (like all human beings) are bound to exaggerate out of all proportion the significance of occurrences—like conflicts and insecurities in the Third World—which in more normal circumstances they would tend to treat as routine in character. It is through the medium of these quite often distorted perceptions that Third World conflicts and insecurities could find a convenient entry point from which they might be able to affect the course of the dominant bilateral relationship.[21] This would not only give them a degree of autonomy *vis-à-vis* the superpower relationship, it could introduce complications into that central equation which, at a time of uncertainty in the strategic balance, could prove extremely dangerous. Third World insecurities, therefore, may in the next decade or less become a significant form of input into the dominant global relationship, in some ways paying the superpowers back in their own coin. The two types of instabilities (in all their political and military, but primarily psychological, manifestations) could feed upon each other, thus compounding the security problems of the global powers and the developed countries as well as the Third World. If, or rather when, this happens, one could start speaking about the convergence of Western (including Soviet) and Third World perceptions of 'security'. However, by that time we would all be living in a much more insecure world.

21. In a curious way, Henry Kissinger, by propounding his 'linkage' thesis regarding Soviet behaviour, might have paved the way for such an occurrence, for it is but a short step from applying the 'linkage' formula to Soviet policy toward specific issues/conflicts in the Third World to applying it generally to Third World conflicts, particuarly when it is assumed that the Soviet Union might have a finger in almost every Third World pie.

Intervention and security in Africa

S. N. MACFARLANE*

The last several years have witnessed a growing number of interventions in internal and regional disputes in Africa. If one begins in 1975, a partial list of such intrusions would include the 1975–6 Angolan crisis, the Shaban (Katangan) interventions in 1977 and 1978, the war in the Horn in 1977–8, the conflict in the Western Sahara from 1975 to the present, and the crisis in Chad (see Table 1 at the end of this article). The frequency of this kind of behaviour by both regional and external actors suggests that intervention is a significant issue of African regional security.

Most studies of intervention in Africa view the issue from the perspective of East–West relations or that of policy-makers in the intervening or in rival states.[1] The validity and utility for certain purposes of this approach cannot be denied, but the discussion of intervention in Africa is incomplete without attention to its impact on regional politics. This article is an enquiry into the relationship between external military interference in civil and regional disputes on the one hand and African regional security on the other. Is intervention regionally destabilizing? Does it hinder development? Does it intensify regional conflict? Is it destructive of national sovereignty?

The geographical focus of this paper is on OAU (Organization of African Unity) Africa. It would be artificial, however, to exclude the Republic of South Africa from a discussion of African security when the internal and external situations of many states in the southern part of the continent are so clearly dependent on the domestic politics and foreign policy of the Republic. Where appropriate, therefore, aspects of South African policy and behaviour are considered here.

The terms 'intervention' and 'regional security' are both rather imprecise and contentious. It is accordingly appropriate to indicate how they are being used here. For the purpose of this paper, intervention refers to coercive military involvement in civil and regional conflict, involvement which is intented to, or does, affect internal political outcomes.[2] This includes intrusions not only by actors from outside the region, but also by states and other agents within it. It may be, and has been, unilateral, as in the case of Tanzanian intervention in Uganda; multilateral, as with the joint actions of the United States, France, Morocco and Belgium in Shaba; or collective, as in the case of the recent OAU involvement in Chad. It may involve the regular forces of the intervening power or irregulars dependent upon and acting at the behest of the intervener, as is arguably the case with UNITA–South African cooperation in Angola or MRM–South African collaboration in Mozambique.

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1. See, for example, A. J. Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War: a study in Soviet foreign policy in the Third World* (Boulder, Col., Westview, 1980); G. Bender, 'Kissinger in Angola: anatomy of a failure' in R. Lemarchand, *American policy in Southern Africa: the stakes and the stances* (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), the contributions by David Hall and Colin Legum in S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of power: Soviet armed forces as a political instrument* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981); D. Yost, 'French policy in Chad' *Orbis*, 1983, No. 1, and I. Greig, *The communist challenge in Africa: an analysis of contemporary Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban policies* (London. Foreign Affairs Publishing, 1977).

2. For a useful discussion of the definition of intervention, see J. Rosenau, 'Intervention as a scientific concept', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 149–71.

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Military intervention is of course neither the only, nor necessarily the most significant, kind of external intervention in African affairs. One can speak of covert or economic intervention without doing violence to the basic sense of the term. There is every reason to believe, for example, that CIA involvement in the Congo crisis and in a number of subsequent conflicts,[3] or French investment and assistance programmes in the francophone African countries,[4] have had significant consequences for the internal politics of the target state and for regional security. But the limitation of the discussion to identifiable military action renders the concept of intervention operational in that it allows a relatively unambiguous distinction between a category of events described as interventions, and a host of other activities the intent or impact of which is to influence political outcomes within other states.

The concepts of national security and regional security are perhaps even more difficult to define with any sharpness than is that of intervention. Those who use these terms tend to employ them in such a way as to further their own interests and policy preferences. When European and American policymakers and writers in the Western strategic literature talk of African security, one suspects that what they have in mind is the security of Western interests in Africa or the importance of Africa to Western security.[5] Likewise, if Soviet writers were to use the term African security, it is probable that they would define it in terms of the expulsion of Western interests and the maintenance and expansion of positions of Soviet influence and 'socialist orientation'.[6] There does exist, however, in OAU member states, implicitly if not explicitly, an African conception of African security. This is the perspective focussed upon here.

Walter Lippman held that a state is 'secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war'.[7] Following this line of reasoning, one can define African security in terms of the ability of states within the region to pursue their core values without internal or external hindrance. It is inevitable that the enumeration of the core values of a group of states as large and diverse as OAU Africa should be somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, in specific instances it is probable that the core values of specific regional actors will be inconsistent with those of its neighbours. In this context, one could cite the Somali commitment to bring the entire Somali 'nation' into one state versus the Ethiopian and Kenyan commitments to their own territorial integrity. But it would in all likelihood be accepted by most politically aware people in the region and by a majority of regimes that a list of core values would include internal political stability and national

3. See R. Lemarchand, 'The CIA in Africa: how central? how intelligent?', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 413.

4. For an enumeration and account of these programmes, see P. Lellouche and D. Moisi, 'French policy in Africa: a lonely battle against destabilization', *International Security*, Spring 1979. See also D. G. Lavroff, *La politique africaine du General de Gaulle* (Paris, Pedone, 1980) and E. Kolodziej, *French international policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: the politics of grandeur* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1974).

5. In this context, the NSSM 39 objective of 'stabilizing Southern Africa' has been referred to as no more than a euphemism for 'continued US presence' (A. Isaacman and J. Davis, 'US policy toward Mozambique, 1946–1976' in Lemarchand, *American policy in southern Africa*, p. 35). See also S. Makinda, 'Conflict and the superpowers in the Horn of Africa', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 93, G. Bender, 'Kissinger in Angola', passim, and J. G. Liebenow, 'American policy in Africa, the Reagan years', *Current History*, Vol. 82, No. 482, pp. 97, 98, 134, 136. The latter two comment at some length on the 'globalist' focus of recent American policy-makers.

6. See D. Volsky, 'Local conflict and international security', *New Times*, 1983, No. 5, pp. 5–7 and A. Gromyko, 'Soviet foreign policy and Africa', *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1982, No. 2, pp. 30–33. See also S. Nolutshungu, 'African interests and Soviet power', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 399.

7. Walter Lippman, *US foreign policy: shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), p. 51, quoted in A. Wolfers, *Discord and collaboration* (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150.

integration, self-determination and the consolidation of external sovereignty, and economic development.[8] Such a list is not complete. One might also include the termination of apartheid in South Africa, the end of colonial rule in Namibia, and the realization of some form of closer African unity. But these last three do not seem to influence state behaviour to the same degree as the first group does. Many states in the region, for example, while subscribing to the tenets of pan-Africanism, violate its spirit when its dictates run counter to perceived national economic and political interest. Nigeria's recent expulsion of illegal aliens is a case in point. With respect to southern African issues, many black African states, while vociferously condemning South African policy on Namibia and the race question within the Republic itself, maintain wide-ranging and lucrative economic ties with South Africa. For these reasons, this discussion focusses on the first group of objectives noted above.

The usual ways in which security is pursued are threefold: the creation of military forces sufficient to deter external threats or to beat them off should deterrence fail; adherence to alliances which supplement national capabilities; and the definition of norms of interstate behaviour which diminish or remove external threats. The first two have been common in African politics. With respect to the first, for example, Ethiopia responded to the threats of Somali irredentism and Eritrean secessionism in the 1960s by building—with American assistance—one of the largest, best-trained, and best-equipped military forces in sub-Saharan Africa. The reliance of some French and British ex-colonies on military ties with the metropolitan powers is an illustration of the second. But Africa is usually considered to be exceptional in its development of the third basis of security, the definition of norms of behaviour reducing external threats from both within and outside the region.

William Zartman, in a 1967 article on the African state system, enumerated several such norms, three of which are particularly relevant here. The first was that 'intra-system solutions [were] preferable over extra-system solutions'.[9] With this went adherence to the principles of non-alignment. In a situation where no African state could hope to compete militarily with the great powers, general acceptance of this norm enhanced regional security by reducing the likelihood that these external actors would involve themselves in African conflicts.

A second was that wars of conquest were not acceptable policy alternatives. The territorial legacy of the colonial period was not to be called into question. A third, mentioned by Zartman and prominent in the OAU Charter, was the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.[10] More recent authors have also stressed the non-conflictual rule-governed character of interstate relations in Africa.[11]

One need not go far to find violations of all three of these basic norms, even in the first years after independence and the formation of the OAU. The reliance of French

8. See, for example, the speech of General Olusegun Obasanjo to the Khartoum OAU summit in summer 1978, in which he cited as the 'basic African questions' national integration, the consolidation of independence, international peace and stability, and the improvement of the material conditions of life. Reprinted in *Survival*, Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 268–9. See also I. W. Zartman, *International relations in the new Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), ch. 4, esp. pp. 149–51.

9. I. W. Zartman, 'Africa as a subordinate state system in international relations', *International Organization*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 559–61; and Zartman, *International relations in the new Africa*, p. 147, where the point is made that external violence in Africa was 'minimal'.

10. Zartman, 'Africa as a subordinate state system', p. 560.

11. See, for example, J. Stremlau, *The international politics of the Nigerian civil war* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 375, which emphasizes the non-conflictual, rule-governed character of African regional politics.

ex-colonies on support from their former rulers in dealing with internal and external threats, a reliance which included the basing of several thousand French military personnel in francophone Africa, has already been noted.[12] Moroccan pressure on Mauritania and Somali attacks on Ethiopia and support for insurgency in Kenya in the early and mid-1960s, as well as the Libyan annexation of the Aozou Strip in 1973, may be cited as examples of infringements of the second of these norms. Ghanaian support in the early 1960s of radical oppositions to moderate African regimes, Gabonese support of Biafra, and Nyerere's aid in the early 1970s to Obote in the latter's attempts to unseat Idi Amin were all violations of the third.

Nevertheless, these norms reflected, and to an extent governed, state behaviour in OAU Africa to a remarkable degree, with the result that the region was in the 1960s and early 1970s largely free from interstate conflict. The regional organization and its member states were reasonably successful in insulating disputes such as the Nigerian civil war from external military involvement,[13] in preventing disputes between member states from escalating into armed conflict[14] and in limiting and resolving those conflicts which occurred.[15] It might be argued that low levels of conflict within the region merely reflected an absence of the means to prosecute war, and, in fact, defence expenditure in OAU Africa was in the 1960s quite low when compared to other regions in the Third World. In 1968, for example, Africa accounted for only 7 per cent of developing country arms imports.[16] However, the failure to acquire the means of self-defence reflected not only the poverty of the region, but the belief that it was unnecessary. This belief was in large part based upon a general acceptance of the normative structure of regional politics, as mentioned above. In short, national elites in the region could on the whole concern themselves, as was their wont, with socialist utopianism, economic development and social welfare, or power-broking and personal enrichment, with little need to preoccupy themselves with questions of external security.

The impact of intervention: negative or positive?

Within the region, it is generally maintained that intervention has a negative impact on African security,[17] being itself a security problem rather than a solution to

12. For an account of the level and distribution of the French military presence in Africa, see Lellouche and Moisi, 'French policy in Africa', p. 109.

13. See Stremlau, *Nigerian civil war*, pp. 373–5. Stremlau rightly notes, however, that the OAU position was not the only factor favouring non-interference by extra-regional actors. He also mentions in this connection the absence of ideological cleavage between the two sides, the weakness of formal and informal ties between the belligerents and foreign governments, the international preoccupation at the time with the Middle East, and the thaw in relations between the two superpowers.

14. An example is the OAU role in reducing tensions between Mauritania and Morocco. Zartman (*International relations in the new Africa*, p. 95), for example, cites the cessation of hostile broadcasts between the two countries in the aftermath of the second OAU summit as 'a significant step in easing tensions between the two states'.

15. Zartman, *International relations in the new Africa*, pp. 88–90 with respect to the Algeria–Moroccan conflict. See also I. Wallerstein, *Africa: the politics of unity* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 73.

16. *World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1963–1973* (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975), table 4. If one omits Egypt, whose primary security preoccupation was the Middle East and not Africa, the figure would be 3·5 per cent.

17. This sentiment is obvious in the numerous OAU resolutions dealing with intervention in Africa, and in African support for UN efforts to prohibit intervention as a mode of behaviour among member states. For the OAU view, see for example the 1977 summit resolution 'On interference in the internal affairs of African states', *Africa contemporary record 1977–1978*, (New York: Africana, 1978), p. C4, and the 1978 resolution 'On military interventions in Africa and on measures to be taken against neocolonial manoeuvres and interventions in Africa', *Africa contemporary record 1978–1979*, p. C19. Nolutshungu ('African interests and Soviet power', p. 405) refers in this context to a 'reflex and often effete imperative against intervention' among African states.

problems of security. This conclusion is apparently based upon several implicit or explicit judgements with respect to the effect of external military interference on African core values: that intervention both prolongs and intensifies the conflict which provoked it, increasing the number of casualties and refugees and the level of physical destruction in the target environment; that it thereby jeopardizes economic development; that it erodes national sovereignty; and that it is politically destabilizing.

This assessment is reflected not only in attitudes towards intrusions by non-African actors, but in prevailing African opinion even in instances where the intrusion is undertaken by an African actor in pursuit of objectives which enjoy widespread sympathy in the region. The Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1979 in response to Ugandan military provocations and in order to remove a regime widely considered to be destabilizing in the regional context is a case in point. The action met widespread condemnation and received almost no support at the Monrovia OAU summit later in the year.[18]

None of the generalizations upon which this negative assessment of intervention is based stands up to close examination. Moreover, several are rejected, in specific situations where national interests or ideological commitments are at issue, by African states which otherwise subscribe heartily to the condemnation of interventionist behaviour in African affairs. The questionable character of these general assertions about the impact of intervention on African security will be demonstrated primarily with reference to recent cases involving three areas of conflict: Angola, the Horn, and Chad.

The argument concerning intervention and the intensity and duration of conflict runs along the following lines. In principle, the introduction of well-equipped units of an external power increases the quantity of firepower deployed and often alters the quality of the conflict through the deployment of technologically more sophisticated systems. Moreover, such intrusions can draw a conflict out, in that it is often when a local actor is close to exhaustion that he appeals for more considerable external support. Finally, intervention may bring counterintervention in support of other parties to the conflict. The cycle of intervention, counterintervention, and escalation in the Angolan conflict is well known, and it is quite plausible that the result was a far higher intensity of conflict than would otherwise have obtained. In Chad (1978–82), Libyan intervention and the consequent competitive involvement of Sudan, Egypt, and, indirectly, the United States in support of Hissène Habré, significantly enhanced the military capabilities of local actors and widened the scope of the conflict.

But there are also cases in which intervention at a level sufficient to determine the outcome of a conflict terminated hostilities or drastically reduced their scale far earlier than would otherwise have been the case. In such instances, it might well be asked whether a short, relatively intense conflict was not preferable, in terms of total numbers of military and civilian casualties and displaced persons and of the degree of disruption of national life, to a prolonged conflict at a lower level.

In Angola, for instance, there is good reason to believe that once the Alvor Accords collapsed in early 1975, conflict between the three liberation movements and the

18. For an account of the Monrovia debate on Uganda, see C. Legum and Z. Cervenka, 'The OAU', in *Africa contemporary record 1979–1980*, pp. A61–A62. It should be noted, however, that the hostility towards Tanzania evident in the debate stemmed also from solidarity with Amin among Muslim leaders and from pressure exerted on non-Muslim leaders by Muslim elements in their national elites (see in this context General Obasanjo's criticism of the Tanzanian action despite the prior Nigerian approval of the invasion).

ethnic groups supporting each one would have dragged on more or less indefinitely. In the Horn, Soviet and Cuban assistance to the Ethiopians brought the 1977–8 Somali–Ethiopian conflict to an end far earlier than was likely to have been the case in the absence of this intervention. Soviet bloc logistical support, technical advice, and weapons supply also enabled the Ethiopians to contain the Eritrean insurgency at a much lower level than would otherwise have obtained. Generalization about the relation between intervention and the intensity and duration of conflict is, therefore, suspect.

The argument concerning the effects on economic development derives from that concerning the intensity and duration of conflict. The more intense a civil war is, the greater the disruption of agricultural, commerical, and industrial activity. But if the assumption concerning the relationship between external participation and the intensity and duration of conflict is questionable, so too is its implication concerning the effect of intervention on economic activity.

In specific instances, the effects of intervention on economic activity can cut either way. In Angola, for example, the South African incursion in late 1975 resulted in the mining of most roads in southern Angola and in the destruction of almost every bridge in that part of the country. Current South African support of UNITA allows that group to attack the Benguela railroad with impunity, depriving the Angolans of a vital transport artery and an important source of foreign exchange, the railroad in better times serving as a major conduit for Zaïrean and Zambian copper. South African attacks on Kassinga, ostensibly directed at SWAPO camps in the area, have prevented the reopening of the iron ore mines there, with the result that Angola, once a major African producer of iron ore, now produces and exports none.

On the other hand, Gulf's oil production facilities in Cabinda survived the 1975–6 war and subsequent unrest because they were protected by Cuban troops. French and Moroccan intervention in Mauritania in 1977–8 in response to Polisario guerrilla activity in all likelihood prevented serious and prolonged disruption of iron ore production at Zouerate, the export of which is Mauritania's major source of foreign exchange.[19] The presence of French troops in Djibouti and the virtual certainty that they would intervene actively if the government of that country were seriously threatened from within or without create a favourable climate for the foreign private investment the government is attempting to attract.[20]

In other cases, intervention has no obvious economic effects. Here, one could cite Chad, where what little economic activity there had been in the north and centre of the country had been so disrupted prior to Libyan intervention that the Libyans, even had they desired to do so, could inflict little damage. The production in the south of cotton, the country's major export crop, was little affected by the Libyan action. Again, there would not seem to be any justification here for broad generalizations about the impact of intervention.

The view that intervention compromises national sovereignty and self-determination rests on the argument that intrusion on behalf of a party to a civil war

19 For an account of French military involvement in Mauritania, see *Strategic Survey 1979* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 93, 96. Despite this assistance, Polisario succeeded in applying sufficient pressure on the Mauritanian regime to induce the July 1978 coup which toppled the Ould Daddah regime. The successor government accepted a ceasefire with Polisario, requested the withdrawal of Moroccan troops in early 1979, and concluded a peace agreement with Polisario in August of the same year. Mauritania renounced its claims to the southern portion of Western Sahara and subsequently withdrew its forces from that territory.

20. On this point, see W. Skurnik, 'Continuing problems in Africa's Horn', *Current History*, Vol. 82, No. 482, p. 123.

creates a relationship of dependency such that the local client is incapable of independent action in internal and international affairs where his interests or preferences diverge from those of his patron. In other words, intervention constitutes a new kind of colonialism.

This may be true in some instances. French military intervention in Africa comes quickly to mind here, though it is probable that political and economic ties are far more important in accounting for dependency in much of francophone Africa than is French military activity. But this effect of intervention is by no means necessary. British intervention on behalf of Nyerere in 1964, for example, brought little in the way of political reliability.

Nor is it absolute. Both Angola and Ethiopia are governed by regimes which have benefited substantially from Cuban intervention with substantial Soviet support. While they display a tendency to support the Soviet Union on issues which are to them peripheral—for example, their voting on the Afghan and Cambodian issues at the United Nations—on issues more central to their interests, they show considerable independence. Angola has rebuffed Soviet requests for bases and cooperates with the Western contact group's efforts to resolve the Namibian question.[21] Ethiopia refuses to negotiate on the Eritrean issue, engages in intervention of its own in Somalia,[22] and resists Soviet pressure to restructure its political institutions.[23]

Nor is such influence permanent. The removal or disappearance of the threat occasioning intervention removes the source of a regime's dependence, weakening the basis of influence. The case of British intervention in Tanganyika again comes to mind. Elsewhere, it is probable that an accommodation between South Africa and Angola would reduce considerably the level of Cuban and Soviet influence in Angola, a large part of which is derived from the protection provided to the Angolan regime by these two powers against South African aggression and sponsorship of UNITA guerrillas. The availability of alternative sources of external support has the same effect, as is evident from Egyptian behaviour in the aftermath of the 1973 war, or in Goukouni Oueddei's foreign policy in the aftermath of Hissène Habré's expulsion from Chad by Libyan troops in late 1980. The improvement in Franco-Chadian relations in the summer of 1981 made it possible for Goukouni to request the withdrawal from Chad of Libyan forces. Along similar lines, it could be argued that a more receptive American attitude to overtures from both Angola and Ethiopia could do much to undermine the position of the Soviet Union in both these countries.[24]

Moreover, intervention may preserve and enhance sovereignty rather than eroding it. Soviet/Cuban intervention maintained the external sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia in the face of Somali invasion. It is probable that their intervention in Angola prevented or postponed that country's eventual disintegration

21. On the Angolan attitude towards Soviet bases, see J. Marcum, 'Angola', in G. Carter and P. O'Meara, eds, *Southern Africa: the continuing crisis*. (Bloomington, Ind.. Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 193–4. Volsky ('Local conflict', p. 5) gives a succinct Soviet view of the contact group's initiatives on Namibia. On this point, see also R. Jaster, 'A regional security role for Africa's front-line states experience and prospects', Adelphi Paper 180 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), pp 41–2. Gerald Bender has claimed recently that a February 1982 joint Angolan–Cuban statement on conditions for withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola drew a 'stiff rebuke' from the Soviet Union. G. Bender, 'The continuing crisis in Angola', *Current History*, Vol. 82, No. 482, p. 138.

22. There is good reason to doubt Soviet and Cuban complicity in this venture, as it constitutes an assault on Somali territory, thereby risking the alienation of other African states.

23. On Ethiopian independence from the Soviet Union in internal policy, see P. Henze, 'Communism and Ethiopia', *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 63–4; O. Ogunbadejo, 'Soviet policies in Africa', *African Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 316, p. 125; and Nolutshungu, 'African interests and Soviet power', p. 410.

24. For an argument along these lines with respect to Angola, see G. Bender, 'Kissinger in Angola', pp. 112, 113, 117–19

or dismemberment. Finally, even those in the region most adamant in their opposition to intervention in African affairs generally accept that the involvement of external actors in the 'struggle for liberation' can further the cause of self-determination.[25]

It is clear in this context that underlying the general condemnation of intervention mentioned above is a wide range of mutually incompatible positions on intervention in African conflict. The 1978 Khartoum OAU summit, which dwelt at length on the subject of intervention, was split between, on the one hand, moderate and conservative governments which supported actions, such as those taken by France, Belgium, and Morocco in Shaba, to preserve a weak regime against a 'radical' opposition, and, on the other, 'progressive' regimes which displayed great reluctance to condemn Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa while bitterly criticizing involvement by Western powers and the position of those African states which cooperated with France and Shaba and in subsequent proposals for a 'pan-African peacekeeping force'. In this instance too, then, there is little basis for a sweeping condemnation of intervention.

Turning finally to the question of political stability—assuming that the latter term refers principally to a state of affairs in which a regime or political system is free from serious challenge (originating within the country) to its existence in its efforts to cope with and adapt to evolving internal and external political realities[26]—a look at cases of intervention in Africa suggests that such behaviour may in the short term be either stabilizing or destabilizing in both intent and consequences. By way of illustration, there is little to argue with in the assertion that South African intervention in Angola since 1976, and in particular its support of UNITA, has been destabilizing in both intent and consequences, creating severe difficulties for the regime in the Bié, Moxico, Cuando-Cubango, and Cunene districts, fostering dissension within the ranks of the party, and impeding the government in its attempts to meet the needs of the population and to integrate the diverse ethnic groups inhabiting the country into one nation.[27]

By contrast, the recent Ethiopian incursions into western Somalia in support of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front were intended to undermine the Siad Barre regime, but in all likelihood have had the opposite effect by mobilizing nationalist support behind the tottering Barre and inducing the northern Isaaq clans to reduce their pressure on the central government.

Another contrasting example is that of Soviet/Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, which was intended to prop up the socialist Ethiopian government and did just that. The intrusion neutralized the principal external threat to the Derg, provided the Ethiopians with the means to contain the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies, and gave the regime the breathing space necessary to consolidate its hold on power in the capital and in central Ethiopia.

In the longer term, there are a number of good reasons for expecting that military intervention is unlikely to enhance a target state's stability. While intervention may bring military victory for one of the parties to a civil or regional dispute, so long as the political and social roots of the conflict which occasioned intervention are not addressed, the solution will remain at best a temporary one, and one which is fraught with dangers of deeper entanglement for the external actor.[28]

25 See the Nigerian position, as elaborated by Obasanjo in the speech cited in note 8.

26. For the meanings of stability, see S. Huntington, 'Remarks on the meaning of stability in the modern era', in S. Bialer and K. Sluzar, *Radicalism in the contemporary age. Vol. 3*, (Boulder, Col. Westview, 1977).

27 See Bender, 'The continuing crisis', pp. 125, 128

28 On the permanence of military solutions in the Horn, for example, see Nolutshungu, 'African interests and Soviet power', p. 411

External interference may in fact reduce the likelihood of conflict resolution. In the Angolan, Ethiopian, and Chadian cases, external assistance convinced its internal beneficiaries that negotiation with their opponents was unecessary, that military means were sufficient to resolve the civil conflicts in which they found themselves embroiled. In Angola, the Soviet/Cuban presence has apparently strengthened the MPLA's resolve not to share political power with UNITA. In Ethiopia, and despite Soviet and Cuban advice to the Derg to negotiate with and to grant limited autonomy to the Eritreans,[29] military intervention has made it possible for the regime to survive without compromise and to pursue indefinitely its campaign against the Eritrean insurgency. In Chad, Libyan and OAU intervention on behalf of Goukouni Oueddei's transitional government convinced Goukouni that he could consolidate his control of Chad without any attempt to achieve a political solution involving his principal opponent, Hissène Habré.

Moreover, intervention and a sustained foreign role in defending a government against its internal opposition may discredit that government in the eyes of the broader populace, which comes to see the regime as an instrument of a foreign power and as betraying the nation which it purports to serve.[30] In other words, it may undermine further the legitimacy upon which the stability of a government ultimately rests. In Angola, several sources have maintained that the Cuban and Soviet presence has evoked a hostile nationalist reaction within the MPLA and in the population at large.[31] In Chad, Goukouni's recourse to massive Libyan support redounded to Habré's favour, as the latter came to be seen as the repository of Chadian independence in the face of Libyan depredations.[32]

However, it is again not necessarily the case that intervention will have these effects. It may, on the contrary, set the stage for longer-term stability by removing short-lived threats to basically popular and legitimate regimes. British intervention in the face of army mutinies in East Africa in the mid-1960s may be cited in this context. One might also cite here the recent Senegalese intervention in behalf of Gambian President Jawara.

Moreover, foreign intervention and a sustained military presence need not discredit an incumbent government. There is little evidence to support the view, for example, that the French presence in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, or Gabon has rendered the governments of these countries illegitimate in the eyes of their publics. Whether intervention has this impact depends on a number of factors: the comportment of foreign personnel, the degree to which the military involvement is accompanied by economic benefits to the target state, the performance of the incumbent government in meeting the economic and social aspirations of the populace, the degree of political awareness of the indigenous population, the effectiveness of the opposition in mobilizing public opinion, and so on.

In short, it would appear that it is neither easy, nor very productive, to generalize about intervention and its impact on regional security in the senses discussed above. Intervention in Africa is not a homogeneous phenomenon.

29. Ogunbadejo, 'Soviet policies in Africa', p. 125.

30. Lemarchand ('CIA in Africa', p. 418) makes a similar point with reference to regime dependence on covert assistance.

31. See, for example, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 23, Nos. 2 and 8 for accounts of the impact of foreign affairs on factional conflict within the MPLA

32. Several leading officials in Goukouni's transitional government defected in the aftermath of the announcement of the merger between Libya and Chad in January 1981 Habré repeatedly called attention to Goukouni's tie to the 'Libyan conqueror' in order to broaden his base of support. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1981, pp. 31161–2.

Repercussions for regional arms levels

That having been said, it is possible to accept a number of more careful conclu about the relationship between intervention and regional security. First, appears to be a clear connection between intervention and increased defence sper and weapons procurement in contiguous states. The South African defence bu for instance, doubled and then doubled again in the aftermath of the Angolan a going from R335 million in 1972–3 to R1,564 million in 1979–80. While soı this may be accounted for by inflation in military costs, this corresponded to a r the defence share of GNP from 2·1 per cent to 4·5 per cent and in the defence sh: central government expenditure from 11·8 per cent to 16·8 per cent.[33] It wou inaccurate to ascribe this substantial real increase in defence spending sole Soviet/Cuban military activities in Angola. The collapse of the Portuguese emp Southern Africa and the increasing pressure on the Smith regime in Rhodesia v have altered the basis of the Republic's external security whether or not external i had intervened. But it is true nevertheless that these processes were partici disturbing from the white South African perspective, given the close involveme them of communist powers from outside the region. As Robin Hallett has obse the South African preoccupation with and fear of 'the communist menace' shoul be belittled, but taken at face value.[34]

The Kenyan response to the growing conflict in the Horn was to increase de expenditure from $113 million in 1977 to $255 million in 1979.[35] Again. should perhaps not be ascribed principally to Soviet and Cuban involvement, the long history of problems in relations between Somalia and Kenya. But regional power committed to capitalist development and to close ties with the \ Kenya could not have been indifferent to the rapid growth in the regional preseı the Soviet Union and Cuba.[36] Moreover, the fact that this shift in Kenyan polic a response primarily to a 'Somali threat' does nothing to diminish the (connection to intervention, for it was a Somali military intrusion into Ethioı support of insurgents in the Ogaden which occasioned the Ogaden war and v provided the Kenyans with graphic evidence of continuing Somali irreden

Finally, in a direct response to Libyan intervention in Chad and to wha Nigerians believed to be Libyan involvement in sectarian violence in Kano iı 1980, Nigeria adopted a five-year defence procurement plan valued at $6.4 b and increased its projected defence budget for 1981–2 by 35 per cent.[37] This rev the post-civil-war downward trend in Nigerian defence spending and in the s the country's defence establishment.[38]

More generally, while it was noted above that in 1968 Africa accounted for o per cent of developing country arms imports, in 1978 the corresponding figur

33. *South African Yearbook 1981*, p. 286. Figures in Table 4 differ owing to differing methodological inr
34. R. Hallett, 'South African intervention in Angola, 1975–1976', *African Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 308, p
35. *World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1970–1979* (Washington: Arms Control and Disarn Agency, 1980), p. 64. Figures are in constant dollars.
36. For the perceived link between Kenyan security and the activity of communist powers in the Horn, see *Review* (Nairobi), 27 Feb. 1978, pp. 8–9, 11.
37 See the article on Nigerian defence expenditure by J. de Onis in the *International Herald Tribune*, 16 Jan. De Onis ascribes this increase to worries over the Libyan action in Chad and quotes President Shagari as sayiı 'Nigeria was being forced by recent world events to reassess its security and defence expenditure'. In v substantial shortfalls in oil revenues and cutbacks in government expenditure across the board, it is unclear w these targets have been or will be met. See also *Times*, 14 April 1981.
38 On the downward trend in Nigerian defence expenditure and military manpower, see E. Kolodziej : Harkavy, 'Introduction', pp. 2, 7, and J. Ostheimer and G. Buckley, 'Nigeria', pp. 285–302, both in E. Ko and R. Harkavy, *Security policies of developing countries* (Lexington, Mass., Toronto. Lexington/Heath, 19

32 per cent.[39] (For details see Table 2 at the end of this article.) This occurred despite a substantial drop in the dollar value of the purchases of Egypt—which in the 1960s and early 1970s had been the continent's largest arms importer—after the October war. African purchases were somewhat lower (around 26 per cent of developing country arms imports) in 1979. This reflected primarily the curtailment in Ethiopian demand for arms[40] rather than any significant improvement in the security situation in the region as a whole. It remained the case that imports were approximately 3·5 times higher in constant dollars at the end of the period than at the beginning, and that regional defence spending had virtually doubled, while there were approximately 2·5 times as many indigenous military personnel in the region in 1979 as in 1970, this again despite declines in the size of the Nigerian and Egyptian armed forces (see Tables 3 and 4 at the end of this article). The recent frequency of intervention in Africa is part of a climate of growing violence to which this shift in resource allocation is a response. While it is perhaps simplistic to maintain without qualification that arms races lead to war, it is nevertheless true that the better armed a state is, the more able it is to contemplate the use of force. The increasing availability in the region of the instruments of violence removes what was an important constraint on intra-African conflict.

The growing prominence of the military in national budgets and of military tasks in national policy diverts scarce resources, human, financial, and material, from the pursuit of other objectives, such as development, health, and welfare, in societies which are already for the most part desperately poor. Moreover, it may result in an even greater role for military personnel in the domestic political process, with attendant effects on prospects for democracy and human rights.

Second, the increasing incidence of intervention in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Africa reflects an erosion of the normative basis of interstate relations in the region. One aspect of this is an apparently greater willingness of regional actors to seek military assistance from external actors.[41] Another is the greater proclivity of regional actors to involve themselves in civil conflicts in other states and to employ force in their relations with each other. The great majority of instances of intervention since the mid-1970s have involved African actions against fellow Africans (see Table 1). In this context, Akinyemi's assertion, questionable in any case, that the OAU, rather than seeking to resolve conflicts, strives to insulate them from 'non-African factors', is rather cold comfort.[42]

Growing regional disorder

The increasing number of interventions in this period not only reflects but fosters this erosion of previously accepted norms, for, in the absence of a supranational authority capable of enforcing rules, compliance is based upon mutual interest and upon the expectation that others will comply. Each violation of these norms challenges this expectation. As the latter becomes increasingly untenable, regional actors will move further towards seeking other means of guaranteeing their security and pursuing their interests.

39. *World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1970–1979*, table 2.

40. *World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1970–1979*, table 2. Ethiopian imports fell from $1.1 billion in 1978 to $192 million in 1979 (both figures in 1978 constant dollars), which closely parallels the regional decrease of $1.2 billion from 1978 to 1979.

41. This trend was recognized by the OAU in its resolution 'On the settlement of intra-African disputes' (Libreville, 1977), reprinted in *Africa contemporary record 1977–1978*, p. C6.

42. A. Bolaji Akinyemi, 'Africa: a foreign policy perspective', *Daedalus*, Vol. 111, No. 2, p. 251.

For these reasons, it is legitimate to question whether the conventional characterizations of inter-African relations in terms of principles such as the non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, general acceptance of the territorial legacy of imperialism, the commitment to pan-Africanism, and multilateral conflict resolution are still valid, and, if they remain so, how long this will last. It is not coincidental that this period has witnessed the apparent demise of the OAU. Too many of its member states no longer take seriously that organization's constitutive principles in situations where the latter impinge upon the pursuit of fundamental national objectives.

It is as an element of this growing regional disorder that the impact of intervention on African economic development should be seen. Regional unpredictability and disarray make the continent as uninviting an economic investment for private interests both within Africa and outside it as it is an unpromising political investment for external actors seeking lasting influence and strategic gain.[43]

So far, it has been argued, first, that there is no basis for a general condemnation of intervention in terms of its impact on African core values. To the contrary, in specific instances it may be, and has been, supportive of these ends. However, in the longer term, it may inhibit the emergence of stable political conditions and may encourage higher levels of defence spending and procurement, while, as part of a growing use of force in regional affairs, it both reflects and furthers a corrosion of the normative basis of interstate relations within the region.

If intervention is only one aspect of a general trend in regional politics, it remains to ask what the profound causes of this trend are. In this sense, intervention is more a manifestation of insecurity than a cause of it. There are at least three fundamental problems in African security, leaving aside the issue of apartheid in South Africa.[44]

The first is political fragmentation. There were several apparently promising movements towards national integration in the 1960s and early 1970s. Ghana under Nkrumah and Nigeria in the period of national reconciliation and rapid growth after the civil war are examples. But with the passage of time, it is increasingly clear that the dominant trend in African politics is towards the disintegration of the states created upon the departure of the European colonialists. Evidence for this may be seen in continuing sectarian problems and North–South conflict in the Sudan, in the failure in Ethiopia to extinguish the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies, in the continuing ethnic conflict in Chad, in the failure of a non-ethnic party to emerge in Nigerian politics, in the persistent secessionism of the Lunda in Shaba evident in the popular response to the arrival of FLNC forces from Angola in 1977 and 1978, in ethnic strife between Kikongo, Kimbundu, and Ovimbundu in Angola, in the growing violence between Shona and Ndebele in Zimbabwe, in unrest among the Baganda in Uganda, in continuing Kikuyu-Luo tensions in Kenya, and so on. There is hardly a state in black Africa which appears today to be more viable as a national entity than it did on the eve of independence. Several appear much less so, the unifying influence of colonial power long ago having departed, and the concept of neocolonialism being too nebulous to arouse popular enthusiasm. Even those states usually cited as being based upon a strong national identity, Somalia being a case in point, are riven with ethnically and regionally based struggles for power and position, and for the meagre material rewards available to those who possess them. External

43. On this point, see Xan Smiley, 'Misunderstanding Africa', *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 250, No. 3, p. 79.
44. I have benefited considerably in this discussion from an informal presentation by Mr Dragoljub Najman to the Africa Research Programme at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs in February 1983.

oppression has been replaced by oppression by indigenous clan and tribal groupings. The consequences are almost inevitably fissiparous. The connection between ethnic conflict and intervention is evident throughout much of the continent—the Zaïrean involvement in northern Angola in support of the FNLA, the Somali link with their ethnic kin in the Ogaden, and the Libyan connection with Chadian Arabs are all cases in point.

This political fragmentation is exacerbated by the catastrophic economic performance of much of the region in the 1970s and early 1980s. At present, almost two thirds of the states falling into the World Bank's 'low income' (*per capita* income less than $370 a year) category are African. GNP growth *per capita* for sub-Saharan Africa (including rapidly growing countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast, but excluding the Republic of South Africa) was 0·8 per cent per year in the 1970s, down from 1·3 per cent per year in the previous decade. The World Bank notes that output per person grew more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s than in any other part of the world. Seven countries in the region had negative growth in total GDP, while fifteen had negative *per capita* rates of growth in GDP.

Volumes of exports in sub-Saharan Africa fell at an annual rate of 1·6 per cent (median for countries in the region excluding South Africa) during the decade. This fall in volume was accompanied by fairly rapid deterioration in the terms of trade for African oil importers late in the decade (a negative shift of approximately 8 per cent in 1978–80). Mineral exporters were particularly hard hit during the decade, despite a number of good years. Their terms of trade dropped between 1970 and 1979 by an average of 7·1 per cent per year. The softening of oil markets in the last two years has extended these effects to African oil exporters such as Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola as well. The financial consequences of these trends are severe. Current account deficits in the region climbed from $1·5 billion in 1970 to $8 billion in 1980. External indebtedness went from $6 billion to $32 billion between 1970 and 1979. The situation has, if anything, deteriorated further since 1979.

Food production in the 1970s in sub-Saharan Africa grew in absolute terms by some 1·5 per cent per year, but, given the regional population growth rate of 2·7 per cent, the *per capita* growth rate in food production was negative, dropping at an annual rate greater than 1 per cent. A conservative estimate of the number of African countries now self-sufficient in food would be around six or seven.[45] Commentaries from around the continent stress endemic shortages of foodstuffs, both in urban areas and in the hinterland, and consequent severe inflation in the price of staples.[46]

Much of this poor economic record may be explained in terms of prior underdevelopment with attendant undercapitalization, absence of substantial domestic markets, and shortages of technically skilled indigenous personnel, the legacies of the precolonial and colonial eras. The inefficiency of many foreign assistance programmes, the result of poor planning and coordination, insufficient attention to the characteristics of the local environment and the constraints these impose on the development effort, and bureaucratization, is another important factor.

45. Liebenow, 'American policy in Africa', p. 98. The data in the above paragraphs are taken from *Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington: World Bank, 1981), pp. 3, 18–19, 45. All statistics concerning Africa are somewhat suspect, given rudimentary and sporadic collection techniques, and the wide variation between sources such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the FAO. Food production statistics are particularly problematic, given the existence of widespread subsistence production and black markets. There is little reason, however, to doubt the gravity of the region's economic problems, or that the World Bank figures are broadly representative of regional realities.

46. See, for example, Bender, 'The continuing crisis', p. 128; Skurnik, 'Continuing problems in Africa's Horn', p. 121 and J. Kraus, 'Revolution and the military in Ghana', *Current History*, Vol. 82, No. 482, pp. 116, 131.

A third is the relatively low level of the flow of private capital to Africa, and the outward movement of African capital. A fourth is the crippling effect of OPEC oil price increases on the region's oil importing economies. In addition to these, the incompetence, irresponsibility, and acquisitiveness of many of the continent's leading political figures and of the bureaucratic and political elites from which they emerge and which they serve, cannot be ignored.

In periods when the pie is growing, it is possible to contain communal and class tensions by sharing out the benefits of development. When the pie is not growing or is shrinking, while the numbers of those trying to eat it are expanding, communal conflict over resources becomes an ever more serious problem.

This may be of greatest import in those states which have had some economic success, as subsequent failure necessarily involves the disappointment of expectations formed in the good years. In this context, Nigeria, once considered one of Africa's few success stories, seems at the moment to be in a particularly parlous state, given its falling oil revenues, government expenditure cutbacks, and rising unemployment. The recent reduction in the price of Nigerian oil in violation of OPEC price guidelines is an indication of its distress, as is the expulsion early in 1983 of 1·5–2 million illegal aliens.

While the internal consequence of this economic collapse may be an acceleration of political fragmentation, the increasing recourse to force in regional disputes suggests that its external impact may be a proliferation of conflict in OAU Africa, as regimes attempt to compensate for their incapacity to cope with internal problems by success in foreign policy. The Moroccan involvement in Western Sahara is a case in point.

The third factor which deserves mention here is the growing regional disparity in military and other forms of power. Zartman, in the article mentioned above,[47] described the regional configuration of power as one of highly diffused and unhierarchical distribution at uniformly low levels. The early figures in Tables 3 and 4 support this characterization. The past decade, however, has witnessed the emergence of a number of significant regional powers whose military capacity far outstrips that of the majority of smaller states in the region.[48] Libya, Ethiopia, Algeria, Morocco, and Nigeria are all examples of this. At least one of them—Libya—displays a pronounced tendency to employ its new military power to acquire a political position in regional affairs commensurate with its inflated self-image. One might ask whether the prominence of Nigeria in the 1982 conflict in Chad does not demonstrate a similar tendency on the part of that country.

To summarize, the current state of regional politics gives little ground for enthusiasm. Economic decay, political fragmentation, growing disparities in military power, the accelerating import of arms, an increasing tendency to resort to force in regional disputes, the erosion of regional norms governing interstate relations, the manifest incapacity of the OAU to cope with internal and regional conflicts, and the apparent collapse of that organization, all justify this pessimism. Intervention from outside the region is on the whole overrated as a source of insecurity. It is instead largely a manifestation of and a response to deeper regional problems. Intervention by both regional and extra-regional actors does, however, accelerate several of these trends by impeding conflict resolution, drawing into question the legitimacy of internal beneficiaries, and, as a general phenomenon, encouraging arms spending and further undermining regional norms.

47. Zartman, 'Africa as a subordinate state system', p. 550.
48 See Nolutshungu, 'African interests and Soviet power', p. 406.

The prospect for OAU Africa is one of increasing frustration, disintegration, and frequent use of force. This will persist until the economic situation improves and a new regional structure emerges.[49] The dynamics of this process are largely internal and not susceptible to control from outside. The fact that Africans themselves seem incapable of producing a rapid, tidy, and lasting solution to their problems does not suggest that outsiders would do any better.

For tables referred to in text see following pages.

49. In this too, Africa resembles to an increasing degree the rest of the Third World. For a discussion of the increasing likelihood of higher levels of interstate conflict and the use of force in the Third World as a whole, as states redefine the politics of their regions, altering the configurations of territory and power left by the colonial powers, see I. J. Weltman, 'War in international politics today' in R. O'Neill and D. Ball, eds., *Strategy and defence* (London, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 49–50.

Table 1

Interventions in Africa 1975–82

Venue	*Year*	*Intervener*	*Orientation*
Angola	1974–6[1]	Zaïre	pro-FNLA[2]
		United States	pro-FNLA, UNITA
		Rep. of South Africa	pro-FNLA, UNITA
		Cuba (with Soviet support)	pro-MPLA
Zaïre (Shaba)	1977, 1978	France[3]	pro-Zaïrean govt.
		Belgium	pro-Zaïrean govt.
		Morocco	pro-Zaïrean govt.
		Senegal	pro-Zaïrean govt.
		United States	pro-Zaïrean govt.
The Horn	1977–8	Somalia	pro-WSLF
		South Yemen	pro-Ethiopian govt.
		Cuba	pro-Ethiopian govt.
		USSR	pro-Ethiopian govt.
Mauritania	1977–8	Polisario	anti-govt.
		Morocco[4]	pro-Mauritanian govt.
		France	pro-Mauritanian govt.
Chad	1978	France	pro-Chadian govt.
		Libya	pro-Acyl Ahmat
Uganda	1979	Libya	pro-Ugandan govt.
		Tanzania	anti-Amin
Chad	1979	Nigeria	peacekeeping
		Libya	anti-govt.
Tunisia	1980	Libya	anti-govt.
Chad	1980	Libya	pro-Goukouni/Acyl/Kamougué
Gambia	1981	Senegal	pro-Gambian govt.
Chad	1981	OAU	peacekeeping
Zimbabwe	1982	Rep. of South Africa	destabilization of govt.
Mozambique	1982	Rep. of South Africa	destabilization, pro-MRM
Chad	1982	Libya	pro-Goukouni
Somalia	1982	Ethiopia	pro-SSDF

1. Cuban troops remain in Angola, while South African incursions persist

2. Abbreviations FNLA—Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola, UNITA—Uniao para e Independencia Total de Angola, MPLA—Movimento Popular di Libertação de Angola, WSLF—Western Somali Liberation Front, Polisario—Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamr and Rio de Oro, OAU—Organization of African Unity, SSDF—Somali Salvation Democratic Front.

3. Since the FLNC (Front de Liberation Nationale Congolaise) apparently acted independently, and is comprised of Zairois, it is not listed as an intervener

4. Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara is not listed as an intervention, as King Hassan was not intruding on one side or another of an internal dispute His intent was not to affect the internal politics, such as they were, of the former Spanish Sahara, but to extinguish them

Table 2

Arms imports of African states, 1970–9 ($54 million)

	1970	1975	1979	Peak
Algeria	49	107	385	625 (1978)
Angola	—	120	100	261 (1976)
Benin	—	—	9	(1979)
Botswana	—	—	4	10 (1977, 1978)
Burundi	—	11	9	(1975)
Cameroons	—	5	—	11 (1976)
Cape Verde Is.	—	—	27	(1979)
Central African Rep.	—	—	4	(1979)
Chad	—	—	—	11 (1976)
Congo	—	11	18	32 (1977)
Egypt	1075	417	339	1215 (1973)
Equ. Guinea	—	11	—	(1975)
Ethiopia	16	35	192	1100 (1978)
Gabon	—	—	9	22 (1976)
Gambia	—	—	—	5 (1976)
Ghana	—	11	36	40 (1978)
Guinea	—	23	18	(1975)
Guinea-Bissau	—	—	9	10 (1978)
Ivory Coast	—	5	55	70 (1978)
Kenya	—	11	45	50 (1978)
Lesotho	—	—	NA	—
Liberia	—	—	—	—
Libya	99	656	2113	(1979)
Madagascar	—	—	18	20 (1978)
Malawi	—	—	9	(1979)
Mali	—	11	9	60 (1978)
Mauritania	—	—	9	42 (1977)
Mauritius	—	—	NA	—
Morocco	16	59	441	460 (1978)
Mozambique	—	35	55	120 (1978)
Niger	—	—	27	—
Nigeria	8	107	91	—
Rwanda	—	—	4	10 (1978)
Saõ Tomé é Principe	—	—	—	—
Senegal	—	—	9	20 (1978)
Sierra Leone	—	—	—	—
Somalia	16	83	27	170 (1978)
Republic of South Africa	66	155	18	204 (1976)
Sudan	66	—	73	171 (1977)
Swaziland	—	—	—	—
Tanzania	8	11	220	(1979)
Togo	—	11	—	22 (1976)
Tunisia	16	11	82	(1979)
Uganda	—	83	—	(1975)

Table 2 continued

	1970	*1975*	*1979*	*Peak*
Upper Volta	—	5	9	(1979)
Zaïre	16	35	27	136 (1976)
Zambia	8	23	18	60 (1978)
Zimbabwe	—	5	18	(1979)
Total	1463	2097	4540	(1979)

Source: World military expenditure and arms transfers, 1970–1979 (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982). Figures are in 1978 constant dollars.

Table 3

Size of armed forces in African states

	1965	*1970*	*1975*	*1979*
Algeria	30,000	80,000	80,000	89,000
Angola	—	—	30,000	47,000
Benin	2,000	2,000	3,000	4,000
Botswana	—	—	1,000	3,000
Burundi	2,000	3,000	7,000	8,000
Cameroons	8,000	8,000	10,000	11,000
Cape Verde Is.	—	—	NA	NA
Central African Republic	2,000	2,000	3,000	4,000
Chad	4,000	7,000	11,000	NA
Congo	4,000	6,000	7,000	16,000
Egypt	205,000	255,000	400,000	395,000
Equ. Guinea	—	1,000	5,000	2,000
Ethiopia	60,000	45,000	50,000	250,000
Gabon	1,000	1,000	3,000	5,000
Gambia	—	—	—	1,000
Ghana	25,000	35,000	20,000	15,000
Guinea	9,000	9,000	7,000	18,000
Guinea-Bissau	—	—	5,000	5,000
Ivory Coast	5,000	6,000	7,000	6,000
Kenya	16,000	7,000	9,000	13,000
Lesotho	—	—	1,000	1,000
Liberia	4,000	5,000	6,000	7,000
Libya	17,000	18,000	25,000	53,000
Madagascar	5,000	9,000	13,000	20,000
Malawi	4,000	4,000	5,000	5,000
Mali	8,000	8,000	8,000	5,000
Mauritania	2,000	3,000	3,000	8,000
Mauritius	—	—	3,000	—
Morocco	50,000	65,000	75,000	98,000
Mozambique	—	—	20,000	24,000

Table 3 continued

	1965	*1970*	*1975*	*1979*
Niger	2,000	4,000	4,000	3,000
Nigeria	25,000	200,000	270,000	164,000
Rwanda	2,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
Saõ Tomé é Principe	—	—	NA	NA
Senegal	7,000	7,000	7,000	8,000
Sierra Leone	3,000	3,000	5,000	2,000
Somalia	12,000	20,000	30,000	54,000
Rep. of South Africa	55,000	40,000	50,000	70,000
Sudan	18,000	25,000	50,000	65,000
Swaziland	—	—	1,000	2,000
Tanzania	10,000	20,000	25,000	53,000
Togo	2,000	2,000	3,000	4,000
Tunisia	20,000	25,000	20,000	24,000
Uganda	6,000	16,000	25,000	6,000
Upper Volta	3,000	4,000	5,000	4,000
Zaïre	25,000	45,000	55,000	23,000
Zambia	9,000	12,000	16,000	20,000
Zimbabwe	—	11,000	15,000	22,000
Total	662,000	1,017,000	1,402,000	1,641,000

Source: World military expenditures and arms transfers, 1964–1973 and *1970–1979* (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976, 1982).

Table 4
Military expenditure in Africa,[1] 1970–9

	1970			1975			1979		
		%	%		%	%		%	%
	$m	*GE*[2]	*GNP*	*$m*	*GE*	*GNP*	*$m*	*GE*	*GNP*
Algeria	309	8·1	2·0	456	6·8	2·3	642	8·2	2·4
Angola	—	—	—	103	11·5	3·6	NA	NA	NA
Benin	10	12·2	1·7	9	11·4	1·5	15	12·6	2·0
Botswana	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	5	2·4
Burundi	6	12·7	1·3	11	20·7	2·3	20	23·3	3·3
Cameroons	46	12·0	1·8	51	11·6	1·7	59	9·9	1·4
Cape Verde Is.	—	—	—	NA	NA	NA	1	4·5	2·1
Central African Rep.	11	12·4	2·9	9	9	2·1	9	10·4	1·9
Chad	28	22·3	4·7	34	29·0	5·5	NA	NA	NA
Congo	32	NA	5·0	40	11·1	4·7	35	14·4	4·2
Egypt	1161	32·4	12·8	2164	35·5	19·6	1717	24·8	10·5
Equ. Guinea	7	19·6	5·2	5	61·8	4·6	NA	NA	NA
Ethiopia	66	21·2	2·3	126	20·2	3·8	322	35·1	8·7
Gabon	21	6·1	1·5	24	1·8	0·8	NA	NA	NA
Gambia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ghana	208	9·9	2·0	185	7·3	1·7	64	4·2	0·6
Guinea	30	NA	3·0	23	10·0	1·9	NA	NA	NA
Guinea-Bissau	—	—	—	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ivory Coast	53	5·1	1·3	83	5·6	1·4	214	7·3	2·7
Kenya	32	4·9	1·0	68	6·5	1·7	255	15·6	4·8
Lesotho	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Liberia	8	6·6	1·4	4	3·5	0·8	8	2·7	1·1
Libya	443	9·9	2·8	262	5·1	2·2	394	5·9	2·2
Madagascar	30	8·1	1·4	36	9·7	1·7	99	14·3	4·3
Malawi	2	1·5	0·5	6	3·0	0·8	18	6·7	1·7
Mali	15	17·8	2·3	23	21·4	3·0	30	23·7	2·9
Mauritania	5	9·4	1·5	10	5·8	2·7	NA	NA	NA
Mauritius	1	NA	0·2	1	0·6	0·1	1	0·4	0·1
Morocco	203	12·4	2·6	467	13·6	4·4	762	17·5	5·6
Mozambique	—	—	—	22	7·5	0·9	NA	NA	NA
Niger	8	6·5	0·8	9	6·8	1·0	10	4·6	0·8
Nigeria	1180	36·6	5·9	1601	8·8	3·4	1531	12	2·5
Rwanda	12	23·5	2·0	10	14·5	1·3	14	15·2	1·7
Saõ Tome é Principe	—	—	—	NA	NA	NA	—	—	—
Senegal	35	12·1	2·0	34	10·0	1·7	58	12·5	2·6
Sierra Leone	5	5·4	0·8	8	4·2	1·1	13	5·6	1·7
Somalia	30	25·3	3·5	32	10·9	3·2	85	24·2	7·0
Rep of South Africa	762	10·7	2·3	1671	15·6	4·1	1602	13·7	3·6
Sudan	128	19·6	3·4	130	10·9	2·6	218	12·1	3·7
Swaziland	—	—	—	1	2·6	0·7	5	3·4	1·8
Tanzania	40	6·0	1·4	141	11·8	3·9	251	18·7	5·6
Togo	7	8·5	2·0	10	5·0	1·3	19	7·3	2·2

Table 4 continued

	1970			1975			1979		
	$m	% GE[2]	% GNP	$m	% GE	% GNP	$m	% GE	% GNP
Tunisia	49	5·4	1·6	76	5·4	1·6	87	4·2	1·4
Uganda	152	10·8	1·8	231	19·3	2·7	106	17·8	1·4
Upper Volta	10	11·3	1·3	20	15·7	2·4	29	18·2	3·4
Zaïre	323	14·5	5·4	274	12·6	3·9	50	3·1	0·8
Zambia	43	5·6	1·9	77	6·8	3·1	121	15·3	5·2
Zimbabwe	42	6·8	1·1	85	10·1	2·3	216	19·3	6·5
Total	5553	—	—	8629	—	—	9090	—	—

1. Expenditures are in 1978 constant dollars.
2. GE—central government expenditure. *Source: World military expenditure and arms transfers, 1970–1979* (Washington, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982).

Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa

HARRY BRIND*

Soviet activities in Africa in the last quarter of a century have attracted widespread attention. Some see the Soviet hand behind every *coup d'etat* and every Western setback, part of a master plan to turn the continent into a series of satellite states hostile to the West; others regard the Russians as opportunists, taking advantage of the numerous openings for interference which have arisen in the newly independent countries; yet others point to the Soviet Union's many failures in Africa, in terms both of aid and of winning friends.

Facts to establish the validity of these theories are sparse: the Soviet Union naturally does not publicize its activities, still less its methods and motives, while its African partners are equally coy about the details of their relations with it. One is therefore working with very incomplete and inadequate information.

Russian contacts with Africa before the mid-1950s were few. While the West European powers were opening up the interior of Africa, the Russians were doing likewise in central Asia. The importance of spreading the revolutionary message among peoples under colonial rule was recognized by the Soviet authorities within a few months of their seizing power in 1917, but they took few practical measures. They had more pressing problems nearer home, while the colonial powers did all they could to prevent the Soviet Union or its agents establishing themselves or exerting influence in their colonies or protectorates.

By the mid-1950s, the situation had changed. The Soviet Union was indisputably a superpower, and after the death of Stalin took a growing interest in world affairs. At the same time the process of decolonization, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, provided new fields for Soviet activity.

The Russians appeared on the African scene with certain advantages and disadvantages. Each party was ignorant of the other. To most Africans, Russia was a country which had pulled itself up by its bootstraps after the Revolution, had fought a heroic war against fascism and had no overseas colonial record; most Africans were ignorant of the nature of the Soviet regime and of its relations with its East European neighbours. Likewise, the Russians knew almost nothing of Africa. A very Procrustean bed was necessary to fit the facts of tribalism and family life, of subsistence farming and nomadism, into a Marxist–Leninist pattern. It is therefore not surprising that both sides started by misunderstanding each other. The Soviet Union anticipated that on attaining independence colonies would react against the former colonial power and look elsewhere for friendship and assistance; except in Guinea, this did not happen. The newly independent countries, having emerged from colonial rule, did not wish to embrace a new and equally non-African philosophy—nationalism triumphed over ideology. Nor, on the other hand, did the Soviet Union possess a magic wand which could solve Africa's problems, as some

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newly independent countries imagined. The technical assistance that it could provide was limited, partly because of the nature of the Soviet economy, partly because of Soviet ignorance of African needs (the legendary case of snow ploughs being sent to Conakry); it showed little enthusiasm for 'liberating' the African continent for the *beaux yeux* of the Africans. It rapidly became clear to most of the newly independent African countries that the Soviet Union was more interested in promoting its own interests than in giving support to progressive governments.

After the failures or disappointments which the Soviet Union encountered in its early involvements in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s, notably in Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the Congo, it appeared to relegate Africa to a low position in its order of priorities. However, in the early 1970s a new situation arose, partly out of Portugal's withdrawal from its African territories, partly out of the fall of Haile Selassie's regime in Ethiopia, but to a great extent out of the intervention of Cuban armed forces in Africa. These developments provided the scenario for Soviet involvement on a larger scale than hitherto.

Geography and strategic position

The Horn's strategic significance resides mainly in its position on the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and to a lesser extent in its position as a wedge between predominantly Muslim and predominantly non-Muslim Africa: 'The importance of this region is determined by its geographical situation at the junction of two continents—Asia and Africa, by the presence of first class ports in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean, and what is most important, by the fact that important sea lanes, linking the oil producing countries with America and Europe, pass through the region.'[1]

It is, however, easy to overestimate the strategic importance of the Horn and of the facilities it can provide to the superpowers. Djibouti apart, the coast of the Horn lacks good natural harbours: Berbera, Mogadishu and Kismayu are all man-made, small, and with limited repair and bunkering facilities. Virtually all defence facilities in the Horn have to be expensively constructed and supplied.

Nor are the facilities which the Horn has to offer unique and indispensable. The Soviet Union was not greatly inconvenienced when Somalia expelled its military personnel in 1977: many of them simply moved across the straits of Bab el Mandab to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. As regards the Indian Ocean, facilities in the Horn have little to offer that the PDRY to the north, or Mombasa and Diego Garcia to the south and east, cannot equally well provide. One may talk of 'surveillance' of the straits of Bab el Mandab, but in practice it is difficult to envisage a situation far short of total war in which it would be possible for one superpower to close the straits, and in such a situation it is probable that the Suez Canal would also be closed, making the straits of little strategic value. It is conceivable that facilities in the Horn could be used by one superpower to 'lean on' unfriendly states across the Red Sea, but it is difficult to imagine this taking place without bringing in the other superpower on the other side.

It has sometimes been argued that one of the reasons the Soviet Union was prepared to abandon its stake in Somalia in favour of one in Ethiopia was that the latter provided a better base for destabilizing African countries. This is a proposition of doubtful validity: the 'domino theory' has not operated in East Africa. None of its

1. *Tass*, 8 Feb 1978.

neighbours has much sympathy with the Mengistu regime. Sudan's relations with Ethiopia have been delicate and difficult, and her experience of the Soviet Union is likely to make her wary of attempts at infiltration. It is true that Ethiopia and Kenya have a defence agreement, but this is in spite of, rather than because of, Soviet influence in Ethiopia.

The whole concept is out of date: in the 1980s Soviet agents do not slip across international frontiers on camels in the dead of night; it is easier to go by Aeroflot and preferably not from a neighbouring country.

It has also been argued that Ethiopia is a western extension of the tier of states to the south of the Soviet Union to which she attaches strategic importance. This is to extend the 'arc of crisis' rather a long way. One of the Soviet Union's interests in Ethiopia and a reason for its support against the Eritrean rebels was its wish that the Red Sea should not be a lake controlled by conservative Arab states, and it was no doubt useful to have a friendly government on Saudi Arabia's Western flank, but it can hardly be claimed that Ethiopia's position in this context is of overriding importance.

Cuba's involvement

Cuba's involvement in Africa began only months after Castro came to power in December 1959. In the 1960s and early 1970s it varied in scale, was modest in size, and was mainly confined to military assistance and training. This African involvement was maintained in spite of the fluctuations in Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union.

Cuba first appeared in the Horn in 1974, when it sent a small military mission to Somalia. This mission was reinforced in 1976 by several hundred men as part of Cuba's expanded presence in Africa following the Angolan civil war. Their main role was in training the presidential guard and guerrilla fighters. Whereas Cuba had had links with Angola for many years before her decisive intervention there from 1975 onwards, its arrival in the Horn was of comparatively recent date when the Ogaden conflict erupted. Castro attempted to act as mediator during a tour of Africa in March 1977. At a meeting with Siad Barre and Mengistu in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, he proposed an anti-imperialist federation of the PDRY, Ethiopia and Somalia, with an autonomous Ogaden and Eritrea. By this time Cuba had come to regard the Ethiopian revolution as genuine, not least because several of the Derg's policies resembled those pursued in Cuba in Castro's early years. Cuba probably began to despatch military advisers to Ethiopia in May 1977, and there were reports of Cubans in the Ogaden in September, although the Cubans and the Ethiopians denied such a presence. Somalia broke off relations with Cuba in November 1977, and all Cuban personnel were ordered to leave the country at forty-eight hours' notice. Cuban military assistance to Ethiopia mounted rapidly thereafter, from some 400 advisers in November 1977 to 17,000 regular troops by June 1978. While many of these troops reached Ethiopia only after Somalia had withdrawn its forces from the Ogaden in March 1978, there can be little doubt that the Soviet/Cuban presence was decisive in turning the tide of the war.

There were, however, significant differences between Cuba's action in the Horn and its action in Angola. In the latter, Cuba was assisting a movement which it had been supporting for a decade, a movement threatened by 'imperialist' outsiders—South Africa and the United States. In Ethiopia, Cuba was assisting a relatively new

government with which it had no traditional relationship against a country which was nominally Marxist–Leninist and which had, only months before, been receiving Cuban military assistance. It is more difficult to find ideological or practical reasons for Cuba's course of action in the Horn than for its action in Angola, particularly if one does not accept the view that Cuba was acting solely as a surrogate of the Soviet Union.

Also, the nature of Soviet–Cuban cooperation differed in the two cases: the cooperation was closer, and the Soviet leadership more marked, in Ethiopia than in Angola. In the latter there were cases where Cuba appeared to take initiatives which the Soviet Union followed, and other cases where their policies diverged: the best known example occurred in May 1977 when Neto used Cuban troops to suppress an attempted coup by an extremist 'pro-Soviet' faction. In the Horn there were differences between the Soviet Union and Cuba: the Cubans appear to have been more eager to see a diplomatic, rather than a military solution to the problem of Eritrea, and refused to allow Cuban troops to be used against the Eritreans. However, the two have worked more closely together in the Horn; it seems that the Cubans may have been under firmer Soviet guidance than in Angola. Cuban troops appear to have been under overall Soviet control in the operations in Ethiopia, and the build-up of Cuban troops was more Soviet-organized than in Angola. This may reflect the fact that the Horn, being nearer home, is of greater strategic interest to the Soviet Union than was Angola; it may also result from Soviet determination, after the experience of Angola, that the piper's paymaster shall call the tune. But Cuba came to Ethiopia's assistance of its own volition and has not compromised its basic ideological principles there. It was also acting with the tacit approval of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), although some Africans were less than happy to see this second large-scale Cuban involvement in an African dispute. In the Angolan case the bogey of South Africa was in the background, but no such external threat existed in the Horn. The Cubans were aware of this, and have attempted to play down the significance of their role, and the extent of their participation, in the Ogaden fighting. As justification for their action they claim to have been assisting Ethiopia to defend its borders against aggression and to be showing international solidarity with the 'progressive revolutionary movement in Ethiopia'.

Somalia

Somalia became an independent country in July 1960, being formed by a merger of the former British and Italian Somalilands. It was unusual—almost unique—among African states in that its population was ethnically and linguistically homogeneous. On the other hand, there were also considerable numbers of Somalis in adjoining countries—French Somaliland, Ethiopia, Kenya. This untidy situation was the result of Western colonial intervention in the last years of the nineteenth century in an area which was itself far from stable. Small numbers of Somali nomads had for centuries been moving south and to a lesser extent west in search of pasture and water. Ethiopia, with its heterogeneous population and the fluctuating authority of its government, was also far from stable. The closing years of the nineteenth century, when some Western states were becoming involved in the Horn, was a period of expansion and of relatively effective Ethiopian control over the Somalis, Afars and Oromos, who lived in areas outside the central highlands. Consequently, when frontiers were being provisionally agreed between Ethiopia on the one hand and

Britain, France and Italy on the other, large numbers of Somalis and other non-Amhari speakers, and the seasonal grazing areas vital to their way of life, fell within the boundaries of Ethiopia, including areas where Ethiopian governments had exercised little or no control. In the twentieth century, Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and British Somaliland in 1940, thus bringing all the Horn except French Somaliland under one flag. The flag soon changed when British troops occupied Ethiopia and both British and Italian Somaliland in the following year.

Somalia came to independence in 1960 with many problems. It was one of the poorest countries in Africa, with few natural resources. Lack of water restricted cultivation to the area along and between the two major rivers and a small area in the north. The majority of the population was nomadic, moving constantly in search of pasture for its livestock—sheep and goats, cattle and camels. This movement in search of grazing took little heed of international boundaries, and Somalis regularly grazed their animals in the Ogaden and the Haud.

The foreign exchange which Somalia earned—mainly from its exports of bananas, livestock and animal by-products—was barely sufficient to pay for essential imports and the maintenance of such minimal infrastructure as existed. For development or military expenditure Somalia was dependent on external sources of finance. At independence, the two former colonial powers, Britain and Italy, gave aid which was a mixture of budgetary support, technical assistance and development assistance. They were joined by numerous other donors—the United States, West Germany, the Soviet Union, China, United Arab Republic and various UN agencies.

When Somalia became independent, Somalis living in French Somalia, the neighbouring regions of Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya remained outside its boundaries, and prospects of altering this situation were not encouraging. In 1958, French Somaliland had voted in a referendum to remain an overseas territory of France. The controversy over the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland was still unresolved at the time of independence. The leaders in British Somaliland refused to endorse the provisions of the Anglo–Ethiopian treaty of 1897 which placed the Haud under Ethiopian suzerainty. The Ethiopian argument was that the frontier agreements concluded with Italy in 1900 and Britain in 1897 remained valid and that Somalis living in the Haud and the Ogaden were Ethiopian citizens. Ethiopia had been hostile to British intentions to merge the British and Italian Somalilands, and had accused Britain of wishing to establish a pro-British greater Somalia. The date of Haile Selassie's first visit to Moscow (1959) and his acceptance of a Russian loan are perhaps significant in this context.

In Kenya, although an independent commission reported at the end of 1962 that the Somalis who made up 62 per cent of the Northern Frontier District's population 'almost unanimously' favoured secession from Kenya with the objective of 'ultimately' joining Somalia, these findings were not translated into action, and in March 1963 the British government announced that the NFD was to remain part of Kenya. This decision was a considerable blow to the Somali government, which had since independence been pressing for self-determination for Somalis in Kenya, and had been under pressure to take stronger action. The immediate consequences were a break in diplomatic relations with Britain in March 1963, and a loss of British aid.

The Somalis in the NFD did not accept this rebuff to their aspirations without protest, and desultory fighting continued in the area for some time. The Somali media supported their compatriots, but there was little the Somali government could do; its army was small and ill-equipped even had the government wished to commit

it. A somewhat similar situation existed in the Ogaden in the early 1960s. There were clashes between the Ethiopians and the Somalis there; Ogaden guerrillas found sanctuary and limited support in Somalia. The fighting in both areas gradually subsided. Kenya and Somalia agreed to normalize their relations and establish peace in the NFD, and the later 1960s also saw a move to improve relations with Ethiopia. Meanwhile, Kenya and Ethiopia had in 1964 signed a mutual defence agreement.

The failure of Somali attempts to bring its nationals within its own borders showed how isolated the country was and that it was swimming against the tide of African thinking. Most of the newly independent African states faced the problem of creating nations from people of varied tribes, languages and religions, whereas Somalia had a population which was virtually homogeneous ethnically, linguistically and religiously. It was natural that Somalia should wish to bring all Somalis under one flag. What its neighbours, heterogeneous Kenya and Ethiopia, perceived was an attempt to seize territory over which they had sovereignty and the first step of a process which could lead to their collapse as nations. Most African countries took the Kenyan/Ethiopian, rather than the Somali line, partly because their nation-building problems were similar to those of the former, and partly because the Somali approach involved a change of colonial frontiers, which could open a veritable Pandora's box for much of the continent.

In the early days of independence, Somalia had adopted a generally non-aligned stance in African and world affairs, and had received a considerable amount of aid from both West and East. While this might appear to vindicate the Somali government's policy of not allowing the pan-Somali problem to affect its wider stand, some of the government's opponents favoured taking a much more active line on the NFD issue. There was also an anti-Western feeling, arising partly from the fact that Western powers were largely responsible for Somalia's boundaries and even more from Britain's apparent abandonment of Somalis in the NFD and the Haud.

Consequently, there were moves away from the West towards China and the Soviet Union. A trade and aid agreement was concluded with the former in 1963, and the Soviet Union agreed to supply military assistance worth nearly £11 million. The Somalis had received, shortly after independence, a small quantity of weapons from the UAR. In 1962, the United States, Italy and West Germany offered to provide roughly $10 million worth of equipment and training for a force of 5,000–6,000 men, with the emphasis on internal security, on condition that Somalia undertook not to accept military assistance from any other source. This offer was rejected in favour of the larger Soviet offer, which included the training and equipping with modern weapons of a 10,000-man force, including a small air branch.

The expansion of the Somali armed forces proceeded in the later 1960s as envisaged in the military aid agreement. The number of Soviet military advisers remained small—probably less than 200. As regards Soviet non-military aid, the construction of a meat-processing plant in Kisimayu began in 1964, and work on a fish factory at Las Koreh and on Berbera harbour also started in the 1960s. A new economic agreement was concluded in August 1969. However, the Soviet Union was by no means the only non-military donor. The United States terminated its aid programme in 1966 because Somali registered ships had carried freight to Hanoi, but China, Italy and the European Community remained major donors.

In October 1969 a military coup, inspired by general dissatisfaction with the performance of the previous regime, brought Siad Barre to power. Within a year the 'coup' had retrospectively become a 'revolution', and the regime declared that the

country would henceforth be guided by 'scientific socialism'. While some of the participants in the coup had received military training in the Soviet Union, and some of them had, by virtue of being army officers, had contact with Soviet military advisers, it would be wrong to think of it as Soviet-inspired, or of the majority of the participants as dedicated Marxists; it was a home-inspired and home-made coup.

Immediately after Barre's takeover, the constitution was suspended, the National Assembly closed and political parties declared illegal. A Supreme Revolutionary Council, with twenty-five members, mainly army officers, was established. This was assisted by a fourteen-man committee of 'secretaries', almost all civil servants, which was responsible for the day-to-day administration of the country.

In 1973, on the fourth anniversary of the 'revolution', Siad Barre announced plans for the formation of a new party based on 'scientific socialist' principles. It was almost three years before this party—the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party—was actually formed, in June 1976. The party consisted of a Supreme Council of seventy-three members, and a Central Committee, an enlarged version of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. At the apex of the pyramid was the Political Bureau, consisting of the President, the three Vice-Presidents and the head of the National Security Service. Ministers were also appointed to act in coordination with the Political Bureau.

Thus Somalia acquired a system of government which bore at least a superficial resemblance to a Soviet model, and much of the rhetoric of the regime was couched in Marxist–Leninist terms. This does not mean that it was adopted in an imitative way. The system was devised partly to give legitimacy to a government which had come to power as a result of a military coup and partly as the most suitable instrument for carrying out the many changes to Somali society which the government wished to make. Many of Siad Barre's speeches in the 1970s stressed that his policy was a pragmatic one, and that ideology could not be transplanted out of context.

Much emphasis was placed on the party, but one must not exaggerate its importance. Two years after its foundation it had only 200 members. Because it was created as an act of policy, it had no officials, and many civil servants were drafted into it. In the regions and districts the former regional governors and district officers were redesignated as regional and district secretaries of the party, but of necessity the functions which they performed remained much the same. While the party was an important factor in formulating and executing government policies, and while it undoubtedly contained some intellectual Marxists, it would be a mistake to exaggerate its or their importance: it was a new factor on the Somali scene, but by no means the only one. Perhaps its main function was to bring as large a cross-section of the population (in terms of geography, kinship and political persuasion) as possible into the Supreme Council, and to give some air of popular support to a military regime. While the major decisions were taken by the Political Bureau, the Supreme Council and the Central Committee provided an opportunity for a larger grouping to have some say in the decision-making process.

There was, after the 1969 coup, a tendency to emphasize governmental control and guidance. This was partly by way of reaction to the *laisser-faire* policy of the previous government, partly because many of the problems which faced the country were soluble only by government action or leadership. 'Scientific socialism' was also intended to change modes of thought. A strong campaign was waged against tribalism and some of the sanctions of kinship groupings; orientation centres were set up where the public was encouraged to study the aims and methods of the revolution;

the National Security Service had wide powers to deal with those who stepped out of line.

It is impossible to quantify the extent of the change in Somali society which resulted from the policies of Siad Barre's government during its first eight years. In the economic field, many Marxist or socialist ideas had little relevance to Somali conditions. In general, it would be correct to say that the economy remained mixed, but that the proportion under state control increased under Siad Barre's regime. The difficulties any government faces in changing the life of nomads are obvious. The mass literacy campaign, with the attempt to reach nomads through the orientation centres, had some effect. More significant is the resettlement of half a million people after the 1975 drought—initially in camps, later in fishing or agricultural settlements. Some of those resettled subsequently restocked their herds and returned to the pastoral life. However, the proportion of the population following the nomadic way of life diminished during these years, a process paralleled by the growth of towns. The non-nomadic and particularly the urban portion of the population was more exposed to the regime's policies. While there was more surveillance and less freedom of dissent than under the previous government, Siad Barre's record in the field of human rights was not a bad one. Most of the Somalis who left the country in these years, mainly for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, did so for economic rather than political reasons.

Siad Barre's speeches repeatedly made the point that scientific socialism was entirely compatible with Islam. While the government's measures to introduce equality between the sexes in inheritance rights were opposed by conservative Muslims, there was no deep conflict between church and state. The government's campaign against tribalism had only limited success; it is ironic that after the Ogaden war the main opposition to Siad Barre was based on tribal lines, and the gravamen of the criticism of him that he favoured his own and related tribes.

After the 1969 coup, the new government declared its non-alignment in foreign affairs. The Soviet Union appears to have welcomed the change, partly because its relations with the previous government had been passing through a difficult phase, mainly because of differences of view about debt repayments. Shortly after the coup a Soviet delegation visited Mogadishu and is reported to have offered further financial assistance. The number of Soviet advisers increased to between 800 and 900, of whom 300 were military advisers. The Somali Vice-President visited Moscow early in 1971, and the Soviet Defence Minister visited Somalia a year later, signing an agreement covering further cooperation. 1974 saw a visit by Podgorny and the signing, on 11 July, of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The flourishing of this friendship was accompanied by a cooling of Somalia's relations with the West.

In the first half of the 1970s, Somalia was the largest recipient of all forms of Soviet assistance in Africa. Soviet military aid was estimated at $132 million up to 1975, and substantially more in the two subsequent years. Overall Soviet economic credits extended were about $155 million, approximately half of which were drawn. After the signature of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation a further $60 million was offered, mainly for drought resettlement schemes and fisheries.

Soviet non-military assistance met with varied success. Some of the schemes were badly planned, others ran into local difficulties. The meat-packing and fish-canning plants were unable to operate at full capacity; the Fanole irrigation project, uncompleted at the time of the Somali–Soviet break in 1977, appears to have been something of a white elephant. The most successful schemes were probably a deep-sea

fisheries project and the Soviet contribution towards resettling nomads after the drought. It must, of course, be remembered that alongside Soviet non-military assistance Somalia was also receiving aid from China, Arab countries, the European Community and UN agencies.

Military aid, on the other hand, came exclusively from the Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba. It comprised military equipment and training, both by Soviet and Cuban personnel in Somalia, and of Somalis in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The result of this assistance was to transform the Somali armed capability, which was virtually non-existent at the time of independence, into one of the largest and best equipped forces in Africa.

There was, as a consequence of this aid, a large and very noticeable Soviet presence in Somalia. The Soviet embassy was by far the largest in Mogadishu. Estimates of the numbers of Russians in the country varied considerably, but the figure generally accepted is something in excess of 3,000. This is about one Russian for every 1,000 Somalis, but the Russians were concentrated in a few places, making the proportion there even higher.

It is impossible to measure precisely the influence which this large number of Russians exercised on the Somali government up to 1977. On the surface relations seemed cordial, but there was little rapport between the individual Russian and the individual Somali: it is difficult to envisage two peoples with more dissimilar backgrounds and temperaments. The reaction of different members of the Somali government to the Soviet presence varied. There were some intellectual Marxists in the regime and some who considered the Soviet way to be the best means of achieving the government's aims; but there were also those to whom Marxist–Leninist doctrines were unattractive, either because of their materialistic basis or because they were alien to Somali tradition, and those who regarded Soviet assistance as a necessary but distasteful means of achieving their ends. There were areas where Soviet and Somali policies appeared to coincide, for example, in support of African liberation movements in the mid-1970s, but there is no evidence that the Somali government was following a Soviet lead rather than belatedly joining the majority of African governments. There were also areas where the Soviet Union had virtually no influence, including some of major Somali activity, such as the mass literacy campaign following the introduction of a written Somali language. Where the Russians were major aid donors they naturally had influence, but this was more on the lines of 'how it should be done' rather than 'what should be done': they were certainly not drawing up the country's development plans. The fact that Soviet aid projects were far from universally successful, and compared unfavourably with some Chinese and Western projects, militated against Russian influence. Soviet diplomats and advisers had easy access to senior members of the regime, and were well informed of what was happening; their influence in training the National Security Service was particularly valuable here, but it would be wrong to imagine that they dictated policy.

In the military field it was, before the Ogaden war, generally assumed that Soviet advisers were so closely involved on the staff that the Somali armed forces would be unable to mount a major operation without their involvement. The Ogaden war showed that this view was incorrect. One means by which the Soviet Union was able to exercise firm control was by its hold on spare parts and ammunition. The Somali armed forces were unable to sustain their campaign in the Ogaden in large measure because the Soviet Union had ceased supplying ammunition for their weapons. For

similar reasons, after the break with the Soviet Union the meat-packing plant soon ground to a halt for lack of spare parts. But the fact that the Soviet Union was unable to prevent Somali involvement in the Ogaden underlines the limits of its influence, as does the ease with which it was sent packing in November 1977. Nor must one underestimate the element of xenophobia in the Somali character, and the resentment of Somalis at any appearance of being given orders by an outsider.

What did the Soviet Union gain in return for its heavy investment in Somalia? The use of Somali ports and airfields for its naval and air forces is one obvious advantage. The extent and nature of the Soviet-built facilities at Berbera were the subject of much controversy, which has never been satisfactorily resolved. By building up, almost from nothing, the Somali armed forces, the Soviet Union certainly introduced a new element into the politics of the Horn, although in the event Soviet and Cuban troops were to be a decisive factor in destroying these forces. By involving itself in an area much of which was, initially, Western- or conservative Arab-oriented, the Soviet Union probably saw an opportunity to exert influence there and to damage Western interests.

In its first years, the government of Siad Barre concentrated on Somalia's internal problems; in external affairs it continued the low profile of its predecessor. After a period of consolidation at home, the government devoted more attention to foreign affairs. In 1974 Somalia joined the Arab League and was host to the OAU. The government became prominent in African affairs, actively supporting independence movements.

In this context it turned to the pan-Somali question. While it had, since the 1969 coup, paid lip service to the liberation of Somalis living under alien rule, it had shown moderation in its actions. French Somaliland became independent, as the Republic of Djibouti, on 26 June 1977, under an ethnic Somali president, with France retaining military facilities. The newly independent government gave no commitment on the possibility of future union with Somalia; in view of the fact that its existence was so dependent on its relations with its two neighbours, and on the delicate relations between the two ethnic sections of its population, it was hardly in a position to do so, particularly against the background of deteriorating Somali–Ethiopian relations.

Ethiopian control over the Somalis in the Ogaden had been slight and spasmodic before 1935. Then came the war years, when the Ogaden was ruled first by Italy, then by Britain. Only after the British withdrawal in 1947 (and from the Haud in 1954) did Ethiopia begin to take an active interest in the area; the fact that there had been, and continued to be, a border dispute may have made them the more determined to exercise firm control. (The fact that drilling for oil was taking place was another factor.) Ethiopian control was in the main confined to such towns as there were; in the rural areas the Somalis continued their traditional way of life, disturbed only by the occasional foray by Ethiopian troops. This assertion of authority led to a revival of Ogaden national feeling, and there were armed clashes, and a brief war in 1964, between the Ethiopians and the inhabitants of the Ogaden. Simultaneously, in the neighbouring Ethiopian province of Bale a similar opposition to Amhara rule was being carried on by the Oromo, who are closely related to the Somali. This movement was defeated by the Ethiopians in 1970, and many Oromo fled to Somalia, where they were not entirely welcome. Similarly, the Somali government was cool in its support—certainly support in practical terms—for the Ogaden liberation movement, the Western Somali Liberation Front.

However, in the mid-1970s events in Ethiopia led to a change of attitude. For a time, after the fall of Haile Selassie, it seemed uncertain whether the country would hold together; the war in Eritrea was going badly from the government's point of view, a new and successful Oromo campaign was launched, this time under the WSLF flag, while Ethiopia's relations with the United States had deteriorated sharply, and the latter, the traditional furnisher of arms, was by February 1977 withholding military supplies. The fact that the new Ethiopian regime nominally shared many of the objectives of its Somali neighbour did not lead to any identity of view about the Ogaden. Somali overtures came to nothing, and in March 1977 Castro proposed a loose socialist federation embracing both Somalia and Ethiopia, with unspecified autonomy for the Ogaden. This solution would clearly have been an attractive one from the Soviet point of view, leaving it in a strong position in both the major countries of the Horn, enjoying the strategic advantages of both countries and being their principal arms supplier; it would also have placed both the West and China in a subsidiary position in the area. But it was not to be—the gap between what the Ethiopians were prepared to concede and what the Somalis wanted in the way of local autonomy for the Ogaden, and the timing of any such devolution, were problems too great for this solution to have any chance of success.

Time was running out for Somalia in the spring of 1977. Ethiopia may have been in difficulty but Mengistu visited Moscow in May, a secret military agreement was negotiated, and shortly afterwards a large peasant army, carrying Russian arms, appeared. A visit to Moscow by Siad Barre and attempts at OAU mediation, both in August, were unproductive of results, the former failing to halt increasing Soviet support for Ethiopia, the latter foundering on the Ethiopian refusal to agree to self-determination in the Ogaden. Ethiopia broke off diplomatic relations with Somalia in September.

The liberation movement was by this time in control of much of the Ogaden. Then, towards the end of the year, stalemate set in. Somali and WSLF forces were operating along over-extended lines of communication and were beginning to experience shortages of spare parts and ammunition: the Soviet Union had reduced, and in October 1977 stopped, supplies, while Siad Barre had failed to find a major alternative supplier of arms. On the other side, the presence of Soviet and Cuban military advisers and the growing influx of Soviet weapons transformed the Ethiopian military capability. The major Soviet airlift began in November, supplemented by a sealift from Aden. This massive exercise involved some 1,500 Soviet advisers, around 2,000 advisers and technicians from Eastern Europe, mainly East Germany, and about 13,000 Cuban troops. The Ethiopian counterattack began in February 1978 and rapidly expelled Somali and Liberation Front troops from the Ogaden. Siad Barre announced on 9 March that Somali forces were being withdrawn from the Ogaden.

Until a late stage, the Somalis claimed (although the Ethiopians contested the assertion) that only Liberation Front forces were involved in the fighting. The extent of Somali backing for the Front varied from time to time, from providing refuge in moments of need to full military support. As the guerrilla war escalated in 1977 Somali assistance increased, both in the supply of arms and in the despatch of members of the Somali armed forces to operate alongside the Front, although this took place on an individual, rather than a unit basis. Many in the Somali army (from Siad Barre downwards) had family connections with the Ogaden, and it is not surprising that they were given leave to help their kinsmen. Only in February 1978 did Somalia formally announce the entry of its regular forces into the war, in a vain

attempt to halt the Ethiopian advance. This they were unable to achieve, and they returned within their own borders, although guerrilla fighting continued in the Ogaden.

By this time, Somalia's relations with the Soviet Union had undergone a profound change. The Russians were less than popular in Somalia, both individually and because they were associated with the less liberal aspects of Siad Barre's regime, but they had been tolerated as the suppliers of military equipment. The Somali government had been apprehensive of the Soviet Union's growing friendship with Ethiopia. When the Soviet Union began supplying arms to Ethiopia, in contravention of the Somali–Soviet friendship treaty, and restricting supplies to Somalia, it gave the Somalis food for thought, as did the realization, during the Ogaden fighting, that the Russians had inside knowledge of the Somali armed forces, their order of battle, their capabilities and deficiencies. Siad Barre's visit to Moscow in August 1977 failed to achieve any modification of the Soviet Union's policies, and the Somali government was at this time sounding out some of the Western and Arab states about the possibility of their supplying, or financing the supply of, arms to Somalia. On 13 November 1977 Somalia abrogated its treaty of friendship with Soviet Union, all military facilities were withdrawn, all Soviet advisers were ordered to leave within seven days, and the Soviet embassy was greatly reduced in numbers. At the same time Somalia broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The break with the Soviet Union was welcomed by most Somalis, although some considered that Siad Barre should have waited to find new friends before breaking with the old. The arguments in favour of the break were obvious; a treaty of friendship is of little advantage if one's partner is sending military supplies and advice to a country with which one is in a virtual state of war, the more so if the continuation of the treaty may inhibit other countries from coming to one's assistance. Siad Barre's line with the West and some of the Arabs that 'the Soviet Union is trying to destabilize the Horn and neighbouring countries; I am resisting them; what are you going to do to help me?' was hardly convincing while Somalia still had a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.

There were, nevertheless, several arguments for not breaking the treaty. There was the negative point of being off with the old love before a new one was in sight. There was also the hope either that the Soviet Union might swing back in support of Somalia or that, by virtue of its position of strength in the Horn, it could impose a settlement in the Ogaden which would be acceptable to Somalia. These hopes appeared increasingly unrealistic in view of the massive Soviet build-up in Ethiopia. It is however significant that, while it abrogated the treaty of friendship, Somalia did not break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, as it did with Cuba, and that contacts continued after the abrogation. The Somalis perhaps thought that it was in the Soviet Union's interest to be on good terms with all the countries of the Horn, and that it was the only power with sufficient influence there to impose a regional solution.

International repercussions

The international implications of the struggle in the Horn were considerable. As regards the Arab world, Somalia had since 1974 been a member of the Arab League, was the recipient of much aid and assistance from several Arab countries, and its population was predominantly Muslim. While a sizeable proportion of Ethiopia's

population was Muslim, the traditional Amhara rulers were mainly Christian, and some of the Arab states had supported the liberation movements in Eritrea against the Ethiopian government because they were Muslim. (This in turn led to the unlikely spectacle of Israel supporting Ethiopia to prevent the Red Sea becoming an Arab lake.) Some of the conservative Arab states had been urging Somalia to loosen its ties with the Soviet Union, both because they were suspicious of Soviet motives and because of the alleged incompatibility of Islam and Marxism–Leninism. Siad Barre maintained that there was no clash between his policy of scientific socialism and Islam, but he certainly began to have suspicions about Soviet policy. Hope that a break with the Soviet Union would lead to increased Arab aid and support was no doubt a factor in the decision to abrogate the treaty. However, while some of the Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, did step up their assistance following the break, Somalia was in general disappointed by the Arab response. Some of the more militant and left-wing Arabs were inclined to back the new revolutionary Ethiopian regime and its Soviet allies rather than Somalia. Most of the Arab countries, except to some extent Egypt, were not in a position to supply military assistance. The Arab League, meeting in Cairo while the Ogaden war was in progress, was less warm in its support of Somalia than the latter would have liked.

The weight of African opinion was in favour of Ethiopia rather than Somalia. The latter was in African eyes the aggressor, bent on altering frontiers by force. Kenya in particular was disturbed, feeling that if the Somalis achieved their aims in the Ogaden, the NFD would be the next region to come under threat. On the wider issue there was some apprehension about the scale and nature of the Cuban intervention, about the involvement of outside forces in an essentially African dispute, and irritation at Africa's inability to solve its own problems, but the argument that Soviet/Cuban forces were in Ethiopia at the invitation of the latter's government, and that these forces were helping to defend its boundaries from aggression, carried greater weight. The fact that the Soviet Union had agreed to give military support to the Derg months before Ethiopia's frontiers were crossed was ignored.

The Chinese maintained a low profile. Although China welcomed Somalia's break with the Soviet Union ('a daring act by a dauntless people to safeguard national sovereignty and independence') and took over the Fanole irrigation project from the Russians after they were expelled, it held to its policy of not becoming involved militarily.

The West found itself in a difficult position as a result of the crisis in the Horn. In the mid-1970s relations between most Western countries and Somalia had been cool, although the aid programme financed by the European Development Fund was maintained. The bilateral content of the relationship between Somalia and most of the Western nations was, except in the case of Italy, slight; the foreign policy and rhetoric of Siad Barre's regime tended to be anti-Western, and life was not made easy for Western diplomats. Then, as Somalia began to be disillusioned with the Soviet Union, and as the West's relations with the new Ethiopian regime deteriorated, the two sides moved closer. The West was obviously interested in any development which reduced Soviet influence, while Somalia was on the lookout for new friends and allies. However, the change was not an easy one to make. Somalia's aim was to secure arms and political support by portraying its struggle as one against Soviet intervention in the Horn. The rest of the world did not see the matter in that light: to them the struggle appeared a local one, with Somalia the aggressor; the rights and wrongs of the Somali/Ethiopian border were a secondary consideration, and the Soviet/Cuban forces were in Ethiopia at the invitation of her government.

The West therefore reacted cautiously to Somali approaches in the spring and summer of 1977 about the possibility of supplying arms. It did not wish to find itself with the majority of African opinion against it, or to alienate countries such as Kenya, where Western interests were so much greater than they were in Somalia. There has been speculation that a positive US reaction to Somali approaches encouraged Siad Barre to become involved in the Ogaden war, but this appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of what was on offer. There was an improvement in Somalia's relations with the West: Britain, the United States and West Germany resumed or increased their non-military aid programmes, but the visible signs of the improvement came only after Somali troops had withdrawn from the Ogaden. Siad Barre visited West Germany, Britain, France and Italy in the spring and summer of 1978, and an agreement on the supply of military assistance by the United States, in return for limited facilities in Somalia, was concluded in 1980.

It is clear, then, that the country most involved in the Horn, first in Somalia and subsequently in Ethiopia, was the Soviet Union. Was the switch of support from one country to the other a deliberate act of policy or was it the result of events which the Soviet Union either had not foreseen or over which it had no control?

When the Soviet Union first became involved in the Horn and provided military assistance to Somalia, all the latter's neighbours were Western-oriented—Djibouti was still a French colony, Kenya had just ceased to be a British one, Ethiopia had close ties with the United States in particular and the West generally. There was therefore little likelihood of the Soviet Union being able to make much headway in any of these countries. It turned to Somalia, rather as Somalia turned to it, because the West seemed so firmly established in Somalia's neighbours. After the fall of Haile Selassie the West's relations with Ethiopia deteriorated and the Ethiopian regime moved to the left in both internal and external policy. How was the Soviet Union to react to this situation? It would have been unrealistic to expect it to rebuff or neglect Ethiopia because it had a treaty of friendship with Somalia. The Soviet Union may have underestimated the extent of the differences between Ethiopia and Somalia and have thought that, since the regimes in both countries now seemed of similar ideological complexion, the differences between them could be overcome—with Soviet assistance if necessary. Again, the Soviet Union may have thought that Somalia would not be prepared to break with it because of the difficulties it would face in finding new friends. The Soviet Union wanted, if possible, to retain its influence in Somalia and, at the same time, gain influence in Ethiopia. Hence the attraction of the ideas of a loosely federated Horn which were floated by Cuba in March 1977.

These ideas came to naught, mainly because the course of events in Ethiopia which led the regime there to closer links with the Soviet Union also provided the temptation to Somalia to attempt to gain control of the Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia. The Soviet Union was, in spite of its efforts, unable to prevent Somalia using its Soviet-supplied arms first to support the WSLF in the Ogaden and then to become involved in the war there. Faced with the success of the Liberation Front in the Ogaden war in autumn 1977, the Soviet Union had two alternatives—to do nothing, or to become more heavily involved militarily on the Ethiopian side. To have done nothing would have meant the abandonment of all prospect of gaining influence in Ethiopia; it might have led to the disintegration of Ethiopia itself. This was not an attractive proposition to the Soviet Union: some of the likely successor regimes, for example that in Eritrea, were not to Soviet taste, nor could the Soviet Union be certain of Somali gratitude for having supplied the arms which enabled it to

win control of the Ogaden. There was also the consideration that African opinion might well have considered the Soviet Union responsible for the dismemberment of Ethiopia because it had supplied and trained the Somali armed forces and thus enabled them to change frontiers by force.

So the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in Ethiopia, hoping and perhaps thinking that it could at the same time retain its position in Somalia. If, as turned out to be the case, it was necessary to choose between the two, Ethiopia had certain advantages. There is the point, made above, that in the Ogaden conflict Somalia appeared to be the aggressor, and the Soviet Union did not wish to be cast in the role of its supporter. Also, Ethiopia has twice the area and nine times the population of Somalia, and enjoyed a far greater position and prestige in Africa. Ethiopia's lack of an Indian Ocean coastline was compensated for by its more central position on the African continent and its proximity to areas of Soviet strategic concern across the Red Sea. The Soviet Union may also have thought that the struggling Derg would be a more compliant partner than Siad Barre. It can have had little illusion about the difficulties of dealing with the Somali leader, nor did it trust his increasing links with the conservative Arabs. The Ethiopian regime, on the other hand, looked at first sight a more dependent potential partner. The historical ties between Russia and Ethiopia, and a certain similarity in their histories and backgrounds—Czar and Emperor; Orthodox and Coptic Christianity; neo-feudalism—may also have influenced Soviet thinking. Of ideological considerations, in any Marxist–Leninist sense, there is little sign.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is, in many ways, the odd man out of Africa. Apart from a few years after the Italian invasion in 1935, it was never a European colony; it had recorded contacts with the outside world going back several centuries; almost half the population are Coptic Christians; its social structure has changed little. This unusual background gave Ethiopia a fascination to both Europeans and Africans, not to mention the West Indian Rastafarians.

The country is about 395,000 square miles in area and has a population estimated at 31 million—the third most populous country in Africa. The majority (80 per cent) of the population live in the temperate mountains and plateaux in the centre of the country. The dominant ethnic group, although in a minority, are the Amharic and Tigre speakers. Various Ethiopian states can be identified from the first century AD, not always with the same centre, and with wide variations in authority. The Coptic religion remained dominant in the highlands in spite of intermittent pressure from Islamic forces on three sides of the country, and in the second half of the nineteenth century a relatively strong state developed, with much the same boundaries as present-day Ethiopia. It was partly because of this strength, and partly because of differences of interests among Britain, France and Italy, that Ethiopia was not colonized at that period, and it was because of this strength that the frontiers were drawn where they were, to include within them peoples over whom the Ethiopians had little or no traditional authority.

Ethiopia is a diverse country in terms of people and religion. No single ethnic group accounts for half the population, nor does a single religion dominate: the numbers of Muslims and Christians are roughly equal, and the Oromos are as numerous as the Amharic speakers.

One area which has been both within and without Ethiopian frontiers in the past century is Eritrea. Lying along the Red Sea, with little homogeneity itself, it became an Italian colony in the 1860s and after 1935 was administered with Ethiopia first by the Italians, then by the British. There was much discussion about its postwar status, discussion in which the wishes of the Eritreans seemed often to be of secondary significance: should it become independent of, federated to or assimilated by Ethiopia? The solution agreed by the international community was a loose federation with Ethiopia, which the latter converted into amalgamation in 1962. A fierce war has been waged by various Eritrean groups against the Ethiopians, with varying success and with heterogeneous outside support, ever since, and the fighting still goes on.

For more than half a century before 1974, Ethiopia was, except for the brief period of Italian occupation, ruled by the Emperor Haile Selassie. The country had little of the apparatus of a modern state, and the extent of the Emperor's authority varied both in time and place. It had been obvious for some time before 1974 that change was inevitable, but the nature of the country and Haile Selassie's reluctance to make sweeping changes in the last years of his reign made it difficult to predict its nature. Behind the facade of the legendary Ethiopia all was not well. The majority of the population lived by subsistence agriculture under a complicated system of land tenure; the absence of means of communication meant that three quarters of the farms were more than half a day's walk from the nearest road, and that famine in one province could not be relieved even if there was plenty in the next.

This is not the place to analyse the causes or chart the course of the revolution which began in 1974. That course, often bloody, seems to have been determined by way of reaction to the situation in the country rather than by ideological conviction. The opposition to Haile Selassie in the latter years of his reign was not exclusively revolutionary or leftist. There was no communist party in Ethiopia, and most left-wingers were in exile. There was a widespread feeling among articulate Ethiopians that it was time for a change, although the nature and extent of this change had not been thought through.

The events which sparked off the revolution occurred in the armed forces, and it was a military government which replaced the emperor, although not as a result of a coup. The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) was established in September 1974. It met in full on only a handful of occasions, and at first directed the government from outside. However, from 1977 onwards its personnel were increasingly integrated into the ministries and provincial administration as well as into the new political structures. At the end of 1979 a new cabinet system was introduced in which PMAC members assumed ministerial positions for the first time. The all important Committee, or Derg, was composed of representatives of all the military units in the country. None was above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and some were haphazardly chosen. This body, originally 126 strong, has developed into a structured executive body. None of its members who have been killed or who have fled have been replaced, nor have those who remain ever been subject to reelection. Ideologically, the Derg has changed from a heterogeneous body, agreeing on little more than 'Etiopia Tikden' (Ethiopia first) to one advocating Marxism–Leninism. In its early days the Derg was rent by a series of internal conflicts, in most of which those on the losing side were killed. The main issues appear to have been how to deal with Eritrea and what relationship to establish with civilian opposition groups. Out of this infighting Mengistu emerged as undisputed leader of the PMAC.

The regime's internal policies favoured a more centralized and interventionist state than the old. The provincial power holders of imperial days were swept away, their place being gradually taken by nominees of the centre. Extensive measures of land reform were introduced. Building on the emperor's policies, the government took the leading place in the economy, and by the end of the 1970s had erected a system of state controls and centralized planning. By 1977 the regime was talking of a transition to socialism. However, there were inevitable limits to the extent of the changes, particularly in the rural areas.

There was much discussion, in the later 1970s, about the establishment of a political party. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies encouraged the drive towards this end; its main advocates within the PMAC were a group led by Legassie Asfaw and Fikre Selassie Wogdress, who had been on courses in the Soviet Union. The resistance of Mengistu and his supporters to the early establishment of a party seems to have arisen because they did not want power in the new party to pass into the hands of this pro-Soviet faction.

The establishment of COPWE (Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia) at the end of 1979 appeared to signal the end of discussion within the PMAC about the establishment of a party. Although membership of COPWE was on an individual basis, this in practice gave more control to the PMAC leadership. Eighty of the 123 full and candidate members were from the armed forces or police and the seven members of the Executive Committee were members of the PMAC Standing Committee. All fourteen provincial committees of COPWE were headed by PMAC members. None of the mass organizations established by the regime was represented.

Ethiopia had, over the years, and in different ways, maintained relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The relationship with America dated from the Second World War. In 1953 a military assistance agreement was signed, under the terms of which the United States trained and equipped the Ethiopian armed forces. Between 1951 and 1976 Ethiopia received over $350 million in economic and $279 million in military aid, while over 3,000 Ethiopian military personnel trained in the United States. Also in the postwar years a large US communications station was established at Asmara (Kagnew).

In this period, Ethiopia was probably the United States' closest ally in black Africa. The relationship began when Ethiopia was one of the few independent African states, and one whose policy was generally anti-communist. It developed as Ethiopia played a larger part in world and African affairs—contributing to UN forces in Korea, becoming host to the headquarters of the OAU. US policy became more favourably disposed towards the Ethiopian government, its relations with which was one of the contributory factors to US reluctance to supply arms to newly independent Somalia; a new US-Ethiopian military agreement, concluded in 1960, contained a commitment to Ethiopia's territorial integrity. The US government also modified its stand on Eritrea, moving towards support of the idea of federation with Ethiopia, and not protesting at the forced amalgamation in 1962.

The early 1970s saw changes in US–Ethiopian relations. The Kagnew communications station was of less importance as a result of developments in satellite communications and in Diego Garcia: US personnel there fell from over 3,000 in 1971 to 35 in 1976. When Ethiopia broke off relations with Israel in October 1973 its usefulness as an ally in the Middle East was reduced. The obviously unsettled state of Ethiopia led the US administration to keep its distance from Haile Selassie in his

later years, and on his last visit to Washington in May 1973 his request for new jet aircraft and tanks was refused. The fall of Haile Selassie brought little change in US–Ethiopian relations at first. While there was more than one school of thought on the subject, Washington's line, until early 1977, was not to oppose the Derg. This was mainly for foreign policy reasons: since the Soviet Union was still supporting Somalia it was thought that the United States should continue to back Ethiopia, and Washington had no wish to see Eritrea break away from Ethiopia.

When the change in the US attitude came in 1977 it was for both internal and external reasons. By this time the nature of the Derg had become more obvious, and the fact that the controlling influence had fallen into the hands of Mengistu had paved the way for closer relations with the Soviet Union. The advent of the Carter administration led to increased emphasis on human rights issues, a field in which the Derg did not score high marks. Externally, the Arab states, led by Sudan, were taking a more hostile stand towards the Derg, while Somalia's ties with the Soviet Union were weakening, and March 1977 saw the failure of Castro's attempt at mediation in the Horn. In February 1977 the American Secretary of State announced that because of human rights violations US military aid to Ethiopia was to be reduced. In April the Derg ordered all US-run installations to close, and the United States suspended arms supplies.

Ethiopia is the African country with which Russia has the longest-standing ties, predating the 1917 revolution. Russian aims in the area were at that time primarily strategic, designed to limit the influence of Western European states— particularly Britain. Repeated efforts were made to establish a Russian presence on what is now the coast of Eritrea. A Cossack, N. I. Ashinov, attempted to found a 'new Moscow' colony at Tajura Bay at the entrance to the Red Sea in 1888–9. This venture was without official Russian backing, and failed because of opposition from the French. More official delegations visited Ethiopia in 1890–1 and were favourably received by Menelik II. An Ethiopian mission, largely military in composition, visited Russia in 1895 and returned with arms and promises of military and diplomatic cooperation. A Russian officer acted as military adviser to the Emperor in the campaign which culminated in the defeat of the Italians at Adowa in March 1896. (When he visited Moscow in 1959, Haile Selassie recalled the valuable aid which Russia had given his country at a critical point of its struggle against imperialism.) After that battle a Russian Red Cross mission visited Addis Ababa and set up a Russian hospital which survived for many years. Russia also established diplomatic relations with Addis Ababa, and Russian officers served in Menelik's army, some of them engaged in survey work which helped to establish the frontiers of Ethiopia. However, Russian interest in Africa waned in the early years of this century, partly because of the realignment of alliances, partly because of Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905.

Nor did the Soviet authorities, in the early years of the revolution, devote special attention to the Horn. Africa was not high on the list of Soviet priorities, although some notice was paid to anti-colonial and revolutionary movements. The fact that Ethiopia was, until it was overrun by Italy, one of the few non-colonial territories in Africa meant that it received less attention. The Soviet Union did try to interest the Western democracies in Ethiopia when Italy invaded it, but this was for anti-fascist rather than for African reasons.

In the postwar discussions on the future of the Horn, the Soviet Union opposed the 'Bevin plan' for a Somalia containing the majority of ethnic Somalis within its

boundaries, mainly because it regarded this as an attempt at colonial expansion by Britain—a view shared by the United States.

The Soviet Union's relations with Haile Selassie were correct but cool. It opened an embassy in Addis Ababa in 1956, and in 1959 Haile Selassie was the first African head of state to visit Moscow. The Soviet Union provided a loan of $102 million, and tried, without success, to win Ethiopia over to the non-aligned movement. It gave no encouragement to the opposition to Haile Selassie and welcomed his return after the attempted coup in 1960.

The Soviet Union's initial reaction to the 1974 coup was one of caution. It urged on the Derg the desirability of going slowly over land reform. While it supported the Ethiopian approach to Eritrea, it insisted that a solution must be achieved by peaceful means. The PMAC itself was at first divided in its attitude towards the Soviet Union—for some members close links with the Soviet Union were a natural reaction against US support of Haile Selassie; for others the Soviet Union's support of Somalia was an inhibiting factor. The PMAC requested military assistance from the Soviet Union in September 1974, but initially the latter offered only economic aid and short training courses, presumably because it still had doubts about the Derg and because it did not want to antagonize Somalia. There was however a gradual improvement in relations, which accelerated after Mengistu's emergence as the dominant force in the Derg in February 1977. By this time Ethiopia's links with the United States and Israel were either weaker or broken and the Soviet Union's relations with Somalia had cooled.

In October 1977 the Soviet Union announced that it was ceasing to supply arms to Somalia. Until then the level of Soviet military assistance had been limited, and no Soviet or Cuban personnel appear to have been engaged in military operations. But after Somalia's break with the Soviet Union and Cuba in November, a large-scale airlift of Soviet equipment to Ethiopia began, and in December Cuban troops began to arrive.

Both Soviet and Cuban military forces were involved in the subsequent fighting with Somalia in the Ogaden. This fighting cemented the alliance, and an estimated $1·5 billion worth of equipment was supplied by the Soviet Union to Ethiopia. In September 1978 an economic aid agreement was signed, followed in November by a twenty-year friendship and cooperation treaty, which stressed respect for 'territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers'.

Conclusions

The Soviet Union has been actively involved in the Horn for just over twenty years. During that period the two largest countries in the region have each experienced a major change of government and a 'socialist revolution', there has been a war between the two, and their international alliances are now the reverse of what they were at the beginning of the period. To what extent are these dramatic changes due to Soviet influence?

In both Ethiopia and Somalia a newly established military regime has attempted to change the course of the country's development. In the case of Ethiopia this involved the abolition of the empire and an attempt to introduce a more modern and centralized state apparatus. However, this is still of an ad hoc nature. Progress towards the establishment of a party has been slow, and the composition of the all powerful Derg is haphazard in the extreme, both in its original selection and in the nature of the survivors. The structure of government in Somalia is rather more

formalized, with a written constitution and organized party, but again the objective has been the development of a more centralized administration and a greater degree of government intervention. In both countries these developments have been by way of reaction to the internal situation which the new governments faced, and are not dissimilar from changes which have taken place in other African countries. Some of the forces and styles of government in Somalia, and to a lesser extent in Ethiopia, bear similarities to the Soviet model, but these are superficial and coincidental rather than the result of direct Soviet influence. Nor is there any certainty that the present forms in the two countries will endure. Ethiopia is still in an unsettled state in the aftermath of the 1974 coup, while after Siad Barre's departure from the Somali scene the form of government there may well be different.

Soviet influence on the foreign policies of Somalia and Ethiopia has also been limited. It is not surprising that radical regimes should in many cases look at international issues in a similar way to the Soviet Union; Somalia in the early and mid-1970s, and Ethiopia later, often found themselves siding with the Soviet Union. But there was no automatic following of the Soviet lead. Somalia became a member of the Arab League, and held the chairmanship of the OAU quite independently of Soviet influence, while its major foreign policy decision—support of the liberation movements in the Ogaden—was contrary to Soviet wishes. Ethiopia was one of the few countries (Angola and Mozambique were others) which voted against the General Assembly resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1980, but it has not been wholly subservient to Soviet interests.

During the period in which Somalia and Ethiopia had treaties of friendship with the Soviet Union they maintained their diplomatic links with the West and with China. Somalia's relations with the West were cool during the mid-1970s, but they were not broken off. There was some bilateral aid, notably from Italy, while aid from the European Community and from China continued on a large scale. A similar pattern emerges in Ethiopia a few years later: relations with the West are cool, but maintained, and European Community aid continues. Indeed, most of Ethiopia's trade and non-military aid comes from Western and international sources rather than from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Both Ethiopia and Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for military aid. In the case of Somalia the approach occurred fairly soon after independence, when Somali armed forces were almost non-existent, and it took place because the Soviet Union offered a larger package of military assistance than the West. The build-up was gradual, but the end result, after a period of fifteen years, was that Somalia's armed forces were among the largest on the continent. Without such forces Somalia could not have embarked on its intervention in the Ogaden.

The Ethiopian approach took place in different circumstances, when its relations with her traditional supplier of arms were in decline. The Soviet Union's reaction to the request was initially cautious and by the time it was met on any scale Ethiopia was engaged in war with Somalia. The Soviet and Cuban involvement was far greater in Ethiopia than it had ever been in Somalia, and was undoubtedly a major factor in determining the outcome of the conflict. The Cuban contribution was decisive. It is most improbable that the Soviet Union would have wished to commit large numbers of its military personnel in Africa, and Soviet advisers and equipment could not, in the short term, have enabled the Ethiopians to turn back the Somalis. The Cubans would have been ineffective without Soviet material and logistic support, but between them they changed the course of the conflict.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was the principal supplier of arms to Ethiopia, the Soviet Union to Somalia; the two countries were thought of, in very general terms, as being respectively in the American and Soviet camps. This pattern changed as US–Ethiopian relations cooled, at first gradually, and then more rapidly after the 1974 coup. The culmination took place in late 1977, when Somalia abrogated its treaty with the Soviet Union, the latter ceased supplying arms to her and instead gave massive military support to Ethiopia. The Soviet Union concluded a treaty of friendship with Ethiopia in November 1978, and later Somalia made an agreement with the United States.

To what extent, in this reversal of alliances, were the parties acting voluntarily? Certainly Somalia's decision to break with the Soviet Union was voluntary, arising from what it saw as the Soviet Union's support of its arch-enemy. The Ethiopians had slightly less room for manoeuvre, in that they were in desperate need of arms, and the Soviet Union looked to be the most promising source of supply. The switch of alliance was probably one which the Soviet Union would have preferred to avoid, hoping to remain on good terms with both Ethiopia and Somalia. It delayed formally choosing between the two, and it was the Somalis who took the decision for them by abrogating the treaty of friendship.

Soviet leverage, formerly in Somalia, now in Ethiopia, was and is limited. To remain in either country against the wishes of its government, even if that were possible, would undermine its position in Africa and in the Third World generally. The only effective threat at the disposal of the Soviet Union would be to cut off arms supplies, but this threat proved ineffective in Somalia, and if executed would probably lead to the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the country to which it was applied. It is arguable that the Soviet Union could have held a pistol to the head of the Ethiopian government at the end of 1977 and the beginning of 1978 when the latter was in retreat in the Ogaden and in desparate need of military assistance. However, this is a somewhat hypothetical argument, since it would not have been in the Soviet interest to see Ethiopia defeated in the Ogaden.

The Soviet presence in the Horn has been of comparatively short duration. The treaty of friendship with Somalia lasted little longer than three years, and that with Ethiopia was signed only in November 1978. The Soviet presence in Somalia and Ethiopia was never large enough to dominate either country. The most the Soviet Union hoped for was to establish a type of 'indirect rule' through compliant local rulers. Even in this aim they were not conspicuously successful. Neither the Somali nor the Ethiopian government has shown itself eager to follow the Soviet lead unquestioningly. Both showed determination to deal with their own problems in their own way. When it was convenient to follow Soviet advice they followed it; when not, not. The Somali government went against Soviet wishes in its involvement in the Ogaden, the Ethiopian government in its handling of Eritrea and in delaying the creation of a party. Perhaps the most telling example of the limitation of Soviet influence is the ease with which Somalia abrogated its treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in November 1977, and the slight effect which the departure, at seven days' notice, of large numbers of Soviet advisers had on the running of the country or of the armed forces.

The Arabs and the southern African problem

OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN*

Until July 1952, when Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and a group of young army officers seized power from King Farouk of Egypt, Egyptian leaders and Arab Africans had paid little or no attention to political issues affecting Africans living south of the Sahara. This article examines the historical development of Arab attitudes and opinions on the southern African problem, from the articulations of Nasser in the 1950s to the rhetoric of Colonel Qadhafi in the 1980s. Attention will be given to Arab support for liberation movements in the southern parts of Africa, especially those in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, and to the voting records of Arab states at the United Nations on issues relating to the southern African problem.

Nasser and the beginnings of involvement

Any discussion of Arab attitudes and opinions on sub-Saharan Africa in general and the southern African problem in particular must go back to the Egyptian coup in July 1952. Before this date, the Arab world had observed the invisible 'keep off' signs erected by the colonial powers in Africa; but with Nasser's rise to power came a significant shift in Egyptian policy. Nasser felt himself under an obligation to lend moral, material, political and psychological support to Africans fighting against colonial domination, imperialism and apartheid. He also believed that he had 'the responsibility to carry out the historically and geopolitically significant role of gatekeeper of Africa's northern borders'.[1] Nasser was a true nationalist; this factor was fundamental to his appreciation of the interrelationship between the Arab world and African issues in general, and the southern African problem in particular. It has been pointed out that Nasser, in his *The philosophy of the revolution*, envisaged Egypt as the centre of three concentric circles, in each of which Egypt had a significant role to play, namely the Arab world, the Islamic world and Africa. As a true nationalist, Nasser committed himself and Egypt to full participation in matters connected with all three. In *The philosophy of the revolution* he wrote:

> We cannot, in any way, stand aside, even if we wish to, from the sanguinary and dreadful struggle now raging in the heart of the continent between five million whites and two hundred million blacks [this was the total African population in 1959; 420 million in 1980]. We cannot do so for one principal and clear reason—we ourselves are in Africa.[2]

What Nasser meant was that sub-Saharan Africa was an important part of the Egyptian political landscape and he and his fellow Free Officers were determined to join the Africans in their struggle for independence. Nasser proceeded to give

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1. Ali A. Mazrui, *Africa's international relations the diplomacy of dependency and change* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1977), p. 135.
2. Gamal Abdul Nasser, *The philosophy of the revolution* (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959), p. 74.

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material, moral, political and propaganda support to various nationalist groups i African colonies south of the Sahara. Egypt opened its educational doors to Afı students, providing them with scholarships in various subjects. Training facil were provided for militant and nationalist groups from Angola, Kenya, Rhodesia South Africa.[3]

Nasser's awareness of the Arab–African link led to the rediscovery of the Ar connections with black Africans south of the Sahara and even beyond. nationalistic activities and full support for the militant and nationalist movem agitating for independence from their colonial masters led a large section of Wes opinion to regard Nasser as one of the West's worst enemies. According to one Bri newspaper in 1956: 'Who today is Britain's most immediate enemy? Who in whole world does most to obstruct and damage the interests of this country? Tl can be no doubt about the answer. Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, Prime Ministe Egypt.'[4] According to Professor Ali Mazrui, many white settlers in the then colo of Kenya and Rhodesia were in agreement with this opinion.[5]

After the Algerian war from 1954 to 1962, which finally led to Alge independence in July 1962, the former Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella joined v Nasser's Egypt in championing the Arab cause in black Africa during the nation movements of the 1960s in those southern African territories still under colonial r Both presidents, Ben Bella and Nasser, were willing to provide moral supp material and training facilities to southern African liberation movements, and g the Arab world a significant presence in the southern African struggle against w minority hegemony. The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 was motivatec Nasser's Arab nationalism and his view of Egypt as the emerging leader of the Ar in the new international diplomacy of the postwar world.

The Afrikaner Nationalist government in South Africa saw President Nasser source of new imperialism in Africa as well as the symbol of an old nationalism. So Africa's concern, no less than the West's dilemma, focussed on two equ unpalatable possibilities. The first was that if Nasser were allowed to go unchallen and undefeated, this was likely to encourage nationalists elsewhere in Africa tc both more ambitious and more adventurous. This was especially true in south Africa where African resistance and opposition to apartheid, led by the Afri National Congress, was gathering momentum in the 1950s. The second was tha the West sought to frustrate Nasser by force, since persuasion was unlikely tc effective, it would make a hero of the Egyptian leader and so merely fan the fire nationalism. In either case the final outcome was bound seriously to damage, if destroy, the West's and South Africa's position and prestige on the contine

Attention was drawn to the interlinkage between the Suez nationalization Egyptian nationalism by *Die Transvaler*, the leading Afrikaner National P newspaper. In an editorial on 31 July 1956, it commented that not only was So Africa interested in the Middle East situation because it wanted peace in the wo but that the nationalization of the Suez Canal affected South Africa's security.[6] paper pointed out that 'this is all the more the case because the Egyptian decisio the outcome of an awakening nationalism'.[7] The paper spoke of President Nass

3 See Sulayman S. Nyang, 'A study of African opinions on and attitudes towards the Palestine questio Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., *Palestinian rights, affirmation and denial* (Wilmette, Ill., Medina, 1982), p. 1

4 *Sunday Express*, 18 March 1956

5 Mazrui, p. 136

6 *Die Transvaler*, 2 Aug. 1956

7 *Die Transvaler*, 2 Aug. 1956.

designs and deeds in the Middle East, of events at the Suez Canal and in the orchards of the Nile, as matters which could have the profoundest effects on the destinies of the people of South Africa.

Many of the Afrikaner leaders found in the Suez crisis an occasion for renewing their commitment to the Union of South Africa's race policies. The opportunity was provided by the general support for Nasser's nationalism among the black nationalist movements in South Africa, who saw him as the standard-bearer of their emancipation from white oppression and racism.[8]

After the crisis, South Africa's determination to persevere with white minority government was coupled with strong pleas from the Defence Minister, C. F. Erasmus, to the Western powers for a constructive response to South Africa's repeated urgings for the creation of a NATO-style defence pact for southern Africa. The 'SATO' pact suggested by Erasmus in 1956 was to include the Western states plus Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Erasmus was the most persistent advocate of this proposal throughout the 1950s (the idea was revived by the United States during the Angolan conflict of 1975–6).[9] He once argued:

> The alliance of nationalism and communism, of which India, the Arabs under Nasser and the Soviet Union were regarded as the principals, was seen subverting the Western position all over the East, including Africa. The only way in which the West could save itself, physically and spiritually, was in its coming together in a politico-military alliance underpinned by Christian ideology.[10]

Arabs and the southern African problem after Nasser

After Nasser's death in November 1970, Arab involvement in southern African problems took a new turn. Sadat was not as committed to the nationalists' struggle as his predecessor had been; indeed, marked changes in Egyptian foreign policy followed his accession.

Sadat went far beyond Nasser in coming to terms with the existence of the Jewish state. In 1971, he caused widespread astonishment by his willingness to break Arab taboos on Israel in offering to negotiate a peace treaty with the Israelis. He demanded as a precondition that Israel should settle the Palestinian refugee problem and withdraw to pre-1967 borders; it was a surprise move when he went further and openly told a UN special envoy to the Middle East that Egypt was prepared to recognize Israel's 'territorial and political integrity'.[11] In July 1972, Sadat expelled all the Soviet military advisers in Egypt, and subsequently, in March 1976, unilaterally revoked the Egyptian–Soviet friendship and cooperation agreements. These moves were those of a leader looking for Western favour and cooperation.[12] In 1974–5 Henry Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli conflict led to disengagement, withdrawal agreements between Egypt and Israel, and ultimately to

8. *Cape Times*, 29 Sept. 1956

9. In 1976, South American and US officials met in Buenos Aires to discuss 'SATO' proposals. Shortly after this, South African Navy officials visited Washington DC to discuss the results of this meeting. See John Prados, 'Sealanes, Western strategy and Southern Africa' in *US military involvement in Southern Africa* (Boston: West End, 1978), p. 79.

10. *Star* (Johannesburg), 23 Nov., 1956.

11. 'The man who took risks', *Newsweek International*, 19 Oct. 1981, p. 36.

12. By 1979, Egypt was receiving $750 million annually from the US to supplement its budget. After signing the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt was promised another $2·5 million, to be spread over a period between 1979 and 1982. In return, the United States intended to expand the Egyptian military base at Ras Banas and transform it into a launching pad for its Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) that could accommodate warplanes and up to 18,000 troops. See 'US defence umbrella: shelter or storm?', *The Middle East*, Dec. 1980, No. 74, p. 11.

the Camp David Peace Accords of 1978 and the signing of the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty on 26 March 1979.[13]

This 'westward-turn' on Egypt's part had its corollary in changed attitudes towards conflicts in southern Africa. Sadat's Egypt and King Hassan's Morocco both collaborated with the apartheid regime in South Africa in its efforts to overthrow the MPLA during the Angolan second war of liberation of 1975–6. The Moroccan government is collaborating with South Africa in sending arms to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels fighting in southern Angola against the MPLA government. In return for this support, King Hassan's government is receiving US and South African weapons to combat the Polisario nationalist liberation movement, fighting for the independence of the Saharwi Arab Democratic Republic in Western Sahara.[14] Under Sadat, Egyptian government policy towards the southern African liberation movements went contrary to the OAU policy of liberation supported by all the OAU member states, embracing the white racist regime in South Africa and even allowing South African planes to fly American arms from Egyptian bases to the rebel groups fighting against the MPLA in Angola and SWAPO in Namibia.

In the absence, after Nasser, of Egyptian leadership against South Africa, Colonel Qadhafi of Libya claimed to be the hawk among Arab leaders, ready to stand up against the racist and oppressive regime in Pretoria.[15] Along with the Algerian government, the Libyan regime has given financial, material, moral and propaganda support and training facilities to all the southern African liberation movements:[16] the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) during their struggle against Portuguese colonialism; the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) during their war of liberation; and to the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) during the Zimbabwean armed struggle against the minority white regime of Ian Smith.

All three of the above-named groups are close allies of the Algerian government.[17] Many of their fighters were trained in Algeria by Algerian military personnel, and even financed and provided with weapons by the FNL government in Algeria during their struggle for independence. Currently, many of the SWAPO fighters waging war in Namibia against South African rule are being trained on Algerian soil by Algerian military personnel. Similar support is also given to the ANC, of whose supporters Algeria has been and is still one of the strongest. Just as Nasser's Egypt welcomed Nelson Mandela in his 1962–3 campaigns to gain the backing of the independent African states for ANC resistance against apartheid in South Africa, so the Ben Bella government has supported the black cause in South Africa.

Arabs, Africans and oil

One of the planks of the Arab–African coalition inside the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has always been an implicit understanding that black African support for the Palestinian cause is reciprocated by Arab support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa. (It is clear from the previous sections that there is plentiful evidence that Arab countries were supporting liberation movements in southern Africa years

13 *Economist* 19 May 1979, p. 74.
14 'US–Hassan ties', *Africa*, No. 127, March 1982, p. 28.
15 *Africa Report*, Vol. 27, No. 3, May–June 1982, p. 33
16 Douglas Kiker, 'libya', *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1970, Vol 225, No. 6, p. 37.
17 Joshua Nkomo has been a very close ally and associate of the leaders of Algeria's FLN since the early 1960s. This is one reason for his frequent visits to Algiers. The same applies to Samora Machel of Mozambique. See The Africa Research Group, *Race to power: the struggle for southern Africa* (New York: Anchor, 1974), p. 148.

before black Africa recognized the Palestinians as a people with a grievance.) To this assumption has, increasingly in recent years, been added the understanding that oil-rich Arab countries (both inside and outside the OAU) have particular developmental obligations in Africa. In addition, the oil-producing Arab countries *inside* the OAU are felt to have obligations to help the southern African nationalist movements fighting against the South African regime. The issue of this support has been prominent at the several Arab–African summits which have been held, and complaints as to the insufficiency of such assistance were among the factors behind the muted, and now dead, campaign in recent years for a resumption of relations with Israel on the part of certain African states.[18]

In 1980–1 the Shipping Research Bureau of Amsterdam carried out research in consultation with the OAU on possible violations of the UN oil sanctions against South Africa.[19] Its first report, covering the period 1 January 1980 to 30 June 1981, was released in 1981. It clearly heightened international awareness of the need to stop this oil flow; it also showed that the Pretoria government admitted its vulnerability to sanctions. Certain OPEC members have banned foreign oil companies listed in the report as having carried oil to South Africa: one such company was prohibited from operating in Indonesia by a government ban on local oil companies' dealings with it. The Libyan government banned an oil tanker as having entered a South African port for less than a day en route from Libya to Japan, even though the ship claimed not to have discharged any oil in South Africa.

During the period covered by the report, a total of 256 visits were made by the ships involved, sometimes with several visits being made by the same ship, carrying over 10 million tonnes of crude oil to South Africa, about half of its estimated imports for that period. (Only vessels over 25,000 tonnes weight capable of carrying crude oil were taken into consideration.) Of the 256 ship-visits, the Bureau selected fifty-two as being the 'most likely' to have delivered oil, and a further twenty-nine to have 'possibly' made such deliveries. These categories were arrived at after very careful analysis and seem to have been very conservatively defined. For instance, to have appeared in the 'most likely' group, a ship had to be shown to have sailed from an oil-exporting company or a transshipment port to South Africa and to have satisfied many other conditions supporting the conclusion that it had no other business except to discharge oil.

The Bureau invited all oil companies and shipowners involved in violation of the UN sanctions to comment on its findings. Few admitted to anything, despite the evidence against them. According to the Bureau's report, the top three oil companies involved were all Dutch or partly Dutch-owned: Transworld Oil, Shell and Vitol. The report stated that, 'as far as shippers are concerned, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group could well be the company most involved in the tanker sailings to South Africa'.[20] Transworld employs in one of its subsidiaries a man named George Atmore, who was for fifteen years head of Genta, the secret Rhodesian oil company which broke mandatory UN sanctions against Rhodesia. Another interesting sidelight was the

18. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire restored diplomatic relations with Israel in May 1982, thereby breaching the position collectively adopted by the OAU following the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In consequence, the Arab and Islamic world, with the exceptions of Egypt and Sudan, called for diplomatic isolation of Zaire. The Khartoum-based Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), which gave $38·8 million worth of funds to Zaire between 1975 and 1981, immediately suspended dealings with Mobutu. See 'The Star of David and Mobutu's torch', *Africa*, July 1982, No. 131, pp. 44–6.

19. 'Stopping the oil flow to South Africa', in *How they break the oil embargo: oil tankers to South Africa 1980–81* (Research Report by the Shipping Research Bureau of Amsterdam in consultation with the OAU, 1982).

20. 'Stopping the oil flow'.

claim that Shell and Vitol were also deeply involved in the exploitation and export of South Africa's coal. The profitable coal trade was used as an extra lever by the racist regime in Pretoria to keep the oil flowing in. Shell has denied such a trade-off, but a South African government minister has admitted that 'coal export quotas for British Petroleum, Shell and Total have been subjected to the condition that they continue to fulfil their obligations in supplying liquid petroleum products'.[21]

Company denials are often unconvincing and inconsistent. Shell denied that any of its ships mentioned in the report 'transport oil to South Africa contrary to a destination restriction imposed thereon'.[22] Yet four of these Shell ships sailed from the Arabian Gulf to South African ports and back again—a sort of shuttle service.

All Arab oil exporting countries in the Gulf embargoed South Africa. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) passed a resolution in its Council of Ministers in May 1981, recommending strict enforcement of the embargo and the imposition of penalties, including possible blacklisting, for companies and carriers which violate the rule. However, out of the fifty-two ships 'most likely' to have delivered oil to South Africa, twenty-eight sailed there from the Arabian Gulf, which suggests that the companies operating these twenty-eight ships deliberately violated the intentions of these countries' governments. Individual Arab countries are not listed in the report because some of the ships called at more than one port before going to South Africa, making it difficult to determine where the oil was loaded. There was also some evidence that oil tankers sometimes called at Arabian ports without these visits being reported to the shipping organizations which publish such movements. But one cannot escape the conclusion—which the Bureau did not emphasize—that some Arab oil producers do little to enforce the OAPEC embargo. The same is not true of other OPEC members. For example, Nigeria was singled out as enforcing the embargo in the most diligent way. One oil company told the Bureau that their trade with other African countries, especially Nigeria, prevented them from risking the relationship built up between themselves and those countries by using tankers which have or had connections with South Africa.[23] Saudi Arabia has been submitted to US pressure to replace Iran as South Africa's major oil supplier. Before the fall of the Shah, 90 per cent of South Africa's oil came from Iran.[24] In spite, then, of all the OAU and UN resolutions demanding that member nations stop sending oil to South Africa, Arabian Gulf states nevertheless continue to allow their oil to flow to South Africa.[25]

Frustration at the UN

Of the 1,747 resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly in its first sixteen sessions (1946–61), 336 wholly or partly concerned Africa and 260 (14·9 per cent) have dealt solely with African problems. An analysis of these 260 affords an insight into the nature of the UN's concern with Africa.

Eighty of the 260 'Africa resolutions' in one way or another involved the policies of the white minority government of South Africa.[26] The question of the potential racial

21 'Stopping the oil flow'.
22 'Stopping the oil flow'
23 'Stopping the oil flow'
24. Caryle Murphy, 'Pretoria forced to pay premium for oil since cut off by Iranians', *Washington Post*, 27 April 1979, p. 36
25 'Another hostage oil', *Newsweek International*, 19 Nov., 1979, p. 21.
26 Thomas Hovet, Jr, *Africa in the United Nations* (Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 207.

conflict created by the apartheid laws of South Africa has resulted in resolutions in every session of the UN General Assembly since the first, but to no avail. In the case of Namibia it was hoped that South Africa would place this mandate of the League of Nations under the UN trusteeship system, yet in spite of the fifty-six resolutions passed by the General Assembly in the first seventeen years of the organization, the only accomplishment has been to prevent the complete administrative incorporation of Namibia into South Africa. From 1946 to 1962 (and even up tp 1982), the African states with the support of the Arab members attempted several times to get UN approval for a break in diplomatic relations with South Africa, as well as economic boycotts, in protest against its apartheid policies.[27]

The fact that a two thirds majority is required for resolutions on important questions, especially those relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to trusteeships and non-self-governing territories, has proved frustrating to the African and Arab states in the United Nations. In a number of sessions, resolutions on important issues relating to southern Africa have failed because of this requirement.

From a brief analysis of Arab votes in the UN on five selected southern African issues between 1961 and 1966,[28] it is apparent that the Arab states were strongly in support of the African struggles for liberation in southern Africa. The voting analysis is given in Table 1; the resolutions are as follows. (1) Sanctions and expulsion paragraphs of African resolution on apartheid; document A/4968, 1067th Plenary Meeting, 28 November 1961; failed for lack of two thirds majority. All Arab states were in favour except Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which abstained. (2) Resolution 1761 (XVII), 2 November 1962; recommended sanctions and Security Council action against South Africa because of its apartheid policy. (3) Resolution 2145 (XXI), 27 October 1966; terminated South Africa's mandate over South-West Africa/Namibia. It established a fourteen-member ad hoc committee, the Council of Namibia, and called upon the Government of South Africa to refrain from altering the international status of Namibia. (4) Resolution 1819 (XVII), 18 December 1962; supported immediate independence for Angola and requested Security Council action. (5) Resolution 2022 (XX), 10 November, 1966; called upon the United Kingdom to use all means, including military force, to put an end to the Southern Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith.[29] The fate of resolutions such as these had a significant impact on the attitude of the African and Arab states towards the UN, leading to considerable frustration and to Africa's desire for a unified voice with the support of the Arab states in the UN.

This is not to argue that all the resolutions listed above should have been passed. rather, it is to suggest that the combination of frustration in the Security Council and frustration on some of the same issues in the General Assembly has been an important factor in the African arguments for unity of action between the African and Arab states at the UN. The same arguments have contributed to the development of a so-called North–South split in the UN, in addition to the long-standing East–West conflict. This split between the colonial states and the newly independent states has

27. For details, see *The Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: UN Office of Public Information), Chapter II, Article 4 (1).

28. See David A. Kay, *The new nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967* (New York. Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 210–25. See also UN records and documents 1949–1982 concerning resolutions against South African apartheid policies.

29. For details see 'The United Nations and Southern Rhodesia', *Decolonization*, Vol. II, No. 5 (New York: UN Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, July 1975), pp. 27–30.

Table 1
Arab votes in the UN on selected southern Africa questions during the 15th to 21st sessions

	Issues and votes				
	1	2	3	4	5
Algeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Egypt	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iraq	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jordan	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kuwait	Y	O	Y	Y	Y
Libya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lebanon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Saudi Arabia	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Somali Democratic Republic	O	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Syrian Arab Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	X	X	X	X	X
Yemen Arab Republic	Y	O	Y	Y	Y
Bahrain	X	X	X	X	X
Qatar	X	X	X	X	X
Sultanate of Oman	X	X	X	X	X
United Arab Emirates	X	X	X	X	X

Y—in favour; N—against; O—absent; X—Not UN member when vote was taken.

Sources: David A. Kay, *The new nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 210–25. See also Thomas Hover, Jr *Africa in the United Nations* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 232–42.

widened as the UN has become increasingly concerned with struggles for independence from the old colonial powers in various areas of the world.[30]

The African states in the UN fully supported the Arab stance on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including the right to national independence. This was adopted as General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX) on 22 November, 1974. This resolution put the Palestinian question in the mainstream of international concern; it granted observer status to the PLO and invited it to participate, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in the General Assembly's work, and in all international conferences convened under its auspices.[31]

In 1979, all the Arab states supported the Namibian cause in the adoption of Resolution 33/182A on 21 December 1979. The resolution dealt with the situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of the territory by South Africa, the refusal of South Africa to comply with the UN resolutions on Namibia and the programme of work of the UN Council for Namibia.[32]

30. Hover, p. 209.
31. See *UN Monthly Chronicle*, Dec. 1974, Vol. 11, No. 11.
32. *UN Monthly Chronicle*, Jan. 1980, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 8–10.

Algeria, Libya and Nasser's Egypt were members of the radical and progressive Casablanca Group, whose strong pressure for a practical means towards achieving African unity[33] led to the establishment of the OAU in 1963. They made many declarations and resolutions affirming Arab support for the liberation of Africans under minority rule in southern Africa and calling for the continued economic, diplomatic and political isolation of South Africa.

African and Arab states have proposed a conference of all oil-producing countries to discuss improvements in the implementation of the oil embargo against South Africa. There are plans for this to take place under UN auspices; it should involve not only oil-producing countries, but also countries in which the oil-shipping companies are based. OAPEC has urged serious support for an UNCTAD proposal to set up a centre for monitoring oil tankers entering and leaving South African ports, an idea also backed by the OAU at its 1981 summit. If the OAU can obtain serious and strong support from its Arab members, it could give an important impetus to plans for an oil embargo enforcement drive against South Africa.

Conclusions

Zionist nationalism is similar to Afrikaner nationalism. The leaders of Israel and South Africa are determined to sustain the original 'intrusion' of their peoples in their respective sub-regions. The 'laager mentality' of the Afrikaner nationalists is reminiscent of the ancient 'Masada' complex of the Jewish people—representing the determination of the Israelis and South Africans, respectively, to disregard the rest of the world and fight to the last man if need be to preserve their separate identities. The logic of their isolated and vulnerable situations propels them into becoming expansionist, racist and imperialist states.

The exposure of the extent and depth of Israeli ties with South Africa might provide a more enduring instrument with which the Arabs could mould national consensus against both the racist policies of South Africa and the expansionist policies of Israel, while at the same time attacking the Western support for the policies of both countries. Colonel Qadhafi of Libya is a prime example of this approach, with his constant verbal attacks on US support of Israel against Arab efforts to create a Palestinian state and on South African resistance to efforts to bring about black majority rule in South Africa.[34]

Moreover, Arab–African linkages and solidarity must be developed as a counterpoise to Israeli–South African cooperation. It was the initial African support for the Arab position on the Middle East conflict at the OAU and the UN in return for the extension of the oil weapon, used against the West in 1973, to Africa's old enemy, South Africa, which laid the foundation of Arab–African cooperation. The development of that cooperation is disturbing to both Israel and South Africa as well as to the West in general, and this is a strong argument for encouraging such cooperation. That solidarity must include economic and financial cooperation as well as intensified support for all the nationalist liberation movements in Southern Africa and the PLO in the Middle East in their struggles against racism and imperialism.

33. Adekunle Ajala, *Pan-Africanism: evolution, progress and prospects* (London: Deutsch, 1974), p. 30.
34. 'Libya: exporting trouble', *Africa*, June 1980, No. 106, pp. 27–9. See also 'Africa needs Libya', *Africa*, July 1982, No. 131, p. 23; also 'Gadhafi threatens UN', *Daily Sketch* (Ibadan), 24 Sept. 1982, p. 8.

Book reviews

Chatham House books

European interests in ASEAN. By Stuart Harris and Brian Bridges. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 89pp. (Chatham House Papers No. 19.) Pb.: £4·95.

OF the various organizations set up in South-east Asia after the Second World War, ASEAN, as this brief and lucid Chatham House Paper shows, has proved to be one of the more durable. Its five members, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are well endowed with minerals and land, and have a predilection for market-type economies. The richest of them, Singapore, has a higher *per capita* GNP than Greece, the poorest member of the European Community. The other members, however, lag well behind this performance with Indonesia, with the highest population, coming last.

The paper begins with a description of the origins and development of ASEAN, and goes on to find answers to specific questions on present and future EC–ASEAN relationships. The difficulty for the non-specialist reader is to decide exactly how much weight to attach to ASEAN. It is not a military zone and its main purpose is to serve as a forum for the discussion of regional political and economic cooperation. It is not a free trade area, much less a customs union, and its trade with the EC is carried on under the generalized scheme of preferences with the addition of a number of package-deal industrial projects, not all of them successful, as a special feature. In this connection it would have helped if a few extra paragraphs could have been added to outline the main features of the member economies. Otherwise the use of blanket statistics for ASEAN trade gives the impression of a level of uniformity which does not exist. This is especially relevant to Singapore, which is a major international financial centre as well as a newly industrialized country whose exports include electronics and wigs in addition to the more traditional plywood.

The authors conclude that, as far as it goes, the EC–ASEAN relationship is a good thing. The existence of the Special Coordinating Committee (SCCAN), which initiates regular contacts, and the annual ministerial meetings from 1978 onwards have helped ease the problems of post-colonial relationships. However there are others who believe that the time taken up by these meetings is excessive in view of other calls on ministers and officials, and that there are 'few concrete problems that cannot be handled through normal bilateral channels or existing international bodies' (p. 79). In other words, keep the relationship low key and events will prove whether it is adequate. The trouble with this view, as the authors point out, is that its real costs 'are likely to arise in terms of opportunities missed'. (p. 81).

RICHARD BAILEY

Energy: two decades of crisis. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for Policy Studies Institute and Royal Institute of International Affairs. (British Institutes' Joint Energy Policy Programme.) 1983. 357 pp. Index.

International institutions for energy management: an American perspective. By Wilfrid Kohl. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for Policy Studies Institute and Royal Institute of International Affairs. (British Institutes' Joint Energy Policy Programme.) 1983. 135 pp. Index.

THE British Institutes' Joint Energy Policy Programme was established in May 1981 by the

Policy Studies Institute and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. A mere two years later the first results of its efforts have already appeared as represented by the seven published papers reviewed here. The six shorter papers are included in the first volume with a foreword by Robert Belgrave, the seventh longer paper by Wilfrid Kohl being published separately. The subject matter of the papers is extremely varied, but the quality is uniformly high, and all the authors have undoubtedly made useful contributions to the continuing energy debate.

Jonathan Stern's paper on East European energy and East–West trade in energy is timely in view of the imminent opening of the Soviet gas pipeline to Western Europe. He accepts that the pipeline increases interdependence in Europe, but not that it necessarily makes Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet pressures. The Soviet Union is a more secure source of energy than the Middle East. Any tampering with supplies to Western Europe would be extremely counter-productive from the Soviet point of view as it would increase Western solidarity, and would harm prospects for East–West co-operation in other fields, including technological transfers. Stern also examines the relations between the Soviet Union and the energy-deficient countries of Eastern Europe, and discusses the growing tensions over energy supplies. Soviet gas exports to Western Europe to earn hard currency may actually increase these tensions, especially if the East Europeans have to pay more for their gas, and are given a lower priority than Western consumers as far as supplies are concerned.

The industrialized country most dependent on imported energy is Japan, but as Ronald Dore shows in his paper on energy conservation in Japanese industry, the problem has been tackled with characteristic vigour. A consensus was soon reached on the need to save energy after the 1973 crisis, and the Tokyo government, largely through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, worked closely with major energy users to see that the necessary savings were achieved. Dore describes the Japanese laws for energy saving, and also shows how tax incentives and a high energy pricing policy have contributed to the reduction in the extra energy required for gross national product growth. In contrast, there is much less consensus over where Britian's interests lie, as Louis Turner shows in his paper on the United Kingdom and the International Energy Agency (IEA). The United Kingdom is of course fortunate in being a large energy exporter, but it still seems uncertain whether its main interest is as a producer or a consumer. Much of Turner's paper is taken up with a review of the IEA and its activities as a monopsonistic answer to the OPEC sellers' cartel. The United Kingdom's attitude towards the IEA is at best reserved, although it is more positive than that of France which is not a member.

Within the European Community there is even less consensus on energy policy, as Nigel Lucas shows in his paper The major common policy initiatives have involved coal in the context of the European Coal and Steel Community. As Lucas shows, however, Community investment sources have been misdirected, with too much support given to the less efficient and productive pits of France and Germany, and too little funding allocated to the United Kingdom's coal industry, where the returns in terms of tonnage of coal per amount invested are over twice as high. The European Community has never clearly defined its position *vis-à-vis* the IEA, and its position regarding OPEC is even more confused.

A much more detailed examination of how various international institutions organize their energy policies is given by Wilfrid Kohl in his paper which is published as a self-contained book. The IEA structure is critically examined, as are the Western summit decisions on energy and the policies of the European Community. Kohl's work will undoubtedly prove a useful reference source for all those concerned with energy matters, and few will dispute his interpretation of the events of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ultimately, however, the role of markets in determining energy prices cannot be ignored; all that institutional arrangements can do is modify market behaviour. Daniel Badger and Robert Belgrave illustrate how in 1979 it was panic among buyers which drove the price up in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, not supply shortages. In contrast, in 1980, when the Iran–Iraq war caused a production cutback similar to that of the previous year, there was little buyer reaction, and the price stayed static. Of course since then the world has entered a period of oil glut, but Robert Belgrave argues in a separate paper that it would be unwise for the Western consuming nations to become complacent in this new situation.

University of Durham

RODNEY WILSON

The origins of the Cultural Revolution, 2: the great leap forward 1958–60. By Roderick McFarquhar. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the East Asian Institute of Colombia University and the Research Institute on International Change of Colombia University. 1983. 470 pp. Index. £22·50.

THIS second volume of Roderick McFarquhar's trilogy begins with Mao in Moscow in 1957, where began the definitive turning away from the Soviet model and the subsequent initiation of an independent road to socialism in China through Mao's experiments with the communes and the great leap forward. The volume ends with the failure of these experiments, Mao's semi-retirement and the growing and irrevocable split with the Soviet Union.

Here is a very broad canvas indeed, covering both domestic developments and foreign policy in great detail, and research must have been prodigious despite the author's close and continuous involvement with Chinese affairs for more than a quarter of a century. We have in this highly readable book one of the most closely-reasoned and penetrating analyses of the Chinese communist political system yet to appear in print. A central chapter, entitled 'High Noon at Lushan', throws further light on the challenge to Mao's leadership and position by the Army chief, P'eng Teh-huai, in 1959, that was to prove one of the key developments over the grim years leading up to the final cataclysm of the cultural revolution. That this challenge failed, at any rate in the short term, seems to have been due to the Chairman's great personal prestige and his support in the army, as much as to the silence or craven cowardice of other potential critics who were as aware as P'eng Teh-huai of the misery caused by the great leap. It is no fault of the author if there are still some uncertainties concerning the nature of Mao's personal ascendency over his colleagues and the working of the system, such as bestrew the path of anyone attempting to unravel the exact locus of power within such a closed system. In the case of Stalin, the explanation generally considered satisfactory and sufficient was his control of the secret police. In the case of Mao, as one would expect, a key factor was control over all appointments, and Lushan was followed by a comprehensive reshuffle in the top ranks of the military. P'eng's self-criticism also suggests that we should not ignore the peculiar cultural flavour and traditional attitudes sometimes apparent in the relationships among Chinese leaders: 'I have given the Chairman three guarantees; I will never become a counter-revolutionary; I won't commit suicide; I will support myself by the sweat of my brow' (pp. 233–4).

Dr McFarquhar clearly establishes the link between P'eng's fate and the attitude of the Soviet leadership at the time, which was becoming outspokenly critical of Chinese policies, both domestic and foreign—an attitude entirely reciprocated by Beijing. How these were intertwined and continued to reverberate, with increasing force, on into the 1960s under Mao's blanket condemnation of 'revisionism', will no doubt appear in the third and final volume of what has already established itself as one of the definitive works and essential reading on the Cultural Revolution.

University of Hull VICTOR FUNNELL

International relations and organizations

International regimes. Edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press for Center for International Affairs, University of California and the World Peace Foundation. 1983. 372 pp. Index. Pb.: £8·50; $12·95.

THIS book provides an ideal point of reference for those whose curiosity may have been aroused by talk of 'regimes' in international affairs, particularly from North American students of the subject, in recent years. Such regimes are defined, throughout the volume, as the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that largely direct the behaviour of actors within given international 'issue-areas'. The nature and implications of such international regimes are then discussed exhaustively; indeed, at times, exhaustingly. The many epistemological, theoretical and definitional problems encountered by the idea of regime are also considered in depth and at some length, if not, as Susan Strange's apposite contribution makes clear, with total success.

Stephen Krasner provides introductory and concluding chapters that give the appearan being two halves of an arbitrarily segmented survey of the regime scene. Between these reader is presented with schemes for classifying the work of other students of 'regimes' (E Haas); schemes for classifying 'regimes' themselves (D. Puchala and R. Hopkins); discuss of regime formation and change (Oran Young, A. Stein, and Robert Keohane); considerat of regimes in the security area (Robert Jervis); three varying approaches to the modern t regime (J. G. Ruggie, J. Lipson, and J. A. Finlayson and M. W. Zacher); and an interes discourse upon the post-war 'balance-of-payments financing' regime (B. Cohen). M individual points of interest are made within these contributions, despite some problems regime analysis in general.

Susan Strange balances the volume with a piece that expresses profound scepticism al the basic idea of regimes. She identifies five faults that attach to the concept and its usage: it is a conceptual fad which has been stimulated by the confusion of Americans at t country's apparent decline in international power, influence and status; that it remains, an doomed to remain, imprecise; that it poorly camouflages a serious value bias in favou 'order' and associated conditions; that it remains an essentially static conception of w realities; and, finally, that it retains an excessively state-centred perspective upon gl relations and activities.

The difficulties that are not properly resolved in *International regimes* are certainly substa and serious. The coverage of the concept—what is to be properly deemed to b regime—remains uncertain. Similarly, there remains a degree of vagueness as to whether members of a purported regime are required to be consciously aware of its existence functioning. Indeed, the theoretical foundations of the very notion of regime appear ra insubstantial: a loose combination of 'problems' posed by a rather crude 'hegemonic' mod international relations and somewhat casual empirical generalization drawn from a notice narrow base. The reader might well be excused for coming to the conclusion that the international regimes of any real contemporary salience reside in the realms of trade monetary affairs and that their supposed influence amounts to very little more than iner

Overall, then, *International regimes* indicates that this particular neologism may not be philosopher's stone, upon the arrival of which students of international affairs have l waiting with bated breath. However, the volume does contain strenuous arguments in fa of the concept and its analytical employment and will therefore prove invaluable to any who wishes to gain insight into an idea of considerable contemporary currency.

University of Reading

R. J. BARRY JO

Satellite reconnaissance: the role of informal bargaining. By Gerald M. Steinberg. N York: Praeger. 1983. 200 pp. Index. $27·95.

THIS volume is concerned with negotiating styles and processes, and uses sate reconnaissance purely as a vehicle to argue for the superiority of a centralized and infor style of negotiating. The book divides almost exactly into two parts: a first section of c chapters giving a political, but not technical, history of satellite reconnaissance, and a sec section of four chapters devoted to analysing the influence of the bargaining process on outcomes of the negotiations for restraint. The overall effect is of a carefully researched presented set of arguments. Within that overall impression, however, the volume has a 'Je and Hyde' personality—at times carefully reasoned, scholarly and tentative in its conclusi and at other times brashly assertive.

For a volume concerned with bargaining processes it is strangely ethnocentric. Altho the lack of Soviet source material is recognized (p. 8), to build and develop a whole theor bargaining based only upon the observation and analysis of one party to the bargaining pro might be thought seriously to undermine the credibility of any resulting prescript Ethnocentrism permeates the whole volume but is most marked in chapters 5 and 9, espec in the section on the role of leadership (p. 175).

The volume leaves many questions unanswered. No attempt is made, for example explain why, from the whole plethora of arms control negotiations, the satellite reconnaiss issue was 'selected' by the United States and the Soviet Union for the use of an infor approach. Nor is there any explanation offered as to why, if government leaders have l

control over their bureaucratic machines (as implied in chapters 6 and 7), in both states the issue of satellite reconnaissance became the one issue upon which each managed to overcome its bureaucracy. Nor does the author offer any explanation as to why the informal process, which he considers highly successful, has not been adopted by successive Presidents and Chairmen to resolve other equally intractable problems in the field of arms control. One must conclude either that successive leaders have had no wish to reach accord, or that the claim that '. . . centralised decision making in informal arms control negotiations is more efficient and more conducive to reaching agreement than in formal negotiations' (p. 147) has not been found valid by government leaders. A further conspicuous gap is the absence of any discussion of what constitutes 'success' in negotiations—in this context, the dismissal of the formal SALT negotiations as fruitless (ch. 8) would be seen by many as a very sterile conclusion.

Dr Steinberg's confidence in how the informal negotiating process actually worked for satellite reconnaissance is matched only by the condfidence of his assertions of how totally ineffective the more formal processes would have been, had they been employed.

As a basis for reorienting negotiating style, the volume leaves too many unanswered questions and makes too many assertions to be anything other than an eloquent but inadequate plea. However, as a case study this is an interesting and worthwhile volume.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

The making of the second cold war. By Fred Halliday. London: Verso. 1983. 280 pp. Index. £18·50. Pb.: £4·95.

IT verges on the impossible to be dispassionately objective about the causes of dispute or conflict between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its associates on the other, for two reasons in particular: first, fear, because of the capacity each superpower has to cause suffering and destruction on an incomprehensible scale; and secondly because the protagonists are seen to represent opposed values and beliefs, and people are emotionally as well as rationally attached to the things they believe in. Fred Halliday is opposed to capitalism, and therefore starts emotionally from a standpoint hostile to the United States, and *ipso facto* favourable to the Soviet Union, however much he finds reason for adverse comment on the latter. He is then critical of Soviet actions in relation to Ethiopia, Cambodia and Afghanistan, but is at pains to show the reader why they regrettably felt it necessary to behave as they did. US actions in Vietnam or Guatemala or Iran, on the other hand, are described with no such tolerant understanding, because his starting assumption is that 'Cold War II is above all else a US programme for waging the globalised social conflict, the Great Contest' (p. 204). Similarly, he properly criticizes US opinions that all revolutionary or anti-Western movements in so-called Third World countries are inspired by the Soviets, but when (p. 84) he lists counter-revolutionary developments in Latin America, Africa and the Arab world between 1961 and 1970 the hand of the United States is apparently to be found in all of them.

To one who, like the present reviewer, prefers the values imperfectly represented by the United States to those even more imperfectly represented by the Soviet Union, and who does not believe either that the policies of the latter are almost entirely reactive or that those of the former are consciously and coherently aimed at preserving or restoring global military, economic and ideological dominance, the account given by Mr Halliday seems partial. It does not seem to me, for example, that public ownership of the means of production in the one case and private ownership in the other implies that the role played by the expert military and the military organizations is necessarily qualitatively different in one case as compared with the other; or that the fact of heavy investment of resources and the employment of large numbers of people in the defence and defence-related industries is not something that weighs heavily in the decision-making processes of both countries. To Mr Halliday the military–industrial complex and its right-wing associates in the United States carry a heavy responsibility for the opening of the second cold war; but in the Soviet Union the Party controls all.

However, having disclosed *my* biases, let me not be unfair to Mr Halliday. Partial though his book may be, it is analytically wide-ranging, it dips well below the surface manifestations of events, it is well-informed, and it is attractively and fluently written. It properly knocks

down many pretensions, and the point of view it presents is one that deserves critical attention.

University of Lancaster P. A. REYNOLDS

Dag Hammarskjold revisited: the UN Secretary-General as a force in world politics. Edited by Robert S. Jordan. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic. 1983. 197 pp. Index.

KURT WALDHEIM begins his contribution to his collection of essays with the remark that we look back on Dag Hammarskjold's Secretary-Generalship with nostalgia for a simpler world that is now gone for ever. Times have indeed changed, and none of Hammarskjold's successors in that office has dared to show publicly the courage or initiative, or to take the risks, that he did. Those who praise and appraise him in this collection do so from various standpoints: those of his friends and contemporaries as well as those of younger men looking at him and his achievements with a more detached perception.

Robert S. Jordan, sometime director of research in UNITAR, writes of the legacy Hammarskjold inherited at the UN and the imprint he made upon it. Dr Waldheim recalls that when Hammarskjold became Secretary-General, there were only sixty UN member states, as opposed to 100 when he died in office. At the beginning of his tenure continental China was not a member, and the Third World had yet to have the term coined for it.

Professor James Barros of Toronto University draws on the League of Nations and the personalities of Sir Eric Drummond and Joseph Avenol as background for his view of the importance of Secretaries General of the UN; Professor Oscar Schachter, legal adviser to three UN Secretaries General, including Hammarskjold, explores the latter's role as top international civil servant with its requirements of neutrality and responsibility, making reference to Khrushchev's remark that 'while there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men' in the vexed context of his 'troika' proposals. Larry Trachtenberg of the London School of Economics begins his essay on the papers of Hammarskjold, Ralph Bunche and Andrew Cordier with a little known sidelight on this famous episode. He cites two handwritten notes from Heinz Weischoff, who died with Hammarskjold in the air crash, one undated and the other dated 18 March 1961. The first said that a member of the Soviet delegation had said that 'they feel they have made an error in their attack on you'; the other, dated, note that 'in regard to the sharp attacks on you personally, he shrugged it off as "one of those things in politics" '. These notes were found, neatly folded, in Hammarskjold's wallet on the day after his death; he had apparently carried them round with him for six months.

Three other distinguished UN officials also contributed: Philippe de Seynes on Hammarskjold's commitment to economic and social development; General Indar Jit Rikhye on peacekeeping; and Brian Urquhart on 'The private person in a very public office'. Urquhart wrote the 1974 biography of Hammarskjold and is now UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, the UK's most senior international civil servant. Professor Mark Zacher of the University of British Columbia has written on 'Hammarskjold's conception of the UN's role in world politics'.

The publisher's claim that the essays were written by persons uniquely qualified to do so is well justified. Zacher ends his piece with Barbara Ward's reference to the Secretary-General as 'a man of the next generation' and his own view that 'Hammarskjold's triumphs will be remembered and valued for generations to come'.

BRIAN MEREDITH

Defence and disarmament

The nuclear future. By Michael Mandelbaum. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1983. 131 pp. $19.95. Pb.. $5.95.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM has recently published two rather well-received volumes entitled *The nuclear question* and *The nuclear revolution*, whose sub-titles—respectively *The United States and nuclear weapons, 1946–1976* and *International politics before and after Hiroshima*—reveal their

interest for readers of this journal. Unfortunately, *The nuclear future* does not constitute the last part of a trilogy; instead it is a pot-boiler for a general audience. Mandelbaum has expanded a paper given at the US Naval War College for the purpose and rather self-consciously written down to his assumed audience. That audience is clearly intended to be in the United States; readers in this country will have to think themselves into the American scene and there seems little reason for the British general public to bother to do so when they can easily get a similar product in suitable local packaging.

The four principal sections of the book deal with strategic concepts and the evolution of nuclear strategy, the arms race, nuclear proliferation and anti-nuclear weapons movements. The exposition is clear and the point of view is conventionally realist with a dash of liberalism. Mr Mandelbaum is unlikely to excite his readers' intellectual curiosity any more than he is likely to satisfy it if it has been aroused elsewhere. That is not his aim; he wants to set out the issues in a cool, clear and rational manner. But he is extraordinarily sanguine and his readership will surely insist that he should argue his case rather than simply asserting that 'Nuclear weapons will continue to exist but will not be used, at least not by the United States and the Soviet Union against each other on a large scale' (p. 25). Moreover, how confident are non-Americans that 'No one rash or reckless is likely to win supreme power in the United States. That statement cannot be made with the same confidence about the Soviet Union . . .' (p. 84)? And if the Soviet Union is prone to recklessness will the superpower relationship therefore remain stable at the nuclear level?

The discussion of the likely effects of nuclear proliferation is not taken far enough. For example, little is made of the complexities that proliferation will entail not only for regional deterrence systems but also for the interaction between regional systems and the global one. The best part of the book lies in the few pages devoted to bringing out the long-standing tension between European and US views on the role of nuclear weapons in Europe which governments, for their different reasons, usually camouflage in alliance rhetoric. The issues are clearly stated and this should help readers in the USA to understand alliance relationships.

The general reader sufficiently interested to read this book is unlikely to have his fears allayed despite the authors' assurances. Mandelbaum assumes that governments are and will remain in control. It is not self-evidently so; nor, for that matter, even if they were, would all their citizens necessarily be happy with the prospect.

University of Kent A. J. R. GROOM

Uranium enrichment and nuclear weapon proliferation. By Allan S. Krass *et al.* London, New York: Taylor & Francis for SIPRI. 1983. 296 pp. Index. £15·00.

THE purposes of this book are to present a comprehensive review of the state of the art of enrichment technology and to evaluate the impact of this technology on the proliferation problem. It aims to provide journalists, policy analysts, diplomats, students, and governmental decision-makers with detailed descriptions and analyses of those developments which, during the past decade, have greatly increased the significance of the enriched uranium route to nuclear weapons.

The work is divided into three parts. Part one gives an overview of the relevant technical processes, compares their potentials for exacerbating proliferation, assesses the capabilities and intentions of the many nations that have demonstrated an interest in enrichment, and explores the problems of control raised by enrichment developments in both technological and institutional terms. It also offers a set of conclusions and recommendations. Parts two and three comprise the supporting material upon which part one is based: they cover, in great detail, the technologies of enrichment and, in less detail, the history of non-proliferation efforts and the availability of, and potential for, enrichment facilities around the world.

The book is very strong on technology: it is a splendid reference source on the theory, practice and global distribution of enrichment; it is well illustrated; and it shows clearly how the barriers to enrichment, especially those surrounding the centrifuge process, are falling. It is also good on the shortcomings of the various institutional and technical mechanisms for safeguarding enrichment facilities and for controlling exports of sensitive components and know-how. The only omission is of any sense of the relative attractions of the enriched uranium and the plutonium routes to nuclear weapons.

The political content is less strong. This is partly because there is a good deal of repetition

of the now well-known history of non-proliferation policy, partly because its recommendations (such as that no new national enrichment facilities should be built) do not all have the smack of realism about them, and partly because it is sometimes a little dogmatic (as with the assertion on page 77 that the discriminatory aspects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 'do not provide a sufficient explanation for a state to refuse to become a party to the Treaty'. It also overlooks the proliferation consequences of the US-induced enrichment crisis of 1974. Nevertheless, the technical sections of the book alone would make it very worthwhile and, despite the reservations listed above, the political sections are still of value.

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

Airpower in the nuclear age, 1945–82: theory and practice. By M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason. London: Macmillan. 1983. 296 pp. Index. £25·00.

THE rate of technological change in aircraft was rapid during the 1914–18 conflict and has been meteoric since 1945. The pilot of a current combat aircraft can choose to fly in excess of Mach 2, fire 'medium-range' air-to-air missiles with ranges of around forty miles and/or deliver several tons of guided munitions against ground targets. But such an aircraft costs upwards of $20 million to acquire and then perhaps thousands of dollars per flying-hour to operate. Aircraft prices have reached the point where a senior US Air Force officer has suggested that the United States could develop its next fighter in collaboration with the West Europeans in order to keep costs bearable.

For the greater part of this book the authors ignore these considerations and concentrate instead on the actual contribution of airpower to some international conflicts since 1945. They set for themselves a very large field of enquiry and consequently the analyses of different wars are somewhat unbalanced: thus, while the chapter on the Falklands is detailed and places airpower effectively in the context of the war as a whole, the chapter on Vietnam, though containing much of interest, is comparatively thin. This reader particularly appreciated the chapter on Korea. There are also chapters on the role of airpower in NATO and the Soviet forces.

The book has three real qualities. First, the authors recognize the limitations of airpower (although they are naturally sympathetic to it). They often emphasize the need for it to be coordinated with other elements of armed force. Second, although they draw lessons from individual wars, they are properly cautious about applying those lessons to other conflicts. The overall lessons from the book as a whole are modest (p. 226). Third, they illuminate very clearly in all the chapters the different roles—interdiction, strategic damage, air superiority, air defence, reconnaissance, etc.—which aircraft can play. There is also a very useful glossary at the beginning of the volume, which makes the book accessible to the non-specialist in military affairs.

As the authors look to the future in the final chapter, they offer appropriate technological and military judgements, tending to the conservative in doubting the wide utility of unmanned aircraft, seeing a continued role for the manned bomber and rejecting any move in favour of more simple but numerous aircraft (they are familiar with the work of Fred Spinney but do not specifically counter his analysis).

This is an interesting and sober book, more useful for the historical data it assembles than for grand theoretical advances.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TREVOR TAYLOR

The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO 1965–1980. By Paul Buteux. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. 292 pp. Index. £22·50. $39·50.

THIS is a timely book; the issue of consultation in respect of American nuclear weaponry hosted in Britain generated more heat than light in recent debate in press and parliament. It is also an interesting book; *interesting* in that it demonstrates the availability of source material in a field both sensitive and surrounded by secrecy. Buteux acknowledges (p. vi) that sources are limited and direct documentary evidence scarce; but his study nevertheless confirms that the public record is quite sufficient when approached coolly, patiently and analytically. He begins by defining the problems posed for NATO by reliance on nuclear weaponry, and looks at the attempts to make them disappear by the 'hardware' proposals for MLF and ANF. He then examines the 'McNamara Committee', established in 1965 to look for ways in which

allied consultation on the possible use of nuclear weapons might be improved and involvement in nuclear planning extended. The formal creation and evolution of the Nuclear Planning Group is treated next, before the ends are tied up in what should have been the final chapter on consultation and the Group. In fact, Buteux seeks to make his book not only timely, but topical; it ends with a chapter on the strategic implications of theatre nuclear weapons, a subject which is really outside his self-prescribed brief.

This said, the author's careful demonstration that consultation does not imply either control or consent, that it is pursued by the various allies for equally varied reasons, that while generally a benign process contributing to alliance cohesion on occasions it encourages friction to the point of discord, is eminently persuasive. There is a certain repetitiveness about his earlier chapters which initially provokes impatience, but eventually can be seen to be part of his advocacy; obliging us to look again at the same issue from the standpoint of different allies and especially in the light of the changed international political environment, Buteux leads our thinking towards conformity with his own. There is also the deft use of another device of advocacy: the sudden illumination of something already known, as when he describes the attempt by President Carter to shift the responsibility for deployment of the 'neutron bomb' as an attempt by the United States to avoid the position of *demandeur*, an attempt which demonstrated, as did the later issue of theatre nuclear force modernization, just how difficult it is for the United States to abdicate its leadership in nuclear affairs.

A final point: Buteux is well served by his publishers. The book is a pleasure to handle and read, the chapter notes, bibliography and index beautifully done; and there is only one misprint. It is heartening to realize that in these dark days one can buy illumination.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

Dependence and deterrence: success and civility in the Anglo-American special nuclear relationship 1962–1982. By G. M. Dillon. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 206 pp. Index. £14·50.

THIS book is essentially an analytical history of the administrative, economic and technical aspects of Anglo-American collaboration in the production of British nuclear weapons between 1962 and 1982. As such it is well researched, brings together more information than can readily be found elsewhere and makes many points of interest to specialists in this field.

Clumsy writing makes it hard to read, as does the recurrence of certain theoretical concepts which are not always clearly explained or satisfactorily illustrated by concrete examples. Analysis of the 'civility' of the Anglo-American relationship, for instance, carries little conviction in the absence of any reference to the dominating position and singular personality of Admiral Rickover. Nevertheless there is much meat inside the sandwich.

The bread is soggiest in the introduction. Mr Dillon is out of his depth in strategic argument and has devoted less research to this aspect than to the core of his book. Anyone who writes 'it has, however, never been possible to specify the circumstances in which a British government might have to resort to the independent use of nuclear weapons' (p. 2) ought to dispose of the contingencies hinted at in the statements on the defence estimates for 1980 and 1981. Mr Dillon does not mention these publications or the various arguments of less authoritative but more outspoken commentators. Instead he covers himself with a characteristic sentence: 'New rationales for Britain's nuclear force, such as the multiple centres of decision-making rationale, or ones which associate it with the Euro-strategic balance, are clearly ex post facto' (p. 4). So what? It is exceptional for any kind of armed force actually to be employed for a purpose specifically envisaged when it was first created. Strategy has to keep pace with changes in the international environment and to adapt old weapons for new purposes—bespoke tailoring takes too long.

Mr Dillon has achieved what he describes (p. 4) as 'the principal purpose of this book'—'to add a little to the historical record of the way in which the Anglo-American relationship in nuclear matters has operated in practice'. Chapter 5 on submarine construction is particularly useful for its wealth of detail. That was worth doing and worth reading today, but it is a pity he called the book *Dependence and deterrence*, concepts requiring more extended and thoughtful treatment. One would gladly have sacrificed Mr Dillon's rather superficial theorizing on this and other subjects for a comparison of the results of British dependence with those of French independence, but France is scarcely mentioned.

This book is thus best regarded as a useful source of factual information. A fuller index would have increased its value, but the price would still be excessive for a book produced by a microphotographic process better suited to the bottom line of an optician's test card.

JAMES CABLE

Mimicking Sisyphus: America's countervailing nuclear strategy. By Louis René Beres. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 142 pp. Index. £17·50.

DEBATE about nuclear strategy is often characterized by a surfeit of statistics and jargon about new weapons systems or relative force levels, or by excessive idealism and political naiveté. In attempting to challenge the central assumptions of current US nuclear policy, Professor Beres employs a sensible combination of published evidence and logical argument. He sees the nuclear policy of the Reagan administration as going beyond legitimate objectives of maintaining minimum deterrence to accelerated preparations for nuclear war fighting, and justifying increased military spending as necessary to strengthen the capacity of the United States to respond to Soviet preparations for nuclear war by improving the capability for retaliation, and the ability to wage nuclear war rationally if deterrence fails.

Beres sets out to refute the central assumptions underlying these policy developments in clear and simple terms. He attacks the validity of the concept of a limited nuclear war, and the assumption that the Soviet Union is more likely to be deterred from all-out nuclear war if the United States improves its capability to conduct such a limited nuclear war. He is sceptical that meaningful survival is possible after a superpower nuclear war. Both of the above strategies, he believes, actually increase the likelihood of all-out nuclear war, as do the views that meaningful arms control can be achieved while the United States continues to increase its own nuclear capability, or that the best guarantee of peace is the maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent.

Beres does not offer simple alternative solutions to current policies, nor does he deny the reality of the challenge facing the West; but he argues that the United States should move immediately towards a central policy principle of minimum deterrence and agreement in due course with the Soviet Union on substantial restrictions in strategic forces. Moves towards minimum deterrence should be augmented by a comprehensive test ban treaty, American renunciation of the right to first use of nuclear weapons, implementation of a joint nuclear weapons freeze and the establishment of additional zones free of nuclear weapons. This incremental policy of extrication is discussed realistically. Beres recognizes the importance to any such developments of public opinion, as shown by the nuclear freeze movement, and the necessity of increased public scepticism about the domestic manifestations of militarizatioon if governments are to fashion their foreign policies on a less nationalistic and more internationalist basis. This study, aimed at forcing a reappraisal of existing American nuclear strategy, merits the serious attention of specialists while being both intelligible and persuasive to the general reader.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

The bomb and European security. By Guido Vigeveno. London: Hurst. 1983. 131 pp. Pb.: £1·95.

THIS book is primarily a description of past and present NATO policy for the defence of Western Europe, with particular emphasis on the prevention of war through nuclear deterrence. The author has worked in the Netherlands Army Staff and is now with the Foreign Ministry, but there is no flavour here of the distinctive policies, especially as regards arms control, of successive Dutch governments. Indeed, Mr Vigeveno's nationality seems of no significance—a tribute to his impeccable English and an indication of his loyal and orthodox approach to a subject of great topicality.

This is thus an unpolemical contribution to a debate that is all too often conducted with great heat from opposite poles. It deserves to be considered on its own somewhat limited terms, as well-written and reasonably concise explanation of NATO's collective position on nuclear weapons in Europe. It avoids the trap of over-popularization, to the point of opening with a chapter entitled 'Terminology' which, without introduction, sets out a series of useful definitions of categories of nuclear weapons. This resemblance to a good military staff paper,

or perhaps a thesis by an unusually well-organized postgraduate, endures. The result is 'icy, lucid and well-informed', (p. v), in the words of the foreword by Eugene Rostow, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the early years of the Reagan administration.

When the book turns to Soviet policies and motives, as it rightly does quite frequently, the material is not very original or penetrating, and there is little disposition to question some rather sweeping assumptions. Thus we are told flatly that 'a long-standing aim of Soviet foreign policy' is 'the removal of American military power from Europe' (pp. 113–4), whereas there is ample room for doubting whether the Russians would really like to see that happen in the foreseeable future. Mr Vigeveno has not avoided the delicate problem of the British and French nuclear deterrents—indeed, they crop up again and again. He sets out without comment the well-known views of the US, British and French governments, but also gives some prominence to the Soviet case, including Marshal Ustinov's statement in August 1982 that 'The Soviet Union cannot ignore the fact that these arms are a part of the medium-range weapons of NATO countries. They are targeted against the USSR and its allies' (p. 112). Many people in the West, well beyond the supporters of unilateral nuclear disarmament, think the Russians have a point there—though it is hard to imagine a book published in a Warsaw Pact country giving space to an equivalent Western point.

The book has some rather unoriginal photographs and an appendix of tables and charts, mostly taken from IISS and NATO publications. An index would have been more valuable and appropriate.

Altogether, a useful and readable work of reference for those with an interest in the NATO standpoint on nuclear deterrence and on the main current and recent arms control negotiations, and at a very reasonable price.

JOHN EDMONDS

Britain's naval future. By James Cable. London: Macmillan. 1983. 220 pp. Index. £20·00.

THIS is an interesting book, but its contents do not match well with what the title suggests. It reads as if the author really wanted to write a book about the future of Britain's defence policy, but somehow got stuck with forcing his ideas into a discussion about the navy.

Perhaps this problem arose because of the difficulties of writing any forward-looking, and therefore speculative, work in this area. The author is keen to address what he sees as the lack of coherent strategic thinking behind Britain's defence policy. He needs to develop this angle in order to put his discussion of naval matters into context. But this broader task dominates the book, and it is for the thinking about likely threats, and possible British responses, that one should read it. The navy, of course, figures prominently, but the strain of presenting general scenarios without a balanced discussion of all the services often shows through.

That said, there is a rich and stimulating discussion on offer in this book. The author takes an openly nationalist approach to defence priorities, and he provides a thoughtful survey of the contingencies facing Britain from nuclear war to coastal defence. He is acutely aware that the policy of 'equal misery' in cuts has passed the point of diminishing returns, and one wishes that he had allowed himself a freer hand in discussing all the services in this context. Much emphasis is given to possible British roles in defence against Soviet 'salami tactics' on the Northern Front, a threat which the author sees as crucial for both Britain and NATO. He sees it as an area in which the limited resources available to Britain might make a difference, and it allows him to combine national defence priorities with collective defence and alliance responsibility.

The book is a welcome challenge to government complacency about overall military strategy. It starts with the premise that shrinking resources require Britain to rethink its defence priorities along narrower lines than at present, and goes on to make a case for retaining the nuclear deterrent, and for giving priority to the navy and the Northern Front rather than to the army and the Central Front. Like any exercise in speculation this can be faulted for arbitrary selection, but the author's impressive command of his topic results in an analysis of immediate relevance to current defence policy-making.

University of Warwick BARRY BUZAN

The Falklands/Malvinas conflict—a spur to arms build-ups. By Jozef Goldblat and Victor Millan. London: Taylor & Francis for SIPRI. 1983. 63 pp. Pb.: £2·50. $4.00.

ANOTHER book on the Falklands, this time from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It is comparatively short and not packed with the detail that one has come to expect from SIPRI publications. There is a useful but incomplete bibliography, which is particularly valuable for Latin American sources, and a few useful summary tables, but by and large the analysis is superficial and not always accurate. British capabilities are overstated, and there is a lack of appreciation of problems posed by the long logistic chains and gaps in air defences.

Not surprisingly, the SIPRI authors take a dim view of the whole affair. They are sympathetic neither to Britain's claim to possess the islands nor to Argentina's attempt to repossess them by force. The war has solved nothing but made the dispute itself harder to resolve. Meanwhile, the fighting has encouraged an increase in military preparations throughout the area. This is, in fact, the most original point in the analysis and it is supported by interesting discussions of the arms programmes of Chile, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia as well as of the two belligerents. While some of the developments might have been prompted by the war (such as Brazil's desire to build a new combined air and naval base) with many the relationship is tenuous and it is not made clear what was already planned prior to April 1982.

Kings College, London LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Israeli nuclear deterrence: a strategy for the 1980s. By Shai Feldman. New York: Columbia University Press. 1983. 310 pp. Index. $32.50. Pb.: $13.00.

DEFINING and refining deterrence is a mini-industry in the strategic studies sector. Shai Feldman now offers us an impressive and challenging new addition to the stock. He argues, with remarkable clarity and a thorough command of the sources, that Israel should adopt a strategy of nuclear deterrence based on a counter-value force of nuclear weapons. Feldman covers almost all the angles, including a sympathetic understanding of Arab perceptions of Israeli nuclear weapons and a comprehensive review of superpower attitudes towards proliferation. It is difficult to do justice to Feldman's intricate argument, for he does address most of the sceptics' questions about the dangers of Israel 'going nuclear'. He recognizes the obvious risks, but suggests that Israel needs to reduce its dependence on costly conventional defence. Feldman is no right-wing extremist, for he insists that if Israeli nuclear deterrence is to work, it must be in support of basic security objectives and that does not include the territories captured after the 1967 war.

Feldman's study is probably the best assessment of the nuclear weapons doctrine of 'near-nuclear' powers. It blends the best of area studies expertise with training in current strategic studies. However, one must admit to serious doubts about the proposition that *any* state should be encouraged to go nuclear. At a time when most nuclear powers are searching for ways to reduce their nuclear arsenals, it is difficult to accept the notion that nuclear weapons are to be desired. As West Europeans and the superpowers know only too well, nuclear weapons are no substitute for massive conventional spending. Nor can nuclear weapons prevent guerrilla war, and at least two of Israel's wars were due to that kind of threat. Feldman's belief that if nuclear threats have worked for the superpowers they will work for Israel and the Arabs underestimates the complexity of Middle East politics and the less pressing conflict of interest between the superpowers. Feldman begins his book by admitting that strategy is first a political and then a military problem, but in his suggestion that nuclear deterrence can give Israel security, he ignores the underlying political roots of the Arab–Israeli conflict. No exercise of military power, not even nuclear military power, can resolve a conflict that requires a solution to the Palestinian problem. One can sympathize with Feldman's desire to end Israel's costly security problems, but in the end he is proposing that Israel run high risks for uncertain results. Far better to cure the patient by resolving the Palestinian problem, than merely to treat the symptoms of heavy Israeli defence spending.

University of Leicester GERALD SEGAL

Politics, economics and social

Terror — violence: aspects of social control. By Robert A. Friedlander. London, New York: Oceana. 1983. 299 pp. Index. $35·00.

THIS book was written to accompany three volumes of documents on terrorism edited by the author. However, the relationship between this study and the volumes of documents is sufficiently loose that there is no difficulty in reading, or assessing, the book as it stands. Describing the contents does present more of a problem. Robert Friedlander is better at summarizing the arguments of others than developing an analysis of his own. Posing a series of questions is characteristic of his style. In particular, it is impossible to extract a conclusion from his discussion of the crucial issue of definition of the term, terrorism.

The one view he does put forward consistently through the book is that the problem of terrorism is likely to get worse in the 1980s,which he describes as 'the dangerous decade' (p. 209). Another general proposition repeated in different forms through the book is that terrorism 'may ultimately destroy liberal, industrial, pluralistic society' (p. xi). He has collected together a large number of statements by politicians, diplomats, and journalists which echo these conclusions but he marshalls very little other evidence to provides support for either proposition. While he accepts, for example, that West Germany has met the challenge posed by terrorism, this does not temper in any way his assessment of the gravity of the terrorist threat. His inclination is to emphasize the sensational and the dramatic, which leads him to a somewhat uncritical acceptance of allegations of terrorist conspiracies. However, he has amassed a considerable quantity of information on acts of terrorism around the world which the student of the subject will find valuable, especially as he gives very full references detailing his sources.

The book's strongest point is legal analysis. A substantial account is given of attempts by the international community to outlaw various facets of terrorism such as air piracy and hostage-taking and there is an interesting discussion of American domestic legislation. Friedlander's political analysis is much weaker. He finds it easier to condemn acts of terrorism than to explain why they occurred or to understand what political utility they might have. The book contains a useful bibliography.

Queen's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

Strikes in Europe and the United States: measurement and incidence. By Kenneth Walsh. London: Pinter. 1983. 230 pp. Index. £15·75.

The political role of international trades unions. By Gary K. Busch. London: Macmillan. 1983. 287 pp. Index. £25·00.

THE first of these two books is a detailed study of the nature of the statistics published on strike activity in the United States and eight leading West European countries. Part one shows why it is difficult to make satisfactory comparisons between countries. In some countries the data refer to all stoppages whereas in others only stoppages above some minimum size are included. When breakdowns are given by duration and numbers of workers involved, the countries adopt different classifications. Industrial classifications used also differ. The nine chapters of part two deal with the nine countries in turn, showing how they compile their statistics and the limitations of the published data. The material in this part is invaluable for anyone wishing to make intelligent use of the published data in any of these countries. Part three attempts, despite the difficulties highlighted in the earlier parts, to make some comparisons of the pattern of strike activity in the nine countries. Although some interesting points emerge, the main impact of this part is to reinforce the need for caution in making comparisons.

In no real sense do international trade unions exist, and there is as yet little effective cooperation between national unions to meet the problems posed by the existence of transnational companies. There is, however, a great deal of interaction among the unions of the world, and all aspects of this interaction form the subject of the second of these books.

In many countries the trade union movement plays a major part in the political life of the nation. In Britain we are well aware of the links between the Labour Party and the trade union movement. In many countries the position is complicated by the existence of rival union

groupings with different political affiliations. Moreover, in some countries, union activity is often directed towards political objectives rather than objectives more directly involved in industrial relations.

International trade union activity does not take place only through international federations like the WFTU and ICFTU. Union national centres (like the British TUC) and even individual unions may play a role in supporting unionism in other countries, particularly those of the Third World. They may choose to support union growth in countries where the government is hostile. They may choose between rival groups of unions with a view to influencing the country's national politics. Busch suggests that much inter-union aid is financed by the donor union's government, and that the shadows of the CIA and KGB lie heavily across the international machinations of trade unions on either side of the Iron Curtain.

The weakness of this book is that, although a general bibliography is appended, there is little detailed documentation. Remarkable events are chronicled but no authority is quoted. There is no way in which the reader can check for himself the account that Busch gives of the way in which unions intervene in affairs in other countries.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

Translating world affairs. By Ruth A. Roland. Jefferson, London: McFarland. 1982. (Distrib. by Bailey Bros. & Swinfen.) 185 pp. Index. £17·05.

IN the conduct of international affairs lives a breed that is usually as invisible as Father Brown's postman—the interpreters. In essence Ruth Roland's book is a reminder that their skills are not to be taken for granted; in the machinery of international diplomacy they can serve as oil or grit. It may no longer be possible for a treacherous interpreter to lead his side to perdition, as happened not infrequently in the early history of the Americas, but it is still possible for their gaffes to bring nations closer to conflict and their inspired diplomatic inexactitudes to defuse a dangerous situation.

Despite her title, Ms Roland deals with interpreting rather than with the whole field of translation, and she is chiefly concerned with tracing the development of the art and craft of interpreting from earliest times through to its full burgeoning as a profession during only the last few decades. While much of the tale is inevitably anecdotal and smells a little of the well-stocked card file, there are many good and apposite stories well told. The profession has always attracted more than its share of virtuosos and 'characters', whom Ms Roland vividly celebrates. Perhaps a shade too much time is spent on these performers *hors série* to the detriment of the greyer skills of those rendering an endless mileage of words into Unospeak or Eurobabble. (Not that all is dull there; I well recall a dull afternoon in Brussels being redeemed by the English translation of a more than usually impenetrable and prolix native Anglophone). One regrets that Ms Roland is a shade cursory on computer translation, a trifle brief on the ethical aspects of interpreting and has rather less to say about questions of power than might have been expected of a political scientist. However, this slim and unpretentious volume reads easily, and if there are still those who believe that *traduire/trahir* sums up the matter then this will soon disabuse them.

University of Keele MARTIN HARRISON

Human rights and world politics. By David P. Forsythe. Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press. 1983. 309 pp. Index. £12·50. Pb.: £6·80.

THIS is a good textbook. It is well informed, easy to read and illustrated with cartoons. It also has the virtue of optimism. David Forsythe discusses human rights, including rights in wartime, and implementation procedures in the manner of Louis Henkin. On the one hand a cartoon forcefully spells out the message, 'We are a watchdog committe, gentlemen, but it *will* facilitate our work if everyone here remembers that we have no teeth' (p. 86). On the other hand, the text persuasively suggests that the enormous power of modern governments to crush enemies and control citizens can be countered by 'pinning them down with articles and stunning them with paragraphs' (p. x). Like Henkin, Forsythe holds that 'the international law of human rights is revolutionary because it contradicts the notion of national sovereignty—that is, that a state can do as it pleases in its own jurisdiction' (p. 4). This vision may account for some minor flaws of omission, like the role of government ministers under the European Convention.

The second part of the book concentrates on the United States, from the point of view of a political scientist. First, there is an informative descriptive essay contrasting the rhetoric and actions in this field of the Carter and Reagan administrations. Secondly, there is an assessment of the nature and impact of the human rights lobby in Washington based on partially structured interviews. Both are well done in themselves. Again, by concentrating on the good guys, Forsythe leaves the reader with a more optimistic impression about the importance of the lobby than he would get from, say, Lars Schultz's comparable account of US lobbies in Latin America.

The book is much less successful as a contribution to understanding of the role of human rights in world politics. Ideological perspectives are recognized as influential but deferred on the plausible ground that classroom testing in Denmark and the United States has shown that students prefer philosophical discussion later rather than earlier in the book. He treats conservatism, liberalism and nationalism—extended to include group loyalties—in the manner of Van Dyke. I found both this division and exposition superficial. There is no thought of explaining why bankers and other powerful conservatives are so hostile to human rights, or redistribution, or the inflation consequent on attempting to meet popular expectations without harming established elites. Secondly, the author is not interested in the way in which human rights, like toleration in the seventeenth century, can be at once an ideological battle-cry and a common ground for reconciliation. He makes no defence of his own outlook, assuming that we all share the same humanism. He is receptive to Scandinavian thinking, but not to African hostility to colonialism as akin to slavery. And, like most of us, he ignores Asia. Finally, I hope I am not being unfair in wondering whether there is an unstated assumption that the world has hitherto been an arena of power politics in which the declarations of human rights offer a first ray of light and hope for the future.

Let me conclude with the more immediate target which Forsythe has in his sights in this excellent book. On page 178 there is a cartoon from the New Yorker in which a progressive parson is depicted concluding his peroration: 'Of course, if national security is involved, disregard everything I've said'.

University of Keele CHRISTOPHER BREWIN

The international dimensions of human rights. 2 vols. Edited by Karel Vasak. Revised and edited for Eng. edn by Philip Alston. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood for UNESCO. 1982. 755 pp. Index. £42·95.

ORIGINALLY published in French in 1978, this is the collective work of lawyers, which accounts both for its juristic approach and for its ideological diversity in terms of individual essays, which do not pose as a coherent treatise. Flanked by two brief summary statements from the general editor are twenty essays grouped around three structural ideas: historical foundations; principles and norms; and international institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights. This three-fold testimony to unassuming legal sobriety is somewhat reassuring in the presence of a fast-growing human rights literature of the 'global perspectivist' kind. The approach is straightforward, perhaps even bland: human rights are legal norms, subject to interpretation. Yet there is awareness that the scientific study of human rights requires also inter- and multidisciplinary approaches.

Three annexes—of a chart of ratifications of major international human rights agreements, useful diagrams of implementation machinery and a selective but very substantial bibliography—as well as an index of international instruments and a general index complete the set of two volumes.

This work is aimed at students and, except for its price, will undoubtedly attract the discerning among them. A successful balance has been achieved between comprehensive information and detailed description. The presentation is simple, yet not facile. Differences of view are noted, yet not allowed to obscure the general themes addressed. Twenty essays constitute as many cautionary tales that the drafting of standards and the effective protection of human rights are not identical. Human rights are but just one element among others of the structures of society. Whether perceived as interacting dialectically or as being interlocked in a vicious circle, their language, essential concepts and operative mechanisms must be understood. This is greatly facilitated by this work, which will be welcomed by students and teachers alike.

London School of Economics J. F. WEISS

Nuclear exports and world politics: policy and regime. Edited by Robert Boardman and James F. Keeley. London: Macmillan for Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie Univeristy. 1983. 256 pp. Index. £20·00.

GIVEN the spate of recent works on nuclear non-proliferation, every new book needs a distinctive approach if it is to hold the reader's attention. This book passes that test easily. Its focus is on the policies and policy processes of a selection of nuclear exporting states, arguing first, that while the ability of the exporters to dominate the non-proliferation regime has been eroded, they nevertheless remain central actors; secondly, that nuclear policy in these states is growing in complexity; and thirdly, that there is ample scope for broader comparative assessments of their policies and of the implications of these for the non-proliferation regime.

The main body of the book comprises studies of the United States, Canada, France, West Germany, Britain and Australia. All are good, and cumulatively they give an excellent sense of the variety of ways in which foreign and domestic policy concerns, coupled with markedly different policy processes, have combined to yield the nuclear export and non-proliferation policies of the countries under examination. In comparison with the others, the chapter on the United States is perhaps a little fragmented in structure, though redeemed by the provocative thought that the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation was 'a resounding success in helping to disseminate in a methodical way much of the information required to proliferate and to evade most of the safeguards' (p. 22).

Two further chapters broaden the scope of the book by offering a critical view of non-proliferation activities as seen by the countries of the South and a discussion of persisting problems with the non-proliferation regime approached from the perspective of international regime theory. The first of these, by Ashok Kapur, is particularly interesting for the arguments which it derives from the differing security contexts of the Northern and Southern states in the mid-1970s. For the North, in the context of secure military alliances, the key issue was the tension between assured supply of nuclear technology and safeguards. For the South, in the absence of military security, it was a matter of seeking to develop the nuclear option for both energy security and its military counterpart. Moreover, argues Kapur, in the relatively unstable international system of the South, militarization is motivated not so much by regional threats as by a desire to keep the superpowers out. The nuclear option, in short, is seen as part of a larger strategy to reorient the relations between the superpowers and the regional states.

In the concluding chapter, the editors successfully summarize and reflect upon the substantive chapters. They observe that the states examined in this volume have reached a rough consensus on non-proliferation policy during the last decade or so. It is hard to disagree with their final conclusion (p. 246) that '[k]eeping this rough-hewn consensus in place while tackling, during the final few and crucial years of this century, the nuclear energy requirements of developing countries will be a task far less easy to accomplish'.

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

Nuclear power. 2nd edn. By Walter C. Patterson. London: Penguin. 1983. 256 pp. Index.
Pb., £2·50.

The Harvard Study Group: Living with nuclear weapons. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1983. 268 pp. Index. £9·95.

WHETHER our societies can or should continue to gaze upon the two faces of the nuclear Janus, looking to peace and war, is an issue no one can choose to avoid. Since we must all confront it, we could do worse than begin with these two simple but expert primers on the civil and military uses of nuclear fission. Although one deals with power and the other with weapons, there is a similarity of form and, at the margin, of substance. Above all, there is a common desire for a more rational public assessment of nuclear policies. Both books express their authors' opinions, implicitly when not explicitly; but both also provide at least some of the evidence on which readers can reasonably base a different view. When the prevalent public tendency is towards unreasoning acceptance or rejection of all things nuclear, against a larger background of equally unthinking apathy, such efforts to inform as well as provoke deserve recognition.

Dr Patterson, a physicist associated with the Friends of the Earth, has brought up to date a

slim paperback, first published in 1976, which nevertheless contains two books in one. The first, an explanation of nuclear science and technology for the layman, emphasizing the technology of power reactors, is quite simply the best text of its kind in the English language: lucid, instantly intelligible and beautifully organized. The second, recounting the history of nuclear power and its problems, is a different matter: fluent and absorbing, but also selective and uneven. Three chapters on the progressive adaptation of nuclear fission to civil use concentrate on mishaps, follies and safety deficiencies, interspersed with accounts of famous accidents. Yet these, although hardly dispassionate, can claim fairly to describe the means by which industries and governments have earned the public fears now aroused by nuclear power. The succeeding chapters, on nuclear economics and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, are less convincing. The former falls into the trap of abstracting the costs and benefits of nuclear electricity from their broader economic setting. The latter is disappointingly sketchy and occasionally inexact. These blemishes are greatly outweighed, however, by the merits of the first section of the book.

Dr Carnesale and his Harvard colleagues have followed a broadly similar course, presenting evidence about the nuclear armouries of the two superpowers, in the political context, before identifying and addressing the policy issues demanding public judgement. The public to which they look, however, is more clearly a national one: their first, inevitably cursory section, on international politics in a nuclear world and on possible scenarios of nuclear war, is predominantly concerned with Soviet–American relations, and their second concentrates on the comparison of Soviet and American military forces. Their joint view of the evidence is sometimes open to question, as when it leads them to argue for basing Western responses on the effect, rather than the intention, of Soviet actions (p. 36). This is nevertheless a perceptive, measured summary, deserving a non-American audience if only because it offers a 'moderate liberal' antidote to prevalent official thinking in Washington. The book should be read most widely for its third section, in which the authors set out conflicting arguments, with their own conclusions, on major contemporary issues of policy, including the procurement and deployment of particular nuclear weapon systems, the pursuit of nuclear arms control and the constraint of nuclear proliferation. Whether or not one agrees with their final prescriptions, the presentation of alternative choices is a model of intellectual fairness.

Within the latter pages of these two books one finds a divergence of outlook far more fundamental than the overt topic of either. Dr Patterson, on the civil side, believes that this generation faces an urgent and irreversible choice as to whether 'we commit ourselves and our descendants to a nuclear future', and that the decision will condition for all time 'the entire organisation of our global society' (p. 219). Dr Carnesale and his colleagues see no such apocalyptic choice on the military side; rejecting 'atomic escapism' (p. 253), they envisage only an unending struggle to live with tolerable security in an ineluctably nuclear world. The former is a powerfully tempting vision, in contrast to which the latter seems bland or defeatist. Yet to suppose that our capacity to command the use of nuclear energy, civil and military, offers no choices between 'full ahead' and 'full astern' is to diminish both ourselves and our real difficulty. It is also to arouse false hopes and fears, and to encourage polarization at the expense of a painful search for consensus. The true value of these two books is that, in their different ways, they can in fact do something to stimulate wider participation in the effort to derive benefit at an acceptable cost from an attribute of the natural order, the exploitation of which must be controlled but the existence of which cannot be denied. In nuclear affairs, neither we nor any of our successors can be innocent. We can only be responsible.

IAN SMART

Renewable energy: the power to choose. By Daniel Deudney and Christopher Flavin. New York, London: Norton for the Worldwatch Institute. 1983. 431 pp. Index. Pb.

FOR the past few years a shortfall in energy demand in many parts of the world has distracted public attention from the underlying crisis caused by diminishing supplies of irreplaceable traditional fuels such as coal, oil and natural gas. A temporary glut in petroleum products has slowed down the rate of increase in price of many fuels, and new discoveries of oil and natural gas have partially countered the economic stranglehold attributed to the OPEC countries in the mid-1970s. Nuclear power, once seen by environmentalists as the deadliest of threats to

more benign renewables such as wind and solar power, is currently subject to a *de facto* moratorium.

But the fuel crisis remains essentially unsolved, and it is therefore good to know from Deudney and Flavin's eminently readable study of the renewables that not everyone has been sleeping during the current pause in demand. The authors offer an up-to-date survey of the full range of 'benign' energy sources, suggesting appropriate mixes which, though varying regionally, will ultimately pave the way to a sustainable global future. But although life with the renewables is preferable to dependence on traditional fuels and nuclear power, it will only be possible if institutions and politics are geared to the transformation of existing energy systems (p. 316).

Renewable energy: the power to choose is at its most convincing when dealing with its stated subject matter. The section on nuclear power ('Too bleak to meter', p. 24) is simplistic, and fails to recognize what the nuclear power industry, rightly or wrongly, sees as the potential for the Third World of its most recent 'turn-key' reactors. The production of liquid fuels from crops is acknowledged in some countries as having caused 'environmental, equity, and nutritional problems' (p. 160), but such tentative statements fail to recognize the devastating social impact of, say, ethanol production on the economies of small farmers and landless labourers in Brazil.

Like many propagandists, Deudney and Flavin overstate the potential of their products. They are right in identifying the need for political will and more appropriate regionally diverse energy systems. But however ecologically attractive the renewables may be, they have more drawbacks than the book admits, and it seems less than likely that they can ever in themselves avert a global fuel crisis.

University of Hull DAVID GOSLING

An efficient energy future: prospects for Europe and North America. London, Boston: Butterworths for UN Economic Commission for Europe. 1983. 259 pp. £40·00.

THIS is an ambitious study of the different energy consumption patterns and variations in the efficiency of energy use in seventeen countries belonging to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The study is a report of the results of a research programme undertaken on behalf of the secretariat of this Commission. The aim was to analyse the potential energy savings that could be made by the relevant countries during the period 1980 to 2000. The study is presented in two parts: part one gives a broad outline of energy demand and supply conditions as well as a brief description of the various governments' energy policies. Part two covers the same topics in more detail by analysing the individual countries.

The approach adopted by the authors is to analyse energy demand through a study of historical energy consumption patterns, energy forecasts and the present energy policies pursued by the governments under study. In doing so the study relies heavily upon underlying trends in energy use which are assumed to be relatively stable through time. In general, energy supply is not held to be a long-term constraint and given the present overcapacity in most energy-supply investments this may be a reasonable assumption. The analysis is sectoral with the main sectors defined as housing and services, transport and industry. As the methodology relies more heavily upon the analysis of energy demand, energy consumption *per capita* and energy intensity ratios became important determinants in the model. In this way the study relies more upon technical analysis than a purely economic approach. Such approaches emphasize the functional uses of energy supplies and tend to complement purely economic approaches. There is thus very little discussion of the effect of pricing policies upon future demand patterns.

Two possible energy futures are presented, one based upon extrapolation of current trends in energy demand patterns, the other forecasting energy demand assuming utilization of the most efficient technology available. There is little testing of the forecasts. In one case, however, when recent trends are compared to predicted trends, the model does not perform well, and the authors admit that some short-term developments appear to be at variance with the forecasts (p. 49). Little justification is given for this variation, apart from assuming it to be a short-term fluctuation around the long-run trend.

In analysing the industrial sector the model assumes substantial economic growth for all countries until the end of the century. The economic justification for such growth is not

explicitly stated. Indeed, in the recent past Britain has consistently revised energy demand forecasts downward as economic growth has fallen.

The results of the study conclude that a 20 per cent decrease in energy demand could be attained by the year 2000 if currently available efficient technology could be substituted for existing inefficient technology. There is little discussion of the mechanics of the recommended substitution process, although it is proposed that greater international co-operation would help achieve this goal. Sceptics might conclude that this is a fairly naive approach to the solution, although current international cooperation in nuclear power may be cited as a step in the right direction.

Part two details the historical demand patterns and present policies, but adds little to the results. An appendix details the model used in the study. Whether or not the forecasts turn out to be correct only time will tell.

University of Aberdeen A. McGuire

OPEC, the Gulf, and the world petroleum market: a study in government policy and downstream operations. By Fereidun Fesharaki and David T. Isaak. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1983. 268 pp. Index. £18·95.

An appraisal of OPEC oil policies. By Ali M. Jaidah. London, New York: Longman. 1983. 150 pp. Index. Pb.: £4·75.

The main disappointment is that these books do not fulfil their aim of providing insight into the decision-making processes within the OPEC forum. No authoritative sense emerges of how important this forum is, compared with (for example) regional groupings such as OAPEC or the Ministerial Committee of Gulf States (which arranged the October 1973 oil price increase) or, indeed, unilateral actions by individual members. Nor are we given much sense of the politico-economic tensions among OPEC members which have influenced events and non-events such as the two-tier posted-price system and the lack of progress towards the heralded OPEC Long Term Strategy. Nor, again, is much attention given to the watershed event of the adoption of export quotas by the OPEC membership and how these will enhance (or otherwise) OPEC's control over oil prices or add to the complex of tensions within OPEC. Fesharaki and Isaak perhaps come nearest to authoritatively discussing these topics when they debunk 'colourful econometric studies' (p. 237) of OPEC for making unrealistic assumptions about its objectives. But this section is all too brief, which is a pity, given the large size and small brain of their prey.

Jaidah, with good inside knowledge of OPEC, having been its Secretary General for two years, tries to give the impression that it suffers from none of the internal tensions which affect its gait and momentum. His book is a public relations exercise, defending OPEC on every front and explaining the reasonableness of all of its actions. All the chapters were originally speeches, delivered in a variety of more or less political or academic fora.

Neither of these books gives the impression of having always sought after academic objectivity. In Jaidah's case this is, of course, not looked for—the value of his book is as a record of the views of a man who reached the highest levels in OPEC policy-making circles. But in Fesharaki and Isaak's case it is a disappointment, especially as they are university-based and often quote from their papers published in the academic literature. Their unmistakably pro-OPEC leanings might be primarily derived from Dr Fesharaki's close links, as an Iranian delegate at several OPEC ministerial conferences.

Fesharaki and Isaak's book does contain four particularly informative chapters on the Gulf countries' downstream operations in oil refining, transportation, petrochemicals and natural gas sectors, which should prove to be valuable as a factual record, and contain convincing arguments on each topic. However, there are also a few somewhat unnerving cases of less than thorough argument and questionable conclusions, such as the claim that enlarged direct sales of crude oil by national oil companies will enhance OPEC's control over price; the possibility of increased competition between these companies and the problem of containing it is hardly mentioned.

The important section on the economics of Gulf export refineries (pp. 118–30) is something of a curiosity, for it draws conclusions which seem to be at odds with the facts and analysis upon which they are based. The authors' aim seems to be one of justifying recent Gulf

investments in refinery capacity rather than being entirely objective on factual knowledge. Certainly this reviewer would have been more convinced if Fesharaki and Isaak had been more explicit on the matter of the degree of subsidy needed to get these refineries into world markets. We are told that Gulf refineries 'will probably provide fair returns on equity' (p. 130), but the financial analysis leading up to it points in quite the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the authors say that 'we feel {now} is precisely the right time to enter the market' (p. 130). Apparently, they are very confident that the Gulf refineries will 'push out refineries elsewhere' (p. 130). The unconsidered question in all of this is just why enough OECD refinery capacity will close if it is expected that even the high-cost Gulf refineries will eventually be profitable?

Despite these comments both books can in their different ways be recommended. Both are useful records of the development of OPEC and growth of downstream operations in the Gulf area. The reader needs, though, to be alert for the improbable.

University of Aberdeen PAUL HALLWOOD

Multinationals: company performances and global trends. By John M. Stopford and John H. Dunning. London: Macmillan. 1983. 147 pp. Index. £30·00.

THIS book is a review and analysis of the recent performance of 500 multinational firms selected by virtue of the fact that their turnover exceeds $US 1 billion. It draws on the raw data in the same authors' *World directory of multinational enterprises 1982–83*. This volume consists of three parts. The first presents data, derived from government and other official sources, on all foreign direct investment. It includes the scope and pattern of foreign direct investment, its sectoral composition and influences on the firm's growth, such as technological innovation and government policy. Part two presents data on the 500 multinationals, their international scope, product policies and expansion strategies up to 1981. The final section consists of four statistical tables with no analytical commentary, ranking the 500 firms by measures of size and degree of multinationality, with a final table detailing government ownership among the 500 firms—thirty such 'state owned multinationals' are identified.

Given its price, the book must be aimed at library sales and at the shelves of large companies. In coverage too, this market is suggested as no reference is made to econometric studies of the growth, pattern and profitability of the world's largest firms, which is surprising as John Dunning has contributed extensively in this field. The only summary statistics used are percentages, averages and ratios. Little attempts is made to relate the different parts of the book. Part one is hardly used as a contextual background against which to set the performance of the 500 firms. Many of the tables would bear the weight of much deeper analysis than the authors impose; for instance, the tables on intra-firm exports (pp. 34–6) are pregnant with inferences and the interesting data collected on technology licensing (pp. 40–1) are very suggestive in an area where hard data are hard to find.

The section on performance contains an interesting analysis of international competitiveness based on the relative growth of foreign production and exports from the home country base (ownership advantages versus location advantages) analysed by nationality of ownership and industry grouping. It would have been interesting to link the analysis of the movement of industries to increasing worries about the footloose nature of some firms and policy measures on this issue. On employment, the authors are generally satisfied that job losses are not the result of outward investment, though they do recommend some degree of *dirigisme* in relating investment patterns to locational comparative advantage (p. 79). Profitability is examined only cursorily, the authors preferring to concentrate on difficulties in its measurement and comparison. The chapter on product policies and expansion strategies contains some interesting analyses of diversification and product specialization, including the tentative hypothesis that industries subject to international competition are likely to remain the most specialized.

Overall, researchers in the field will welcome this pre-digested data base as a source of testable hypotheses about the behaviour of multinational firms.

University of Bradford PETER BUCKLEY

Protectionism and industrial decline. By Vincent Cable. London: Hodder & Stoughton for Overseas Development Institute. 1983. 274 pp. Index. Pb.: £10·50.

WHEN LDCs flexed their economic muscles while the developed world relaxed, one result was surplus capacity in some of our import-competing industries and a clamour for protection. Although it would be better if we picked the winners amongst R & D-based sunrise industries and left the more mature activities to the LDCs, in conformity with some product cycle models, this is scant comfort to those who earn their living in the threatened industries. So we have our problem cases, shielded through a miscellany of overt and not-so-overt protection. While the proportion of Britain's total imports so 'managed' may be small, when it comes to imports from LDCs this proportion is thought to be around 30 per cent. Economic adjustment in the United Kingdom is correspondingly less urgent while the LDCs' way ahead is partly blocked. Such arguments abound in the first and last chapters of the book under review. They are given added weight by the empirical studies in the chapters between.

A key question is why some UK industries are especially prone to injury from LDC and other imports. Amongst the authors' most significant findings is that the structure of UK protection is best explained in terms of the level of import penetration rather than in terms of the rate of change of such penetration. In other words, protection was not given to assist adjustment (to that rate of change), but to protect low incomes, whether wages or profits. This is at variance with GATT intentions, much US trade legislation and modern thought, including the author's. A new wage protection argument appears to have prevailed, the aim of which was not to protect those industries from low wages abroad but to protect low wage activities at home. Detailed studies of the knitwear, footwear, cutlery and consumer electronics trades help to put this argument into perspective. Despite many differences among the four trades studied, there was a common feature in the relatively high proportion of unskilled labour employed. Although such labour worked together with professional and other highly skilled labour, which became increasingly difficult to attract to some of these activities, the dominant feature was less skilled labour in terms of UK production functions. Not so in the LDCs, where low wage rates were found not to be a sufficient condition for export success. Doubt is cast on whether such low rates are even a necessary condition. Scale economies, capital intensity, management attitudes and labour productivity were often found to be more decisive. Ultimately, it is a question of adjustment to new activities or higher quality in old ones. NICs have learned how to go upmarket. For those who think that we too should learn this, this book is a must.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

International trade policy: from tariffs to the new protectionism. By David Greenaway. London: Macmillan. 1983. 240 pp. Index. £18·00. Pb.: £6·95.

THIS book seeks to explain the new protectionism of the 1970s and 1980s. By 1980, nearly half of world trade was 'managed'. Even in manufactures, where postwar trade liberalization had gone furthest, the share of managed trade is shown to have risen from an eighth in 1974 to nearly a quarter in 1980. Much of this is explained in terms of the continuing shift in comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing from developed market economies to LDCs. In times of recession, the consequent labour-shedding in the developed countries could not be offset by the growth of labour absorbing new industries. The reaction was the erection of non-tariff barriers by developed economies. Since the loss of employment in those countries was concentrated in trades which formed the basis of LDCs' trade expansion, such as textiles, the new protection was also concentrated on labour-intensive products. In consequence, LDCs bore the brunt of the new trade restrictions.

The theoretical basis of the book is a version of the Ohlin–Heckscher model, with the empirical aspect most thoroughly considered being the employment factor. One question is whether the new protectionism was a retrograde step. In a comparison with the unilateral actions taken in the 1930s, it was not. At least there are now attempts to discuss and negotiate protectionist measures. The author's standard, however, is the higher one of GATT with its ban on discrimination and quantitative controls, by which we have retrogressed. Since the purpose of the new protection was to safeguard employment, special attention is paid to whether the employment effects were as expected. They are shown to have been fairly insignificant even in the labour-intensive sector, suggesting that the new protection was

largely ineffectual, but also that trade barriers do not matter and the results would have been similar with free trade. Such conclusions probably stem from a separation of productivity changes from trade. Where trade follows the traditional inter-trade pattern, as in primary commodities and labour-intensive manufactures, the effects of productivity changes on trade are one-directional but not independent of such changes. In more than half of trade in manufactures, where the pattern is one of intra-industry trade, productivity changes are similar in the various developed trading countries and the trade effects reciprocal. Since the necessary change in production functions affects factor use and factor proportions less than in inter-trade, the employment effects are not so marked and more acceptable. This point needs to be made not only to explain why three quarters of trade in manufactures has remained immune from the new protectionism. It should be stressed as showing how productivity changes can affect trade in ways which make adherence to GATT rules practical politics for the sake of employment as well as real incomes. This is just as much 'trade policy' as the clamping down of trade barriers. It is no adverse criticism of the book to say that, as far as trade policy is concerned, it is possible to interpret recent events somewhat more optimistically than the author does, and to do so on the evidence he presents.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

Industrialization in the non-Western world. By Tom Kemp. London, New York: Longman. 1983. 212 pp. Index. Pb.: £6·50.

THIS book examines the process of industrialization in a group of countries which together account for more than half of the world's population and a rather larger proportion of its total landmass. Population and size, then, are the important factors in this particular analysis of the process of industrialization, the purpose of which is described as to raise living standards in the non-Western world to levels comparable to those in the Western industrial countries, a view which can only be accepted at the most elementary level. How, then, does one turn large, overpopulated non-Western countries into sophisticated and highly industrialized 'smaller' Western nations? Development economists spend an awful lot of time arguing whether or not it can be done, and if so, what the appropriate strategies are. Historians simply content themselves with presenting the record of past development.

This book inclines to the latter position. It starts with a general chapter on industrialization which introduces the subject and sets out its principal considerations, costs and dimensions. The author then devotes a chapter to each of his case studies, namely Japan, the Soviet Union, India, China, Brazil and Nigeria. These are followed by another general chapter on industrialization in the developing countries. His conclusions are brought together in the final chapter in which he draws some comparative lessons from his different models (i.e. case studies).

Generally, the author's discussion of the industrialization process as it has emerged in the different countries which he has chosen is competent and clearly written. One feels that within the constraints of a small volume he has assembled quite a lot of useful information. He does not, however, present any new insights or forms of analysis but seems rather to concentrate on describing developments. His study seems, therefore, to lack the analytical focus which is essential to a comparative study. He claims, for example, that Japan was the most successful country at assimilating Western standards, but on the other hand the Japanese model is not exportable. Again, he concludes that Brazil's industrialization is successful but that it cannot be exported to other Latin American countries. Taken to its logical conclusion, every success story could well turn out to be *sui generis*, a rather strange criterion of success! Nevertheless, taken as a whole, this is quite a handy book for the general reader and well worth having at the price.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

The North-South dialogue: a brief history. By Charles A. Jones. London: Pinter. 1983. 153 pp. Index. £16·00.

US foreign policy and the Third World: Agenda 1983. Edited by John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab. New York: Praeger for the Overseas Development Council. 1983. 294 pp. Pb

THE North-South dialogue clearly means different things to different people and on more

than one occasion, the parties have ended up talking to themselves. That much is clear from the first of these volumes. The author does not however say why this is so. Rather, he gives a broad sweep of events, issues and the outcome of various international conferences which have made the headlines. The negotiating plans and gestures of the different parties have also been identified as the author slips backwards and forwards between politics, economics, international diplomacy and ideology. In the absence of a proper historical perspective or analytical approach, however, the result tends to be too polemical.

The author's intention is to provide a narrative of the relationship between the rich North and the poor countries of the South, the so-called Third World, a dialogue which has been repeatedly side-tracked by East-West events and issues. Unfortunately he does not explain why this happened and what constraints and opportunities it created for North and South. Nor does he relate the dialogue to the enthusiasm in the 1970s for the New International Economic Order. One feels that the author has perhaps cast his net too wide, and consequently lost much of the essential flavour of the main debate. Quite a lot of what he concentrates on is really 'noises off'.

By way of contrast to this rather personal view, the Agenda series of the Overseas Development Council is an established and authoritative review and evaluation of US foreign policy relations with the Third World. Agenda 83 begins with an introduction by Robert McNamara, the Chairman of the Council, in which he stresses the theme of interdependence and the need to recapture the benefits of the real growth which occurred during the 1970s and also to do something positive about the deteriorating conditions in the low-income countries. These themes are developed in an overview by John Lewis in part one in terms of the question: 'Can we escape the path of mutual injury?' He views the progress of interdependence since 1974 as falling into two well-defined periods. The first, extending from 1974 to 1979, he identifies as the positive phase of increased interdependence. In other words, he does not agree with those who regard this period as a time of major de-linking in the international economy. On the other hand, he considers the later period, 1979–82, as fateful for the United States in the sense that it seems to have turned its back on the Third World precisely at the time when it should have been pursuing policies of positive interdependence. This has obviously done much harm to the United States as well as to the Third World countries. Strenuous efforts should now be made to rebuild interdependence and to this end he puts forward a number of interesting proposals, some of which are not particularly new but well worth making again.

The goals of US policy are then discussed in terms of regional perspectives in part two. One chapter is devoted to each of Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and India and South Asia. These are well written and provide a number of interesting insights into the thinking of the present administration. US policy towards Latin America has always represented a strange blend of crude frontier-like politics, strong-arm tactics and simple do-gooding. One has to wait and see into which of these categories President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative will fall. The 'discovery of Africa' in the 1970s forced both the Carter and the Reagan administrations to do some serious rethinking of specific issues in relation to that continent. That process is still being worked out and Henry Bienen calls for a more constructive approach.

The present US administration is obviously very hot on what it calls 'the magic of the market-place'. The role of the private sector is in fact one of the main themes developed in part three. However, it is much easier to coin phrases than to initiate policies which will promote growth with equity. The controversy as to whether growth trickles down or trickles up is likely to be with us for a long time. The other major theme developed in this section is the US interest in containing the serious financial crisis facing the World Bank. The United States undoubtedly has a major role to play in keeping the World Bank group going; whether it will rise to the occasion has yet to be seen.

The final section is given over entirely to the Statistical Annexes. These extend to almost 130 pages but are a mine of information and reliable data and add immensely to the value of the publication.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

South–South financial cooperation: approaches to the current crisis. The Jamaica papers. Edited by Dragoslav Avramovic. London: Pinter. 1983. 205 pp. £15·50.

CONCERN with the slow progress of North–South discussions has created pressure for

developing countries to become collectively more self-reliant, and to come up with proposals for reform of the international trading and financial system that do not depend on the cooperation of the North. The idea of cooperation within the South is, of course, not a new one. Proposals for a Southern currency, or for pooling arrangements, or for some form of managed trade have been around for some years. This volume brings together edited versions of papers submitted to an Expert Group meeting of the Group of 77 held in Jamaica in March 1982, with the purpose of examining the scope for and mechanics of financial cooperation among developing countries.

The key policy areas identified are balance of payments support, development lending, direct investment and export financing; and the papers discuss, *inter alia*, commodity finance, regional credit arrangements, joint ventures, energy investment finance, and investment guarantees. In most cases an often cursory discussion of the economics of these issues is combined with a fairly extensive review of institutional arrangements. The book also touches frequently on the historical evolution of South–South cooperation.

It is difficult, in a short review, to do justice to the range of proposals that are covered. People tend to have their pet schemes and certainly readers are likely to find some ideas more compelling than others. A more fundamental question arising from the book is whether there is any significant mileage to be gained from exclusively Southern arrangements; significant in the sense of offering a true alternative to cooperation with the North. Is there any reason to believe that it will be easier to reach agreement among Southern countries than between Southern and Northern ones? Possible answers to this question run up against a central dilemma. Almost all schemes require finance. But where is the finance to come from within the South? Answer: the surplus countries—in the main, OPEC. But will surplus countries have the necessary motivation to support financial cooperation with the rest of the Third World? No doubt it would be stronger if they were to share the same payments problems. But as soon as they do, their capacity to finance such cooperation evaporates. Even beyond the deficit–surplus distinction there are probably as many differences of opinion within the South as between South and North and these are likely to stall South–South reforms.

While there is undoubtedly scope for more financial cooperation within the South along some of the lines explored in this book those who expect too much will be disappointed. Southern cooperation offers no unconstrained panacea. As with North–South reforms there seems little alternative other than to chip away in a piecemeal fashion. By providing one blueprint for reform this book is a useful addition to the literature. The problem remains that of converting a blueprint—which is quite easy to draw—into reality.

University of Surrey GRAHAM BIRD

More for the least? Prospects for poorest countries in the eighties. By Thomas G. Weiss and Anthony Jennings. Lexington, Mass:, Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. 176 pp. Index. £19·50.

THE title of this book could be misleading. It is not an analysis of the problems and prospects of the thirty-one poorest countries designated by the UN as 'least developed'. In fact, in the conclusions the authors state that such an analysis still waits to be done. Rather, the book is a discussion of the preparation, negotiations and outcome of the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries held in Paris in September 1981. The book is an important contribution to the so far pretty thin literature on the techniques and methods of North–South negotiations. There can have been no reason not to indicate this in the title.

By the dismal standards of other conferences, this one was a success, assuming that the intentions expressed by all concerned are actually implemented. In his foreword, M. Jean-Pierre Cot, then French Minister for Cooperation and Development (who was also the Chairman of the Paris Conference) states that it 'achieved results that went far beyond even the most optimistic expectations'. The authors, somewhat more cautiously, describe it as a 'qualified success'. The Conference was certainly lucky—as the authors make clear—to have taken place in Paris a few weeks after the inception of the Mitterrand administration which was determined to make it a success and put the full resources and prestige of its French hosts behind it. This is the kind of stroke of good luck which it is impossible to plan for—more often UN conferences recently have been plagued by the opposite experience.

The preparations and secretariat functions were in the hands of the UN Conference for Trade and Development. The authors, one of whom, Weiss, is an UNCTAD staff member, give UNCTAD good marks for its work but are by no means entirely uncritical. They seem well aware of UNCTAD's central dilemma: how to reconcile its role as a pressure group for the 'Group of 77' fully committed to the demands of the developing countries with its role as an impartial UN secretariat. In the long run, it seems inevitable that the Third World should have its own secretariat—a Third World OECD—to enable UNCTAD, perhaps together with GATT, to assume the function of a universally accepted international body.

Once any misunderstanding arising from the title of this book is removed it should be valuable reading for all those concerned with the mechanics and dynamics of international negotiations, and especially the global North–South negotiations. The book is obviously based on a good deal of internal and direct knowledge of the inner workings of the Paris Conference and contains useful lessons, indicating a preference for specific one-issue topics, preferably of low controversial intensity, over wide-ranging conferences about changing whole systems; also throwing some doubt on the value of the 'group system' (South, West, East) where 'solidarity' within the group becomes the main concern and becomes an enemy of true negotiations.

Institute of Development Studies, Sussex H. W. SINGER

Food security: theory, policy and perspectives from Asia and the Pacific rim. By Anthony H. Chisholm and Rodney Tyers. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 359 pp. Index. £22·50.

THIS book springs from a programme of research on food security in Asia and the Pacific organized by the East–West Resource Systems Institute in Hawaii. The papers deal with the issue at the level of theoretical, descriptive and empirical analysis and comprise a searching, comprehensive exploration of the problems involved in ensuring an adequate food supply for all people at all times. Inevitably in a book reporting on research there are great variations in the demands made upon the reader. Those chapters which deal with general theory and policy issues, including accounts of stabilization policy, will be most accessible to those already familiar with the language of economics; the reports of empirical studies will only be fully appreciated by those who have some knowledge of econometrics. Despite this, the book should not be ignored by the more general reader who will be much helped by the lucid first and last chapters written by Chisholm and Tyers and find great interest in the account of policies in Japan, India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

Possibly the most misleading feature of the book, for a European reader, is its title. The ideas and analysis it contains are of global importance and specifically of relevance to current debate in Europe about the Common Agricultural Policy. They suggest that a move towards the liberalization of agricultural trade might bring massive gains in economic welfare to the industrialized world and an improvement in food security. So great would be the gains that these countries could enjoy a higher standard of living while at the same time financing deficiency payments for farmers in developing countries to help them raise output whilst keeping prices to consumers low. Such a scenario of international cooperation may seem impossibly utopian. However, if it is dismissed those who make policy in the West should recognize that the same arguments also suggest that protectionism leads to a poorer, less secure future, not only for others but for themselves.

This is but one element in an important book. The text as a whole will be valuable to research workers and graduate students who will find drawn together in an up-to-date form most of the relevant arguments and much of the contemporary literature relating to food security. Academic discussion will be enriched by familiarity with its contents. At a time of recession when the temptation to seek autarchic solutions grows, it helps to maintain the intellectual case for an interdependent, openly trading world. Critics may question the political assumptions and the analytical methodologies employed by some of the authors. Indeed, the reader is repeatedly reminded of the need to proceed cautiously and to avoid drawing simplistic policy conclusions. Despite this, the chapters provide impressive examples of the difficulties which flow from attempts to 'improve' the working of the market. Such evidence is especially relevant where policy, as in Europe, creates an administered market for agricultural goods and, as a result, creates problems of oversupply and overspending.

University of Aberdeen JOHN S. MARSH

Information, economics and power: the North–South dimension. Edited by Rita Cruise O'Brien. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1983. 156 pp. Index. Pb.: £7·50.

THIS volume of essays largely derives from the papers presented to a conference on 'Information access and international negotiations: new directions in North–South relations' which was held at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, in 1981. That conference in turn arose out of concern over the effects that differential access to information and the impact of new technology were having or might have on international negotiations, particularly those with a North–South dimension. The problem was seen as having acquired a new urgency in that new information and telecommunications systems were liable seriously to exacerbate the previously existing information capacity differential.

The ten essays included in this book vary greatly in their coverage, scope, and size. Much the longest and most ambitious are the review of relevant literature by Rita Cruise O'Brien and G. Helleiner and the study of transnational corporations and transborder data flow by an anonymous member of the United Nations staff in New York. In such a rapidly changing field it is somewhat surprising that the former chapter cites practically no references later than 1979. The latter chapter is in many respects more satisfying and succeeds in conveying the sophistication, complexity and speed of modern transborder data flows, usually via computer terminals linking electronic processing with advanced telecommunications facilities. The author shows that it is the information-intensive industries such as banking, insurance, tourism and air transport that have come to require immediate availability and dissemination of data, which have in turn spread to many other fields. This chapter is written with admirable clarity and is well illustrated with several maps and diagrams (almost the only ones in the book).

Other chapters deal with information needs relating to two areas of commodity negotiations (coffee and copper) and to mineral prospecting via remote sensing from satellites, in what seems like a futuristic study until one realizes that such work has been going on for a decade or more, with a conceptual approach to developing countries' information requirements on embryonic cost–benefit lines and requirements in the energy field.

With ten studies included in a total book length of 156 pages, some of these individual chapters are quite short. In such a specialized field the choice of papers for inclusion in the book is likely to have depended more on what was available than on any other rationale. Nevertheless, overall the book throws much useful light on a topic of which, it can scarcely be doubted, much more will be heard over the next few years. But will the editor be able to fulfil her stated objective of aiding the Southern countries? The general impression given is that at present the cards are stacked against them.

Loughborough University J. R. HOUGH

Development by people: citizen construction of a just world. By Guy Gran. New York: Praeger. 1983. 480 pp. Index. $33.95. Pb.: $9.95.

THIS is an ambitious and interesting, but ultimately frustrating book. Most of it is devoted to a frontal attack on the conventional assumptions, the activities and the *raison d'être* of the great capitalist institutions involved in development finance, in particular the World Bank and the IMF: they maintain the world system which keeps the poor poor. The remainder is an attempt to present an alternative strategy to be pursued by those who are convinced of the need for one, this consisting basically of a worldwide network to educate and mobilize the poor.

The most illuminating sections are those which analyse the detailed process of World Bank and USAID projects and IMF interventions, especially as related to the local context of such countries as Zaire. There is no mincing of words in describing the corruption and repression in such countries, and the part the US and international institutions play in maintaining their régimes and perpetuating poverty. In other chapters, however, the lengthy discussion of the failings of the project approach as practised by the aid agencies becomes somewhat irritating as each point is treated equally stridently and superficially: for example, on pp. 298–9, cost–benefit analysis appears to be blamed for the fact that in the Gezira Scheme in the Sudan, the rich are able to impoverish the poor.

Such irritations would be secondary if the alternative offered were convincing. The proposal made is for an expansion and systematization of a formula already used by some rural

development agencies: the training for three to six months of vast numbers of 'development catalysts', each of whom will work in a village with a 'base organization' of eight to twenty households, assisted in groups of eight to ten by an 'intermediate organization' (thus covering about 800 rural people), helped in its turn by a 'central resource base' covering 8,000 people, with about 103 (sic) positions to be funded. For funding, Gran proposes sister-city linkage—'mobilization to create perhaps 200,000 links' (p. 181).

It is not just the fact that too many paid posts are required to cover the whole Third World which makes this proposal unrealistic. More importantly—because Gran's thinking reflects a substantial utopian trend in writing on participation and 'alternative development'—there are apparent the same errors which were at the basis of 'community development' ideology in its heyday in the 1950s, although the attitude to the global capitalist system and to national 'modernization' within that system has been reversed. Still, there is the belief that the poor lack the capacity to understand without guidance what it is that is keeping them poor, and lack without external stimulus the ability to organize themselves, to defend themselves politically or to undertake economic activities cooperatively. Still, there is the belief that the training of wise and conscientious change agents will be enough to guide them to their own emancipation.

There is an enormous bibliography but it is most annoyingly divided into twenty-six thematic sections so that it is impossible to look up a reference. There are also stylistic faults, including over-adulatory references to works of which Gran approves (Illich, and particularly Branco Horvat, p. 336), and the repeated use of the term 'confidence mechanism', explained only the first time as mechanism of impoverishment or exploitation.

Alastair White

Philosophical and economic foundations of capitalism. Edited by Svetozar Pejovich. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 144 pp. Index. £17·50.

Capitalism has always had its critics and opponents, originally exclusively internal, since 1917 also external. While some of them have advocated its social reform, others have believed in its breakdown as a result of its own internal contradictions, its overthrow by violent revolution, its transformation through democratic political process, and the like. For the latter, its successor has usually been socialism.

Without doubt, capitalism is not without shortcomings. But would they be eliminated if socialism took its place in the developed industrial societies of the West? Even if they were overcome, would socialism not give rise to new and more serious ones as well as produce unintended consequences? Most importantly, what would individuals and societies lose if capitalism perished? It is the last question which the book under review seems to attempt to answer, inquiring into the moral and philosophical qualities of capitalism.

The answer lies in the main features of market capitalism. As an economic system, it disperses economic power and economic decision-making; is impelled by the profit motive and therefore responds to effective demand while, at the same time, implying emphasis on cost–benefit analysis; encourages individual effort, initiative and self-reliance; permits consumers to get the most for their incomes; requires the rule of law; and acts as a check on political power. Accordingly, what is at stake is individual liberty and economic efficiency, both as facts of life and as value categories. Of course, in practice neither the former nor the latter have ever been absolute. Besides, the state has always intervened in the capitalist economy, and not infrequently has taken steps to circumscribe or even abolish private property, profit, and the market as a coordinating mechanism. Several of the contributors discuss this tendency.

F. A. von Hayek, for instance, regards socialist theories as the cause of the decline of Britain's economy and of Britain's general standing in the world and as leading to the erosion of distinctive British traditions. In the opinion of the editor, codetermination (labour participation in the management of business enterprises) not merely weakens West European capitalism, but attacks it at its very roots. Ingemar Ståhl sees the 1970s as constituting an economic watershed in Sweden and hypothesizes that, mainly as a result of increasing political interventions in the market, the Swedish economy is arteriosclerotic.

In sum, this book concentrates on the moral justification of capitalism. As an economic

system, market capitalism developed spontaneously in favourable historical circumstances. It has a distinct impact on the structure and values of society and on the behaviour and attitudes of individual role-players. And although it is compatible with both a democratic and an authoritarian political system, only within it does modern political democracy arise and thrive.

St Antony's College, Oxford J. L. PORKET

Nations and nationalism. By Ernest Gellner. Oxford: Blackwell. 1983. 150 pp. Index. £12·50. Pb.: £4·95.

THIS extended essay sums up Gellner's theory of nationalism, which has previously appeared briefly in his more general works of philosophy and anthropology. His thesis is boldly presented as a 'new position' on the subject, and he rejects most of what has been said by others, whether they be nationalists, Marxists, individualists, universalists, or plain social scientists (few of the last are mentioned). What Gellner tells us is that nations and nationalism are to be explained in terms of the needs of modern industrial society for a centralized educational system, or 'high culture'. This culture must be homogeneous: 'genuine cultural pluralism ceases to be viable under current conditions' (p. 55), and any defiance of cultural homogeneity by state boundaries appears to constitute a 'scandal'. The homogeneous nation state is, then, not the result of nationalist idealism or the will of 'nations' but the product of economic development and modernization, which has as its 'imperative' such a political unit. The world is not yet, however, made up of advanced industrial nation states in this sense, and a great deal of trouble is involved in getting them established, even if they spring 'inevitably from the requirements of a modern economy' (p. 140). As long as the world is based on advanced industrial societies, so long will the age of nationalism last, but it will be a more tolerant nationalism, based on an international plurality of high cultures in the form of nation states. Ethnic cultures will be respected by these states as long as they do not set up barriers between people, and only race will remain to disrupt the harmony.

Gellner rejects both nationalist and Marxist theorizing, but he has not really escaped from either. From the nationalists he has taken it as given that a homogeneous nation-state is the best (only?) form of political unit for the world today; from the Marxists he has taken the primacy of economic determinism in asserting that industrial society requires the nation-state. The result is not such a clear theory as at first appears. Structural 'imperatives', especially economic, are mixed up with features of process and change such as the building of a high culture through an educational system, which are the result of 'will', often of nationalists. 'Culture' and 'homogeneity' are not comprehensively defined, and odd terms such as 'social entropy' do not help the reader. Why should the modern economy need a nationalist culture and not an internationalist one? Is the 'high culture' of advanced industrial societies really acceptable to the many nationalist movements which revived in the 1960s and 1970s? Surely cultural pluralism is a feature of some modern industrial societies, and states such as Belgium, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have demonstrated that several 'high cultures' and educational systems can coexist within the framework of a modern industrial economy. Gellner writes at some length about northern and eastern Africa, and about 'Ruritania' (Czechoslovakia?), but his coverage of nationalism is extremely limited, and he does not even include a discussion of familiar examples such as Welsh nationalism with its strong cultural and linguistic, yet weak political/economic, content. His two references to Scotland point up the deficiencies of his theory. Scotland has its own centralized educational system, separate from that of England, and a high culture of its own. Yet it also shares the *British* educational and cultural tradition, and is part of a multinational state. Such an arrangement would be a 'scandal' in Gellner's theory. So far, it seems destined to survive, and it has already survived a long period of industrialization. The world is not quite what Gellner thinks it is.

University of Glasgow JAMES G. KELLAS

Law

Humanitarian good offices in international law: the good offices of the United Nations Secretary General in the field of human rights. The 1981 Reid Lectures delivered at Acadia University. By B. G. Ramcharan. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1982. 220 pp. DFl 95·00.

THE UN Secretary General is the world's top bureaucrat. He appoints staff, provides services

for UN organs, and performs such other tasks as are expressly entrusted to him by the policy-making bodies. In addition, he has one important duty with far-reaching implications: he may bring to the attention of the Security Council 'any matter' which in his opinion may threaten world peace (Article 99 of the UN Charter). In order to meet this obligation in an effective way, the Secretary-General needs information while crises are still latent, and it is in search of such information that he travels to the world's trouble spots or appoints special representatives who report directly to him. This activity supplements the normal worldwide network of senior UN staff—the heads of information centres, representatives of the UN development and aid programmes, commanders of peacekeeping forces, appointees for mediation or good offices under decisions of policy-making bodies.

Professor Ramcharan has had the interesting idea of examining all those occasions on which UN Secretaries-General have concerned themselves with allegations that human rights are being violated, often without any specific authorization from a policy-making body. This is consistent with the UN Charter since gross and persistent denials of human rights often lead to armed conflict. Indeed, Ramcharan considers that the UN Secretary-General has 'now been granted a general mandate to exercise his good offices in the field of human rights' (p. 55).

Dag Hammarskjold was the most imaginative of the Secretaries-General, but he did not much care for the way human rights were dealt with in the UN context, and he banished the Human Rights Division of the UN Secretariat to Geneva. It was U Thant who developed the Secretary-General's human rights work (pp. 27–8) and who spoke out plainly when he believed that human rights were threatened (p. 159).

The exercise of good offices in the cause of human rights requires great discretion and confidentiality if it is not to make the situation worse, though Ramcharan believes that there are occasions when a UN Secretary-General should 'speak out publicly' (p. 162). The provision of UN good offices usually offers a means of contact between two governments which are not on speaking terms, but good offices in a human rights context often involves only one government (p. 161). The Secretary-General in effect provides a link between a government and those voiceless people within a country who are being persecuted or mistreated, but always without transgressing the ban on intervening in matters which are essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction.

Ramcharan's analysis, originally given as lectures in Canada, is impeccable, though occasionally repetitive, and his generalizations from UN experience in the concluding chapter will be of great value to both scholars and practitioners.

Sydney D. Bailey

Protection of officials of foreign states according to international law. By Franciszek Przetacznik. The Hague, London: Nijhoff. 1983. 390 pp. Index. DFl 160·00.

This is clearly a topical book, written just after the case *Concerning United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran*, and published during the deliberations of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal. The author has taken the opportunity to reexamine issues in the law that have long been taken for granted, and especially in the light of the above case; he ranges over the legal basis of the duty to protect foreign officials, the extent of the duties involved, the character of crimes committed against foreign officials in relation to extradition and asylum, international responsibility, and settlement of disputes arising from such matters.

The sheer amount of material referred to in this book can only be admired. Reference is made to writers and case histories from all over the world and spanning the centuries. The bibliography alone takes up thirty-two pages. As a result, the book is a tremendously useful source of materials concerning the subject of protection of foreign officials. It must be said, however, that there are two problems which face the reader: the style and the legal analysis of the materials. The author's treatment of the subject is quite detailed, to the extent sometimes of labouring his points. It includes minute descriptions of, for instance, the role of a Minister of Foreign Affairs or the different ways of giving satisfaction, such as an expression of regret or a salute to the flag. The tiniest differences between writers' statements of law are noted. The general effect is, unfortunately, to disguise the relative importance of each issue. In addition, the text itself often reads awkwardly, sometimes due to a misprint or partial omission of a sentence which renders the whole meaningless.

More seriously, perhaps, doubts may be expressed about the legal technique employed by the author. The scheme is to review various categories of source on each issue: international

decisions, state practice, codification (both unofficial and official), doctrine and any relevant theories. Impressively thorough though this is, the author's calm assumption at the end of each section that his conclusion follows from 'the above considerations' occasionally gives rise to unease. A profusion of writers is used but without distinction between their times of writing or qualifications as jurists. Statements of opinion, for instance by members of the ILC during discussion (p. 116) or by an American Secretary of State (p. 179), are used as proof of the law that exists, not of the law as it may exist subject to evidence of general state practice and perhaps judicial pronouncement. Indeed, state practice is cited whenever there is relevant material, but no attempt is made to assess whether *opinio juris* may be found in every case.

Despite these reservations, the book is a mine of information for anyone who wishes to delve into the subject more deeply than the literature has hitherto allowed.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne ILONA C. CHEYNE

Enforcing international law: a way to world peace. A documentary history and analysis. 2 vols. By Benjamin B. Ferencz. New York: Oceana. 1983. 890 pp. Index. $43.00 per vol.

THE author of these two substantial volumes describes himself in the foreword (p. xv) as having been 'a young prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremburg war crimes trials'. He also mentions (p. xix) that he is not an 'academic'. That needs no apology. It appears that his experiences at Nuremburg convinced him that 'aggressive war was the most terrible of all crimes and that those—and only those—responsible should be held to personal account'. (p. xv). It is not clear in this context whether he would exclude the perpetrators of genocide in time of peace and those who wage internal armed conflicts within a state, often accompanied by the grossest savageries. The waging of internal armed conflicts, by either party, is, at the present time, no violation of international penal law in general or of the UN Charter in particular. Perhaps there are, in his view, no aggressors in internal armed conflicts.

The purpose of the book seems to be to relate, historically, the development of the enforcement of international law governing the preservation of peace. The two volumes comprise 890 pages in all. Approximately 680 pages of this total are devoted to extracts from certain documents considered germane to the central theme. Each of the documentary extracts is the subject of a brief excursus by the author, embracing about 150 pages. The whole is preceded by an historical exposition of five pages covering a period of about 4,500 years, a somewhat taxing undertaking. The period spanned is from the 'code' of Menes, of which we have no text known to Egyptologists, to the end of the fifteenth century. In this lightning foray into the history of the enforcement of the international law governing peace, he includes a reference to the code of Hammurabi. Professor Driver and Dr Miller made clear for all time in their classical work on the 'Laws of Hammurabi' that they dealt with domestic law matters such as marriage, inheritance and commercial law.

The use of the documents extracted in this work is not facilitated by the lack of a documentary index. Moreover, extracts from the writings of the classical jurists and international law texts, such as that of the UN Charter, suffer from the material excluded. Thus Grotius, the 'father of the law of nations', in his main work, *Concerning the law of war and of peace* (1625), is far from consistent in his approach to such matters as the doctrine of the 'just war'. Likewise, the omission of articles 97 to 109 of the UN Charter (pp. 623–4) (document 42) is not helpful in that article 98 holds up the UN peacekeeping role.

There appears to be no conceptual analysis of, or comparison between, the 'enforcement' and the 'implementation' of international law. By the time that law has to be enforced it has failed to secure implementation. Again, there is no attempt to touch upon the essential distinction, in the context of both concepts, between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* and the relations between the one and the other.

The role of education as a means of securing the implementation of international law, particularly in the penal sphere, is not mentioned. Implementation of international law forestalls its enforcement.

The author concludes his documentary extracts with two pages of 'afterthought' (pp. 493–4). He states that 'the documents of history tracing the efforts to enforce international law since the law first began, may help point the way to world peace'. Both as a matter of history and of prediction such a judgment may be open to challenge.

Mr Ferencz has collected in two volumes an interesting selection of extracts from certain international law texts for our scrutiny. Perhaps he can be encouraged to produce a further study devoted to improved processes and modalities for the implementation and enforcement of international law designed to maintain peace.

G. I. A. D. DRAPER

History

The squandered peace: the world 1945–1975. By John Vaizey. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1983. 455 pp. Index. £14·95. Pb.: £8·95.

JOHN VAIZEY'S book is a stimulating and highly readable overview of post-1945 international politics and deserves a wide readership. The author skilfully avoids the pitfall of a bland compendium of events, and the crisp and clear narrative is anchored by a strong backbone of argument and reflection.

The book is organized in five parts. The first covers the period from Yalta to the Korean War; the second deals with the events of the 1950s; part three looks at technological advance and the Third World; part four discusses instability in the 1960s and part five examines the diversity of the 1970s. Over thirty main episodes are analysed to illustrate the global interplay of problems and tensions. Inevitably over such a broad canvas some topics are handled better than others. Experts on special themes will find fault with particular episodes. For example, the treatment of China, with Mao as a manic Nehru, seems weak. However, John Vaizey's forthright style makes a refreshing change from conventional academic caution. No punches are pulled. Gaitskell's integrity is contrasted with the 'degree of secrecy, intrigue and incompetence . . . disguised by continual activity' of the Wilson government (p. 385).

The author argues that the post-1945 peace was squandered because the hopes for a better world were unfulfilled. The superpowers did not reach a lasting agreement and liberal democracy was forced on the defensive against communism and authoritarianism. If the United States had exercised its leadership 'the world could have marched against totalitarianism and authoritarianism wherever it was found' (p. 422). The argument is not convincing. Vaizey voices the illusions of the traditional liberal intent on setting the world to rights. Dreams are necessary, but we cannot live them. Life is ramshackle, flawed and uncertain. In fact the post-1945 account is not as deeply in the red as Vaizey suggests. Nearly forty years on, the freedom, however fragile, from general wars should not be lightly dismissed. There is a contradiction between the authors' liberalism and his contention that the West should have imposed its ideals. None the less, these criticisms do not seriously detract from a valuable conspectus.

Loughborough University ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

The United States and the Berlin blockade, 1948-1949: a study in crisis decision-making. By Avi Shlaim. Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1983. 463 pp. Index.

ONE of the most frutiful trends in foreign policy analysis in recent years has been the growing number of case studies undertaken within an analytical framework and with a view to offering conclusions which go beyond the particular decison or policy being examined. Avi Shlaim's new book on American decision making during the Berlin blockade is a model example of this kind of approach. It combines historical scholarship of a high order with an incisive conceptual analysis to produce a work that is of enormous value for historians of the cold war and students of foreign policy concerned with decision-making processes and structures. Indeed, the author has produced what will almost certainly be the definitive work on the United States and the crisis for many years to come. In addition he has added substantially to our understanding of crisis decision-making in a way which challenges some of the conventional wisdoms regarding the debilitating effects of stress on policy-makers.

The work, which is a product of the International Crisis Behaviour Project directed by Michael Brecher, examines the psychological environment of the key United States decision-makers during the period leading up to the crisis and during the confrontation itself. Shlaim steers a judicious path between the traditional and revisionist approaches to the cold war and manages to convey the attitudes and beliefs prevalent in the United States

foreign-policy-making elite in a way that is often critical yet rarely unsympathetic. Throughout this part of the book the author draws on an impressive range of primary and secondary sources, while his analysis of the key decisions themselves is meticulously researched and thoroughly documented.

The work is important not solely because of its contribution to the literature of the cold war. What gives it even more distinction is the author's explicit and systematic attempt to assess the effects of stress on the ability of decision-makers to engage in the kinds of creative thinking and rational problem-solving that are essential to successful crisis management. The prevailing orthodoxy is that high levels of stress are invariably debilitating in their impact and undermine policymakers' ability to function effectively in crises. Shlaim's conclusions suggest that this is too simplistic a view and that the impact of stress needs to be differentiated far more carefully than is usually done. During the Berlin blockade crisis, at least, policy-makers displayed an ability to resist or to cope with stress to a surprising degree. Although he recognizes that too much cannot be made of the conclusions from a single case, Shlaim's argument is sufficiently convincing to reopen the issue and to prompt a reassessment of the conventional wisdom.

The book has the added virtues of being clear, concise and highly readable while maintaining its analytical rigour. In short, this is an important work which makes a considerable contribution to the subject and deserves to be widely read.

University of Southampton PHIL WILLIAMS

Zionism in the age of the dictators: a reappraisal. By Lenni Brenner. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 277 pp. Index. Pb.: £9·95.

THERE is a current fashion for 'revising' history. It having now been 'discovered' that the Nazi holocaust of Jewry never happened and that Hitler never knew about it when it did, a new 'reappraisal' puts much of the blame on the Zionists. It is in fact not really new—the story here told of 'Zionist collusion with the Fascists and the Nazis' (p. 269) has long been part of Soviet propaganda, and the present British version is original mainly in that the author is a Jew whose philosophy of history is Trotskyism.

He strongly believes that 'the masses' (p. 107) would have stopped Nazism while the 'capitalist exploiters' (p. 96) collaborated, and Zionism must be regarded as an offshoot of 'the ruling classes'. When the Zionists failed to resist in the Weimar Republic, it became 'inevitable that they would end up as the ideological jackals of Nazism' (p. 55). No less.

Mr Brenner has employed a considerable amount of literature to support his thesis, but ideology has a knack of getting in the way, and while quotations can work wonders the realities of which Brenner appears to have no direct experience tell a very different tale. It is perhaps true (as he points out) that the Zionist leaders were pessimists, but if they 'depreciated the significance of the vast Gentile sympathy for the Jewish victims' (p. 2), were they so far wrong? Such sympathy may have helped Captain Dreyfus: it did not save the million Dreyfuses a generation later. Then sympathy just was not enough and since effective action was taken neither by 'the masses' nor by governments, Jews were left to their own devices and had to make often painful choices among the priorities.

The political leaders of the Zionist movement put interests above sentimentalities, as any other politicians would have done. Trotsky would have parleyed with Hitler as Stalian did (or the Tsar did with Napoleon), and in given circumstances Churchill was prepared to sup with the devil. The *Ha'avarah* deal of which Brenner has so much to say can be defended on the ground that the Zionists were 'using the Nazis for their own purposes' (p. 61), and mistakes should not perhaps be regarded entirely with the perspective of hindsight. Today we know that 'no *modus vivendi* was ever even remotely possible between Hitler and the Jews' (p. 55) but in the 1930s this was not always clear. Besides, if the whole of Europe nearly perished in the effort to stem Hitler, how much could the Zionists have been expected to do? It so happens that in claiming 'the Jews were powerful in the emporiums of the world' (p. 57), Brenner agrees with Hitler as much as when he quotes *Mein Kampf* to prove 'Zionism's classic role as an outrider of antisemitism' (p. 79).

In its refusal to believe that, in terms of political action, the struggle against antisemitism should take precedence over the building of a National Home for victims of persecution, Zionism could by no means be described as the 'empty fantasy' (p. 104) and 'utopian cult' (p. 67) as which Brenner castigates it. If 'Hitler's antisemitism was never popular with the

capitalists' (p. 178), neither could it prosper without their brand (or that of others), and to a good many people in both East and West, antisemitism was among the lesser of Hitler's evils. Brenner dubs Zionism 'naive' (p. 89) but he himself is largely an innocent in the jungle where the struggle for survival has to be fought.

Neither 'the anti-Nazi working class' (p. 32) nor the 'many Polish workers' (p. 212) would have cared for too close a link with the Jews, and if ' "pride" and "dignity" are words open to interpretation' (p. 48), as Brenner says about a German Zionist document of 1933, I can assure her, from first-hand experience, that in those days, rightly or wrongly, nothing so comforted and fortified the mind of Jews as the Zionist message.

Brenner has produced a party political tract that unhinges the balance of history by ignoring too many difficulties, especially psychological. For once Stalinists will be pleased with the work of a Trotskyist.

Institute of Jewish Affairs C. C. ARONSFELD

The prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British policy in Greece 1944–1947. By G. M. Alexander. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1982. 299 pp. Index. £19·50.

THIS excellently written, balanced and penetrating study of a period and a policy so encrusted by partisan mythology should be greatly welcomed. Drawing primarily upon the papers in the Public Record Office, supplemented by a judicious use of familiar as well as recently published Greek and English-language sources, Dr Alexander has, I suspect, come closer than any previous writer to telling the story accurately.

A situation of latent, when not actual civil war, with 'monarchofascists' firing at 'anarchocommunists' over 'the crouching body of the centre', to use the apt metaphor of the British ambassador, was hardly a propitious time for creating that necessary moderate grouping. That this *was* the consistently sought British objective emerges convincingly from the narrative. Equally certain is that any Greek 'leftist' would have been understandably sceptical. He would have been aware that Britain was prepared to bombard EAM–ELAS into submission, while seemingly applying only bombast against the subsequent 'White Terror' of the extreme right. The British tinkered with the timing of the first postwar election and the institutional referendum, and still got the 'wrong' results. They threatened to cut off economic and military aid to the Greek government, but never implemented their threats. In short, they held the Greek ring without ever being fully masters of it. Ultimately, they transferred the whole tragic circus to the Americans.

There were those among British policy-makers who wanted to get the 'right' result by running Greece upon the lines of Cromer's Egypt, who despaired of the British 'passion for half-way houses and useless compromises'. But the British government, its national interest dominated by the postwar national debt, declined to be sucked deeper into that 'vortex of violence'.

Greece did not fall to 'Cromerism' and it seems unlikely that it would have fallen to communism. The KKE leaders were the sort of communists who would have made Lenin turn in his mausoleum. All their revolutionary rhetoric cannot obscure the fact that they were incompetent pragmatists forever hamstrung by the international deals of their Soviet masters. They always seem to have used force as an aspect of pressure politics, not to capture state power, although this is not Dr Alexander's view, and particularly not of the December 1944 events. But here I remain more convinced by John Iatrides' assessment (1972), as well as some of the evidence presented by Dominique Eudes (1970), the latter work, for all its shortcomings, being a strange omission from Dr Alexander's sources.

TONY SHARP

British documents on Ottoman Armenians. Vol. I (1856–1880). Edited by Bilal N. Şimşir. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi (Turkish Historical Association Press). 767 pp. 1982. TL 2250.

THE Turkish Historical Association is publishing a series of compilations of government documents on important aspects of Ottoman history. The present book is the first volume of a series bringing the documentation up to the First World War, volume II being due in 1984. A considerable debt is due from all students of diplomatic history to Mr Şimşir for his careful and painstaking work and for an admirably short and pungent introduction.

The material in this volume consists almost entirely of the texts of despatches and telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office, HM Embassy at Constantinople and numerous consular offices throughout Anatolia. The theme of the collection is the concern of the British government for the condition of the population of Asiatic Turkey and particularly its Christian, mainly Armenian, elements, as a consequence of the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention. By the latter the British government acquired (temporary) possession of Cyprus in return for a guarantee to help the Ottoman Empire against (Russian) attack on its Asiatic provinces. In order to justify this undertaking to its home public opinion, the British government felt that it was essential for the Ottoman government to institute a radical programme of administrative, judicial and fiscal reform.

Mr Şimşir suggests in his introduction that the British government may have intended to go beyond this and was in fact competing with Russia for control of Eastern Anatolia by means of the establishment of the right to protect the Armenians. This view of British intentions may have been held in some Ottoman circles at the time but there is very little evidence for it in this series of documents. Rather, on the contrary, the documents reveal a deliberate attempt by certain Armenian leaders to create and internationalize 'the Armenian question' and to claim a geographical definition of a province of 'Armenia', to which Sir H. Layard replies forcibly that there is no such geographical entity, and that it would be possibly fatal to the Ottoman Empire and therefore entirely contrary to the interests of the British government if an Armenian question were to attract the same kind of international attention as, for example, the Bulgarian question had done in the immediately preceding period.

In spite of its length this volume is compulsive reading for anyone with any interest in Ottoman history, and is unfortunately of high topicality in the light of the current revival of Armenian propaganda and terrorism. Reading it bears similarities to watching the first act of a tragedy, as, in a general climate of Ottoman maladministration, the various actors made the preparatory moves that were to contribute to Turkey and Britain being on opposite sides in 1914 and, more directly, to the Armenian debacle of 1915—the Kurdish brigands (almost all Kurds are brigands in this correspondence, and usually out of government control); Moslem and Christian fanaticism, the latter particularly visible in the short period when under Russian occupation the Armenians were in the ascendancy; the Russians waiting in the wings at Kars and Ardahan for the next chance to re-possess Erzerum, from which the Congress of Berlin forced them to retire; and the growing impatience between Turkey and Britain. The latter, while in fact genuinely anxious to preserve the Ottoman Empire, gave to some Ottomans increasingly the impression of being concerned only with its Christian inhabitants, and at the same time the continuing inability of the Ottoman authorities to deliver on their promises of reform caused British opinion to be increasingly disenchanted with the task of propping up the Ottoman state.

The Federal Trust BERNARD BURROWS

Supremacy and oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American world order, 1918–1930. By William Stivers. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1983. 207 pp. Index. £17·00.

IN spite of its rather high-sounding title, this book focusses specifically on British and American attitudes in the diplomatic negotiations leading to the creation of the state of Iraq in 1922 and the subsequent conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne. The narrowness of focus may be judged by the fact that in the course of recounting the contradictory positions adopted by Britain during the war, such as the Sykes–Picot agreement and the McMahon correspondence, no mention of any kind is made of the Balfour Declaration. In compensation there is a penetrating analysis of certain aspects of British and American policy, and the opinions of its executants, which spotlights some surprising and now mainly forgotten attitudes. How many of us realized, for example, that as early as 1920–1 it was urged by many influential British statesmen, soldiers and officials, including (momentarily) Churchill, that Britain's imperial commitments were excessive and that the financial and military resources for dealing with them were inadequate? The abandonment of Iraq was actually proposed in 1921 but vetoed by Lloyd George, largely on account of the effect it would have in India. The Emperor's clothes were wearing thin, but would only fall away after another world war.

How surprising, too, that President Wilson's self-determination principle was not intended even by him to apply to the lesser breeds without the law, that is, those not yet ready for

nationhood, including the Arabs and other oriental subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Even more inconsistent with the liberal image cultivated by Wilson was the American insistence up to the last moment on maintaining the foreign capitulations in Turkey. Mr Stivers illustrates convincingly how and why the Americans failed to espouse Arab or Turkish nationalism, having, for example, had recent experience of the effects of the nationalist revival in Mexico on American trade. In the particular case of Iraq, once the principle of US participation in oil extraction had been established, they regarded British political control as the best guarantee for the new oil industry and for the expansion of American business interests. For the same reason the Americans refused to be wooed by Turkish promises of the concessions that they could obtain in Mosul if this became part of Turkey.

On this point, and more importantly for the whole discussion of the Lausanne negotiation between Turkey and the European powers, it is unfortunate that Mr Stivers makes no reference to Turkish documents and includes only one secondary Turkish source in his bibliography. The difficulty of obtaining access to Turkish official documents for foreign scholars is notorious, and does nothing to help the presentation of a Turkish case to informed opinion. Nevertheless there is nothing in this book to suggest that Mr Stivers made any effort to overcome this difficulty, and one is left once again with some regret at the rather narrow perspective which he has adopted.

The Federal Trust BERNARD BURROWS

National minorities in Eastern Europe 1848–1945. By Raymond Pearson. London: Macmillan. 1983. 249 pp. Index. £14·00. Pb.: £4·95.

RAYMOND PEARSON'S book is one of the first in a projected series with the overall title of 'Themes in comparative history'. According to a note by the general editor, the aim of the series is 'by exploring problems across national boundaries, to encourage students in tertiary education, in sixth-forms, and hopefully also the more general reader, to think critically about aspects of past developments'.

Mr Pearson, in tackling the subject of national minorities in Eastern Europe on this basis, has undertaken a daunting task. He himself says his book is intended as an introductory study, adding that it is justified by the fact that historiographical coverage of Eastern Europe often reflects its national fragmentation, promoting an unhealthy academic 'tunnel vision' in which wider horizons are reduced to a vaguely perceived blur. On the other hand, he also acknowledges the complexity of Eastern Europe and 'the sheer variety of human settlement, social development and political experience' in the area. The attempt to treat so complex and varied a subject therefore risks producing a series of loose generalizations, to which there are inevitably all too many exceptions; and the characteristics and development of individual national minorities tend to be reduced to 'a vaguely perceived blur'.

Mr Pearson cannot be said to have avoided these dangers. Generalizations about the anti-religious or post-religious nature of nationalism in the post-1848 period may apply to its German forms, but not to its Polish form so closely linked with the Catholic Church (pp. 38ff). The statement (p. 229) that the Second World War promoted a 'shift in the direction of the ethnically homogeneous, minorities-refined nation state: minorities were required to transport themselves to their kin states or accept the consequences' is true of the German minorities (though only partially true to Romania); it is not true of others, for example the Hungarians of Transylvania, the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, or—so the Bulgarians would claim—the Slavo-Macedonians of Yugoslavia or Greece.

There is also the problem that for sixth-forms, the level of discourse, with its reference to trans-national ethnic, cultural, social, economic and demographic factors, could seem as complex and confusing as earlier, more factual, 'tunnel vision' studies of the area. But they should benefit from succinct analyses of the structure and collapse of the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires and useful statistical tables relating to population distribution and growth.

In general, Mr Pearson is strongly critical of nationalism and nationalist movements as a constructive political force or basis for lasting peace in the area (though he does not suggest a better alternative). He is almost equally critical of great power efforts to deal with the minorities problem after the two world wars (though again he does not suggest a viable solution). It would have been interesting, given the space, to discuss the ideas of men such as

Otto Bauer or Oskar Jászi—or to give a fuller account of Stalin's views than that on page 17. Nevertheless the book contains much of interest and will provoke thought and argument, especially among younger readers.

ELISABETH BARKER

Western Europe

Social democratic parties in Europe. By Anton Pelinka. New York: Praeger. 1983. 190 pp. Index. $26.95.

THIS is an English translation, revised for the US market, of a work completed in 1979 and published in German by an Austrian professor of political science. The 'social democracy' to which the book refers is that part of the socialist tradition distinguishable from communism, implying essentially an 'historical, ideological rejection of the October Revolution' (p. 10). By this largely historical definition, 'social democratic' parties in fourteen European states are considered, according to their importance in relation to the government of those states, while less numerically representative parties fitting the same definition or those not accustomed to sharing power are either excluded or referred to tangentially. For the United Kingdom all references are to the Labour Party and no account is given of the breakaway resulting in the SDP. The book contains much, however, that is relevant to the recent agonies of the British Labour Party and much that would be of interest to those pondering on the possible significance, or lack of it, of the SDP in terms of the European socialist tradition. One tantalizing question it prompts (though does not, of course, treat) is how any British SDP members elected to a future European Parliament might be compared to their Labour counterparts as qualified participants in the European Socialist group.

A number of useful generalizations emerge from an analysis of public support for and membership of the parties considered, their position in relation to other political forces and to government in the states concerned, and their historical and ideological development. The parties are seen as distinguishable within the general socialist tradition above all by their desire to rule and by their concern with political practice. These essential characteristics are seen as having led them away from dependence on trade unions and working-class support to seek the support of other groups, and forced them to sacrifice intra-party democracy in favour of leadership by a social elite, while in foreign policy their diverse positions (for example, in relation to the European Community or to the Atlantic Alliance) are explained by their anxiety to play a national role in different national circumstances. Something of the author's general interpretation of social democracy as a European 'political family' can be summed up by his suggestion that in the United States it is the Democrats who should be seen as filling the gap left by the absence of the kind of tradition European social democracy represents. On the other hand, social democrats are warned in the conclusion to the book against failure to distance themselves sufficiently from the prevailing order: 'A Social Democracy that no longer musters the vision and no longer measures the existing social order against the design of a possible future order has lost its historical mission' (p. 162).

As with many translations from German, the book reads awkwardly in places and sometimes the meaning is lost. As with a lot of contemporary specialist books, it is computer-type set in a rather ungainly fashion. There are a useful bibliography and comprehensive references, but much of the data and the argument that the book contains can now be found elsewhere.

National Institute of Higher Education, Limerick DAVID COOMBES

Capital and politics in Western Europe. Edited by David Marsh. London: Cass. 1983. 162 pp. £19·50.

THIS book is one of a growing number of works which are appearing as a corrective to the over-emphasis by academics on the relationship between the state and labour. In this respect it is to be welcomed. The book contains studies of the relationships between British financial and industrial capital and EEC and domestic government policy-making; the state–capital relationship in postwar France and West Germany; a short discussion of the role of capital in the European electronics industry; and a theoretical piece by Bob Jessop on the problems of the definition and specification of the interests of capital *vis-à-vis* the state in capitalist societies

While each of the individual articles contains useful and interesting material, the book as a whole does not appear to have a unifying theme—other than vague references to capital. The editor introduces the reader to some of the questions which must be answered in any discussion of the role of capital, but it is not clear that the pieces in this volume do in fact provide the answers to the questions posed in his introduction. This may well be due to the lack of focus on the contributions on the issues which the editor has outlined. Indeed, the French and German country studies appear to be most concerned with whether or not corporatist relationships will develop in each country. While this is interesting in its own right (and each chapter contributes valuable insights on this issue), it is not clear how this relates to the focus of the main British chapter, which is an attempt to analyse whether capital dominates the policy process.

Finally, the contribution by Jessop, while stimulating, is largely theoretical and raises many problems which might seem fundamentally to question the approaches taken earlier in the volume. It is a pity that Jessop's piece did not inform the theme of the book and that the two British chapters were not merged. If this had been done, and the electronics study excluded, then a more detailed and truly comparative volume on the relationship between capital and the state in Western Europe might have been possible. This should surely have involved studies of the Swedish and Italian experiences.

University of Hull ANDREW COX

Planning and politics in Western Europe. Edited by David McKay. London: Macmillan. 1982. 197 pp. Index. £25·00.

THE content of this book came as a mild surprise to me. I assumed that it would be about macro-economic planning, whereas in fact it is about physical planning, particularly of urban development. As the editor points out, the two types of planning are connected in various ways; nevertheless, the book will probably be of more interest to specialists in urban politics than to political economists.

For those like myself who are relatively unfamiliar with the literature in this area, David McKay provides a review of it in his introduction, in which he argues that no theory of urban planning has yet satisfactorily accounted for differences between countries and that more empirical work is needed within a framework which facilitates general comparison. The framework adopted here is one which sets planning within the broader context of urban policy and examines the role of political actors, but also emphasizes the influence of national urban heritages.

Five states are examined: France, Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. These were chosen as states which have been active in their attempts to control the use of land and which represent contrasting political traditions. Sweden was a sixth candidate for inclusion, but was omitted, we are told, for 'administrative reasons' (p. 11). Each of the chapters on an individual country outlines planning developments there since 1945, setting the changes in their political context. Most chapters have a separate section explicitly devoted to the identification of the major political actors and the extent of their influence.

In both his introduction and his conclusion, David McKay specifically attacks the generalizations about planning made by Marxist writers on urban politics, singling out Castells, Olives and Dunleavy for mention. Although there is a strong whiff of straw men in his characterization of their positions, McKay's defence of inductive method is vigorous and challenging. From the evidence of the studies of individual states in this book, he concludes that national diversity outweighs the common factors that are stressed by the Marxists in the physical planning policies of Western Europe. He also argues that such common factors as can be identified point to the lesson that planning cannot hope to achieve radical ends, and ought to content itself with defending the national heritage from the worst depredations of rapid economic growth.

Overall the book seems to be a valuable addition to the volume of empirical information available to students of the subject, and a stimulating contribution to a debate on the politics of urban planning which forms the basis of what is currently one of the most interesting branches of the discipline of political science.

University of Sheffield STEPHEN GEORGE

National communsim in Western Europe: a third way for socialism? Edited by Howard Machin. London, New York: Methuen. 1983. 232 pp. Index. £10·95. Pb.: £4·95.

THE epoch marking illusion of the 1970s was 'Eurocommunism'. This term is no longer in vogue and is wisely avoided in this book by the editor. As the subtitle of the book states, one of its principal sales pitches was the faërie gold of the 'third way' between Stalinism and social democracy: there never was any such 'third way' and, as the authors show, the ideology associated with it in the late 1970s has now pretty much departed the scene, leaving only a patchwork of divergent views.

Howard Machin's book appears at a time appropriate to an examination of the state of contemporary Western communism: in the middle of a recession which, as orthodox Marxism has been telling us for a century, is when the revolutionary movement should come into its own. But, as a glance at Spain, France, Italy and Finland shows, the Communist Parties have suffered electoral slumps and in the key 'Eurocommunist' parties (Spain and France) the decline is probably terminal. (The principal exceptions to this trend are Portugal and Greece.)

The introduction states that Western communism has become 'national'—Moscow has sold off the franchise—and the position, as the contributors make clear, is complicated. Of all the points that can be made about communism, Lenin's invention of the hierarchical, disciplined, organized professional party is the most important: it is this feature which enables Communist Parties to adopt contradictory positions from one day to the next, and the spectacle of unanimous votes at party congresses are the evidence that it still exists. At the last PCI Congress only seven people voted against the leadership and at the twenty-fourth PCF Congress nobody did. Paul Preston shows that Carrillo's PCE was different—though not much—and the *renovadores*, the intellectuals and middle-class anti-dictatorship activists, as well as the pro-Soviets, have been savagely cut down. (Carrillo, now in eclipse, considered himself the 'onlie begetter' of 'Eurocommunism'.)

On divergencies in Western communism, Annette Morgan shows how the weekly *Mundo Obrero* steered a course between the pro-Soviet French and the somewhat more reserved Italians; but these parties still refer to the 'socialist' countries (of Eastern Europe). In communist language this cannot be a thoughtless usage; these mental reservations do not fit inside a supposedly 'democratic' communism.

At first in a trickle, then in a flood, various researchers produced books on 'Eurocommunism' and these now form a minor library. The magisterial *Eurocommunism and detente*, (edited by R. Tökés) marked the height of the interest and Howard Machin's book provides an excellent epitaph to this episode in Western communism.

University of Leeds DAVID S. BELL

Jewish identities in France: an analysis of contemporary French Jewry. By Dominique Schnapper. Trans. by A. Goldhammer. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1983. 181 pp. Index. £20·00.

FOR many decades French Jewry served as the prime example of assimilation. Emancipated by the French Revolution—the first Jewish community to undergo this experience—and subjected to the process of modernization in the nineteenth century, the Jews of France identified themselves wholeheartedly with the country, the French language, and French cultural values. Not even the experience of the Dreyfus case and the antisemitism that it engendered seriously shook this stance. The experience of the German occupation and its revelation of the extent to which the heirs of the French Revolution would collaborate with the Nazis wholly modified this confidence. The dream of comfortable assimilation was shattered and led, particularly in the period after the Six Day War, to a rediscovery of Judaism.

It is at this point that Mme Schnapper's book begins. It opens with a short introduction that is principally devoted to the matter of definition: who is a Jew? The answer is couched in social terms—'a Jew is a member of that group which declares itself to be Jewish' (p. xxvi). But this group lacks homogeneity and is itself capable of subdivision into practising Jews, militant Jews and assimilated Jews. Precisely what these labels connote is elucidated by a series of in-depth interviews which constitute the main feature of Mme Schnapper's work and allow her to give full weight to the transformation of French Jewry wrought by the mass immigration of Jews from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in the 1960s and after.

This is by no means a work of quantitative sociology—there is hardly a statistic in the

book—but it has literary attributes that make it eminently readable. The conclusions are unsurprising, with one exception: that 'assimilated Jews are acutely aware of sharing a distinctive identity—a sense of community—or a common fate with other Jews . . . Jewishness in one form or another has survived several generations of French life and participation in industrial society' (p. 133). Mme Schnapper explains this phenomenon in terms derived from the study of ethnic identity in American society—that what the son wishes to forget the grandson seeks to remember. This overall conclusion, however, does not conceal the very wide diversity of French-Jewish affiliation. Different grandsons seek to remember different things. No attempt is made to impose an artificial uniformity, and this liberality of outlook makes the book a graphic and convincing guide to the *état d'âme* of contemporary French Jewry.

University of Warwick LIONEL KOCHAN

The population of Cyprus: demographic trends and socio-economic influences. By L. W. St John-Jones. Hounslow, Middx: Temple Smith for Institute of Commonwealth Studies. 1983. 204 pp. Index. £19·95.

AFTER a brief consideration of earlier evidence, this study concentrates on data provided by the censuses that have been held roughly every ten years in Cyprus since 1881. Differential rates of fertility, mortality, migration, urbanization, employment, sex-ratios, etc. for the two main communities are considered wherever possible (a projection of future trends has to leave the Cypriot Turks out of consideration), and their ascertainable or probable causes discussed. Despite methodological technicalities (explained in an appendix) the main conclusions are easily understood, and leave one feeling that in almost everything except its politics Cyprus continues to be an enviable land.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

The crisis of Turkish democracy. By C. H. Dodd. Beverley, Yorks: Eothen. 1983. 136 pp. Index. £9·50. Pb.: £4·95.

OVER three years have now passed since the Turkish armed forces intervened to halt the mounting chaos of the country's politics and set up what they claimed would be a temporary military regime. Having restored public order and instituted a restrained economic recovery, they prepared the ground for the general elections of 6 November 1983. Professor Dodd is a specialist in Turkish politics, and his book is the first extended account of this story. It is short—eighty-seven pages of text—but balanced, straightforward and well-informed.

The first two chapters set the scene for the seemingly inevitable *coup* of 12 September 1980. The Turkish military has traditionally been close to the state, the author suggests, but has not shown 'a sustained desire to direct its affairs' (p. 4). On the other hand, the collapse of Turkey's fragile parliamentary democracy in the late 1970s is ascribed to the fragmentation and polarization of the party system, and the consequent division and paralysis of the organs of the state. Amidst the chaos, the army was the sole national institution which retained its cohesiveness and a broad measure of popular trust.

The most detailed and original section of the book deals with the actions of the generals since their takeover and the new constitutional arrangements they have instituted. The status of the ruling National Security Council and the hand-picked Consultative Assembly, the spate of political trials, and the region's relations with the United States, the Arab world and Western Europe are all described in detail. On the last topic, the author rightly criticizes the superficial reactions of such bodies as the European Parliament, which mixes genuine concern for the restoration of democracy in Turkey with pointless and utopian calls for a solution of the 'historical situation of the Armenian people'. The evolution and provisions of the new Constitution of 1982 are examined at length even though, as the author admits, 'constitutions do not greatly control or even fashion politics' (p. 79). For the benefit of fellow researchers, there is a useful thirty-four page appendix, giving an English translation of the most important articles of the new Constitution, and an invaluable tabular guide to the perplexing parliamentary scene of the 1960s and 1970s.

University of Durham WILLIAM HALE

USSR and Eastern Europe

Khrushchev and Brezhnev as leaders: building authority in Soviet politics. By George W. Breslauer. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 318 pp. Index. £14·95. Pb.: £6·95.
Andropov. By Zhores Medvedev. Oxford: Blackwell. 1983. 227 pp. Index. £7·50.

WITH the last change in Soviet leadership both these books are of topical value: the former evaluates the leadership of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, while the latter is not only a biography of the new leader, but also an analysis of the decline of one and the succession of the other. In addition Professor Breslauer's book is a comparative study of Soviet post-Stalin leadership after Stalin, in which Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's power and policy are tested from their succession through the policies of consumer satisfaction, administrative reforms and political participation. The author also considers their periods of ascendency, frustrations and reaction. Though the book was written in 1981 (and published in 1982) the two Soviet 'administrations' are treated as complete and definite periods (Brezhnev's death in November 1982 did not add anything to Breslauer's hypothesis) to establish the 'patterns of Soviet leadership' since Stalin. In the space of some 300 pages the author utilizes all the Western Sovietology and Soviet writing, including the works of the leaders themselves, to come to a rather common-sense conclusion: Khrushchev wielded greater power than Brezhnev, but because he was a natural leader ('led from in front') he was brought down when his leadership resulted in major difficulties. Because Brezhnev led not from the front but 'from the middle' he remained in power even after the much greater difficulties that arose during his 'administration'; we can now add, in order to die in office. The author's major contribution to Sovietology is his emphasis on the economic dimension of these two Soviet 'administrations'. The volume is written in current US political science jargon, which does not make it any more a political science work, but by contrast makes Dr Medvedev's book sound like Gibbon, while both are actually pieces of what used to be called topical journalism.

Dr Medvedev must have collected his material in anticipation and was rewarded by having his 'candidate' selected as secretary-general, and subsequently as President of the USSR, which, of course, he did not know at the time of publication. Straightaway he explains Brezhnev's lack of leadership since 1975 by a series of illnesses, or as he puts it, 'physical decline'. He can therefore date Andropov's succession struggle and while he deals with his favourite topics, such as the KGB and the Lysenko affair, he also covers the communist party 'atmosphere' in which the new leader will have to make his influence felt and build up his authority. The official career record of the new leader is dull and uneventful. Dr Medvedev thinks that he will not offer the Soviet people higher living standards through harder work but will try and achieve it through improved efficiency and lesser corruption. He demonstrates Andropov's new technique by reference to the cases of Shchelokov and Medunov, expelled from the Central Committee for 'errors in their work'. We are given the composition of the politburo elected at the 26th Party Congress, but otherwise the author is not very methodical even with the top leaders and their biographies: thus, for example, it is not noted that the late First Secretary of Byelorussia, Kiselyov, passed the three years before assuming this high office as Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR. Apart from a few such inaccuracies, however, the author makes the book very lively reading by using what he terms 'Moscow rumours', presumably passed onto him by his brother, who still lives there.

A final comment: both books fail to consider the impact of foreign affairs on Soviet domestic policies properly.

University of Manchester

JOHN F. N. BRADLEY

After Brezhnev: sources of Soviet conduct in the 1980s. Edited by Robert F. Byrnes. London: Pinter. 1983. 457 pp. Index. £15·00. Pb.: £6·95.

THIS book comprises seven extensive and detailed surveys of specific areas relevant to Soviet policy-making, each written by a distinguished scholar assisted by a small team of established specialists; the editor adds a short concluding chapter, identifying 'critical choices' for the 1980s.

The wealth of expertise—mainly American—that went into the book's preparation is outstanding, and is reflected in the rich material. There is general agreement that the next two decades will present severe policy dilemmas for the Soviet leaders. Economic slowdown, a serious demographic imbalance, and unpredictable external developments present the Soviet

political system with an unprecedented array of decisions of long-term significance. After over a decade in which they succeeded in expanding the country's military power, projecting this on a global scale, and simultaneously raising living standards, the leaders of today (and those who will follow them) face highly constrained choices, the outcomes of which will affect the country's internal development and world role well into the next century.

The assessment of these authors is by and large pessimistic, and none more so than in Maurice Friedberg's chapter on cultural and intellectual life: in that field, after all, policy is more clearly voluntaristic on the part of the leaders, and the constraints of objective socio-economic factors are less directly relevant. But this perception may to some extent reflect certain purely American values, which, as Adam Ulam points out in a different context (p. 413), are not necessarily identical to those of America's allies. There is, moreover, a tendency to make comparisons with the United States, which biases the evaluation of Soviet performance. For example, Gail Warshofsky Lapidus's unfavourable comparison of meat consumption (p. 193) is put into more meaningful context by Robert W. Campbell, who shows that, in comparison with wealthy Sweden, Soviet meat consumption is not so derisory (p. 119). Elsewhere, too, especially in the chapters on foreign relations, there seems to be an underlying assumption that it is the Soviet Union which enjoys the initiative, and that its leaders wish to control the world, retaining what they have and extending their influence whenever they can against a wholly benign and defensive West.

That has been the West's working assumption for decades now, but it has rarely been subjected to serious scrutiny. It is, of course, a useful posture for Western policy-makers to adopt. Some would say it is the only sensible one: we must have no illusions, we have to assume the worst. That being the case, and since such a view is dominant at present, this book is important for all concerned with policy for dealing with the USSR. While according with received assumptions, it also contains many valuable insights about both Soviet and Western attitudes and behaviour, and, taken as a whole, it permits one to reach a more balanced view of the complexity of both running the Soviet Union and dealing with it.

One final, trivial note: as British readers will be aware (at least, those who have read Gowers), the word 'anticipate', much used in this book, is not a synonym for expect, foresee, foretell, project or predict. Readers beware; writers—don't imitate.

Trinity College, Dublin RONALD J. HILL

Pluralism in the Soviet Union: essays in honour of H. Gordon Skilling. Edited by Susan Gross Solomon. London: Macmillan. 1983. 179 pp. Index. £20·00.

IN two areas particularly H. Gordon Skilling's contribution to communist studies has been not just a substantial but also a pioneering one. The first of these is communist Czechoslovakia; the other is the group approach to communist politics. The essays in this volume, a tribute to Skilling on his retirement by a group of friends and colleagues, focus particularly on this latter area and upon the controversial issue of 'pluralism' that arises in this connection; a biographical note by John Hazard and a bibliography of Skilling's major publications are also included.

The first essay, by Susan Gross Solomon, provides a background to the volume as a whole by considering the intellectual history of 'pluralism' as a concept in political science. She notes the varying uses that have been made of the concept over the years, and argues that its value must be judged not *a priori* but by the insights it provides. The other contributors take up several of these issues. Jerry Hough, who looks at the relationship between pluralism, corporatism and the Soviet Union, cautions against the obsessions with models (his own term 'institutional pluralism' was apparently imposed by his editors) and suggests that more attention should be paid to questions than to labels and classifications. These matters are taken further in Archie Brown's article, which covers both Western discussions of Soviet 'pluralism' and also the much less familiar Soviet discussions on related issues such as the relative autonomy of the state. These discussions show, Brown suggests, the diversity of opinion that can exist in the USSR even on ideologically sensitive issues, though they do not justify classifying that system as a pluralist one.

In further contributions, Wlodzimierz Brus considers the relationship between political pluralism and markets in communist systems, and Frederick Barghoorn looks at regime–dissenter relations since Khrushchev. Brus finds the relationship between the role of

markets and political pluralism a complex one; market-oriented economic reforms may assist the development of political pluralism, but they may also be promoted by the ruling elite in its own self-interest, and in the last resort their effect is determined by the scope and outcome of political struggles. Barghoorn, in a wide-ranging essay, carries further his own earlier work on Soviet dissent, concluding that although the present outlook for Soviet dissenters is gloomy, several factors suggest that it may improve in the future: the strengthening of dissent among ordinary workers, an increase in the level of protest in several republics, and the recruitment of second-generation activists—the sons and daughters of the dissenters of earlier years.

This volume, in sum, is a worthy tribute to Gordon Skilling. It has a strong group of contributors, drawn, like Skilling's own education, from both sides of the Atlantic, and they focus on concerns central to his work and particularly on the problem of pluralism, which receives extended treatment in both its conceptual and empirical aspects. One is bound to feel some slight disappointment that no more than six scholars are included in this not overlengthy volume, and especially that none of the chapters deals explicitly with Czechoslovakia. It does, however, make an important contribution to the developing debate on conceptualizations of Soviet politics, and all further discussion of the subject will be substantially in its debt.

University of Glasgow STEPHEN WHITE

The grand strategy of the Soviet Union. By Edward N. Luttwak. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1983. 242 pp. Index. £12·95.

EDWARD LUTTWAK has the reputation of having a hawkish voice even within the conservative Washington defence community. If this book is any guide, unfortunately, he has acquired a rather mechanistic view of international politics during his rise to prominence. Luttwak sees the Russians as an imperial people, surrounded by weak neighbours, in possession of growing military power for which their leaders will be driven to find employment. As a result, he believes that 'a new phase of Soviet imperial strategy' emerged several years before the invasion of Afghanistan, and that a 'radically different pattern of Soviet external conduct' is now unfolding before us. The men responsible for this strategy are seen to be a disappointed group, whose views are shaped by a mixture of ideological and economic pessimism and military confidence—a brew which Luttwak believes will set the Soviet Union on the road to war. In one form or another, these ideas have been around since the late 1970s. Dr Luttwak's particular contribution has been in putting them together in one bundle, without the usual qualifiers, and then pushing them as far as they will go. Luttwak sees war resulting from opportunist calculation: 'For it is notorious that the conjunction of a long-term regime pessimism with current military optimism is the classic condition that makes deliberate war more likely' (p. 40).

Typical of Luttwak's penchant for mechanistic power-political explanations is his warning that American strategic nuclear rearmament raises the fear that the Soviet Union 'will be tempted' to exploit its present advantages to make 'permanent gains' (typically, he ignores the Soviet Union's present strategic disadvantages *vis-à-vis* the United States). He believes that marginal differences in overkill have enormous effects. This is misbegotten strategic thinking in today's confrontation. Luttwak does not actually believe that the Russians think that they can fight and win a nuclear war against the United States (p. 90); but only because he believes that they are confident that they are making 'such good progress' towards eroding the cohesion of NATO by means of diplomacy, propaganda, and the manipulation of trade. Predictably, Luttwak is not impressed by the state of NATO, particularly not by the contribution of the Western Europeans, whom he sees as either ill-equipped or lacking in resolution (p. 32).

Since Luttwak believes that the United States is too strong for the Soviet Union to attack and Western Europe too weak to make it necessary, he sees China as the main target for the Soviet empire's pent-up military energies. China and the Soviet Union 'are almost mechanically preordained to hostility towards each other'. (p. 97). Thirty years ago, it might be recalled, when today's Reaganites were either in short-pants or were merely middle-aged, the American Right believed that China and the Soviet Union were almost mechanically preordained to expand monolithic communism.

Despite these criticisms, the book under review should be read for its lucid and interesting statement of a 'fairly bad case' version of the Soviet threat. The warnings Luttwak gives about

the options created by the accretion of Soviet military power and the dangers raised by growing military confidence should be seriously considered, especially by those of us who take a more relaxed view of the Soviet challenge.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

Soviet foreign policy: the Brezhnev years. By Robin Edmonds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. 285 pp. Index. Pb.: £4·95.

WITH East–West relations currently passing through yet another phase of pointless overreaction, this cool, clear, cleansing book should be prescribed reading for politicians and commentators on both sides of the Atlantic. It was a very good book before (*Soviet foreign policy 1962–1973: the paradox of super power*; Oxford University Press, 1975; reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1976). It is an even better one now. Well over half is new. The author, a former Minister at the British Embassy in Moscow, has produced within a remarkably small compass a complete guide—part analysis, part historical survey—to Soviet foreign policy from the Cuban confrontation to the accession of Andropov. There are extensions in time at both ends, and each of these is welcome. The essential themes are continuity and stability. To the author the Brezhnev era 'was one of the most stable in Russian history and certainly the most stable in Soviet history' (p. 214)

The continuity theme is helped by the review of Khrushchev's foreign policy which follows immediately from the author's introduction. While Khrushchev is regarded as having 'transformed' Soviet foreign policy (p. 14), he is not saddled with the authorship of 'peaceful coexistence'. This doctrine is not attributed to anyone, and here one feels that the book would have gained by a brief comparison of Khruschev's 'fresh emphasis' of 1956 (p. 15) with Stalin's equally full formulations at the seventeenth and eighteenth Party Congresses of 1934 and 1939.

Much the same can be said about the author's treatment of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Of its many versions, the author is right to give pride of place (p. 72) to Brezhnev's address to the fifth Polish Party Congress on 12 November 1968 rather than to the Kovalev *Pravda* article; but even here no one could say that the West had not been warned. In his rejoinder to Churchill's Fulton speech (*Pravda*, 13 March 1946), Stalin had made it abundantly clear that only 'governments loyal to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries'.

There is a chapter called 'The theory', but the title is misleading. Those in search of theory should refer to the preceding chapter on 'Paradox', but even so they will be disappointed. There is insufficient, for example, to enable the reader to elucidate the extracts from the Brezhnev Constitution which feature as a useful appendix. As a result the essential ambiguity of: 'The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favourable for building communism . . .' is not examined. Interpreted one way, it could wreck the author's entire thesis.

About the reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Mr Edmonds is undecided, but nothing he says conflicts with Mr Henry Trofimenko's recent suggestion in Stockholm, reported in *The Times* of 18 July 1983, that events in Iran were one of the determining factors.

What with the clarity and precision of the writing, the comprehensiveness of the theme, the provision of clear (though simple) maps, interesting footnotes (albeit at the end), a chronological table and a reasonable bibliography, and, above all, the price, the student of Soviet foreign policy will find it difficult to believe his luck. Both author and publisher deserve congratulations.

Polytechnic of North London BRIAN THOMAS

Soviet policy and practice toward Third World conflicts. By Stephen Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. 318 pp. Index. £19·50.

Soviet intervention in Third World conflict. By Neil MacFarlane. Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Security Issues. 1983. 58 pp. Pb.: £3·00. $7·00.

SOVIET intervention in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan is the subject of these studies. Both are well-written and carefully documented; neither breaks any new ground. The conclusions differ only in detail, and are alarming in the anticipatory interventionism advised to American policy-makers.

MacFarlane examines the sources of the new assertive Soviet military posture, the gains and losses entailed, prospects for future interventions and implications for Western policy. Hosmer and Wolfe describe the evolution of Soviet Third World policy since the Second World War, devoting a short, succinct chapter each first to an overview, and then to six consecutive periods, indicating how theory and policy changed. There are chapters on 'co-operative intervention' by Cuba and the Soviet Union in Angola and Ethiopia and the precedent-breaking Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In part two, this empirical material is analysed. The fundamental, enduring aims of Soviet Third World policy and varieties of involvement are listed, before patterns of past involvement are presented. The authors, like MacFarlane, speculate about future intervention and assess the implications for US foreign policy.

It is agreed in both studies that Soviet Third World policy over the past thirty years has 'combined assertiveness with caution' (Hosmer and Wolfe, p. xvii), or demonstrates 'cautious opportunism' (MacFarlane, p. 17). According to MacFarlane, the causes of a more active policy in the mid-1970s were increased Soviet military power and ability to project force. This combined with a decreasing American capacity to respond, caused in part by improved East–West relations. Detente made a forceful American response difficult to justify. It also made the Soviet Union more responsive to Third World radicalism, to prove revolutionary fervour despite the softness towards imperialism made explicit by detente. Economic trends encouraged Soviet activism, seeming to indicate the long-forecast crisis of capitalism and Third World anti-imperialist unity. But both studies find that in specific instances, Soviet policy is a reaction to opportunities (Angola and Ethiopia) or a response to change threatening established Soviet interests (Afghanistan). MacFarlane concludes that 'there is no grand Soviet strategy to subvert and engulf the Third World' (p. 26), while Hosmer and Wolfe point out that 'Soviet ability to foresee, create and control events within the Third World is limited' (p. 136).

According to MacFarlane, 'the failure of American deterrence was the critical permissive condition of Soviet intervention' (p. 17) in Angola, and in Ethiopia, 'the risk of . . . effective American response was low' (p. 22). Hosmer and Wolfe agree, seeing this as an important feature of pre-Afghanistan Soviet intervention. Other features are that Soviet leaders hedge their commitments and get involved incrementally; they only intervene in situations of dire necessity; they prefer that local forces do the fighting; and their intervention is usually low-cost, effective and responsive to local conditions. The intervention in Afghanistan conforms to some of these features: it was a response to a situation perceived to be dangerous and there was no risk of direct military confrontation with the United States. It also confirmed Soviet determination to prevent the overthrow of a Marxist client state. And it proves something that Soviet leaders should have learned from their Angolan and Ethiopian experience: intervention in formal military situations is more successful than coping with popular insurgencies.

The agreed prerequisite of Soviet intervention is American passivity. Thus a more active policy is advised in areas in which America has an interest. (MacFarlane suggests a ready rapid deployment force; Hosmer and Wolfe, the maintenance of credible US military capabilities and political resolve). But 'once [a] country becomes a likely target to Soviet *intervention*, the United States may be said to acquire a derivative interest in it' (Hosmer and Wolfe, p. 175). Thus US *interest* is defined by Soviet interest. Anticipatory US involvement is advised, for example, 'by backing outcomes that prevent radical extremists from seizing power' (Hosmer and Wolfe, p. 178). Hosmer and Wolfe seem set on turning the United States back into the gendarme of the Third World. We must hope that MacFarlane's wiser, though low-priority, counsel prevails, which points out that 'it is as much American misperception and lack of realism about Third World radicalism, as it is that radicalism itself, which gives the Soviet Union openings in Third World politics' (p. 46).

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

Soviet policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan: the dynamics of influence. By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York: Praeger. 1982. Index.

THIS is the latest in the Praeger Studies of Influence in International Relations, a series of which Professor Rubinstein is himself the general editor, and which has already yielded ten well-received volumes covering various bilateral relationships between one of the two

superpowers and a client state, all building on a conceptual framework developed earlier by Rubinstein in his excellent work on Soviet–Egyptian relations (*Red star on the Nile*, Princeton University Press, 1977).

The aim of this book is to examine the actual influence that the Soviet Union was able to exert on the foreign policy and domestic behaviour of the three northern tier states of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Professor Rubinstein makes a crucial distinction between power and influence and specifically excludes the use of force as a possible instrument for the construction of an influence relationship. Additionally he uses the case studies as a vehicle for examining a number of hypotheses prevalent in the literature about the relationship between states' purposes and action on the one hand and actual results in terms of influence on the other.

In the case of Turkey, Rubinstein's survey concluded that relations between Moscow and Ankara had been transformed from the 'bristling suspicion' of the 1950s to the 'wary detente' of the late 1970s. Nevertheless the undoubted improvement of bilateral relations was due more to a general shift in Turkish domestic and foreign priorities which inherently diminshed the areas of conflict with Moscow than to actual positive returns for the USSR from specific inputs. Indeed, in the case of Soviet–Turkish relations, the author was able to conclude categorically that 'there was no correlation between inputs and influence' (p. 52).

Soviet–Iranian relations were altered substantively by the downfall of the Shah. While Moscow and Teheran enjoyed mutually advantageous bilateral relations under the Shah, albeit within a regional strategic environment of predominant US influence, the Soviet Union has been unable to prevent a deterioration in its bilateral relationship with Teheran since Khomeini came to power, even though that relationship is now placed within a regional security environment detrimental to American interests. Rubinstein reveals that it was only after a similar period of frustration with a leftist-oriented Afghan regime that Moscow used the military option.

Rubinstein concludes his book with the observation that 'the Soviet Union has achieved its greatest strategic-political triumph in the Third World in the changed policies of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan' (p. 181). Moscow has indeed made gains in these three countries. However, as the author so perceptively and methodically demonstrates, those gains have often been the result of either windfalls for Soviet policy or the projection of Soviet military power. The success of Soviet efforts to establish a long-term and viable influence relationship with any of the northern tier countries has been much more limited.

The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC KAREN DAWISHA

The bells of the Kremlin: an experience in communism. By Arvo Tuominen. Edited by Piltti Heiskanen. Hanover, London: University Press of New England. 1983.

ARVO TUOMINEN was the last survivor of Lenin's Comintern Praesidium. He first met Lenin in 1921, while attending the first Comintern Congress. That other great Finnish survivor, Otto Wille Kuusinen, who was then drafting the Comintern constitution, had learned that his beautiful young girl friend and secretarial assistant was in fact a spy, planted in his office by Felix Dzerzhinski, head of the Cheka. Kuusinen persuaded Tuominen to seek an interview with Lenin in order to reassure the Soviet leader that Kuusinen was entirely loyal to the revolution. The mission was apparently successful. The two Finns outlived both Lenin and Stalin and died peacefully in their beds.

Kuusinen had a great influence on his protégé. After two periods in jail in Finland for political offences, Tuominen went to Moscow in 1933, and shared a flat with Kuusinen in the rat-infested *Dom Pravitel'stva* where many of the top Soviet and Comintern *apparatchiki* lived. Tuominen recalls the atmosphere of menace that brooded over the building as one by one their neighbours were taken in for 'questioning'. The fixing of a large red seal across the door was the outward sign that the bells of the Kremlin had tolled for men like Rykov, Tomski, Radek, Bukharin and Lozovski. Nor were the foreign communists spared: Tuominen gives a graphic account of Bela Kun's last public appearance at the Comintern Praesidium.

In 1938, Tuominen and his wife obtained exit visas, ostensibly to carry out party work in Sweden. Their journey was made possible through the efforts of Kuusinen and Alexandra Kollontai, then Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm. In November 1939 Tuominen was invited by Stalin to head the short-lived People's Government of Finland on whose behalf the Red Army was supposed to be acting when they marched into the Karelian Isthmus. Tuominen's

reply was to apply to join the Finnish Army, and to urge his fellow communists to follow his example in resisting the aggressor.

There is no mystery as to why Tuominen threw in his lot with the communists when the Finnish Social Democrats split at the time of the civil war in 1918. Tokoi, who in 1916 had become the world's first democratically elected socialist prime minister, had fled to Petrograd along with Kuusinen and the other militants. Tanner's reformist group, which remained in Finland, made no appeal to the young idealist whose faith in the parliamentary road to socialism had been shattered by the events of 1917–18. It is more difficult to explain why he stuck with the party for so long, in spite of what he knew of the brutality and corruption which permeated Stalin's empire. Even to the end of his life he held the view that had Lenin lived the revolution would not have turned sour.

The bells of the Kremlin is based mainly on his *Kremlin Kellot*, published in 1956, to which selections from later autobiographical writings and from the transcripts of taped interviews have been added. Despite the fact that the editor does not identify his sources except in very general terms, I am satisfied that the book is an authentic historical record of great interest to students of communism.

University of Bradford F. B. SINGLETON

Crisis in the East European economy. Edited by Jan Drewnowski. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 177 pp. Index. £11·95.

ALTHOUGH the Soviet and East European economic slowdown has in recent years become an increasingly discussed topic, the present collection of essays and case studies is the first volume to draw together all the key evidence and various factors which either cause or contribute to this unfavourable development. The appearance of the book was prompted by the dramatic collapse of the Polish economy in the early 1980s and much of the discussion revolves around the notion of the 'Polish disease'. However, this is a condition from which all East European countries suffer to a greater or lesser extent. In this book the causes and symptoms of the disease are analysed by leading British (or British-resident) practitioners of the study of East European economics, including P. Wiles, M. Nuti, S. Gomulka, A. Smith and A. Nove.

The Polish crisis is given a chronologically and analytically thorough account in a paper by Nuti as well as in a short chapter by Gomulka. Developments in Romania, in economic crisis to a degree second only to Poland, are analysed by Smith while Ellman, Wiles and Nove have concentrated on the issue of the Soviet slowdown. A Comecon-wide overview of the behaviour of the individual economies under the conditions of crisis is provided by Stephen Barker. In addition, two chapters address slowdown theoretically with the aim of producing a synthetic explanation of the 'Polish disease'—an introductory chapter by Wiles and an essay by the editor, Jan Drewnowski.

In his introduction Wiles lists several of the generally accepted causes of the East Euroean economic difficulties (world market inflation, exhaustion of the potential for extensive growth, excessive defence burden, lack of technical innovation, etc.) but since these are by now commonplace he spends much of his time on a range of factors less susceptible to quantification and hence neglected by mainstream economic writing. His analysis of these 'imponderables' leads him beyond the strictly 'economic' into a more speculative but highly perceptive and illuminating approach, showing clearly that the rot which plagues the East European economies goes very deep indeed and that no conventional cure tried to date by the communist governments has a realistic chance of success. Briefly, Wiles argues that the Soviet-type economic systems and the policies implied by their adoption are by now corrupt and discredited to such an extent that the planners, managers and workers are unable to muster the minimum of morale to make them operable. Broken promises and deception have now accumulated to a point when no new ones can be taken seriously. The system however continues to grind on, largely due to its own inertia. It is not amenable to reform: the earlier communist theocracy has given way to the current logocracy—everyone continues to use the obligatory words without believing in them because a use of new words would cause a collapse of the whole systemic structure.

Wiles's diagnosis is further developed by Drewnowski whose thought-provoking essay introduces the concept of 'economic tissue'—a set of assumptions and norms regulating economic behaviour without whose existence neither market nor central plan can operate.

These include, for example, an assumption that the economy operates within a well-defined legal framework, that honesty is the prevailing attitude and that managers and workers are willing to perform according to the best of their ability (p. 77). It is the erosion of these norms which lies at the root of the East European problem. This is a helpful approach, for it enables us to avoid the increasingly sterile conclusion that the crisis of communism is simply due to the elimination of market economics: the tissue can be eroded also under the conditions of a mixed or market economy (Wiles, p. 15). Is not the 'British disease' in some respects similar to the Polish one?

St Antony's College, Oxford V. SOBELL

The GDR: Moscow's German ally. By David Childs. London: Allen and Unwin. 1983. 346 pp. Index. £18·00. Pb.: £7·95.

THERE is a tendency among cold war strategists on both sides to view the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a single indivisible bloc, dominated by Moscow. Disaffections may be dealt with quickly, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, or take rather a long time, as with Poland since 1980; but without fail, conformity is reasserted. As the title of David Childs's book suggests, the bond between the Soviet Union and East Germany is particularly strong. It is not simply a matter of 'treaty and constitutional relations', but of 'underlying economic, military, ideological and class ties' (p. 308).

This is borne out in what is an excellent history and political, social and economic analysis. The policies and fortunes of East German leaders have followed or anticipated those of their Soviet mentors. The constitutional structures and operational techniques of the two societies are more or less identical. Both economies suffer from the blight of excessive control. East German foreign policy adhered closely to that of the Soviet Union in the period before the state achieved widespread recognition, and although it has contributed more positively throughout the world since then, through trade and aid, it has never deviated, even at moments of sudden change.

However, Dr Childs's book is not a simple exposition of imitation and similarity. He draws on immense knowledge in setting out how the Party system works in the conditions of East Germany; in analysing the peculiar emphasis on developing a sporting elite and the particular clumsiness shown towards a questioning intelligentsia; and in stressing the impact on the East German economy of the unique demographic drain both abroad and into the conscript army. In dealing with the differences, as well as with the parallels, he is also a balanced critic. He leaves Ulbricht in the end unsung; he regards the rearmament of East Germany as a mistake. Yet he has praise for the improvement of education in rural areas and for the steady development of the economy despite its bad start.

However, one of the main impressions left by the book is that the German Democratic Republic, like the other East European communist countries in different ways, is not ineluctably intertwined with the Soviet Union. The 1974 constitution may have eliminated all reference to the German people and nation as a postscript to the building of the Wall in 1961; but the latter remains 'a permanent, massive, anti-Communist propaganda exhibition' (p. 65). The East German press may report little on Poland; but 'the tendency is for East Germans to make a point of watching West German news programmes' (p. 238). In the last resort, 'many East Germans remain sullen, bitter, alienated and angry . . . they identify with "Germany" ' (p. 317). Soviet and East German 'hawks' are clearly aware of the danger of this to their whole East European position. Western 'hawks' ought perhaps to think about it.

University of Glasgow WILLIAM V. WALLACE

Polish communism in crisis. By George Sanford. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1983. 249 pp. Index. £14·95.

SO much of the commentary on recent events in Poland has concentrated on Solidarity's emergence and evolution, that our view of the situation was perhaps in danger of becoming one-dimensional, ignoring the existence of other dynamic forces. George Sanford contends that the Polish reform movement of 1980–1 can only be understood in terms of the goals and values of the reformers within the Polish United Workers Party (PZRP) itself. Thus he aims

to redress the balance by presenting an account of the leadership developments that occurred during those tense months, since 'only reform from within the Communist system, led by the PZRP and designed to make democratic centralism really work, would have any change of success, given Soviet military power and its politico-strategic preconceptions' (p. 5).

Drawing extensively on Polish sources Sanford gives us great insight into the PZRP at this time and the arguments, factions and power struggles within it, so that the picture which emerges is one resembling political pluralism, with numerous alignments which Sanford likens to the political grouping in eighteenth-century England. He introduces us to countless party functionaries and summarizes the opinions of many. It is a rich and meticulous coverage.

Sanford believes the Polish case merits such detailed treatment because it 'throws crucial light on the possibilities of the party-led democratisation of the CPs in maturing industrial societies under conditions of developed socialism' (p. 11). For changes and reform depended not so much on what Solidarity did or demanded, but on the PZRP's ability to 'produce Communist reformist leadership and policies which would be acceptable to both Polish society and the Soviet leadership' (p. 5). As we now know, the party did not succeed in this, as it failed to achieve acceptance of its concept of the 'historic compromise'.

It was probably the gravity of the economic situation that prevented adherence to the compromise, since the worsening deprivations brought with them an increasing reluctance on the part of Solidarity to engage in political manoeuvres and concessions. Eventually it was impossible to ignore the 'irreconcilable gap between what Solidarity might grudgingly accept and what the USSR and its Polish Communist supporters would stand for' (p. 226) and this inability to agree led ultimately to the imposition of what Sanford calls the 'State of War'.

Sanford does not, however, regard this period in Poland's history as being one of total failure. There were lively and frank debates in the Sejm and at party plena; there were elections within the party bringing with them an unprecedented turnover in officials, committee members and congress delegates; and there were influential reformers within the party who sought to negotiate with Solidarity, and who strove to convince the Soviet leadership 'that only a policy of reform and democratisation from above' (p. 149) could obviate the possible collapse of Communist rule in Poland. Indeed, in Sanford's estimation the significance of the crisis lay in the fact that 'the Polish Communist elite proved strong and determined enough to preserve its rule without direct Soviet intervention' (p. 227). It is perhaps unusual to attribute such political responsibility and creativity to the PZRP, but it is an intriguing approach nonetheless.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Solidarity: the analysis of a social movement: Poland 1980–1981. By Alain Touraine *et al.* Trans. by David Denby. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la maison des sciences de l'homme. 1983. 203 pp. (First publ. Paris, Fayard, 1982). £20·00.

BETWEEN April and November 1981 teams of French and Polish sociologists led by Alain Touraine discussed with Solidarity activitists in the movement's main centres the nature and aims of their political and economic struggle. By the technique of sociological intervention, the researchers enable the reader to hear from individual Solidarity members their benefits and hopes, and the realism with which they defined their aspirations. The result is an account of grassroots thinking that is unique in its immediacy and intimacy.

The discussions spanned the period during which optimism finally gave way to resignation. But listening in on these debates, the reader is led to question the extent to which Solidarity was ever likely to become an enduring and creative political force in the totalitarian state in which it was born. For while this book describes the thinking of people whom thirty years of communist rule had not prevented establishing a democratic movement, it also shows that Solidarity failed to demonstrate unity of purpose and evolve coherent policies. Instead, the movement emerges as a collection of disparate groups or tendencies, some radical, some moderate and pragmatic, whose differing views made it difficult for the leaders to decide how far they should extend its role beyond that of a trade union to an all-embracing social movement of national conscience intent on the restructuring and reform of society, or indeed to a quasi-political party.

Time and circumstances did not permit such a development. An inhibiting factor was the limits that Solidarity members themselves set on their demands and actions. This is most obvious in the refusal to challenge the leading role of the party, which was largely due to an

acute awareness of geopolitical realities, and especially of the proximity of the Soviet Union. In the words of one militant: 'We cannot bring down the Party because we know whom we would have on our backs then' (p. 66). The deteriorating economic situation was a further constraint. For one thing it prevented Solidarity demanding the sort of concessions a trade union might legitimately seek. For another there was the debilitating effect on individuals of the queues, shortages, and struggles to obtain the basic necessities of life. This gradually diverted attention 'from grand plans for the democratic transformation of society' (p. 166). Touraine comments that by September 1981 'the effect of the paralysing constraints on the union's action was to create among the rank and file a strong mistrust of the leaders and their advisers' (p. 77).

Solidarity's problem was that it 'continued until the very end to be torn between its principles and its praxis, between a set of far reaching aims, and a reality which imposed limits which it was unthinkable to overstep' (p. 180). This book's achievement is the light it sheds on the ordinary members' reactions to this dilemma.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

South-eastern Europe after Tito: a power-keg for the 1980s? Edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. London: Macmillan. 1983. 211 pp. Index. £20·00.

THE title of this book suggests that its subject is the impact of Tito's death on Yugoslavia's internal stability and the resulting danger to peace in the Balkans. This is not so. The book is a collection of papers presented in the early autumn of 1980, in Venice, to the eighth course of the International School of Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, a 'non-official forum' receiving financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Pugwash Conference and three Italian institutions including the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. The authors are Italian, American, British, Hungarian, West German, Greek, Bulgarian, Romanian and Yugoslav.

In an introductory paper, written at the beginning of 1982, Professor William Gutteridge, of the University of Aston, comments that 'a number of significant developments has taken place . . . since the majority of papers . . . were written and presented'. He himself then briefly records the Army take-over in Turkey in late 1980, the coming to power of Andreas Papandreou's Socialist government in Greece in October 1981, and the outbreak of riots in Kosovo in the same year, with the resulting Yugoslav-Albanian tension. Otherwise there is no analysis of internal developments in Yugoslavia or their wider international impact.

Two of the most substantial papers, dealing with the concept of a Balkan nuclear free zone and the arguments for and against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a small country such as Greece, were published in 1982 in *The arms race in the 1980s*, also published by Macmillan. The main part of David Carlton's paper on 'Great Power spheres of influence in the Balkans: 1944 and after', was also already published in his biography of Anthony Eden (Allen Lane, 1981). The reader is therefore paying £20 for about 150 pages of previously unpublished material.

Of the fresh material, the most solid and satisfying paper is that of Hans Günter Brauch of the Institute of Political Science at Heidelberg, on 'Confidence-building measures in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean'. He gives figures for the military balance in South-east Europe as it existed in 1980 (including Soviet forces in adjacent military districts and US forces in the Mediterranean). He then recalls past arms control proposals for the Balkans up to 1980 and discusses possible confidence-building measures, ranging from prior notification and limitation of military manoeuvres and movements, through exchange of information and a freeze on defence spending, to rules limiting the use and deployment of weapons. He warns aginst 'the over-emphasis on balances of forces and arms that have often been used . . . to legitimise a levelling up as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations' (p. 101).

The contributors from South-east Europe itself lay slightly differing emphases on the type of confidence-building measure or disarmament steps they see as possible for the Balkans. For Bulgaria, Nansen Behar, of the Academy of Sciences in Sofia, lays the main emphasis on the need for economic cooperation between the Balkan countries 'with different social orders' as the way to detente and stability. For Romania, Ioan Mircea Paşcu of the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy in Bucharest, recalls his country's various prewar and postwar initiatives in the field of Balkan cooperation, including those of President Ceausescu, in particular Romanian sponsorship of the idea of a Balkan nuclear free zone. He suggests that a general European

Conference on Disarmament could set up a 'network of sub-regional negotiating fora for the Balkans or Northern Europe' which could discuss confidence-building measures and military disengagement in particular regions; the Balkans might then set an example to Europe as a whole.

For Yugoslavia, Professor Radovan Vukadinović of Zagreb University advocates confidence-building measures in the Mediterranean, such as the freezing and gradual scaling-down of non-Mediterranean (i.e. US and Soviet) fleets, leading to measures such as halting the spread of military alliances and banning new military bases. For Hungary, György Réti of the Budapest Institute for Foreign Affairs, stresses his country's growing political, economic, cultural and scientific cooperation with Mediterranean countries as a contribution to building confidence between Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean countries.

György Réti also contributes a paper on Albania's foreign policy which unfortunately does not take in the important post-1980 developments. There are papers on the internal problems, with their wider impact, of Turkey and Cyprus, which are perceptive, though again limited in time-span.

The main problem underlying all papers is whether any purely Balkan initiatives in the field of confidence-building and detente can have much value without detente between the two superpowers and the two main power-blocs. The general answer seems to be: depressingly little.

ELISABETH BARKER

Conflict and cohesion in socialist Yugoslavia: political decision-making since 1966. By Steven L. Burg. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 365 pp. Index. $49.00.

STEVEN BURG'S book concentrates on the conflict between nationality-based elites in the constituent republics, and on the mechanisms by which these conflicts are resolved at federal level, both in the state and party apparatus. It is certainly true that the nationality question is one which permeates all aspects of Yugoslav social and political life, and it is right that the author of a book dealing with conflicts within Yugoslav society should give due attention to this issue. It is not, however, the only source of social conflict: there are tensions within the national groups which result from conflicts of interests between, for example, peasants and industrial workers; between the private and public sectors; between the 'red bourgeoisie' and the 800,000 registered unemployed—even between the generations. None of these conflicts is considered.

Although the present economic crisis is not helped by the rivalries between the national elites and by the tendency for each republic and autonomous province to operate a quasi-autarchic economy, its underlying causes are far more complex. Yugoslavia has been unable to cope with the consequences of the bold decision in the 1960s to enter 'the international division of labour'—decoded, to use the spur of foreign competition as an instrument for modernizing the economy. 'Market socialism' helped to widen social and economic differences between the haves and have-nots, both within the individual republics and between the richer north and the poorer south. The economic inequalities among the republics help to exacerbate the national rivalries. Moreover, Professor Burg's self-imposed limitation in concentrating his interests on the power struggles within the political hierarchies means that he tends to lose sight of the fact that the majority of Yugoslavs operate outside these games in Belgrade.

Despite my regrets at the limitations of Professor Burg's study, I must agree with Paul Shoup's assessment, printed on the dustjacket, that the book is a remarkable study of decision-making, showing a 'detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the political system in a communist country'. Professor Burg is particularly good on the complex processes of decision-making at federal level, which involve so many layers of compulsory consultation that a state of near paralysis ensues.

The author used his time during a prolonged period of residence in Yugoslavia between 1974 and 1976 to gain a detailed knowledge of Yugoslav politics. The chapter on social cleavages and political conflicts before 1966—especially the section dealing with the interwar period—contains some minor errors and is the least satisfactory part of the book. For example, the date of the Constituent Assembly elections is twice given as 1919, when in fact they were held in November 1920. There are excellent accounts of the Slovene roads dispute of 1969, and of the Croatian crisis of 1971, and many other valuable case studies, showing in great

detail how the various groups within the leadership resolve their differences. There are also useful summaries, with full extracts of the relevant statistics of the surveys conducted by Yugoslav researchers into such matters as the perception of people of the relative economic position of their own republics after the reforms of the mid-1960s.

This is a scholarly work which has thoroughly explored an aspect of Yugoslavia's political culture, and is a worthwhile addition to the Western literature on Yugoslavia. My regret is that a man of Professor Burg's intellectual skills and knowledge should not have widened his scope and have looked beyond the smoke-filled rooms of Belgrade and Zagreb to the underlying conflicts which are to be found among those at the base of the pyramid.

University of Bradford F. B. SINGLETON

Middle East

Israel in Lebanon: the report of the international commission to enquire into reported violations of international law by Israel during its invasion of Lebanon. London: Ithaca. 1983. 282 pp. £4·50.

'THE motivation here', says the non-governmental commission of international lawyers and human rights activists, headed by Sean MacBride, who produced this report, 'is to build public pressure for law enforcement against Israel as a violator of the international law of war, and, more broadly, to create a climate in which public opinion insists upon adherence by all states and political movements to the international law relative to war'. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 thus becomes both a particular subject of investigation and a moral, political, and legal object lesson of much wider significance.

The commission draws this lesson quite explicitly when it criticizes the way governments 'have become creatures of their doctrines about the primacy of state interests when it comes to national security policy', and they suggest that 'such excess' is counteracted in international jurisprudence by the idea of natural law which recognizes 'certain elementary principles of justice and fairness as immutable, binding on all human activity . . .'. 'One task of citizen groups and international organisations', it maintains, 'is to insist that this natural law content not be abridged by states'.

The commission concludes that Israel's planning and waging of aggressive war in Lebanon failed this fundamental test and violated specific legal obligations imposed by customary international law and the Hague and Geneva Conventions with their ancillary body of treaties. They see the Israeli failure as stemming from Israel's role in the war as the opponent of a movement of national revolution.

An impressive body of evidence from a variety of sources (not including the Israeli government, which declined to appear before the commission) tends to support the commission's general conclusions on Israel's war aims ('to exterminate Palestinian nationalism' and further Israel's territorial consolidation and regional dominance) and specific conclusions on Israeli violation of the law on military necessity, protection of civilian objects and population, and the proportionate and discriminating use of force.

Israel's occupation of south Lebanon, the detention of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians and fighters there, the siege of Beirut, and the massacres in the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps are also covered. The report concludes with ten recommendations for the enforcement of the law through payment of reparations by Israel and other international action.

Dry and technical though much of this report is, the reader needs little imagination to appreciate the human meaning of hospitals bombed (seemingly systematically), refugee camps devastated, and innocent civilians made homeless. In presenting this appalling story as clinically as it does, the commission nevertheless succeeds in producing for scholars and intelligent laymen perhaps the most persuasive analysis yet of precisely what happened in Lebanon and why.

University of Aberdeen DAVID H. OTT

This land is our land: the West Bank under Israeli occupation. By Jan Metzger, Martin Orth and Christian Sterzing. London: Zed. 1983. 273 pp. £15·95. Pb.: £6·50.

THE academic and journalistic literature on the West Bank is growing so rapidly that the scholar can no longer simply welcome every new work as an addition to the store of scarce

information. It has become necessary to sift the wheat from the chaff. This volume passes muster as a useful addition to the shelf, in spite of the fact that it is written with intensity of feeling and is therefore bound to be moving to the reader, a challenge that scholars usually prefer to evade.

This book is full of facts, figures and analysis, as well as personal responses. Although it does not place the plight of the Palestinians within a comprehensive analytical framework, it does effectively convey the destructive and explosive impact of Israel's policy at the rawest point of encounter with the Arabs.

Tracing the rise of Palestinian resistance in face of the predatory tide, the authors rely almost exclusively on Israeli sources. As they point out, 'Many newspaper readers in unoccupied countries would be thankful for the amount of freedom of press and opinion which can be observed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Red Cross would be happy if it could work in all countries under the conditions it is granted in Israel. . . . The conclusion that the Israeli occupying authority is not a murderous, terrorist regime does not ease the suffering of those under occupation, nor does it affect the legitimacy of political resistance. Yet solidarity with the victims must not exclude justice towards the perpetrator' (p. 75).

The Juggernaut of Jewish settlement in every Arab back-yard throughout the West Bank has moved well beyond the extent reported in 1980, when this work was first published in German. Today it is not the millenarian fanatics who orchestrate the calamity, brandishing Bible and sword, but young couples with implausible title deeds in one hand and cheap mortgages in the other. Licensed developers and construction speculators have replaced the more mystical cartographers of reciprocal hatred.

The book moves through an analysis of the economic and social impact of creeping annexation upon the lives of the Arabs of the West Bank, to a level-headed account of the changes wrought by the Sadat initiative and the treaty between Egypt and Israel, concluding with a necessarily pessimistic prognosis relieved only by the tiniest chink of light from the marginal peace camp in Israel.

University of Sheffield NOAH LUCAS

A Palestinian state: the implications for Israel. By Mark A. Heller. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press for Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University. 1983. 190 pp. Index. £12·80.

MARK HELLER'S proposition is the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza that would have distinct political and economic benefits for Israel. This is not a new idea, but Mr Heller has gone deep into the practicalities, scrutinizing the classic arguments of Israel's religious and political maximalists, its military strategists, and a great many of its people whose reservations about a neighbouring Palestinian state are built on fear and memories. He is careful not to dismiss emotional considerations and replace them with rationale; on the contrary he exposes the risks in his own logical alternatives, but requests a rationally longer vision from his countrymen about Israel's future well-being. He suggests, among other things, that the PLO should not be bypassed in negotiations for a settlement, pointing out that a settlement without it will result in continuing instability for Israel—and Israel is Mark Heller's prime concern. Any well presented arguments that demonstrate consideration for the rights of the Palestinians have the primary function of deflating fear and suspicion among the Israelis and for Mr Heller that is the key to his proposal.

In the prevailing climate of pessimism regarding any Palestinian state engendered by time and logistics, failed peace plans, Israeli intransigence over the occupied territories and more recently Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its aftermath, Mark Heller's study is especially welcome. He not only revives some optimism but presents a convincing procedure that would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza, with minimal green line alterations, within a decade. Even the difficulties of settling the Jerusalem question do not deter him.

However, this commendable study lacks attention to and analyses of the nature and motive of America's support for Israel and how this may be a contributing factor to Israeli intransigence over the occupied territories, rather than a lever to prise Israel out, as the author seems to imply. And what of Israel itself? Thirty-five years has made this state, brought into being by the force of Jewish ideals, a pragmatist in the mini-superpower class. Can Israel realize its new potential on a land area that limits its population and growth? Will Israel not

always regard itself as alien in the area, thus justifying continued arms supremacy? Can the movement for Eretz Israel be halted? Mark Heller and many like him have a solution because they are looking for peace and containment. But is this what Israeli decision makers are looking for?

KATE E. MAGUIRE

Promise and fulfilment: Palestine 1917–1949. By Arthur Koestler. London: Macmillan. 1983. 286 pp. Pb.: £4·50.

THE back cover of Arthur Koestler's *Promise and fulfilment*, first published in 1949, tells the prospective reader that it 'offers a thought-provoking and challenging perspective on the troubles in Israel today'. In fact, the psychological forces Mr Koestler was primarily concerned with recording are very much the product of the diverse and tragic past of the Jewish people, climaxing in the political climate in Europe after the First World War and culminating in the drive to create a state in Palestine. With the exception of insights mainly gleaned from Arthur Koestler's personal diary, which is included at the end of the book, the study is a period piece, chronologically told. Even Koestler himself expresses confusion and bewilderment at the time about the nature of Israel's future. The conditions prevalent then which combined and motivated the actions of the Jews from 1917 to 1949 are not the same today, unless the parallels are stretched. Koestler attempts to describe with a certain observer's detachment the bloody and tragic events and factual details of the period. But the turbulence of the period is too strong and Mr Koestler's own involvement too personal for him entirely to succeed—he almost apologizes for these lapses, which is unnecessary; it *was* a tragic and bloody period with many actors involved and many to blame. His chapter entitled 'Little ships', recounting the numerous attempts of refugees to land in British-mandated Palestine, has a particular impact but like all the chapters it is kept sufficiently within factual limits to have its uses as a historical document. An index would have been appreciated.

These facts, figures and accounts of incidents could have been collected together from various other works and documents, but what distinguishes *Promise and fulfilment* is that Koestler's personality is reflected in the accounts and it is this, with the extracts from the diary which he kept in Tel Aviv during the creation of the state of Israel, that provide the insights that give a hint of future problems. The diary starts at the beginning of June 1948 and is continued for three months (it would have been useful to have had the entries dated). The entries at times are quite short and obviously personal. They do not suffer from Koestler's attempts to distance himself or justify his feelings as in the main body of the book. The period covered by the diary includes the shaky beginnings of the Israeli state, early Soviet courtship, the Arab–Israeli truces, the struggle between Begin's Irgun and the new government and the assassination of the UN mediator Count Bernadotte.

It is regrettable that the author, no longer alive, cannot give us a study of Israel today along the lines of *Promise and fulfilment*, which would have provided a challenging perspective on the troubles in Israel today.

KATE E. MAGUIRE

The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the political economy of two regimes. By John Waterbury. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 475 pp. Index.

Autumn of fury: the assassination of Sadat. By Mohamed Heikal. London: Deutsch. 1983. 290 pp. Index. £10·95.

ON the second anniversary of President Sadat's assassination the government of Egypt, alleging Marxist and Islamic conspiracies against the state, obtained another year's extension of the emergency powers introduced to cope with the feared aftermath of that assassination. This is an apt symbol for the present malady of Egyptian politics: a society generating fundamentally opposed visions of the state, governed by men who had no sympathy with these visions, and who are determined to preserve their supreme position within the states, but who have little sense of direction.

These themes run through both books, but in very different ways. Of the two, John Waterbury's *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat* is the more substantial and the more seriously analytical—at times perhaps too much so for the general reader, who may find the early sections on comparative development and dependency theory rather heavy going. This should

not, however, deter anyone from persisting. Once out of the thicket of acronyms and tangled jargon which mar the first few sections of the book, it is highly readable. More than that, it is also the most thoughtful study of Egypt's political society to have appeared in recent years.

There is much to praise in Waterbury's analysis; one of the outstanding features is his examination of corporatism and the state, in which he argues that the former has become the self-serving ideology of those who have managed to seize the latter. This has not been a function of class interests, but it may eventually produce them. Waterbury's impression of Egypt in 1971 was of 'a classless society whose members tenaciously sought to assert class differences. Only the elite succeeded in that quest' (p. 261). He sees this elite as managing successfully to exploit the entrepreneurial free-for-all initiated by Sadat, and in the process transforming itself into a genuine class.

Nevertheless, as Waterbury convincingly shows, the basis of this elite's power remains the state itself. This is the vehicle for the corporatist myth of 'national unity' and for the coercive muscle needed when that myth no longer convinces those who feel they have been ill-served by the rhetoric of their rulers. Some of the strongest parts of the book record the corruption bred and tolerated by such power—and the price paid by individuals whose lives are broken by the ruthless operation of a system where success is the only criterion and where rights are ignored in the scramble for advantage. The trappings may have differed but the process remained more or less the same under both Nasser and Sadat. As Waterbury concludes, for all the pyrotechnics, by 1981 Sadat 'threw away the last thing that still distinguished him politically from Nasser, i.e., all pretense to political liberalism' (p. 384).

As one of the first victims when the mask was dropped, Mohamed Heikal was in a unique position to record its effects. His account in *Autumn of fury* is correspondingly and characteristically vivid. It is not a dispassionate account, however, and should not be read as such. Having benefited greatly from autocratic favour under Nasser, and having suffered moderately from autocratic displeasure under Sadat, Heikal is unlikely to point to the basic similarity of the two regimes. Indeed, this would blunt the main thrust of his book which seeks to argue that Sadat was a wilful deviant from the 'true' course of Egyptian history as laid down by Nasser.

When at his most magisterial Heikal is also at his weakest. The better to indict Sadat, Heikal feels he has to assume the role of spokesman for the Egyptian people. Given his past history and present situation, this is not very convincing. Nor does he have much success in trying to draw a sharp contrast between Nasser's virtues and Sadat's vices. It leads him into considerable difficulties in trying to explain away some of Nasser's own colossal blunders, and also tempts him to take some fairly cheap personal shots at Sadat. However, in describing some of the corruptions of the Egyptian *haut brigandage* and the very pettiness of tyranny, Heikal has captured the flavour of the kind of political society which Egypt has sadly become. He regales us with its gossip in the authentic style of the jostled and garrulous boulevardiers of Cairo, sharpened with the added zest of a fallen favourite's rancour. In some respects it scarcely matters how accurate it all is, since one knows who is saying what about whom and why. As such it is a valuable and entertaining chronicle of its times.

International Institute for Strategic Studies CHARLES TRIPP

The two Yemens. By Robin Bidwell. Harlow: Longman; Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. 350 pp. Index. £15·95.

IN setting himself to write 'the first book in over a hundred years to treat North and South Yemen as a single unit' Dr Bidwell may seem to the captious to have impaled himself on a dilemma of his own devising. Even before Britain bullied the Ottomans into accepting the separation of their respective spheres of influence in South-West Arabia (into what are now the YAR and the PDRY), the occasions when the area could be described as a 'single unit' in any political sense are elusive. Indeed, the captious might protest that *The two Yemens*, which Dr Bidwell himself adopts as his title, is a smaller number of Yemens than the record suggests, and that anyway, for nine tenths of the book, he is obliged to handle North and South alternately since their courses have so conspicuously diverged—never more than when the book was written, for all the talk of unification.

However, this would be largely cavilling, for the inhabitants of the area do form, if not a single unit, at least a single community conscious of its own distinctiveness, no matter how political, religious, tribal and other rivalries have torn it historically asunder. (Compare, on

the wider stage, the Arab world as a whole.) The author might have helped his own cause by exploring Yemeni particularism more fully.

Dr Bidwell clearly loves the Yemen(s), though the aspects of Yemeni behaviour on which he concentrates are seldom lovable, and he has little good to say of any of the protagonists, past or present. (One of the few to emerge with unexpectedly high marks is the Imam Yahya.) But it is on Britain that he lays most of the blame for the area's major misfortunes. Whether Britain could have extricated itself honourably from the trap it had historically laid for itself in South Yemen, had it not been for Nasser's charismatic maleficence, is a question that history, when it comes to be written, may never answer.

Writing as he does for the general reader, Dr Bidwell releases himself from footnotes and the obligation to quote sources. When minor controversial statements are advanced (for example, Britain's alleged support for the NLF against FLOSY), this will cause the *cognoscenti* irritation. And the maps are sadly inadequate for any reader. But the book is a serious contribution, written with a nice turn of phrase, to a wider understanding of an 'unknown' people's dramatic past and complex lifestyle.

University of Exeter GLEN BALFOUR-PAUL

The Euro-Arab Dialogue: a study in associative diplomacy. By Saleh Al-Mani'. Edited by Salah Al-Shaikly. London: Pinter. 1983. 156 pp. Index. £15·50.

IT is often a salutary experience to see ourselves as others see us. Outside Europe our efforts to reach common positions are often taken more seriously than they are within. This book is an Arab view of one aspect of our external policy, though it is seen through somewhat Americanized lenses. At the same time it is an attempt to use some of the precepts of international and economic theories to illuminate the relationship. It may not always make for easy reading (and is not helped by some sloppy sub-editing) but it can sometimes provide interesting insights.

Saleh Al-Mani' seeks to test a number of hypotheses. The first concerns the existence of a discernible European regional dependence on the Arab world, tested by an examination of European imports from the region. He finds that the period 1970–73 was that of Europe's greatest dependence, as oil imports have since declined. His second hypothesis concerns the correlation between European aid and the price of Arab oil exports; he concludes, not very surprisingly perhaps, that other Arab exports are not of particular importance to many members of the Community. His chapter on European and Arab aid is, none the less, one of the most interesting. He suggests *inter alia* that the Community has been attempting to exert additional influence on oil-rich Arab states through aid to resource-poor Arabs. Thirdly, the linkage between the level of intensity of the Community's dependence on the Arab world and the urgency of its overtures to the Arabs is examined. The fourth hypothesis is that the Community does have an influence on Arab states even if it is sometimes shown in a negative way by, for example, refusing to accept Arab demands to include trade problems within the Euro–Arab Dialogue. Fifthly, 'the entire study has proved our contention that EC overtures and dialogues tend to be moulded into a permanent pattern of associative diplomacy, provided that conditions of regional dependence continue to be equally maintained' (p. 136).

The outcome of these investigations is not an unmitigated success. The discussion is sometimes interesting but there is a tendency for ideas to be pursued to the point of exhaustion; this is very largely true of the somewhat vague concept of associative diplomacy itself. Moreover, by using the Euro–Arab Dialogue (EAD) as the central focus, the author makes it appear far more important than it has in fact been—at least to the Europeans. He suggests, for example, that the EAD has contributed to a modification of attitudes towards the Arabs and the Arab–Israeli conflict, most notably on the part of West Germany and the United Kingdom. Even the author admits that in economic terms the achievements of the EAD have been meagre. In his opinion, the 'fullest expression' of associative diplomacy can be found in the Community's relations with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries (p. 70); the EC's Mediterranean policy is seen as a mechanism for controlling future economic and agricultural growth in the area as well as furthering political links with the Arabs. By focusing on the EAD, he tends to underestimate the bilateral relationships between individual European and Arab states which remain crucial. Yet such a focus is a useful reminder that, even if the Community is not seen as an alternative to the United States in helping to bring

about a settlement in the Middle East, it is already seen by others as being an importa political and economic entity. We should try to act accordingly.

David Davies Memorial Institute GEOFFREY EDWAR

Africa

Arms for Africa. By Bruce E. Arlinghaus. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1983. (Distri in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 233 pp. £20·00.

THE proclaimed objective of this book is to discuss the supply of arms to Africa as instrument of international diplomacy. There is certainly little doubt about the attitude arms supplier to consumer in Africa. What is questionable is even the short-term politic influence achieved by arms transfers. There is no real attempt here made by the editor, Bru Arlinghaus of the United States Military Academy, and his authors to establish an effecti correlation between cause and effect. Nor, disappointingly, does a clear picture emerge of t resultant state of military development in the major states across the continent.

The activities of the major communist and Western suppliers of military equipment a considered in detail. David Albright and Cynthia Cannizzo respectively provide an overvie of the two camps. Significantly, only West Germany and France among European supplie are specifically dealt with. Britain and Italy are only incidentally mentioned but even that difficult to confirm, because there is, deplorably, no index. It is ironic that what is in son ways for historical reasons the least significant subject gets the best chapter. Joseph Smaldone, who has both academic authority and that which stems from being chief of t licensing division of the Office of Munitions Control in the US State Departmen demonstrates convincingly (p. 179ff.) that Africa is the only region where US arms transfe have never reached notable proportions. He comes to the interesting conclusion (p. 215) th there has not in practice, as far as military aid and sales go, been much difference betwe Carter's policy of unilateral 'restraint' and Reagan's 'rapid response'. Nor has he much comfort to offer American policy-makers, quoting sources (p. 214) which suggest that 'U conventional-arms transfers were "singularly unsuccessful" in achieving American foreig policy objectives' and even that they have contributed to undermining civilian element Though such conclusions may seem obvious to many readers, as far as Africa is concerned t record of US arms transfers has not been so well documented before. The many statistic tables are very useful.

All the other chapters without exception strain after portentous generalizations and in son cases, such as China, make a little material go too far. But again that is inherent in t subject; the total number of African military personnel trained in China up to 1979 is given 2,705 (p. 111) and the maximum numbers of Chinese military in Africa as 590. The Sovie East European and Cuban figures are, of course, on a much larger scale, whatever their preci authenticity. It is, however, important for an appreciation of the struggle for influence Africa that Edward J. Laurance takes care (p. 69) to dispose of the Soviet Union as the 'natur ally' of Southern African states. His conclusion that Soviet arms 'have led to presence, but th has only been transformed into influence in a selective and transient way' (p. 70) seems one the more usefully realistic statements in this book.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDC

Conflict in northwest Africa: the Western Sahara dispute. By John Damis. Stanfor Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1983. 196 pp. Index. $19.95.

THIS book is a competent overview of the history and politics of the struggle over the Weste Sahara. It examines the issues involved, the motivation of the major parties to the dispute, t evolution of the military and diplomatic aspects of the conflict and the role of external acto such as the United States, France, the Soviet Union, Spain and Libya. In a concluding chapt the author examines the prospects for a settlement.

He argues that the conflict is largely a result of a struggle for regional preeminence betwe two different political systems: a pro-Western monarchy with a liberal economy as in Moroc and a one-party authoritarian regime with a socialist economy as in Algeria. This argument not very well sustained in the work since the author does make clear that it was the Morocca claim to Western Sahara which began the conflict.

The book is well organized and clearly written but somewhat dull, largely because the author presents the various arguments of the competing parties without any assessment of their validity. Although one appreciates the problems of researching liberation fronts, Polisario has a rather shadowy existence in the story. Nevertheless, it fills a gap in the English literature on the subject and raises some interesting points: for example, that the phosphate deposits are of only marginal interest to Morocco's Saharan policy and that the restrained behaviour of the Soviet Union in the dispute is linked with its economic ties to Morocco and Algeria.

University of Manchester DAVID POOL

Imperalism, colonialism, and hunger: east and central Africa. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot). 270 pp. Index. £25·00.

THIS book reflects a growing trend in the development literature on Africa. Its central theme is that African governments, colonial and post-colonial, have impeded the expansion of production through excessive intervention in the spheres of agricultural production and marketing, the net effect of which has been to slow down the commercialization of African farming, to create widespread poverty and to force many Africans into defensive subsistence production. Public sector policy should be geared to promoting not food self-sufficiency, but a free interaction between individual producers and the market in order to promote specialization.

Various empirical case-studies are presented in support of this argument. David Cohen rejects as fallacious the notion that in pre-colonial times East Africans were self-sufficient at the household or small community level. Papers on Malawi, Zambia and Kenya argue that a combination of government measures, including the appropriation and reallocation of land, controls over African production and state intervention in crop marketing have resulted in the impoverishment and marginalization of vast numbers of people. The continuation of such policies after the colonial period is due to the fact that African rulers have found that public sector intervention in the economic sphere can constitute an important source of political patronage. Having in many cases a weak political base it is in their interests to maintain and create such sources of influence.

There is a fundamental weakness in these arguments in so far as they purport to be concerned with the impact of public policy on mass welfare. It is neither public interventionism *per se*, nor the (widely varying) rate of growth of rural output, that has caused poverty and defensive subsistence production to become widespread in African societies. First and foremost it is in the nature of the expanded market opportunities that have confronted African producers to generate growing inequality and growing individualism. Whether the exploitation of such opportunities results in growing poverty, and in emphasis on subsistence production by poor households as a means of survival, depends above all on the quantity and quality of productive resources in different societies, and their distribution, on the one hand, and on the level and reliability of returns to market-orientated production on the other. To advocate the withdrawal of public authorities from intervention in the spheres of production and exchange is neither an adequate nor a realistic solution. Firstly, to promote growth infrastructure investments must be financed. The taxation of high-value export crops is one obvious method of doing this. Secondly, in the absence of a welfare state and of adequate market-generated wage employment opportunities, only public sector intervention in resource distribution can ensure sufficient access to income-generating resources for the survival of the poor households with whom this book purports to be concerned.

University of Sussex DIANA HUNT

Integration, development and equity: economic integration in West Africa. By Peter Robson. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 181 pp. Index. £15·00.

THIS book examines the most significant steps attempted towards economic integration in West Africa, namely, the CEAO, the Mano River Union, ECOWAS and Senegambia, and also includes a chapter on monetary aspects of such integration covering the experience of the cooperation to date. The theme is approached at three levels. There is some preliminary discussion of the theoretical bases of customs unions—though this reviewer found the author's

use of the terms orthodox and neo-classical rather confusing—the central conclusions being drawn that there is a case for regional economic integration and that the benefits that accrue from such integration require a high degree of positive action—in other words, it is not simply a matter of stepping back and allowing market forces to do their work.

On the basis of these theoretical points the crucial policy areas of integration schemes are identified, namely, the scope and direction of regional trade, equity in the distribution of benefits among the member countries and policies towards multinational companies. A very useful chapter is devoted to the exploration of these policy questions in their various aspects, though non-economist Africanists will perhaps find the discussion of effective protection coefficients and so on a little too condensed. These policy areas then form the basis for the third and most substantial section of the book, analysing the various integration schemes themselves.

These chapters bring together a great deal of useful information on the various economies concerned as well as briefly sketching the historical background to and providing fairly detailed information on the treaty documents in each case. The impression given by this material is not only one of the enormous economic difficulties that West African countries face but also of the obstacles that they present to an application of the principles proposed by economists. It is not clear, for example, that any of the schemes contain any clear idea of 'the desirable extent and direction of industrial development and the character of regional specialisation' (p. 18) or that even if they did, the methods proposed to devise them are appropriate or convincing. The author is aware, indeed he stresses, the statistical difficulties involved—difficulties that are in fact so great that 'the extent to which the emergent pattern of trade and specialisation in CEAO is appropriate to the relative opportunity costs of the different producers and the distributional constraints imposed by the member states is at present impossible to determine' (p. 52). What calculations there are show that the countries with the largest industrial sectors, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, have the comparative advantage over the others. It is not obvious that the other countries will readily accede to politics that will intensify the existing distribution of comparative advantage.

These problems are reflected in Professor Robson's brief concluding overview which, while it puts a brave face on things, compiles a formidable list of obsracles that lie in the way of economic success via regional integration in West Africa.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London THOMAS YOUNG

The economics of political instability: the Nigerian–Biafran War. By E. Wayne Nafziger. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 251 pp. Index. £17·00.

DR NAFZIGER'S book helps fill a gap, for the Nigerian civil war of 1967–70 has yet to become established as a subject of disinterested enquiry. It is, however, a work of interpretation rather than original research. It adds little to what has already been published on the economic effects of the war and the subsequent economic recovery of Nigeria. Its emphasis is on explaining the political instability that led to the war, and interesting parallels are made with the break-up of the old Pakistan in 1971.

Political stress in Nigeria, as in many another developing country, would be generally attributed to competition for the spoils of the political system, a competition heightened by extensive government intervention in economic life, communal allegiances, and the tendency for sub-national ethnicities to be accentuated, or even fabricated, in the course of the struggle. Nafziger accepts such explanations, but thinks them insufficient because they neglect the influence of colonial history, post-colonial relationships of international dependence, and class conflicts.

It is true that British colonial rule in Nigeria and elsewhere did not create integrated national societies. No doubt there is substance in Nafziger's view that such an outcome would not have suited the British. But it should also be acknowledged that unification would have been strongly resisted by the subject peoples, and beyond the power of the colonial authorities to have accomplished. Some steps toward integration were taken. An obvious example is the free migration of people within Nigeria. As Nafziger recognizes, these movements—specifically, the movement of the Igbo to the North—became a grievance and led to wholesale murder in 1966.

Nafziger's second point is that the interest of the Nigerian elite in maintaining financial and trading connections with capitalist countries constrained their ability to manage and moderate internal conflicts. Very likely, but it is not obvious that those conflicts would have been more manageable if the external economic relationships had been other than they were or absent altogether. Nafziger makes much (pp. 65–6) of the report that the British High Commissioner and the US Ambassador urged Colonel Gowon in July 1966 to resist the dissolution of Nigeria into a loose confederation of the four regions. But would regional autonomy really have made for tranquillity in Nigerian affairs? And would any Nigerians today regard the advice given Gowon in 1966 as evidence of neo-colonial designs?

As to class conflicts, Nafziger's illustrations are either of narrow sectional interests (young civil servants and army officers whose expectations of rapid advancement were disappointed), or of wider groupings (urban wage-earners and cocoa farmers), whose passivity in the face of adversity or exploitation has been much more remarkable than their occassional protests.

One need not agree with the answers Nafziger gives to acknowledge that the questions he raises are provocative. He has also provided a painstaking review of the literature relevant to this subject, and useful compilations of the estimates of economic statistics made by the Central Bank and the Office of Statistics.

University of Birmingham DOUGLAS RIMMER

Federalism in Nigeria under the presidential constitution. By B. O. Nwabueze. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 1983. 413 pp. Index. £16·00.

CONFRONTED with three Nwabueze volumes within a calendar year (see *International Affairs*, Winter 1982/83, pp. 128–9, and Spring 1983, p. 310), the single-minded reviewer, let alone the multi-purpose librarian and student, must be forgiven an initial start of disorientation and disbelief. Yet, for all the variations on the theme of federalism and the presidential constitution of Nigeria, none of the prolific Professor Nwabueze's interlocking volumes duplicates any other. In this particular study, Nwabueze seeks to enlighten the reader on the possibly confusing yet essential division of powers relating to the control and regulation of community affairs and relations between two tiers of government. The basis of his argument rests, of course, in the authority derived from the legislative powers which are either set out in the Exclusive list (there are no less than sixty-seven of these in the 1979 Nigerian constitution) or the Concurrent legislative list.

After a general discussion of the force of the exclusive, concurrent, and residual matters, of the doctrine of incidental powers and of what is known among constitutional lawyers as the doctrine of covering the field, the main focus (and two thirds of the nineteen chapters) is given over to a detailed account of the division between the central and state (currently nineteen, possibly forty-nine if the federal legislative house has its way!) governments of selected areas of governmental powers, for example, law and order, the administration of justice, land, local government and, to identify one of special controversy and conspicuousness, revenue allocation (it turns out to be the longest chapter of them all). In his final chapters Nwabueze reflects on problems which have arisen in the working of the system, on how balanced the federal system may be said to be under the presidential constitution, and on how far it may be held to have contributed to that previously elusive goal of building a Nigerian nation.

With the question of how many more states will be set up promising to eclipse the general election as the eye of Nigeria's restless political storm, and all the delicate centre–state relationships which will emerge, students of Nigerian politics will find as much interest in what Nwabueze has to say on the creation of states and the allocation of revenue as those interested in external affairs will find in his chapter XIII. By the time this review appears, it is to be hoped that Nigeria will not have been plunged into another crisis of 'president by mathematics' over the interpretation of what constitutes two thirds of nineteen states (pp. 370–6). Why, one wonders, has no one listened to the layman's voice arguing that the best way of avoiding another such crisis is to ensure that Nigeria's total of states should always be divisible by three? Or, recalling the suits and appeals of 1979 (and doubtless 1983, too), might that put too many of Nigeria's persuasive lawyers out of business? Whatever the case, students and scholars will hope that Nwabueze himself will go on doing us so handsomely on the niceties of Nigeria's federal constitutions, by bringing the story up to and beyond the

anticipated constitutional crises, controversies and conflicts of Nigeria 1983. There is no better authority.

St Antony's College, Oxford A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE

Mobutu ou l'incarnation du mal Zaïrois. By Nguza Karl i Bond. London: Rex Collings. 1982. 201 pp. £11·00.

THE author of this book, born in 1938, a minister by the age of 33 and under sentence of death by 39, is one of a generation thrust by necessity into the power vacuum left by the precipitate departure of the Belgians at Zaïre's independence in 1960. It was M. Nguza's destiny to observe at close hand the methods and nature of Mobutu, the 'incarnation of Zaïrian evil', the psychopathology and deeds of a leader deservedly ranking with Amin and Bokassa amongst the least endearing representatives of this part of equatorial Africa.

Much of the book is taken up by an autobiographical account of the events leading up to Nguza's trial in 1977, and the events following his imprisonment, release, rehabilitation and voluntary exile. It is important in its own right as a record of how human rights can be set at nought, a regime of terror established and a potentially rich economy reduced to ruin. For those still interested in the Shaba Wars of 1977 and 1978 there are some glosses on events, but most importantly it is in the author's attempt 'to re-establish the truth and to present Mobutu in his true light' that the account becomes remarkable, despite a lack of literary or intellectual pretensions.

Aside from the harrowing details of the author's physical and moral torture and degradation, the book illuminates many aspects of a state corrupted by its leader and an army described as a veritable mafia. Figures are produced and documents copied to back up the scale of financial irregularities which could allow Mobutu and his family to disburse US$150.4 million between 1977 and 1979 in a period when the country was effectively bankrupt. The development aid and misdirected funds from the programme of commercial and industrial Zaïrianization allowed Mobutu's own village to build an international airport, an advanced hospital and the most modern church in Zaïre, whilst the president's foreign *pieds à terre* included a castle in Belgium and a villa in Switzerland. M. Nguza's evidence before the African Affairs Committee of the American Congress in 1981 is reprinted over twenty-seven pages, and one is persuaded that much of his people's suffering must be laid at the door of the Western powers which claim that without Mobutu there would be chaos and balkanization of the country and cynically defend their economic and strategic interests by keeping Mobutu in power. Understandably the book appears in French, but it is to be hoped that its publisher may do an even greater service to Zaïre's people by ensuring that an English version becomes available.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne J. A. HELLEN

Tanzania: an African experiment. By Rodger Yeager. Boulder, Col.: Westview; Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 136 pp. Index. £9·50.

DR YEAGER'S study examines whether Tanzania represents a model of success or a lesson in failure. Tanzania has always excited strong views among outsiders, both from those who see the country as Africa's great hope and from critics, of both right and left, who point out that its *per capita* income ($280 a year) is at the bottom of the African league.

Independence, achieved twenty-two years ago, has brought undeniable progress. There is more equality among Tanzanians than among their neighbours in Zambia and Kenya. Governmental stability is greater than in societies such as Zaire or Uganda. Political repression is felt less than in dictatorships like Malawi's. Measured in terms of education and health care, the quality of life has improved more in Tanzania than in any of these countries.

But Tanzania has tottered on the brink of economic collapse during the past decade. The *ujamaa* programme of rural development is now acknowledged to have failed. Peasants were encouraged and ultimately forced into new villages, but communal production proved a disaster. Legally marketed food production is now actually below the level it was ten years ago. Tanzania's peasants continue to grow agricultural products which are exported in return for imports which are mostly consumed by the urban elite. Meanwhile, despite its policy of self-reliance, Tanzania was by 1981 receiving more *per capita* aid than any other black African state.

Dr Yeager provides a concise overview of post-independence development, both economic and political. The section of the failure of the *ujamaa* programme is particularly interesting. The book, unfortunately, is too short to explore many of the issues in sufficient depth. It is also largely based on published sources, rather than original material, and it therefore adds little in the way of new information. What the book does offer, however, is a useful and succinct account for those wanting a general view of contemporary Tanzania. The author is realistic yet sympathetic, and his viewpoint is balanced. He concludes with President Nyerere's haunting admonition: 'While other countries aim to reach the moon, we must aim to reach the villages'.

MARTIN BAILEY

Namibia: political and economic prospects. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 132 pp. Index. £16·00.

THIS short book emerged out of a conference in late 1981 on Namibia's prospects after independence. Its five chapters are written by different authors each well versed in a particular field. Nicholas Watts describes the history of the Namibian dispute at a formal legal level from South Africa's acquisition of the mandate for South West Africa in May 1919. He perhaps overstates the role of racial policy as an obstacle to the integration of the territory into South Africa in the prewar period while ignoring the role of German-speaking whites in the territory, but that is a minor criticism. He draws the important conclusion that the Geneva conference on Namibia in January 1981 'foundered because Ronald Reagan was elected to the US presidency' (p. 26).

Robert Rotberg, in his chapter on the current political and economic situation, attributes the delay in achieving independence to South Africa's fear of the impact of a SWAPO government in Namibia on its own position. This seems at best a very partial explanation, especially as the cost to South Africa of administering the territory has dramatically increased in recent years and as South Africa's efforts to create a viable alternative to a SWAPO government have collapsed. Rotberg convincingly stresses SWAPO's political predominance within the territory.

In by far the longest as well as the most substantial chapter in the book, Wolfgang Thomas describes the territory's economy sector by sector and analyses the economic options facing a Namibian government on the territory's transition to independence. He argues that a moderate social-democratic strategy under a SWAPO government is the most likely outcome, though he concludes that the longer independence is delayed the greater the possibility that a more radical strategy will be adopted. Kate Jowell stresses the fragility of the territory's economy and its dependence on South Africa. Finally, Stanley Uys examines SWAPO's plan for the post-independence era, principally in the economic field, though he also discusses the more important strategic issues. He argues that, despite the fact that the Soviet Union has supported SWAPO's liberation struggle, a SWAPO victory in Namibia will tend to reduce Soviet influence in the region by settling the question of Namibia's international status once and for all.

There is a considerable overlap among the various chapters, with an emphasis on the economic rather than the political aspects of the territory's future and with too little attention paid to the strategic and international issues that account for the continuance of the conflict. Unfortunately, this bias is all too typical of recent writing on the territory. The overall message that emerges from the book is that Namibia's early independence is in the West's best interests. The problem is that this view does not appear to be shared by the Reagan administration, or, if it is, the United States attaches a higher priority to other objectives such as the removal of Cuban troops from Angola and the destabilization of Marxist-oriented governments within the region. In these circumstances, the assumption forming the basis of the book, that Namibia's independence is imminent, is open to question.

Queen's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

Apartheid: the facts. London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa/United Nations Centre Against Apartheid. 1983. 112 pp. Pb.: £3·00.

THE term 'apartheid' is one which is sometimes thought to describe a situation of segregation in South Africa, in which people there are kept apart. But, as with most labels, that is far too

simplistic. For apartheid is, in fact, a very complex structure of unequal social, economic and political relations. One can describe these in many different ways and interpret them differently, but nothing conveys the reality of those relations better than the kind of data presented here. Of course, all social scientists know that 'the facts' never speak for themselves, but have to be organized and presented. In this case, however, the facts are almost enough. For, as they show, at the core of apartheid is inequality, across a whole range of economic, social and political factors, between white, black, Asian and Coloured South Africans. It is not simply a matter of horizontal segregation between people, but a complex and tightly controlled vertical structure of hierarchical relations in which the whites get the best of what is going and the blacks get the worst, if anything.

This book is divided into ten chapters dealing with historical background; segregation and inequality; education, information and culture; economic exploitation; political structures; repression; the armed forces; wider Southern Africa; international relations; resistance and the armed struggle; plus appendices, maps and tables. The best sections are the central ones, providing detailed information, often drawn from official statistics. For example, black South Africans comprise some 72 per cent of the population, yet are excluded from ownership of agricultural land in 86 per cent of the country; they received (in 1977) only some 26 per cent of total income; they have a life expectancy of fifty-five years compared with sixty-eight for whites; they received (in 1981) less than R200 per head in educational expenditure compared with R500 for whites. The great dream of apartheid—the Bantustans or so-called homelands—remain barren and sunk in poverty, and their prospects are bleak. For instance, only 3 per cent of South African GDP is produced in them, and 70 per cent of their GNP comes from commuters and 'migrant workers' in the 'white' areas. One of the central mechanisms of social and economic control is that complex of laws called the Pass Laws. Between 1948 and 1981 some 12·5 million blacks were arrested or prosecuted under them, and in 1979 some 30 per cent of all prisoners in South African gaols was accounted for by people convicted under them. Black unemployment is thought to be in the region of 21–24 per cent. While the average white monthly income is some R950 (about £570), that of blacks is R250 (about £150). Between 1963 and 1983 some fifty-seven people died while in police custody.

If these facts do not speak for themselves, they certainly convey a pretty clear sense of what apartheid is, and what it is like for blacks to live in it, given their effectively zero access to formal political power or influence. In any society, its development and the welfare of all its people depend on being able to liberate human energies and skills—in science, art, sport, invention and all forms of productivity and creativity. The more people who are enabled to contribute their skills and potentials to a society, the better for all in it. The extraordinary irony is that what apartheid does is to deprive South Africa of most of the potential skills and capacities of the majority of its people. So, while democrats, Christians, liberals, socialists and others may find South African policy and practice to be immoral, there may be a much more fundamental criticism worth making, which arises from the kinds of facts presented in this volume: and that is that apartheid is breathtakingly stupid.

University of York ADRIAN LEFTWICH

Asia and Australasia

The Indian Ocean: region of conflict or 'zone of peace'? By Dieter Braun. London: Hurst; Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 228 pp. Index. £12·50.

THE satellite photograph of the Indian Ocean and its littoral which appears at the beginning of this volume provides a graphic indication of the problem of imposing a sense of strategic unity on a geographic expression. Although the author provides a comprehensive summary of events bearing on the region so-called, especially during the course of the 1970s, the assumption that the Indian Ocean and the coastal states constitute a geopolitical region is never convincingly sustained. The dimensions of scale and the degree of political diversity reduce the analysis to a fragmented catalogue of happenings which have a measure of unity imposed in part by the fact of superpower competition. In effect, that competition has expressed itself in sectoral terms and in no sense evenly within the bounds of the Indian Ocean and its littoral. Moreover, in order to cope with the ramifications of such competition, as well

as intruding Sino-Soviet antagonisms, the author feels obliged to extend the notion of regional hinterland virtually to the southern borders of China.

Dr Braun begins his analysis with a general description of the Indian Ocean area, depicted as consisting of a highly heterogeneous assembly of states. He then considers the impact of superpower competition giving logical attention, for example, to the role of Diego Garcia and the asymmetry in geostrategic advantage between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Gulf area after the fall of the Shah of Iran. A discussion of the interests of other significant external states is followed by a sectoral *tour d'horizon* and only at virtually the end of the book is consideration given to regional initiatives which possess a regional scale and a unifying framework. To this end, the author looks at the chequered progress of the 'zone of peace' proposal put forward initially by Sri Lanka and Pakistan's nuclear-free zone scheme which constitutes a response to India's explosion of a nuclear device. A sketchy final chapter styled 'a perspective view' takes account of significant developments since 1980.

London School of Economics MICHAEL LEIFER

Pakistan: the roots of dictatorship. The political economy of a praetorian state. Edited by Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid. London: Zed. 1983. 394 pp. Index. £22·50. Pb.: £7·95.

THE editors, Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, have undertaken a formidable task in assembling contributions from twelve different authors and attempting to put them into some sort of framework. The authors work 'over three continents, specialize in diverse academic disciplines and work in isolation from each other'. Many were not known to the editors, who both have teaching appointments in Canada, before the work began. Six of the chapters have appeared elsewhere, sometimes in another form; some have postscripts in which the authors have modified their conclusions to take account of political changes.

The book moves from a short historical survey to an analysis of the social structure of Pakistan, its economy and its relationship with the aid donors. It then examines the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of families, the development of the labour movement, and the social consequences of the green revolution, going on to examine the resurgence of Islam in Pakistan.

Despite the differences of background and experiences of the authors, the book forms a reasonably coherent whole. The editors argue that 'to live meaningfully in Pakistan, as Pakistanis, requires an understanding of why these events [of the post-independence period] have occurred and what is likely to happen in the future. An element of personal concern thus pervades all the articles in this book'. Although most of the authors might claim to be radicals, their partisan political attitudes are not too obtrusive. Indeed, the book appears to be primarily a text book rather than a political treatise. This impression is reinforced by the liberal use of tables and other illustrative material. The editors have aimed 'to meet the needs of students and readers interested in a comprehensive and detailed knowledge of Pakistan society from an interdisciplinary dialectical perspective'. They argue that 'the internal dynamics of Pakistani society have too often been ignored by those concerned with the South Asian region'.

Those parts of the book which deal with Pakistani society, including an interesting essay on the systemic injustices and inequalities in a Punjab village, carry more conviction than the anti-American approach to economic and military aid. Nor is the reader likely to accept as adequate an analysis of Islamic ideology which concludes that 'the Islamization of society is, in reality, a process of feudalization and development of capitalism as an appendage of international monopoly capitalism' (p. 391).

There are occasional *obiter dicta* which jolt the reader. For instance Aijaz Ahmad writes (p. 137): 'It is useful to recall that Bhutto was overthrown with the consent of the US Embassy and by the concerted effort of all the pro-American forces in the country'. And the two editors commit themselves to the opinion (p. 15) that 'Agha Shahi had to resign his position as Foreign Minister to make room for a retired general'. Perhaps, too, British readers would prefer Sir Olaf Caroe's name to be spelt correctly (p. 385).

CYRIL PICKARD

Afghanistan's two-party communism: Parcham and Khalq. By Anthony Arnold. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1983. 242 pp. Index. Pb.: $10.95.

ANTHONY ARNOLD, a former US intelligence analyst, has followed his previous short study of the background to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with a more substantial history of the ruling party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Since its foundation in 1965 the party has been prone to factional disputes, notably those between the Parcham and Khalq factions which led to a split within the party between 1967 and 1976 and to what can only be described as intra-party warfare since 1978. Discussion of these disputes takes up a large part of Arnold's book. The author adopts the common view that the disputes reflect the differences between two social groups: Parcham members tend to be non-Pashtun Dari speakers from relatively well-off urban families, Khalqis to be poorer Pashtuns from rural backgrounds. He also emphasizes the conflicts of personalities, notably the ambitions of Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin, and the role of ideology, and he relates the progress of the disputes to the contingencies of passing events. Although Arnold makes no use of Persian sources he does bring together some useful information to explain the clashes of the late 1960s and early 1970s and his book is a helpful contribution to the understanding of the situation in Afghanistan. He offers some interesting suggestions, for example, that Amin planned the assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber in April 1978 (the event that triggered the revolution), using the Alemyar brothers as his instruments; and some lively comments, for example, his description of the DRA Minister of Defence, Lieutenant General Abd al-Qadir, as 'the Inspector Clouseau of Afghan politics' (p. 66).

Three reservations may be expressed concerning Arnold's analysis. First, it rests almost exclusively upon an examination of a handful of party leaders; his attempt to look at the middle and lower ranks of the party founders on lack of information. Secondly, many episodes in the history of the party cannot be explained in terms of a two-faction situation. This is true, for example, of the disputes of the late 1960s when several leftist factions were involved, of the August 1978 plot, of the Taraki–Amin rivalry of 1979, and of the removal from Afghanistan for two years of Muhammad Rafi (it is altogether too much to believe, as Arnold apparently does, that he was merely furthering his education in the Soviet Union). It is also the case that family and tribal loyalties play a more important role in determining alignments within the PDPA than do ethnic or class divisions. A simple examination of who is related to whom could explain much that is left mysterious in Arnold's book. Thirdly, it may be that Arnold over-rates the role of the PDPA; readers are well-advised to compare Arnold's book with that of Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, reviewed below.

A particularly valuable feature of this book is the appendices which include the 1966 party programme, the 1965 party constitution, and a quite fascinating internal party document of 1976 which gives many novel insights into the history of the PDPA.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London M. E. YAPP

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. By Henry S. Bradsher. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 1983. 324 pp. Index. $32.50. Pb.: $12.75.

EMPLOYING a variety of English and Russian—but not Persian—language sources, including US archives, Henry Bradsher has written the most detailed and perhaps the most useful account of the Afghan revolution and the Soviet invasion so far available. He traces the course of events from the 1978 revolution onwards, putting together the available evidence and offering helpful suggestions about the many unknown and, at present, unknowable factors in the developing situation.

Although the Soviet Unoin had fallen out with Da'ud before the 1978 revolution it neither planned nor triggered the April coup, which was largely a military uprising to which the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) fell heir. Bradsher describes the subsequent factional disputes within the PDPA, the radicalization of its policies under Amin, and Soviet pressure for moderation, the failure of which led to the Soviet invasion of December 1979, when it was feared that the PDPA regime was in danger of collapse, with an associated threat to Soviet interests related to border security, ideology and prestige, and ambitions towards the Indian Ocean. The invasion was, he states, 'tactically defensive, strategically offensive' (p. 160). The invasion could also be accommodated within a more militarist and expansionist trend in Soviet policy about which the author offers some interesting speculations.

In the second part of the book Bradsher describes the world reaction to the Soviet invasion

and the progress of the civil war. Finally, he examines the solutions which have been proposed. He is sceptical about many of the suggested model arrangements, for example, Finlandization or an Austrian-type settlement. There is, he considers, no stable alternative government and no willingness on the Soviet side to accept any compromise on acceptance of the revolution and PDPA rule. While Afghanistan is unlikely to be annexed to the USSR in whole or in part, it will probably be converted to the status of Mongolia. Bradsher compares the Soviet operations to the suppression of the Basmachis in Turkestan in the 1920s and to the Chinese crushing of the Tibetan revolt.

Bradsher's analysis may be too gloomy about the future of Afghanistan. The Afghan situation differs from the other cases that he mentions: unilke Tibet and Turkestan it is legally an independent country, and unlike Mongolia there is no great national enemy which would incline many of its people to look upon Russians as protectors; indeed, the enemy is the USSR. There is no Russian settler population such as facilitated the establishment of Soviet control over Turkestan, and the geography of Afghanistan is very different from that of Turkestan, where the greatest number of the people were located in easily controlled oasis regions. Lastly, it may be asked what Soviet determination to defend the gains of the revolution means. Judging by recent statements it may mean no more than the acceptance by any future Afghan government of a modest amount of land reform and of non-alignment in foreign policy. Neither should be too difficult to swallow. And if the Soviet Union wishes to abandon the PDPA it has many ideologically plausible excuses for doing so.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London M. E. YAPP

Cult and canon: the origins and development of state Maoism. By Helmut Martin. Armonk, NY, London: Sharpe. 1982. 233 pp. $37.50.

THIS volume catalogues the employment of Mao Zedong's texts and thought in Chinese politics with particular emphasis on the period 1976–80. It is a well documented and perceptive study, especially of recent history, but it has to some extent been overtaken by events.

Martin's treatment of the beginnings of the Mao canon is extremely brief. There is no discussion of the origins or originality of Mao's ideas; the events in Yanan (where Mao's thought emerged as the *vade mecum* of the Party) are alluded to in only a few sentences, and Chen Boda's role as Mao's prompter and amanuensis is not mentioned. A work with this title might fairly be expected to consider these topics in greater detail, and to refer to some of the considerable literature devoted to them, for example, Ray Wylie's excellent *The emergence of Maoism.* Similarly, a series of very brief chapters are devoted to the publication of Mao's works in the 1950s, the Cultural Revolution, and its aftermath. Indeed, the book only gets into its stride with the death of Mao, the fate of his works and legacy being the subject of more than half the text. Here Martin shows in soundly documented and skilfully written chapters the ways in which specific Mao texts, allusions to Soviet experience, and historiographical references were employed first by Hua Guofeng and then by Deng Xiaoping in their contest for supremacy within the Communist Party. These opponents are shown to have been struggling with the difficulties entailed in attempting to attribute certain errors to Mao whilst retaining his ideology as one of the cornerstones of the regime, the victory of Deng being attributable in part to his dextrous use of the maxim culled from Mao, 'seek truth from facts'. The concluding discussion, perhaps the most interesting of the work, deals with similar cults and canons in the communist world and contrasts Mao's obsession with his writings with the modesty and self-deprecation of Ho Chi Minh.

As a discussion of the ideology of de-Maoization this work is most useful, but it was completed before an analysis could be offered of the definitive assessment of Mao which was released after the meeting of the sixth plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party, though this text is printed as an appendix. Similarly, no account could be offered of the emergence of the new Deng Xiaoping canon, the likelihood of which the author discounts on the basis of earlier evidence.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JAMES COTTON

Japan's quest for comprehensive security: defence, diplomacy and dependence. By J. W. M. Chapman, R. Drifte and I. T. M. Gow. London: Pinter. 1983. 259 pp. Index. £16·50.

IN Europe today Japan is perceived primarily as an industrial and technological competitor, possibly as a threat. Yet Japan is, if not strictly speaking an ally, a 'friendly' state, a partner, with major strategic preoccupations and an uneasy geopolitical position, whose security is of vital interest to the entire Western alliance system. Whoever said 'know thine enemy' did not, presumably, mean to imply that one should totally ignore one's friends. And yet that has tended to be the prevalent attitude of European governments.

In recent years, the rapidly evolving international situation and especially the decline of American power and presence in the Far East, has forced Japan to think deeply about its security; a number of nations, albeit principally the United States, are calling on the country to extend security considerations on a wider regional basis. Prime Minister Nakasone has tried, if with somewhat mixed results so far, to call upon his compatriots to take up this particular Japanese burden. Japan's friends should follow closely the internal debate on Japanese security issues; they should be knowledgeable about, and preferably sensitive to, the constraints and opportunities facing the Japanese government both on domestic and international fronts.

Chapman, Drifte and Gow have produced a very valuable study which no policy-making department or organization should fail to read. Gow analyses the subject from the military standpoint (defence), Drifte from that of Japanese foreign policy (diplomacy) and Chapman the highly complex economic dimension of comprehensive security (dependence). The authors integrate the three different perspectives effectively and assess them in terms both of national and international political considerations. The result, therefore, consists of both a clear presentation of the forest and an identification of the more prominent trees.

From every imaginable point of view—military, geopolitical, constitutional, economic, psychological—the question of Japan's comprehensive security (or, as a special issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* called it, 'comprehensive confusion') is a highly complex one, a complexity exacerbated by the very strong emotional overtones of the issue both in Japan and abroad: memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and consequent nuclear allergies on the one hand, Nanking and a few other massacres on the other, together with the outcries that ensue when the Japanese Ministry of Education goes about 'revising' history textbooks and, while they are at it, history itself. With a policy that looks like an Irish jig—two steps forward, three backwards, two to the side, then a half-circle—that has at least the merit of bewildering both friends and foes alike, it is clear that in due course something is going to have to give. The KAL atrocity should further concentrate minds. Indeed, the Japanese security issue is likely to prove one of the most critical international developme its in the next decade. Chapman, Drifte and Gow are to be thanked and congratulated for having provided a sound framework for analysing the past and the present and thus facilitating greater insight into the direction these developments are likely to take.

Euro-Asia Centre, INSEAD, Fontainebleau JEAN-PIERRE LEHMANN

North America

America's security in the 1980s. By Christoph Bertram. London: Macmillan for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1982. 117 pp. Index. £20·00.

Winding down: the price of defense. By the Boston Study Group. San Francisco: Freeman. 1983. 359 pp. Index. Pb.: £6·50.

IN a typically elegant contribution to the first of the above volumes Henry Kissinger underlines some of the obstacles to conceptual thinking in democratic societies. The dictates of gaining and holding office require the cultivation of image: 'candidates must devote years of their lives focussing on how to get on the evening news, not on what they will do when they get into office'; and in complex bureaucratic structures 'it grows increasingly difficult to disentangle departmental or agency self-will from the national interest' (p. 53). In such

contexts independent intellectual analysis becomes critically important. These two volumes represent such exercises, and divergent approaches.

America's security in the 1980s is the record of eleven papers delivered at an International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia. This small, immaculately rebuilt colonial town is claimed to have been an appropriate setting for discussion of the security theme, but is it really an adequate metaphor for the heroically scarred vitality of the American way and the uncertainty of present circumstance? The sophisticated analysts there assembled considered problems of legislative oversight, strategic nuclear and conventional forces, alliances in Europe and Asia, perceptions of Soviet policies and the nature of US responses. There are some pointed criticisms of policies, for indeed the United States does seem 'uncomfortable with prolonged ambiguity in international affairs' (p. 104) despite the fact that ambiguity is usually the norm. But despite frequent references to the 'periphery' of the world arena lying beyond the immediate confrontations of the superpowers, the focus of debate seems too conventional. One contributor reminds us that most American blood spilt since 1945 has been on the periphery, and there is a clear chapter on US alliances in Asia, but only by a narrow definition of security can creative thinking refuse to recognize the impact of indigenous developments in the Third World. They have their own momentum and also challenge the traditional American view that their democracy cannot happily survive in an ideologically alien world. There is much to admire in these papers, and a lot of aesthetic distinction, as in Williamsburg, but there is also a crowded world outside demanding to be let in. The book is generously produced, and priced beyond the reach of the wider readership that should be the natural constituency of such ratiocination.

The Boston Study Group, working largely from published government documents, has produced an alternative analysis of US military strategies through critical evaluation of the defense budget. The group itself consists of interested citizens, including a professor of physiology at Harvard Medical School, a physics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, members of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, and a number of writers identified with non-establishment views. Alarmed by the arms race, and acutely conscious of the terrifying threat to mankind presented by nuclear confrontation, they analyse the balance of forces in the late 1970s clearly and with apparent precision. The arithmetic of thousands of warheads poised on each side, and millions of men under arms, leads them to the conclusion that overkill potential has transcended the imperatives of national defence, and that security interests could be sustained by a 40 per cent reduction in the military budget. Indeed, they suggest that such a reduction could actually increase national security by making the world safer. They suggest that even if the USSR did not make commensurate reductions in its own military resources, the United States would retain a more than adequate deterrent capacity. It is not sufficient to dismiss their position as visionary or naïve, for their argument is carefully sketched and they try to confront possible criticisms at each stage. Whether or not the reader agrees with them is almost irrelevant. By examining in detail the military budget, and suggesting alternative strategies in the context of global politics, the Boston Study Group has tried to break out of the cast of mind within which we have come to live. In so doing they have made an important contribution to the debate which, as new missile systems come to be deployed, has once again moved nearer to the centre stage for America's allies overseas.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

The intemperate zone: the Third World challenge to US foreign policy. By Richard [illegible] Feinberg. New York, London: Norton. 1983. 287 pp. Index. $17.50.

THIS is an important book which should be obligatory reading for everyone engaged in the making of foreign policy, especially in the United States. Professor Feinberg, a senior fellow and director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC, is an international economist who was formerly (1977–9) on the policy planning staff of the secretary of state, and he is a specialist on Latin America. He writes in a clear, lively manner, deploying both example and comparison in a way that makes what he has to say easy to read, while at the same time the solid intellectual underpinning of his argument is manifest throughout.

Professor Feinberg's thesis is that United States policy is in disarray and should be replaced by what he (and independently Professor Tom Farer) terms 'neorealism'. 'The setbacks in

Central America', he argues, 'are the consequences of policies based on false assumptions regarding American influence, the nature of Third World politics, and the imperatives of our national interest' (p. 17). The new approach, neorealism, resembles earlier ones in that it 'concentrates on defending the vital interests of Americans—their life, liberty and property'. It differs from them not in its 'definition of America's vital interests' but in 'its conception of the threats' that face the United States in the Third World and in 'its prescriptions for dealing with them' (p. 23). In particular it differs from Reaganite 'reassertionism' in rejecting 'global containment' and the concept of Third World relations as a zero-sum game between the superpowers, and in seeing the US position in a dynamic world economy as being full of promise, not menace, provided it is prepared to accept the profound changes that have come over that system since the early days of the cold war.

The United States must, he argues, first recognize that the Soviet Union has not in fact made substantial ground in the Third World. It must, however, accept increasing state intervention in the economies of Third World states, recognize that regional powers are not clients of the United States, stop backing incompetents, avoid the seductive embrace of the military, cut its losses, embrace a carefully designed human rights policy, accept non-alignment and even revolutionary changes, and stop thinking in terms of ideologically grounded 'reward' and 'punishment'.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

Child of conflict: the Korean–American relationship 1943–1953. Edited by Bruce Cumings. Seattle, London: University of Washington Press. 1983. 355 pp. Index. £18·00.

THIS is a very useful collection of essays, by scholars having access to recently declassified US archival material. Bruce Cumings' introduction rather neatly describes the three strains in American foreign policy—'internationalism', 'containment' and 'roll-back'—as this policy worked itself out in Korea. At the Yalta Conference, the 'internationalist' strain was dominant, and it had been agreed that a joint trusteeship of the great powers should administer Korea after its liberation from Japanese control, with independence to follow in due course. Mark Paul's essay explains why and how the American delegation at the Potsdam Conference fended off the attempts of Stalin and Molotov to clarify this vague understanding, and shifted American policy away from 'internationalism' and towards 'containment'. James Matry's essay covers the period from 1945 to 1950, focussing on the reasons why 'internationalism' was finally abandoned, and containment became the dominant strain in American policy. This shift superimposed the cold war between the great powers on to the hotter war between factions that had caused '100,000 casualties in South Korea before June, 1950' (p. 136). James Merrill provides an excellent study of this internal warfare in South Korea, and his study, together with a penetrating comment by Jon Halliday, illuminates the way in which a purely internal problem in Korea expanded into a major international conflict.

William Stueck's 'March to Yalu' picks up the narrative in June 1950, and demonstrates how American policy shifted from containment to roll-back with the invasion of North Korea and the acceptance of a mission to 'clear Korea' of communist influence. Chinese intervention ensured the failure of roll-back, forcing the US to revert to containment. UN troops retired to defensive positions approximately along the thirty-eighth parallel, and armistice negotiations opened at Kaesong in July 1951, but negotiations and hostilities continued for more than two years before an armistice was finally achieved.

Two factors were chiefly responsible for this long delay. J. B. Kotch analyses one of these, the absolute refusal of Syngman Rhee to commit the South Korean government to any armistice until he had extorted from the United States a Mutual Defense Agreement in the late summer of 1953, ensuring a permanent military occupation of his country. The other delaying factor was US insistence that repatriation of prisoners of war should be 'voluntary'. This second factor is the subject of Barton Bernstein's essay. Some of the prisoners in UN hands were certainly reluctant to return home, others could be coerced or induced to 'choose freedom'. Admiral C. Turner Joy, chief of the American delegation at the negotiations, recorded in his diary how prisoners asking for repatriation 'were either beaten black and blue or were killed . . . the majority of the POW's were too terrified to frankly express their choice' (p. 285). The prolongation of the war over this one issue resulted in an additional 125,000 UN casualties (p. 306), and in the complete devastation of North Korea, but scored a

satisfying propaganda victory. Some 82,000 POW's chose repatriation, but about 50,000 'chose freedom'.

C. S. BURCHILL

Patterns in the dust: Chinese–American relations and the recognition controversy, 1949–1950. By Nancy Bernkopf Tucker. New York: Columbia University Press. 1983. 396 pp. Index. $45.50. Pb.: $19.50.

AMERICA'S rapprochement with China in the 1970s has led to a resurgence of interest in the related question of whether the Truman administration had also had an opportunity in 1949 to open a dialogue with the newly-established government in Beijing. In this well-researched and interesting study of America's recognition policy, Dr Tucker argues not only that the opportunity existed, but that President Truman, guided by his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was willing to recognize the PRC when the dust kicked up by Chiang Kai-shek's downfall had finally settled. Recognition appealed to the President and many within the State Department because it would allow the United States to improve its image in Asia, it could lead to an expansion of Sino–American trade, would facilitate the continuance of Japan's trading relationship with China, and give impetus to the policy of promoting a breach in the relations between Beijing and Moscow. Moreover, the eventual collapse of Chiang's regime on Taiwan would soon provide no alternative but recognition, US officials reasoned, unless the American government preferred to be isolated from a government which ruled one quarter of the world's population.

Dr Tucker is not impressed by earlier arguments which had depicted the strong influence on Truman's Asian policy of the China lobby and China bloc, describing the former as uncoordinated and incompetent, and the latter as representing minority sentiment within Congress. Their activity could be countered, she asserts, by a State Department that had the support of the academic, business, religious and journalistic communities, the majority of whom would be willing to explain to a generally indifferent citizenry and Congress why recognition of Beijing was the only real alternative.

More controversial is Dr Tucker's assessment that, but for the outbreak of the Korean war, Acheson would have continued to resist the activities of those closest to him within the bureaucracy who were trying to alter his course on China policy. Yet there is evidence to show that even before the fighting in Korea erupted, administration officials were hardening their attitude towards communism in general, and Asian communism in particular. The review of national security policy in April 1950 which produced NSC 68 depicted communist gains anywhere as a blow to the prestige of the United States and as a test of its will to resist communist 'encroachment'. In May, the US government decided to provide aid to the French in Indochina. Also that month, Acheson's closest confidants, including Dean Rusk, Philip Jessup and Paul Nitze, had agreed that a UN Trusteeship for Taiwan should be proposed to Acheson and that naval units should be stationed in the straits to prevent the island's take-over. The author argues that despite these pressures, Acheson was not to be deflected from his recognition policy, until the Korean war and clashes between Chinese and American troops rendered it untenable. Her case is important, and the weight of the evidence presented means that the book must form a central part of the debate on the course of the cold war in Asia.

University of Sussex ROSEMARY FOOT

Latin America and Caribbean

Argentina under Perón, 1973–76: the nation's experience with a labour-based government. By Guido di Tella. London: Macmillan for St Antony's College, Oxford. 1983. 246 pp. Index. £25·00.

GUIDO DI TELLA is a distinguished Argentine economist who has many links with Britain and who served as a junior economics minister in the 1973–6 Peronist government. He writes as an economist with a deep affection and regard for the phenomenon of Peronism, rather than as a professional Peronist who happens to know some economics. The result is a serious and detailed book, which covers rather separately but with equal expertise the politics and

onomics of the period. It is weakest in its treatment of Peronist Argentina's place in the orld: the political system of Argentina is seen essentially as a world of its own.

Underlying di Tella's treatment of the period is a political question. The assumption in veral places is that Peronism is the embodiment of all that is good in the Argentine people d a movement that has their interests at heart and is both unifying and progressive: the izzle, raised explicitly in the brilliant 'Political epilogue' at the end, is how such a good ing could have come to such a nasty end. How was it that the second coming of Perón, llowed by a brief period before his death when old enmities seemed to be dying and a new tional unity was being forged, could have ended in the chaos, corruption and ismanagement of the government of the General's third wife 'Isabel'? Di Tella's view is that eronism, as a unifying and essentially centrist movement, came under the control of a ght-wing group who managed to lose the support of the usual Peronist sectors and yet, cause they were Peronists, failed to be recognized as allies by the traditional right of the untry. Lacking support, 'Isabel's' government then had to fall, and the merry-go-round of rgentine politics—what di Tella calls 'a system of sorts. . . which should not be disguised y the continuous formal interruptions of the political process'—could then go on. This may em to be the old Peronist view (typical of populists the world over) that sinister forces ppose the people as embodied in the movement in question: the 'wc wuz robbed' syndrome. ut di Tella is more sophisticated than that. Peronism may well have been too broad a alition to be viable in government with only rhetoric to bind it together, but foreigners tend o readily to dismiss it as personalist or opportunist. It was, and is, as di Tella makes clear, e party of the 'outs', of the excluded majority in a country where talk of democracy has often ome from minorities expressing their distaste for the majority rather than an adherence to the ubstance of democratic principles. Yet at the same time, it was beginning to be both the arty of the 'outs' and more or less pluralist and democratic. Its challenge was more ophisticated than the caricature threat to the ruling class of populist imaginings.

The story is still unfolding. For those who have a detached and academic interest, Professor i Tella has much to offer by way of information and analysis. But his book is dedicated to hose who 'believed with hope and remember with sorrow'.

DAVID STEPHEN

he Peruvian experiment reconsidered. Edited by Cynthia McClintock and Abraham . Lowenthal. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 442 pp. Index. £38·70. b: £8·65.

The new bourgeoisie and the limits of dependency: mining, class, and power in evolutionary' Peru. By David G. Becker. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 983. 419 pp. Index. £30·20. Pb: £8·60.

VENTS move rapidly in Peru. Only yesterday, it seems, the 'first phase' of the Peruvian evolution' was giving way to the economic debacle of 1974–5, and then the protest, pression, and corruption of the 'second phase'. Since the re-election of President Belaúnde in 980 the pace of political change has quickened, making it difficult for foreign publishers and cademics to keep up. In these books there is only one mention of Sendero Luminoso (a otnote in Becker), and Lowenthal's description of Apra as 'a collection of old men and their nemories' (p. 430) contrasts strangely with the recent revival of the party and the emergence f the young Alan García.

Lowenthal's earlier collection of papers, *The Peruvian experiment* (Princeton University Press, 975), is still an excellent guide to the Velasco government. *The Peruvian experiment reconsidered* eaves one more dissatisfied, partly because of the longer delay in publishing the papers, which late from a conference held late in 1978, and many of whose authors have since produced nore detailed monographs and articles about the 'revolution'. The difficulties of taking a etrospective view of the 'revolution' in 1978, during its death-throes, rather than in 1980–1, fter the funeral, are apparent. The book also shares many of the problems common to ightly-edited conference papers. Similar tables, often with different figures, appear in several hapters; some references to tables in FitzGerald's paper are incorrect (pp. 77, 78, 82, 84); nterpretations diverge, leaving the reader to draw them together. Yet, despite its drawbacks, his is a good collection of papers, an essential purchase in paperback for any Peruvianist, and valuable addition to reading lists.

Of the contributors to the 1975 volume only Julio Cotler and Lowenthal himself remain in *The Peruvian experiment reconsidered.* Cotler providing a more developed and refined overview of the 'revolution', and Lowenthal, in a postscript, taking issue with the predominantly pessimistic tone of his collaborators' papers. Rosemary Thorp and E. V. K. FitzGerald offer readable analyses of the external factors and policy mistakes that created the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, the former within the context of economic history, the latter that of a theoretical discussion of state capitalism. Schydlowsky amd Wicht present an unconvincing recipe for alternative policies. Of the two contributions on foreign capital Barbara Stallings's is the more sophisticated. The writers on politics—Cleaves and Pease García, North, McClintock, and Pásara—all struggle with the excessive secrecy that still characterizes the internal workings of the regime, but agree on the importance of the military's failure to adopt a coherent policy towards popular mobilization; McClintock's discussion of agrarian and industrial policy and Sinamos is especially succinct. In the two comparative chapters Eckstein makes a brave but strained attempt to compare revolutions, while Sheahan comments on the economic problems shared by reformist regimes.

As Lowenthal rightly states, one enduring legacy of the military regime was the collapse of the old oligarchy and the rise of the aggressive businessmen who dominate the still more corrupt and demoralized Peru of the 1980s. David Becker, too, identifies a new bourgeoisie in Peru, one of the principal components of which is the technocratic, managerial elite of the mining industry, working in the state agencies, MineroPeru and Centromin, foreign firms, and the domestic private companies which benefited from military rule. Using his study of the mining sector he goes on to draw out broader points about the development of working-class political activity, the relationship between national governments and elites and transnational firms, and the shortcomings of dependency theory in a situation of what he terms 'bonanza development'. Peruvian specialists will gain much from Becker's detailed understanding both of the private mining companies and the technocrats of the state agencies and enterprises; his analysis of the contrasting fortunes of Southern Peru Copper Corporation, which obtained the Cuajone contract, and Cerro Corporation, expropriated in 1974, is particularly instructive. Yet this book also has its flaws, not the least of which is its curious combination of jargon, neology, and antiquated English. The non-ferrous metals mining boom simply cannot be taken out of the context of the development of transnational corporations, state enterprise, and private business in other sectors of the economy, but Becker largely ignores Marcona/HierroPeru, Occidental and PetroPeru, and, most importantly of all, manufacturing industry and construction. Moreover, one must draw a distinction between the concepts he uses to rationalize economic and political developments with hindsight—in this case 'bonanza development' and 'segmental incorporation'— and the actual confusion and poverty of policy-making in the early 1970s, which comes across quite clearly in the McClintock/Lowenthal collection. Few would claim that the military government had as clear a strategy as Becker suggests, nor, paradoxically, that the Instituto Nacional de Planificación was as unimportant.

These books are only two of a current flood of publications about Peru in the 1970s. It is to their credit that they continually draw attention to topics that need more investigation: policy-making, the difficult problem of the shifting tactical and ideological alliances within the military, the foreign policy and arms spending of the regime, the development and legacy of left-wing and working-class political activity, and the return to civilian rule. Yet research on Peru in the 1970s is now in a transitional, uncertain state. Perhaps only the next change of government, whether a military coup or the presidential election due in 1985, will provide the perspective necessary for us to improve our judgement of the 'revolution', and maybe for some courageous contemporary historian to attempt a synthesis of the research published in the last ten years.

University of Liverpool RORY MILLER

Bibliography and reference

International who's who 1983–84. 47th edn. London: Europa. 1983. 1,530 pp. £46·00.

OVER 1,000 new names have been added to the latest edition of this invaluable who's who. Existing entries have been revised to include the latest available information, and in many

instances expanded. The consistently comprehensive listing of personalities prominent in international affairs, government, administration, diplomacy, the liberal professions, all branches of the arts and sport results in one of the most authoritative sources of biographical information in English.

Chatham House Library N. G.

Yearbook of international organizations 1983/84. 20th edn, Vol. 1. Munich, London: Saur for the Union of International Associations. 1983. 910 pp. DM 428.00.

UNDER a new publisher this yearbook has increased enormously in size, scope and ambition. The present volume, 'Descriptions and index', covers nearly everything included in previous issues; a very little—geographical index, cross-references—has been transferred to the second and third volumes, entitled 'Geographical volume' and 'Subject volume', which are otherwise new. A unified, multilingual index of names, abbreviations, keywords and officers is followed by ten lists of organizations. Two of these lists, 'religious orders' and 'multilateral treaties', are new, and serial conferences are also included for the first time; otherwise the arrangement is similar to that of the nineteenth edition, itself a radical advance on its predecessors. The number of entries has increased by 5,000 to 19,579. Names in lesser-known languages may occasionally be mis-spelt, but the yearbook is more than ever one of the most basic and valuable reference tools for the study of international affairs and for the general library. It is also a source of entertainment, especially in the section of 'inactive or dissolved organizations'. All human life is here—including the Mafia.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Europa year book 1983: a world survey. 2 vols. London: Europa. 1983. £90·00.

THE new edition of this established annual reference work follows the pattern of previous two-volume editions. Volume I deals in part one with international organizations, their administrative structure, aims, activities and membership; part two, devoted to a survey of the countries of Europe from Albania to Yugoslavia, provides political, historical, economic and statistical data. Part three is devoted to surveys of countries outside Europe arranged alphabetically from Afghanistan to Burundi. Volume II covers the rest of the world from Cameroun to Zimbabwe.

The information provided is revised annually through attributed reliable national and international sources. This is an indispensable reference work.

Chatham House Library N. G.

The annual register 1982: a record of world events. Edited by H. V. Hodson. London, New York: Longman. 1983. 549 pp. £27·00.

BRITAIN'S oldest annual—or perennial—gives a survey of the year's developments in all parts of the world, with additional sections on religion, the sciences, law, the arts and sport. Although anonymous, the articles are pungent as well as informative. A small documentary section includes interesting material on the Falklands war. The Register opens with strikingly apposite quotations from earlier issues, and ends with obituaries and a chronology.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1981. Edited by Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels. Bonn: Europa Union for Institut für Europäische Politik. 640 pp. Index. DM 88.00.

THIS annual is now in its second year. Thirty-nine articles by highly qualified contributors cover recent developments in the institutions; sectoral policy; 'political infrastructure' (pressure groups and public opinion); and the European policy of member countries, with Spain and Portugal. The Council of Europe also receives a chapter, and the volume is concluded by a chronology, a long bibliography and a useful documentary section. This is a valuable work which ought to have an English equivalent.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Comecon foreign trade data 1982. London: Macmillan for the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies. 1983. 518 pp. Index. £25·00.

Now in its second year, this compendium gives fairly detailed statistics of the trade of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, based variously on official, Western and United Nations sources. One section is arranged by the main Western countries, together with Austria. Supplementary data on finance are included, as are calculations of shares in total trade. Non-European members of Comecon are not covered. A compact, attractive format enhances the usefulness of a valuable work.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Africa south of the Sahara 1983/84. London: Europa. 1983. 971 pp. £45·00.

The thirteenth edition of this yearbook has been revamped in format, with fewer but larger pages, and altered in coverage. The introductory section has been greatly extended, with new chapters on both historical and contemporary developments, but the useful who's who has quietly disappeared. According to the editors, the signed articles on countries and organizations, with their statistical and other appendices, have been streamlined in content and presentation. They claim that theirs is 'the premier annual reference work on sub-Saharan Africa'—justifiably, if one excludes the late-publishing 'Africa Contemporary Record'.

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Asia and Pacific 1983. 4th edn. Saffron Walden: World of Information. 1983. 322 pp. Pb.: £17·00.

Now in its fourth year, this annual contains brief journalistic articles on regional topics, followed by country surveys which concentrate on the economic situation. It provides up-to-date information for the business community, who should not object too much to the numerous advertisements which interrupt the text, Touristic details are included.

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CLOSE, Robert. *Time for action*. Oxford, New York: Brassey's. 1983. 233 pp. £13·50; $24.50. Pb.: £6·50; $13.00.

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Books reviewed, Winter 1983/84

The future of the European Community: Britain's approach to the negotiations

GEOFFREY HOWE*

The European Community was a radical experiment undertaken to end the rivalries which had torn Europe apart twice in the first half of this century. The Treaties of Paris and Rome were conceived as vehicles for change. There can be no doubting the success of the venture—what has resulted is a unique community of nations, attempting not just the coordination of national policies, but common policies, disciplines to prevent short-term beggar-my-neighbour strategies, and a joint external role both politically and in trade. Together these nations can provide effective support for freedom and democracy both within Western Europe and in the world as a whole. Accordingly, enlargement to include Spain and Portugal must be seen as an urgent political imperative. Everything which follows about the future should be taken to apply to a Community of Twelve. The decisions reached in autumn 1983 on Mediterranean agriculture seem to offer the prospect of progress towards this end, but the going is still painfully slow.

Britain was right to join the Community. Our accession did not constitute a renunciation of past ties, but a new context for them. The Commonwealth remains central to our foreign policy, as do our relations with our Western partners, including Japan, outside the Community. But a strong and united Europe is better for all than a weak, divided one. At home, the 1983 general election has confirmed public support. The debate about whether we should be in or out is over; now the more fruitful debate about the future direction of our Community is under way.

Yet, while the British public accepts the European Community, it is hardly enthusiastic. This is partly an insular reflex. The European Community is a natural scapegoat for national failures and for the impact of world recession. These are perceptions which can be changed over time. The government has a duty to provide information and explanation, and is applying itself seriously to this task. There are, however, deeper, and genuine, concerns. The Community often seems imprisoned in an elaborate and inflexible structure of national trade-offs. The result can resemble fossilised apathy: not the radicalism of the founders, but, on the contrary, resistance to necessary change. Also, there is a real danger that people are coming to see the Community as at best irrelevant, and at worst obstructive, to the fundamental challenge facing all of Europe: to halt the decline in its international competitiveness, to restore sustainable growth and to generate new employment.

The Community, like its member states individually, has been trapped by good intentions into sacrificing the future for the present, resorting all too often to buying its way out of trouble. The result has been restricted growth. Until now, Britain has not encouraged the Community to face up to fundamental issues of this kind. It was perhaps diffident as a new member; since then it has been inhibited by the sterile domestic debate over its own membership and absorbed in righting inequities which operated against it, particularly over the budget. But let there be no doubt: this

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0020–5850/84/2/0187–06 $3.00

government believes in the European Community and wants it to work better. It has ideas as good, and as *communautaire*, as anyone else's. It wants to restore a sense of confidence and purpose to the Community; and this entails helping to steer the ship past the rocks of the present negotiation and into the sea beyond, with a clear idea of where it is headed.

The post-Stuttgart negotiation

The European Council in Stuttgart in June 1983 was a turning point. Heads of government announced the day of reckoning. The imminent exhaustion of the Community's present resources has concentrated minds wonderfully.

As a context for discussion of more detailed questions of policy, it should be emphasized that there are considerable areas of agreement between Britain and its partners, and with the Community institutions. For all the doom and gloom, there is an emerging Community view of the changes which are needed: what has been lacking until now has been the will to achieve them.

Two areas of policy have emerged as the acid test of whether the Community means business or whether it is going to try to muddle through with stop-gap measures which please nobody, solve nothing and stifle the development which all seek. Several of Britain's partners want to introduce a fundamental change in what is called the Community *acquis* by increasing the Community's own resources. The Prime Minister has made clear that she would consider this provided that it is accompanied, first, by fair and lasting arrangements for the Community budget, and second, by effective control over the growth of agricultural and other expenditure.

The budget

Thinking on the budget has moved a long way over the past four years, and the terms of the debate have changed. The budget is now accepted as a Community problem, not just as a tiresome British hobby-horse. The succession of patched-up solutions over recent years has been bad for the entire Community. Britain proposes, quite simply, that there should be an upper limit on the net budgetary burden which each member state should be expected to bear, according to its relative prosperity. This hardly seems a controversial proposition: it is, after all, the approach which underlies the fiscal policy of all our democracies. Adoption of such a mechanism would be a major Community achievement: it would be demonstrably fair; it would cause minimal disturbance in present arrangements; it would apply to an enlarged Community; and all new policies could be looked at on their merits. Not all our partners see it this way, however. It is perhaps not surprising that those who do well out of the present system should fight to maintain their advantage. Britain wants action on the revenue side; arrangements on the expenditure side would open the way for more annual wrangles about refunds, 'special programmes' for the UK and how they should be spent. There has been quite enough of that. The negotiation is now reaching a critical phase; the key problem which has emerged is how to find an objective way of measuring the full extent of the budgetary burden and to agree on the extent of the correction needed.

The Common Agricultural Policy

In the agricultural field, as in the case of the budget, the proposals Britain has made are offered in a constructive spirit to help solve a Community problem, not to tear

down what has been achieved. This government accepts the stated objectives of the CAP; but the simple truth is that those objectives are not being fulfilled, and certainly not cost-effectively. Those with a vested interest in the present ruinous state of affairs stamp *communautaire* on their advantages and proclaim them sacrosanct, and beyond rational debate. They are not. The basic causes of the problems facing Community agriculture are inexorably rising production coupled with stagnant demand and a doomed effort to secure the admirable social objective of keeping small farmers on the land through the one basic mechanism of a common price policy. The result is food we can neither eat at home nor sell profitably abroad.

All the member states agree with the Commission on the broad outlines of a solution: price restraint and, where necessary, other measures to relate Community support to sensible levels of production. But the technical problems are horrendous. To discuss them here would be an endless task; as endless as the debate in the Community threatens to be if action is not taken. That is why the Community needs an external budgetary constraint on agricultural spending as a spur to sensible decision-making. Agricultural decisions—not just this year but for years to come—must be related to Community resources and wider Community purposes. This is the basis for the British proposal to ensure that in future the rate of growth of CAP spending is held below the rate of growth of the Community's financial resources. That goal is shared by all Community partners and institutions, but some want to restrict it to a vague political commitment. If it is to be effective, it must have a basis in the Community's budgetary procedures. Of course, the establishment of a financial guideline of this kind would not be an end in itself. It could only work if there were changes in the commodity regimes themselves—changes which are in any case needed on their merits. It could only work, too, if some flexibility was built in to take account of unforeseen developments on world agricultural markets.

Success is imperative: nobody wants to see the breakdown of the CAP. Yet the cracks are beginning to show, as was graphically illustrated by the decision in October 1983 to suspend advance payments within the CAP for lack of funds. Furthermore, this is not just an internal question. The problems of Community agriculture cast an ominous shadow over the pattern of international trade and the Community's relations not only with its allies but with many developing countries. It makes no sense to solve the problems of the CAP at the expense of third countries: that would be contrary to the EEC Treaty, and contrary to the undertakings made at the Williamsburg summit in May 1983.

Yet even supposing success in taking radical action within the Community to sort out the problems of the CAP, it is clear that there will soon be a need for an international review of the worrying development of agricultural protectionism throughout the world, and on the extent of structural surplus in some key commodities. It is cause for concern that protective barriers and competitive subsidies are continuing to proliferate in world agricultural trade. This is diametrically opposed to the world economic order Britain is seeking to promote, and to the role it sees for the Community in that world.

The future

The negotiation launched at Stuttgart and continued at Athens in December 1983 is not just about the budget and the CAP. It is about the whole future shape and direction of Europe. The Stuttgart declaration called for a 'relaunch' of the

Community. It is necessary to safeguard what has been achieved and adapt what has gone wrong—but more than this, attention must be given to new policies, too. This is extremely important. Britain has tabled a paper to help focus attention on what the Community was set up to do, but has not yet done.

Over the years there have been unrealistic expectations of the Community, not least in Britain, where some believed a decade ago that it would magically solve all the country's problems overnight. The critical point for the future is that the Community must be harder-headed and more practical: the emphasis must be on cost-effectiveness, commercial viability and the overriding need to improve Europe's economic competitiveness. It must be in the business of generating wealth, not just of distributing it. The Community is too important to be allowed to degenerate into a vehicle for grandiose projects which simply drain its members' common resources. There must be rigorous concentration on those areas where more can be achieved, or where aims can be achieved more economically, by action on a Community basis than by action nationally.

The greatest single step the Community could take towards encouraging economic growth in Europe would involve almost no budgetary cost at all. The revolutionary British suggestion is that the Community should establish a *common market*. This does not exist at present. The Commission estimated recently that the annual cost of intra-Community trade barriers is some £6,750 million. The cost of frontier formalities—which are only the tip of the iceberg—is equivalent to some five to six per cent of the value of goods before tax. It is small wonder, then, that European industry is having a hard time of it. One cannot tie large shackles around the ankles of companies and then ask them to cooperate across national frontiers. Industry must be set free to get to work for Europe. Britain is urging, for example, free movement of goods vehicles, as of people, including simplification of frontier checks; fewer obstructions to trade (caused in particular by different technical standards used as non-tariff barriers); full and rigorous application of Community rules on state aids and the regulations governing public procurement, to eliminate distortion of competition; and a genuinely common market in capital and in services. The example of airlines provides a conspicuous illustration of the problem; why should it not cost as little to travel from London to Paris as from New York to Washington? It is much the same distance.

With a healthy, more integrated and more competitive Community market an environment would be established in which a host of new policies and new initiatives, some public but many more private, would become viable. Community intervention must be used as the spark to ignite new private initiatives. It cannot and should not be the motor that drives them.

While these efforts are being made to create a free internal market, there is still a lot the Community can be doing to encourage industrial cooperation across a broad front. For example, we should be encouraging Community cooperation in research and development. The JET project at Culham in Oxfordshire is a good example of the sort of research which only makes sense on a Community basis. No individual member state has the national resources or the national market to sustain such an investment. We should help to promote industrial cooperation across national frontiers. The Community is currently embarking on ESPRIT—an imaginative scheme to promote the new information technologies. A closer look needs to be taken at other ideas for closer industrial cooperation which have been advanced, for example, by the French.

The development of a more integrated market and industrial structures on a Community scale will at once help and be helped by the process of economic convergence. The European Monetary System is important as both an instrument and a symbol of that process. This government has always made it clear that economic conditions must be right before sterling can enter the exchange rate mechanism. But it understands and accepts the objectives: to help the process of Community development by reducing the exchange rate fluctuations and monetary instability which so complicate long-term planning.

Community policies must be formulated not just for today, but for tomorrow. The Community needs to build, for example, on the framework already agreed for an energy strategy to reduce its dependence on imported sources of energy. Britain welcomes participation by companies from other member states in the exploration and production of North Sea gas and oil. But a solid fuels policy, too, should be an important part of the Community's energy strategy Environmental protection, too, is an area in which the problems are transnational, and which therefore invites Community action. Britain has called, for example, for urgent action to eliminate lead from petrol and would like the Community to embark on research to tackle the problem of acid rain.

These are all areas where progress could and should be made. We need to reach decisions in the current negotiations on as many of these points as possible to clear the way for a revitalised Community which will be less introspective and better placed to play a positive international role. This must be reflected, perhaps above all, in its trade policies. For the Community to reap the full benefits of a strong internal market its members need to work to maintain and strengthen the world trading system and to increase trade with both developed and developing countries. Economic recovery, within Europe and outside it, must be accompanied by sustained, stable and open trading practices. The Community must stop flirting with protectionism, however selective, in the name of 'Community preference' and emerge as a champion of economic liberalism, as the founders of the Community undoubtedly envisaged. The Community has a huge influence and therefore a huge responsibility: it accounts for nearly one quarter of the gross world product and nearly 20 per cent of world exports.

A more balanced and positive external Community role must be reflected, too, in its approach to relations with the developing world. If developed and developing countries can move together out of recession, their progress will be mutually reinforcing. Trade policy is even more important to this goal than aid, but aid too has a role to play, and the Community and its members contribute nearly half of all OECD aid. The talks on the next Lomé Convention are now launched, a major aim of which must be to ensure the maximum developmental effectiveness of Community aid and trade access. In the present economic climate, when money is bound to be tight, it is more than ever important that aid should be seen to be well used. The success of the Lomé negotiations is important to us as much as to the developing countries concerned—to say nothing of its undeniable importance to the Commonwealth.

Finally, in the external field, a confident, prosperous Community will play a more influential political role. European Political Cooperation is a story in itself. It has made great strides with no bureaucracy and little expense, but there is still a big gap between the economic weight of the Ten and their political influence in the world as a group. Successes are taken for granted, but every failure is noted, such as the divisions over the shooting down of the Korean airliner in September 1983. There is still an

unpleasant degree of truth in the old description of the Ten as a 'tardy and ineffective commentator on events', and there is still a gap between Political Cooperation and the traditional business of the Community—not administratively now, but in the sense that if failure in one does not infect the other, nor does success. So Political Cooperation must be described as a tool the potential of which has yet to be fulfilled. Yet there can be no doubt at all of the need to develop the process. Recent events in Grenada provided another reminder that there are times when Europe needs a voice independent of even its closest allies. If Europe wants to be heeded it must be in a position to exert a real influence over events—and it can do that much more effectively as the Ten than as separate nations. That is why I want to see the Community build on the firm foundations of the 1981 London Report, especially as regards the commitment to consult before taking national decisions on questions of importance to the Ten as a whole.

This government has fought to break down the artificial barriers which fence off Political Cooperation from the mainstream of Community affairs. In some respects this drive to eliminate barriers epitomizes its whole approach to the Community. Two examples may serve. First, there are some, both within and outside Europe, who see a strong Community as exclusive—somehow 'fenced off'. That conception is utterly misguided. On the contrary, a confident Community must be *more* open and *readier* to accept international responsibilities. Thus, while Community policies may give rise to friction with Britain's friends in, say, New Zealand, or in the United States or Japan, their overall interest, like ours, will be best served by a united and healthy Europe. Second, there are some who attach an almost mystical significance to the reform of the Community's institutions. This is to create artificial barriers and rigidities and puts the cart before the horse. The institutions can and will develop as the Community develops. For example, some hard decisions need to be taken in the context of enlargement—but the emphasis must be on evolution, not institutional tinkering as a substitute for solid achievements on the substance of Community policies.

The European parliamentary elections in June of this year are important. The Parliament has come a long way since 1979. There is inevitably some friction with the Council; yet that is no bad thing. The democratic basis for a Community which is founded on the common bond of democracy in its constituent parts must continue to develop. The coming elections should set the seal on what heads of government have described as the 'relaunch' of the European Community, and to give it further impetus.

Conclusion

There will be more hard pounding to come in the crucial negotiations on the future development of the Community, now coming to their critical point. There has already been much talk of crisis and of deadlock. This is not cause for despondency. That is how the Community works, and there is no changing that. What must be changed is the air of resignation and fatalism which has come to permeate Community thinking. It is right that the democracies of Western Europe should act together and stick together, for together they give democracy a louder voice in the world and reinforce the stability of the West. This government believes in Europe, and believes in Britain. For the sake of both, the successful completion of the Stuttgart negotiations must signal a new beginning.

Trade policy: retrospect and prospect

EDMUND DELL*

In 1763, Louis XV's Minister, the Duc de Choiseul, wrote to the Earl of Halifax, one of my illustrious predecessors as President of the Board of Trade: *'mais pour l'amour de Dieu, ne laissons pas les querrelles de pêcheurs degenerer en querrelles de nations'*.[1] During the intervening centuries progress in human civilization has been so slow that quarrels of fishermen continue to degenerate into quarrels between nations, even within a union as close as that which constitutes the European Community. Nor is this the only commercial quarrel that has disturbed the even progress of Europe's ways. When the wider world is brought under observation, the flesh creeps at the battlefield cries of governments rallying to the support of their fishermen and wealth creators of all kinds.

Thirteen years after Choiseul wrote, Adam Smith published *The wealth of nations*. For more than two hundred years since then, liberal economists have been striving to persuade governments of the unwisdom of their interventions.[2] They have singularly failed. We are forced to conclude that tendencies so deep-rooted in the conduct of nations demand more thorough enquiry than has yet been achieved by economists of the liberal school. This article, then, will discuss three themes with the aid, at certain points, of some illumination from my own experience of international economic relations. The first question is why nations and governments, after two centuries of liberal economic thought, are still basically mercantilist in their approach, still carry their mercantilism into trade negotiations and can still be found supporting their 'own' companies in competition for orders at home and overseas. The answer will be that the interests of nations are in conflict and that uncertainty as to the working of economic forces leads governments into policies of risk reduction. This is followed by an attempt to illustrate the effect conflict and uncertainty have on economic policy. I will show that, particularly at times of economic difficulty, economic policy becomes defensive and international economic cooperation difficult. Thirdly, I will argue that pragmatism, even mercantilist pragmatism, is better than liberal dogma as a way of reconciling conflicts and increasing cooperation. I will take comfort from the fact that—perhaps paradoxically, in the present tense international situation—there are such dangers in further divisions within the West that practical men of government will make great efforts to patch up economic conflicts. It cannot be certain that they will succeed, but they will do what they can. They have not done too badly so far in circumstances that have been far from easy.

I begin with a plea. International economic relationships are, in part, relationships between nation states. Nation states are political institutions. Few these days seriously question the proposition that the functioning of the economic system internationally can in principle be improved by agreements of different kinds negotiated between nation states. There are certainly those who see, especially in

* The Rt Hon. Edmund Dell was Secretary of State for Trade 1976–8.

1. Quoted in D. C. Coleman, ed., *Revisions in mercantilism* (London: 1969).

2. See P. D. Henderson, 'Trade policies: trends, issues and influences', *Midland Bank Review*, Winter 1983. Professor Henderson, in an article published after mine was already in draft, defines the distinction between liberal and non-liberal policies as being between non-discrimination and interventionism.

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gatherings of heads of government, grave dangers of inflationary excesses. Governments, they know, are always seeking opportunities for domestic political advantage. By pressing for expansionary 'Keynesian' policies, the many irresponsible governments in the world will undermine the resolution of the few responsible governments, those whose economies have been kept in good repair even in these difficult times. Such sceptics place no reliance on the discipline of democratically elected governments. As heads of governments cannot be trusted when they get together, better that they should stay apart.

Such critics face the difficulty that the discussions they condemn will take place anyway. High-level international gatherings are irresistible to statesmen. Domestic politics these days is so parochial that it is natural that world figures reserve their most impressive performances for the international stage, where the television cameras are always ready to record the high-principled way in which they denounce both the crimes of the Russians and the failings of their friends. Leaders are not to be dissuaded from leading or, at least, appearing to lead. In fact, the sceptics need not fear too much. These days there are in the economic situation pressures for discipline more powerful than the resolution of even the best governments.

The search for accommodation of interest will go on. The postwar construction of the Bretton Woods system and of the open international trading order resulted from negotiations among nation states. Even in the 1970s it proved possible to conclude successfully a further round of multilateral trade negotiations (that started in Tokyo). These negotiations were undertaken and concluded successfully because the participant states considered success to be in their interests. It is absurd to imagine that the relationships thereby established can be sufficiently understood without the most careful analysis of the political motivations that lie behind the actions of nation states. The study of economics is rendered nugatory to the extent that it cuts itself off from any such analysis, or to the extent that it categorizes governmental actions of which it disapproves as motivated only by lack of foresight or political cowardice. It is time to bring the study of politics and that of economics together once more, that each discipline may enrich the insights of the other.

Conflict and uncertainty

After making a plea for reconciliation between the studies of politics and of economics, it would be too much to claim that economics does not exist. On the other hand, it is true that there is no more a science of economics than there is a science of politics. If there were, it would be possible to make economic forecasts with greater certainty and there would be fewer disagreements among economists. But while economics is not a science, it does provide valuable insights. One of the most valuable in the context of trade policy is that governments, and particularly perhaps the British government, have since 1945 wasted vast resources through protectionist policies that have yielded no benefit and sometimes done positive harm.

This, however, is the beginning and not the end of a discussion about trade policy. The world, for good or ill, consists of nations. Nations have conflicting interests, among them conflicting economic interests. At the moment there is great complaint about the American budget deficit and American interest rates. They are said to be holding back European recovery. The Americans, on the other hand, seem for the moment relatively relaxed. Governments are in the business of protecting national interests where they can. The nation state is a protective device. The fact that

governments do meet with agendas full of mutual grievances suggests that they perceive conflicts to discuss and reconcile. Governments may from time to time, or even often, perform their protective duties badly or even counter-productively. That does not remove the responsibility they have as governments. The invisible hand does not confer its benefits equally, or equally lavishly, on all. It does not perform its tasks with blind impartiality even within nations, let alone between them.

If one could rely on the doctrine that economic liberalism eliminates conflicts of interest between nations and promotes the welfare of all, one would be left simply with the political task of educating those who carry the responsibility of running the state to abstain from intervention. Certainly the process of education would be difficult. Power will not be easily sacrificed on the altar of liberal economic doctrines; it is sought for its own sake and for its own enjoyment, and it has its own values which are attractive to those who possess it. That hurdle, however, might just possibly be jumped, though it is not an educational leap which anyone would contemplate with much optimism. What puts the whole project out of court is the disturbing fact that liberal economic policies do not eliminate conflicts of interest, and that therefore state power may be necessary to protect citizens from the impact of unguided market forces. Indeed, the emergence in recent years of the doctrines of 'modified free trade', which permit state intervention to correct various distortions within economies by means of subsidies, tax incentives and the like (but only as an absolutely last resort by intervention at the frontier to prevent imports), suggests a hedging of bets by some of those previously most devoted to economic liberalism. The world is too complex, its processes too little understood, to make it a practical option to embark in a craft of liberal economic doctrines with no lifeboat available if those doctrines begin to leak a little.

It is argued that the sovereignty of nation states, their wish for a residual discretion to act in the defence of their people as they see fit, has become an illusion because of the interdependence of national economies. The argument continues by claiming that the problems created by this illusion are compounded by a lack of insight, with the result that there are very different views of the way in which our economies and our monetary system really function and what therefore are the fundamental causes of our difficulties. In short, consensus is difficult to achieve and the necessary reforms make no progress. The trouble with this argument is that one of the reasons why nations cling to this 'illusion' of sovereignty is precisely because of the uncertainties exemplified by the very different views of the way in which our economy and our monetary system actually function. If we had certainty as to the effects on our different countries of particular proposals for international cooperation, and if it was clear that they would be beneficial, nations would be more likely to cooperate to achieve them. The difficulty is that there are differences of analysis which add to the conflicts of interest to make agreement hard to obtain. The differences of analysis may indeed relate in part to the differences of interest. But they may also arise from genuine differences of interpretation of the phenomena visible in international economic relations today.

Here is the great dilemma. An attempt to substitute market forces by planning can, at least at the extreme, lead to a loss of liberty as well as to a diminution of welfare. But these insights leave unsolved the problem that a state is concerned above all for its own security, including its economic security, and wishes to retain discretion to act as it finds best. Security requires organization, some degree of planning, defensive weapons. It may involve a readiness to sacrifice welfare. A state

ıcerned with security may yet love liberalism but not at the expense of every other ısideration. This is not an argument against genuine interdependence. Genuine :erdependence leaves the participants with negotiating strengths which, if cessary, can be deployed.

It is easiest to satisfy the differing requirements of security and of liberalism if nflicts of interest can be kept to a minimum. Peace clearly provides a better vironment than does war for the preservation or promotion of liberalism. By the ne token, economic peace provides a better environment than does economic war. ıe problem then is to avoid war of whatever kind, military or economic, even ough conflicts of interest persist. However, when one ventures out into the ›ubled waters of international economic relations there is no power of organization guidance sufficient to ensure that the different protective actions of competing .tion states do not cause ever more serious conflict. Such organizations as GATT, e IMF and the World Bank do what they can. There is the stronger guide of merican influence, backed by the world's most powerful economy, and by its key le in Western defence. Suspicion in this cynical world remains that, devoted as it ay be to objectives which are in the general interest, its purposes are certainly in the merican interest. In the end the only way is the way of negotiation, and negotiation quires there to be some power behind the arm of the negotiator. It is that power at no state will, if it can help it, relinquish.

At a time of recession, scepticism about the universal validity of liberal doctrines ıs increased. There is a conviction among the purest kind of liberal economist that ıe sins of some nations bring grace to others. If Japan insists on running a vast ırrent account surplus aided by an impenetrable domestic market and an ndervalued currency, let the rest of us rejoice, not protest. The Japanese are thereby iving us, unsolicited, the fruits of their highly skilled labours at an under price. We re the gainers and they are the losers. Moreover, their current account surplus is epriving them of a great slice of welfare that they have truly earned.

It is understandable that France with its Colbertian inheritance should look this ift horse in the mouth and direct its entry via Poitiers. More surprisingly, countries s liberally inclined as the United States and the United Kingdom also tend to turn way some of the benefits which the Japanese so enthusiastically shower upon us. 'here is increasing concern, for a variety of reasons, at the Japanese dominance in lectronic hardware. Even the Germans show from time to time some signs of worry. 3ut then the liberal Germans, like the unliberal Japanese, do show a most illiberal levotion to a current account surplus which they cannot bear to be without.

At least the benefit to the consumer of Japanese quality and price is evident nough. But there is another kind of sin in the liberal calendar, the sin of the estrictive practice. Contrary to the rule that sins against the invisible hand are elf-defeating, this sin sometimes appears to confer grace only on the sinner. This is ıot surprising. In many countries restrictive practices are subject to law precisely ›ecause they need to be controlled in the interests of the citizen. The only difference ın the international market is the lack of an agreed repository of power to control them.

In 1973 OPEC quadrupled the price of oil. There was some talk at the time of the benefits it was conferring on consumers by making them aware of the coming scarcity of oil. Some consumer countries might have been prepared to deny themselves this particular benefit in consideration of the high price put upon it had they been given any option. As it was, they found virtue forced all untimely upon them.

In 1979 the price of oil was doubled. It became ever more difficult to perceive the benefits these sins conferred on the consumer. There were those who were able the more stoically to contemplate the effect of all this on their country's current account and their consumers' standard of living because of the certainty of retribution to come. OPEC would shortly collapse. True, a lot of money would have passed into the coffers of OPEC members before the collapse; but the vindication of a liberal principle is worth waiting for even if it takes a little time and costs a great deal of money.

In 1983 the collapse of OPEC was apparently imminent. Oil was in surplus. The price of oil had called forth vast new supplies outside the grip of OPEC. Conservation had made progress far greater than the most optimistic forecast. Slower economic growth had reduced demand. The liberals were at last to be vindicated. For our greater pleasure the collapse would take place at a special OPEC meeting here in London, the cynosure of everyone's eyes. At the last moment OPEC decided not to collapse. Acting like a true cartel, and assisted by the fact that the Iran-Iraq war had removed some supplies from the market, it decided instead on a new price for oil and a quota for each OPEC supplier. It was even suggested in the London pubs that there had been communication between OPEC ministers and the British Department of Energy. Britain might not be a member of OPEC; indeed, to be a member would be clean contrary to the well known policies of successive British governments. But Britain, itself now a major oil producer, could be helpful, or not, as the case might be.

It appeared therefore that the consumers' revenge on OPEC, so gloatingly anticipated by all good liberal economists, was deferred once more. It appears that it is possible for a group of nations to act against the interests of the rest and get away with it, at least for a time. Europe, after all, is doing it with the Common Agricultural Policy. That, perhaps, is different. The CAP is not just ruinous to food exporters from other countries with a comparative advantage in food production, it is pretty expensive to Europe also. But the general point remains. There are conflicts of economic interest. Some arise out of the manipulation of national resources, some out of the struggle for limited markets, others out of differences in economic performance, yet others out of political constraints. Beyond that there is uncertainty about the outcome of economic policy, however well designed. Simply to reduce risk, governments will struggle, even in this interdependent world, to retain some discretion to intervene to moderate the impact of market forces on their citizens. There will then be conflict and a search for solutions. But at least the solutions are more likely to be politically realistic if arrived at by negotiation between those who will have to bear the burden of responsibility.

Politics can enter into international economic relations in curious ways. So dependent has Europe become on the United States for its defence, and so constricting is that dependence when it comes to trade negotiations, that Europe's *amour propre* is very easily offended and there is grave danger of an outbreak of the sulks. I give an illustration of such an outbreak, resolved in this case with the help of Robert Strauss, then President Carter's Special Trade Negotiator and general factotum. With Robert Strauss it was possible to deal without humbug on either side. That made him an unusual participant in trade negotiations. A very senior figure in the Democratic Party, he had been appointed to try to bring the multilateral trade negotiations to a successful conclusion and thus, it was hoped, deflect a threatened outbreak of protectionism in Congress. He knew trade negotiation was a matter of making deals. He gave a wonderful impression of knowing nothing about the detail but everything

about what could be got through Congress. On the other hand he realized that others might have parliamentary problems as well. Unlike some American officials he did not expect Britain to act as a Trojan horse in the European Council of Ministers for American trade policies.

In October 1978, the Community was deeply incensed by the failure of Congress, before going into recess, to pass legislation extending a Presidential power to waive certain countervailing duties. It was taken as symbolic of the 'couldn't care less' attitude of Congress towards relations with the European Community. The Community had represented the issue to Strauss beforehand in that light, and he had appeared to take the point. He was now blamed for not making it clear to Congress that, small as the matter might appear to be, it was for the Community a touchstone of American sincerity. Everyone in the Community who was suspicious of the progress being made in the MTNs, and believed that the Commission was making too many concessions to the Americans, saw this as a great issue for eloquence and obstruction. How could they treat in this way poor Denmark, one of the few Community countries really dedicated to free trade, and the Community country mainly affected?

I was in Canada and I flew down to Washington to talk to Strauss. The Council of Ministers was about to meet. What should I tell them? Strauss was very apologetic on his own behalf and that of President Carter. They had really tried. But Congress just had been more interested in getting back to their districts for the biennial Congressional elections. He had to confess that at that precise moment Danish cheeses had not seized their imagination. Would I please explain to the Council of Ministers how very sorry the President and he genuinely were? It would all be put right when Congress resumed. Twenty-four hours later the Council of Ministers listened gravely to my report. We decided to make our protest but not to break up the negotiations.

To Strauss must go the principal credit for the eventual success of the MTNs. He realised that in that difficult economic climate objectives had to be modest if the outcome of a supposedly liberalizing trade negotiation was to be capable of being counted a success. Combining in himself precisely the right proportion of cynicism and conviction, he made it appear that the United States really wanted a deal. So, in the end, he got it.

Interdependence and self-dependence

Conflicts of interest and uncertainty about economic processes reinforce the principle that interdependence does not lessen the need for self-dependence. Such a principle is, of course, nothing other than mercantilism. 'Mercantilism', by my definition, is not the same as protectionism. Certainly it proclaims the need for a comfortably defensible current account. It makes trade policy a matter of calculation even though the calculation is by definition uncertain. It denies the existence of benign and automatic regulators which will ensure that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, and suggests that the state has a protective, but not necessarily protectionist, role in ensuring that life remains tolerable for its citizens. In other words, unlike *laisser-faire*, a doctrine strange to human nature, it sees a role for the state in economic affairs, but not an easy role.

In a lecture which I delivered in February 1977 entitled 'The politics of economic interdependence', I said: 'There are many aspects of economic strength, but the most

important is simply this: one should reduce, not increase, one's dependence on the goodwill of other governments, particularly the need to borrow from them or from international agencies established by them.'[3] This statement led me into trouble with an economist who pointed out that borrowing to the limit of a nation's credit can lead to increased welfare and that what I was really concerned with was pride and the welfare of politicians, not the welfare of the people.[4] Despite such severe criticism, I persist in my belief that countries should, and given freedom to choose normally do, opt for those policies that reduce rather than increase their exposure to forces they cannot control. But equally, I regard it as wrong for a developed country with its own oil resources to get itself into a position in which it has to finance a gap between what it spends and what it earns by borrowing from official agencies whose scarce funds are more appropriately directed to developing countries in real need of official assistance.

Britain's disabling area of weakness has, for many decades, been its economic performance. In 1974 a new British government was elected in the midst of a crippling miners' strike. When it attempted to persuade the rest of the developed world that the course of conduct which it was appropriate to follow in the wake of the oil price hike was one carefully designed to relieve Britain's problems, it was greeted with some scepticism. The advice in question was to the effect that the strong economies of the industrialized world should expand demand. This would lift the rest of the world out of recession by compensating for the contractionary effects of the oil price hike. Otherwise, it was argued, Britain could not be expected to resist mounting protectionist pressures. No other country took too much notice of this advice, which was seen simply as a reflection of policies which had damaged Britain's economic performance over the years and which had taken it into the world recession economically weaker than almost any other developed country. Most other developed countries saw the requirements of the time as defensive: look after your balance of payments, look after your public expenditure, look after your borrowing, do not on any account increase your dependence on the goodwill of other countries because, in a crunch, that goodwill may not be available. Other developed countries understood perfectly well that in an interdependent world in crisis, the first responsibility of governments was to toughen defensive policies, not soften them. Interdependence does not mean surrendering one's economic defences. It means, on the contrary, keeping them absolutely intact.[5] None of this makes cooperation on agreed policies easy. But that is the nature of the real world.

West Germany and Japan make a current account surplus a major object of policy. This is the purest mercantilism. One might think that two such strong economies could afford to be helpful by running a current account deficit. Because of their history, because of a continuing sense of separateness, because of their dependence on imports of raw materials, they are determined to control the exposure to confidence factors that the financing of a current account deficit involves. They are particularly dedicated to this course in a world susceptible to massive flows across the exchanges. Whatever pressure their trading partners bring upon them for less self-regarding policies, on that point they will stand firm.

I have no doubt that, as Mr Deepak Lal has alleged, it represented an increment to

3. Rita Hinden Lecture, London, February 1977.

4. See Deepak Lal, 'The wistful mercantilism of Mr Dell', *The world economy*, June 1978, Vol. 1, No. 3. See also subsequent exchanges in *The world economy*, May 1979, Vol. 2, No. 2 and September 1980, Vol. 3, No. 2.

5. Very relevant in this context is Sir James Cable's article 'Interdependence: a drug of addiction?', *International Affairs*, Summer 1983, Vol. 59, No. 3.

my welfare when, in my journeyings overseas as one of Her Majesty's Ministers, I knew that my country's views were likely to command respect. I did indeed greatly prefer it to those occasions when those views were rightly regarded simply as special pleading. I was in Madrid early in 1978 discussing trade relations with the Spanish government and their prospects of entry into the European Community. I had an appointment with the President of the Spanish Confederation of Industry. 'Mr Dell', said the President on my arrival in his office, 'please explain to me the reasons for the British economic miracle.' I rapidly recovered from my surprise and explained our great achievements. The truth was, of course, that there had been no British economic miracle. All there had been was a decision, largely forced on us by the IMF, to put our affairs in a condition in which sterling could withstand flurries on the exchanges and in which government borrowing was at levels which the market could absorb without pain and doubt. Although British governments can do little about economic performance, they can at least avoid the necessity of going around the capitals of the world with a begging bowl.

While the need for self-dependence is the right lesson for an interdependent world in recession, a less admirable consequence is an excess of protectionism. British policy between March 1974 and autumn 1976 was a combination of fiscal excitement and dangerous thoughts. Protectionism by one means or another was very much on the agenda. The government, feeling its well-meant advice scorned by its trading partners, sank into a mood in which pulling down the temple of free trade was an option by no means to be ignored. In fact it was not a realistic option. In the end it was realized that such policies were more likely to bring down the British government than the temple of free trade. The government came to the conclusion that we had to live in the world, not attempt to get off it. However, perhaps more could be done. It was Callaghan's view that as Secretary of State for Trade I was not sufficiently protectionist. At meetings of NEDC I fought the subtle protectionism of the CBI and the more overt protectionism of the TUC. There was a lunch at which the TUC complained about my negligence in admitting imports of all kinds. They said I was a nineteenth century liberal. Callaghan retorted that they were doing me too much honour, I was in fact even worse, an eighteenth century liberal. At the time the British government was even more protectionist in inclination than the French. As one prepared to accept without protest the stigma of 'mercantilist', I got on very well with my French opposite number, Jean-François Deniau. He seemed to me to have a different, and on the whole more respectful view of Colbert than that to which Adam Smith gives expression in *The wealth of nations*.[6] On many occasions we were able to collaborate in the Council of Ministers to secure the type of mandate for the Commission that we both wanted. Our task was eased by the fact that frequently we seemed to be the only ministers present in the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Council in which trade ministers meet, who actually understood what we were discussing. Actually, although both of us might be described as mercantilists, we were as much free traders as we could manage. We both knew how stupidly governments can act when the protectionist bug is on them.

In 1977–8 Britain was known to be a hardliner on the renegotiation of the multifibre agreements limiting the imports of textiles from developing countries. The negotiation was handled by the Commission on behalf of the European Community and their mandate was defined in the Council of Ministers. Sometimes

6. Adam Smith, *The wealth of nations*, Everyman edn (London. Dent, 1947), Vol. 1, p. 411, Vol. 2 pp. 157–8.

the Commission would 'take their responsibilities', that is they would ignore the mandate, and come to an agreement *ad referendum* the Council of Ministers. To avoid the Commission taking their responsibilities too far and too often, the more protectionist countries like Britain and France tried to tie up the mandate as tight as possible. The more liberal, like Germany, tried to keep the mandate as loose as possible.

The responsibility for rescuing our embattled textile industry fell on me. However, nothing I could do could satisfy Members of Parliament representing textile constituencies. It is a law of protectionism that whereas businessmen can seldom be satisfied with what is done for them, MPs never can. My strongest critic was my old friend Joel Barnett, Chief Secretary to the Treasury and MP for a Lancashire seat. He tells the story in his book *Inside the Treasury*.[7] There he finds me guilty of treating the question as 'a trifling matter and not worth upsetting the EEC Commission, or our ministerial partners, about'. I was 'using every trick in the book to have the matter speedily resolved'. But Joel, sword in hand, had persuaded the Prime Minister that we must be tough, and when I phoned Callaghan for clearance one Sunday before the decisive meeting of the Council of Ministers, being myself pretty satisfied with what had been achieved, I 'had got a flea in [my] ear'. As a matter of fact I had persuaded the employers and trade unions that I was doing everything possible for them. But, according to Barnett, the trouble was that 'when they were called in by Edmund Dell and his officials, they were obviously overawed'.

Actually I did not get a flea in my ear when I spoke to Callaghan. He knew how to talk to Joel and he knew the limits of the possible in the Council of Ministers. This was not a matter on which Britain could rightly stand out alone, using the ill-defined procedures of the Luxembourg compromise to upset an agreement virtually ready for signature. There might even have been a vote, and though I could expect France to vote with me, it might not have done if I was being totally unreasonable. Callaghan told me to wring out of the situation anything more I could, by such threat of a veto as was credible, and then to phone him on the Monday evening after the first session of the Council. I privately explained my dilemmas to colleagues in the Commission and the Council who were very ready to help a friend by some minor adjustment. I then obtained Callaghan's assent to my lifting the British veto, such as it was. Callaghan was surprised at how well the British textile industry received the news. He told me that I must have presented the agreement well. I did not think that that was subject for criticism.

That countries grow more self-regarding during a period of economic difficulty is not surprising. What is unnecessary is the degree of humbug with which all matters relating to trade policy are customarily discussed. Americans (Robert Strauss excepted) were not the least practised in the art. A typical comment when we disagreed might be: 'We have been very sorry to see that the UK has abandoned its traditional free trade stance.' Actually I was at least as much in favour of free trade as any of them. I had pressures which I had to recognize and so did they. But in some mysterious way, succumbing to their pressures was consistent with free trading principles. However, my cynical observations on their resounding moral declarations did not, fortunately, lead them to attempt to deny Britain a share in the final carve up of mutual concessions. The humbug is not just that of governments that preach what they have no intention of performing. It is also the humbug of businessmen who want

7. Joel Barnett, *Inside the Treasury* (London: Deutsch, 1982) pp. 132–3.

protection but intensely dislike being called protectionist. There are those businessmen who consider that the Department of Trade is too wedded to legality. They would love to see tons of imported cargo lying rotting and uncleared on our quaysides. To them Poitiers is the symbol of everything the French government does but the British government shies away from. Mary Goldring, writing to me in the columns of the *Investor's Chronicle* (8 October 1976), argued in favour of a dirty tricks department which would do all those delightfully nefarious things to prevent imports in which our industrialized competitors are fondly believed to be expert. Nor should it be imagined that such ideas are far from the thoughts of government when the current account goes badly into deficit. Keynes wrote: 'Only individuals are good, and all nations are dishonourable, cruel and designing.'[8] Ministers in government can, under pressure of a large and persistent current account deficit, become dishonourable, cruel and designing. But in those countries which, like Britain, have an enforceable law against the commission of dirty tricks by the customs and excise, or go as far as to have a Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, the opportunities for protectionism by stealth are few. That does not mean that non-tariff barriers are impossible, only that they have to be overt.

Mercantilism is the way of the world. Liberalism, in understanding hands, can sometimes civilize it and control its worst excesses. But it is self-defeating to act against nature.

The reconciliation of conflict

But is there in truth not a better way, a way which eliminates conflict rather than simply papering it over? Various forms of federal union have been proposed. Under the benign and democratic rule of such super-powers, all conflicts of economic or political interest between nations are to disappear and liberalism is to triumph. Unfortunately conflicts do not thereby disappear. They have not disappeared within unitary states. Within the unitary state they are kept in check by laws and police forces. What substitute for state power is there within international relations? One can try to regulate conflict by international agreement and by the establishment of organizations such as GATT. One thus creates a kind of law. This is certainly a more practical alternative, but even at this more modest level it raises problems, problems which are inherent in the fundamental dilemma that it attempts to solve—that there are nation states, they exist, they have functions, and in any attempt to reconcile liberalism with intervention their existence, with all its implications, must be accepted, not ignored.

Professor Hayek, Nobel Laureate in Economics, comes at the end of *The road to serfdom* to this very dilemma. Hayek's concern derives from the fear that not every state will adopt a liberal economic policy, that some that have power, whether economic or political, may try to use it against their neighbours, and that therefore safeguards of some kind are necessary. Unfortunately our hope for enlightenment from this authoritative source is disappointed. Hayek, writing in 1943, says: 'We cannot hope for order or lasting peace after this war if states, large or small, regain unfettered sovereignty in the economic sphere.'[9] In the field of polemic it is too much to expect precise statements. What state has, or ever has had, 'unfettered sovereignty'? It is a matter of degree. Is the degree of sovereignty that Hayek is

8 J. M. Keynes, *A revision of the Treaty* (London: Macmillan, 1922), p. 183

9 F. A. Hayek, *The road to serfdom* (London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 172.

prepared to allow so low as to be in conflict with the practical discretions which nation states wish to exercise in defence of their own citizens? We shall see as we go on:

> But this does not mean that a new super-state must be given powers which we have not learnt to use intelligently even on a national scale . . . It means merely that there must be a power which can restrain the different nations from action harmful to their neighbours, a set of rules which defines what a state may do, and an authority capable of enforcing these rules . . . The need is for an international political authority which, without power to direct the different people what they must do, must be able to restrain them from action which will damage others . . . it is essential that these powers of the international authority should be strictly circumscribed by the Rule of Law.[10]

Professor Hayek argues against world government with power to plan the world's resources because of the difficult and discriminatory judgements that it would have to make and because what would have been delegated to that authority would not be merely a technical task 'but the most comprehensive power over their very lives'.[11] Yet having wisely ruled out one kind of super-state, we are back even before the end of the chapter with another kind of super-state. Certainly we have Hayek's word for it that his revised super-state is not to do some of those things which we have not yet learnt to do on a national scale. But it is to do other things that we have not yet learnt to do, such as enforcing the rule of a law yet to be written which will restrain nations from action which will damage others. It will be bound to make exactly those judgements between countries about the use of their resources which Professor Hayek has already correctly argued no super-state or world government could possibly make without causing deep resentments and deep injustice.

> The form of international government under which certain strictly defined powers are transferred to an international authority, while in all other respects the individual countries remain responsible for their internal affairs, is, of course, that of federation . . . there can be no international law without a power to enforce it . . . the small can preserve their independence in the international as in the national sphere only within a true system of law which guarantees both that certain rules are invariably enforced and that the authority which has the power to enforce these cannot use it for any other purpose.[12]

We now see fully exposed the extraordinary nature of the system by which Professor Hayek attempts to make the different economic policies of nations consistent with international peace and order. States are to be permitted, under this federation, to look after their internal affairs but presumably only that part of their internal affairs which does not impact on their international economic relations. The rules are to be 'invariably enforced', no doubt by force of arms if necessary. It is indeed remarkable how far the imagination of one so deeply opposed to economic intervention on a domestic scale can take him when he comes to contemplate the problems of international economic relations. At home the state must hardly lift a finger unless it be to give merely minimum guarantees against the worst deprivation. Abroad we are to have the most extraordinary edifice of supranational power, in which the voice of the smaller states will inevitably be as nothing, and which will rapidly in the

10. Hayek, p. 172.
11. Hayek, p. 171.
12. Hayek, p. 175.

fulfilment of its mission take on all those additional tasks which Professor Hayek himself has ruled as unacceptable.

Of course it has not happened, nor will it happen. Professor Hayek permits that in the first instance there should be a number of federations rather than just one world federation. Yet these federations, super-states in their own right, will certainly come into conflict with one another and will have to find some way, hopefully short of war, to reconcile their differences. We now have more experience of this than had Professor Hayek when he was writing *The road to serfdom*. We can see the European Community in its relations with the United States: continual differences, usually reconciled after intense negotiations, but seldom actually removed altogether, always waiting in the wings to be revived in the form of some new grievance. World government perhaps beckons? Yet how long are we to wait for that extraordinary conjuncture before we can live as citizens free of the fear of 'serfdom'?

The European Community is perhaps the realization of Professor Hayek's ideal of a more limited federation. Within the Community there are enforceable rules and attempts are sometimes made to enforce them. But member countries act in ways which damage their partners; nor can they always, or even often, be prevented from doing so. It is not just a matter of what is practical. It is not desirable to enforce rules clearly against the interests of member states and which they are not prepared voluntarily to accept. That would have led to the break-up of the Community before now. It is much better to accept that the Community is an association of nation states possessing all the characteristics of nation states, and, where interests conflict, to find the best possible *negotiated* solution. That is the way to reconcile the protective nature of the nation state with the maximum of liberalism in economic and political behaviour.

Professor Hayek published his book in 1944. In 1975 another Nobel Laureate in Economics, Professor James E. Meade, has demonstrated comparable misunderstandings of the nature of the real world to which his recommendations are addressed. For Professor Meade the exchange rate is the automatic regulator of the balance of payments. But he tells us that in order to avoid nations artificially depressing their exchange rate in order to win a trick in international trade, there should be a single supranational exchange equalization fund to carry out all interventions in floating foreign exchange markets.[13] Of course no such fund exists, or is likely to exist. Professor Meade is also understandably anxious about the distortions that can be created in foreign trade by government actions allegedly intended to correct domestic distortions. He therefore recommends 'some measure of international or supranational control over these social interventions in which the whole international community is involved'.[14] Very little of such international, let alone supranational, control exists. GATT tries its best. The Commission of the European Community does something. Subsidies were intensively discussed in the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations, but without noticeable progress being made.

Professor Meade has proposed, as Professor Hayek in his time proposed. The facts of international relations, the concerns of the nation state to preserve its discretion against the pressures of international regulation, combined with a strong input of commonsense, have disposed. Yet, and this is the important point, the open international trading system continues to function. Presumably, on balance,

13. James E. Meade, *The intelligent radical's guide to economic policy* (London. Crane Russak, 1975), p. 135.
14. Meade, p. 141

developed countries consider it to be in their interests that it should do so, at least for the time being, even though few of them are totally satisfied with the behaviour of their trading partners. And governments have the continuing task of preserving that system through all the turbulences that are to come without any prospect that any of the supranational agencies which Professors Hayek and Meade see as essential will actually come into being. Apparently we can do without them. If we can do without them there does not seem to be much point in not doing without them, and the enormous international bureaucracies that they would establish. It may be that a time will come when the open trading system cannot be preserved without a greater degree of supranationality than is currently possible or acceptable. There was a time when the power of the United States and of its economy dominated all, and agreement was easier. That situation has gone for ever. More recently, in face of economic difficulties of a kind that promote protectionism, the need to avoid fissures in Western solidarity has been a prime support for the open trading system. Without that support it might well have collapsed. But if the support of that need were ever removed at a time of economic recession, the probability must be not an advance to supranationality but a retreat to protectionism.

Today the way forward must be found among nations more equal in their economic power and more determined to defend their own point of view. It needs to be recognized how great is the achievement that, in a depressed world economy lacking the unifying force of a predominant American economy, so much collaboration has proved possible. This shows that reconciliation of conflicting interests, within such framework of international law as commands respect, is still possible. We may not be able to solve all problems by one flash of illumination. We can still solve urgent problems one by one by talking together to find the point of greatest mutual accommodation. To ignore the inevitable limitations in knowledge and understanding of the way in which the world works, to ignore the conflicts of interest that are perceived to exist, to imagine that only wisdom is lacking on the road to a consensus, is so to misunderstand the nature of the modern world, and indeed all its predecessors, as itself to represent a further obstacle to international agreement. If, however, it can be for once admitted that interests do conflict, that interpretations do differ, that there is therefore a need to find reconciliation rather than a magic formula, the prospects are perhaps less daunting. The lesson is that the instinct of the nation state to look to its own security, and to the preservation of its own discretion in the making of economic policy, need not lead to a narrow nationalism. The search for security undoubtedly is motivated by a collectivist instinct and such instincts can lead, and in the past have led, to the narrowest possible interpretation of the interests of the nation and even to wars in the prosecution of those interests. Yet it is possible to see the interests of the nation in cooperation and in the highest possible degree of liberalism rather than in nationalism and a high degree of restrictive protectionism. The choice is open even if wisdom suggests modest ambitions.

Indignation, influence and strategic studies

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN*

In his Inaugural Lecture in the Chair of Military Studies at King's College in January 1927, Sir Frederick Maurice developed his case for equipping 'the young men who came to our great universities with the ambition to take part in public life' with the means of studying war:

> No one has ever suggested that epidemic disease or pauperism or any other such evil could be abolished or reduced without an examination of the causes, or application of the remedies by experts, and the education of public opinion. Only in regard to one of the greatest social evils of all—war—have these processes been but very partially applied.

Thirty-seven years later, in his Inaugural Lecture in the Chair of War Studies, Professor Michael Howard found the situation much the same:

> Pronouncements about military power and disarmament are still made by public figures of apparent intelligence and considerable authority with a naïve dogmatism of a kind such as one finds in virtually no other area of social studies or public affairs.

Almost two decades on there is no doubting the growth of academic activity in this area. To what extent this has been fed into policy, let alone how far there has been a commensurate improvement in policy itself, is debatable. It may be that any meeting between the worlds of scholarship and of policy is doomed to be awkward and unsatisfactory. To the hard-pressed official, much academic advice inevitably appears as discursive, unfocussed and innocent of political realities. The academic, for his part, may well feel that the issues of war and peace can only be properly illuminated by taking the widest possible historical and social perspective. Such an approach contributes most to a policy debate by broadening it, which is why it may not always be well received in government. But the academics cannot be expected to sacrifice content in order to cultivate influence.

It is often argued, however, that there does exist a compelling example of how matters might be organized differently. In the United States remarkably close ties have developed between the strategic studies community and policy-makers. Differences between the two political and administrative systems make this an inappropriate model for Britain; it is at any rate a product of particular historical circumstances. Moreover, the US experience suggests that such an intimate relationship is hardly an unmixed blessing, and may not have done either academic study or public policy as much good as is often supposed. The relevance of the American experience is that it has shaped to a remarkable extent the development of both the theory and the practice of contemporary strategy, and not just in the United States. The consequences are evident in the current debate raging in the West on nuclear weapons. Indeed, this debate has created as much of a crisis for strategic studies as it has done for Western policy.

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The crisis affects the self-image of strategic studies, forged and bolstered through years of influence, as a dispassionate policy science. The role of strategic studies, according to this point of view, is not so much to broaden the policy debate as to keep it focussed. The issues of war and peace are naturally vulnerable to the influence of strong passions, to displays of indignation. In the nuclear age, with so much at stake, to allow such passions to reign unchecked is extraordinarily dangerous. Strategic studies must therefore serve as an alternative source of policy to fear, rage and instinct. The specialists must keep their emotions in check and provide policy-makers with a full range of options, some possibly quite unpleasant, so that choices can be made on the basis of the best possible information and a complete appreciation of the full implications of any course of action. This article is concerned to explain how this view of strategic studies took root, the consequences of its application and the reasons why it may now be untenable.

It has long been expected of strategic studies that they will be tailored to meet the direct needs of policy-makers. The great postwar expansion of the subject was a response to the novel and awesome challenges of the nuclear age, as the pursuit of national security became a far more demanding and hazardous exercise than ever before. Academics were not, by and large, drawn to the subject as disinterested seekers after truth. They were impelled by the thought that here their labours might be put to good use—and perhaps also a sneaking suspicion that if war was now too important to be left to the generals, and even to the politicians, it might just about be safe with the professors.

Contemporary strategic studies developed in the 1950s in the United States as part of the reaction to the Eisenhower administration's policy of 'massive retaliation'. This policy appeared to threaten nuclear hostilities in response to quite modest provocations. Once the Soviet Union acquired an equivalent capacity to deliver nuclear weapons, for the United States to implement a strategy of 'massive retaliation' would be suicidal and so to threaten it would be incredible. The resultant combination of illogicality and recklessness was almost designed to incite academics, who, spurred on by public concern over the immediate state of the arms race, as well as over its ultimate logic, moved into the hitherto underpopulated area of strategic studies. They began to examine in detail the contradictions of the Eisenhower administration's policy while exploring a whole range of alternative policies that might restore credibility to deterrence by means of anything from technological fixes to artful tactics.

Few problems could be as perplexing as that of how real political and military muscle can be extracted from a nuclear arsenal that is in the process of being neutralized by the main adversary. It was a problem that was not only the most pressing facing the nation, and indeed all mankind, but which also involved a close association with some of the more dramatic areas of technological advance. Nuclear strategy was to be played for the highest of stakes, at the frontiers of knowledge, with the most fantastic and awesome of instruments and at an unusually demanding intellectual level. The demands of the nuclear age on defence policy were so unique that not even the experience of warfare or responsibility for the weaponry ensured any useful insights. Indeed, any assumption of continuity from the pre-nuclear age might lead to disastrous misjudgements. Even in military affairs, brawn had to give way to brain.

Contemporary strategic studies was based on this exhilarating prospect, and from the start it took the form of the mobilization of civilian intellectual resources to serve

the higher goals of national security policy. The effort was organized through specially constituted 'think tanks', the most notorious of which was the Rand Corporation. Here fine and committed minds could be brought together. The large issues could be addressed without the hindrances of academic life such as students, committees, the rigid confines of the established disciplines and the need to spend time with people with quite different interests and concerns to one's own! Through the think tanks, access to classified information and the channels of communication to the government apparatus could be readily arranged. Soon these new strategists were losing contact with the wider academic community, drawing on information that their former colleagues could not share to write reports that they could not read. The work had to be presented in such a way as to impress itself on busy officials rather than earn plaudits in scholarly journals.

By the beginning of the 1960s members of the American strategic studies community were already making a distinct contribution—as both critics and consultants—to American policy. With the start of the Kennedy administration in 1961 they achieved a greater influence. Strategic studies became not just a special sort of discipline, but also a route to high office. Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, sought to fight prejudice and self-interest in the Pentagon with ruthless logic. He saw the new academic strategists as the source of this logic. The generals and admirals, protecting their service traditions and interests, and the businessmen and lawyers, doing their stints of public service, were displaced. In came earnest young men, sporting doctorates instead of campaign medals and club ties. Instead of playing the old routines of budgetary fudging and political fixing, they wielded new-fangled tools of analysis, normally involving quantification. This revolution was accompanied by cries of rapture from other academics in the fields of business administration and political science, who saw in it a model by which all policy-making might be put on a rational technocratic basis.

By the end of the decade these same students of administration and politics were less sure. They were wondering at the revelation that policy output could still be usefully understood as the product of a bargaining process between competing interests rather than as the application of refined methodology. It transpired that McNamara's opponents, working on the principle of 'if you can't beat 'em, join 'em', had realized that his major innovation had been to change the rules of the old game. To play by these rules merely required the acquisition of civilian strategists of a congenial disposition who understood the new jargon, could manipulate the new techniques and could trade statistics with the best.

One net result of the policy-making revolution was to generate a requirement for every point of view to be supported by some impressive-sounding strategic analysis. Another lasting result, of which more below, was that the conceptual framework within which the security debate took place had been narrowed and recast according to the requirements of the new strategic studies.

What I have been describing has been largely an American experience. Elsewhere the political culture or the organization of the bureaucracy militated against such a development, and somewhat broader and less focussed forms of strategic studies evolved. Nevertheless, the influence of the American community has hardly been confined to Washington. It has succeeded in shaping the way that most Western governments view their security problems, especially where nuclear weapons are concerned. Furthermore, it is through the American experience that the scope and character of contemporary strategic studies was defined. It came to be seen as policy

science, preoccupied with *reformulating* some of the most fundamental and complex issues of our time into sets of technical propositions. This, it was hoped, would provide an invaluable aid to those responsible for managing the unusually dangerous international system.

This role for strategic studies has long been questioned. As its exponents became more prominent in policy-making they came under criticism for the narrowness of their vision and their over-reliance on sophisticated techniques. This particular line of criticism was highlighted by the association of many of the stars of the strategic studies community with the Vietnam disaster. Now, the criticism is of helping to promote the arms race.

A recurrent theme has been the charge that influence has been cultivated by suppressing the indigation that ought to form part of any human being's reaction to the nuclear age. The guilty strategists treat nuclear weapons as normal and acceptable instruments of power politics. They tolerate an international structure underpinned by a capacity for mutual assured destruction. They describe this awful state of affairs and devise plans to work within it using sanitized language and concepts that obscure the horrendous implications of what is going on. The incapacity of indignation has become a professional distortion, and because of the influence of the nuclear strategists this distortion is transmitted to the political system as a whole.

This indictment was developed as soon as nuclear strategy looked like becoming respectable. It has been revived with renewed vigour in recent years as part of the general challenge being mounted in the West to the artefacts of the nuclear age. The familiarity of the indictment has resulted in a well-rehearsed defence. It is agreed that strategic studies does present itself as an attempt at dispassionate analysis. However, it is argued that this attempt is wholly to be welcomed because any alternative approach would be much more dangerous. The emotions that could soon be brought to bear on policy might not only be an understandable revulsion at weapons of terror and genocide, but also the most crude and aggressive forms of jingoism. Those who provided the early resistance to the rise of nuclear strategic studies were hawks much more than doves. They were appalled at the suggestions that the adversary might be something other than brutish, capable of rational calculation, and with whom there might be in some areas a coincidence of interests. Popular indignation has swept nations to war in the past. A movement from another direction that might restrain governments from acting firmly in pursuit of national interests is merely the other side of the same coin. A set of casualty figures can produce one cry demanding that the madness stop at once before more young men fall; another that the military effort be redoubled to ensure that the deaths were not in vain and would be avenged.

Strategy is about the pursuit of political ends with military means in the international environment. It requires judgements as to when to hold back and when to go forward; it involves a realistic appreciation of the relative power of oneself and an adversary, and of the likely respective skill in wielding this power. Such assessments need to be made with care; they are best made without the intrusion of excessive bravado, anger or fear.

In the nuclear age fear might seem the only honest reaction. But, the new strategists warned, that could give an unscrupulous power capable of manipulating this fear a dangerous advantage. As the margins of safety contracted the need was for more, not less, dispassionate analysis; a continuing and most careful calculation of the balance of risks. When two hostile, nuclear-armed camps confronted each other, so the argument went on, the balance of terror could be tilted by the prospect of terror

making a deeper impression on one side than on the other. Part of the analytical effort, therefore, must be to keep the risk of terror in perspective and to examine thoroughly all means of alleviating the terror should it occur. If policy came to be overwhelmed by a revulsion and horror at nuclear weapons then the United States could be placed at a strategic disadvantage. If discussion of civil defence was abjured because it was repellent to address the details of the holocaust, then not only might an important source of advantage be lost but the nation would be ill-prepared should there be, by some mischance, a disastrous strategic failure. If discussion of alternative nuclear strategies was resisted, because contemplating the use of just one of these things was abhorrent, then should deterrence fail governments might find themselves drawn into massive genocidal attacks because that was the only way that the system had been programmed. So the defence was not just that indignation interfered with the effective study of strategy; it was a positive handicap. It was necessary, in the words of Herman Kahn that became almost a motto for the new strategy, to 'think the unthinkable'.

The particular circumstances of the nuclear age thus encouraged an unusually clinical approach to strategic studies. Because of the aspirations to the status of policy science and the nature of the clientele, work was expected to be rigorous and analytical and to betray few strong feelings. The powerful emotions brought forth by the prospect of nuclear war seemed to make this approach even more necessary. Otherwise, these emotions might overwhelm all thought, and in the resultant paralysis nations would soon become victims rather than masters of events. Victory could well go to an enemy whose political structure made him far more able to suppress indignation. The new strategists insisted that it was necessary to look carefully at nuclear battle plans, not because it was thought likely that they would ever be needed, but because the quality of peace-time deterrence depended largely on a convincing answer to the question of what was to be done if deterrence failed.

There are a number of familiar complaints about this clinical approach: that it is wrong to serve governments in their most dubious pursuits; that it is foolish to rely on abstract models and quantitative techniques, so misleading in their apparent precision; that the scientific affectations exclude moral values; that in thinking about the 'unthinkable' the strategists render it thinkable for everyone else. Accusations of this sort are often misplaced, overstated or unfair; they were dealt with effectively some time ago by Hedley Bull.[1] Nuclear strategy is a legitimate area for study, and it is of such importance that one dare not preclude any particular methodology; and the fruits of any study should be available to governments. It is, however, worth asking whether the cumulative effect of decades of clinical, policy-orientated analysis has been to encourage a systematic distortion in our understanding of the basic problems of military power and international order; whether there is now some kind of institutionalized bias in the strategic studies community which makes it difficult to appreciate many of the key factors that shape and temper conflict in the modern world. In particular, this community has taken a proprietary interest in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Is this a subject susceptible to a clinical approach?

It is necessary to go back to the formative years of the 1950s, when strategic studies was already displaying an inclination towards sophisticated techniques, towards the calculable factors of hardware and force levels in preference to the less calculable factors of history and culture. But these factors were qualified by a political context that was so unsettled that it could not be ignored. When Dulles made nuclear

1. Hedley Bull, 'Strategic studies and its critics', *World Politics*, July 1968, No. 4, pp. 593–605.

deterrence the centrepiece of US security policy in the first half of the 1950s he was acting in the traditional manner of a diplomat, seeking to employ available military power with particular problems—such as Korea and Indo-China—very much in mind. Even the elaboration of the more complex and abstruse theories of the Kennedy administration was tuned to the crises over Berlin and Cuba. (It is of note that, in both cases, the immediate logic of the crises severely qualified and overrode the internal logic of the long-term strategy.) Thereafter, as the Soviet military build-up swept away the traces of superiority, American policy-makers found that the detail of the strategic balance was of only marginal relevance to the conduct of diplomacy and even of war. The loss of nuclear superiority may have contributed to America's troubles, but, as it could not be retrieved, it had to be replaced by something more appropriate to the new situation.

If nuclear deterrence was no longer so closely tied to immediate crisis management, it was still very much a part of protecting the United States itself from nuclear attacks and of sustaining the network of alliance commitments that had been taken on in easier times. These commitments meant that the United States had to be prepared to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack on a third party. This might have seemed plausible enough when the United States enjoyed a comfortable margin of superiority; it required much more of an act of faith to take it seriously once it was realized that there was no obvious route to victory in a nuclear war. Getting in with a first strike could not disarm the enemy of all his means of retaliation and so was likely to lead to the devastation of American territory. With the passing of superiority, then, the American nuclear guarantee became patently less credible; yet, so long as there was some risk that the Americans might do what they said they would do, deterrence could hold. Among the allies no clearly preferable or generally available alternatives to the guarantee emerged, so they stuck with it as an act of faith. For their part, American governments were unprepared to set in motion the international upheavals likely to follow on withdrawal from the nuclear commitments.

In this way the political environment in which the early theories of nuclear deterrence had been forged was frozen. The people of Europe adjusted to the postwar arrangements and organized their life accordingly; these arrangements were sanctified by international agreements, so that they were no longer questioned as part of the diplomatic routine but only at the margins of political rhetoric. Despite all this, the essential security problem was assumed to be the same. How could the Soviet Union be prevented from exploiting some local turbulence and launching a full-blooded invasion to establish dominion over the continent? The fact that it became progressively more difficult to imagine the circumstances in which this might come to pass could be taken as a testament to the success of the original policy. But the success of containment and deterrence could only be partial. The problem had been held in check, not eliminated. Remove the military pillar and the whole edifice of security might crumble. In the Kremlin, a similar assessment was made. Soviet forces provided garrisons for the Eastern Europe satellites and were viewed by their masters as a necessary deterrent to NATO.

So the two blocs became frozen in the postures that they had adopted in the 1950s, destined to glower at each other forever with fists held raised like two petrified victims of Vesuvius. Neither dared lower its guard because it could not be sure that the other would remain motionless if it did. Outside of this ossified structure in Europe, profound changes were under way. New states were created through decolonization; new forms of power based on oil and economic strength emerged; new

political groupings and new regional powers came to the fore; and the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity. This last fact at least might have been expected to qualify the American nuclear guarantee to Western Europe, but that guarantee was now fixed in place as part of the ossified European structure and could not be easily challenged. Whether it was really the case that the whole structure depended on this guarantee may have been doubtful. There was certainly little inclination to find out.

As the strategic studies community addressed the dilemma of attempting to extend deterrence in circumstances of nuclear parity, they discovered just how rigid NATO had become. All the major options for resolving the dilemma were ruled out of order. A drive to retrieve superiority by developing a true first strike capability was ruled out not only because it was technically extremely difficult, maybe impossible, but because the very effort was unsettling. The American government was unwilling to embark on the endless arms race that might ensue. Also, it was nervous about the development of the sort of delicate relationship that might turn a limited superpower skirmish anywhere in the globe into a massive nuclear exchange. Later on, the West Europeans argued against any visible drive for strategic superiority as being provocative and liable to interfere with the arms control and political dialogue that they saw as a parallel source of stability to that of military strength.

The removal of the dependence on the threat to use nuclear weapons first was unacceptable to NATO governments unwilling to fund the forces required to support full conventional deterrence, and worried that the effort would serve as an excuse for the Americans to remove all nuclear protection. Even the more efficient use of existing conventional resources was frustrated because of the demands of the national defence industries, and the need to demonstrate to West Germany a commitment to the defence of every inch of its territory, so that space could not be traded for time. On the other hand, the virtually automatic early use of nuclear weapons against invading enemy forces also could not be permitted because the Europeans were understandably nervous lest their continent be turned into a nuclear battlefield. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany, in many ways the simplest answer to the problems of the central front, alarmed all those in East and West with vivid memories of past offensives launched from Germany.

Thus it was not that the strategic studies community operated in a political vacuum: rather, the constraints of the political context of an established alliance forced them to seek answers to the basic dilemma in politically non-controversial areas. One key question was rarely asked directly. The politicians found it easier to live without a satisfactory solution to the dilemma of an incredible nuclear guarantee, than to contemplate the upheaval necessitated by following one of the possible solutions. Was this, in itself, a piece of evidence of considerable importance?

To give flavour to their analyses, the strategists would devise a scenario, usually some conjunction of otherwise unrelated events that together would provide an explosive mixture. Increasingly it was found that analysis that tried to plot the course of a conflict was, to quote the jargon, 'scenario-dependent'. Yet few seemed to have realized that they might be illustrating a point of strategic significance when it turned out that most of their scenarios were far-fetched and even preposterous. Furthermore, analyses of future wars played only a small part in the shaping of strategic policy. Much more important were the immediate requirements of alliance. American nuclear forces in Europe were viewed as symbols of a commitment to the continent, rather than as a means of bringing certain Warsaw Pact targets into range. The procedures that governed their release were designed to serve as a reassurance

against recklessness, though the delays inherent in those procedures diminished their likely value in battle. NATO policy became designed to spread the risks and responsibilities of alliance and to accommodate a variety of distinct national requirements. Such schemes as the Multi-Lateral Force could only be understood as complicated political statements: certainly not as serious preparations for conflict.

Even in the fundamental area of the strategic balance the requirements of peacetime overrode those of wartime. US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara began the 1960s with changes in US targeting policy and force planning designed to give the American President a variety of nuclear options in war. He soon concluded that this attempt was creating unrealistic—and unhealthy—expectations, and argued instead for recognizing the virtues of a stable strategic balance, calming the arms race and creating few incentives to pre-empt in a crisis. It was McNamara who set in motion the strategic arms control process by which the superpowers sought to consolidate this stability. The process went off in unexpected directions, but it still cast nuclear weapons in essentially political roles as counters in a self-serving negotiation or as an index of power and status.

As a result of all this, by the mid-1960s the theory of deterrence was no longer being developed and informed by the experience of severe international crisis. The political factors that shaped it were related to the maintenance of alliance solidarity and the sustenance of an emerging superpower detente. Where, then, did this leave the clinical strategists? By this time most of the interesting things about nuclear strategy had been said and the key concepts had been developed. The enormous creativity of the earlier years had been spent or frustrated by political constraints. The attempt to apply the techniques of strategic studies to the Vietnam War hardly did anything for their reputation; indeed, the unpopularity of the war soon rubbed off on all those associated with the military establishment. Strategic studies had never appeared particularly wholesome; it was now considered downright sinister. The environment was one in which speculation as to the conduct of nuclear war was considered neither necessary nor illuminating. It was presumed that the inevitable conclusion of such a war would be utter and complete devastation. When the 'unthinkable' of all-out nuclear war had strayed into the realm of possibility then there had been good reason to give it thought. With a durable balance of terror now firmly in place that requirement had diminished.

The only question mark against the general sense of a comfortable strategic stability was the disruptive impact of technology. Might not some dramatic new development—as spectacular and as far-reaching in its implications as radar, the atom-bomb, the thermo-nuclear bomb and the ICBM had been in their day—suddenly transform the situation? For example, if a truly watertight defensive system could be devised, would that not create a decisive strategic advantage? This effort might fail itself but nevertheless stimulate counter-measures, provoke an arms race and undermine the political understanding between the superpowers.

The same urge towards precision which had led Robert McNamara and his associates to set exacting standards for nuclear war-fighting early in the 1960s led this group to set equally exacting standards for a stable nuclear balance later on in the decade. A level of unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union was set; US forces had to be able to inflict such damage even after absorbing a surprise first strike. So long as destruction could be assured it was believed that deterrence was operating. It would do no harm, and even some good, if the Soviet Union could confidently judge its forces satisfactory by the same standard.

By this method the military aspect of a wider political stand-off was put in a typically systematic form. However, McNamara's approach failed to relate the strategic stalemate to the wider context. Deterrence involves a complex and interrelated set of factors—political, economic and organizational as well as military—that serve to introduce a healthy measure of caution and circumspection into the risk calculus of the major powers. The focus on the state of the strategic balance meant that deterrence came to be seen instead as a function of a particular relationship of military forces. In principle it could break down should anything happen to disturb that military balance.

With vast and diverse reserves of offensive nuclear power available to both sides there was no reason to believe that the balance was at all delicate. That was McNamara's basic message. But in his methodology and his pronouncements he had accepted that this balance could not be taken for granted and that it might be vulnerable to technological change. Given the expectation created during two decades of the arms race, with one dramatic breakthrough following another, it would probably have been politically difficult to adopt any alternative assumptions, even though the overall balance was becoming far less sensitive to such breakthroughs. Technology was now considered the greatest threat to deterrence. It became the business of the strategic studies community—and it turned out to be good business—to monitor technological innovation for its likely impact on the strategic balance. Thus technology replaced academic imagination and political experience as the source of fresh ideas and insight in the study of strategy. The mysteries of research and development, the impact of scientific enthusiasms, the industrial interests involved and the ten-year gap between the conception of a new system and its birth all contrived to give the process of innovation in weapon design and production a quite independent character, apparently well removed from deliberate political choice. The mechanistic treatment of the strategic balance, the concentration on technological innovation and the neglect of political context accentuated the worst features of strategic studies. Without political criteria by which to assess the 'decisiveness' of some new development, there was no way to distinguish a serious instability from a trivial disparity in force levels.

If McNamara's permissive criteria had been sustained then there would have been no problem. The balance of terror remained remarkably indelicate. But as the number of nuclear warheads and their individual accuracies increased, imaginations began to play with all sorts of offensive tactics that might secure a winning advantage despite the apparent stalemate. If it was the case that the state of the strategic balance was the fundamental factor governing the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and if it was possible to discern some trend making possible some tactic that might just create a real advantage, then the United States could be in trouble. Such an advantage could only make itself felt in war. Following this line of thought led soon to a questioning of whether nuclear war was really inconceivable or whether, at least, it was prudent to act on that assumption.

The American pledge to use nuclear weapons first on behalf of its allies in the event of war was presented as the essential underpinning of European security. If the advertised result of the implementation of this pledge was going to be mutual assured destruction, then this had obvious implications for its quality. We have seen how this credibility problem was tolerated out of a sense of the overall stability of the European security system and the feeling that even if the US guarantee was little more than a gigantic bluff, this was not the sort of bluff that any prudent Soviet leader was going

to be inclined to call. But impose a strict logic on this problem and a deterrent threat that is palpably incredible seems bound to fail. Without the necessary capabilities and doctrine to back up the nuclear guarantee, the allies would have to act on the assumption that the United States was unreliable and make other arrangements. Add to that fear a sense that new technologies were creating sources of strategic advantage that the Soviet Union might be better placed to exploit, and the policy of deterrence was close to failure—unless corrective measures were taken early on.

Events in the 1970s conspired to give this approach to strategy far more authority than it deserved. An apparently relentless Soviet military build-up; the discovery of aspects of Soviet doctrine at variance with the prevailing American view on the non-usability of nuclear power; the disappointment with the meagre results of detente; a series of irritating Soviet excursions into Third World trouble-spots—all this created an impression that the Soviet Union was seeking to free itself from any constraints imposed upon it by American nuclear strength. Confidence in the robustness of the established framework declined. The 'unthinkable' moved back into the realm of possibility.

That the Soviet Union had been emboldened by the clear loss of American nuclear superiority may have been the case. That it was being tempted to push its luck out of a belief in favourable trends within the strategic balance was far more questionable. Explanations for the troubles of the 1970s would have been better sought in the processes of change in the Third World, and the relative Soviet and American abilities to cope with these changes. The ascendant right wing in American politics, however, assigned the blame for the troubles and frustrations of the decade to unfavourable and dangerous trends in the strategic balance. Perhaps this was because such a simple explanation permitted a simple solution—rearmament. Perhaps it was the prominence of arms control as the centrepiece of detente which drew attention to these strategic trends. The strategic arms limitation talks were based on those presumptions of assured destruction that were becoming increasingly discredited. At any rate, the challenge to the East–West policies of the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter years reached a crescendo with the opposition to the 1979 SALT II treaty.

The impact of all this on the strategic studies community was profound. The community itself had expanded and in its character and its output reflected the concern with technology and the details of arms control. As the issues of nuclear strategy moved to the centre of the political stage, so did the number of government agencies, congressional offices and pressure groups interested and involved—and they all wanted the appropriate expertise on their staff. The security debate was being conducted using the terminology and concepts of clinical strategic studies and the participants wanted to be properly briefed. The profession was now of undoubted influence. Its products still consisted of abstract, speculative theorizing about unlikely contingencies, bolstered by technical details and force comparisons. Yet while its products retained their clinical appearance they were now politically loaded. Moreover, many of those involved, particularly those of a hawkish disposition, knew exactly what they were doing. If their analyses were right then the past years had involved monumental folly. Appalled by those of their fraternity who had enjoyed the greatest influence over policy during the 1970s despite clinging to the imagery of a stable balance, and frustrated by their own lack of influence, these professional strategists put themselves to the fore of a political movement. The strategists, having lost their professional detachment, were now moved by a sense of indignation.

It did not seem to matter that the strategic analyses now wielded as potent political

weapons were often quite dubious. They depended on questionable assumptions about the reliability and performance of unproven new technologies, about the implementation of subtle and ingenious tactics in the most fraught military environment imaginable, and about the attitudes and behaviour of national leaders in the most extreme circumstances. In the willingness to explain and predict great and disastrous international events on the basis of tenuous logic, the effect was reminiscent of Stephen Potter's advice on Gamesmanship in chess. Potter advises White to make three moves at random, then to resign. White then establishes his psychological superiority by explaining to his bewildered opponent how a brilliant checkmate by Black was inevitable in twenty or so further moves, thereby leaving White little choice but resignation. It is made clear to Black that he has only gained victory because his opponent understands the game far better than he.[2] Similarly, at times it seemed as if the strategists were arguing that a virtual American surrender and the collapse of alliances were inevitable on recognition of the full implications of trends in the strategic balance that, thus far, they alone had been able to discern.

When the strategists of this persuasion rose to positions of influence in the Reagan administration, they had the opportunity to put their theories into practice. This is not the place to examine their experience. Suffice it to say that they discovered as many domestic and external political constraints as their predecessors of an earlier generation. NATO allies were as nervous as ever about disturbing the security structures of Europe. These remained in their frozen state, slightly modified only in the political and economic spheres. For domestic and alliance consumption it was still necessary to enter into arms control negotiations at least with the appearance of good faith. The early statements of strategic intent had to be qualified because they generated more alarm than reassurance.

Indeed, the influence of clinical strategic studies has been evident as much in the protest movements opposed to the new American policies as in the policies themselves. The critics have not reasserted a more relaxed, less frenetic view of the strategic balance or argued the danger of a fixation with technology, or the nonsense of exaggerated interpretations of scenarios for a future war. Instead, in their fascination with the aftermath of a nuclear war they have encouraged the view that deterrence is about to fail, and, in their focus on the arms race as the likely cause of this disaster, that a striving for strategic advantage, rather than real political differences, is to blame for the current international malaise. Their literature is replete with the language and concepts of strategic studies. They also argue for a new foreign policy in terms of adjustments to force levels.

In the 1970s the strategists became populists; in the 1980s the populists became strategists. It is not clear which of these developments was the least helpful. The combination of the two has resulted in a wholly artifical crisis of deterrence. It has become accepted in everyday comment, from both ends of the political spectrum, and much in between, that the future of our civilization is dependent on a particular configuration of forces. The only real differences are over just what that configuration should be. It is not that the structure of forces or shifts in the balance are unimportant: in certain circumstances they would be extremely important, but we are nowhere near such circumstances. They are part of the story, but not the whole story. It is the political context that will produce the pressures for war, and it is the nature of these pressures—and its consequences for the cohesion of alliances and the

2. Stephen Potter, *The theory and practice of gamesmanship* (London: Hart-Davis, 1947), pp. 93–5.

determination of individual nations—that will shape the course of any war. Whatever else one can predict, it is certain that the political environment on day one of some future war will bear only scant resemblance to that of today.

It is, in fact, a paradox to which this article has been attempting to draw attention that the apolitical character of so much contemporary strategic studies is partly a product of a static political environment. With so much, at least in Europe, so fixed and firmly in place, study of the environment generated few fresh insights. The preference for the familiar and understood, the unwillingness to tamper with the delicate political and doctrinal compromises of years ago, now fortified by institutionalization and inertia, the difficulty of getting a large group of nations to agree together on any dramatic change in policy, provided an unpromising backdrop for anyone interested in strategic innovation. As a result of the ossification of the European security structure, military preparations became steeped in a political symbolism designed to hold the alliance together. This imposed constraints on military policy that were first found irritating and then simply not understood. Strategic studies found it easier to neglect the current political environment and think instead of a future military environment. There was little left for the strategists but to project current policy and inventories forward and to speculate on the impact of new technologies. As this could only be done with a detailed knowledge of the relevant hardware and sophisticated analytical methods, the view of strategic studies as something highly technical was reinforced.

However, the image of a detailed and dispassionate policy science, following the analysis to wherever it led, was soon dispelled. To operate in such a way required the comfortable framework of a political consensus, within which there was sufficient leeway to take account of the more interesting and useful contributions of the strategic studies community. Equally, if the analysis kept on leading to the conclusions that the balance of terror was remarkably stable, and that it could tolerate quite striking variations in force levels, then there was no need to get excited and the political masters could be left alone to use the analysis as they saw fit. Once the political consensus was undermined then the strategists were forced to make overt political judgements. If, then, by imposing one's own political judgements on the strategic analysis the balance seemed to be under threat, then of course it mattered. Because many strategists felt that only they really understood these issues, they felt obliged to draw attention to these dangers, and as the political system failed to respond they became indignant and began to campaign. When even modest proposals faced formidable political obstacles it was tempting to use strategic analysis to generate a sufficient sense of crisis and urgency to get politicians to agree to change.

Those who understood the analysis but disagreed with the conclusions, largely because they imposed alternative political judgements, then began to campaign in opposition. But they campaigned against the strategic analysis, arguing against one set of prescriptions on how to respond to the failure of deterrence with their own set, without asking the prior question of whether deterrence was really close to failure. A debate which really should have been about these alternative political judgements, concerning such matters as the relative risk-taking propensities of the Soviet Union and the United States and the real extent of their conflicts of interest in the various world trouble-spots, got bogged down in arguments over force structures and the conduct of total war.

I argued above that the difficulty in developing convincing scenarios for the outbreak of World War Three was not a professional failure but a strategic fact of

some significance. Equally, the extent to which contemplation of World War Three produces widespread public indignation is also a strategic fact of some significance. If all this fuss has occurred in what are, despite the admittedly harsh international climate, hardly crisis conditions, what would be the state of opinion in a real crisis and how might that affect available strategies? The idea that strategic studies could serve as a counter-influence to public passions in the formation of security policy has therefore fallen on two counts. First, those with sufficiently strong feelings cannot be deflated merely by reciting to them the conclusions of experts. Secondly, the experts have shown themselves to be as susceptible to strong feelings as everyone else. The strategists, or at least forms of strategic analysis, have appeared on the expert wings of broad political movements rather than as independent servants of policy. In this way, strategic studies have served as a source of indignation as well as of influence.

The conclusion I would draw from this experience is that strategic studies must reintegrate politics into its analytical framework. If the analysis is serious then politics is unavoidable. Where this is not recognized then the political judgements involved will be crude and dogmatic. The subject will be vulnerable to the charge of promoting a particular point of view under the cover of spurious expertise. Strategic studies based on political understanding as much as on echnical competence may not appear so obviously as a source of specialist advice to policy-makers. But it might be able to make a more constructive contribution to public debate, and the advice that was sought would be more useful. The sort of strategic studies I have in mind must return to its roots in military history and international relations, to the sort of work that for the past three decades has been the business of the Department of War Studies at King's College, London.

Mexico and the South Atlantic conflict: solidarity or ambiguity?

Esperanza Durán*

Although Mexico was noticeably absent from the diplomatic manoeuvrings that accompanied the Falklands conflict, the dispute presented the López Portillo administration with a series of uncomfortable decisions and dilemmas. Mexico felt obliged to reiterate its traditional support for Argentina's claim to the islands, but in private harboured little sympathy for the political regime that had carried out the occupation. Mexico was also anxious to avoid compromising public postures, but privately sought to improve its bilateral ties with Washington by offering to serve as a 'communicator' between the United States and Latin America.

The importance of assessing the reaction of Mexico, a middle-ranking Latin American power, stems from three related factors: first, Mexico's long-standing and prestigious practice of abiding by and defending the basic principles of international law; second, its record of pursuing a foreign policy independent of its powerful neighbour to the North, in spite of its geographical proximity to and vital economic dependence on the United States; third, its recently acquired status as a major oil exporter, leading to seek greater prestige and influence in international affairs, and to launch a more active and committed foreign policy based on oil wealth. The analysis of Mexico's position in the South Atlantic conflict may provide a valuable test-case for the contention that Mexico is seeking a new international global or at least hemispheric role, and can throw light on the nature of Mexican foreign policy, where its priorities lie in this field and possible future trends.

The first part of this article will set the scene by describing in broad terms the international reactions to the conflict. This will be followed by a brief sketch of the evolution of Mexico's postwar foreign policy from a primarily reserved, defensive and rather passive stance to the adoption of a more active approach to international issues. The third part will explain Mexico's position during the armed confrontation through the perspective of its bilateral relations with Argentina. Finally, the Mexican stand in the multilateral organizations of which it is a member will be described and compared with the reactions of other Latin American countries.

The international response to the crisis

The Anglo–Argentine confrontation produced a chain of diplomatic, political and economic reactions alongside the military action. All these were to have serious repercussions on the existing relations of the parties to the conflict, both individual countries and regions. States and regional organizations on both sides of the Atlantic were forced by the gravity of the circumstances to take positions in the dispute, and to support that country with which they shared geographical vicinity as well as common interests. It is interesting—and surprising—to note how the degree of support varied from country to country, and in some cases diverged from what might

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have been expected at the outset. This article will argue that the extent to which each country was willing to become engaged in backing Argentina or Great Britain was determined primarily by calculations of strict national interest rather than by the vaguer concepts of regional unity or cooperation.

The most apparent demonstration of this can be found in the US position, initially ambivalent and later openly supportive of the British side, despite the Monroe Doctrine. But then, the position of the United States in the international community and the Western alliance is a special one. More interesting in this respect is the case of the EEC countries. These admittedly rallied unanimously behind Great Britain in the first instance, but when it came to supporting the United Kingdom not only rhetorically but through concrete actions, such as the imposition of economic sanctions on Argentina, European solidarity was short-lived: Italy and Ireland withdrew from this action, the former in attention to its special economic interests and indeed traditional and emotional ties with Argentina, and the latter perhaps signalling its opposition to UK colonialism.

Similarly, within Latin America, declarations by individual countries came unanimously in support of Argentina. In a show of great Latin American solidarity and unity all countries agreed that *las Malvinas son Argentinas*, though some countries condemned Argentina's means to regain them (notably Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico). Latin American sympathy and solidarity were particularly loudly voiced after Britain's overwhelming reaction to the attack, and its non-compliance with Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council. But below the rhetorical support, each Latin American country's reaction was in accordance with its own national priorities and interests.

In this context, Mexico's position *vis-à-vis* the South Atlantic conflict is an interesting case in point. Harold Blakemore wrote in the wake of Argentina's occupation of the Falklands that 'Guatemala's support for Argentina may be taken for granted, as may—despite the nature of the Argentine regime—the support of the other Central American republics, committed as they are to a posture of anti-colonialism in international affairs. Mexico and Venezuela will take a similar line.'[1] An accurate statement, as it happened, in so far as Central American reactions in general are concerned; but there is certainly no comparison between the Venezuelan commitment to backing Argentina and Mexico's lukewarm support. Given its relative lack of interest in the conflict, the weakness of its ties with Argentina, being an important borrower of Eurodollars in the City of London and a supporter of self-determination for Belize, ambiguity was in order. Contrary to natural expectations in view of its recent activism in foreign policy, Mexico remained visibly rather aloof.

Mexico's postwar principles and policies

Mexico's postwar attitude and relations with the outside world have been accurately described by Jorge Castañeda as 'generally speaking, reserved, cautious, and mainly defensive'.[2] Indeed, Mexico's foreign policy has been characterized by a strict respect for the principles of international law and by what may be referred to as 'ethical'

1. Harold Blakemore, 'Latin American reactions,' in *The Falkland Islands dispute: international dimensions* (London. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982), p. 35

2. Jorge Castañeda, 'Revolution and foreign policy,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 391–417 at p. 408

international behaviour, that is to say, the defence of such principles as the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, the self-determination of peoples and equality amongst individuals as amongst nations. These principles, emanating from historical tradition and revolutionary ideology, were to form the guidelines for Mexico's international relations and a bulwark against the assumption of an active role or a political commitment on international issues. As Castañeda succinctly puts it '. . . in general international political questions—where the interests of Mexico were not directly affected—Mexico's contribution was rather limited'.[3]

The evolution of Mexico's foreign policy from this passive, almost isolationist stance, to a more active, though not as yet politically committed one began during the López Mateos regime, when Mexico started expanding its contacts and relations beyond its immediate borders and taking a greater interest in international affairs. This was followed by more moderate international activity under Díaz Ordaz (among other reasons because domestic politics required most of this government's attention). It was not until Luis Echeverría came to power that Mexico started actively, almost feverishly, to participate in foreign affairs. During his tenure as President (1970–6) Echeverría endorsed the existing reformist trends internationally. Seeking to redress the existing balance of international economic power in favour of the less developed countries, Echeverría gave his support to certain institutions and groups in the international arena and promoted his own plans to bring about important reforms in the international status quo and its domination by the industrial powers. All this developed in tandem with Echeverría's own personal ambitions to become a prominent leader in the Third World and the international community.[4]

During the López Portillo administration, 1976–82, Mexico became politically involved outside its own borders, entailing active political and economic support for other countries. An important element in bringing this about was Mexico's newly discovered huge oil deposits and the acquisition of some stature in the world oil market as a significant exporter outside OPEC. It was then that Mexico began to search for a new international role, only this time backed by petrodollars and Eurodollars which started flowing as loans, Mexico using its new oil wealth as collateral. As has been asserted with reference to the increasing influence in Central America and the Caribbean sought by the López Portillo administration, 'Mexican leadership is anxious for the country to exercise influence in international politics equal to its size, wealth, level of industrialization, petroleum holdings, and political sophistication. A sphere of influence in the Caribbean Basin combined with a voice in Third World politics is the point of departure.'[5] And indeed, this international political involvement took place precisely in Central America, an area which forced itself onto Mexico's attention since threats to Mexico's national security stemmed from the instability in that region. Although perhaps most Mexicans would deny that the aim of Mexico's foreign policy is to achieve a hegemonic role in the area, Mexico is certainly taking a leading role in the search for a peaceful solution to the Central American predicament.

National and foreign views of the evolution of Mexico's foreign policy from being

3. Casteñeda, p. 409.

4. On Echeverria's foreign policy see Yoram Shapira, *Mexican foreign policy under Echeverría*, *Washington Papers*, Vol. 6, No. 56 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1978).

5. Edward J. Williams, 'Mexico's Central American policy: apologies, motivations and principles', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 21–42 at p. 32.

legalistic and detached to more active and committed (even at the expense of *de facto* abandonment of one of its most cherished tenets: non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries) are well known.[6] But a less often mentioned continuity in Mexico's interests is that Mexico's international political activism, when there has actually been one, has remained basically provincial. One point should remain clear: even though Mexico has gradually become active in foreign affairs, defending Third World interests in multilateral fora, generally concerned with questions of economic international justice and the remaking of the international economic order, Mexico remains basically uninterested in and will not commit itself to countries or affairs outside its immediate geopolitical setting. Indeed, the examples of Mexico's activism in defending the letter and principles of international law and the examples of its independent foreign policy—such as its opposition to the United States in the overthrow of the Arbenz government in 1954, followed by its objections to the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS in Punta del Este in 1962 and its condemnation of US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965—were all not only clearly in line with Mexico's international independent, even 'moral' traditions, but also, and very importantly, were all directly related to immediately neighbouring countries.[7]

Mexico's secret diplomacy

Mexico's position towards the two countries involved in the South Atlantic conflict reflected to a large extent this detachment and reserve in affairs far beyond its borders. Apart from its declared support for Argentina, Mexico refrained from adopting a publicly active position during the conflict, with Central America still occupying the larger part of its attention, even at the height of hostilities in the South Atlantic. Mexico not only did not show any active solidarity with its Latin American peer, as, for example, Venezuela did, but did not even make overtures to act openly as a mediator as it had done with respect to Central America. In the Anglo–Argentine conflict Mexico kept well out of the limelight.

There was in fact a Mexican effort to mediate in the South Atlantic confrontation but this was kept at the unofficial level and was accordingly not made public. The Mexican initiative, which took place outside the formal framework of the Mexican Chancellery, was the result of personal relationships between prominent British and Mexican politicians. It was believed in private British and Mexican circles that Mexico could play an important role in negotiating a settlement between Argentina and Great Britain. The Mexicans concerned succeeded in convincing López Portillo of the value of a Mexican contribution to finding a peaceful solution to the

6 Mexican officials would probably question that initiatives such as the Franco-Mexican communiqué meant intervening in the internal affairs of other countries, but some Latin American governments (namely those of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela) denounced it as 'interference' in Salvadoran affairs On the evolution of Mexico's foreign policy see. Olga Pellicer de Brody, 'Cambios recientes en la politica exterior mexicana,' *Foro internacional*, Oct -Dec. 1972, Vol XIII, No 2, pp. 139–54, Guy E. Poitras, 'Mexico's "new" foreign policy', *Inter-American Economic Affairs*. Winter 1974, Vol 28, No 3, pp 59–77; Harvey J Kaye, 'How "new" is Mexico's foreign policy?' *Inter-American Economic Affairs*. Spring 1975, Vol. 28, No 4, pp. 87–92.

7. An exception is the support accorded by the Echeverría administration to the Allende regime in Chile, followed by the policy of open doors to political refugees This is explained to a large extent by Echeverría's personal sympathy for the *allendistas* and his desire to strengthen his leftist image for internal political consumption. However, at present, Mexico's traditional policy of granting political asylum is coming under severe strain owing to Mexico's new hard-line attitude towards political refugees from Central America On this topic see Errol D. Jones and David Lafrance, 'Mexico's foreign affairs under Echeverría. the special case of Chile', *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Spring 1976, Vol 30, No 1, pp 45–87

Anglo–Argentine war, and a Mexican delegation appointed by the President met with the British Prime Minister and presented a plan along the lines of the Peruvian peace initiative.[8] In the event this unofficial effort at mediation was unsuccessful, not least because Britain was not willing to negotiate.

The fact that this diplomatic activity was conducted informally and secretly reflected not only Mexico's cautious attitude towards the conflict, but also that this tactful approach had several advantages for Mexico. On the one hand it thereby avoided the risk of a notorious diplomatic failure (such as the manifest defeat of Haig's shuttle diplomacy), yet, in the unlikely event of success, Mexico would have scored a resounding diplomatic victory. On the other hand, Mexico made sure that the United States found out about this attempt at mediation, and some 'cordial' letters were exchanged between Castañeda and Haig, in which Mexico stressed its anxiety that the Anglo–Argentine war should not be a cause of strain in their bilateral relations.[9] This was an important point for Mexico: to let the Reagan administration know that although Mexico's policy towards Central America might displease the United States, on other issues (not vital to Mexico's interests) Mexico was not willing to arouse US antagonism and dissociated itself from many vociferous Latin American attacks on US support for Britain and its lack of hemispheric solidarity.

Mexico's ambivalent relations with Argentina

Mexico's real lack of support for the Argentine cause stems from several factors. Foremost is Mexico's overwhelming interest in achieving political stability in Central America, a basic concern for its own national security. Central America has certainly occupied a prime place in Mexico's diplomatic efforts, being the region where it has spent most of its political capital. But there were other good reasons in this case for Mexico to refrain from espousing the cause of Latin American anti-colonialism and Third World solidarity: Argentina's forceful occupation of the islands was clearly not in line with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, territorial or otherwise, through negotiation, to which Mexico had always adhered. On the contrary, indeed, it offered a good opportunity for Mexico to demonstrate once again its international convictions.

Another reason for Mexico's detached attitude towards Argentina concerns bilateral relations between the two countries. The Mexican leadership, which takes great pride in its political stability—unmatched within Latin America—and its long-standing civilian rule, is naturally inclined to oppose dictatorial military regimes and viewed with little sympathy its Argentine counterpart. On top of this basic antipathy, relations had been strained ever since the military coup in Argentina in 1976 over the issue of political exiles who had sought asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Buenos Aires. Some of those of lesser political importance had been able to obtain safe conduct from the Argentine government to go to Mexico, but other more politically prominent refugees in the Mexican Embassy (such as former President Héctor

8. In a British publication's chronology of the conflict it is stated that on 24 April 'Mexican President López Portillo offers mediation should Haig mission fail', but no source or other details are offered. *The Falklands/Malvinas: whose crisis?* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982), p. 89.

9. Alan Riding, 'Surrender expected to bring better U.S.–Latin ties', *New York Times*, 18 June 1982. Castañeda conceded in a press interview that Mexico's Central American policy had brought about difficulties with Washington, and that Mexico had no need to 'look for gratuitous enemies' and become involved in other people's problems such as the Middle East troubles, South Africa or the Malvinas. *Excélsior*, 24 June 1982.

Cámpora or Peronist leader Manuel Abal Medina) had not.[10] The already tense relations between the Argentine military and the Mexican government deteriorated on account of this to the point where the Mexican Ambassador to Buenos Aires at the time, Roque González Salazar, was recalled to Mexico in mid-1976.

An interesting feature of responses to the Anglo–Argentine dispute is that the support Argentina received from certain Latin American countries crossed over some basic ideological divisions: paradoxically, Argentina received wholehearted support from Nicaragua and Cuba, despite its role as the US proxy in Central America. Indeed, Argentina's involvement in this sphere, organizing, advising and training Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries in both Honduras and Argentina, and providing military advisers to El Salvador and Guatemala, may well have been resented by Mexico and dictated its cool reaction to the southern conflict. On economic and political issues, too, Argentina has not ranked high in Mexico's external relations, Argentina being of little interest as a potential market for Mexican products or as a potential political ally, not only on account of their very different political ideologies and possible rivalry as leaders of the Latin American subcontinent, but also given Mexico's geographical position: its distance from Argentina and its closeness to the United States.

It has been on general questions and within multilateral fora that Mexico and Argentina have backed common causes: both have supported the 200-mile territorial sea limit; both have defended the nation's right to exert control on foreign investment and multinational corporations; Argentina sided with Mexico in supporting the charter on economic rights and duties of states. Nevertheless, even here one may find another possible source of Mexico's lack of sympathy for the Argentine cause: the fact that although Argentina was a signatory of the Mexican-sponsored Tlatelolco Treaty, which aimed to turn Latin America into a nuclear-free zone, it has failed to ratify it. In short, Milenky's assessment of likely trends in Mexican–Argentine relations in the post-Echeverría period was fairly accurate and held both for the López Portillo administration and under the de la Madrid Presidency while the Argentine military were still in power: 'If the two countries continue to have quite distinct approaches to the inter-American system, the United States, and intra-Latin American politics, they will remain quite distant from each other.'[11] And so they remained during the Falklands conflict. However, the disappearance of the military from the political scene in Argentina, the return to democratic rule and the style of government of the new Argentine president Raúl Alfonsín presage a new era in Mexican–Argentine relations.

Mexico and the United Kingdom

Relations between Mexico and Britain have traditionally been cordial yet distant, except during two specific periods when internal circumstances in Mexico imposed a strain on diplomatic intercourse between the two countries. The first period of tension arose during the most violent phase of the Mexican revolution; the second was the aftermath of the expropriation by Mexico of foreign-owned oil companies, a step

10. In January 1978 many internationally prominent politicians and intellectuals (Bruno Kreisky, Olof Palme, Willy Brandt, Felipe González and Alberto Moravia, among others) wrote to General Videla demanding the restoration of the state of law in Argentina and safe conduct for Cámpora, who had remained in the Mexican Embassy since May 1976. *Proceso*. No. 63, 16 Jan. 1978.

11. Edward S. Milenky, *Argentina's foreign policies* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1978), p. 216.

which affected the partly British-owned Royal Dutch Shell. However, these episodes have left no mark on current relations and attitudes.

With respect to the other major Latin American dispute in which Britain has in recent decades been involved, namely the status of Belize, it should be noted that Mexico has not opposed British policies, having consistently joined Britain in supporting independence for Belize—apart from an embarrassing diplomatic gaffe by Echeverría in 1975, quickly corrected. This was of course never framed as a support for the British stand as such, but rather as support for the right to self-determination of the Belizean people. Mexico had traditionally maintained the position that if the status of Belize should change—in effect meaning the transfer of all or part of Belizean territory to Guatemala—Mexico would reactivate its claim to the northern part of Belize, which it had allowed to lay dormant. What this meant in practice was active opposition to Guatemala's recurrent threats; indeed, the definite change of Belizean status brought about by its declaration of independence in 1981 was not only tolerated but encouraged by Mexico, which then dropped permanently its previous conditional territorial claim.[12]

Mexico's public diplomacy

In the South Atlantic crisis one could say that Mexico was careful not to adopt a definite position which could in any way be interpreted as support for either party. It stood by its traditional principles of strict compliance with international law (which, as we have seen above, form a convenient shield from acquiring political commitments). The Mexican position throughout the conflict can be summarized in the following points. First, Mexico recognized that the sovereignty over the Falklands was Argentinian. Second, it reiterated that the solution to international disputes should be by peaceful means, through negotiation, although at some point it did concede that in the case of the Falklands negotiations had been held up by Britain. Third, Mexico demanded that Resolution 502 of the Security Council should be complied with; and fourth, it maintained that the Security Council had a higher authority than the Organization of American States (OAS) to deal with the dispute, on the grounds that one of the parties involved in the conflict did not belong to the OAS. Mexican officials reiterated this official position, and laid particular emphasis on recommending that the solution should be looked for within the framework of the United Nations. Mexico's position was impeccable from the legal standpoint, and at the same time sufficiently ambiguous that existing relations with Britain and Argentina would not suffer any substantial change.

What may seem striking, though, is Mexico's lack of will to act openly as mediator in the conflict, a role with which it had felt quite comfortable in the Central American case. Mexico's open rejection of a role as mediator was explicitly made by President López Portillo, when, during a press interview, he agreed that Mexico was acting positively in serving as 'communicator' between the United States, Cuba and Nicaragua, but stated that Mexico saw no reason why it should mediate in the South Atlantic question, explaining that Mexico's function in this case was 'to maintain our traditional principles',[13] a conveniently ambiguous public statement. This position

12. On Echeverría's faux pas see 'Belize: the Mexican connection' in *Latin America Weekly Report*, 14 Nov. 1975, Vol. IX, No. 45. On the background to Belizean independence see Noël Fursman, 'Belice: balance de los primeros dos años de independencia', *Foro internacional*, Oct.–Dec. 1983, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, pp. 131–54.

13. *Unomásuno*, 12 April 1982.

was echoed almost word for word by Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda later on;[14] while attending the meeting of the UN International Law Commission (which itself illustrates the ranking Mexico gave to the Falklands conflict), he stated that Mexico would prefer the UN to act as mediator, rather than individual countries such as Peru, Spain, or Venezuela: 'Mexico has confidence in the United Nations, and would favour that the UN Secretary General be the only one who acts as mediator.'[15] Both the President's and the Foreign Minister's public statements contrast with the covert mediating initiative described above.

As part of the British strategy to obtain support from some Latin American countries, the British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher sent a letter to López Portillo putting forward the British case. The British Ambassador to Mexico, Crispin Tickell, delivered the letter to the Mexican President on 12 April. After his meeting with the President and the Mexican Foreign Secretary, Mr Tickell expressed his country's satisfaction with the Mexican Foreign Ministry's statement that Mexico backed the Security Council Resolution calling for an Argentine withdrawal from the islands.[16]

Argentina, for its part, was also trying, almost desperately, to secure Mexico's support. President Galtieri also sent a letter to López Portillo explaining his motives for taking the decision to invade and asking for his support. López Portillo's response to this letter was delivered through the Mexican chargé d'affaires at Buenos Aires, Juan Todoberto, to the Argentine chancellery. In this communication López Portillo 'expressed his preoccupation about the conflict', and reminded Galtieri that 'Mexico had stood by Argentina every time it had claimed sovereignty over the islands', but he also stressed that 'Mexico was against the use of force for solving international disputes'.[17] Later on, when Argentina prepared a diplomatic offensive to obtain Latin American support for its cause in the UN General Assembly, top Argentine officials were sent to Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico to obtain their support.[18]

That Mexico's support was of great importance to Argentina[19] was made clear by one of the gestures of goodwill that Argentina was prepared to make to obtain such backing: to grant safe conduct for the Peronista guerrilla leader Juan Manuel Abal Medina, who had been confined in the Mexican Embassy in Buenos Aires since 1976.[20] Argentina's refusal to release Abal Medina had been one of the causes of increased tension in Mexican–Argentine relations. But not even this was enough to persuade Mexico to change its mind about the public lukewarm support (if support it was) it had been giving Argentina in its dispute with the United Kingdom. It was not until hostilities were over, and the situation on the military front in the South

14. *Unomásuno*, 2 May 1982

15. *Unomásuno*, 11 May 1982.

16. *Excélsior*, *Unomásuno*, 13 April 1982.

17. *Unomásuno*, 18, 20 April 1982.

18. *Excélsior*, 8, 9 July 1982.

19. That Argentina was in dire need of support was clear from the fact that even the Argentine opposition took the trouble to look for it. Vicente Leonidas Saadi, the former Argentine senator and left-wing Peronist leader, arrived in Mexico City to seek official support for Argentina's position in the conflict, and declared he was seeking an interview with López Portillo (*Unomásuno*, 14 April 1982). However, nothing was reported in the Mexican press of any Argentine leader meeting (officially or otherwise) with the Mexican President. Interview with Saadi, *El día*, 22 April 1982

20. *Unomásuno*, 22 April 1982. The Mexican chargé d'affaires at Buenos Aires stated. 'Abal Medina's situation will be favourably resolved . . . perhaps not today nor tomorrow, but possibly next week'. Abal Medina arrived in Mexico City on 21 May 1982 accompanied by the Mexican Ambassador to Argentina, Emilio Calderón Puig. *Latin America Weekly Report*, 30 April 1982; *El día*, 22 May 1982, *Unomásuno*, 23 May 1982, *Financial Times*, 24 May 1982.

Atlantic and the political front in the Americas and Europe was less volatile, that Mexico moved away from secret diplomacy and returned to a more active position within the framework of the UN, trying to bring Britain back to the negotiating table.[21]

In practical terms, Mexico's rather detached attitude during the conflict took the form of issuing appeals to both parties to put an end to hostilities and search for a negotiated solution within the framework of the UN. When the Mexican Foreign Ministry received news of the landing of British forces on the islands (once negotiations had broken down in the UN) an official communiqué was issued condemning the British action and stating that there were no legal foundations to justify the fact that a permanent member of the Security Council should take upon itself, unilaterally, the responsibility to execute a resolution of the Council without having received a specific mandate to do so.[22]

Mexico's multilateral diplomacy

It is appropriate now to turn to an examination of Mexico's reactions to the South Atlantic conflict within the framework of the inter-American multilateral organizations of which it is a member, against the background of what took place in these fora and what were the reactions of other Latin American countries.

It has often been stated that the Falklands crisis dealt a mortal blow to the inter-American system—in particular to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR or Rio Treaty)[23]—and demonstrated the inoperability of the Organization of American States.[24] However, these two conclusions are questionable. The ability of the OAS to solve an international dispute in which one of its members was attacked by an extra-regional power was hindered by the fact that it was the Latin American state which carried out the first attack. The departure from the traditional pattern of behaviour of the inter-American system lay in the United States making clear that its allegiance was primarily to Britain rather than to Argentina. In the Falklands case the United States not only turned its back on its Latin American ally, but overrode one of the institutions of its own creation. For its part, Mexico took the opportunity to voice not only its reservations about the effectiveness or the advisability of resorting to the TIAR to solve this dispute in particular, but also doubts about its more general applicability. But in order to assess the validity of criticisms of the inter-American system it is important to review however briefly what took place in this context.

The Mexican Ambassador at the OAS, Rafael de la Colina, stated that the TIAR 'is a very flexible treaty and should be read carefully and understood with caution'.[25] Later on, Castañeda pointed out that 'we are members of the TIAR and we abide by it, but we would not be terribly disenchanted if it were applied less and less'.[26]

21. *Excélsior*, 8 July 1982.

22. *Unomásuno, Excélsior*, 22 May 1982.

23. The 1947 collective security pact of the nations of the Western Hemisphere against aggression, armed or otherwise, occurring within this region.

24. 'The OAS lost legitimacy because it lost representativeness. And the TIAR lost viability because the enemy stopped being common in an interAmerican context.' Helio Jaguribe, *Folha de São Paulo*, 26 June 1982, p. 3, quoted in Celso Lafer, 'La política exterior brasileña y la crisis del Atlántico Sur', *Estudios internacionales*, Oct.–Dec. 1982, Vol XV, No 60, pp. 462–72 at p. 470.

25. *Unomásuno*, 6 April 1982.

26. *Unomásuno*, 24 June 1982.

Castañeda was quick to take this opportunity to express Mexico's doubts about the desirability of invoking this treaty, since it had been used on several occasions against its original purpose (defence against an extra-territorial threat) and had served internal political purposes on other occasions (concerning Cuba and Guatemala).[27]

With the imminence of the arrival of the British task force in reaction to the Argentine occupation of the islands, Argentina invoked the TIAR, calling a meeting of consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS member states on 20 April.[28] The majority of OAS members agreed to hold the 20th Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers which gave Argentina qualified support. It is interesting to note in passing that only three Latin American Foreign Ministers failed to attend the OAS meetings to discuss the Falklands question; significantly, Castañeda was one of those absent, being represented by Rafael de la Colina. The meeting issued two resolutions,[29] the most important points of which were that Argentina's right to sovereignty over the Falklands was recognized (a stand which was logically to be expected in view of the fact that the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the OAS had approved a document supporting Argentina's claims over the possession of the islands in January 1976);[30] and that Britain was urged to cease hostilities within the security region defined by the TIAR, and Argentina requested to 'refrain from taking any action that may exacerbate the situation'.[31]

During the debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 1 Mexico and Colombia sided with the United States on whether the Anglo–Argentinian conflict should be dealt with at the UN, within the framework of Resolution 502 of the Security Council.[32] An important point of Resolution 1 was Article 6, which deplored the economic and political coercive measures adopted by the EEC and urged the lifting of such measures, indicating that they constituted a serious precedent since they were not envisaged by Resolution 502 of the Security Council and were 'incompatible with the charters of the UN and of the OAS, as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade'. It is interesting to note that it was the economic sanctions imposed on Argentina by the EEC which most deeply disturbed the Latin American countries. In the Latin American multilateral organizations these sanctions aroused a wave of indignant opposition, and within these institutions Mexico also voiced its concern. Enrique Iglesias, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) stated that the sanctions represented 'an unprecedented risk'.[33]

27. *Unomasuno*, 24 June 1982.

28. In a vote taken on whether or not this meeting should be held, eighteen countries voted for, none against, and three abstained (the United States, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago).

29. Resolution 1 of 28 April and Resolution 2 of 29 May. Both were adopted by a vote of seventeen in favour, none against and four abstentions (Chile, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States). The text of both resolutions can be found in *International Legal Materials*, May 1982, Vol. XXI, No. 3. On the OAS position during the conflict see G. Connell-Smith, 'The OAS and the Falklands conflict', *The World Today*, Sept. 1982, Vol. 38, No. 9, pp. 240–7.

30. *Financial Times*, 21 Jan. 1976; Resolution 1 in *International Legal Materials*, May 1982, p. 670. Following the adoption of Resolution 1, the US government decided to apply coercive measures against Argentina and was giving support, including material support, to the United Kingdom, a fact which contravened the spirit and letter of Resolution 1. Thus, Article 5 of Resolution 2 urged the US government to order the immediate lifting of coercive measures against Argentina and to refrain from assisting Britain, 'in observance of the principle of hemispheric solidarity'. Article 5, Resolution 2, 29 May 1982, *International Legal Materials*, May 1982, p. 674.

31. Articles 1 and 2 of Resolution 1, *International Legal Materials*, May 1982, p. 670, on the legal authority of the Inter-American Juridical Committee to issue declarations regarding territorial disputes see Seymour J. Rubin, 'The Falklands (Malvinas), international law, and the OAS', *The American Journal of International Law*, July 1982, Vol. 76, No. 3, pp. 594ff, *Latin America Weekly Report*, 30 April 1983.

32. *Unomasuno*, 15 April 1982.

33. *Unomásuno*, 16 April 1982

The Andean Pact opened its market to Argentinian products as a response to the European sanctions.[34] Carlos Alzamora, Secretary-General of the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA), affirmed that coercive measures against a Latin American country by extraregional powers supporting colonial interests were extremely grave, and proposed that the member states of SELA should use their defensive mechanisms.[35] In this context, Mexico joined the protests, voting in favour of a resolution of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI), opposing the EEC's economic sanctions against Argentina and joining in issuing a communiqué (which was approved unanimously by the eleven members of ALADI) 'exhorting' the EEC to lift the sanctions.[36]

Within the United Nations, Mexico's Ambassador Porfirio Muñoz Ledo was quite active and his personal diplomacy was committed to helping Argentina diplomatically in that forum. In one of the Security Council's sessions held to discuss the South Atlantic Muñoz Ledo made a speech which was basically a repetition of Mexico's official position (that the two parties should cease hostilities and search for a negotiated peace within the framework of the UN), but couched in less ambiguous language of an anti-colonialist cast, declaring that the Anglo–Argentine conflict should not provoke the 'resurgence of colonialist attitudes' and of 'wars of domination'.[37] This anti-colonialist rhetoric on the part of Mexico, almost absent during the early phases of the conflict, became more blatant on the part of Foreign Minister Castañeda once hostilities were over and Argentina had surrendered. Castañeda stated that the Latin American countries should present a common front to exert pressure on Britain within the framework of the UN 'to put an end to one of the colonial vestiges' in the Western hemisphere.[38] And it was on a Mexican initiative that the Latin American countries presented a petition to the effect that the Falklands problem should be dealt with in the 37th General Assembly of the UN. After the Argentine defeat, Mexico considered 'prudent silence' the best policy, and joined the other Latin American countries whose policies during the episode had ranged from 'correct but unenthusiastic support for Argentina'[39] to restraint or neutrality on the part of Brazil, Colombia and Chile.

Conclusions

It may be asserted that Mexico's discreet diplomacy towards the South Atlantic conflict was the best policy for its own purposes. It avoided sharing the embarrassment of those Latin American countries which had acted as Argentina's staunchest supporters (Venezuela, Peru, and Panama). Mexico did not allow its attention to be distracted from its first foreign policy priority, Central America, and actually took advantage of the Anglo–Argentine conflict to improve and acquire more leverage in its bilateral relations with the United States. By not joining in the anti-American denunciations of many Latin American countries Mexico demonstrated that it was not searching for gratuitous confrontations with the United States and could still act as a bridge between the latter and the rest of Latin America. Mexico

34. *Unomásuno*, 16 April 1982
35. *Unomásuno*, 18 April 1982.
36. *Unomásuno*, 24 April 1982.
37. *Crónica de las Naciones Unidas*, July 1982, Vol. XIX, No. 7, p. 11; *Excélsior*, *Unomásuno*, 23 May 1982.
38. *Excélsior*, 24 June 1982.
39. *Latin America Weekly Report*, 25 June 1982.

made clear that while its policy towards Central America may have been a major cause of friction with the United States, it would not allow US support of Britain in the South Atlantic war and its lack of 'hemispheric solidarity' to cause more strain in Mexican–American relations.

Apart from these direct political advantages which were sought by Mexico there were other, incidental returns: for example, American support for Britain offered the advantage of possibly neutralizing Argentina's future meddling in Central America as a US proxy.

Mexico's cautious diplomacy enabled it to maintain its traditional cordial relations with Britain and did not substantially modify its ideological and diplomatic detachment from the Argentine military. That Mexico's relations with Great Britain remained virtually unaltered during and after the South Atlantic conflict was confirmed when Queen Elizabeth made a five-day trip along the Mexican coast in February 1983, proving that the Head of the British royal family could visit a Latin American country after the Falklands confrontation and still be greeted with enthusiasm: 'As to the Falklands, the general goodnaturedness of the Mexican crowds towards the Queen simply confirms the suspicion that there was little sympathy for Argentina during the conflict.'[40]

The Argentine defeat in the Falklands War also meant the demise of the Argentine military. Their spectacular retreat from the political scene and the return to democracy in Argentina, with a new government elected by a clear majority, will no doubt be a major factor in attitudes to the dispute over the Falklands both in Latin America and worldwide. As mentioned above, the political situation in Argentina, both internally and as reflected in its foreign involvement in Latin America (particularly in Mexico's 'backyard', Central America) constituted the main obstacle to the development of friendly relations between Argentina and Mexico. These obstacles removed, Mexico may well feel freer to take a more committed stance in supporting Argentina over the Falklands issue, one more akin to the main tenets of Mexican foreign policy. Admittedly, the present Mexican government has given clear signs of being less bent on the populist brand of Third Worldist diplomacy espoused by its two predecessors; but it has equally clearly maintained Mexico's traditional non-interventionist principles in a more sober mode resulting both from the personal style of the new Mexican President and from the country's current financial crisis. In addition, Alfonsín seems to be joining Mexico in supporting the Contadora group's proposals, to say nothing of the major debt problem shared by the two countries. These new points of coincidence could well augur improved relations and greater future solidarity between the two leading Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America.

40. John Carlin, 'Mexico returns to grim reality after five-day celebration for the Queen', *The Times* 24 Feb. 1983.

The Indian Ocean: arc of crisis or zone of peace?

CHANDRA KUMAR*

The Indian Ocean was not considered to be an area of prime significance in political or strategic terms until the late 1960s. The outbreak of cold war in the late 1940s and its continuance in the 1950s had highlighted deteriorating East–West relations and international attention had been focussed on the 'North', where the nerve-centres of the international system were located. North–South polarization, dialogue and confrontation between the rich, industrialized nations and the developing nations of the Third World had not yet aroused any serious concern. The Indian Ocean area largely escaped the attention of academics and scholars, political and military strategists: after all, no serious naval engagements of any consequence had taken place on the waters of this ocean during the Second World War.

A striking change has, however, taken place in the Indian Ocean and its littoral states during the past two decades. What had long been seen as a peaceful 'British lake' has turned into an arena of confrontation. The growth of rivalry among the Northern powers for political and economic advantage, commercial jealousies and the frantic quest for markets for the vast quantities of military and consumer goods produced by the industries of the West—these pressures have transformed the region into an area of turbulence and tension, a focal point for crises of all descriptions and an area of crucial geostrategic importance. It has become entangled in the grand oceanic designs of the superpowers, and competing strategic and commercial interests have led to a rapid arms build-up of both conventional and nuclear arsenals. This extensive militarization of the region poses a grave threat to the peace and stability of the littoral and hinterland states along the ocean's entire reach. The eruption of conventional wars or a nuclear showdown by accident, miscalculation or design cannot be ruled out.

Arc of crisis

Several developments have contributed to this transformation. The announcement in 1968 by Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the British decision to withdraw its forces from east of Suez led to the development of a power vacuum. Like nature, the superpowers abhor a vacuum and rushed in to fill the void by establishing a naval and military presence in the area. Other local and regional conflicts in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Africa and south-east Asia were responsible for further escalation of tension. The Israeli-Arab dispute, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war and the American hostage crisis in Tehran, on top of the 1973 oil price shock, all raised the regional temperature, and the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in 1979 exacerbated an already potentially explosive situation.

The United States was perturbed by developments in the Persian Gulf area, which was considered to be of vital importance to it and its allies, owing to their dependence

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on oil supplies from the area. President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, observed: 'An arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean with fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries.'[1] Statements such as this have borne witness to the existence of a second cold war, this time with its theatre of operations as Asia rather than Europe, and embracing most of the areas of tension in the Indian Ocean region. The existence of this new cold war has vitiated the security environment of the majority of the littoral and hinterland states of the region, in the main newly independent nations which have gained their freedom during the past thirty-five years. With the exception of Australia, Thailand, South Africa and Israel, almost all of them are Third World states, and have been occupied in the first decades of their independence with the task of consolidating their political structure and grappling with enormous social and economic challenges. Their weakness and instability presents a tempting invitation for foreign intervention; and the superpowers, who are seriously engaged in the business of establishing bases, acquiring facilities for fighting their own war of nerves and securing permanent footholds for the maintenance of their military and naval establishments, are not above taking advantage of the situation. All kinds of pressure tactics, including financial inducements, offers of arms and equipment and veiled threats are used to gain their objectives. The superpowers have unleashed a fierce arms race and their secret services are fully occupied in helping insurgents, hiring agents and recruiting mercenaries to enable them to influence and manipulate the internal politics of states, even to the extent of ousting uncooperative regimes. Little concern is shown for the susceptibilities, sensitivities and aspirations of sovereign states, most of whom simply want the power blocs to quit the area and leave them alone. They are, however, relatively defenceless against the encroachments of the superpowers.

Why, then, have the United States and the Soviet Union chosen to become so involved in the region? The American strategy is clearly outlined in the annual military posture statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 1981 statement contains the following remarks:

> The United States has a number of major interests in the region comprising the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Northwest Indian Ocean. These interests involve access by the U.S. and its allies to the resources of the area, most notably oil from the Persian Gulf States—to include protection of transportation routes for the flow of that oil to North America, Western Europe and Japan . . . In the past year, the United States has taken a number of steps to improve the military balance in Southwest Asia. U.S. objectives call for a greater military presence, a capability to surge additional forces into the region, and access to facilities sufficient to support both peacetime presence and contingency operations . . . The United States has concluded agreements for use of support facilities in Oman, Somalia and Kenya. Improvement of facilities in Diego Garcia is already under way.[2]

Such passages show very clearly that US hardliners have full faith in following an aggressive military strategy in pursuit of their objectives. President Carter had issued

1. *Time*, 15 Jan. 1979.

2. Quoted in Namboodiri, Anand and Sridhar, *Intervention in the Indian Ocean* (New Delhi. ABC, 1982), pp. 159–60. Excerpts published in the book are taken from USICA *Backgrounder*, 7 February 1981.

a grim warning in January 1980 that 'Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force'.[3] Unfortunately, such tough postures are not compatible with the realities of current international politics, especially with reference to the rising power and capabilities of the USSR. When their own interests are threatened, both the superpowers display similar reactions and responses. Namboodiri in his astute analysis states: 'Despite the call for peace and apparent adherence to UN system, the superpowers have time and again demonstrated their proclivity to militarily intervene in situations when their interests are threatened. The U.S. intervention in Indo-China, Iran, Lebanon, Dominican Republic and Guatemala and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and French intervention in Zaïre are only some of the more pronounced in a long list of overt and covert interventions in the third world.'[4]

In addition to its strategic interests and its concern to keep the sea lanes open, the United States also wants to protect its huge investments in the area and establish markets for its consumer products. It also enjoys a lion's share of the lucrative arms trade in which most of the big powers, including the Soviet Union, participate actively. The Indian Ocean area is also a valuable source of imports of the vital strategic raw materials required by the industrial economies of the West. Moreover, West European countries and Japan look towards the United States to counter Russian attempts at predominance in the region. The entire gamut of Soviet activity—military, political, economic, and diplomatic—is viewed as a danger, and is seen as necessitating an accompanying Western build-up. The US presence in the ocean is seen as tangible evidence of Western interests in the area, as well as an expression of its determination to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming predominant in the region.

The Soviet Union has maintained a military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean since 1968, partly as a strategic response to the challenge to its security posed by the presence of American nuclear submarines in close proximity to its southern flank, compounded by political factors and the long-term interests of its own economy and that of its partners in the eastern bloc. The Indian Ocean route forms an important link in the all-weather sea lanes between its far eastern fleet based in Vladivostok and northern fleets based in the Baltic and Black Seas. Russia's growing trade and commercial ties with several countries in the region have led to a considerable expansion both of its merchant fleets and of the naval protection accorded to the sea lanes and commercial highways. Soviet support is given to the underground liberation movements in South Africa against the white minority regime and to SWAPO in its struggle for the liberation of Namibia; also to the regimes in Angola and Mozambique for the purpose of combating South African raids and incursions into their territories.

The Soviet Union is chiefly alarmed, however, by the introduction into the ocean of nuclear-powered submarines with a capability for launching ballistic missiles at the southern flank of the Soviet landmass, and has been strengthening its anti-submarine defences and increasing its naval strength in these waters to meet this new threat. The members of NATO, and also Australia and Japan, have been watching the

3. Namboodiri, Anand and Sridhar, *Intervention*, p. 158.
4. Namboodiri, Anand and Sridhar, *Intervention*, pp. 162–3.

phenomenal expansion of Soviet naval forces with increased concern and have been urging the United States to match Soviet naval strength in the region. The action-reaction cycle thus set up has created an extremely unstable situation.

The geopolitical setting

The Indian Ocean has an area of 28,350,000 square miles and is framed by Asia, Africa and Australia. In the south, it extends to the Antarctic Ocean, but, apart from its southernmost stretches, its surface waters are generally warmer than those of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Its northern extremity does not extend beyond the Tropic of Cancer and it may therefore be considered to be tropical in character. Five narrow stretches of water guard its eastern and western entrances, and these are considered to be of great strategic importance: the Cape of Good Hope, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Bab el Man-deb, Hormuz and Malacca.

The ocean has been the scene of maritime and naval activity from ancient times. Hindu political and naval ascendancy until the thirteenth century was followed by virtual domination by Arab merchantmen and navigators. This lasted until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Western naval powers fought out their battles for naval supremacy on these waters until, after the Napoleonic era, the Indian Ocean became a 'British lake'.[5]

The Indian Ocean region comprises thirty-six littoral and eleven hinterland states. It is a region of great diversity in religious and cultural backgrounds, traditions, economic structures, resources, area, population and levels of development. There are four very large states: Australia, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. India, with a population in the region of 700 million, is the most populous country, and the Seychelles, with a tiny (estimated) population of 66,000 (1980), the least. Standards of living range from one extreme to the other. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have the highest GNP *per capita* in the world: US$24,660 and US$20,900 respectively; they rub shoulders with the poorest countries in the world, Bhután and Bangladesh with *per capita* GNP of US$80 and US$120 respectively (all figures for 1981). The region is estimated to include 60 per cent of the world's crude oil reserves, and is an important source of raw materials and strategic minerals such as chromium, bauxite and manganese. Most of these materials are exported to the industrialized countries, the local economies lacking the infrastructure necessary for the processing and industrial exploitation of these commodities. Low population figures mean, too, that the indigenous demand for oil is very low, and the bulk of the production, over 90 per cent, is available for export to Japan, Western Europe and the United States. Fifteen per cent of the US requirement was imported from the area in 1982, and the figure is likely to rise in the coming years. It is possible that Eastern Europe may also try to import oil from this area from the mid-1980s onwards.

The Indian Ocean region has never in the past formed a single geopolitical unit; however, its development as an area of high commercial and strategic interest to the major powers and the complex global rivalry and competition for its resources have encouraged movement towards some regional cohesion. Individually, the countries are weak and incapable of defending themselves against the might of the great powers. India, Indonesia and Australia have modest navies, chiefly designed for coastal operations.

5 K. M Panikkar, *Asia and Western dominance* (London Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 121.

Militarization: the build-up

The naval vessels of the United States and the Soviet Union are now present in the Indian Ocean in considerable numbers. Small contingents of the British and French naval forces are also deployed to keep an eye on the commercial highways; and while they do not often indulge in flag-waving exercises, they are playing an increasing role in the overall situation. Australian, Pakistani and Indonesian naval power is by no means substantial. Japan has not paid much attention to the building of another naval fleet in postwar years, and the Chinese navy has confined itself mainly to its coastal areas. The Shah of Iran's dream of Iranian naval power seems to have been consigned to oblivion. India woke up with a start from its obsessive preoccupation with the build-up of its land forces in 1971, during the Indo-Pakistani war, when the United States decided to back Pakistan and attempted to apply pressure to India by moving the Seventh Fleet, led by the nuclear-capable *Enterprise,* into the Bay of Bengal. The attempt did not succeed but India had learnt its lesson and the Indian navy is being strengthened. It does not, however, have the resources to challenge the superpowers or to halt the arms race in the region by itself, which suggests that the possibilities of regional collective security arrangements need to be explored.

During the last few years, especially after the Soviet entry into Afghanistan, the United States has been able to establish naval superiority in the region. Between thirty and forty US combat and support ships are believed to be permanently present in the Indian Ocean, with Diego Garcia, the coral atoll in the centre of the Indian Ocean which has been the subject of so much controversy in recent years, as the main base for this activity. Construction programmes for the building of anchorage bays, submarine pens, runways and living accommodation for soldiers and marines are under way, and repair and storage facilities and missile silos are being established. B-52 bombers are operating from bases in Australia, from Guam in the Pacific and from the extended runway in Diego Garcia. The United States has succeeded in setting up a string of bases at strategic locations and establishing vital communication links between them. US sailors and marines can be seen on shore visits to port towns and holiday centres all over the ocean area.

While the Soviet response to the massive US build-up has been haphazard and the USSR does not have a similar line-up of bases, it is catching up, having built up a formidable naval fleet almost from scratch during the last two decades. The fifth operational squadron of the Soviet Pacific fleet, which includes Kresta-class cruisers, Kotlin guided-missile destroyers, submarines (several nuclear-powered), Krivak-class guided-missile frigates, minesweepers, oil tankers and supply and maintenance ships, along with the small aircraft carrier *Minsk,* patrols the Indian Ocean from time to time. The Dahlak archipelago in the Red Sea is the main base for Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean. The Russians, too, are engaged in considerable construction work on bases and facilities which they have acquired.

The most alarming facet of this build-up is that the area has become a theatre for nuclear rivalry between the nuclear giants. The first move was US deployment of submarines with facilities for launching nuclear ballistic missiles aimed at the southern flank of the Soviet Union. The challenge was met head on and the Soviet fleet of nuclear submarines and anti-submarine missiles has entered the arena. In the case of an exchange of missiles with nuclear warheads, Indian Ocean territories in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa will be caught in the cross-fire.

The flag-waving exercises and patrolling activities of small contingents, during the early 1970s, by the Soviet Union and the United States from their bases in the

Pacific, gradually increased in scale with the developments which changed the Indian Ocean region from an area of little consequence to one of crucial geostrategic importance. The increase in the number of naval vessels on the ocean and the frequency of their visits gathered pace with the outbreak of the second cold war and the intrusion of global superpower rivalry into the Indian Ocean area. The search for permanent bases and facilities in the ocean area itself started with the US acquisition of a fifty-year lease from the British on the use of Diego Garcia for the building of a communications base in 1972. It has since become a fully-fledged and well-equipped naval and air base. In due course, the United States obtained other bases closer to the Persian Gulf and the ocean entry straits, some of which were also required for use as springboards for the Rapid Deployment Force. The island of Masirah off the Omani coast, formerly an RAF staging post, only 400 miles from the straits of Hormuz is another important US base. The US navy has access to facilities in Berbera in Somalia, which was formerly used by the Soviet Union, and at Mombasa and at Nanyuki international airport in Kenya. In the case of an emergency, the United States could also use some ports in Saudi Arabia (Jubail and Yanbo), Israel (Eilat), Bahrain (Manama), Oman (Muscat) and Egypt (Ras Banas). The Australian government has offered the United States the use of its ports and bases, including Cocos (Keeling), which is closer to the strategic area than the other sites. Also available for US navy use with the agreement of the South African government would be the ports of Simonstown, Durban and Port Elizabeth. The French base at Réunion could also be made available. This is an impressive list and completely outclasses the Soviet acquisitions.[6]

The Soviet Union has a major base at Socotra in South Yemen. It is 180 miles off the Horn of Africa and was an RAF staging post during the Second World War. Dahlak archipelago, as mentioned above, is the main base of the fifth operational squadron of the Soviet Pacific fleet, and was Ethiopia's gift to the Soviet Union for its exclusive use. The Ethiopian Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab, which are not far from Dahlak, are also being developed by the Soviet navy. One of the most spectacular Soviet successes recently in this context has been the grant of rights by Vietnam to Soviet use of the bases of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, where they are expanding and modernizing the facilities built by the United States. Russia is also bringing pressure to bear on Vietnam to allow Soviet use of the Kampuchean base at Kompong Son, which is very close to the Straits of Malacca.

India and the Indian Ocean: security perspectives

The sub-continent of India occupies a central position in the Indian Ocean which, together with its peninsular character, endows it with several advantages. It is almost equidistant from Europe and the Far East and has easy access to the islands and the littoral and hinterland states of the ocean region. It has a coastline of 3,500 miles, and the islands of Andaman and Nicobar in the east and Lakshadweep in the west extend the lines of communication by another 700 miles into the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. India has been a maritime nation since ancient times, having established communication links and thriving trade relations with several countries in south-east Asia before the commencement of the Christian era. Those maritime links and its naval ascendancy, however, came to an end with the collapse of the Chola kingdom of South India in the thirteenth century.[7]

6. Milan Vego, 'The US navy in the Indian Ocean', *Naval Forces*, 1982, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 20–3.
7. Panikkar, *India and the Indian Ocean* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1945), pp. 33–4.

Indian scholar and diplomat K. M. Panikkar observed in 1945 that few historians have been able to appreciate the importance of the Indian Ocean for India, probably because their accounts, based on the chronicles of Muslim historians and focussing their attention on the changing dynasties in Delhi, had a central Asian focus and did not give appropriate emphasis to the South Indian kingdoms whose might and power were directly linked with maritime activities across the Indian Ocean. Panikkar pointed out: 'While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India, it is the vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected.'[8]

Unfortunately, not much heed was given to Panikkar's warning and it is only in more recent times that India has taken note of the alarming level of military and naval escalation in the region and taken steps to strengthen its own naval forces. Mrs Gandhi realized the gravity of the threat to India's security environment and stated in her address at the opening session of the Commonwealth heads of government regional meeting in New Delhi in 1980: 'The ocean has brought conquerors to India in the past. Today we find it churning with danger. The frantically increasing pace of militarization in the Indian Ocean makes the 3,500 miles of our coastline more vulnerable. How can we acquiesce in any theory which tries to justify the threat to our security environment or condone the existence of foreign bases and cruising fleets?'[9] The Indian Ministry of External Affairs noted the threat to India's security environment in its 1981 annual report: 'The epicentre of world tensions has clearly shifted from Europe to Asia. This is evidenced by the frantic build-up of military and naval presences in the Indian Ocean, search for new allies or bases, formation of Rapid Deployment Forces, the general situation in West Asia including the introduction of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan and the lingering tensions in South-east Asia. These developments have aggravated the security environment of India.'[10]

It is clear, then, that India's security is inextricably linked with the situation in the Indian Ocean, and that the country needs to develop a high level of maritime reconnaissance and coastal patrol capability. This is absolutely essential for an adequate defence of its long coastline, its outlying island territories, its offshore oil installations in Bombay High and adjacent areas, its exclusive economic zone stretching for 200 miles into the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and its continental shelf. Simultaneous preparedness for naval defence is required on the eastern and the western flanks, and this requires the development of two fully independent naval fleets. Events in 1971, at the height of the Indo-Pakistani war, have convinced India that it cannot afford to relax in its efforts to build up adequate naval strength to defend its territories. The presence of a Soviet naval task force in the vicinity at the time led to the withdrawal of the US Seventh Fleet from Indian waters. But India has not forgotten this attempt at 'nuclear blackmail' and will go to some lengths to avoid exposure to similar threats in the future. In more recent years Diego Garcia, a mere 1,100 miles away from the southern tip of India, has been developed as a fully-fledged naval base and the possibility of a US Rapid Deployment Force

8. Panikkar, *India and the Indian Ocean*, p. 84; see also *Historical relations across the Indian Ocean* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), Part 1, pp. 13–61.

9. Opening address by Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, to the Commonwealth heads of government of the Asia-Pacific region, New Delhi, 4 Sept. 1980.

10. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, *Annual report 1981*, published 1982.

being stationed there has increased the threat as perceived by India and other littoral states. The Indian Ministry of Defence report for 1980–81 stated: 'The enlarged military presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region, with the increase in one power's strength serving as an example for the expansion of another's, the expansion of bases and facilities, in particular the Diego Garcia base, and the deployment of a Rapid Deployment Force by the United States, threaten security and stability in the area.'

There are many other considerations affecting India's security concerns. India and several other non-oil-producing developing countries are dependent on imports of oil from the Gulf. Their dependence on oil is in no way less crucial than that of the United States and its allies, and any disruption of oil supplies because of US interference would affect the interests of India and other Third World states very adversely. India is not happy to see a stranglehold exercised by either superpower in this sensitive area, and quite understandably feels concerned about the monopolization of the large markets for foreign goods by vested interests of the Western industrial countries. India itself is a leading manufacturing country, counted among the top ten industrialized nations, and needs markets for its own goods. It resents exclusion from 'captive markets' and assured sources of strategic raw materials and minerals, which it sees as a manifestation of neo-colonialist attitudes.

Another factor is India's strong ethnic, cultural and emotional links with South Asian countries, including several island republics such as Mauritius, the Seychelles and the Maldives, where there are a large number of people of Indian origin. India, with its large size, population and resources is a major regional power and it is quite natural for other, smaller states in the area to look to India for assistance not only in economic and technical but also in security matters. India is the largest country in the Indian Ocean and as leader of the non-aligned movement is apparently quite anxious to assume such a role in the region, but the global rivalries of the major powers have denied it opportunity to do so. India feels very strongly that the menacing military and naval presence of the superpowers and their calculated interference in the internal affairs of the littoral and hinterland states of the area have a highly disruptive effect on their development.

The non-aligned movement

The shared experience of colonialism and imperialist domination has united most of the region's states in a resolve to keep out of international power politics and participation in military pacts and treaties. A platform of common interest has been provided by the non-aligned movement, which has given them self-confidence and a willingness to come together and develop collective self-reliance. These states are now increasingly reluctant to accede to superpower requests for grants of bases and facilities, though some do not find it easy to resist financial inducements or offers of arms which may enable them to defy any internal challenges to their power or authority.

India's foreign policy derives basically from its commitment to non-alignment. Jawaharlal Nehru, founding father of modern India and one of the principal architects along with Tito and Nasser of the non-aligned movement, declared (in 1946) that India was determined to 'keep away from power blocs or groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale'. Of the many countries which have gained

independence since 1947, a large proportion have come to the decision that their interests would be best served by peaceful coexistence. The membership of the non-aligned movement has risen from twenty-five in the early stages to 100. In her inaugural address to the seventh conference of heads of government of non-aligned countries in March 1983, Mrs Gandhi spoke about the significance of the movement:

> The very growth of the membership of our movement, twenty-five in Belgrade, a hundred now, proves that non-alignment meets a felt need of vast numbers of people in various continents. Its significance is not to be measured by the number of divisions or the megatons of destructive power we command, but by the intensity with which we desire peace and freedom, development and international justice. Non-alignment is not vague, not negative, not neutral. Non-alignment is national independence and freedom. It stands for peace and the avoidance of confrontation. . . . The desire for peace is universal even within countries which produce nuclear weapons and in those where they are deployed. The non-aligned movement is history's biggest peace movement. It welcomes these spontaneous upsurges of peoples. But governments persist in propounding, practising and pursuing the self-same strategic interests, spheres of influence, balance of power and tutelary relations reminiscent of the earlier theory of divine right.[11]

The Western press, except for some brief reports and even shorter notes, did not take much notice of the Delhi summit. However, the final declaration aroused a storm in the United States, where there was much resentment of the criticism levelled at the United States and Israel by name whereas 'it did not single out the Soviet Union in voicing the group's opposition to "foreign forces" in Afghanistan'.[12] While there may have been some justification for this feeling, the *Washington Post* went all out to attack the movement. The *International Herald Tribune* reproduced an editorial from the *Washington Post* entitled 'Crooked nonalignment'—a disconcerting reflection of attitudes towards a movement representing 100 nations and voicing the concerns of over one third of the human race—which stated: 'The nonaligned movement is like the United Nations, only more so. Evidently braced by one another's company, member governments seem to feel liberated—and obligated—to attack the United States on the fashionable issues of the day, notwithstanding the unfairness, irrelevance or unhelpfulness of the attacks'.[13]

'Zone of peace': the work of the UN ad hoc committee

Joined in its serious concern about the militarization of the Indian Ocean by the majority of littoral and hinterland states of the region, India became the leading spokesman in the campaign for the removal of the military and naval presence of the superpowers. The issue was raised for the first time at the conference of non-aligned states at Lusaka in 1970. This summit called upon all states to respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In 1971 a Sri Lankan motion in the General Assembly of the United Nations was adopted, and in Resolution 2832 (XXVI) the Assembly stated

11. *Final documents of the seventh conference of heads of state or government of non-aligned countries*, New Delhi, March 1983, Annexure II, pp. 2, 5.
12. *International herald tribune*, 16 March 1983.
13. *International herald tribune*, 16 March 1983.

that 'the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all times as a Zone of Peace'. In 1972 an ad hoc committee was established by the Assembly to study the implications of this declaration. In 1974, the Assembly called on the great powers to refrain from increasing their military presence in the Indian Ocean region, requested the littoral and hinterland states to consult with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean, and invited all states, especially the great powers, to cooperate with the committee (Resolution 3259A (XXIX)).

The meeting of littoral and hinterland states was held in July 1979. It adopted, without a vote, principles of agreement for implementing the 1971 declaration, dealing with the limitations of the zone, the elimination of the great powers' military presence there, the elimination of their military bases, the denuclearization of the ocean, the non-use of force, regional cooperation and the free use of the ocean by vessels of all nations. Another significant step forward was taken when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 34/80B of 11 December 1979,[14] containing the decision to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean which had been under discussion for several years. The Assembly selected Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, as the venue of the conference, to be held in 1981. The Resolution also contained a provision for the enlargement of the membership of the ad hoc committee from twenty-three[15] to forty-six (it is at present forty-seven) to include those permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean (Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Liberia, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) that were not already members. The enlarged committee was entrusted with the task of undertaking the preparatory work for the Indian Ocean conference.

Enlargement of the ad hoc committee has, however, turned it into something more resembling a debating society, and little progress has been made towards the implementation of its mandate. The United States and its allies are no longer enthusiastic about the convening of the conference, and all attempts made by the non-aligned members of the committee to focus attention on the crux of the matter, fixing of dates for the conference, have been frustrated by the determined opposition of the reluctant Western members. These countries maintain that the situation changed drastically with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and that there can be no meaningful progress until that invasion has been reversed. They also assert that it is essential to secure 'complete harmonization of views' and 'convergence of positions' on the substance of the matters for discussion and negotiation at the conference, before the conference is held. The UN General Assembly has been noting 'with regret' since 1980 that the conference scheduled to be held in 1981 has still not been convened. It has been renewing the mandate of the ad hoc committee year by year and urging it to apply itself to the task, sort out differences of opinion, and carry out its instructions to set up the conference. The ad hoc committee has been holding several sessions each year since 1981 but its members have not as yet resolved their differences.

The littoral and hinterland states are not completely united in their approach to the controversial principle of the elimination of all foreign military presences and foreign bases from the area; some of them are veering round to the view that a limited or

14. Fourteen nations abstained in the vote: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States.

15. The original twenty-three members were Australia, Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen Arab Republic, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Zambia.

balanced superpower presence is desirable. The majority of the states on the periphery of the ocean are nevertheless in favour of discussing all the differences and divergent approaches at the proposed conference. They feel that the question of Afghanistan is not covered by the terms of reference of the ad hoc committee and that it is not competent to resolve the differences on this issue. It is conceded that it may be unrealistic to expect miracles to take place at the conference, but if the superpowers have managed to sit together to discuss detente and arms reduction in the START negotations in Europe, why should it be impossible for them to discuss certain other differences in Colombo?

The choice lies between dialogue and confrontation. By refusing even to talk in a common forum, the powers who are adopting inflexible attitudes are jeopardizing the initiative taken by Third World nations towards reducing conflict and tension in a highly strategic and populous area of the world. The bottleneck has been caused by the procedure for participation in the work of the ad hoc committee, which is based on consensus. The prospect of a resort to voting would not find favour with some major maritime users of the Indian Ocean and any decisions taken without their participation would not lead to a very happy situation, indeed, might even exacerbate the situation in the region instead of ameliorating it. The US representative on the committee expressed his misgivings about the possible consequences of a change in procedure, stating at the meeting on 23 November 1982 that the consensus procedure was vital for his country's participation in the work of the committee and that any attempt to press for a vote would have the 'most serious consequences' for US participation in the committee. There is, however, no consensus of views among research scholars in Indian Ocean studies on the US attitude. One has written:

> Initially, the United States ignored the work of the UN committee to create a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. The Reagan administration has taken the line that the real threat to regional peace comes from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and from regional disputes and arms races. In going beyond the original framework of General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI), which declared the Indian Ocean to be a peace zone, the United States and its allies have in fact signalled to regional powers in the Indian Ocean area that the validity of an argument depends upon the power of the country concerned.[16]

India has been vociferous in its call for the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and has consistently deplored the tendency to import the cold war atmosphere into the deliberations of the ad hoc committee. Addressing a meeting of the committee on 28 May 1982, the Indian representative, T. P. Sreenivasan, said that the committee had become an arena for some countries to engage in propaganda warfare and polemics. He added: 'What we require is a political will on the part of the great powers and other major maritime users to contribute constructively to the work of the committee.'[17] The UK representative, Anthony Goodson, told the committee that it was no good pretending that the goal of the conference could be achieved quickly or easily. There were a number of fundamental issues on which some states were divided, and those differences were on matters elemental to the success of the conference. He said that the impasse in the committee had been due to changes in the international climate since the adoption of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a

16 Ashok Kapur, *The Indian Ocean: regional and international power politics* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 212.

17. United Nations Department of Public Information, New York (henceforth UN/DPI) press release 10/122, 28 May 1982.

zone of peace and that those changes had affected states within the Indian Ocean region.[18]

One apparently encouraging feature of the debates in the committee has been the Soviet approach to the 'zone of peace' idea. While one may suspect that the superpowers share a similar outlook and approach to power politics and the maintenance of a balance of power in the region, whatever they might say in public, the Soviet Union has been a consistent supporter of the zone of peace concept in its public utterances. Whatever cynics may think about its real motives, its representatives on the committee have always expressed willingness to take an active part in the Indian Ocean conference. Vladimir V. Shustov, speaking at a committee meeting on 28 May 1982, said that the Soviet Union was prepared to use every opportunity to realize the concept of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and to resume bilateral negotiations with the United States on the reduction of military forces, including nuclear weapons, in the Indian Ocean region.[19]

The non-aligned states have consistently extended their unanimous support for the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. During the seventh conference of heads of government of non-aligned countries at New Delhi in March 1983, the matter was taken up again. The summit participants reaffirmed their strong support for the efforts being made towards the attainment of the objective of the 1971 declaration, the implementation of the principles enunciated at the meeting of the littoral and hinterland states of July 1979 and the achievement of the aim of the ad hoc committee in setting up the proposed conference. They also urged all great powers and other major maritime users to participate in that conference in a constructive spirit and meanwhile to start reducing their military presence in the Indian Ocean area.[20]

The message of the non-aligned summit seemed, at first, to have had some impact on the deliberations of the ad hoc committee. It was galvanized into action on the opening day of the third session on 12 July 1983, when it decided to dispense with a general exchange of views and to devote the current session mainly to work on substantive and organizational issues relating to the holding in 1984 of the Indian Ocean conference. The Soviet delegate stated that the relevant decisions of the non-aligned summit in New Delhi held out new hope for the work of the committee and reiterated his delegation's commitment to participation in practical work preparatory to the conference. On 19 July Bernard A. B. Goonatilake (Sri Lanka) introduced a draft resolution in the ad hoc committee on behalf of the non-aligned group, proposing that a three-week conference on the Indian Ocean be held in Colombo starting on 4 June 1984. This was the first occasion on which specific dates for the conference had been mentioned.[21]

There was, however, no evidence of any change of heart on the part of the group of nations opposed to the convening of the conference until certain conditions had been met. The US delegate declared that it was unrealistic to hope at this stage that an Indian Ocean conference could succeed in resolving regional conflicts or in reaching general agreement on establishing a zone of peace in the region. Concluding his statement, the US delegate, David Adamson, stated that the United States was ready

18. UN/DPI press release 10/161, 19 July 1983.
19. UN/DPI press release 10/122.
20. *Final documents of the seventh conference of heads of state or government of non-aligned countries*, political declaration, p. 18, para. 78.
21. UN/DPI press release 10/161.

to attend the conference once a realistic basis for that zone had been agreed upon in the committee, and once political will had been exercised to improve the political and security climate in the region, notably through the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.[22]

As a consequence of this continued deadlock the ad hoc committee concluded its third session of 1983 without reaching agreement on its annual report to the General Assembly and without agreeing on a date or terms for convening the conference in 1984. Subsequently, after several meetings of its group of 'friends of the chairman', which was set up to continue consultations on the committee's report to the General Assembly, the committee submitted a draft report in November 1983, 'regretting' the failure of the committee to reach a consensus on finalizing dates for convening the conference in 1984.[23] This draft report also contained a draft resolution recommending the continuance of the work of the ad hoc committee 'to make decisive efforts in 1984 to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean, in consideration of the political and security climate in the region and with a view to enable the opening of the Conference in Colombo in the first half of 1985'.[24] It was approved by the Political and Security Committee of the United Nations in December 1983 and is to be taken up in the General Assembly shortly. According to press reports, the Chairman of the ad hoc committee, Ambassador Fonseca of Sri Lanka, had stated that if the will to hold a conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace existed, it could be held, but that that will had unfortunately been less than forthcoming on the part of some members of the committee; hence the third postponement of the conference to 1985. According to further press reports about the discussions, the Indian delegate and deputy permanent representative at the UN, Vinaya Varma, criticized by implication the Western powers for setting preconditions with regard to the political and security circumstances of the Indian Ocean area and said that such preconditions were merely a pretext to kill the proposal for the conference.

Conclusion

The members of the non-aligned movement have expressed their apprehension about the continued divergence of views on the holding of the Indian Ocean conference. The heads of government of Commonwealth countries, meeting in New Delhi in the last week of November 1983, once more expressed their disappointment that despite the expressed wishes of the littoral and hinterland states and the adoption in 1971 of the UN declaration there had been a further increase in the military presence and rivalry of outside powers in the Indian Ocean with adverse consequences for peace and security in the area. They called upon all governments concerned to reach agreement for the convening of the proposed conference in 1984, or early in 1985 at the latest.

The concept of the zone of peace is an attempt to reduce tensions and conflicts in international waters in a sensitive, crisis-ridden area of the world. It is a measure of vital importance for resolving the deadlock caused by the clash of interests between the generally poorer peoples who live in the Indian Ocean territories and the outside powers who are determined to pursue their own interests, by all available means.

22. UN/DPI press release 10/164, 22 July 1983.
23. UN/DPI press release 10/164.
24. UN General Assembly A/AC159/L56/Rev. 1, 12 Nov. 1983.

It is in the interests of all members of the world community to keep the maritime lines of communication open for international trade. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was adopted last year, guarantees passage for all ships through international waterways, with referral in cases of disagreement on interpretation or implementation of the regulations to an international tribunal. This has been suggested as a precedent for a way of settling disputes between the nation states of the Indian Ocean region and external powers.

It has been suggested that the major powers have never taken the idea of a zone of peace seriously, and that so long as they have the power to enforce their wishes, they will not be willing to relinquish the bases, facilities, spheres of influence, assured supplies of oil and other vital materials and markets for their lucrative arms industry which they have established in the region. To whatever extent this is in fact the case, the states of the Indian Ocean area would do well to try to establish greater unity and cooperation among themselves and devise ways and means for achieving collective self-reliance. The security of the region is unlikely to be assured until some such progress is made.

Japan, China, the United States and the United Kingdom, 1951–2: the case of the 'Yoshida Letter'

CHIHIRO HOSOYA*

In September 1982 the Japanese Prime Minister visited Beijing to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between his country and the People's Republic of China. Until September 1972, Japan had maintained diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government, regarding it as the legitimate government of China, although its actual control had been limited to Taiwan—an abnormal situation which began with the conclusion in April 1952 of the peace treaty between Japan and the Republic of China. The Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, had committed Japan to such a treaty by his letter of 24 December 1951 to John Foster Dulles, the Republican special adviser to the Secretary of State, who had played a decisive role in shaping the Japanese peace settlement on behalf of the United States. This document, the 'Yoshida Letter', did not reflect the direction of Japan's policy towards China which Yoshida himself wished to pursue, and was written very reluctantly, under considerable pressure from Dulles.

Although this episode itself has long been known of, much fuller information about the events of the time has recently become available. In the seventh declassification of postwar diplomatic documents, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released in September 1982 a number of documents concerning US–Japanese negotiations over the issue of relations with China which culminated in the 'Yoshida Letter'. In addition, diplomatic documents released by the British Foreign Office in January 1982 shed much light upon Anglo–American relations at this time. If these new sources of information are studied alongside the US diplomatic documents which have been available for some years, a clearer and more accurate picture emerges of the process leading to the writing of the 'Yoshida Letter' and the discord which the letter generated between the United States and Britain.

The Dulles–Morrison understanding

The Japanese peace conference which opened in San Francisco on 4 September 1951 was marked by the absence throughout of any Chinese delegation; and as China had fought Japan for longer than any other ally and had suffered more from Japanese invasion than any other nation, this lack lent the conference a decided air of artificiality. The reason for this unnatural arrangement was of course the existence of the 'two Chinas'. The Nationalist government, which had fought Japan as the legitimate Chinese government recognized by the allied powers, had lost the subsequent civil war and taken refuge on the island of Taiwan (Formosa). This government continued to be recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of China. The communists, triumphant in the civil war, had established the government of the People's Republic of China on the Chinese mainland in

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October 1949 and had received formal recognition by the United Kingdom on 6 January 1950. The resulting problem of which government was to be invited to participate in the peace conference persistently eluded resolution, with the United States insisting on the Nationalists and the United Kingdom on the communists. Finally, a compromise was agreed, which took the form of the so-called 'Dulles–Morrison understanding' of 19 June 1951, and which contained the following two points: first, that China would not be invited to the coming peace conference to sign the multilateral peace treaty; and second, that Japan's future attitude towards China 'must be determined by Japan itself in the exercise of the sovereign and independent status' to be conferred on it by the multilateral treaty.[1]

However, this 'understanding' by no means embodied complete harmony of thought or intention. The continuing discrepancy between American and British ideas of the policy Japan should pursue towards China led the two parties to conflicting interpretations of the second point of their understanding. The British hoped that Japan would establish *de facto* relations with the People's Republic, and therefore tended towards a strict interpretation: that Japan should refrain from making any decision on the matter until the peace treaty became effective, when it would be free to choose one of the 'two Chinas' in accordance with its own preference—hoping that sovereign and independent Japan would incline towards the communist government. Dulles, however, had no intention of subscribing to such a strict interpretation, thinking rather that it would be admissible to regard Japan as 'sovereign and independent' when it began diplomatic activites *before* the treaty became effective, and therefore that it could at this stage make its choice between the Chinese governments.

During the period of preparation for the peace conference, Dulles had very much in mind the problem of securing Senate approval of the signed treaty. As a participant in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, he had vivid memories of Wilson's failure to obtain Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty, and was determined that 'his' treaty should not suffer the same fate. In 1951, therefore, he watched political trends in the Senate closely, worried chiefly by the pro-Nationalist Republican Senators and the rise of McCarthyism. If there was any one issue on which a Japanese peace treaty could fail to obtain the necessary two thirds majority in the Senate, he reasoned, it would be the question of Japan's policy towards China, with opposition likely to increase should Japan seem to be leaning towards the Beijing government. A determined anti-communist himself, Dulles appreciated the sensitivity of the pro-Nationalists on this point, and considered it essential to the smooth approval of a peace treaty by the Senate to obtain from Japan some kind of prior commitment to recognition of the Taipei regime as the legitimate Chinese government. Consequently, he flatly rejected Clement Attlee's suggestion of June 1951, in an attempt to break the Anglo–American deadlock, that the task of supervising Japan's future relations with China be entrusted to the member countries of the Far Eastern Commission.[2]

On 19 May 1951 Dulles had received from Ambassador Sebald in Tokyo a communication stating that Yoshida had told the ambassador that the Japanese government under no circumstances desired signature of the peace treaty by the

1 *Foreign relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*), 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 1134–5.

2 Memorandum by Dulles, 9 Jan. 1952. 'Japan and China', pp. 1–2. John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ.

Chinese communist regime.[3] Dulles wanted a firmer assurance from Yoshida and on 6 August obtained a letter which stated that the Japanese government had no intention of concluding a bilateral treaty with the communist regime.[4] Still, however, he felt uncertain whether this would be sufficient to satisfy Senate anxieties. It was this uncertainty which led him to push for the formal, clear commitment to the line of policy on China desired by the United States which was eventually embodied in the 'Yoshida Letter', the acquiring of which re-opened the Anglo–American rift papered over by the Dulles–Morrison understanding.

British policy towards Japan

After the conclusion of the San Francisco peace conference, Dulles and Morrison flew to Washington together. During the flight, Dulles broached the subject of their differing interpretations of the 19 June understanding with a view to resolving them. Mentioning the political difficulty of obtaining Senate consent to the treaty, he tried to draw Morrison towards acceptance of his position. Morrison, however, was unyielding. Although he was not opposed, he said, to some practical arrangement between the Japanese government and the Chinese Nationalist government, he insisted that it would be 'seriously objectionable' to Britain for Japan to recognize the Nationalist regime as 'having legitimacy and power to bind all of China'. He added that if such a recognition occurred prior to the coming into force of the peace treaty, this government would be exposed to the 'charge of having been deceived by the United States'.[5]

The Minister of State, Kenneth Younger, second in command of the British delegation to San Francisco, was equally adamant, and proposed that Britain should postpone parliamentary ratification of the Japanese treaty to put pressure on Japan not to incline towards a pro-Nationalist course. This suggestion, however, did not gain much support in the British Foreign Office, where such tactics were seen as too coercive. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was by and large in favour of Japan adopting a policy of equidistance from the two Chinese governments.[6] For example, R. H. Scott, Chief of the Japan and Pacific Department, wrote in a memorandum dated 26 September 1951: 'From our point of view, we would prefer Japan trade with both Formosa and the mainland of China without, however, taking an early decision on recognition of either.'[7]

In early October 1951 Sir Esler Dening arrived in Tokyo to assume the post of head of the British Liaison Mission which had been vacant since Sir Alvary Gascoigne's departure in February 1951. Dening, who was to become the first postwar British ambassador to Japan, was known as a Japan expert in the Foreign Office and had long been involved in policy-making with regard to the Japanese peace settlement.

On 8 October Dening communicated to London his opposition to the delaying of British ratification as a means of influencing Japanese policy. In the same letter, he reported a conversation with Sebald, to whom he had said that although it was understandable that the Japanese would seek 'some kind of a *modus vivendi*' with Taiwan to enable the establishment of trade relations, 'a formal treaty would be quite

3. 'Japan and China'.
4. *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 1241–2
5. *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 1343–4.
6. Memorandum by Kenneth G. Younger, 18 Sept. 1951, FO371/92604 (London: Public Record Office).
7. Memorandum by R. H. Scott, 26 Sept. 1951, FO371/92603.

another matter'.[8] Towards the end of the month, Dening reported to London that 'the Japanese would probably like to establish a *modus vivendi*' with the People's Republic.[9] This was obviously seen as desirable by the British Foreign Office in the context of its attempts to encourage Japanese equidistance from Beijing and Taipei, and accordingly it was strongly opposed to any diplomatic move on Japan's part which might be taken to contravene the spirit of the Dulles–Morrison understanding, such as the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Nationalist government or declaration of intent to conclude such a treaty, before the multilateral treaty signed at San Francisco should come into force.

Two considerations lay behind the British attitude. The first was political. British policy had traditionally sought to establish Japan and China as counterforces to Russian expansionism in the Far East, and now wished to see them acting as counterweights to Soviet power in the region. UK policy-makers hoped that the development of relations between the Beijing government and Japan might encourage China to pursue a political course independent of the Soviet Union. Whereas Washington saw inter-state relations in the Far East in cold war terms and adopted a strategy of containment aimed at uniting non-communist nations in the region against the monolithic communist bloc of the Sino–Soviet alliance, London operated within a framework of power politics and had in mind a diplomatic strategy quite different from that of the United States to cope with the Soviet threat.

The second consideration was economic. In the years preceding the Second World War, Japanese products had penetrated British colonies and dominions to the detriment of British exports. Remembering this, Britain feared that Japan could once more become a threat to its position in the South-east Asian market, an anxiety exacerbated by the United States which, eager to re-establish Japan as its partner in the Asian cold war, was advising the Japanese to make South-east Asia its major export outlet. Had not China, argued the British, been the most important market for prewar Japan? Was it not therefore natural for the two countries to reforge close trade relations? If this could be brought about, it would be easier for Britain to maintain its position in the South-east Asian market. Interesting in this connection is the long memorandum sent to London from the British Liaison Mission in Japan on 2 October 1951. The memorandum was a discussion of future Japanese economic and political relations with Asia, and its concluding part read as follows:

> Japan's attitude to Asia certainly has changed but little from pre-war days . . . I can only say that the majority of Japanese have no idea of the legacy of hatred they may have left behind them in South-east Asia . . . Though the war taught Japan some lessons, she still aspires to be a world power and her dependence on Asia for the achievement of this ambition is still the same. Though Co-prosperity may change its name, and probably some at least of its most detestable features, it still remains from Japan's point of view, a conception, one pre-requisite of which, the elimination of paramount western influence in Asia, has been established.
>
> If China has been lost and Japanese military and naval power abolished, probably for ever, the best of the old Co-prosperity Sphere is open under favourable conditions to Japanese economic penetration and Japan's security is now guaranteed by the greatest military and naval power in the world.[10]

8. Esler Dening to Herbert Morrison, 8 Oct. 1951, FO371/92604
9. Dening to William Strang, 30 Oct. 1951, FO371/92603.
10. Memorandum by United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan, 2 Oct. 1951, FO371/92603.

Yoshida and the policy of equidistance

As mentioned above, Yoshida had given Dulles before the peace conference his assurance, orally and in writing, that Japan had no intention of making an approach to the Beijing government. However, in spite of these reassurances, Yoshida began to show a somewhat equivocal attitude towards the China issue after the peace conference had been convened. This may have resulted from an impression gained by Yoshida from his meeting with US Secretary of State Dean Acheson in San Francisco on 3 September that Washington's own attitude on the question was not necessarily rigid. Acheson advised the Japanese Prime Minister that Japan should take time for deliberation before deciding on its China policy. Kumao Nishimura, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who accompanied Yoshida, recalled later that Acheson, in contrast to Dulle's overt pro-Nationalist sympathies, seemed detached and logical in discussions on the subject.[11]

Yoshida's position was becoming embarrassing. At the same time that Morrison was warning him that decisions on Japan's relations with China had to be made freely by independent Japan after the implementation of the multilateral treaty,[12] Republican Senator Alexander Smith, a member of the US delegation, was urging him to make public as soon as possible his intention of concluding a treaty with the Chinese Nationalists. However, as a veteran diplomat, Yoshida must have considered how best this Anglo–American divergence might be exploited. His own views on China, based on a great interest in the country and experience in a number of diplomatic posts there, bore some resemblance to those of British statesmen and officials: like them, he expected that the Beijing government would eventually become another Titoist regime; like them, he saw China as a valuable potential market for Japanese exports. Thus he had reason to agree with the British on the appropriateness for Japan of a policy of equidistance from the two rival Chinese governments.

R. H. Scott reported in a memorandum Yoshida's enigmatic statement that 'Japan's role would be to "democratise" China'.[13] At the same time, Yoshida was telling Dulles and Smith that his choice in favour of the Nationalists was final. His real intention at this time was probably simply to postpone for a while any decision on the China issue and gain time to see how the situation would develop.[14] In late September, after a conversation with Yoshida and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadao Iguchi, George Clutton, chargé at the Liaison Mission, reported to London: 'The present Japanese intention is not to commit themselves to the Nationalists . . . Japanese policy towards the Nationalists in Formosa is concentrated solely on the development of trade.'[15] His report suggests that the Japanese government was trying to find a way to edge towards a position of equidistance between Taipei and Beijing, a tendency stimulated by the arrival of Dening in Japan.

Dulles and Senate consideration of the peace treaty

On 12 September 1951, immediately following the end of the San Francisco peace

11. Kumao Nishimura, *Nihon Gaikō-shi*, Vol. 27: *Sanfuranshisuko heiwa jōyaku* (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 191–2.
12. Memorandum by Scott, 26 Sept. 1951, FO371/92603.
13. Memorandum by Scott, 26 Sept. 1951.
14. Shigeru Yoshida, *Kaisō jūnen*, Vol. 3 (Tokyo, 1957), p. 73.
15. George Clutton to Scott, 27 Sept. 1951, FO371/92604.

conference, fifty-six US Senators joined in signing a letter to the President declaring that 'prior to the admission of the Japanese Treaty to the Senate, we desire to make it clear that we would consider the recognition of Communist China by Japan or the negotiating of a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime to be adverse to the best interest of the people of both Japan and the United States'. If Japan were seen to be inclining towards Britain's line on China policy, the wrath of the Senate would inevitably be aroused, making approval of the treaty very uncertain. If approval were denied, all the effort Dulles had put into the peace-making process for more than a year would have been in vain—to say nothing of the repercussions for his political career, in particular his aim of becoming Secretary of State in a Republican administration. In early October, therefore, he declined President Truman's offer of the first postwar ambassadorship to Japan in order to be able to give his undivided attention to the passage of the peace treaty through the Senate.

Dulles saw two diplomatic moves on his part as necessary to ensure ratification. The first was to induce the British to form a 'common front' with the United States on Japan's China policy; the second to rebuke Yoshida for his apparent drift towards equidistance. In this connection, Dulles was glad to see a Conservative government returned in the British general election in late October and the advent of an administration headed by Sir Winston Churchill. It was known that the Conservative Party had been divided over the issue of recognizing the Beijing government, and Dulles not unreasonably hoped for some change in British policy on the subject.

On 7 November Dulles sent a telegram to Acheson, who was in Paris for a foreign ministers' conference, announcing his intention of going to Japan in mid-December, accompanied by Senators Alexander Smith and John Sparkman, and also stressing the necessity of negotiating with Britain, in the hope that the new British cabinet might acquiesce in at least a limited treaty between Japan and Nationalist China which 'would be operative with the *de facto* authority' of that government.[16] His immediate reason for this visit was concern at the ambiguity of certain statements by Yoshida to the Japanese Diet which not only avoided specifying which Chinese government he intended making peace with, but also mentioned the possibility of opening a Japanese trade office in Shanghai to promote trade with mainland China. One influence behind these utterances was certainly rooted in domestic policies, in which context China policy was a very delicate question: the strong interest in China trade within a certain section of the business community had to be taken into account. However, it is reasonable to assume that his statements also reflected his own inclination for a policy of equidistance. Whatever their origin, they were highly irritating to Dulles, who had expected that Yoshida would make a firm statement on China policy to the Diet, and who now felt it necessary to go to Japan himself and obtain directly from Yoshida a reliable indication of the latter's intention. There were other contributory causes of Dulles's uneasiness, among them a memorandum of 30 October from the State Department Office of Chinese Affairs, which he undoubtedly read; analysing the possibility of a rapprochement between Japan and the People's Republic, it concluded that 'it is not safe to assume that Japan intends to conclude a peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government'.[17] Another was his suspicion that the British were encouraging the Japanese government to change its stance towards China away from the line favoured by the United States.[18]

16. Dulles to Dean Acheson, 7 Nov. 1951, *FRUS*. 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, p. 1393.
17 Perkins to Dean Rusk, 30 Oct. 1951, *FRUS*. 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, pp. 1389–90.
18 William Sebald to Acheson, 30 Nov 1951, *FRUS*. 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 1419–20.

Anglo–American talks aimed at adjusting differences over Japan's China policy were held in London on 13–14 November. Livingston Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, who represented the United States in these discussions, appealed to the British to form a common front with the Americans, stressing that if Japan did not indicate within a few weeks its intention to establish 'reasonable relations' with the Taipei government, the ratification of the treaty in the Senate could be jeopardized. Explaining that 'reasonable relations' meant agreements to develop trade and settle matters mentioned in Article 4(a) of the peace treaty, he tried to gain British support for a flexible interpretation of the Dulles–Morrison understanding, favouring the US version. The two-day talks produced a new memorandum, which contained the agreement that neither government would object 'if, in view of the importance to Japan of regularising her relations with the authorities in Formosa, the Japanese Government wish, before the Peace Treaty comes into force, to engage in preliminary discussions with the Chinese Nationalist Government for this purpose'.[19]

Ambassador Dening was not happy with this formulation. He suspected that Dulles would interpret liberally the term 'regularising Japan's relations with the authorities in Formosa' and try to induce Japan to conclude an agreement with the Nationalist government that would be virtually equivalent to a peace treaty. He conveyed his unease to the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who was also in Paris for the foreign ministers' conference. Eden, impressed by Dening's concern, told Acheson that he would follow the policy of the previous cabinet toward the China problem—in other words, that he would stick to the basic line of the Dulles–Morrison understanding and oppose Japan's initiation of 'preliminary talks' with the Nationalist government. Acheson asked Eden to reconsider, but negotiations ended inconclusively with the agreement that the matter should be settled at talks between Dulles and Denning expected to be held in Tokyo in December.[20]

Both Dulles and the American diplomats in Tokyo were increasingly displeased with Dening's activities and strongly suspicious of his influence upon Yoshida's attitude toward the China problem. When William Sebald accompanied Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk for a talk with Yoshida, he felt confirmed in this suspicion. On this occasion Yoshida told his guests that, since allied disunity regarding the China question was a serious matter, he had been wondering whether Japan might not make some 'contribution' in relation to the question. Yoshida stressed, however, that he did not have any particular measure in mind and assured them that he would not enter into 'direct negotiations' with the Beijing government without the knowledge of the United States.[21] This was the first time that the Japanese Prime Minister had indicated to the American officials a wish to play an active, independent role toward the China question. Surprised by this change in Yoshida's attitude, Rusk and Sebald assumed that he was trying to lay 'a foundation of some sort for further suggestions or moves which he anticipated we might find disagreeable'.[22] It now seemed clear to Sebald that Dening had exerted considerable pressure upon Yoshida. In a communication to Washington, he was bitterly critical of the British, who, he said,

19. Summary record of meetings held at the Foreign Office on 13–14 Nov. 1951 to discuss 'Japan's future relations with Formosa'; also Anthony Eden to Dening, 14 Nov. 1951 FO371/92604.

20. Dening to Eden, 15, 16 Nov. 1951, FO371/92604.

21. Livingston Merchant to Dulles, 26 Nov. 1951, *FRUS*. 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 1412.

22. Memorandum of conversation by Rusk. *FRUS*. 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 1416–18.

appeared to be urging the Japanese not to establish diplomatic relations with Taipei, while dangling before their eyes the 'mirage of benefits to be derived from closer affiliation with continental China'.[23]

Sebald was also critical of Yoshida's opportunism in 'toying with possibility of entering into direct negotiations with Chinese Communists for the avowed purpose of "being helpful" to the United States in finding a solution to the China problem'. He summarized the attitude of the Japanese government toward the China problem as follows: 'In view of evident Anglo–American differences on this subject, any affirmative actions taken by Japan regarding either regime in China will be apt to offend either the US or the UK; therefore the most prudent course for Japan is to eschew such actions pending the return of full sovereignty and possibility of further developments which might place Japan in a more advantageous position.'[24]

The 'Yoshida Letter'

Dulles arrived in Tokyo on 10 December for his third series of talks with Yoshida, Senators Smith and Sparkman having arrived two days before via Taipei. The political context of these talks was characterized by Anglo–American discord, Yoshida's inclination for a policy of equidistance between Taipei and Beijing, American displeasure with Dening's covert manoeuvring in Tokyo and British antipathy to Dulles's breach of faith with regard to the Dulles–Morrison understanding and to his high-handed tactics. An additional factor was Yoshida's diplomatic flirtation with Dening, which Dulles had watched with considerable disapproval and was determined to stamp out. It seemed to be a good time to force a showdown on the matter, with the United Kingdom apparently having given away its best card by ratifying the San Francisco peace treaty in parliament.

In a conversation with Vice-Minister Iguchi on 12 December, Dulles expressed his desire that the Japanese government might consider a 'bilateral agreement' to enter into friendly relations with the Nationalist government, recognizing it as 'a government on a *de facto* basis', not as 'the government controlling the whole of China'.[25] In the afternoon of the following day, the first formal session was held, in which Yoshida showed Dulles a Japanese plan of an agreement intended to normalize relations between Japan and the Nationalist government. This consisted of seven articles and contained the following two provisions: first, that Japan and Nationalist China would normalize traffic between them, and that their two governments would exchange special diplomatic missions; and secondly, that the Japanese and Chinese Nationalist governments would begin negotiations to conclude an agreement as prescribed in Article 4(a) of the multilateral peace treaty. This plan conformed to the Anglo–American agreement of 14 November. It also reflected a Japanese desire to postpone the conclusion of a Sino–Japanese peace treaty until the question of Chinese representation was internationally settled. The plan specified in its preamble that it aimed to normalize relations between the two governments with regard to the areas over which the Nationalist government was actually exercising its governing power.[26]

Dulles then read a prepared memorandum which expressed his views on Japan's

23 Sebald to Acheson, 30 Nov 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, pp. 1419–21.
24 *FRUS*, 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, pp. 1419–21.
25 Documents relating to the third Dulles mission, Records of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (henceforth third Dulles mission, JFMA), Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo.
26 Third Dulles mission, JFMA Also see Nishimura, p. ?15.

relations with China. He stated that the Nationalist government of China was recognized as the lawful government of China by the United States and by a large majority of members of the United Nations. Moreover, it controlled an important link in the offshore island chain, of which Japan was also a part. From the 'strategic and security standpoint', therefore, Japan and the Nationalist government 'are interdependent and need to be cooperative'. On the other hand, the communist regime was condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations and was mounting in North Korea a major military threat to Japan. 'Under these circumstances', he concluded, 'Japanese interests might best be served if the Japanese Government were to negotiate with the Nationalist Government of China with the view of arranging that following the coming into force of the multilateral treaty of peace there should also be brought into force a bilateral treaty with the National Government of China which would restore peace and reestablish relations along the lines of the multilateral treaty, but with the understanding . . . that the applicability of the bilateral treaty is to territories under actual control of the contracting parties.'[27] This, the 'Dulles memorandum', made it clear that Dulles wanted Japan to do more than merely normalize its relations with the Nationalist government.

Yoshida answered that he had 'in principle no objection' to the Dulles memorandum, but also expressed his hope of making some 'contribution' to solving the China question and went on to speak of his views on it.

> The China problem cannot be solved by military force. The free nations should enlarge their contacts with China and give opportunities for the people under Communist control to expose themselves to the liberal atmosphere of the free nations. Because of its cultural and racial affinity with China, Japan may serve this purpose better than the United States and Britain. Please place your trust in Japan and let it lead the free nations in enlarging contacts with China. The reason for the present condition befalling China can be traced ultimately to the collapse of cooperation among the powers in China. It is essential to solve the China problem to revive this cooperative relationship, or at least to bring forth a complete Anglo–American agreement on China policy.[28]

In short, 'Japan might be able to play an important role in weaning China from domination by the Soviet Politburo'.[29] However, Dulles had no time for Yoshida's arguments. He had already made up his mind and saw his task now as simply to coerce Yoshida into acceptance of his own prescription for Japan's China policy.

In parallel with the Yoshida–Dulles talks, negotiations between Dulles and Dening were taking place. The possibility of compromise was slight from the beginning. Eden had stated his position unambiguously in his instructions to Dening, dated 8 December: 'I am firmly opposed to anything in the nature of a treaty between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek even in respect to Formosa. Practical trading arrangements will no doubt be necessary'.[30] Dulles's expectation that the change from a Labour to a Conservative government would bring with it some change in China policy had proved to be misplaced. His tone to Dening was far from conciliatory, however. 'He said', reported Dening to Eden after a conversation with Dulles on 12

27. Dulles to John Allison, 13 Oct 1951, *FRUS*. 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 1437–8.
28. Nishimura, pp 315–16.
29. Dulles to Allison, 14 Dec. 1951, *FRUS*. 1951, Vol 6, Part 1, pp. 1438–9
30. Eden to Dening, 8 Dec. 1951, FO371/92605.

December, 'he thought the Americans could if they wished persuade the Japanese to do what they wanted because they held more cards than we did.'[31]

The next day Dulles conferred with Dening again, after talking with Yoshida, and repeated for his benefit the oral memorandum he had given Yoshida. He told him that American policy had been firmly set and explained that the presentation of such a memorandum had become necessary because Yoshida's statements in the Diet had had an adverse effect upon the attitude of the Senate toward the peace treaty. When Dening suggested that Dulles's memorandum seemed to be contrary to the Dulles–Morrison understanding, Dulles simply repeated that it would not prejudice Japan's future relations with mainland China. After this conversation, Dening informed London: 'It looks as if the Americans are going to go ahead with this whether we like it or not. The Japanese certainly will not like it. But they may well give in under pressure.'[32]

Upon receiving Dening's reports, Eden sent on 16 December a telegram to Sir Oliver Franks in Washington, instructing him to protest to Acheson. 'I am advised', Eden stated, 'that such a treaty, even limited in this way, would be evidence that Japan recognised the Nationalist regime as the Government entitled to end the state of war between China and Japan. Such a treaty must prejudice Japan's future relations with mainland China.' The American attempt to coerce Japan into concluding such a treaty was 'hard to reconcile' with the Dulles–Morrison understanding, and it would certainly appear to many Japanese as a 'serious derogation from the status' which they would acquire when the peace treaty came into force. Therefore he instructed Franks 'to persuade Mr Acheson not to press the Japanese to take any action with regard to Formosa before the Peace Treaty comes into force'.[33] This telegram also revealed Eden's personal reservations about Dulles. 'Apart from my dislike of the substance of Mr. Dulles's proposals', he added toward the end of the telegram, 'American tactics in this matter make me uneasy. It seems to be another example of their weakness for pursuing a temporary domestic political objective . . . regardless of longer term consequences in the international field.' To Dening, he gave on 17 December instructions that it would no longer be necessary to confer with Dulles.[34]

After a visit to the Republic of Korea, Dulles held his second meeting with Yoshida on 18 December. It was in this meeting that Dulles handed Yoshida a draft letter and requested him to sign and return it. This was the original 'Yoshida Letter': a version of the Dulles memorandum rewritten in the form of a letter from the Japanese Prime Minister. Its most important section read as follows:

> My government is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the National Government of China, if that government so desires, a Treaty which will reestablish normal relations between our governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral Treaty of Peace, the terms of such bilateral treaty to be applicable as regards the territories now or hereafter under the actual control of the Japanese and Chinese National Governments . . . I can assure you that the Japanese Government has no intention to conclude a bilateral Treaty with the Communist regime of China.[35]

With this document Dulles appeared finally to have pinned Yoshida down.

31. Dening to Eden, 12 Dec 1951, FO371/92605.
32. Dening to Eden, 13 Dec. 1951, FO371/92605.
33. Eden to Oliver Franks, 16 Dec. 1951, FO371/92605.
34. Eden to Franks, 16 Dec 1951.
35. Draft letter handed to Yoshida by Dulles, 18 Dec. 1951, *FRUS 1951*, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 1445–6.

However, during the remaining two days before Dulles's departure Yoshida attempted his final resistance. On 19 December Japanese officials busied themselves in negotiations with the Americans on revisions to the text of the letter, and minor alterations were conceded.[36] However, one major bone of contention persisted. The point in dispute was the phrase 'the terms of such bilateral treaty to be applicable as regards the territories now *or hereafter* under the actual control of the . . . Chinese National Government' (emphasis added). Dulles had explained to the Japanese as well as the British several times that the bilateral treaty would be applicable only to the areas actually controlled by the Nationalist government, as stated in the Dulles memorandum a few days previously. But the text of the Yoshida Letter contained the words 'now and hereafter' which could be harmful to Japan's future relations with continental China; in view of the hostile expressions against the Beijing government that were scattered throughout the letter, it might even be construed to imply Japanese support for the Nationalist counter-offensive against the mainland. The insertion of the word 'hereafter' was therefore very disagreeable to Yoshida, who had hoped to leave as much room as possible for normalizing Japan's relations with Beijing. However, Dulles steadfastly refused to yield on this point. On his departure, Iguchi followed him to the airport for a last negotiation, but achieved no progress. Having heard over the telephone of Dulles's attitude from Iguchi at the airport, Yoshida finally decided he could do nothing but surrender.[37] On 24 December he signed the letter and sent it to Dulles.

On the same day, Yoshida wrote another letter to Dulles, asking for American economic assistance for the construction of power plants. 'Economic ties between Japan and the United States are as important as political ties between us', he stressed.[38] Since the Yoshida Letter would leave Japan with little hope of reentering the China market, Japan would on the one hand have to consider entering South-east Asian markets in spite of British domination in the region and, on the other hand, have to develop close economic relations with the United States to reconstruct the Japanese economy. This second letter of Yoshida's demonstrated his awareness of the need to cope with these constraints on Japan's external economic relations.

Anglo–American conflict over the Yoshida Letter

The Yoshida Letter reached Dulles on 7 January 1952. With the letter in his possession, Dulles was no longer worried about the fortune of the treaty in the Senate; the spotlight shifted on to relations between the United States and the United Kingdom, with the imminence of the Anglo–American conference in Washington, at which Churchill and Eden were to be present. Topics on the agenda ranged from the unification of European armed forces to the Middle East, and included the issue of Sino–Japanese relations. Anglo–American discord on the latter question had remained unresolved since Eden had protested to Washington about the Dulles memorandum. Dulles had promised Yoshida that he would resolve the dispute, and this conference offered him an opportunity to do so. It seems certain that, although the question of Sino–Japanese relations was discussed by Eden, Acheson and Dulles,

36. Japanese document titled 'Observations', undated, *FRUS 1951*, Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 1446.
37. Author's interview with the late Ambassador Sadao Iguchi, 6 Nov. 1978.
38. Third Dulles mission, JFMA.

no substantial progress was made towards a solution of their differences, with both sides largely sticking to their established positions.[39]

On 7 January, the day on which both the letter and the British leaders arrived, Sino–Japanese relations came up for brief discussion in the first session of the conference. The question was again taken up on 10 January, when substantial discussion seems to have taken place between Acheson and Dulles on one side and Eden and Franks on the other. Nothing transpired, however, beyond an agreement to disagree.

Although the Americans had told the British of the need for a public statement by the Japanese on China policy, the Yoshida Letter itself did not figure in the discussions at the Washington conference. Consequently the dispute flared when the American government published the letter on 16 January, immediately after Eden's departure from New York, and the day before the Senate was due to begin its consideration of the Japanese peace treaty—a time selected to maximize its effect on the Senators. Eden was shocked, having neither been shown the text of the letter nor even told that it would be published immediately after his departure. The timing of publication, moreover, appeared to give the public the impression that Eden had agreed while in Washington to revision or abolition of the Dulles–Morrison understanding. This made him vulnerable to the attack of the opposition at home. Eden was extremely angry, feeling that he had been served a 'dubious trick',[40] and confirmed in his dislike of Dulles, whom he regarded as a 'sly fellow'.[41]

Later, Acheson regretted that the episode had been 'an inexcusable bungle'.[42] However, Rusk, while admitting American responsibility for its unhappy consequence, recalled that the responsibility should not be attributed entirely to the Americans, since Franks had known the text of the letter but had failed to inform his own government of it. Thus, he argued, a communication gap within the British government had been partly responsible for the shock to Eden.[43]

A few days after publication of the letter, Acheson wrote to Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian Foreign Minister:

> The talks with Eden were very useful and I think established a good relationship between him and me. The incident of the Yoshida Letter has perhaps cast a shadow over this. To some degree I think we were at fault in not being more explicit about the whole matter and not informing him specifically about the publication, but I think in some degree also there was some fumbling and error on the British side. I have made my regret very clear to Eden and I do not think that he believes we intentionally misled him.[44]

Acheson did not, however, fully understand the background to Eden's anger. It was not caused simply by the sudden publication of the Yoshida Letter; rather, it was an eruption of animosity which had been accumulating in the British Foreign Office against Dulles's high-handedness ever since the Dulles–Morrison negotiations in June 1951. This lofty approach, with its assumption of the 'logic of strength', was

39 Dean Acheson, *Present at the creation* (New York, 1969), p. 604.
40 Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (New York, 1972), p. 298
41. Rusk's statement at Princeton Seminars, 14 March 1954. Papers of Dean Acheson, Truman Library (henceforth Acheson papers).
42. Acheson, p. 604
43. Rusk's statement at Princeton Seminars, 14 March 1954. Acheson papers.
44 Acheson, p. 604; Anthony Eden, *Full circle* (London, 1960).

apparent in such documents as a report to Acheson dated 26 December 1951, in which Dulles had written that when the Dulles–Morrison understanding had been made, it had been 'taken for granted by the British government that Japan would in fact align itself with the United States' policy' towards China. In the same report, he had also written of American pressures upon Japan with regard to the China question: 'Such pressures as there are are inherent in the relationship of Japan to the United States and rest upon the basic fact that Japan, unable to defend its own sovereignty, which is in mortal danger, must and does rely on the United States.'[45]

Helped by the Yoshida Letter, the San Francisco Peace Treaty easily obtained the approval of the Senate on 20 March: Dulles's task was successfully accomplished. However, the disharmony which had developed between the Americans and the British in the peace-making process and over the letter did not soon disappear. Anglo–American friction was basically a product of the differing interests of the two nations in East Asia and in their respective perceptions of East Asian policy, considerably exacerbated by mutual personal distrust between the diplomatic leaders of the two nations. Before the Presidential election of 1952, Eden wrote to Eisenhower asking him not to appoint Dulles as Secretary of State in the event of a Republican victory.[46] This continuing mutual distrust cast a long shadow over Anglo–American relations throughout the 1950s, especially during the Suez crisis of 1956.

The Yoshida Letter is a document of considerable historical significance which was decisive in determining Japan's basic postwar diplomatic posture. Although some assurance of Japan's intentions was certainly necessary to ensure Senate approval of the peace treaty, the evidence and analysis presented above does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that this had to take the form of such a letter obtained in such a way. The consequences of the letter were great, not only in turning Japan towards Nationalist China and away from the People's Republic, but also in its repercussions on the Anglo–American relationship, which was not soon to recover.

45. Dulles to Acheson, 26 Dec. 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp 1467–70.
46. Michael A. Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: a statesman and his time* (New York, 1972), p. 64.

The Holy See and the postwar Palestine issue: the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the Holy Places

SILVIO FERRARI*

The fate of Jerusalem and the other Holy Places in Palestine, so strongly linked with the origins of Christianity, has always commanded the Holy See's interest and has led it on a number of occasions to undertake political initiatives designed to guarantee a Catholic presence in the Holy Land. As early as 1922, Cardinal Gasparri, the Vatican Secretary of State, had publicly expressed the fear that the terms of the British mandate on Palestine, which at the time was being approved by the League of Nations, might give the Jewish population a privileged position and might compromise the rights of the Catholic Church regarding the protection of the Holy Places. These fears gradually faded away in the following years; but the problem of the fate of the Holy Land was reawoken by the Second World War, antisemitic persecution throughout Europe, increasingly urgent requests to allow Jews to emigrate *en masse* to Palestine and, finally, by the British government's decision to relinquish its mandate. In an uncertain and changeable political climate, the Holy See decided that the best solution to protect the Catholic Church's rights in Palestine would be the internationalization of Jerusalem, and to this end arranged many political and diplomatic initiatives and mobilized the Catholic hierarchy and faithful throughout the world in support of such a move. The essential features of this attempt are well known, but no exhaustive study of it has ever been made. Using documents from US and British archives recently made available to scholars, this article sets out to clarify those aspects of Vatican policy which could be guessed at but not proved from a reading of Pius XII's encyclicals and the articles in the *Osservatore Romano*.

The attitude taken by the Vatican on the Palestine issue at the end of the Second World War was unequivocally and succinctly stated in the summer of 1949 by John Victor Perowne, the British plenipotentiary minister at the Holy See:

> The Vatican would have preferred, from the point of view of the fate of the Holy Places and of Catholic interests in Palestine generally, that neither Jews nor Arabs, but a Third Power, should have control in the Holy Land. Such a solution it well knew, however, was unattainable, and in the actual circumstance it preferred the Arabs to the Jews.[1]

There is considerable evidence proving this diagnosis to be true. Once the Holy See had overcome its suspicion of the Balfour declaration, it was generally satisfied with

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1. FO371/WV1011/1, Perowne to Attlee, 8 Aug. 1949; see also FO371/E6425, Perowne to Bevin, 4 May 1948.

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the British management of the Palestine mandate,[2] and particularly with the rigorous respect of the status quo that Britain assured, which had prevented the Orthodox Church from gaining new positions in the possession and administration of the Holy Places and which had permitted the Vatican to distance itself from France, whose traditional function as the protector of Catholic interests in the Holy Land had by now lost most of its meaning.[3]

Understandably, the British decision to relinquish the Palestine mandate, announced in spring 1947, was greeted with dismay in the Holy See, which could see no satisfactory alternative way of protecting Catholic interests in the Holy Land. The possibility most acceptable to the Vatican was that the administration of Palestine should be entrusted to the United Nations. Mgr McMahon, a leading figure in the conduct of Vatican Middle East policy, wrote in summer 1945: 'Palestine is international, an international (United Nations) government is another plan proposed; the idea is good, in fact far better than any of the others, because it does safeguard the sacred character of Christ's homeland.'[4] This idea was, however, not without drawbacks and soon proved to be difficult to implement because of the joint opposition of Arabs and Jews. It was quickly discarded.

The idea of creating an Arab state in Palestine, openly favoured by the Middle East Catholic community, was supported to some extent by groups involved in education and assistance work in Palestine and by some members of the Sacred Oriental Congregation, satisfied by the success that Vatican diplomacy had achieved in the Arab world and the good relationships that Catholic organizations operating in the Holy Land had with the leading members of the Muslim community. It was obvious to all, however, that the creation of an Arab state, although appearing in many Catholic circles to be the lesser evil, was nevertheless a step backwards, once more subjecting the Holy Places to Muslim domination, which seemed to have been definitively eliminated in 1917.[5]

The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was viewed even less favourably. The fears and worries of leading exponents of the Curia in Rome and the Holy See's concern over growing Jewish immigration into the Holy Land are well known.[6] There is nothing to suggest that this attitude changed after the end of the Second World War. As well as coming up against the incomprehension and suspicion of those sections of Catholicism inclined to interpret the dispersion of the Jewish people in theological terms, the return of the Jews to Palestine was something of an unknown quantity as regards the protection of the Holy Places and the safeguarding of Christian interests. In this connection Sir Alan Cunningham, the last British High Commissioner for Palestine, expressed a diffidence shared by most of the Christian

2. See M G Enardu, *Palestine in Anglo–Vatican relations, 1936–1939* (Florence: CLUSF, 1980); also many of Perowne's reports, for example, FO371/E6418, 15 May 1948.

3 On the end of the French religious protectorate in the Holy Land see S. I. Minerbi, *L'Italie et la Palestine 1914–1920* (Paris Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), pp. 152–73.

4 Thomas J McMahon, 'Threat to the Holy Places', *Sign*, June 1945 McMahon's proposal had a number of points in common with a plan under discussion at the State Department; see *Foreign relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*), 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 690–1, 727–32.

5. The risks of a new Arab domination of the Holy Places in Palestine were clarified by the Apostolic Nuncio in Washington, Mgr Cicognani, in a letter to Myron C. Taylor, 11 April 1941, see E. Di Nolfo, *Vaticano e Stati Uniti 1939–1952 dalle carte di Myron C. Taylor* (Milan. Angeli 1978), pp 299–300.

6 See S Minerbi, 'Il Vaticano e la Palestina durante la prima guerra mondiale', *Clio*, July–Sept. 1967, pp. 424–4; Enardu, *Palestine in Anglo–Vatican relations* pp. 21–2; Di Nolfo, *Vaticano e Stati Uniti*, p. 258; *Actes et documents du Saint-Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale: 9. Le Saint-Siège et les victimes de la guerre, janvier–decembre 1943*, Città del Vaticano 1975, pp 300–1

world when he wrote 'from the angle of Christendom, the worst that could happen to Jerusalem would be that it should come under Jewish control'.[7]

The Holy See preferred not to choose between these unsatisfactory alternatives. It is true that leading members of the hierarchy and much of the Catholic press did not hesitate to express their aversion to any idea of division of the Holy Land;[8] however, this position, which reflected the requests put forward by Arab nations and which was objectively in conflict with Jewish aspirations for national independence, was not taken up by the Secretary of State's office, nor did it lead to any diplomatic move by the Vatican in the crucial months in autumn 1947. The Custodia di Terra Santa and the Catholic Near East Welfare Association carefully avoided revealing any preference regarding the future government of Palestine, stressing in the statements given to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine that they were 'completely indifferent to the form of the regime which your esteemed Committee may recommend, provided that the interests of Christendom, Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox, will be weighed and safeguarded in your final recommendations'.[9] The Pope followed a similarly reserved line. Despite pressures from Arab countries and particularly intense pressure from the Christian Arab community in the Middle East,[10] he managed to avoid making any statement about the territorial aspects of the Palestine issue. The same line was taken by the Vatican-inspired press, which throughout 1948 did not publish any correspondence or comments that might be taken as being favourable to one of the contending parties.[11]

This reticence should not, however, be confused with lack of interest. The Holy See did not think it appropriate to make an official statement on the future of the Holy Land because it felt that neither the creation of a single Arab state nor the division of the region into one Jewish state and one Arab state was a satisfactory solution. It preferred to avoid taking any position on the problem and decided to concentrate its efforts on a different objective, namely the protection of the Holy Places and the Christian Arab community with a view to safeguarding the essential nucleus of Catholic interests in the Holy Land, even if Palestine should fall once again *in potestate infidelium*.

7. FO371/E11216, telegram, 26 Nov. 1947

8. The strongest statements came from Spellman 'The Catholic Church strongly opposes any form of partition, primarily on the ground that the whole land is sacred to Christ'; National Archives, Washington DC, Record Group 59, Central Files of the Department of State (henceforth NA), 867N01/1-3047, memorandum signed by G. Wadsworth, 13 Jan. 1947, and McMahon. 'No partition of [the Holy Land] can satisfy us, because some part of it would thereby be without Christ', 'Threat to the Holy Places'. For the tendencies in the American Catholic press, see E. Y. Feldblum, *The American Catholic press and the Jewish state. 1917–1959* (New York. Ktav, 1977), pp. 55ff., and for the French press, D. Lazar, *L'opinion française et la naissance de l'Etat d'Israel. 1945–1949* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1972), pp 177–219. The *Tablet*, the leading British Catholic newspaper, was also particularly hostile to the division plan.

9. See United Nations, *Official records of the second session of the General Assembly. supplement No. 11. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Report to the General Assembly*. Vol. IV, Annex B, A/364/Add. 1 and A/364/Add. 3 (Lake Success: 1947).

10. On the initiatives of the Christian-Arab groups see NA867N404/6-2047, Robert B. Macatee, US consul in Jerusalem, 20 June 1947; Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, 93.02/170/12, Eliachar to Fisher, 21 Jan. 1948; *Journal de Genève*, 11 Sept. 1947.

11. P. E. Lapide writes: 'le 14 mai, jour où Israél redevint un Etat, l'*Osservatore Romano* donna l'opinion du Vatican avec une clarté cristalline. "Le Sionisme moderne n'est pas le véritable héritier de l'Israel biblique mais un Etat laïque . . . c'est pourquoi la Terre Sainte et ses sites sacrés appartiennent au christianisme, le Véritable Israël"'; *Rome et les juifs* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1947), p. 345. The *Osservatore Romano* of 14 May 1948 does not in fact contain the sentence quoted by Lapide, nor does any other 1948 issue; there is, however, a similar statement, but expressed less peremptorily, in the 28 May issue.

Partition and internationalization

The idea of establishing Jerusalem as a separate entity, directly controlled by the United Nations, was developed during summer 1947 in a subcommittee of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, which was responsible for studying the problem of the Holy Places in Palestine. It was then included among the proposals put forward by the majority of this body and became an essential aspect of the plan to divide Palestine. For this reason, it obtained the support (albeit reluctant) of the Jewish Agency and of the countries which supported the creation of a Jewish state in the Holy Land. Thus it was reproposed in the report made by the first subcommittee set up in October 1947 by the ad hoc committee of the United Nations, approved by the United Nations on 25 November 1947 (as part, however, of a much wider plan for the division of Palestine) and finally accepted by the General Assembly under Resolution 181 (II) on 29 November 1947.[12] During this period of time the Holy See made no request, either publicly or confidentially, for the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Vatican's position had been confidentially made known to the Department of State by Cardinal Spellman in January 1947. During a meeting with the US ambassador to Iraq, Spellman expressed his opposition on the grounds of principle to the division of Palestine and added:

> If, however, partition be imposed, the opportunity must not be lost to prescribe a carefully conceived, detailed regime of guarantees and safeguards for the Holy Places and for the Christian minorities, both under the supervision of appropriate organs of the United Nations and the latter (i.e. provisions for the protection of Christian groups) to be such as might serve as a model, accepted by the Arab and all other Eastern states, for the treatment of their religious minorities.[13]

This position was reaffirmed in much greater detail in two official declarations presented to the UN Special Committee on Palestine by the Custodia di Terra Santa and the Catholic Near East Welfare Association. The latter in a memorandum of 5 June 1947 insisted particularly on the adoption of a detailed system of legal guarantees regarding religious freedom which would protect the Catholic community in Palestine from any discrimination;[14] the Custodia stressed the need, should the Holy Places come under Arab or Jewish control, firstly, for a special commission set up to guarantee 'free access to all sanctuaries at all times and the unhampered conducting of religious services' and, secondly, for the creation of 'solid international guarantees embodying effective protective measures for the safeguarding and preservation of . . . Christian shrines'. In this context an explicit reference was made—the only one in any way suggesting internationalization—to the idea of an

12 For a detailed account of the debates relating to the internationalization of Jerusalem undertaken in the UN see J. Le Morzellec, *La question de Jerusalem devant l'organisation des Nations Unies* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1979), pp. 63ff. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (and the subcommittee formed to deal with the Jerusalem question and the Holy Places in Palestine) was made up of representatives from Australia, Canada, Guatemala, The Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, India, Iran and Yugoslavia. The last three opposed the internationalization of Jerusalem and proposed the creation of a federal state with Jerusalem as its capital.

13 NA867N01/1-3047, memorandum dated 13 Jan. 1947, signed by G. Wadsworth. Spellman also met Warren R. Austin, head of the US delegation at the UN (see NA *Records of the US mission to Palestine, 1946–1948*, J. C. Ross to Rusk, 27 March 1948).

14 The memorandum is reproduced in the appendix of C. Rackauskas, *The internationalization of Jerusalem* (Washington, DC: Catholic Association for International Peace, 1956), pp. 73–8. The arguments in this memorandum had been developed in a declaration given to the press by one of Spellman's closest collaborators, Mgr James H. Griffith, see *Catholic News*, 17 May 1947 and *Documentation catholique*, 20 July 1947.

"enclave" for the Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem', but it was made clear that this was inadequate for the purpose of protecting the Holy Places in other parts of Palestine.[15]

It would seem, then, that initially the Holy See came to favour a system of guarantees which did not necessarily imply the creation of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum*. The origin of the internationalization plan cannot therefore be directly attributed to requests put forward by Christian religious confessions,[16] even though the desire to remove the Holy Places from Jewish and Arab control undoubtedly contributed to encouraging this solution. Rather, the plan must be attributed to the international policies of those countries (primarily France) which were interested in obtaining a sphere of influence throughout the Middle East by virtue of the UN presence in the Holy City. This conclusion seems to be supported by the fact that no statement was made by the Holy See expressing approval of the plan to internationalize Jerusalem adopted by the United Nations under Resolution 181 (II). Until October 1948, the Pope in his frequent statements on Palestine avoided any reference to the Holy City. Without authoritative guidance the *Osservatore Romano* and *Civiltà Cattolica* merely produced summaries and accounts that left out any value judgements. Spellman and McMahon, who were, and were to continue to be, important spokesmen for the Vatican's position on the Jerusalem issue, remained silent. The Vatican's diplomatic activity carried out in those months would also appear to be negligible. In April 1948 the Holy See communicated its 'profound anxiety for the safety of the Holy Places and particularly of the Holy City of Jerusalem' to the British and US governments and asked that all steps should be taken to protect the city.[17] In the same period the Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Griffin, the Custodia di Terra Santa and the Sovereign Military Order of Malta tried in various ways to encourage the recruiting of troops to protect the Holy Places in Palestine militarily,[18] but the Holy See always denied that it had ordered any of these initiatives and even declared that it was completely in the dark about one of them.[19]

It is difficult, given the present state of research, to find any convincing explanation for such a long period of silence, particularly when it is considered that in the same months leading exponents of other Christian denominations had resolutely expressed a favourable opinion about the internationalization of Jerusalem.[20] The

15. UN *Official records of the second session of the General Assembly*, A/364/Add. 3. The passages mentioned are taken from the evidence given to the Special Committee on Palestine on 15 July 1947 by Br Simon Bonaventure, a representative of the Custodia di Terra Santa.

16. Statements favouring internationalization of Jerusalem made by members of Protestant faiths (see note 20 below) all postdate the adoption of Resolution 181(II).

17. See FO371/E4707, Godfrey to Creech-Jones and NA501BB Palestine/4-818, 5-2148 and 7-948, Cicognani to Secretary of State.

18. See FO371/E4089 for the correspondence between Griffin and Bevin. For the efforts of the Custodia di Terra Santa, See NA867N404/6-1048, James C. Dunn to Secretary of State, 10 June 1948; for those of the Order of Malta see NA867N404/6-1648, James C. Dunn to Secretary of State, 16 June 1948. For the State Department's reaction, see NA867N404/6-1648, Marshall to Dunn, 18 June 1948.

19. In a meeting with Perowne, Tardini said on 3 May 1948 that he was not aware of Griffin's letter. See FO371/E6425, Perowne to Bevin, 4 May 1948

20. See in particular the statements made by the Archbishop of York, *The Times*, 16 Jan., 29 March 1948, *New York Times*, 31 Aug. 1948, and Charles P. Taft, President of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, United Nations, *Official records of the fifth session of the General Assembly: supplement No. 9*, A/1286 (Lake Success: 1950), pp. 7–8. See also H. Fishman, *American Protestantism and a Jewish state* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), p. 117. The Archbishop of Canterbury also indirectly supported internationalization when he asked the UN to appoint a Governor-General for Jerusalem; see *New York Times*, 10 April 1948, *The Times*, 15 April 1948.

most probable explanation is that there were differences of opinion within the Roman Curia and the Catholic hierarchy on the Palestine question, and that the groups hostile to the division of the Holy Land acted so as to delay any declaration by the Holy See favourable to internationalization. Because this measure was in fact an integral part of the plan to divide Palestine approved by the United Nations, any statement in favour of the project would have been taken as indirect approval of the entire Resolution 181 (II).

Three initiatives, too close together in time to be independent of each other, seem to confirm this interpretation. On 24 February 1948 the *Osservatore Romano* gave news of the creation of an autonomous Apostolic Delegation for Jerusalem and Palestine which would report to the Sacred Oriental Congregation. Given the extreme caution with which the Holy See normally proceeds with the creation of permanent representations (even when not diplomatic in nature) in territories with uncertain or contested legal status, the political meaning of the measure, designed to stress the single nature of Palestine, and hence the inadvisibility of its division, is highly significant.[21] Two days later Mgr Testa, the new Apostolic Delegate for Jerusalem and Palestine, expressed his perplexity about the plan to divide the Holy Land during a meeting (requested by the Holy See) with Graham Parsons, Taylor's assistant in the Vatican: 'Testa personally hopes for reconsideration [of the partition plan] by the Assembly, accompanied by a truce in Palestine and, eventually, a federated state' wrote the US diplomat.[22] Finally, on 3 March, the Committee of the Christian Union in Palestine, in which both the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Custodia di Terra Santa participated, published a document condemning 'the erroneous policy which has been imposed in the country and which has culminated in the partition plan' and hoped that peace would be returned to the Holy Land 'by revoking the partition plan and ensuring the unity of Palestine'.[23]

When it is remembered that these statements and provisions were being made at a time when the US government was about to withdraw its support from the partition plan,[24] it is difficult not to see in the initiatives mentioned above an attempt to strengthen those groups which, in the United States as in other countries, were opposed to the division of the Holy Land and the creation of a Jewish state. Given this policy, it was inappropriate for the Vatican to support the internationalization of the Holy City with statements of position, which inevitably would have implied approval of Resolution 181 (II) and thus of the project to divide Palestine. Hence the silence maintained by the Holy See on the Jerusalem issue.

It should, however, be stressed that the initiatives against the partition of the Holy Land came from the Sacred Oriental Congregation or from sources close to it and not from the Vatican Secretary of State's Office, which throughout 1947 remained cautious and reserved about the problems connected with the territorial solution for

21 See in this respect H. F. Köck, *Der Vatikan und Palästina* (Vienna, Munich: Herold, 1973), p. 109 and G. Pierazzi, 'Der Vatikan und die Heiligen Stätten in Palästina, 1919–1922 und 1947–1950' in *Jahrbuch der diplomatischen Akademie Wien, 1970–1971*, p. 101.

22. NA867N01/2-2648, Parsons to Secretary of State, 26 Feb. 1948. Pressures for the abandonment of the plan to divide Palestine were created, in the very same period, by US Protestant groups; see Fishman, *American Protestantism*, pp. 84 ff

23. This communiqué is printed as an appendix to M. Rousan, *Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem* (Baghdad: Ministry of Culture and Guidance, 1965), pp. 130–2, and in the French version, *Le Sionisme en Terre Sainte* (Paris: 1948). Some passages were published by the *Tablet* on 27 March 1948.

24 On 19 March Warren A. Austin, who led the US delegation to the UN, declared that the plan to divide Palestine seemed unachievable and proposed a temporary UN trusteeship. See Joseph E. Schechtmann, *The United States and the Jewish state movement: the crucial decade 1939–1949* (New York: Herzl, 1966), pp. 250ff.

Palestine. Two different strategies would seem to have emerged within the Roman Curia: one close to the position held by the Christian Arab community, in favour of a single Arab state in Palestine, the other much more interested in protecting the Catholic Church's general interests, which meant taking up no definite position in the conflict and reserving all resources for the protection of the Holy Places and the Catholic community in the Middle East.

The emergence of a public Vatican stance

The hostility towards any form of division of Palestine prevailed until May 1948, when Vatican circles made it known that the Holy See was 'ready to welcome the continuation of a mandatory regime with the precise task of bringing about order, security and peace as a temporary solution to be attempted by the United Nations'.[25] The 1948 war which made the partition of the Holy Land permanent cut short these political and diplomatic initiatives by stressing beyond any shadow of doubt the strength of the new state of Israel and the impracticability of any plan in favour of the creation of a single Palestinian state. It also highlighted the problem of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. Jerusalem had been occupied during the conflict by Jordanian and Israeli troops who respectively controlled the 'old city' and the 'new city', the new city being where the most important administrative centres were. Faced with this new situation the Holy See decided to abandon its reserve. On 24 October 1948 Pius XII published the encyclical *In multiplicibus curis*, in which he argued for the expediency of giving 'an international character to Jerusalem and its vicinity . . . as a better guarantee for the safety of the sanctuaries under the present circumstances'.[26] This encyclical marked a decisive change in the Holy See's policy. First of all, it was the Pope himself who thereby took up a position on Jerusalem's future, and no longer subsidiary bodies like the Custodia di Terra Santa or the Catholic Near East Welfare Association. Secondly, the request for legal guarantees for the Holy Places in Jerusalem, voiced by all Vatican spokesmen, had been dropped and replaced by a much more demanding request, namely the internationalization of the whole city and its surroundings.

Many factors, including the Arab world's increasing irritation over the Holy See's silence,[27] pressures from certain sections of Catholic public opinion and the consensus reached in the form of Resolution 181 (II), led the Pope to this abrupt change of position. Among these factors are three which had a decisive influence in encouraging the Holy See to embrace the cause of the internationalization of Jerusalem. In the first place, there were great fears for the fate of the sanctuaries and other Catholic institutions based in the Holy City. Many reports had reached the Vatican during the conflict, including protests signed by the Christian Union of Palestine, representatives of the Latin Patriarchy and the Custodia di Terra Santa, levelling serious accusations against the Israelis and blaming them for the occupation, damaging and

25. 'Pope is troubled by Palestine war', *New York Times*, 16 May 1948.

26. The Pope added. 'It is also necessary to assure with international guarantees both the right of free access to the Holy Places scattered throughout Palestine and the freedom of religion and the respect for customs and religious traditions'; Rackauskas, *Internationalization of Jerusalem*, pp. 69–71; for the Latin text see *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 1948, pp. 433ff. The publication of the encyclical preceded by a few weeks the debate at the third UN General Assembly session on Palestine.

27. See NA867N01/7-1648, Jefferson Patterson (chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy in Cairo) to Secretary of State, 16 July 1948.

destruction of convents, churches and other property belonging to Catholic religious bodies;[28] quite apart from the worries about the material damage suffered by these buildings, the suspicion had grown up that these actions were merely the most tangible evidence of a 'quiet effort' designed 'to eliminate Christian as well as Moslem influences from the new city of Jerusalem with the apparent objective of converting it into a completely Jewish city'.[29] These fears later proved to be unfounded, as Mgr McMahon himself recognized in August 1949 when he admitted that people had been led to 'exaggerate into major importance minor incidents where Israelis have wrongfully treated Catholic properties and interests'.[30] In autumn 1948, however, the news coming from Palestine had created extreme concern in the Vatican regarding Israeli intentions, as is apparent from Montini's meeting with the US ambassador in Rome, James C. Dunn,[31] and from the request, put forward in a letter from the Catholic Near East Welfare Association to the UN Secretary-General, that a UN investigatory committee be set up to examine the 'outrages' suffered by Catholic priests and institutions in the Holy Land.[32] In this climate it is easy to understand that the Holy See felt that any guarantees other than the internationalization of the whole of Jerusalem would be inadequate, and that only this would safeguard both the Holy Places themselves and the Catholic institutions located in the 'new city'.

A second factor which led the Pope to speak in favour of internationalization was the problem of Palestinian refugees, which included much of the Christian Arab community of the Holy Land. The connection between this issue and the question of internationalization was expressed on several occasions by Mgr McMahon, who argued that the return of the Christian Arab refugees to their homeland was indispensable to avoid the Holy Places becoming 'lifeless museum pieces'[33] with no religious community to support them and to safeguard the existence of the Catholic educational and hospital missions, whose economic life was inseparably tied to the presence of a sizeable Christian Arab community.[34] The Israeli government, however, refused flatly to accept any repatriation of Palestinian refugees, being opposed to the idea of opening its frontiers to potential enemies. Hence the need for the Vatican to overcome the *impasse* by means of the internationalization of Jerusalem: once Jerusalem had been released from Jordanian, and, particularly, Israeli control, it would have become a place to which thousands of Palestinian refugees, particularly Arab Christians, could return. Apart from bolstering the Catholic presence in the

28 See NA867N404/7-2848, 8-1048, 8-2648, 9-148, 10-2848, 11-1748, 1-1249, *The Times*, 1, 3, June 1948, *New York Times*, 1, 5, 6 June 1948. For the Israeli reactions see *New York Times*, 2 June, 24 Aug. 1948. See also Feldblum, *American Catholic press*, pp. 75ff.

29. NA867N404/10-648, William C. Burdett (US consul in Jerusalem) to State Department, 30 Sept. 1948.

30 NA867N01/8-1749, T. S. Bloodworth to Secretary of State, 17 Aug. 1949.

31 Montini felt that 'unwarranted attacks on Catholic institutions and members of religious orders by irresponsible alleged Jewish elements have caused a painful impression. Arabs, he said, have not attacked or molested Catholics and have generally shown consideration and tolerance. The Vatican feels that Jewish leaders are not personally responsible for these incidents but that they should make renewed efforts and exercise greater authority to ensure protection and respect for Catholics in Israel', NA766A67N/9-1748, Dunn to Secretary of State, 17 Sept. 1948.

32 For the text of this document see Rackauskas, *Internationalization of Jerusalem*, p. 78.

33 James G. McDonald (US ambassador to Israel), *My mission in Israel 1948–1951* (London: Gollancz, 1951), p. 188. See also NA867N01/1-1149, J. G. McDonald to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1949.

34 The French consul in Jerusalem was even more explicit, saying 'French religious institutions including hospitals and schools depended on the patronage of Moslem and Christian Arabs and could not function in the state of Israel' (NA867N01/5-1249, Burdett to Secretary of State, 12 May 1949). See also Lazar, *L'opinion française*, p. 211. It is also significant that *Le Monde* advised the French government to sell all its institutions in Israel to the Israelis (*Le Monde*, 16 Feb. 1949).

Holy City numerically, this would have ensured continued religious vitality for the sanctuaries and the economic survival of the Catholic institutions.

Finally, a number of political considerations, which were connected with the position that France had adopted over this issue, played an important part. In 1948 the Jerusalem issue was at the heart of France's entire Palestine policy: Bidault had told Bevin that 'France was less interested in the question of future frontiers in Palestine than in the question of Jerusalem',[35] and a few months later he proposed bargaining French support over the Negev question in return for Israeli agreement to the internationalization of Jerusalem.[36] This policy was designed to regain some of the influence that France had previously had in the Middle East as the protector of Catholic interests, by exploiting the various possibilities that the international administration of Jerusalem would have given.[37] To reach this objective, however, it was necessary for the Holy See to agree to ratify France's strategy by publicly endorsing the internationalization plan. Wladimir d'Ormesson, the French Ambassador to the Vatican, was expressly asked by Robert Schuman (as d'Ormesson later recalled) to: 'demander au Souverain Pontife de prendre officiellement position en faveur de l'internationalisation de Jérusalem et des Lieux Saints . . . Le Pape Pie XII accueillit cette démarche avec faveur et dès le 24 Octobre fit paraître à ce sujet une Encyclique *In multiplicibus curis*'.[38] The Papal encyclical immediately aroused the interest of the Department of State, which instructed Gowen to 'ascertain the ideas of the Vatican on the most effective means of placing Jerusalem and its environs under international control'.[39] Gowen turned to Montini, but Montini decided to bide his time, arguing that 'the Pope as far as he could tell at this time has not elaborated any definitive formula on this subject'.[40] It was thus only on 12 November that Tardini gave Gowen 'in strict confidence the Pope's view on Jerusalem' and made the following observations:

> One. The Vatican in view of the position taken respectively by Arabs and Jews in Palestine considers the internationalization of Jerusalem and its outskirts the most appropriate solution in present circumstances to ensure peace, order and tranquillity in Palestine.
>
> Two. The Vatican maintains the the rights traditionally enjoyed by Catholics in Palestine must be fully respected and protected, especially with regard to the Holy Places.
>
> Three. The Vatican has no particular preference with regard to any specific manner whereby Jerusalem and its environs would be placed under international control provided such control would effectively protect Catholic interests . . .

35. FO371/E10152/G, minute dated 28 July 1948. For France's initiatives at the UN in defence of Jerusalem in spring 1948 see Le Morzellec, *La question de Jerusalem*, pp. 138ff. The French government's support of internationalization of the city is discussed by D Amson in 'La diplomatie française et le problème de Jérusalem: un chemin tortueux', *Nouveaux Cahiers*, Spring 1972, No 28, pp. 35–44

36. See NA867N01/11-948, Burdett to Secretary of State, 9 Nov 1948.

37. NA867N01/11-1248, Burdett to Secretary of State, 12 Nov 1948. The Vatican was probably not enthusiastic about relying on French protection again, but since Italy and Spain were not UN members, there were no valid alternatives, as those close to the *Custodia di Terra Santa* recognized See NA867N404/8-1347, Macatee to Secretary of State, 13 Aug. 1947.

38. W. d'Ormesson, 'Pie XII tel que je l'ai connu', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*. 1968. pp. 15–6. Many factors confirm the foundation of d'Ormesson's statements see, for example, FO371/E13963, Perowne to Bevin, 25 Oct. 1948; also NA867N404/11-548, Burdett to Secretary of State, 5 Nov. 1948.

39. NA867N01/10-2748, Lovett to Gowen, 27 Oct 1948.

40. NA867N01/10-2948, Gowen to Secretary of State, 29 Oct. 1948. Tardini, too, when approached by Gowen on 2 November, asked for a few days before making any official statement on the Jerusalem issue. See NA867N01/11-348, Gowen to Secretary of State, 3 Nov. 1948.

> Six. After the First World War and when Great Britain assumed its Palestine mandate, the British Government gave a solemn official assurance that she would maintain the status quo regarding the rights traditionally enjoyed by various religious communities and denominations in Palestine. The Vatican has consistently maintained the necessity to keep this status quo and arranged the exertion of force to ensure and maintain full respect and protection for all rights acquired and enjoyed by Catholics in Palestine, especially rights concerning the Holy Places.[41]

Tardini's remarks, and Montini's before this, make it look as if the Holy See (with whom the Israeli government had already established direct contact in September of the same year through Herzog's and Wardie's mission to Rome) wanted to leave the door open for the possibility of negotiations with the Israeli government, and wished to avoid taking up too inflexible a position by declaring its willingness to accept any form of internationalization which would safeguard Catholic interests. Most prominently stressed among these interests was the complete and absolute respect of the rights acquired in the Holy Places but not (judging from Tardini's remarks, which make no mention of them) the return of Christian Arab refugees to their homelands—one of the issues that in the subsequent months was to be stressed in order to promote a form of internationalization that excluded any possibility of self-government by the Arab and Jewish population in Jerusalem.

The Israeli–Vatican talks

The first direct contact between the Holy See and Israel took place in September 1948, in the Vatican, where the Israeli government had sent a mission consisting of Jacob Herzog and Chaim Wardie, officials in the Ministry for Religious Affairs. The presence of these two emissaries had caused speculation that the Holy See was willing to recognize the state of Israel. This possibility, repeatedly denied by Vatican spokesmen,[42] was hardly credible. For the Holy See to have promised to recognize the new state on that occasion would have been to play far too early the best card it had 'as a bargaining counter for obtaining Israeli consent to a workable international regime for Jerusalem and the Holy Places and adequate protection for Catholic interests in Palestine'.[43] It seems highly probable, then, that the purpose of the Herzog–Wardie mission was, as they told Gowen, 'to pay our respects to the Holy See and to seek informal counsel on the manner in which the Catholic Church would wish Israel to define, in its legal and administrative machinery, the religious rights of Catholic communities in its midst'.[44] Within these limits the mission had a degree of success: it dissipated previous misunderstandings and opened up the way to direct political negotiations between Israel and the Vatican. 'The contacts which have been established should be viewed as a beginning of ultimately permanent relations of

41 NA867N01/11-1248, Gowen to Secretary of State, 12 Nov 1948. A number of Tardini's reservations about the Trusteeship Council's Jerusalem statute plan were contained in points four and five of Gowen's telegram.

42 See NA766A67N/9-1748, Dunn to Secretary of State, 17 Sept. 1948, NA766A67N/11-248, Gowen to Secretary of State, 2 Nov 1948, FO371/E12895, unsigned communiqué from the British Legation at the Holy See, 1 Oct 1948 Before leaving for Rome, Herzog too affirmed that 'it is our intention to confine the discussion to administrative and legal questions, matters of diplomatic concern do not fall within the purview of our present mission' (Herzog to McDonald, 20 Aug 1948, in NA766A67N/11-248)

43 FO371/WV1011/1, Perowne to Attlee, not dated.

44 NA766A67N/11-248, Herzog to Gowen, 7 Oct. 1948

good will between the Holy See and Israel', wrote Herzog to Gowen just before leaving Rome.[45]

The task of conducting these negotiations was entrusted by the Holy See to Mgr McMahon, who left Rome for the Middle East on 3 December 1948, after reaching 'convenient agreements' with Montini and Tisserant.[46] He remained there until the beginning of March 1949. Officially, McMahon had been asked by the Catholic Near East Welfare Association to study the living conditions of Palestinian refugees with a view to arranging effective forms of aid. In actual fact, many things seem to indicate he had 'wider powers as unofficial representative of the Holy See on political matters'.[47] In this capacity, McMahon discussed all the main issues affecting the Holy See with the Israeli authorities, stressing two in particular: the repatriation of Christian Arab refugees and the internationalization of Jerusalem.

The Holy See's position on the Palestinian refugee question was clarified during the course of a meeting with the US ambassador to Israel. After recalling the significance the Vatican attributed to the protection of the Holy Places, McMahon listed the following points: that the several shrines should be inviolate but he would prefer that all of them be destroyed rather than that the Christian population be eliminated; that an estimated 75 per cent of the Christian Arabs formerly in Israel occupied territory were now in exile; that the return of these Christian exiles was basic to an Israeli–Church rapprochement; and that the Church could not, however, approve of permission being granted merely for the return of the Christians for this would obviously jeopardize the Christian position throughout the Arab world. Hence, whatever arrangements were ultimately made for more or less extensive repatriation must be on a non-sectarian basis.[48] On the problem of Jerusalem McMahon adopted a similarly resolute line, which was summed up as follows in a telegram sent by Burdett on 4 January 1949:

> Monsignor McMahon, special representative of Cardinal Spellman, discussed the future of Jerusalem at length with officers Consulate General on the first. He stated that the Catholic Church took the position that any settlement should provide for reparation of damage done to Church property, repatriation of refugees wishing to return, and internationalization of the entire Jerusalem area and was considering the possibility of the internationalization of Nazareth. He felt that the chances of success had increased greatly in the past three weeks . . . He asserted that a much greater interest was felt in the United States over Jerusalem than is commonly realized. He hoped the Catholic Church and Protestant Church bodies would unite on a common policy and protect Christian rights. The Catholic Church had carefully refrained from expressing an opinion on the Palestine question as a whole since it is a political, not a religious question. The fate of Jerusalem (including both new and old Jerusalem) is definitely a religious matter and the Church would fight hard for internationalization. It was just now beginning to exert influence. He felt the Jews would make a great mistake if they insisted on the annexation of new Jerusalem since this would tend to fan growing anti-Semitism in the United States. He asserted that a large number of Jews realized this point and many religious Jews

45. NA766A67N/11-248.
46. *Osservatore Romano*, 12 March 1949
47. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, p. 187. See also NA867N01/1-1149, McDonald to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1949 and Feldblum, *American Catholic press*, pp. 82–3.
48. NA867N01/1-1149, McDonald to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1949.

favoured internationalization. He stated that Jews were making great efforts to maintain good relations with the Catholic Church.[49]

On both issues—repatriation of refugees and internationalization of Jerusalem—the McMahon mission proved a failure. As regards the refugees themselves, McMahon had to recognize that Ben Gurion and Sharett 'were not ready to give any general assurance on repatriation'.[50] As regards the problem of Jerusalem, the statement that 'Jerusalem was part of the Jewish state, and there was no difference between Jerusalem and other parts of Israel', made by Ben Gurion a few days after McMahon had left the Middle East, left no room for negotiation.[51] This failure was indirectly recognized by McMahon in a letter sent to the UN Secretary-General on 21 March 1949,[52] in which the question of Jerusalem was discussed once more, the Israeli refusal to make any concession on either question was stressed, and the Conciliation Commission (then meeting in Beirut) was asked not to abandon the principles of the internationalization of the Holy City and the return of the Palestinians to their homeland.

A few weeks later, the Holy See recognized the failure of the McMahon negotiations and, by means of Pius XII's encyclical *Redemptoris nostri*, called upon the Catholic world to unite to defend the Holy Places and work for the internationalization of Jerusalem. The *Redemptoris nostri* repeated the request contained in *In multiplicibus curis* to internationalize Jerusalem and its environs, to guarantee free access to the Holy Places and to guarantee the right to public manifestations of worship. It formulated three new issues: the protection of the Holy Places in Palestine by means of a guaranteed international statute, the possibility for Catholic institutions to continue their educational and other work without impediment, and respect of the rights acquired by the Catholic Church in the Holy Places.[53] Taken as a whole *Redemptoris nostri* put forward a greater number and wider range of requests than the previous encyclical. In particular, however, it contained an invitation to the faithful throughout the world to 'use every legitimate means to persuade the rulers of nations, and those whose duty it is to settle this important question, to accord to Jerusalem and its surroundings a juridical status'. This appeal indicated that the possibility of negotiations with the Israeli government had been closed and that in the Holy See's eyes only strong international public pressure could lead the new state to make the concessions that were indispensable for any satisfactory solution to the Palestine issue.

The Pope's invitation did not go unheeded. Many initiatives were undertaken by Catholics in many countries supporting the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the Holy Places. It was due to this pressure, and the demands of the bishops in the countries concerned, that diplomatic moves were made by such countries as Italy and Spain which, through not belonging to the UN, expressed the desire to be included in 'any international body established to assure protection and freedom of access to the Holy Places'.[54] The pressure exerted by Catholic public

49. NA867N01/1-449, Burdett to Secretary of State, 4 Jan. 1949

50. NA867N01/1-1149, McDonald to Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1949. McMahon added that 'the Prime Minister seemed less yielding than the Foreign Minister. Neither had previously seen clearly the relationship between the Church and this problem.'

51. See *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 817 This statement was made during a debate in the Knesset

52 Reproduced in Rackauskas, *Internationalization of Jerusalem*, appendix, pp. 79–80.

53 See *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 1949, Vol XLI, pp 161ff.

54. NA867N404/7-1249, Dunn to Secretary of State, 12 July 1949, and 867N101/3-149, memorandum to Spanish ambassador in Washington, 1 March 1949. For reference to the pressure applied by the Spanish bishops on their government see NA867N404/8-949, Emmons to Secretary of State, 9 Aug. 1949.

opinion was particularly strong in France and the United States, countries which had their own representatives on the Conciliation Commission and could therefore more easily influence the fate of Jerusalem.

In France, as early as November 1948, first the ecclesiastical hierarchy and subsequently a large number of Catholic intellectuals had called attention to the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places with arguments that linked religious and nationalistic concerns.[55] These initiatives, probably encouraged by the government, were widely reported in the press and were intensified as soon as the Papal encyclical was published. They encouraged the French delegation on the Conciliation Commission to take a tougher line in support of the total internationalization of Jerusalem.[56] In the United States a collective declaration by Catholic bishops was widely publicized, followed by a number of resolute statements from Cardinal Cushing during a rally attended by 40,000 people in Boston.[57] More discreet (but by no means less effective) pressure was exerted by the US bishops on leading political and diplomatic figures. Numerous bishops wrote to Congressmen or officers of the State Department supporting the internationalization of Jerusalem within the terms laid down by Resolution 181 (II),[58] and Cardinal Spellman turned directly to Truman, with whom he conducted a correspondence lasting from May to August 1949, designed to convince the President of the 'necessity of placing Jerusalem and its environs beyond the control of any local group'. In the course of this exchange of letters Spellman did not hide his perplexity over the 'policy of indefiniteness' pursued by the United States in the Middle East and he expressed a lack of confidence regarding Israel's and Jordan's intentions on the Christian Holy Places and a consequent fear that should the Holy Places be internationalized only 'functionally', they might well be in some way 'secularized, confiscated, taxed out of existence or rendered inaccessible'. For these reasons, Spellman, rather critical of the support given by the American government for the proposal to admit Israel to the UN, which he felt was hasty and premature, was willing to accept only proposals based on the principle of territorial internationalization and rejected in particular any attempt to link the internationalization of Jerusalem to the division of the city into two zones entrusted to the 'governmental responsibility' of Jordanians and Israelis. Spellman had little doubt that as time went by this 'governmental responsibility' would become a 'national, territorial sovereignty over their respective portions of Jerusalem', jeopardizing any guarantee of internationalization of the city and the international control of the Holy Places.[59]

With Spellman's pressure on the President of the United States and the other initiatives mentioned above, the Catholic Church showed its readiness to become deeply involved in the political and diplomatic battle for the internationalization of Jerusalem. A first indication of this decision came from the debate on the admission of Israel as a member of the UN in which Catholic countries, probably as a result of pressures from the Holy See, struggled for a long time to obtain from Israel precise

55. See *Le Monde*, 12 Nov. 1948, *Tablet*, 20 Nov. 1948, *Documentation catholique*, 7, 21 Nov. 1948.

56. See the letter of the French cardinals published on 5 May 1949, *Documentation catholique*, 22 May 1949. On the consequences of the activity established by the Catholic clergy and laity see NA867N01/4-1949, Patterson to Secretary of State, 19 April 1949, and NA501BB Palestine/8-1149, Rockwell to Secretary of State, 11 Aug. 1949.

57. See *New York Times*, 27 April 1949, *Commonweal*, 1 July 1949 and *Osservatore Romano*, 18, 19 July 1949.

58. See, for example, NA867N404/6-2449, 867N404/8-1849, 867N404/9-649.

59. The letters between Spellman and Truman are published in the appendix to S. Ferrari, 'Il Vaticano e la questione di Gerusalemme nel carteggio Spellman–Truman', *Storia contemporanea*, 1982, No. 2, pp. 304–17.

commitments regarding the repatriation of Palestinian refugees and the internationalization of Jerusalem.[60] This attempt failed, but the words with which the Catholic hierarchy and press greeted the admission of Israel to the United Nations foreshadowed further, harder battles.[61]

The evaporation of support for internationalization

To understand precisely the meaning of the further Vatican initiatives it is necessary to consider first of all the attitude taken by countries more directly interested in the Jerusalem issue, whose political and diplomatic strategies had a major effect on more than one of the decisions made by the Holy See.

Until the spring of 1948 the internationalization of the Holy City had been upheld by the vast majority of UN member states and accepted, albeit unwillingly, by the Israeli government. The Arab nations had resolutely opposed this solution. The conflict following the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine had profoundly modified this position. In particular, Israel no longer had any interest in giving the UN that portion of the city which it had managed to defend in a long and bloody siege. In addition to the strong traditional religious, historical and political links between Jerusalem and the Jewish people, a number of contingencies arose which carried considerable weight in determining the course of Israeli policy. These included an awareness of Israel's own superiority over the Jordanian forces, a certain lack of confidence in the UN's activities (sharpened by Bernadotte's proposal to include Jerusalem in Arab territory) and a considerable resentment towards the Christian Churches, which it accused of encouraging the internationalization of the city more through wariness towards Israel than sincere interest in the destiny of the Holy Places.[62]

Equally resolute was the attitude taken by the Jordanian authorities. The possession of the 'old city' and the Holy Places carried with it prestige and a degree of power that the tiny kingdom of Abdallāh could not otherwise have enjoyed. For these reasons, the Hashemite sovereign in the winter of 1948–9 proposed the division of the Holy City to the Israeli government; the consequent negotiations continued, with varying fortunes, until the king's death.[63] In opposing any form of internationalization Abdallāh was totally isolated in the Arab world which, averse to the Israeli

60. On Israel's admission to the UN see *Israel and the United Nations: report of a study group set up by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1956), pp. 49–61. Catholic countries' positions, particularly those of the South American states, are analysed in Edward B. Glick, *Latin America and the Palestine problem* (New York: Herzl, 1958), pp. 132ff. Many sources connect the firmness of several South American states' positions on the internationalization of Jerusalem with the Papal encyclical published on 15 April 1949; see *New York Times*, 25, 30 April 1949.

61. See Spellman's letter to Truman of 10 June 1949 (reproduced in appendix to Ferrari, 'Il Vaticano'). See also *Tablet*, 21 May 1949.

62. At a press conference on 2 Aug. 1948, the Israeli Foreign Minister stressed that his government had originally been 'impressed by the emphatic expression of the Christian world that Jerusalem be internationalized, but when the Mediator proposed turning over Jerusalem to Arab rule not one Christian nation raised the slightest objection' (*FRUS*, 1948, Vol. V, p. 1286). See also *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. V, pp. 1212ff., 1307, 1316; NA867N01/8-248, McDonald to Secretary of State, 2 Aug. 1948. US Department of State circles felt these comments were totally without foundation (see *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. V, pp. 1286, 1321). On reasons for Israeli withdrawal of backing for the internationalization plan, see M. Benvenisti, *Jerusalem: the torn city* (Jerusalem: Isratypeset, 1976), pp. 6ff.

63. On these negotiations see the documents published in *FRUS*, 1948–1950; also FO371/EE1015/8, EE1015/13, EE1015/27, EE1015/29, EE1015/30, EE1015/32, EE1015/33. See also McDonald, *My mission in Israel*, pp. 124ff., 192ff. and 'La Jordanie et l'internationalisation de Jerusalem', *Cahiers de l'Orient contemporain*, 1949, Vol. XX, pp. 241–2.

possession of one part of the city and jealous (albeit unavowedly) of the territorial gains made by the Hashemite dynasty, had abandoned the position previously held and now firmly backed the internationalization plan.

The underlying reasons behind the policy of the major powers were much more complex. For various reasons they had originally been in favour of internationalization; but the outcome of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the division of the city had cast increasingly serious doubts on the likelihood of implementing the UN resolutions. The development of US policy is exemplary in this respect. Having supported the complete internationalization of Jerusalem until summer 1948,[64] in September of that year it swung to a more pragmatic attitude and, while reconfirming its preference for internationalization, said it was willing to accept 'any other arrangement satisfactory to both Jews and Arabs . . . provided guarantees were given for access to and safety of the holy places'.[65] The US position was further defined in a meeting in Paris on 30 September with the British UN delegation, during which Dean Rusk put forward the suggestion of entrusting the administration of the two zones into which Jerusalem was divided to the Israelis and the Jordanians, and giving the UN general powers of supervision and specific jurisdiction regarding the protection of the Holy Places.[66] Accepted initially with a considerable degree of reservation by the State Department,[67] this idea was quickly adopted and formed the basis of the US delegation's approach at the third session of the UN General Assembly and, in the following year, on the Conciliation Commission. The British government's attitude was similar. In April 1949, speaking in the House of Commons, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs had given MPs to understand that, because of the increasing difficulty regarding the implementation of the UN resolutions, the Foreign Office had not ruled out the possibility of alternatives to the internationalization of Jerusalem. This interpretation was subsequently denied, but as early as 1949 Britain gave unofficial support to the Jordanian proposals to divide the city.[68]

Without US and British backing of the plan for the territorial internationalization of the Holy City, the Vatican could count only on a firm stand by France. But encouraging signals were not forthcoming from here either. At the beginning of July *Le Monde*, a paper traditionally close to the French Foreign Ministry's positions, cast very heavy doubts on the possibility of territorial internationalization of Jerusalem, suggesting that it would be better to fall back onto a system of statutory guarantees limited to the Holy Places.[69] It is true that a month later a member of the French delegation at the Conciliation Commission was still able to declare that 'Vatican pressure makes it difficult for the French government to agree to anything less than complete internationalization',[70] but this position was not maintained for very long;

64. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol V, pp. 1233, 1277-8; and p. 1363, memorandum from Secretary of State to President, 31 Aug. 1948. See also M. Kaufman, *America's Jerusalem policy: 1947–1948* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1982).

65. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. V, p. 1368; telegram from Secretary of State to McDonald, 1 Sept. 1948. A few days later McDonald informed the Israeli Foreign Minister of the American position (*FRUS*. 1948, Vol. V, pp. 1375 ff.).

66. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. V, pp. 1440ff. This proposal was repeated on 16 Oct. in a telegram to the State Department (see *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. V, p. 1484)

67. See *FRUS*, 1948, Vol V, p. 1495; telegram from McClintock to Rusk, 19 Sept. 1948.

68. See *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 783, H. Sacher, *Israel: the establishment of a state* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1952), p. 170; H. Lehrman, *Israel: the beginning and tomorrow* New York W. Sloane Associates, 1951), pp. 244–5.

69. *Le Monde*, 3, 4 July, 15 Sept 1949.

70. *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 1300.

on 17 August France gave way to US pressure to back a solution that would avoid the creation in Jerusalem of a *corpus separatum* directly under UN administration.[71]

This left only the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in favour of internationalization (despite rumours to the contrary). These 'allies', however, were too remote and unpredictable for the Vatican to be able to count on them with any degree of certainty should the destiny of Jerusalem be decided by a vote at the UN.

The uncertainty increasingly shown by many countries over support for the internationalization plan also had heavy repercussions on the decisions taken by the various UN bodies. Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, although stressing the desire to internationalize the Holy City, established that it was necessary to 'provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area'.[72] The Conciliation Commission interpreted these indications in a fairly broad sense, presenting a scheme by which Jerusalem, placed under international control, would be divided into an Arab zone and a Jewish zone.[73] A Commissioner, appointed by the United Nations, would have the task of protecting the Holy Places and guaranteeing respect of the city's neutralization and demilitarization, and also of guaranteeing individual and collective rights (in particular, freedom of worship and education) laid down in the International Declaration on Human Rights, Articles 6–9). With the assistance of a General Council, this Commissioner would be required to maintain law and order, to oversee public services and guarantee a fair distribution of the expenditure coming from tax on the city's inhabitants as well as looking after other technical matters (Articles 10–11). An international tribunal, also appointed by the United Nations, would settle disputes relating to the Holy Places (both in Jerusalem and other parts of Palestine), violation of human rights, or failure to implement the provisions of the document drawn up by the Conciliation Commission. Another lower-level court would have jurisdiction over all disputes, civil or criminal, between the inhabitants of the two zones of Jerusalem or between these inhabitants and other citizens of Arab or Israeli nationality (Articles 12–13). All other powers would belong, in their respective areas, to the Israeli and Jordanian authorities (Article 3).

The Conciliation Commission's plan then dedicated five articles to the discipline of the Holy Places. First of all, the term 'Holy Place' was restricted to those sanctuaries which had this definition when the British mandate on Palestine ceased. Any doubt or controversy on this point would be settled by the UN Commissioner (Article 15). The Commissioner also had the task of guaranteeing the protection of and free access to the Holy Places (Article 16), guaranteeing priests, pilgrims and visitors freedom to move in the Jerusalem area (Article 18) and carrying out urgent repairs on the shrines. He would also have been asked to see that the status quo was respected (by settling any disputes directly or referring them to the international tribunal—(Article 19)), and that the various states in the Palestine area carried out their commitments regarding the Holy Places in their territory (Article 20). Finally, Article 17

71 *FRUS*, 1949, Vol VI, p. 1322. On this change in French policy see Lazar, *L'opinion française*, pp. 189ff.

72 United Nations, *Official records of the third session of the General Assembly. Part I: Resolutions* (Paris, 1948), A/810. See also Le Morzellec, *La question de Jerusalem*, pp 199ff. and H E Bovis, *The Jerusalem question, 1917–1968* (Stanford, Calif. Hoover Institution Press, 1971), pp 67ff

73 On the activity of the Conciliation Commission set up under Resolution 194, see D. Forsythe, *United Nations peace making: the Conciliation Commission for Palestine* (Baltimore, London Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); P. de Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine, 1948–1952* (Washington, Middle East Institute, 1966), pp. 134ff., 181ff., and pp 212ff. McDonald, *My mission in Israel*, pp 161ff. For a detailed study of the plan see Le Morzellec, *La question de Jérusalem*.

established that the tax position of the Holy Places in Jerusalem could not be amended unfavourably in respect of the position held during British administration. This scheme, which had been drawn up completely by the middle of August, was sent to the UN Secretary-General on 1 September 1949 and examined by the General Assembly which began its work on 20 September.

These political and diplomatic developments could not fail to alarm the Holy See. The admission of Israel to the UN and the at least *de facto* recognition that most members of the international community had given to Israel had strengthened the new state's position and limited the courses open to the Vatican in any negotiations. The negotiations between Israel and Jordan and the plan put forward by the Conciliation Commission, moreover, threatened permanently to eclipse any possibility of territorial internationalization of Jerusalem, since this option was now considered unachievable by many leading countries. In spring 1949, there was widespread conviction that, as Spellman put it, the 'tide was running against the idea of complete internationalization of Jerusalem'.[74] It was in an attempt to counteract this tendency that the Holy See once more embarked on negotiations with Israel.

It is difficult to say, given the current state of research and the documentation available, whether the initiative for these negotiations came from Tel Aviv or Rome. On 14 July 1949 the French consul in Jerusalem, M. de Neuville told Burdett that Israel was making 'strong efforts to establish direct relations with the Vatican which have so far been resisted by the Pope'; but at that date Mgr McMahon had already been in Palestine for more than a month.[75] He had returned to the Holy Land as the President of the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, a recently established body with the task of coordinating assistance to Palestinian refugees. McMahon's promotion and the fact that he had once again been asked to handle the negotiations with the Israeli government indicated that the Holy See did not intend to abandon the policy of territorial internationalization of Jerusalem, once more urged by McMahon in the *Tablet* a few days before his departure.[76] This is confirmed both by an article in the *Palestine Post* which commented that 'McMahon's visit to Israel leaves no doubt that the Vatican, with impressive support from its representatives in the United States, has not given up the idea of internationalization',[77] and, in addition, by a long discussion between Burdett and McMahon. In the course of this meeting McMahon made the following points. First, there was little future for Christian institutions, except for purely charitable ones, in Israel or in Jerusalem if the city was not internationalized. Second, no Christian institutions in Jerusalem and Israel were actually at stake, but action taken there would vitally affect the ability of Christian institutions to operate throughout the entire Middle East. Third, demand was growing in church circles, including 'persons much higher than me and responsible for church policy' for the internationalization of Jerusalem in the manner contemplated by the UN decision of 29 November. Churchmen felt they were misled in 1947 when they accepted the partition plan and internationalization on the

74. NA501BB Palestine/4-3049, Austin to Secretary of State, 30 April 1949.

75. See *Osservatore Romano*, 12 June 1949.

76. 'The Church and Palestine', *Tablet*, 28 May 1949. On this new body, see Pontifical Mission for Palestine, *The Pope and the Palestine tragedy*, 1950

77. NA867N404/7-2749, Burdett to Secretary of State, 27 July 1949. On the same day the *Palestine Post*, a newspaper close to the Israeli government, published an editorial attacking the project for the territorial internationalization of Jerusalem.

assurance that this would guarantee the interests of Christians. McMahon was familiar with the details of the Jerusalem plan now under consideration by the CCP, and declined to advance any suggestions for improvement or strengthening of the plan. He emphasized strongly that under no circumstances should any part of Jerusalem be physically or legally incorporated in the state of Israel. The Consul-General pointed out that the United States felt unable to support the proposal calling for a large international police force or heavy expenditure on administration. McMahon felt the US figures on the cost of administration to be much too high. He said that tensions were growing within the United States and, much against their will, Catholic Church leaders might be forced into open conflict with Jews and the policy of the US government. Top Jewish leaders were well aware of this change in atmosphere in the United States and conscious of the dangerous possibilities.[78]

Nothing in these statements left room for negotiations on the internationalization of Jerusalem. It may be deduced from this that McMahon had not been sent to Palestine to negotiate a compromise solution based on some form of functional internationalization of the Holy City, but rather to get the Israeli government to agree to territorial internationalization by means of the promise of Vatican concessions in other fields (possibly including recognition of the state of Israel by the Holy See). Assuming this to be correct, then McMahon's mission was destined from the outset to have very little success. The Israeli government was in no way willing to modify its refusal of any proposal based on territorial internationalization and considered any negotiations which did not stem from the idea of functional internationalization of Jerusalem, or the territorial internationalization of the 'old city' alone, as unacceptable. This position was underlined in a message that Sharett intended to send to the Holy See in August 1949.[79] This made clear that the Israeli and Vatican positions on the internationalization of Jerusalem were much too far apart for the concessions that the Holy See was ready to make on other problems to be sufficient to enable agreement. McMahon's mission ended in 'a stormy August interview' in which McMahon 'virtually announced to Prime Minister Ben Gurion . . . that Tel Aviv might expect the strongest opposition from the Church in the struggle for Jerusalem'.[80]

The failure of McMahon's mission caused a further entrenchment of the Holy See's position. It was by now convinced that there was no alternative to an open clash with the Israeli government. The Vatican Secretary of State's Office, who during the whole of spring 1949 had merely backed the initiatives supporting the internationalization of Jerusalem undertaken by the Catholic bishops throughout the world, decided to come out into the open. On 12 August Tardini received Gowen and after telling him (probably with reference to McMahon's negotiations) that 'Israel's apparent desire to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican is "quite premature"' and that there were no 'apparent grounds for proper discussion of this subject at present',[81] handed him a long document that the Holy See was about to send to all Apostolic Nuncios.[82]

78 NA867N404/7-2749. In the following weeks, McMahon modified his intransigence. See NA867N01/8-1749, T S. Bloodworth to Secretary of State, 17 Aug. 1949, and NA867N01/8-2549, Burdett to Secretary of State, 25 Aug 1949. However, on the latter occasion McMahon confirmed to Burdett that the 'Vatican still insists officially on the internationalization of Jerusalem in the sense contemplated by the November 29 resolution'.

79. NA501IBB Palestine/8-449 and Palestine/8-16149, Gowen to Secretary of State, 4, 16 Aug. 1949.

80. Lehrman, *Israel*, p 239. On the meeting between Ben Gurion and McMahon see also M. Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's foreign policy* (New Haven, 1975), p. 25.

81 NA766A67N/8-1249, Gowen to Secretary of State, 12 Aug. 1949.

82 NA867N01/8-1349, Gowen to Secretary of State, 13 Aug. 1949.

This document was a clear restatement that only territorial internationalization of Jerusalem, in the Holy See's eyes, would guarantee peace, the protection of the Holy Places and respect for the rights acquired by the Catholic Church in Palestine. All other options were examined and rejected. In particular, the proposal to recognize Israeli and Jordanian sovereignty over the two zones into which Jerusalem had been divided and the idea of appointing a UN administrator with limited powers to protect the Holy Places were rejected. This solution, which the Conciliation Commission was at that time on the point of adopting, would not, according to the Holy See, have avoided the situation whereby

> the Arab state and the Jewish State, recognized as sovereign in their respective areas of Jerusalem, might subsequently, as UN members, invoke paragraph 1, Article 2,7 of the UN Charter which lays down that the UN may not intervene in matters of internal jurisdiction of individual states. Any intervention by the UN in the Holy Places might then be rejected.[83]

This statement, which effectively was an anticipated rejection of the plan that the Conciliation Commission was to make public a few weeks later, alarmed the State Department which sent a telegram to Gowen on 1 September asking him to explain to Tardini the advantages of the solution set out by the Commission.[84] Tardini's reply left little room for hope. Peace in Palestine, the safety of Jerusalem, the protection of the Holy Places could be guaranteed 'only through a real and proper international regime and not through mere international control' in the forms laid down by the Conciliation Commission, whose plan could only 'cause dissension and quarrels between Arabs and Jews'.[85]

Reaction to the Conciliation Commission plan

On 1 September 1949 the Conciliation Commission made public its plan for Jerusalem. The reactions of Israel and Jordan were immediate. On 16 September Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett defined as 'anachronistic and incongruous' the proposals put forward by the Commission; they were also harshly criticized by the Israeli press and Jewish organizations in many countries. The ban on immigration into the city, its demilitarization and in particular the separation between the Jewish part of Jerusalem and the remaining Israeli territory, were considered to be absolutely unacceptable. Equally firm was the position taken by King Abdallāh, who believed that the internationalization of Jerusalem would have opened up a breach of the Jordanian defence system and had thus to be rejected on security grounds.

Equally adverse reactions, but for quite the reverse reasons, were expressed by the Holy See. The plan, Tardini said, was doomed to fail because it was 'impractical and lacking effectiveness';[86] the bodies set up by the Commission (in particular the Commissioner's Office and the International Tribunal) lacked the powers needed, in the Vatican's eyes, to impose the UN's wishes on the Arab and Jewish authorities. The Vatican Secretary of State's Office avoided expressing his own reservations publicly, but at the beginning of October he communicated to the Apostolic Nunciatures and diplomatic representations accredited to the Holy See a series of detailed criticisms of the plan. The main objection voiced by Tardini concerned

83. NA867N01/8-1349.
84. *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 1348.
85. NA867N01/9-1149, Gowen to Secretary of State, 11 Sept. 1949.
86. NA867N01/10-449, Gowen to Secretary of State, 4 Oct. 1949.

Article 3, under which the Arab and Jewish authorities' jurisdiction was recognized in all matters not expressly entrusted to the UN: 'This in substance admits with some limitations Arab and Israeli sovereignty over their respective zones. However, it facilitates conflicts between two neighbouring groups and complicates the commissioner's role, who is placed without adequate power between two sovereign groups'.[87] A second series of observations on Articles 5–12 was designed to strengthen the powers of the international bodies set up by the Commission and to emphasize the subordination of the Arab and Jewish authorities to them. The Holy See felt that the Arab and Jewish authorities should have been explicitly required to implement the decisions of the UN General Assembly and the international tribunal laid down in Article 12. A final series of considerations related to the provisions for the protection of the Holy Places. In particular it was urged that the scope of Article 17 should be widened, in such a way that all exemptions should be 'specifically mentioned . . . not only regarding taxes but also contributions, loans, indebtedness etc. having in past applied to buildings, sites, institutions, communities, persons and Catholics'. It was similarly urged that Article 19 should be widened to guarantee that the status quo would be maintained even in respect of the 'religious institutions'.

Apart from these analytical observations, there remained a basic disagreement. According to Tardini, 'only through a true and effective international regime and not through international control would it be possible to achieve what the Vatican would consider a fair and proper settlement of this vital problem'.[88] In keeping with this approach the Pope on 8 November 1949 renewed his appeals for the safety of the Holy Places and sources close to the Vatican announced the conditions deemed essential for a satisfactory solution to the Jerusalem issue.[89] Two conditions would appear to be particularly significant: first, the Holy See believed that at the UN 'religious aspects of the Palestine question should not be settled without first either directly or indirectly learning the Vatican's desires'. Secondly, it was urged that the international statute for Jerusalem be backed by the member nations of the UN, by France in particular, and by those 'old European nations that are more directly interested by tradition in Palestine problems, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland'.[90]

Despite the radical character of these proposals and the inflexible tone in which they were expressed, it is probable that there were many groups and individuals in the Roman Curia who felt that strict adherence to the principle of Jerusalem's territorial internationalization was counterproductive, and who supported a negotiated settlement with the Israeli government. In December 1949 Sharett said he was convinced that 'the Vatican was divided regarding the question of full internationalization for the Jerusalem area',[91] and in October of the same year a brief visit to Rome had given the US ambassador to Israel the impression that there was a 'strong, if not yet majority, element in church opinion which favoured the

87 NA867N01/10-449

88. NA867N01/10-449.

89 For the text of the apostolic exhortation *Solemnibus documentis* see *Osservatore Romano*, 11 Nov. 1949. On this occasion the Pope omitted any reference to the internationalization of Jerusalem, which gave rise to widespread but subsequently disproved belief that the Holy See was ready to accept a system of guarantees limited to the Holy Places. It is probable that this Papal declaration played a part in convincing the Israeli authorities that the Vatican would not be totally intransigent on the principle of *corpus separatum* in the UN General Assembly.

90 These statements are reported, between quotation marks, by the *New York Times*, 11 Nov. 1949, which attributed them to 'Vatican circles who are thoroughly acquainted with what the Pope would regard as a satisfactory settlement'

91 *FRUS*, 1949, Vol VI, p. 1525.

internationalization of the Holy Places by agreement as preferable to the CCP plan': in particular, Cardinal Tisserant, the secretary for the Sacred Oriental Congregation, was 'openly fighting for compromise with Israel, but has not won the Pope over to his view'.[92]

Given this disparity of opinions the Tel Aviv government probably saw a possibility of re-opening direct negotiations with the Holy See (which had been broken off following the departure of McMahon from Palestine) to try to avoid the Vatican using all its influence, at the fourth session of the UN General Assembly, against Israeli aspirations. To this end Herzog was once more sent to Rome, where he discussed the problems of Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Palestine for over two weeks with Vittorino Veronese, the president of the Italian Catholic Action group. The outcome of these discussions was summarized by an official of the American State Department, on the basis of information given by Herzog:

> Herzog had apparently made very strong efforts to get a statement from the Pope which might be used by Sharett publicly in connection with the current United Nations debate on Jerusalem. This effort was not successful but the Vatican communicated to Sharett through Veronese and Herzog a message indicating appreciation for everything Sharett had done to protect Christian interests in Palestine and expressing the hope that Sharett would be able to continue these efforts . . . This message could not be used publicly by Sharett. The Vatican could not go further at this stage because it did not wish to prejudice the possibility of negotiations in the future with Israel . . . and it did not feel that it would be proper to intervene in a public way at this stage of consideration of the matter by the United Nations.
>
> Herzog then went on to say that there were four specific points which emerged from his conversations and negotiations with and through Veronese as follows:
>
> 1. The Vatican does not expect the United Nations to accomplish anything at this session.
>
> 2. On this assumption the Vatican is prepared to negotiate with Israel immediately after the close of this session with a view to the conclusion of definitive arrangements for the protection of the Holy Places.
>
> 3. The statement issued about two weeks ago by certain members of the American Catholic clergy was unauthorized and did not correctly reflect Vatican opinion. Herzog said that this opinion was to be found in the Pope's last encyclical which stressed protection of the Holy Places as an alternative to internationalization.
>
> 4. There was a split in the Vatican on policy with regard to Jerusalem. Cardinal Tisserant, for example, said to be in charge of Near and Middle Eastern activities of the Church, was very strongly opposed to internationalization.
>
> The conclusion which Herzog personally seemed to draw from the foregoing (I did not have the impression he was presuming to express an official Israeli view) was that if the action taken by the Assembly were essentially one of postponement this whole matter of Jerusalem could be effectively and amicably settled by negotiations between Israel and the Vatican (and presumably other Church groups involved).[93]

92. NA123, McDonald, James Grover, McDonald to Secretary of State, 21 Oct. 1949.

93. NA, US mission to the United Nations 1945–1949, records of the US mission, subject file Palestine 1946–1948, memorandum of a conversation signed John Ross, 5 Dec. 1949.

This summary is further evidence of a split in the Catholic hierarchy. As well as an intransigent wing (the US bishops and, in particular, Spellman), firmly supporting territorial internationalization of Jerusalem, there was another group willing to give up the principle of *corpus separatum* and come to an agreement with Israel on the basis of a set of guarantees for the Holy Places. Cardinal Tisserant, and perhaps the Pope himself, belonged to this group. Nothing can be said about the positions of Tardini and Montini, the men in charge of the Vatican State Secretariat.

There is no reason to doubt that the basic nucleus of Herzog's statements was right and that within the Holy See and the Catholic hierarchy there was no complete identity of views on the question of Jerusalem. It seems less probable that the Vatican section favouring direct negotiations with Israel was as large as Herzog made out or that it was able to impose an alternative strategy to the internationalization of the Holy City. It does not seem that Herzog's mission to Rome was enough to change the course of Vatican policy, clearly and firmly directed towards reasserting the principles contained in Resolution 181 (II) of November 1947. The determination with which the Holy See's representatives acted, during the fourth session of the debate at the UN General Assembly, to get Catholic countries to vote for the Australian proposal for territorial internationalization is eloquent proof that Vatican policy was still directed towards positions favouring the establishment of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* directly controlled by the UN.

It would seem probable that Herzog, in his meeting with Ross, deliberately exaggerated the significance of the group headed by Cardinal Tisserant with a view to inducing the State Department to use its influence at the UN to block the Australian proposal. By making it seem that there would be a rapid and successful outcome to the negotiations between Israel and the Vatican, Herzog was, in other words, trying to involve the State Department in the struggle against a proposal which (if approved), quite apart from being a serious diplomatic defeat for Israel and strengthening the intransigent wing of the Catholic hierarchy (thus making any negotiations with the Tel Aviv government even more difficult), would have embarrassed the United States, which, to avoid the serious consequences of open conflict between the Holy See and Israel, preferred a negotiated settlement between Israel, the Vatican and, if possible, the leading Christian denominations.

The Conciliation Commission's plan was submitted to the UN on 24 November 1949, but the debate, both in the ad hoc political committee and the General Assembly, centred mainly on two other proposals. The first was an Australian motion proposing return to the principle of Jerusalem's territorial internationalization as laid down in Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947; the second was a motion presented by Sweden and The Netherlands proposing that UN activity should be limited to the protection of the Holy Places, a proposal close to the 'functional' internationalization of Jerusalem which the Israeli government had said it was prepared to implement on a number of occasions, including a memorandum presented to the UN on 15 November 1949.[94]

The Australian proposal, bitterly contested by Israel and opposed by America and Britain, obtained the backing of the Arab states (with the exception of Jordan), the communist bloc and the majority of Catholic nations. The Holy See backed the motion without hesitation and expressed its satisfaction during a Vatican radio

94 For an account of the UN debate see Le Morzellec, *La question de Jérusalem*, pp. 228ff. and Bovis, *The Jerusalem question*, pp. 73ff

broadcast on 26 November 1949.[95] All this occurred right in the middle of a campaign backing territorial internationalization of the Holy City conducted very vigorously by the Catholic hierarchy and press in the United States, involving joint statements by bishops, pastoral letters, religious functions, articles in newspapers and diocesan bulletins.

The Israeli government, perhaps deceived by the Pope's statement on 8 November and the conviction, encouraged by Herzog's reports, that the Holy See would follow a wait-and-see policy with a view to new negotiations with Israel, underestimated the Vatican's determination and political ability,[96] as did the US foreign policy-makers, despite warnings from State Department officials that Catholic solidarity was a force to be reckoned with.[97] The Holy See succeeded in getting the support, without too much difficulty, of France, Belgium and in particular the Latin American countries, whose votes were decisive in ensuring that the Australian motion was approved.

The result was attributed in many quarters to a 'terrific last minute exercise of Catholic pressure'. According to the *Palestine Post*, 'Papal Nuncios in almost every UN state visited heads of government with the result that almost identical cables were received by Latin American and other delegations ordering them to support the Australian resolution'. The documents currently available do not contain any decisive confirmation of this. However, there can be no doubt that the Holy See did everything in its power. If the Australian motion had been rejected, the General Assembly would probably have approved 'functional' internationalization as proposed by Sweden and Holland, which would have been a very serious defeat for the Holy See, forced to accept a solution it had repeatedly rejected when offered by Israelis during direct discussions.

The vote on 9 December 1949 by which the General Assembly reaffirmed its desire to internationalize Jerusalem territorially further hardened the Israeli and Jordanian positions. These countries intensified their negotiations to find agreement on the division of the city and speeded up the integration of the parts of Jerusalem they controlled into their respective states. All negotiations with the Vatican were broken off. The Holy See welcomed the UN decision, which at least on paper had strengthened its 'bargaining position in respect of Jerusalem',[98] but there was no hiding the difficulty of actual implementation, as borne out by the failure in the following year of the Garreau plan and all other initiatives, however limited. Resolution 303 (IV) was destined to remain on paper and the Holy City, far from becoming a *corpus separatum*, as provided for in the UN resolutions, was not even to achieve the more modest forms of 'functional' internationalization that seemed on the point of being established on several occasions in 1949.

95. See *New York Times*, 27 Nov. 1949. On Vatican and Catholic hierarchy activity in support of the Australian motion see Edward B. Glick, 'The Vatican, Latin America and Jerusalem', *International organization*. Spring 1957, pp. 213–9, Glick, *Latin America*, pp 142ff , Lehrman, *Israel*, pp. 234ff. and L. Shultz, 'The Jerusalem story', *The Nation*, 17 Dec. 1949, pp. 589–92.

96. From more than one document it is apparent that the Israelis were convinced that not only the Australian motion but also the Conciliation Commission's plan would be rejected by the UN. See, for example, FO371/ER/1011/1 (Israel: *Annual review* for 1949) and F0371/E14673 (Summary for the week ending 30 Nov 1949).

97. NA867N01/8-349, 3 Aug 1949. According to some observers, the absence of countermeasures was due to the fact that the State Department had in fact no intention of opposing the Australian motion See Lehrman, *Israel*. pp. 246–7 and Shultz, 'The Jerusalem story', p 591

98. Dean Acheson in *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 1553.

Book reviews

Chatham House books

National foreign policies and European Political Cooperation. Edited by Christopher Hill. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 207 pp. Index. £18.00.

If one had to read two books on European Political Cooperation, this would be a good choice for one of them. There are two stories to be told about EPC: one is of the steady advance towards the dawn of a Common Foreign Policy; the other of nation states grubbing for national advantage. There is truth in both; Christopher Hill's book tells the second version. In part this is a result of its being the 'book of the seminar', made up of papers on individual countries by different authors, who naturally focus on the distinctively national—and sometimes nationalistic—aspects of each country's policies. The essays at the beginning by William Wallace, who sets the scene, and Christopher Hill at the end, who attempts to draw the threads together, are both excellent, but they cannot remove the impression given by the main body of the book of ten nations pointed in as many different directions. One consequence of this is that, as a whole, it leaves the reader a little confused. Most books aim to make the world easier to understand; this one seems to make it more difficult. But that is a merit: the image of Europe as a combination of forces pulling in different directions may not be the whole truth, but it has a certain validity.

A second merit of this book is the volume of information and analysis provided on individual countries. All of the contributors inevitably find themselves outlining the main parameters of their country's foreign policy. Leaving EPC aside, if one wanted a sketch map of the foreign policy problems and preoccupations of each of the Ten, one could do worse than to go to this collection. In this respect the contributions on Germany, Greece and the Netherlands were particularly interesting. Perhaps these analyses may even outlast any conclusions on EPC, which has already moved on (or back) since publication.

Where, then, does that leave EPC itself? What is most striking is how much everyone seems to get out of it. The larger nations think it increases their leverage; the smaller see it as switching them into a bigger network and giving them occasional co-star roles on the international stage. Diplomats enjoy it; politicians find there is safety in numbers. Any system which benefits all its members has at least something to be said for it. The second point that stands out is how events which loom large in national minds (for example, the French 'denunciation' of the Venice declaration) may be ignored by others and forgotten after a few months. What remains is a core of common interests and attitudes; and EPC, on the whole, represents these well. As Christopher Hill points out in his final sentence, even if Political Cooperation does not make a decisive contribution to some vision of European unity (and it may yet), it could still have a contribution to make to diplomatic history.

ROBERT COOPER

The Soviet Union in East Asia: predicaments of power. Edited by Gerald Segal. London: Heinemann; Boulder, Col.. Westview, for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 150pp. Index. £14.50. Pb.: £6.50.

THIS volume of essays is the third of a series of Soviet foreign policy arising from a continuing Chatham House seminar. The collective enterprise sets out to identify and illuminate those complexities which confront Soviet policy-makers in a vast region of strategic and economic significance, if not of the highest priority. To this end, successive chapters are devoted to Soviet attitudes to East Asia, relationships with China, the United States, Japan and North Korea and also to the military and economic dimensions of policy. Gerald Segal as editor introduces these contributions and provides a succinct and sound final assessment of the Soviet position in which he stresses the persistent feature of uncertainty in Moscow's concurrent

dealings with three adversaries, an ally of a kind and a *de facto* protectorate in the form of Mongolia.

The subtitle 'predicaments of power' serves as a unifying theme for all contributions and receives initial exposition by Malcolm Mackintosh who, with a sure touch, stresses the problems posed for the Soviet Union in being an Asian power by dint of geography but not in political identity. Christina Holmes and David Armstrong in turn discuss Soviet–Chinese and Soviet–American relations; they provide substantive treatments but tend to drift from a sustained Soviet focus. Wolf Mendl, in considering the Soviet Union and Japan, points to Moscow's disposition to miss opportunities to improve the relationship because of an obsessive concern with security and provides a valuable discussion of their territorial bone of contention in an appendix. Gerald Segal writes skilfully about relations with Korea seen as a microcosm of Soviet predicaments in East Asia. In examining the militiary dimension, Lawrence Freedman highlights the logistical nightmare for the Soviet Union and offers some illuminating thoughts about the reluctance of the Soviet Union to reduce its troops deployed along the Sino–Soviet and Sino–Mongolian borders. Kazuyuki Kinbara provides a thorough analysis of the mixture of economic relationships, and in the case of Japan suggests that over time economic cooperation will be determined by economic factors, despite political constraints.

In his concluding analysis, Gerald Segal looks at the five relationships in terms of the types of model they represent. That with Mongolia suggests docility, that with Japan suggests persistent testiness, that with China suggests frustrating failure and that with the United States suggests stable conflict. Korea suggests a tolerable measure of limited engagement, fraught, however, with the greatest complexity and uncertainty. In his introduction, Gerald Segal rejects any extravagant claims for the purpose of this volume. The intention 'to reduce the basic dimensions of Soviet policy to their simplest components' has been well sustained.

London School of Economics MICHAEL LEIFER

Burden-sharing in NATO. By Simon Lunn. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 88pp. (Chatham House Paper 18.) Pb.: £3.95.

IN this interesting study Simon Lunn begins by showing that the problem of burden-sharing is inherent in the structure of the alliance and has bedevilled NATO from the beginning. He goes on to argue, however, that the difficulties created by differing perspectives within the alliance on the defence burden have become significantly worse with the series of disagreements (over Poland, the gas pipeline, interest rates, etc.) which have affected European–American relations from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan onwards. He then considers how the alliance has attempted to cope with its difficulties (through quiet compromise and 'fudge') before concluding with an analysis of alternative methods of 'bridging the gap' in the future.

The author quite rightly sets the problem of burden-sharing within the wider context of the security relationship between the United States and Western Europe. In particular he shows that, despite two Pentagon reports (in 1981 and 1982) which concluded that the Europeans in general were shouldering their fair share of the defence burden, Congressional frustration with the European allies has intensified in recent years. Burden-sharing has exacerbated, and been exacerbated by, other alliance difficulties. In Lunn's words the problem has become 'a major divisive factor in alliance politics'. Given its 'intractability' and the increasingly different perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic, he suggests that it is likely to remain 'central to the future cohesion of the Alliance'.

The major question is whether the existing climate within NATO permits the form of quiet compromise which has traditionally been used to 'solve' problems or whether, as Senator Nunn has argued, 'The NATO Alliance is now in need of major repair, militarily, politically and economically' If there is a criticism to be made of the book it is on this point. Mr Lunn raises the question but his analysis of how severe the crisis is and his discussion of the likely or preferred responses lacks a degree of clarity and depth. For example, on the question of how the alliance will, or should, respond to its present difficulties he suggests that 'more of the same' is the most likely outcome. He does, however, indicate that there is already a change of emphasis taking place towards the more conventional option and, should there be a permanent shift in American attitudes (along the lines of 'global unilateralism'), there could be a move to

a more coordinated European approach to the problem. More time could usefully have been spent on these important issues.

This criticism apart, Simon Lunn's book is to be highly recommended. It is well-written and readable, and he deals with many of the most fundamental issues facing the alliance today in an even-handed and authoritative way.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth JOHN BAYLIS

Defence and public opinion. By David Capitanchik and Richard C. Eichenberg. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 98pp. (Chatham House Paper 20.) Pb.: £4.95.

THIS useful booklet summarizes recent trends in public opinion about nuclear defence and the Atlantic alliance in Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany and France. 'Public opinion' is defined in its technical sense—what the mass public, according to opinion polls, says it thinks, rather than in its political sense, namely what activists do to show what they think. The results present a sobering corrective to the impression generated by the peace movement. Opinion has been remarkably similar on both sides of the Atlantic. There is no deep polarization between Europe and the United States. Americans are about as worried about the likelihood of nuclear war as Europeans and as realistically pessimistic about their chances of personal survival. The peace movement has grown rapidly, yet mass opinion is remarkable for its stability. Anxiety and pessimism have risen, but have existed for a long time, contrary to CND's patronizing assumption that ordinary citizens have been duped into believing that nuclear warfare is no different from its conventional forbears, only slightly nastier. The reputation of the United States and its Presidents (Carter and Reagan equally) has fallen sharply in European eyes, although here the authors run together the United States' image as a reliable ally to Europe, which remains high, with its image of competence and judgement in international affairs, which is what has suffered. But deep and pervasive distrust of Soviet intentions; the belief that the Soviet Union has a military (including nuclear) superiority; support for military institutions, including NATO; acceptance of a role for nuclear weapons in the West's defence; and, in Britain, rejection of unilateral nuclear disarmament—these attitudes have hardly shifted over the past decade. The authors make too little of the apparent inconsistency in British public opinion which has consistently rejected cruise and Pershing (except, briefly, during the 1983 election campaign) without ever embracing unilateral nuclear disarmament. This is interpreted as a public distaste for the modernization of the West's nuclear arsenal; but the more probable explanation is sheer anti-Americanism. (Substantively identical but differently phrased questions in the same survey clearly show that references to '*American* cruise missiles' swell opposition by about 10 per cent.) Nationalism, not pacifism, is the key to British (and other West European) public opinion.

The authors think public opinion matters because in seeking (re-)election politicans must anticipate the public mood. They exaggerate its significance. Elections are infrequent and do not necessarily coincide with the timetable of defence decisions or their implementation. Other issues count as much or more. Politicians change their arguments before they change their policies. The peace movement, however, even if unrepresentative of the mass public and even if it loses momentum, will leave a more enduring mark on politics, especially upon future generations of political leaders. One needs polls on them, too.

University of Essex IVOR CREWE

The third oil shock. Edited by Joan Pearce. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 109 pp. (Chatham House Special Paper.) Pb.: £4.95.

Oil companies in the international system. 3rd edn. By Louis Turner. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 279 pp. Index. Pb.: £6.95.

AS yet the third oil price shock has not resulted in the emergence of a vast body of writing analysing its effects, as was the case with the two earlier shocks. Indeed, the analysts seem to

have been much less prepared for the third shock than they were for the second, even though there was by general agreement over a year's advance warning. Of course from the point of view of the consuming countries the third shock, a price reduction, is at first sight beneficial. This time round it is the producers who are to suffer the welfare losses, although as the Chatham House Paper edited by Joan Pearce shows, the gains to consumers are somewhat ambiguous. The paper helps explain why there now seem to be complaints from the industrialized world not just over oil price increases, but, more surprisingly, over price decreases. Energy markets in general, and the oil market in particular, seem to be working in an even more complicated fashion than they were a decade ago. The causes of oil price changes are better understood than before, but the consequences are not; these are the subject of the Chatham House Paper.

Edward Morse in his contribution to the paper provides an overview of the distributional consequences of the oil price decreases for consumers and producers. He examines the cyclical nature of the oil market and the petroleum investment cycle. The decline in OPEC's power in the 1980s is discussed, as is the growth of the non-OPEC share of supply. The impact of the price cuts on non-OPEC Mexico is compared with the plight of Nigeria, Venezuela and the OPEC states of the Middle East in a contribution by Albert Bressand, Catherine Distler and Ghassane Salame. The problems of the more populous oil-producing countries appear broadly similar regardless of OPEC membership, with Mexico, Venezuela and Nigeria in difficulties compounded by their enormous debts in the Euromarkets; the combined effects of falling oil prices and high interest charges on Eurodollar debts have driven these countries to the brink of insolvency.

David Pearce examines how the oil-importing developing countries reacted first to the oil price rises of the 1970s, and then to the recent price falls. Bangladesh, the Sudan and Brazil are taken as case studies. In all three cases the price rises inflicted great economic harm, but price reductions are also causing problems. For example, Brazil's ambitious investment programme in non-oil substitutes is being threatened, while oil development off Sudan's Red Sea coast and in the Sudd region may be delayed. Even Bangladesh could have its gas development programme threatened, although the present modest oil price fall is undoubtedly bringing balance of payments benefits.

The impact of falling oil prices on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is analysed by Jonathan Stern. The Soviet Union is the world's largest oil producer, and oil exports accounted for 58 per cent of its total foreign exchange earnings from the West in 1981. Given the continuing Soviet need to import both foodstuffs and high technology goods from the West, the price cuts are clearly a cause of some concern to Moscow. Further cuts could cause immediate difficulties, even though in the longer term gas exports may solve the problem (once the initial gas pipeline debts are paid off). According to Stern the oil-importing countries of Eastern Europe will benefit less than those of Western Europe from the oil price cuts, as the Soviet Union has already reduced their deliveries in an attempt to maintain hard currency earnings from the West.

Kenneth King considers the consequences of declining oil prices for the international financial system. The major problem is the existing debt position of the more populous oil-exporting states such as Algeria, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela. Any further weakening of their balance of payments situation could result in a default, which the banks have so far struggled to avoid by delicate rescheduling operations. So long as a sharp, sudden fall in oil prices is avoided, the system should be capable of adjusting, just as it did to the oil price rises.

Louis Turner seriously doubts OPEC's ability to fight off further price declines in his contribution to the Chatham House Paper. He examines intra-OPEC relations, as well as the degree of influence which the organization has on non-members. The publication of the Paper coincides with the appearance of the third edition of his own book on oil companies in the international system. This edition sees the addition of new chapters on the second oil shock, oil's role in international relations, and a final chapter on whether the oil companies will survive. Certainly if neither OPEC nor the major companies survive in the long run the oil market will be very different to how it has been during the past twenty years. In these circumstances Louis Turner's book may be the last word on oil politics, leaving future analysts to concentrate on the more simple forces of supply and demand.

University of Durham

RODNEY WILSON

International relations and organizations

The end of world order: essays on normative international relations. By Richard Falk. London, New York: Holmes & Meier. 1983. 358pp. Index.

RICHARD FALK believes that the existing state system is failing to tackle the growing problems of the present and the future—not only the arms race but still more the ever-increasing threat to the environment and to life itself in the Third World. Since he holds that the study of international relations must be normative and not merely descriptive, he contends that the 'realist' approach which still dominates the subject, and which concentrates on inter-state relations and the search for stability, is no longer realistic. He recognizes the tenacious grip which the traditional view has on both statesmen and scholars, but is not pessimistic, for he believes that 'we are living at one of those axial points in human history, vulnerable to chaotic destruction while receptive to transformative vision' (p. 84). The task, then, is not merely that of criticism—for that is too easy—but that of developing an alternative world order which cannot be dismissed as merely Utopian, of discovering 'the creative space by which the predicted future can be brought into closer alignment with a preferred future' (p. 16). He claims an analogy with the work of Grotius, though of course the Grotian enterprise rather than the Grotian solution.

The chief medium of Falk's efforts is a body called the World Order Models Project (or WOMP, an acronym surely hardly less unhappy than MEOW), under whose auspices many of these essays were written. Like most such collections of reprinted work it is uneven—including, for example, the introduction to someone else's book and a fairly conventional attack on Henry Kissinger. (That notable realist recently said in addressing Chatham House, 'The democracies, whatever their shifting positions, have failed to relate their philosophical and moral convictions to a coherent analysis of the nature of revolution and an understanding of how best to foster moderation', *International Affairs*, Autumn 1982, p.584. Would Falk differ?) But those who wish Falk's enterprise well will be dismayed by an improbable editorial muddle in this volume. The first chapter, an overview, devotes most of three pages, pp.20–2, to summarizing five chapters, 15–19, which, as the pagination and the index make clear, were never included. Unhappily these are the very chapters which might have established the merit of an approach in which 'the world as a whole is taken as the basic social unit' (p.20). Falk's chief retort to the charge of unrealism is in a quotation from Anna Akhmatova, 'The future which we know throws its shadow long before it enters' (p.315). Yet the chapters in which the shadow might have fallen are absent. If it is ever to grow, it must be through work like this. Grotius, however, codified rules which the states of his day were—by and large—willing to accept. Not the least of our problems is that new nations cling to an inherited state system that justifies them as it ruins them. It is hard not to feel that Falk's preferred future is still very distant.

University of Birmingham A. E. CAMPBELL

People, states and fear: the national security problem in international relations. By Barry Buzan. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf. 1983. 262 pp. Index. £20.00. Pb.: £6.95.

DESPITE the surge of interest in international relations theory in the postwar period, the corpus of 'grand theory' has not grown appreciably in recent years. In this category one would include Robert Gilpin's *War and change in world politics* (Cambridge, 1981), J.-B. Duroselle's *Tout empire périra: une vision théorique des relations internationales* (Paris, 2nd edn, 1982), and now Barry Buzan's *People, states and fear.*

As an uncomplicated definition of theory I recommend J. Glenn Gray's 'the general principles of any subject matter'. Gray further defines a principle as 'a primary structure around which and by means of which single and isolated things are grouped and organized'. General principles enable us to look at any phenomenon in its position and participation in a larger context. (*The promise of wisdom: a philosophical theory of education*, New York, 1968, pp. 2–3.)

The phenomenon with which Buzan is concerned is security, and it is the chief merit of his book that it provides the broad theoretical framework in Gray's sense for the understanding of

security. As a starting point he takes Kenneth Waltz's now familiar three levels of analysis—individual, state and international system—but he extends and deepens the conceptual resources of each level. His basic approach, moreover, is 'holistic', as his conclusion stresses, in order to show the links and interactions among the three levels. Nor is he rigidly bound by this framework, for he advances ideas which are not easily accommodated by the tripartite scheme. Among these is the notion of 'security complex', which he defines as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another' (p. 106). The virtue of such a notion is that it offers an intermediate level of analysis between the state and the global international system. It has certain affinities, Buzan admits, with the concept of a regional balance of power or subsystem, as his extended treatment of South Asia suggests. Buzan's notion of security complex is however both more flexible and more precise.

The book is wide-ranging in scope, including a useful chapter on the international economic system, and draws upon a large amount of the most significant literature in international relations, much of which is further analysed in the extensive notes. Buzan is commendably sensitive to the dilemmas and contradictions inherent in international politics, as evidenced by his discussion of the more specific problems of defence in later chapters.

In writing a book which makes a significant advance in the conceptualization of international relations, Buzan is perhaps too reticent in presenting his methodology, describing it somewhat cryptically as 'pre-definitional' (p. 11). He is however mercifully free of methodological encumbrances, and his prose is quite readable and liberally endowed with specific examples from contemporary international politics.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. WRIGHT

Interaction: foreign policy and public policy. Edited by Don C. Piper and Ronald J. Terchek. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 1983. 235pp. Pb.

SIX former Maryland students of the veteran political scientist, Elmer Plischke, have combined with three others to produce this set of essays in his honour. As always in such enterprises, the overall theme is less important than some of the specific subjects which the contributors have chosen to cover, but the whole is attractively printed and extremely well produced.

The range is considerable. Intelligence failures over Pearl Harbor, Korea and Iran feature alongside human rights, Presidential vetoes and the law of the sea. All but one of the essays have obvious bearings on foreign policy; the exception is a review of United States immigration policy.

Of the two most substantial contributions, Larman C. Wilson's comparison of the attitudes of the Carter and Reagan administrations towards human rights surveys a theme which has already received considerable attention and is likely to receive more. No fewer than six substantial books on this subject have appeared in the United States in the past four years alone, and Professor Wilson charts the major controversies in an illuminating way. But perhaps the most striking and original of the nine essays, and one which for many will repay constant re-reading, is Don C. Piper's analysis of the concern increasingly felt by government and public opinion alike over the growth of foreign direct investment in the United States. By way of contrast the second editor, Professor Terchek, best known perhaps for *The making of the Test Ban Treaty*, tends the rather more familiar ground of foreign and domestic policy 'linkages'. In so doing he claims to have come across something called 'the American [national] character' and suggests (p.64) that it has recently 'changed'; but the evidence for these substantial and (to my mind) questionable propositions is hinted at rather than deployed.

The well-worn theme of American public opinion and the cold war is expertly reworked by Norman Graebner, whose essay includes a useful additional note on the inter-war era. It is marred only by his mis-dating of Stalin's influential election address of 9 February 1946 (p.20) and by his description of it as 'belligerent'. Certainly that is how it was reported at the time, since when it has been published in full sufficiently often to warrant a rather different reaction; while less friendly in tone than the interview with Alexander Werth eight months later, the February speech was singularly free of anti-Western polemics.

Those attracted to the fields chosen by the contributors will find the book rewarding and

very readable. There is no index, but the sub-divisions are clear and the contents easy to locate.

Polytechnic of North London BRIAN THOMAS

Contending approaches to world system analysis. Edited by William R. Thompson. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1983. 311pp. Pb.

THIS is a most thought-provoking collection. Following a useful introductory account by Thompson of the major perspectives on world system analysis, there are chapters on the 'world-economy perspective', chapters on various 'political perspectives', and finally chapters giving critiques on both perspectives.

Writing from the world-economy perspective, Bergesen argues that global exchange relations are determined by global class relations (as reflected in control by the core over the means of production in the periphery, and in the coercive relations which created and maintain the world economy). The effect of these global class relations on the peripheral economies is the subject of a highly technical investigation by Sylvan *et al.* Finally, Chase-Dunn juxtaposes Weber's notion of a tendency towards greater rationalization with the notion that the ideology of competition in inter-state and world-market relations determines world development.

Moving on to the political perspectives, Modelski's chapter elaborates on his model of a long cycle of world leadership. Thompson studies the evidence for one consequence of this model, namely the association between the declining relative capability of the world leader and global war. Doran relates these systemic events to his theory about cycles in the relative power of each state. Finally, Levy contrasts these approaches with his own preference: great power theory.

In places, I shared Wallerstein's exasperation over the 'artificial (and as stated, unresolvable) debate that largely misses the point of the world-systems perspective' (p.299). His argument is similar to Frank's that the false reality of growth in the West, socialism in the East, and development in the South, together with their supporting political ideologies and academic theories, are in crisis; and that the world-systems approach is a response to this crisis. Like Rapkin, I would criticize each perspective for neglect of the other, and argue for the adoption of an integrative approach. Rapkin also points to the need for auxiliary theories to explain local deviations from any systemic long-cycle theory. This need is suggested by Zolberg's specific historical criticisms—indeed, Zolberg argues that 'all-encompassing theory at the world historical level is an impossible dream' (p.281).

Some important aspects are, however, underdeveloped in this volume. I believe there is a need, first, for greater formalization of these theories, and second, to apply these theories to support the transition to a future 'normatively preferred world'. This is hinted at by Frank, Chase-Dunn, and Wallerstein, but only fully developed in the chapter by Falk and Kim. They argue that world order studies should now focus on a struggle theory of social change, international regimes, normative foreign policy, alternative security frameworks and demilitarization, and the global cultural nexus.

I found each chapter stimulating not only for its main argument but also in detail. My criticisms of particular chapters were often voiced in the other chapters, and in this sense the chapters complement one another very well.

The Open University GORDON BURT

International organizations: a comparative approach. By Werner J. Feld, Robert S. Jordan and Leon Hurwitz. New York: Praeger. 1983. 329pp. Index. $33.95. Pb.: $13.95.

As Lord Carrington observed in his Chatham House lecture to mark the bicentenary of the office of Foreign Secretary, much international discussion and decision-making now takes place in permanent fora of one kind or another. This text-book tries to make sense of it all, and for good measure looks not only at intergovernmental organizations, but also at the much more numerous nongovernmental bodies which have an international aspect. It is a daunting task but has been executed with considerable success.

After some preliminary explorations the book devotes four substantial chapters to intergovernmental organizations. The first deals with their creation; the next with institutional and bureaucratic developments (a rather uneasy combination); the third with decision-making processes and policy-making scope; and the last with their interactions with member states and with other intergovernmental organizations. The authors' method is to open with some general discussion of the chapter's subject matter, and to follow it up with a number of case studies, which are imaginatively chosen and always illuminating. The issue around which the latter three of these chapters is built is that of task performance, organizations being examined and compared in the light of their success in carrying out their allotted roles. And the explanatory theme which runs throughout the analysis is that organizations are established by states to fulfil their common purposes, and must therefore be seen, very largely, as the creatures of states. This focus and theme also appear in a similarly structured chapter on international regimes; thus the book as a whole has a high degree of intellectual unity, which contributes notably to its value as a text. International nongovernmental organizations are dealt with in a separate chapter.

In the authors' view there has been a general decline in the effectiveness and prestige of intergovernmental organizations. Some of those concerned with security and many of those with a technical orientation are thought to have performed satisfactorily. But others are seen as having stagnated or fallen away so far as the execution of their tasks is concerned. This is attributed to disillusion (at both the official and unofficial levels), concern that other members are benefiting more than oneself, or even alarm at the prospect that international organizations might come to impinge too sharply on national prerogatives. All of which accords well with the book's basic and very sound argument that intergovernmental organizations are meant to do their members' will, and that on the whole they are necessarily limited by this large constraint.

A number of figures and tables are included at appropriate points, and there are some statistical appendices. All of them are very useful, and this, indeed, is the judgement which recurs on the book's several parts. It does get a bit frayed at the edges here and there. But there is no doubt that it is a reliable and valuable guide to a pedagogically difficult but important aspect of the international terrain.

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

The evolution of the modern Commonwealth, 1902–80. By Denis Judd and Peter Slinn. London: Macmillan. 1982. 171 pp. Index. £15.00. Pb.: £5.95.

Multilateral diplomacy within the Commonwealth. By Andrestinos N. Papadopoulos. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1982. 172 pp. Index. DFl. 95.00; US$39.50.

AMBIGUITIES are common enough in international relations but none more than in the Commonwealth as an international organization. With no formal constitution and a chequered history of mistrust and confused objectives, it has emerged as a forum more successful than the UN for meaningful political discussion and with a series of working functional institutions to its credit. The establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965, and the subsequent urgent repair of battered intra-Commonwealth relations after the trauma of the 1971 Singapore summit—dominated by the issue of British arms sales to South Africa and the failure of Britain's Rhodesia policy—had much to do with it.

Relatively short, the Judd and Slinn volume summarizes the history of the movement and organization, whereas that by Papadopoulos is a close study of the Secretariat. Both are concerned with the end of Anglocentricity and use of the Commonwealth as a pressure partner in Britain's diplomacy. Inevitably, however, some key historical milestones are somewhat summarily dealt with, such as the Chanak incident of 1922 when it became clear that the Dominions could not be automatically relied upon to give military support in a crisis involving the erstwhile mother country. But others carry with them pungent observations. One such is that the attack on Pearl Harbor 'effectively won the war for the British Empire' (p.84) and that the 1932 Ottawa Agreements 'hardly amounted to a realisation of the dreams of those who saw a greater degree of Empire economic unity as an alternative to the now vanished hopes of political unity' (p.68). The emphasis put upon the importance of India to the Empire is critically considered, and the point made that the House of Commons was closer

in its concern to the threat of Gandhi than to the unemployed of Tyneside. Right to the end, the tail wagged the imperial dog with India's insistence in 1947 that the British monarch be solely titled Head of the Commonwealth.

The joint authors handle the transition from India to Africa as the centre of political gravity with knowledge and sympathy. The collapse of bipartisan policy in the British parliament on decolonization over the white settler issue in Kenya and the fate of the Central African Federation is well handled, but there is little on the activities of the various pressure groups involved so far as British politics was concerned. Their verdict on the 1979 Lusaka summit and the consequent final Rhodesian settlement is one that found relieved echoes in British embassies around the world: 'British statesmen did something to redeem the sad record of their predecessors whose repeated failures in this regard had so discredited Britain in the eyes of the Commonwealth and the world' (p. 135).

The near collapse of the Commonwealth in the 1966–71 period is also covered by Papadopoulos. A Greek Cypriot diplomat seconded to the Secretariat, he was fortunately placed to record its work. Its genesis is revealing: the poor image, particularly in Africa, of the Commonwealth Relations Office, the handling of the incipient pre-UDI Rhodesia issue on the agenda of successive Prime Minister's conferences by the British and the contemporary euphoria of institution-making, all played their part. Central to this thesis is the contention that, without the establishment of the Secretariat, the Commonwealth would not have survived the Rhodesia UDI crisis which finally broke a few months later, in November 1965.

The consultative function of the Secretariat is given considerable emphasis, as is the careful check on its executive power, granted as and when specifically authorized by its members. Unfortunately, while the book usefully records the work of the secretariat and its various committees—to the extent that it sometimes resembles a communiqué—it barely discusses the political significance of such crises as the 1971 summit and the revelation of British Government tolerance of oil company exports to Rhodesia, which had more than a passing effect upon the Secretariat. The author also leaves much unsaid about the extent and direction of political cooperation in issues not exclusive to Commonwealth members. However, his analysis of the special position of the Secretary-General in the promotion of Commonwealth multilateral diplomacy is sound.

In the last resort, the Commonwealth is, in Baldwin's prescient words of 1937, 'an association of peoples', concerned with the issues and problems of those peoples. It is certainly no club, as some may have us cosily believe, but rather represents a habit: in Secretary-General Ramphal's words, it is 'a way of life'. Both books leave the reader in no doubt about that.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TONY THORNDIKE

The League of Nations in retrospect: proceedings of the symposium organized by the United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 6–9 November 1980. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter. 1983. 427 pp. Index. DM 164.00.

This book contains the proceedings of an international symposium which was held on the sixtieth anniversary of the First Assembly of the League of Nations, and the purpose of which was to evaluate the state of research on the League and uncover areas for future research. It contains twenty-one papers, eight of them in French. After an introductory essay setting out the themes which emerged from the symposium, it is divided into four sections. The first, on institutional aspects, has one paper on the League's institutions themselves and three others on the role of Secretary-General Drummond, the emergence of the Bruce Report and the transition from League to UN. The second section contains seven studies of states' policies towards the League. Of these, three focus on the host state, Switzerland, and the others deal with Britain, Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union. The third section, on security problems, comprises three papers on disarmament, regional security and a comparison of the Letician and Ethiopian conflicts. The fourth section has three papers on financial and economic questions: the work of the League's Economic Committee in the 1920s, the financial reconstruction of Austria and the 1927 World Economic Conference. The other four papers in this section look at humanitarian and social cooperation: refugees, minorities, assistance to China and colonialism.

The word 'failure' recurs repeatedly in these papers. However, the new generation of writers

represented in this book see the League's failure in terms of its overambitious attempt to cope with international circumstances rather than—as did an earlier generation of writers—in terms of individual betrayal. Even so, one is struck by the League's limited but notable successes (for example, the contention that in the short run minority protection produced worthwhile benefits); by the way in which the League extended the field of international cooperation (in which respect the papers on financial and economic cooperation are particularly interesting); and by the extent to which it paved the way for and moulded its successor so that, as one contributor says, the UN could not but follow the path traced by the League. And it is equally interesting to see the way in which states strove to further their interests in the light of the appearance of a new phenomenon on the world stage.

This book deserves to be widely read. Almost every paper is very good indeed, revealing the fascinating insights which are emerging as the history of the League is rewritten (a process which is far from complete, as is particularly evident in the section on states). It is to be hoped that it will soon appear in a more accessibly-priced version, from which the all-too-frequent printing errors have been deleted. It is the most significant and exciting general book on the League to have appeared for many years.

University of Keele LORNA LLOYD

The Lomé Conventions and their implications for the United States. By Joanna Moss. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 218pp. Index. Pb.: £17.00.

NEGOTIATIONS to revise the 1979 Lomé Convention between the European Community and the now sixty-three African, Caribbean and Pacific States commenced in October 1983. Dissatisfaction on the part of the ACP participants with the relationship is widespread, and it is also criticized by third countries, particularly by the United States. Joanna Moss, Assistant Professor of Economics at the San Francisco State University and a former adviser to the American government in international commodity negotiations, has analysed the record of ACP–EEC cooperation to date and assessed the implications for American economic interests of the Lomé regime. She confirms that many of the Lomé Convention's provisions have not had the results hoped for and stresses the limited nature of its contribution to the economic development of most ACP states.

The book consists of eight chapters and some lengthy appendices. The first chapter provides an historical overview of EEC–African relations from the original Rome Treaty association provisions to the conclusion of the first Lomé Convention of 1975. The next five chapters are devoted to investigating specific sectors of the Lomé regime: trade, aid, Stabex, Sysmin and investment promotion, and industrial cooperation. Throughout the analysis is undertaken from an economic perspective, but there is also a balanced assessment of the political interests involved. Her statistics are generally well presented if somewhat dated, a state of affairs which unfortunately can rarely be avoided in book publishing. In demonstrating that the ACP states are justifiably disappointed with the record of ACP–EEC cooperation, Dr Moss suggests a range of proposals to improve the working of the Lomé regime in the light of ACP needs and requirements.

The book's distinctive feature is its unravelling in the concluding chapters of those American interests affected by the Lomé Convention. In so doing Dr Moss provides a most interesting examination of the insuperable problems which would be presented to existing American relationships if the United States attempted to create such an arrangement with developing countries centred around itself. The analysis of these potential problems and the likely negative response of American governmental and private interests to suggestions for concessional, preferential relations with developing countries in large measure also emphasizes the unique character of the EEC's response to ACP needs. Indeed, this reviewer was left with the impression that notwithstanding its many deficiencies, the EEC has actually undertaken a remarkably generous experiment.

The book contains over fifty pages of statistical appendices, mainly relating to the period 1970 to 1979. These dated statistical tables do not add very much to the value of the book. There is a useful bibliography, however, and a brief index providing guidance to the key points covered in the text. Overall, the book is well written and readable. It should be of

interest to students of economics and international relations concerned with past performances and future prospects of EEC policies towards developing countries.

College of Europe, Bruges. CAROL COSGROVE TWITCHETT

Defence and disarmament

Arms control: the multilateral alternative. Edited by Edward C. Luck. New York, London: New York University Press. 1983. 258 pp. Index. $42.50. Pb.: $19.50.

THIS symposium is not what a European reader might expect. The alternative to multilateralism in Europe is unilateralism, so that a book published here with the above title would be about why multilateralism is a reasonable alternative to unilateralism. In the United States, multilateralism is contrasted with bilateralism, and the ten essays constitute a plea to the US government to place more confidence in the negotiation of multilateral disarmament.

Another surprise for a European reader is to find that the book is sponsored by the United States UN Association. Britain's UNA has worked patiently over the years to promote public support for UN institutions, but it has not undertaken the kind of original and substantial study which this book represents. The editor, Ed Luck, has coordinated a distinguished team of practitioners and theorists, and has himself contributed two essays. There is a classified bibliography.

Luck believes that multilateral negotiations 'can foster the conditions necessary for agreement' because of the pressures on 'recalcitrant major powers' from the Third World, allies, and public opinion generally (p. 217), and he provides a comprehensive list of 'the most obvious' disarmament problems which could benefit from multilateral attention (p. 221). The difficulty for NATO, as Luck would readily admit, is not whether the input from the Third World and public opinion would be positive, but how to produce a coherent collective approach to arms control if alliance members are not mere puppets. Each government's disarmament policy is a compromise between different interests and aspirations, so that NATO's disarmament policy is an international compromise wrought from sixteen national compromises. NATO members ought to be as concerned for disarmament as they are for deterrence and defence; but, as Gregory Treverton points out, differences among allies on disarmament policy are more visible than differences on defence because of the need to speak and vote in international bodies (pp. 77–8).

Among the essays which caught my special attention is one by Michael Nacht on Soviet negotiating goals (pp. 97–112). One contribution falls below the general standard and includes the curious statement that the Geneva committee on disarmament has been intermittently concerned with chemical weapons and verification, 'especially in the context of a comprehensive test ban' (p. 43). Luck himself insists that negotiations on disarmament need to be accompanied by improved UN fact-finding, peacekeeping and peacemaking (p. 194). Steven L. Canby considers the extension of confidence-building measures to the Third World (pp. 207–12): it would certainly be useful to see whether the US experience with unmanned sensors in Sinai carries lessons for the verification of disarmament agreements elsewhere.

Disarmament experts will find many suggestive ideas scattered throughout this book. I would have criticized the exorbitant price but for the fact that the book costs a halfpenny a page *less* than my own last book, published by a different university press.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY

Dangers of deterrence: philosophers on nuclear strategy. Edited by Nigel Blake and Kay Pole. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1983. 184 pp. Index. Pb.: £5.95.

THIS is a timely but in some respects disappointing book. It is encouraging that philosophers should concern themselves with the intellectual dilemmas of deterrence. It is disappointing to find neither a serious discussion of the ethical issues nor, in a collection of essays introduced by its editors as reflecting a 'unilateralist' standpoint, any systematic definition of either 'deterrence' or 'unilateralism'.

Much of the discussion is about the particular deterrent strategy espoused by NATO in 1967, which the editors criticize as provocative, unstable and likely to fail. But it is logically impossible for a true deterrent to provoke; and the book is really about the dangers, not of deterrence but of failure to deter.

Ken Booth takes the discussion of 'unilateralism' furthest with the suggestion (pp. 50–1) that Clausewitz, were he alive today and British, would be a 'hard unilateralist', renouncing the independent British strategic deterrent and, while retaining the ultimate American deterrent, seeking a slow adjustment to a conventional posture in Europe. This 'hard unilateralism' is put forward simply as making most strategic sense in the cause of avoiding war, which for Booth is the only rational contemporary interpretation of 'the continuation of state policy by other means'. Nevertheless, while pertinently reminding us that the god of strategy is called Murphy, he does not sufficiently examine how NATO is to deter the Warsaw Pact from initiating the use of theatre nuclear weapons.

Barrie Paskins, who sees a danger that successful deterrence may encourage proliferation, suggests (p. 121) that the two superpowers are not so much seeking a capability to fight and win a nuclear war as pursuing a strategy of overall strength in preference to one of sufficient deterrence. He calls for a major shift of foreign policy based on a Western initiative to persuade the Russians that it is equally in their interest to deprive nuclear weapons of their central role. Jeff McMahon concedes that 'nuclear blackmail' can be prevented most effectively, if with greatest risk, by an independent nuclear force or an alliance with a nuclear power but, perhaps dangerously, questions the reality of the threat.

But none of the authors fully explores the dialectic of one real danger of nuclear deterrence. Its very validity against nuclear weapons may make it increasingly incredible as a deterrent to conventional aggression by a nuclear power. If both sides therefore find themselves in a *de facto* 'no first use' posture, then Booth's advocacy of a less nuclear strategy, McMahon's readiness to make sacrifices for an effective conventional defence, and Paskins's call for a foreign policy initiative to redirect the spiral of nuclear armaments downwards are all highly relevant. There are welcome signs of increasing receptivity to these points both inside and outside official circles, but this book has nevertheless performed a service in bringing them forward.

ARTHUR HOCKADAY

The war trap. By Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 223 pp. Index. Pb., £6.95.

THIS book was first published in the United States in 1981. Reviewers in American journals of political science had trumpeted it as 'a masterful study', a 'major work', an 'important contribution'. It is none of those things. It is a baroque banality, and as such can be recommended neither to the international relations specialist nor to the general reader.

The author's grand aim is nothing less than 'to present a general theory of war and foreign conflict initiation and escalation' (p. ix), and 'to present systematically derived, lawlike statements about war and other serious disputes and to explore the relationship between history and those statements.' (p. 2). The following are just two examples of these 'lawlike statements': 'When diplomacy can leave both partners better off than they expect to be after fighting a war, neither has an incentive to fight' (p. 170). 'The lesson to be derived from the history of relations between allies is that security can be enhanced by alliances, provided that they are close enough to reflect meaningful shared interests and powerful enough to deter would be adversaries, and not too close that they isolate either partner from independent friendly relations with other states' (pp. 163–4). No student of international politics should have to suffer pages of mathematics at the level of 'ninth-grade algebra' (p. x) only to be made aware of such banalities, tautologies, and glimpses of the blindingly obvious. Ninth-grade history would have done nicely, and been much more interesting on the way. It would also have reminded one of the importance of accuracy in words, as well as calculations: what justification is there, for example, in apparently so rigorous a methodological exposition as that offered by Professor de Mesquita, in his decision to use the words 'war', 'dispute', and 'conflict' interchangeably?

The source of the author's 'lawlike statements' is a self-fulfilling theory in which the idea that decision-makers are 'expected-utility maximisers' is both an assumption and a deduction. This fact is pointed out—but its importance is seemingly not recognized—by the author himself. At one point he writes:

> [My] theory is predicated on the belief that national leaders behave as if they are rational expected-utility maximisers. The broadest—and seemingly obvious—generalization that emerges from the theory is the expectation that wars (or other conflicts) will be initiated only when the initiator believes the war will yield positive expected utility (p. 127).

QED indeed.

Towards the end of his book Professor de Mesquita admits that 'expert foreign policy makers are wise enough and knowledgeable enough that the theory will not reveal much that is new to them' (p. 185). I would go further, and claim that 'the theory' will not reveal much that is new about foreign policy to ninth-grade students of history. The latter just might learn something about algebra, but in the study of the relations between states, algebra is bunk. There is nothing to be learned from this book about the 'war trap', but the dangers of the 'scientific' methodology trap are well in evidence. Keep well clear.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

NATO arms cooperation: a study in economics and politics. By Keith Hartley. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 228 pp. Index. £18.50.

THE concept of 'political market place' is not widely in circulation. Neither is the approach of political economy, bringing together the discipline of economic analysis with the conceptual approaches of political science. This volume is an excellent demonstration of the value of political economy: by an economist, but starting from an examination of the political arguments put forward over the last twenty years for NATO standardization and joint procurement, and moving on from there to ask whether the forecast gains have been achieved, within the political, economic and bureaucratic constraints prevailing.

Hartley starts from the 1975 Callaghan Report, with its argument that national duplication in procurement resulted in an estimated 'waste' of over $10 billion per year, and that standardization offered massive gains in efficiency. He notes the shaky basis of this estimate, the vested interests involved both in pressures for arms collaboration and in the maintenance of independent national capabilities, and the wide areas of unsubstantiated assertion, 'myths, fallacies and special pleading' which lie between the benefits claimed and the discovery of 'propositions which have some analytical and empirical validity' (p. 16). The fundamental issue is posed in terms of the economics of public choice: 'If standardisation is as beneficial as claimed, why has it not occurred? Are there some obvious market failures preventing worthwhile international and mutually advantageous trade and exchange, or are the existing arrangements 'optimal' once it is recognised that all policies and exchange involve costs?' (p. 11). No conclusive answer to this question is offered. However, the reader is guided carefully through the theory of efficiency by means of standardization (the imprecision of which Hartley strongly criticizes) and through the political economy of the NATO alliance; in which the importance of producer interest groups is stressed, and the overlap of political objectives—such as security, national prosperity, industrial and technological advance—which shapes the context within which decisions are made. The second half of the book looks in some detail at cooperation and competition in military procurement within the aerospace industry, based upon a number of interviews with European and American companies and an extensive review of the published literature.

The value of this book lies in its careful unpicking of the arguments for arms collaboration, and its micro-economic analysis of the costs and benefits of collaborative projects so far, from the F-16 consortium to the AWACs debate and the Anglo–French helicopter agreement. It does not offer any clear recommendations, beyond the need to maintain an element of competitiveness in the weapons market and to resist the self-interested arguments of the military and the producing companies; its conclusions, indeed, run only to three pages. But this is not a work of advocacy. It is intended as a critical examination of the conventional wisdom within NATO, and of the experience of collaboration so far. Its analysis—which ought to command a wide audience—should give pause to those who argue for non-competitive collaborative projects as the way to cut costs and preserve national industrial capacities, as well as to the declining band who think it possible to maintain those national

capacities without more intensive collaboration and specialization within the Western alliance.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

The dangers of new weapon systems. Edited by William Gutteridge and Trevor Taylor. London: Macmillan. 1983. 241 pp. Index. £25.00.

A PUGWASH symposium in December 1980 addressed the subject of new weapons systems and criteria for evaluating their dangers. This book is one product of that meeting. Its publication is timely in view of the renewed interest in the conventional defence of Europe, and although the quality of the contributions inevitably varies somewhat, most chapters are very good. In addition to the substantive information and arguments which it contains, the book is also valuable for the light it casts on how the problems of the new weapons are perceived in countries as various as Egypt, Finland, India, Poland, the Soviet Union, North America, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and West Germany.

The book contains informative chapters on directed energy weapons (Tsipis), tank developments (Albrecht), and precision-guided munitions and other of the so-called emerging technologies (Miettinen). It examines their impact on strategic theories and on arms control, noting in particular the complexities now associated with the idea of thresholds between nuclear and conventional, and tactical and strategic warfare (Byers). The erosion of these thresholds is well shown by several authors in terms of the possible uses of precision-guided munitions, and of 'area' weapons. (The recently reported development of the capacity to create electromagnetic pulse effects without the use of nuclear explosives further confirms this trend.) Perry-Robinson introduces the term 'quasinuclear' for the new types of non-nuclear weapons which may be substituted for nuclear weapons in some military missions, while Simpson, in another useful addition to the vocabulary of strategic studies, shows how the ambiguous nature of possible thresholds between categories of nuclear warfare means that in some circumstances they may serve as a 'bridge', and in others as a 'barrier', to escalation. These ambiguities lead several authors to revive Bertram's idea that arms control should focus on missions rather than on weapons; Taylor and Dunn, in particular, argue that one mission which should be eschewed is that of the *blitzkrieg*, and also that conventional arms control should receive attention equal to that accorded to nuclear arms.

Another theme running through several chapters is the question of the integration of the problems and possibilities raised by the new weapons into the overall formulation and implementation of defence policy, including here the research and development process (Long), and the tactics and structure of armed forces (Miettinen). An important argument, voiced by Perry-Robinson and Brauch, is that there has in the past been too sharp a conceptual and bureaucratic separation between arms control and defence management, especially with respect to research, development and procurement of new weapons, and that revision of this position is overdue. In addition, there is useful discussion of whether, as is so often assumed, the new technology will favour defence over offence: on the evidence of this book (especially Karkoszka's chapter); the question remains open.

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

The independent nuclear state: the United States, Britain and the military atom. By John Simpson. London: Macmillan. 1983. 340 pp. Index. £25.00.

FEW books discuss so many important questions so authoritatively as this one does. Its achievement in this stems partly from the author's grasp of the details of weapons development, plutonium production and trans-Atlantic trade in fissile material; it also shows how patient scholarship and a highly tuned ability to extract meaning from every nuance of official pronouncements can open up even this most closely guarded area of public policy, and illuminate a major element of Anglo-American relations.

The early chapters draw on the official histories of the US and UK atom bomb programmes. From 1952, no further help is available from the British official history, and so John Simpson's account of the development of the Blue Danube bomb and its successors, the negotiation of the atomic alliance in the mid-1950s, the run-down of active nuclear weapons

development until the inception of the Chevaline project, and the exchanges in fissile material and submarine reactor technology all break new ground.

One conclusion is that British nuclear policy has veered more towards independence under Labour governments and towards interdependence under Conservative ones. Another is that the British nuclear weapons programme has always been under firm political control; however, as a result of certain technical questions reaching the political level (as with the case for Chevaline), politicians in recent years have become more dependent on their advisers.

On the tortuous question of fissile material exchanges, Simpson argues that until the early 1960s there was no clear vision of the need to make a sharp distinction for non-proliferation purposes between the military and civil aspects of nuclear power. However, there is no evidence that any civil reactors have operated on a military fuel cycle, but there is also no doubt that plutonium from these reactors was transferred to the United States after 1964 under the military exchange agreement; moreover, even if no UK 'civil' plutonium has found its way into US bombs, there is little doubt that the 1955 civil reactor construction programme proved (because of its potential as a source of weapons-grade plutonium) to be very important in furthering Anglo-American military cooperation.

Finally, he shows how the web of obligations which has arisen from all these exchanges may raise very great difficulties for any British government seeking nuclear disarmament—not least because of the links in the area of nuclear-powered submarines, where Britain has received both reactor technology and highly enriched uranium fuel, and where any attempt, in a nuclear-disarmed Britain, to retain a source of supply of such uranium would greatly complicate the task of demonstrating that disarmament really had occurred.

This is a very important book which should be widely read: the publishers should lose no time in issuing a paperback edition.

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

War in the eighties: men against high tech. Edited by Brian Macdonald. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. 1983. 162 pp. Pb.: C$10.95.

The Canadian strategic review 1982. Edited by R. B. Byers. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. 1982. 148 pp. Pb.: C$11.80.

THE first of these publications from the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies is a report of a conference held in Toronto in November 1982. The texts of the papers that were presented are supplemented by verbatim reports of the discussion periods. Although a good deal of the material is related, at least in part, to Canadian perspectives and concerns, a number of the papers contain both material and comment that have general interest and relevance. There are three papers, by Gordon MacNabb, Terrence Liston and John Fulton on the manpower, training and organizational implications of high technology that make substantial points in an area that is not much discussed; and there is a characteristically clear and throughtful analysis by George Lindsey on equipment requirements for the high-tech battlefield. The collection begins with two well-informed papers on the Falklands War, one by Robert Elliott, the other by David Masters and Norman Friedman—the last of whom makes some trenchant and robust criticisms of British equipment.

The inclusion of the discussion periods adds a range of detail, and gives a feel for what it was about the papers that caught the audience's attention at the time; but it also shows that, in the Canadian Institute as in our own learned societies, there is invariably someone who has a predetermined, if not predestined, comment of peripheral significance to offer.

The second volume is the first in what is to be an annual series of surveys and, as the President of the Institute says in his foreword, is a major step in the development of the Institute's efforts to improve the climate of informed opinion on strategic interests and national security in Canada. The eleven contributions are divided into three main areas: the international military–strategic and economic–strategic environments, and Canadian defence policy issues. They are, in part, accounts of events and trends in the 1981–2 period under review, but also include a substantial element of commentary, and provide overall a balanced and informative viewpoint. In our parochial terms, it is a collection half-way between *Brassey's* and *Strategic Survey*, but with a distinctively cool and reasonable Canadian perspective. It is a welcome development, and one worth watching.

The Canadian strategic community is somewhat self-conscious on occasions about its

relatively small size and its contiguity to its southern *machina ex deo:* but it has, on the evidence of these Institute publications, interesting and pertinent things to say.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

Industrial capacity and defense planning: sustained conflict and surge capability in the 1980s. Edited by Lee D. Olvey, Henry A. Leonard and Bruce Arlinghaus. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot). 168 pp. Index. £17.50.

AT a time when popular attention is devoted to cruise missiles, theatre nuclear war and alliance strategies, it is refreshing to find a book which draws attention to the other side of defence policy planning and preparation. Proper concern has been expressed about the problems of war on the Central European front, the nuclear threshold and escalation, and emphasis given to the need to strengthen conventional forces and limit as far as possible the nuclear option; but while *Industrial capacity and defense planning* addresses these issues it does so from the point of view less of what should happen but of what is happening to the West's capability to prosecute a long, conventional European conflict as opposed to a short and potentially nuclear one.

The book opens with a paradox, elegantly highlighted in the foreword by Norman Augustine, Chairman of the United States Defense Science Board and author of *Augustine's laws:* that the United States economy and its industrial and technological might, by far the largest and most advanced in the world, rather than being a source of strength *vis à vis* potential enemies has become a source of weakness, certainly in the event of a long war, and potentially in a short one as well. The simple fact is that the US defence industry has failed to keep abreast with anything much more than peacetime requirements, failed to establish the foundations upon which to expand production should this be necessary, and failed to provide adequate stockpiles of essential strategic materials.

The bulk of the book examines in detail how this has happened, including an illuminating and succinct analysis by Thomas Callaghan of the structural disarmament of the West—for which the European allies must accept a substantial portion of the blame—analysing the present status of defence industrial preparedness in the United States, within the NATO alliance, and in the Soviet Union, and offering thoughtful prescriptions on how the situation can be improved, albeit mainly within the United States.

The book is a welcome and timely reminder that well intentioned and high-minded strategic prescription must confront practial circumstances and that the real world does not and cannot always accommodate what one would like to see, or what one thinks should happen. In saying what it does, and in offering well-founded and justified criticism of current defence planning production and acquisition practices, the book has taken a significant step; for this the authors are to be commended. It would be unfair to criticize them for what they did not include, except to express the hope that a later volume—or set of conference papers—will fill in the gaps; for example, it could widen the debate on improvements in defence industrial planning to include the NATO allies, and, taking up Thomas Callaghan's proposals, to explore the possibilities of a more rational Western approach to weapons acquisition.

For students of arms control and disarmament, and of defence and strategic policy, this book is well worth reading, for it reemphasizes a point which is too readily overlooked, namely that there is much more than is usually assumed in appealing to the conventional war option, certainly more than just money—and that it has far reaching implications for the economic, social and political structures of Western states.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

The non-nuclear defense of cities: the high frontier space-based defense against ICBM attack. By Daniel O. Graham. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt. 1983. 152 pp. $25.00.

Not over by Christmas: NATO's central front in World War III. By Elmar Dinter and Paddy Griffith. London: Antony Bird; New York: Hippocrene. 1983. 178 pp. Index. £8.95.

THE authors of these two very different books have a common aim: to escape from the dilemmas created by reliance on nuclear weapons. General Graham suggests that the concept

of 'mutual assured destruction' (MAD) could be replaced by the 'assured (non-nuclear) defence' of cities, and invokes space technology. Dinter and Griffith return to the tenets of classical strategy to avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Both are well-argued contributions to the study of Western defence, and deserve to be taken seriously, but are equally open to serious objections.

The non-nuclear defense of cities (US cities) is a combination of polemic and prospectus. Its theme is set out in short paragraphs, illustrated by tables, diagrams and maps, with the romantic notion of space as the 'new frontier' and specious arguments for its peaceful exploitation to add colour. The style is defence-technological jargon, making very little concession to the general reader. In simple terms, Graham's proposal is to establish an anti-ballistic missile barrier in space. This would take the form of a ring of 432 satellites in orbit athwart the likely trajectory of missiles aimed at US targets, each fitted with sensors able to detect their launch and carrying some forty to forty-five guided missiles able to intercept and destroy them. Using only existing technology, the installation cost is estimated at $13.3 billion and running costs at $60 million per annum.

This proposal is in line with President Reagan's defence statement of 23 March 1983, 'that he intended to embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive', and there is little doubt that the American genius for very large enterprises and technology could realize it. The objections are obvious. Even if the Soviet Union is suspected of experimenting with ABM's, their installation by the United States would be in breach of the agreement of May 1972. The net effect, if both sides were to breach it, may be destabilizing, which is why the agreement was made in the first place. Furthermore, the militarization of space is both wasteful and dangerous. Sheer strategic necessity and the need for security might override such considerations, but this proposal is no more than the creation of a technological Maginot Line in space, and bearing in mind the process of weapon evolution in which each weapon-system generates its own antidote, it will in due course be circumvented.

Not over by Christmas is an inept title for an admirable book, based on a sound view of military history and lucid, reflective and analytic in its approach. Unlike Graham, the authors are not 'mesmerised by weapon-systems'. Their theme is 'the "operational art", that is, the fundamental principles underlying the conduct of large scale operations by armies', as Field-Marshal Lord Carver says in his introduction (p. vii). The whole is eminently suitable as an introduction to the subject for both the student and the general reader. (Its publication is encouraging, as the subject has recently been much neglected by the British military establishment, and the British co-author is a lecturer in war studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.)

Specifically, this book analyses the elements of a successful defence against a Soviet offensive based on an adaptation of the German *blitzkrieg*, and finds the NATO plan wanting. It is linear, passive and seeks to make good the lack of numerical strength (measured not only in terms of men but also by the more important modern criteria of guns and tanks) by an early resort to battlefield nuclear weapons—but this is no remedy. Even a cursory analysis of the equation of weak force plus nuclear weapons *versus* strong force plus nuclear weapons reveals that the advantage remains with the larger, and this is amplified if the larger also has the initiative. Therefore, the authors argue, the operational doctrine of the NATO forces must be based on defence in depth, mobility, and defence which is offensive in character. A rearward echelon aided by the garrisons of static installations in the rear attacks the Soviet *desant* (air-transported) troops arriving at the NATO rear areas, a forward one harasses and checks the armoured columns advancing on the main defensive position while a third, of powerful armoured divisions, waits to launch a counter-offensive at the appropriate moment. This, as specialists will perceive, is the classic German model, with origins going back to 1918—as indeed, one might expect, Elmar Dinter being a colonel in the army of the Federal Republic of Germany. The example of General Heinrici, master of the elastic mobile defence in 1945, is cited.

At the risk of being what Graham calls a 'naysayer', practical objections must be raised, although the theory is flawless. There is a limit to the extent to which sound tactics can compensate for lack of strength. What NATO armies require is more muscle, and that is what its members obdurately refuse to provide. Without it NATO must either hold rigidly forward or, like Heinrici, trade space for time, but this means turning West Germany into a

battlefield. The dilemma cannot therefore be simply resolved, and the Western allies must, pending disarmament, continue to rely on nuclear deterrence, MAD though that may be.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

Naval warfare today and tomorrow. By Hubert Moineville. Trans. by Commander P. R. Compton-Hall. Oxford: Blackwell. 1983. 141 pp. Index. £15.00.

THIS book was first published in Paris in 1982, and its early publication in translation here is very welcome. There is a brief postscript about aspects of the Falklands War, and a wide range of illustrations, some of which are drawn from the Falklands operations. The translation is excellent and retains the limpid clarity of the original. Commander Compton-Hall is also responsible for the picture captions, which are informative—even if number 15 mistakes the *Moskva* for the *Kiev*.

Admiral Moineville sets out to analyse the place and purpose of naval warfare in the modern world, where nuclear war is at the top of the scale of violence and passive demonstrations of intent through presence at the bottom. He deals with both the objectives and the instruments of policy, and tries to provide a logical framework appropriate to general trends and considerations. It is, so far as one can manage, an objective approach, not primarily concerned with any regional or political scenario or environment; and it is full of good things. He notes, for example, in chapter 8, the changes of dimension that have taken place: the greater range of detection and action, the shrinking of reaction time, the enlarged scale of material resources: 'There has been an increase in the minimum size of a naval force that can ensure its own protection against all kinds of threat while retaining its offensive capacity. Formerly a single ship had this capability; today it can only be achieved by a complex assembly' (p. 77). In a similar way he notes that a crisis, in military terms, is a limited trial of strength which requires contingent planning for failure, that is to say, war (p. 79). What is perhaps most impressive is not so much the originality of the thinking as the care and thoughtfulness with which the ideas are laid out and supported—from experience as well as from deductive principle. He shuns neither the simple nor the obvious, but makes good points tellingly.

There is a temptation to be ethnocentric and to say that this book could only have been written by a Frenchman. It has a very distinctive analytical style and quite clearly is set in an intellectual tradition that sets high value on logical progression and clear language. The substantive content marks the book as a major contribution to naval strategic thinking, and to the extent that it is a French contribution, it is doubly welcome. The spirit of Castex clearly lives on.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

Northern development: northern security. By Nils Ørvik. Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston. 1981. 196 pp. (Northern Studies Series No. 1–83.) Pb.: $12.00.

Nuclear weapons and northern Europe: problems and prospects of arms control. Edited by Kari Möttölä. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 88pp. Pb.: FM 60.00; $12.00.

NILS ØRVIK'S monograph on northern Canada consists of seven essays, some dating from the mid-1970s, and is mainly concerned with political and security problems posed by the increased significance of this resource-rich area. The book demonstrates one man's persistent concern with a part of the world which has since attracted wider interest.

Ørvik deals with the prickly question of northern development, the Federal–developer–regional relationship in this process, the Greenlanders' approach to resource use and the relevance of the Greenlandic Home Rule experience for Canada's north-western territories. His second section rebuts calls for a Nordic–Canadian bloc within NATO to counter US influence in the far north, rejects equating the United States with the Soviet Union in dealing with Canadian Arctic interests and recommends a more active Canadian approach to Greenland and Iceland.

The book suffers from a degree of repetition, and certain academics have their ears boxed

regularly in the section on northern security. The essays sometimes tend to be too general, dealing, for example, with tensions between federal, private and local approaches to development but not those within each group. Little reference is made to the nature of Greenlandic society and descriptions of that country's political situation are couched in excessively Westernized terms. The author ignores his own plea for more maps with a polar projection. Nevertheless this is a useful and welcome set of essays.

Nuclear weapons and northern Europe constitutes a collection of articles based on papers given to a seminar on the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone proposals held in Helsinki some twenty years after President Kekkonen first mooted the idea in May 1963. Since then, the concept has been rejected, refined, changed and challenged. The Helsinki seminar marked the re-entry into the debate of Olof Palme, who is clearly losing confidence in the ability of the superpowers to bring security to Europe.

One of the major problems of the zone proposal for the Norwegian and Danish governments is their inability to accept both a formalized, absolute nuclear-free status and membership of a nuclear alliance, NATO. Johan Holst's contribution to this report of the Helsinki seminar tries to square this circle and is almost convincing. His paper is also an excellent introduction to the zone proposals. A more innovative approach to this problem is taken by Osmo Apunen whose contribution aims at drafting a treaty based on Kekkonen's original proposal. He stresses the element of status quo and the superpowers are not brought in as guarantors—in contrast to the draft treaty set out by the Norwegian ex-minister, Jens Evensen.

The three Finnish essays in the section 'Background and theory' form the most intellectually satisfying part of the collection, whereas the contributions by Wiberg and by Treverton are the most thought-provoking. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is to be congratulated for sponsoring the seminar and publishing the proceedings so promptly.

University of Aberdeen CLIVE ARCHER

Nuclear disengagement in Europe. Edited by Sverre Lodgaard and Marek Thee. London, New York: Taylor & Francis for SIPRI. 1983. 271 pp. Index. £17.00.

Nuclear weapons in Europe: modernisation and limitation. Edited by Marsha McGraw Olive and Jeffrey D. Porro. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 167 pp. Index. £16.50.

BOTH these books suffer from the time-lag which almost inevitably afflicts the publication of conference records. *Nuclear disengagement in Europe* consists of the papers submitted to a Pugwash symposium in May 1982; *Nuclear weapons in Europe* contains the documents of a conference organized by the Arms Control Association in September 1981. In each case some later material has been added, but the fact remains that basically we are faced with writing around two years old. Arms control matters tend to move slowly, but what we really need now is to study the situation created by deployment of the new theatre nuclear forces in the West, rather than the old arguments about whether or not they should be deployed.

Compilations of conference papers are susceptible to a particular blight, which can only be cured by stringent editing: repetitiousness. Such editing seems to have been lacking on *Nuclear disengagement in Europe.* Nor was there apparently any basic difference of view among the Pugwash participants. All the papers agree that a Nordic nuclear-free zone is highly desirable; some rather more wistfully advocate a similar zone in Central Europe, and one, by two Bulgarians, considers that, following a statement by the Bulgarian President, 'the idea of a Balkan Nuclear-weapon free zone thus turned into a practical proposition'. There is a strain of naïveté running through many of these papers; however, there is some more valuable and hard-headed discussion of the problems of detecting transit of nuclear weapons through a nuclear-free zone, particularly at sea and in the air, and of verification generally.

The essential problem of the nuclear-free zone idea is well exemplified in Mr Lodgaard's opening paper, in which he quotes a Swedish government statement of 1981 to the effect that a zone 'must include nuclear weapons which are intended for targets within the zone, are stationed near the zone and have ranges . . . which make them best suited for targets within the zone' (p. 32). Sceptics would say that the idea is vitiated by the vulnerability of the zone to attacks from outside, no matter where from. But the particular case of a Nordic nuclear-free zone is called into question by the concentration of Soviet weaponry of all sorts on the border of the zone in the Kola peninsula and the Leningrad military district. A Soviet statement in

reply expressing willingness to consider measures 'applying to Soviet territory in the region adjoining' the zone hardly seems adequate to make this concept a realistic means of increasing the security of the Nordic countries.

Nuclear weapons in Europe is in the main a good deal more rigorous. But, admitting the gravity of the subject, it is surely going rather far to say that 'the nuclear debate in Europe today has become the battle for Europe's soul' (p. 119). On the contrary, many of the contributions bring out that what is at stake is how to reconcile Europe's natural desire for security, a measure of independence in decision-making and the avoidance of undue risk, with American attitudes in which the perception of a military imperative is apt to predominate over the niceties of foreign policy. Gregory Treverton points out, for example, that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (which were insisted upon by Europeans as a condition for deployment) were politically necessary but technically unpromising, even compared with the negotiations on mutual reductions of conventional forces, since the starting level of the nuclear forces in question is even more unbalanced (in favour of the Soviet Union) than that of the conventional ones.

The procedure favoured by more than one contributor is to give up the rather artificial distinctions in the arms control negotiations between different types of nuclear weapon, and to merge the talks on intermediate- and long-range strategic forces, with the probability that the British and French nuclear forces will at some stage have to be brought into the scales. If and when the West once more gets round a table with the Russians, with the deployment of new theatre forces by the West a *fait accompli*, this is an alternative which will have to be taken seriously, and if this book succeeds in bringing it further into public debate, it will have served a useful purpose.

Having regard to the book's title it is no doubt inevitable that the discussion should be confined very largely to nuclear weapons and the possibility of their limitation. It is nevertheless surprising that very little is said about avoiding one particularly agonizing scenario calling for their use in Europe: namely, the inadequacy of Western conventional forces to repel a Soviet conventional attack, and the consequent risk of first use of nuclear weapons by the West. Mr Ivan Selin argues that such first use is in any case unlikely to work to the advantage of the West. Surely, then, there is all the more reason to avoid or postpone the dilemma by an increase in Western conventional forces sufficient to deter or if necessary halt a conventional attack. The Arms Control Association should stage another meeting on this aspect of the subject—and if it does, could we please have the results a bit more quickly?

BERNARD BURROWS

Politics, economics and social

Socialist states in the world-system. Edited by Christopher K. Chase-Dunn. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1982. 304 pp. Index. £19.50. Pb.: £9.75.

ALL the contributors to this very interesting, often provocative volume are socialists, the editor tells us, but with many disagreements among themselves, concerned above all with the question of how far socialist states have been able to organize 'a truly socialist socioeconomic system'. His own view is that they represent 'important experiments . . . neither totalitarian nightmares nor utopias' (p. 9). Many of the fourteen essays are permeated by Wallerstein's very influential concepts, or 'world-system theory', although V. Navarro provides a critique, and stresses Wallerstein's imperfect understanding of historical materialism. Wallerstein is in fact not primarily a historian, and like others of a similar way of thinking is sometimes inclined to put theory first, history second. As seen by him, economic forces often appear to be the sole, or irresistible, determinant, and the capitalist world-system is a basilisk able to paralyse socialist countries with its stare, or a boa constrictor able to swallow them whole. There can be no room, in other words, for independent socialist oases in a world dominated by capitalism.

Thus A. Abonyi argues that the East European countries have been compelled to turn away from the Soviet model and 'reintegrate' at least some sectors of their economies into the global network of market forces. His conclusion is that 'the socialist world-system is withering rather

than emerging' (p. 197). J. Borrego goes still further by maintaining that capitalism is now advancing to a new stage or level; he calls this 'metanational', a term to which exception may be taken on more than linguistic grounds, and an idea reminiscent of Kautsky's 'ultra-imperialism'. Of the other side of the case A. Szymanski is the firmest proponent. He argues that there are two autonomous world-systems, with only inessential economic links: 'The Soviet Union, both potentially and actually, is the most self-sufficient industrial economy in the world' (p. 65). W. L. Goldfrank somewhat summarily dismisses his approach as 'ahistorical', and his statistics as mostly irrelevant, but if they are reasonably accurate they look persuasive enough.

Other articles study forms and problems of socialism in outlying areas. Susan Eckstein finds Cuba's success at exporting manufactures mediocre, but 'its human resource development has been most impressive', especially in multiplication of teachers and doctors (p. 211). Perhaps in the long run this will matter more. In Jamaica, on the other hand, J. R. Mandle shows how a very restrained 'socialism' was enough to deter foreign investment and leave a dependent economy stagnant. China, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Thailand are other countries considered. In the end, the best reason for dissenting from the thesis of all socialist societies being mere appendages of a capitalist order may be the spectacle of the United States feverishly bent on intimidating the Soviet Union and destroying outposts of socialism by brute force. Borrego's picture of war being 'increasingly obsolete', and of capital having no more need of backing by an armed hegemony which America is no longer strong enough to sustain (pp. 122–3), looks strangely different from the scene reflected from day to day in newspaper headlines.

V. G. KIERNAN

Communism and the politics of inequalities. Edited by Daniel Nelson. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 290pp. Index. £22.50.

ONE characteristic feature of the established communist systems is the contrast between the rhetoric of equality and the reality of inequality. Communist parties come to power with a strong ideological commitment to promote equality in the political, economic, social, and cultural realms. Having come to power, they diminish or eliminate some of the existing inequalities, strengthen others, and create new ones. However, the structure of inequality in these systems is only partly a product of design, imposed by communist regimes on society. In addition, and to no negligible degree, it is a product of tradition as well as of the 'market' and its reflections of scarcities. At the same time, the crucial dimension of this structure is the political one, because political inequalities are inevitably the backbone of communist systems.

On top of that, in the hierarchically organized Soviet bloc inequalities within individual countries are linked to inequalities among them. In the book under review, the links are examined by Valerie J. Bunce in terms of dependency relations. Two relatively recent processes should be mentioned in connection with her examination: first, the stability, viability and durability of communist regimes established in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe depend no longer on the Soviet Union alone, but also on their behaviour and performance at home; and second, Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe places increasing demands on the Soviet Union.

With the exception of Bunce's examination, the chapters focus on selected domestic inequalities. *Inter alia*, several of them discuss regional and ethnic inequalities in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and China. There are also a comparative study of welfare ideologies and policy styles in the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain, and a paper on inequalities and the politicization of the Polish working class.

Thus, while the individual contributions are competently written and their topics of manifest importance, the theme of the book itself is conceived rather broadly. That is to say, it might have been better to confine the book exclusively to regional and ethnic inequalities, which in any case constitute the dominant subject of the book, but to explore them in more depth.

At the same time, the book leaves many questions unanswered. For example, can official statistics, disregarding the second economy, accurately reflect the economic inequalities existing in communist countries? Do people in these countries resent all inequalities, or only

those that are perceived as being imposed from above to the disadvantage of some and the benefit of others? Would greater economic equality in these countries inevitably increase satisfaction, defuse conflict, and lessen differences in lifestyle?

St Antony's College, Oxford J. L. PORKET

Transfer and transformation: political institutions in the New Commonwealth. Essays in honour of W. H. Morris-Jones. Edited by Peter Lyon and James Manor. Leicester: Leicester University Press. 1983. 299pp. Index. £25.00.

PETER LYON and James Manor have put together seventeen essays on different aspects of the problems facing the New Commonwealth countries after the transfer of power; there is only space in this review to refer to a few of the most thought-provoking. Perhaps the most interesting are two which discuss the prospects for the survival of parliamentary democracy in India. Myron Weiner has written an excellent short study of the way in which—to the surprise of many people—that system has survived, albeit 'bruised and modified'. As Weiner puts it, the Emergency of 1975 was not the result of a mass upheaval, but simply of Mrs Gandhi's determination to secure her power base. It is significant that, at the end, when she had to choose between further repression and elections, she felt bound to choose the electoral method. India is in fact the shining example of the survival of democracy in the developing countries. Ainslee Embree, in a well thought out essay, takes a less hopeful view: he remarks that in 1975 Mrs Gandhi turned to a workable system of authoritarian government, and this, in his view, may provide a pattern for the future.

Talukder Maniruzzaman discusses the problems of succession to a military ruler and deals in particular with Bangladesh after the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman. The army was riddled with faction and lacked professionalism and had no choice, therefore, but to agree to the installation of a civilian government. It is not clear whether the civilians will continue in office or whether there will be another military takeover.

The next few chapters deal with Uganda and Zimbabwe. The relation between 'tribalism as a primordial sentiment' and its manipulation by politicians in Uganda is so complex that it would be unreasonable to expect a clear-cut account of it in short compass. Michael Twaddle has nevertheless written an interesting study of the problem.

In a study of Africanization of the services in Zimbabwe, Panter Brick makes two interesting points: first, that it was much harder for black Africans to deal with the white settlers who in practice ruled the country than it would have been if, in the early stages, they could have dealt directly with the home government; and second, that black Africans with the right educational qualifications are now available in considerable numbers, while many of the white African officials are anxious to accept the retirement terms and leave. The process of Africanization is therefore being accelerated.

These are just some of the issues thrown up in this collection. A symposium as a rule provides an unsatisfactory basis for a book, but on this occasion the editors have succeeded in assembling articles covering varied aspects of the subject and many of which are of a high standard.

PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS

Holy violence: the revolutionary thought of Frantz Fanon. By B. Marie Perinbam. Washington, DC: Three Continents. 1982. 182pp. Index. $22.00. Pb.: $10.00.

THIS book describes itself as an 'intellectual biography' of Frantz Fanon. It analyses his views and his writings in chapters devoted loosely to an account of his life, sandwiched between purely theoretical chapters at the beginning and the end.

Fanon's thoughts were focused wholly on the colonial era in which he lived. He was born in 1925 in Martinique where he was educated and brought up in a 'black bourgeois' family and went on to gain medical qualifications in France, where he was greatly influenced by the ideas of Jean Paul Sartre. He then worked as *chef de service* in a psychiatric hospital in Algeria from 1953 until he was expelled by the French authorities in 1957. Thereafter he worked passionately for decolonization and revolution until his death from leukaemia in 1961.

Two of his books became famous: *Black skin, white masks* (1952) and *The wretched of the earth*

(published in 1962, just after his death). These two books, and this biography, bring out, not only the intensity of his hatred for the white man, but also his belief in the cleansing effect of violence on the person who uses it. His biographer is a fellow West Indian and, though she probably does not intend it, the Fanon she depicts emerges as a hideously unpleasant person, like some of the more extreme of the original French revolutionaries. He was irritable and violently aggressive in his manner, with friend and foe alike. She gives a vivid picture of his verbal aggression on page 29, punctuating her quotations with 'he snapped . . . he hissed . . . he growled . . . he snarled'—apparently with his friends.

The thoughts of Frantz Fanon about colonialism now have little relevance except as history. His revolutionary philosophies, as such, were not particularly original, but his philosophy of violence is reflected by his disciples to this day. Sadly, some of these people lack Fanon's idealism and sincerity but latch onto his glorification of violence as beneficial to the person who uses it—surely the most unworthy of all motives for killing or maiming other people. There is nothing mindless about this; it is a reversal of the process of civilization, in the sense of turning man from a beast into a 'human' being. Fanon saw this as a necessary process: as reversing the 'socialization' or 'conditioning' to which he felt that he was subjected in his upbringing and education. To read about how to turn a man back into a beast—either in *The wretched of the earth* or in this book—is a chilling experience.

University of Exeter RICHARD CLUTTERBUCK

The plot to kill the Pope. By Paul Henze. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 216 pp. Index. £9.95.

THIS ought to be a very good book: the author had all the right qualifications and opportunities. He was assistant to Mr Brzezinski in the US National Security Council from 1977 to 1980; he has been closely concerned with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, especially with Turkey; he speaks many languages, including Turkish. After the attempt to kill the Pope in 1981 he was commissioned by the *Reader's digest* to investigate the matter and was given the facilities to talk to (among many others), the family of the would-be assassin, Mehmet Ali Agca. They, irritated by the cavalcade of foreign journalists beating a path to their door, were so delighted to meet a foreigner who spoke Turkish that they swung the other way and spoke very frankly with him. He saw the staff of the paper whose previous editor had been murdered, and for whose murder Agca had been convicted; also many government officials and others in Turkey and Italy and some other countries.

His thesis is that the Bulgarian government, acting on behalf of the Soviet Union, sponsored the attempt on the Pope's life in such a way as to make it appear as an extreme right-wing plot. The link with the Bulgarians has been established beyond doubt. Three Bulgarian officials played an ill-concealed part in mounting Agca's operation and the only one who could not claim diplomatic immunity had already been arrested by the Italians before Henze completed this book. The links with the Soviet Union are, however, more tenuous The centre section of the book, "The background of terror', is simply a general and not always relevant account of the Soviet record of exploiting terror and of Soviet activities in Turkey and Italy. The author is nevertheless honest in admitting that his book can do no more than 'provide a framework within which further developments can be understood', and 'pinpoint the main questions on which we need more information, as investigation and research continue'.

Was Agca right-wing or left-wing or neither? Was his own statement after his arrest true?–'I acted independently in the name of truth above ideologies. I do not belong to any organization. International terrorism as I conceive it is not concerned with ideology. It needs no idea. It needs a gun.' My impression after reading this book is that Agca was the kind of terrorist who is happy to kill someone in the public eye for his own satisfaction and for general destabilization of society. The latter aim is shared by left and right (if those words mean anything) so either or both would be happy to provide him with the means and logistic support to do so. Apart from the Bulgarians, who were incredibly amateurish in failing to cover their tracks, no hard evidence is provided as to which other organizations (if any) played a part in moving this rather dangerous pawn about the board. Consequently I found this a disappointing book.

University of Exeter RICHARD CLUTTERBUCK

The political economy of nationalism. By Dudley Seers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. 218pp. Index. £15.00. Pb.: £6.95.

This is an extremely interesting and thought-provoking book, representing as it does the late Dudley Seers's final contribution as a distinguished scholar and commentator on development issues. Seers's career began as an economic statistician and some of this interest is reflected in the work. However, through reflection and worldwide experience he became ever more aware of the many social and political constraints on policy and of the interactions of economic and political behaviour. These concerns are central to this final contribution.

Seers emphasizes the importance of nationalism in today's world. He suggests that both Marxist and conventional Anglo-Saxon economists have belittled the influence of nationalism and treated it as an evil, and views more favourably protectionist theories—notably those of the distinguished Argentinian Raul Prebisch and other Latin American writers—about the economics of national development. He considers that economists of both free market and central planning persuasions have wrongly ignored the strength of nationalism in the contemporary world and over-rated the merits of a (US or Soviet-dominated) international system. The central question arising is: in the present 'world crisis', what room for manoeuvre, if any, do the typical governments of the 180 or so nation states which now exist, have?

Following an extensive examination of the contemporary situation Seers concludes that most governments face huge liabilities, particularly those with small populations, serious ethnic divisions, locations close to a superpower, few natural resources, culturally hidebound bureaucracies, high consumer expectations and narrow technological bases. Such options as do exist centre on a search for cooperative alliances in practical terms, opportunities for autonomous national actions are slight. What any country or its leaders can do depends very much on its size, location and resources and the ethnic basis of its national identity, to say nothing of the quality of its political leadership. Because of the scale necessary for modern economic and military purposes, regional groupings are inevitably going to be more viable than most of the old nation states. This leads to the general conclusion that a viable future world system of 'large regional economies' with a minimum of two hundred million people each 'would be more symmetrical even if not completely so, and some would dominate and some would inevitably be stronger than others'. A grouping which immediately comes to mind is the EEC—which could itself play a more positive role in establishing a durable world economic order. At a minimum such groupings provide an intellectually viable alternative to the present superpower confrontational situation, bolstered by satellite states and vast markets extending over huge distances and areas of the globe, the hope is that such a system could become more stable than the present one based on superpower conflict.

However, Seers's conclusions are cautious. He can imagine George Orwell's 1984 global war between such blocs or perhaps between alliances of them. Seers's final point, however, is that if such a system does emerge 'I shall certainly feel more confident that my grandchildren will grow up to be adults'

In short, this is a holistic *tour de force* by a mind seeking practical solutions to awesome global problems, and is highly recommended.

The Management College, Henley JOHN HUTTON

The role and limits of government: essays in political economy. By Samuel Brittan. London. Temple Smith. 1983. 280pp. Index. £8.95. Pb.: £4.50.

THIS book is sequel to an earlier collection of essays by the author, entitled 'Economic consequences of democracy' which appeared in 1977. The themes of the earlier volume are carried forward but have been revised to form a unified whole. Mr Brittan's departure point is predictable, namely, that many people today 'have excessive expectations' from governments which in turn prevents governments from performing their proper functions as well as they might. He describes this phenomenon as 'The Wenceslas myth', and sees it as permeating nearly all political discussion today. He concedes that in all periods of human history societies have failed to arrange their collective affairs as well as they might. However, proposals for reform invariably contain a mixture of suggestions for improving competence and for

changing the distribution of wealth and power. Alas, the two elements are in practice difficult to disentangle.

The work includes an extensive examination of the so-called monetarist and Keynesian positions, with a section on how to end the monetarist controversy. It also includes a critique of the ideas of F. A. Hayes and the new right and looks to utilitarianism as a moral basis for political action in the present-day world. It also looks in passing at the relationship between unemployment and pay. The main focus of the author's concern is the immediate problems of the industrialized countries in the aftermath of the golden age of postwar growth. The dragons to be slain are those powerful interest groups who are in a position to protect their own short-term interests by distorting the pattern of the market in directions far removed from competitive equilibrium. The dangers of such distortions, at a time when Third World countries are ready to take over many traditional industries, are set out with great clarity.

At the end of the day what can be done to make the 1984 world a happier place? According to Brittan the Social Democrats in Britain have a golden opportunity which they have, alas, shown very little sign of taking. A return to reasonably full employment will require a large rise in the rates of return on capital and in the share which profits take in the national income. This will require a much slower increase in real earnings. Such adjustments are required not only to provide the wherewithal for an improved rate of return to investment, but also to ensure that the new machines use sufficient labour so that 'we do not have employment less prosperity which is the most business men now seem to expect'. There is a need also for a related shift in the ownership of productive property. If most wage earners could also be transformed into capitalists the social arguments against the shift to improve profits would surely disappear. Thus, truly radical policies ought to attack all the market distortions such as agricultural protection, tax concessions, pension funds and so forth, to which conservative interests are strongly attached. What is needed is a more widely dispersed ownership of property throughout the social classes. All good stuff in the Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill tradition—with a strong appeal to those seeking a middle way out of our contemporary dilemmas.

The Management College, Henley JOHN HUTTON

Towards a new Bretton Woods: challenges for the world financial and trading systems. Report by a Commonwealth study group. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 1983. (Distrib. by Longman, Harlow.) 148pp. Pb.: £5.00.

THERE is a certain careful ambiguity about the title of this work. The 'new Bretton Woods' is not a new conference or institution but a conviction that the set of international economic arrangements built since 1944 can be made to work if they are rationalized and strengthened a bit. The announced intention is to 'sort out the issues', yet many of the verbs in chapters 9 and 10 are in the imperative mood, with a great many shoulds and coulds. A basic unease permeates the text which describes the decay of the institutions created after the Second World War, yet remains determinedly optimistic even in the face of the evidence. A convincing case is presented to prove how worn out our international economic institutions are and how inadequate the ad hoc additions to the original framework have become. GATT was flawed from the start because it lacked the balance of the unratified Havana original. The IMF/World Bank set-up has worked well but is not strong enough to contain the pressures building up inside the simmering international economy.

From the history and analysis to be found in almost every chapter, one would expect to see pessimistic conclusions drawn. And so they are—but only in a very short chapter 8 which is well called 'Contingency plans against pessimistic scenarios', where the debt problem and the plight of the poorest are identified as the first priority tasks for damage limitation exercises if the worst should befall. The last two chapters argue the case for doing some preparatory staff work for an international conference and summarize the issues raised throughout the book.

There is of course a fundamental problem which a committee-written book cannot properly tackle, namely, that rich entities—be they private family trusts, corporate entities or nation states—pursue their own interests in ways likely to rip the moth-eaten fabric of international cooperation to shreds. The powerful, privileged managers of wealth must, from day to day, take those steps which the system permits, to protect their funds and perpetuate their privileges. These acts will always seem urgent and practical, whereas the long-term proposals

for reform coming from less self-interested analysts will always seem less pressing. In so far as this tract for the times seeks to persuade the decision-makers to take an enlightened, long-term view of their interests, then the book must be given a warm welcome. Whether it will move the leaders of world finance to deep thought is another question.

Bristol Polytechnic FRANK GARDNER

The Fund and China in the international monetary system. Papers presented at a colloquium held in Beijing, October 20–8 1982. Edited by A. W. Hooke. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 1983. 187pp. Pb.

THE value of this excellent book derives from its insights into many of the current debates inside the IMF. Those who read it should not expect to find a judgement about the effect of Chinese participation on the Fund, nor an analysis of the implications of the country's increasing international economic presence. On the other hand, the book provides a clear statement of the Fund's current preoccupations. Put simply, this book is about the Fund and about China, but not about the relationship between the two. The short papers of which it is made up come largely from senior officials of the Fund. The quality of these contributions lies not in their technical brilliance, but rather in the clarity of exposition. As a result, the book is easily comprehensible to the non-economist interested in current developments in economic relations. Given to an audience of Chinese policy-makers and academics, the papers avoid over-simplification and make no attempt to skirt the central problems that the Fund faces in the 1980s. Only two of the ten papers were given by the Chinese participants: these are straightforward commentaries on Chinese attitudes towards the recession in the capitalist world and upon some aspects of economic liberalization in the domestic economy.

The papers given by Fund staff look in some detail into recent IMF history. Many of the more interesting comments are inevitably those which reflect upon the Fund's switch from being a referee to being a headmaster. Starting its life with the task of preventing the competitive devaluations and protectionism of the 1930s, it has evolved considerably. Now uncomfortably perched between being a lender of last resort and an imposer of fiscal discipline, it seems to sense that its evolution is far from complete.

This book illustrates one of the foremost tensions of the moment. Underlying many of the contributions, and doubtless exacerbated by the particular audience, lies the question: how far should the Fund treat all countries uniformly? On the one hand, the Fund's articles make the clear point that a cooperative venture, such as the IMF or the World Bank, can only function in the long run if all members are accorded equal treatment. On the other hand, the Chinese participants in the seminars stress the severe impact that ostensibly 'equal treatments' are likely to have on Third World countries. Underlying the Chinese comments is the view that the IMF enforces unfairly arduous adjustment programmes on weaker countries.

The last few years have seen a steady extension of the Fund's activities toward the fostering of international development, rather than maintenance of the best economic environment for development. This distinction may be a subtle one, but it has pulled the IMF reluctantly into political arguments over the division of world resources. Thus far, the Fund has tended to move on an ad hoc basis with individual programmes. The papers in this book are illustrations of the increasing sensitivity of the Fund's staff to the need for a coherent view of the future role of the IMF. Is it to be a development agency or merely a guardian of international financial discipline?

CHRIS GOODALL

Policy and performance in international trade: papers of the sixth annual conference of the International Economics Study Group. Edited by John Black and L. Alan Winters. London: Macmillan for International Economics Study Group. 1983. 203pp. Index. £25.00.

THESE papers, first prepared in 1981, have many merits. They are intended principally for the professional economist; but among their merits is what they tell about the kind of evidence that lies behind many economic theories and interpretations of economic history. For example, it is an old story how Britain in the nineteenth century committed itself to free trade and fell behind in the industrial race. Germany, on the other hand, instructed by the ideas of

Friedrich List, and some other countries such as the United States, enriched by the protectionist doctrines of other gurus, flourished behind tariff barriers. Alas for List. After the magisterial statement that 'In international trade theory, neither the argument for free trade nor for protection seems very strong' (p.1), Forrest Capie goes on to argue that 'protection does not appear to have been sufficiently high to make any significant impact on performance' (p.9). One conclusion of the various studies, therefore, appears to be that concentration on the tariff as an impediment to trade, as for example in the Kennedy Round and, indeed, in the Tokyo Round, has been misplaced. Whether it has been a sign of the cynicism or of the economic innocence of developed nations that, in the drive towards freer trade, they have concentrated in their negotiations on tariffs rather than on the more substantial protective effect of other devices such as domestic taxes and subsidies, is a nice point for discussion.

Brian Hindley provides an effective demolition of the Cambridge Economic Policy Group case for protection. He is not able, however, to put anything in its place, and his wisdom, therefore, has that negative flavour so deplored by some politicans and journalists. Hindley despondently tells us: 'Perhaps the explanation of different growth rates lies in the domain of sociology rather than in that of economics' (p.40). This is probably true—but rather unhelpful, as we understand sociology as little as we understand economics.

Although the general trend of the authors appears to be towards free trade, the evidence of history tending to weaken rather than strengthen the case for protection, the general effect on the non-professional reader is likely to be to deepen his agnosticism as to what economics can tell us about the real world. In the light of all this, what are mere politicans to do? The unkindest cut of all comes from J. Borkakoti, in an essay that repays the work of trying to understand it: 'It cannot simply be left to the politican to make parrot-like utterances about the universal benefits of free trade' (p.192). But where do politicans get these over-simplifications if not from the utterances of his colleague economists with their 'propensity to cling to the empirically refuted hypothesis'? A reason for this particular propensity is, of course, the lack in economics of empirically verified hypotheses. At the end, one really does not know for whom to feel more sorry, the economists or those they advise.

EDMUND DELL

Distribution, effective demand and international economic relations: proceedings of a conference held by the Centro di Studi Avanzati, Trieste. Edited by J. A. Kregel. London: Macmillan. 1983. 209 pp. Index. £25.00.

THE first part of this book is concerned with a restatement of Keynesian economics after the experiences of the 1970s. Of more direct interest to readers of this journal is part II, which is concerned with the effects of primary commodity price movements and international monetary disorders on international economic relations. Especially interesting is chapter 4, which shows that there was no fundamental change in the determination of non-oil primary commodity prices in the 1970s. This view is supported by the sequence of events at the time and subjected to econometric tests. (It should be noted in passing that Enzo R. Grilli and Maw-cheng Yang achieve the rare feat of communicating econometrics in everyday language so that the argument can be easily followed by one not skilled in this art.) On the demand side, the principal determinant of real primary commodity prices continued to be the course of industrial production. Nominal prices were also influenced by the increase in private sector liquidity. Instability in exchange and interest rates caused further distortions. On the supply side, there were increasing difficulties in satisfying demand. Increasing pressure on agricultural and food supplies came to a head in 1973. There was a shortfall in cereal production at a time when stocks were already low after the poor harvests of the preceding year. Cereal prices rose. Other primary prices, including oil prices, *followed*.

This exposition of events may help to destroy the legend that the difficulties of the time were all caused by the oil crisis. A similar sequence of events followed in the late 1970s. We continue to be more dependent on the weather than on any one cartel! The price relationship between primary and manufactured products continues along traditional lines, with primary prices rising sharply over a short period and retreating more gradually over a longer period, relative to manufactures prices. The net result for 1948–80 as a whole is long-term stability in this price relationship.

Industrial and monetary conditions are seen as the chief determinants of primary

commodity prices, though more weight is given in chapter 5 to OPEC's skill in manipulating the dollar price of a basic raw material. The chief emphasis, however, is on how to regain international monetary stability. The authors' prescription is international convergence of incomes policies. As an incomes parity theory, it is well put. But it is a far cry from their master's practical work at Bretton Woods.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

Managing international risk: essays commissioned in honor of the centenary of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Edited by Richard J. Herring. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. 273pp. Index. £17.50; $29.95.

Managing foreign exchange risk: essays commissioned in honor of the centenary of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Edited by Richard J. Herring. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. 235pp. Index. £17.50; $29.95.

THESE volumes, the result of a conference held in October 1981, examine three types of international risk. One book is devoted solely to foreign exchange risk: the risk that an unanticipated change in exchange rates will affect the profitability of a transaction or stream of transactions. The other book examines, firstly, country risk: the risk that a sovereign power will interfere with the repatriation of funds or the control of foreign assets; and, secondly, the risk of a breakdown in the rules and practices which govern international trade and investment flows. The format of both books is a helpful overview by the editor followed by a series of lengthy presentations by academics with comments generally written by practitioners.

Managing international risk has a wider remit and appeal than the narrower financial risk volume. Richard N. Cooper examines the risks to the overall international system and, after brief reviews of previous breakdowns (the Great Depression and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system), suggests that the current threats are: a foreign exchange crisis, a banking crisis, an oil crisis and trade wars. A real major war is relegated to a footnote as a 'remote possibility' (p.34). The major danger is seen as the gradual erosion of the system of cooperation; but evolutionary change can occur if diplomacy can manage these processes. The two perspectives on the chapter suggest, first, that the risk of armed conflict cannot be ignored, and second, that the game of economic growth is no longer one against nature but one against other players.

A group of three papers follows: Eaton and Gersovitz on the economic aspects of country risk, Martin Shubik on the analysis of political risk and John Dunn on social and cultural aspects of country risk. The first contribution identifies two sorts of country risk: risk endogenous to the investor's behaviour (climatic upheaval, population change) and sovereign risk, associated with policies and political events, some of which is endogenous in deriving from strategic behaviour towards investors on the part of the country's government. Shubik deals with methods of forecasting, contingency planning and anticipation of political risk, contrasting qualitative and quantitative techniques but finding them to be complementary. Dunn defines social or cultural risk as the dissatisfaction of a population with a government which it perceives to be serving interests other than their own—a situation which, in economic terms, may well be associated with a highly attractive (profitable) environment. A case study of Iran rams home the point.

In analysing a multinational firm's reaction to international risk, Vernon capably recasts international business strategies as responses to categories of risk. The final paper by Kunreuther and Kleindorfer analyses the decision processes of investors and insurers in insuring against country risk.

The contributions in *Managing foreign exchange risk* are more technical, but no less interesting. William Branson, in 'Macroeconomic determinants of real exchange risk', defines such risk as movements of the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative price movements. Conventional wisdom is that exchange rates are determined in the short run by conditions of asset–market equilibrium and in the long run by real conditions affecting the current account. A model is presented and tested which integrates money, relative prices and current account balance as explanatory factors. Regrettably, it is not suitable for forecasting. Lawrence Klein then charts the pitfalls of 'modeling exchange rate fluctuations and international disturbances', suggesting that greater attention should be paid to the individual components

of supply and demand relationships, properly structured. The efficacy and utility of simulating unusual disturbances in a large-scale macroeconomic model are questioned in a penetrating comment by Kenen.

Levy and Sarnat assess the degree to which international portfolio diversification can reduce risk: their case depends on ignoring transaction costs, tax differentials, capital controls and real asset holdings. Bilson, in 'The evaluation and use of foreign exchange rate forecasting services', sets forecasting the task of beating a passive strategy of selling all foreign exchange receivables in the forward market. A composite, portfolio forecast is developed and the conclusion drawn that, for large firms at least, an active strategy is justified. Finally, Ijiri examines the controversial area of foreign currency accounting centering on the choice of exchange rate (historical or current) in translating assets from a foreign currency and the treatment of foreign exchange gains or losses in income statements.

These well produced volumes merit attention both independently and together as overviews of the complexities of international risk management and of the difficulties which the problems present to the relevant academic disciplines. Further research is demanded both by practitioners and theorists. These volumes are pointers to future advances.

University of Bradford Management Centre PETER J. BUCKLEY

Energy economics in Britain. Edited by Paul Tempest. London: Graham & Trotman. 1983. 423pp. Index. £18.00.

International energy markets. Edited by Paul Tempest. London: Graham & Trotman. 1983. 353pp. Index. £18.00.

THE first of these volumes is a compilation of invited papers under the auspices of the British Institute of Energy Economics which is based at Chatham House. The papers are meant to be built around Nigel Lawson's address to the Institute's conference in Cambridge in 1982. That address is reprinted as chapter 1 and appears also in part as chapter 11 of *International energy markets*. With its emphasis on the market as the guiding mechanism for energy policy, the downgrading of the role of central forecasts, minimization of the government role in energy conservation (a policy since mildly reversed within the Department of Energy) and the privatization of some of the energy sector, the speech repays careful analysis. In fact, however, few of the essays take up the challenges in Lawson's speech. O'Sullivan and Wensley make some headway in arguing against a solely price-induced conservation policy, but there is a distinct lack of discussion of what energy policy is supposed to be about.

The essays in *Energy economics in Britain* are variable, omit quite a lot of British research, but on balance provide for a worthwhile volume. G. Corti argues for more concern over national ownership of oil developments in Britain, observing the significant size of the interest and profit outflow because of foreign ownership. Alex Kemp and David Rose provide an outline of their extensive and valuable studies into comparative oil taxation systems, but, in the limited space available, do not get round to explaining what the social objectives of an optimal taxation policy might be.

Particularly valuable is the essay by Ken Wigley and K. Vernon from the Department of Energy on the 'new' forecasting methodology adopted by the Department in the late 1970s. It is regrettably very short, however, and many readers will have difficulty following the inadequate explanation of the modelling of industrial (excluding iron and steel) demand in the appendix. Their essay is followed by a familiar one by Peter Beck of Shell UK which argues against econometric modelling procedures of the kind used by Wigley and Vernon and in favour of the 'scenario' approach used in Shell. In terms of new information, Walter Greaves's paper on petroleum futures markets is perhaps the most helpful in the book, along with C. H. Gosling's paper on the feasibility and desirability of a 'ring main' linking electricity systems not just in Western Europe but in Scandinavia as well. Len Brookes provides a controversial and somewhat unconvincing model of the links between energy prices and the performance of the economy, and the volume closes with Eric Price's reflections on salient aspects of energy policy history and energy economics contributions in Britain. It would be unfortunate if anyone unfamiliar with the UK energy scene were to regard this book as a definitive overview of what energy economists do in Britain, and it is not entirely clear how the British Institute has determined its coverage. None the less, this is a useful volume of essays.

International energy markets is an altogether less satisfactory volume. The basic problem is that the papers are taken from a very large number given to a conference in Cambridge in 1982. The vast majority of papers have had to be omitted, although abstracts are supplied. But even those included have been severely curtailed to the point where it is not possible to appraise the worth of the actual contributions. This is true of a simulation of future oil price movements by Jacoby and Paddock, Fred Banks's essay on the benefits of Soviet gas to Western Europe, and Fesheraki and Isaak's interesting-looking paper on refinery trends and their impact on OPEC. This is very unfortunate given the large amount of space allotted to political statements of very limited content, opening and closing addresses, twenty-five pages of statistical tables not directly related to the papers and sixteen pages of details about the conference itself. This space would have been far better filled with full-length papers. As it stands, the curtailment of the included essays is frustrating and many of the abstracts are simply tantalizing. Maybe there is a lesson here for publishers and conference organisers alike.

University College, London DAVID PEARCE

Energy forum, Vol. 1: First volume in a series on the politics of oil. London: Outline for the Petroleum Information Committee of the Arab Gulf States. 1983. 87pp. £4.00. Pb.: £2.50.

IN what is advertised as the first in a series on 'the thinking and policies of key decision-makers in the Arab Gulf', we are, in fact, offered reprints of four conference contributions, made during a mere seven-week period in late 1982, together with a 1982 report on oil pricing by a sponsored group of experts.

The conference papers are by notable personalities from the world of Arab petroleum policy: 'Ali Khalifah al-Sabah, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, 'Ali Jaidah, Fadhil al-Chalabi. Concentrated as they also are in time, it is not surprising to find a generally coherent and consistent thesis. Demand for OPEC oil has been depressed by recession, conservation, inter-fuel substitution, structural change, stock behaviour and the increasing intrusion of non-OPEC producers. In the long run, it must be expected—or encouraged—to revive. In the interim, the risk of political accident, the need to sustain energy investment and the requirements of economic development argue against either consumer complacency or unbridled producer competition for a shrinking market. The watchwords are stability, self-discipline, moderation. The tone is sober and responsible.

Against such a sombre background of consensus, occasional shades of difference stand out. Dr al-Chalabi and Sheikh 'Ali Khalifah are preoccupied, for example, with stabilizing prices in the immediate future, whereas Mr Jaidah is more interested in stronger long-term regulation of non-OPEC, as well as OPEC, producers. By and large, however, it is left to the paper on 'Oil prices in 1983' by the Research Group on Petroluem Exporters' Policies—here a strangely anonymous group—to inject any disputatious note. Even then, it does so overtly only in regard to the urgent problems facing OPEC in the winter of 1982–3, in which connection it argues for deterrent threats by 'disciplined' members (Arab Gulf producers) to eradicate discounting, establish rigorous output quotas and maintain prices based on $34 a barrel. History tells us that the Research Group's argument was insufficient, but not that it was ill-founded. Meanwhile, its presentation illuminates the Kuwaiti Oil Minister's remark that, in OPEC, 'the ministers are the experts and the experts are the politicians' (p.68).

To those who follow matters of petroleum policy, the texts and thoughts reproduced here will be familiar. Taken together, they may nevertheless help a wider audience towards a sharper sense of the problems and dilemmas with which major oil-producing countries, in or out of OPEC, must now wrestle: the contending merits of competition and cooperation, flexibility and stability; above all, the choice implicit in the Research Group's study, between maintaining short-run income and regaining a larger share of the world energy market. If the promised series is to serve that purpose, however, it will have to extend and accelerate its coverage, add some form of explanatory commentary and achieve a higher standard of editing and production. Five mathematical errors in one table (pp. 30–1) amount to more than a misfortune.

IAN SMART

Analysis of project finance in developing countries. By Charles Harvey. London: Heinemann Educational. 1983. 171pp. Index. £14.50. Pb.: £5.95.

THE aim of the author was to fill a gap in the literature which he identified when, faced with the problem of teaching a course in project analysis, he found that there was no book which treated the subject of project finance. Happily he was fresh from active involvement in the reality of seeking and negotiating such finance and was able to assemble a valuable text to assist those wanting to remedy their ignorance of such matters.

Project finance is an important and inescapable part of a project and an understanding of how it can be mobilized is essential information to officials in financial and planning institutions in developing countries. In addition, because 'donors are unwilling to entrust entirely to recipient governments' the use and management of their funds, they have introduced a strong influence into the procedures of project appraisal. They have largely written the rules. The other participants in the processes of appraisal and decision making, the international consultants and local professionals, deserve access to the rules of the game and insights into the financial institutions and their evaluation criteria. And it is for these groups that the book has largely been written.

The book provides basic data on the costs of different types of loan and explains in helpful detail how to compare loans. The costs of tying are addressed and the costs of delay are treated with an economic matter-of-factness that belies the frustration that such problems generate in the corridors of ministries in developing countries. Elsewhere the complexities of debt services, the impact of inflation and of the financial precautions of high risk projects are elaborated and made approachable by the use of well-chosen and devised exercises and case studies. Teachers in schools of development studies will welcome the book for these alone. The author has provided a useful book of reference for the newcomer to the subject of project finance but especially for those who have laboured long in the professions and politics associated with project appraisal without having the time to come to terms with the complex and usually dominating factor of loan finance.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London J. A. ALLAN

Planning development projects: a practical guide to the choice and appraisal of public sector investment. By G. A. Bridger and J. T. Winpenny. London: HMSO for Overseas Development Administration. 1983. 209pp.

REGRETTABLY it is unusual to find readable books written by busy professionals with the skill and time to distil years of experience into a short (200 pages) book. Here, however, is a hybrid which has the best that a compendium can offer while at the same time providing reviews and opinions on the major current approaches in the field of project planning and appraisal. It is an approachable book which quickly introduces the participants, the problems with which they grapple and the systems of analysis, evaluation, communication and decision making in general use.

The first part discusses the major groups of actors, the 'promoters', the 'professionals' and the 'financiers'. The motives of each are reviewed respectfully but with meticulous and revealing candour. Politicans are people for whom 'completion is less of a priority' than apparent decisive action (p.3), while a civil servant may be drawn by the 'appeal of the second-best project' (p.3) because it would be quick to implement and timely in disposing of a budgetary surplus. The dilemmas of the consulting community are dealt with in four well-informed paragraphs which say much about the difficulties of bringing solutions, or promises of solutions, and exchanging them for money. Throughout there is an underlying awareness of the political dimension, summed up by the authors in their comment that 'projects see the light of day in many ways and the sort of guidelines that are the subject of [the] book are powerless to circumvent the strong political and personal motives that are often present' (p. 5).

The bulk and central part of the book comprises a series of chapters on specific sectors, for example on transport and power, on the social infrastructure—health, housing, waste water and water supply—and on the directly productive sectors of industry, agriculture, livestock and tourism. The structure is helpful, since most users of the book will be interested in only part of the development spectrum, but at the same time the authors recognize the

complementarity of sectors and the need on occasions to take an integrated approach. There are countless useful checklists and a helpful annotated glossary to help the busy professional for whom 'brevity is a salutary (and constant) discipline' (p. xiii), and for those who need more, the references at the end of each section are well chosen and comprehensive. University teachers need rack their brains no longer for sources; the definitive reading list comes with the rest. Bridger and Winpenny have provided a very useful text which is a credit to them and their employer, sponsor and publisher, the Overseas Development Administration, London.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London J. A. ALLAN

Planned change: the creation of a new community. The 27th Bernard Moses Memorial Lecture. By Elizabeth Colson. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California. 1982. 32pp.

Voluntary efforts in decentralised management: opportunities and constraints in rural development. By Lenore Ralston, James Anderson and Elizabeth Colson. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California. 1983. 175pp.

THE incisive wit of Elizabeth Colson's study of the multinational aid-giving community makes one wish that a reviewer need do nothing but quote. Among its absurdities she mentions the provision of technical advice which is patently inappropriate, but she goes on to add that all the apparent nonsense makes sense 'if one assumes that the agencies are staffed by men and women who are primarily absorbed in the maintenance of their own community and ensuring their own place within it' (p.2).

In her view, and not hers alone, the poor of the Third World are not only staying poor, as Michael Lipton has it, but growing poorer—and, as things are, the implementation of the Brandt Report would do nothing to improve matters. She has herself been asked to advise on the training of development personnel, but her views on what they need to know have gone unheeded. She has found that development simply does not mean the same thing for the purveyors of aid and those whom one is sometimes tempted to call their victims. To the former it means increasing the productivity of agriculture; to the latter, realizing ambitions for their children such as salaried employment, which have little to do with agriculture (of course the connection is through better prices for better crops, but this is never made clear). Development personnel seek to foster self-help schemes for the provision of social services, but expect the participants to maintain the services. This was not expected in the 'community development' schemes of British Africa; nor would the self-help workers have the resources for it, and they know this. Least of all does working on such schemes create a permanently changed 'new' cooperative man (or woman). There may be even cruder misconceptions; the Maasai in Kenya are interested in milk, on which they largely live; the USAID Maasai project aimed to improve beef cattle.

Headquarters authorities now assert the importance of communication with actual aid recipients—*not* with local elites—and of fuller knowledge of conditions at the grass roots. But to achieve this takes time, and more than one project implementer has bluntly said that he cannot wait for research.

In thirty-five years the international community has grown to enormous size. In Katmandu, of all places, there are no less than a hundred development agents, representing, among others, seventeen different UN organizations. Why Katmandu? Because Nepal is a beautiful country with a beautiful good-season climate? This is what Robert Chambers has called development tourism; the aid-giver travels quickly through a pretty region in the benign season. Project evaluators commend activities of a kind that has found favour before rather than risk the disfavour of their employers. They are constantly brought together in seminars and workshops where, instead of criticizing, they ritually reassert the values which identify their culture.

Dr Colson acknowledges the cooperation of the two writers who have contributed with her to produce *Voluntary efforts in decentralised management*. This is a research study commissioned by USAID to examine the potentialities of existing local organizations as grass roots mobilizers. The arguments resemble in a less concentrated form Dr Colson's in her own short essay. A point for which she had no space concerns land use. There have been many organized campaigns for the redistribution of land, but it cannot be assumed that the campaigners will

want to farm the land collectively (I would say myself that the contrary can be assumed.) The failure to establish cooperatives based closely on Western models is also discussed.

The concluding recommendations, however, are splendidly commonsensical. Projects should be simple and short-range, their purpose comprehensible and desired by the participants. Time-schedules should be worked out so as to take account of established routines. Administration must be flexible enough to take account of the unexpected, both in possibilities and obstacles. Progress should be closely monitored so that lessons can be drawn from experience. Some projects succeed beyond expectation, but there is no record that explains this. All we know is that very few turn out in the end to be much like what was planned at the outset.

LUCY MAIR

Law

Basic documents in international law. 3rd edn. Edited by Ian Brownlie. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1983. 406pp. Index. Pb.: £8.95.

PROFESSOR BROWNLIE virtually wrote his own review in the preface to the 1967 first edition of this work, which is repeated in this edition. He intends it as a very short collection of basic texts, an aid to those using international materials, including both lawyers and students of international law and relations. The documents are selected empirically, with preference given to internationally significant law-making texts. Economical presentation determines that the main objective be 'utility, rather than completeness according to some formal model'. Every international law teacher will already be familiar with the contents of the earlier editions and convinced of their usefulness, despite the fact that compactness and empiricism result in omission of some preferred or much used texts. The reviewer's own copies of previous editions are dog-eared, but it must be asked whether this new edition takes sufficient account of major developments since 1972 to maintain this high level of utility.

Considerations of space and handiness have led Professor Brownlie to reject most suggestions for inclusions and the only new items are the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) and Parts I–X and a few articles from Part XI of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. One must question the wisdom of this truncation of the UNCLOS Treaty which Brownlie himself introduces as 'the most ambitious scheme of codification and progressive development of international law ever attempted' (p. 127), whatever the constraints. No other document is similarly reduced; all four 1958 Geneva Conventions remain intact. How can any user assess the new convention in the light of this description when most of the innovatory but controversial provisions on the deep-sea regime and all those on protection of the marine environment, scientific research, dispute settlement and the vital final clauses dealing with parties, entry into force, relation to other conventions, amendment, etc., are omitted? The volume remains indeed compact but would not have lost this advantage if another 20–30 pages had been included to cover the whole convention, which will surely be one of the most used documents by students and teachers for years to come in all aspects of international law syllabi, and is also to be regarded as a 'package deal' treaty in which all provisions are interrelated.

Other notable omissions include the UN's seabed Moratorium Resolution, more recent outer space treaties, such as the Moon Treaty, and any of the now extensive materials on international environmental law, the existence of which is ignored; not even the seminal 1972 UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment Declaration of Principles on the Environment is included, though extensive coverage of human rights remains, despite Brownlie's separate volume of documents on this subject. The reviewer also regrets the continued omission of the Statute of the International Law Commission (found in the first edition) but choice is ever a subjective matter, reflecting prejudice to some extent. Some will find these documents a dog's breakfast, others an adequate basic diet for slimmers. Utilitariansim, in the sense that actions are right because they are useful, is not an acceptable philosophy for all, and most would surely have preferred that comprehensiveness had not been so strictly subordinated to handiness.

London School of Economics PATRICIA BIRNIE

English–French–Spanish–Russian manual of the terminology of public international law (law of peace) and international organizations. By Isaac Paenson. Brussels: Bruylant for Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. 1983. 846pp. Index. BFr 6,000.00.

TO help remedy at least the linguistic problems impeding international understanding in the critical area of the international law of peace Dr Paenson offers in his *Manual* a compendium of equivalent international law terminology in four languages. He has wisely chosen to display the technical words and phrases in their context within a detailed analytical description of international law that serves in effect as an outline of the subject.

For easy comparison, the paragraphs of this outline are set out on facing pages in four parallel columns, one for each language, corresponding terms being numbered identically in all four languages and thereby being keyed into a complete cross-referencing system based on elaborate general indices that take up the last two hundred pages of the book. By this system it is possible to locate easily the equivalent terms in any three of the languages presented by knowing the appropriate term in the fourth.

Having got so far, however, the reader may find that mere comparison of the parallel texts does not always clarify usage in languages foreign to him. The difficulty is that single equivalents are apparently not to be found in every case, but no attempt is made, by means of a supplementary glossary or footnotes, to explain or define the semantic distinctions between alternative equivalents. Thus, the average English-speaking reader will simply be mystified to discover, for example, that 'international personality' is without explanation rendered in Russian as both *mezhdunarodno-pravovaya lichnost* and *mezhdunarodnaya pravosubjektnost*.

It may also fairly be objected that the omission of German and Dutch parallel texts creates a serious gap in light of the prime importance of both languages in the scholarship of international law.

On the level of substantive law, the decision to present the terminology in the context of an outline of the subject opens the way for argument about the law itself, and Dr Paenson has been forced to include, where relevant, paragraphs describing what he calls the 'Western' and the 'Marxist' points of view. But criticism of his presentation should be moderated by the realization that this is only secondarily a book about international law and primarily one about the language of that law. Within the confines of the task he has in fact set himself, Dr Paenson has produced a monument of precise scholarship that will greatly assist interpreters, translators, and students in the field. The book's Polish printers are also to be commended for producing a readable text in what must have been a typesetter's nightmare.

University of Aberdeen DAVID H. OTT

The application of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies in international law: its rationale in the international protection of human rights. By A. A. Cancado Trindade. Cambridge University Press. 1983. 443 pp. Index. (Cambridge studies in international and comparative law, new series, No. 1). £30.00.

IT is gradually becoming clear that the law on the protection of human rights is not merely a special case in the law of diplomatic protection, distinguished from the rest of it only to the minimum extent necessary to accommodate the removal of the nationality of claims rule. On matters of standing, remedies, interpretation, the multiplying practice demonstrates that human rights law is a discrete (though not uniform) branch of international law. The realization that this is the case has been partly obstructed because of the use of terms and institutions in human rights treaties which were borrowed from the law of diplomatic protection. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the reference in Article 26 of the European Convention of Human Rights to the duty to exhaust local remedies 'according to the generally recognized rules of international law'. It is the achievement of Professor Trindade's book, the ambit of which is better indicted by its sub-title than by its title, to demonstrate that both in principle and in practice, the application of the local remedies rule in the field of human rights has different functions to those it has in the law diplomatic protection. Accordingly, the rigid, formal and essentially negative role argued for the interpretation of the rule by defendant states has been gradually modified. For human rights the rule has a flexible quality, putting emphasis on the positive obligation of a state to provide an effective

ystem of domestic remedies. Protection of the rights of individuals rather than the ensibilities of states is the object of the rule. This is not, as Professor Trindade shows, ncompatible with a rule of some strictness when it is understood that the most effective protection of individual rights is provided by an effective domestic legal remedy. Accordingly, decisions like *Van Oosterwijk* can be explained by the object of encouraging states o provide and individuals to utilize the widest range of domestic remedies. The practice upon which Professor Trindade relies is that under the European Convention on Human Rights up o about 1977, although a short addendum refers to cases decided up to 1981. He is careful to point out that the precise conclusions he reaches may not apply to other human rights procedures (but he makes an interesting suggestion of the relevance of the inter-state and administrative practice decisions under the Convention to the '1503' procedure of the United Nations).

This is an intense work, not alleviated by any lightness, and much of it has appeared elsewhere in Professor Trindade's copious contributions to the journals. It is thankfully shorter than his mammoth PhD thesis, in which form, as an examiner, this reviewer first encountered t, but the profusion of the references remains: roughly one page of notes for two of text. Its argument is not always stated with the conviction and clarity of his conclusion. Nonetheless, t is eminently worth persevering with this book. It provides an intellectual justification for an approach to human rights law which fully takes into account its innovative characteristics and which marks it as a discrete and not a dependent part of international law.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

Land-locked states and the UNCLOS regime. By A. Mpazi Sinjela. London, New York: Oceana. 1983. 495 pp. $45.00.

THIS book, particularly the first six of the eight chapters, is evidently largely based on a lissertation submitted for a JSD at Yale, probably three or four years ago as little reference is nade to works appearing after that date. References to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which one expects from the title to be central to the work, have often been tacked on belatedly and perfunctorily. An over-long account is given of the long and generally familiar history of he major law of the sea issues, and more attention is given to the conferences of the League of Nations and UNCLOS I and II than UNCLOS III in these chapters.

The purpose is to explain the objectives and rights of land-locked states and evaluate the xtent to which they have succeeded in achieving them in the Convention. This is executed, but often at a superficial level, with more rhetoric than legal analysis, and the author does not, xcept in chapter 7 on the EEZ, provide much insight into the detailed aims and tactics of the Land-locked and Geographically Disdavantaged Group of States (LLGDS). This is lisappointing given that the author is a national of Zambia, acted as an adviser to the LLGDS group at UNCLOS III and is now in the United Nations Legal Affairs Office. Little use is nade of UNCLOS documents until chapters 7 (EEZ) and 8 (deep seabed regime) when the uthor's inside knowledge is put to good use, though even here he relies uncritically on the rguments advanced by the Group of 77 in its 1980 paper.

Sinjela makes little attempt to explain or examine the legal position of the industrialized tates on common heritage. It would have made for sounder conclusions if he had considered heir claims seriously in the context of how international law is made. His recommendations re very general and somewhat unrealistic given state practice and the UNCLOS outcomes: he ays that continental shelf claims should be abandoned and the area added to that administered by the ISA; LLS should be allocated coastal areas to build their own ports, or ports should be eased to them under their sovereignty, fisheries and scientific research should become the oncern of continents, not coastal states, with regional commissions approving projects and all heir members having the right to participate in research if requested.

Finally it should be noted that there are far too many mistakes; points are misunderstood or onfused; chapters and sections are seldom coordinated or cross-referenced despite the Convention's 'package deal' approach (which is not mentioned). Printing and proof-reading rrors are too numerous to mention; there is no index. Perhaps the biggest mistake is the final onclusion that despite the LLS failure to achieve their aims 'the demand of developing

nations' for a new NIEO has 'finally achieved complete substance in the LOSC' (p.341), surely further evidence of superficial analysis?

London School of Economics PATRICIA BIRNIE

The refugee in international law. By Guy S. Goodwin-Gill. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1983. 318pp.

Escape to freedom: the story of the international rescue committee. By Aaron Levenstein. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. 1983. 338pp. £26.50.

IN the first of these books, Goodwin-Gill convincingly demonstrates that despite all its imperfections international law has evolved significantly and can in theory meet the needs of the ever-expanding numbers of refugees throughout the world. The fact that the status and definition of a 'refugee' have become norms of potentially universal application is indeed progress; and the unfortunately necessary extension of these norms to include 'mass exodus' (for example, the 'boat people') is also a crucial development in international humanitarian protection. That the right of 'non-refoulement' (the refugee's right not to be returned to the country from which he or she has sought refuge) has become by now a principle 'binding in all states, independently of specific assent' (p. 97) is extremely important. Indeed, according to the author, the general acceptance of this principle has even substantially circumscribed the power of states to deny the right of asylum (p. 225).

Goodwin-Gill's well balanced assessment is based not only upon analyses of the standard sources of international law, but also upon careful scrutiny of the laws of thirty-five nation states. Its value is at least threefold. In the first place, *The refugee in international law* shapes a disparate body of law into a well-structured framework which reflects the progressive evolution of states' obligations to the refugee. Second, the work not only points to the considerable gaps which are still to be found in the law, but also posits some interesting ways to fill them. Third, it provides political scientists with a fascinating case study, in the evolution of international law as it pertains to refugees, of the ways in which what Meyers McDougal called 'legal realism' can erode the dominion of state sovereignty.

And yet, as Goodwin-Gill would readily accept, the reality of refugee assistance too often seems tied to the political process of the moment. With the UN High Commissioner for Refugees warning of an increasing 'mood of xenophobia detectable in West European attitudes to persons seeking political asylum' (*The Times*, 18 January 1984), one must wonder if the answer to the plight of refugees is not ultimately found in the work of organizations such as the International Rescue Committee. The issue is not that the law has no relevance. Rather, international law pertaining to minority interests, the moral obligation of states, even the moral stances of the body politic requires sponsors and demands commitment and dedication to ensure effective enforcement. This process is really what Professor Levenstein's story of the International Rescue Committee is about.

Like international law on refugees, the International Rescue Committee has evolved well beyond its original conception. Initially formed to help victims of Hitler's Europe, the IRC now plays a global role for individuals seeking political asylum as well as for those seeking refuge *en masse*. Hungary, Cuba, Bangladesh, Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Zaire are but some of the points of departure for the millions whom the IRC has directly or indirectly assisted over the past decades. Moreover, the history of the IRC, as documented by Levenstein, is particularly significant in revealing how it used its authoritative voice to exert political pressure, both in the United States and abroad. There are many voluntary organizations which perhaps could have offered the types of relief which the IRC provided in hosts of refugee camps around the world. However, a considerably smaller number have had the prestige, the authority, even the contacts, to have so effectively prodded and cajoled those in government to observe their moral and legal obligations to refugees.

Aaron Levenstein's *Escape to freedom* is a rich work, full of vignettes about the successes and difficulties faced by an extremely important voluntary organization. It provides some insights into the complex relations between voluntary organizations and intergovernmental organizations and national governments; and to that extent it is a good introduction to the hitherto underexplored area of 'humanitarian politics'. The book has its share of small mistakes (for example, Maurice Williams in 1971 was Deputy Administrator of the US Agency for

nternational Development and not its 'head', p.133); and the book's unrepentant 'cold varrior' style may not fit everyone's view of postwar international relations.

However, these minor criticisms hardly detract from a work which clearly portrays the type of dedication and commitment required to deal with a global problem the magnitude of which ncreases distressingly moment by moment. In the final analysis, though, one is left to ponder vhether even the advances made in international law, the increased authority of ntergovernmental bodies, and even the zeal of organizations such as the IRC can keep pace vith the plight of the expanding population of refugees throughout the world.

Jniversity of Surrey RANDOLPH C. KENT

History

The Great Powers and the decline of the European states system 1914–1945. By Graham Ross. London, New York: Longman. 1983. 181 pp. Index. Pb.: £5.50.

THIS short book, the last of a series of three dealing with the European states system over three enturies, covers the thirty years and two world wars that it took to bring this system from a osition of world dominance to collapse and supersession by a very different international tructure. Apart from some general observations in the introductory chapter, this is not really theoretical book, but a condensed international history, concerned chiefly with the relations of the major European and other world powers, their predicaments, policies and rivalries, as vell as with the League of Nations and the causes of its failure.

Although the author brings no radical reinterpretation to this now familiar story, he tells it vell, presenting lucidly and economically what was often a tangle of complex issues and vents. Occasionally the reader encounters a nugget of surprising information: that in 1914 Belgium's steel production nearly equalled Austria-Hungary's (p. 2), or that in 1918 a British orce occupied Murmansk at the request of the local Soviet (p. 33). On the same page occurs a are slip, for it was not a Jewish 'state' that the British had intended to sponsor in Palestine. The author, in common with other general historians, does not make sufficiently explicit the auses of the Japanese–American War, nor does he always give the underlying economic and inancial factors the attention they deserve, although to have done so would probably have een impossible in a short work of this compass. The book concludes with lists of the foreign ninisters of all the major powers, a chronology, two maps, and an extensive bibliographical guide to further reading. Altogether this is a most useful introduction to the diplomatic history of the period.

Jniversity College of Wales, Aberystwyth BRIAN PORTER

France and the origins of the First World War. By John F. V. Keiger. London: Macmillan. 1983. 201 pp. Index. £14.00. Pb.: £11.00.

Russia and the origins of the First World War. By D. C. B. Lieven. London: Macmillan. 1983. 213 pp. Index. £14.00. Pb.: £4.95.

THE French Foreign Office', noted one exasperated British official in December 1910, 'is an Augean stable. They shd. turn the Seine through it'. Raymond Poincaré, who became French premier and foreign minister in January 1912, was no Hercules, but according to Dr Keiger he did succeed in imposing his will upon the unruly *bureaux* and independently-minded diplomats of the Third Republic. In this monograph Dr Keiger argues that in the period 1907–12 'the Quai d'Orsay fell prey to a number of young, ambitious and unscrupulous officials who were characterised by a hostility towards certain Ambassadors' (p. 27), and that his produced an incoherence in French foreign policy which culminated in the confused negotiations of the Agadir crisis. This state of affairs was, he claims, rectified by Poincaré, who, with the backing of a public which was anxious to see a restoration of France's national prestige, sought to reaffirm France's alliance with Russia and entente with Britain, and to uphold the existing balance of power. Thus, although Poincaré later sanctioned an understanding with Berlin on the Middle East, he initially rejected Jules Cambon's proposals or a Franco–German detente, and opposed the efforts of Barrère and Crozier to wrest Italy and

Austria-Hungary from their alliances with Germany. If, however, Poincaré thereby contributed to the crystallizing of the prevailing divisions between the European great powers, Dr Keiger considers that his diplomacy was 'in reality far more passive than has often been alleged' (p. 166). France's stance in the war crisis of 1914 was, he suggests, determined by its desire to maintain the favourable diplomatic position which it had achieved, and its unwillingness 'to live again in the sahdow of a mightly Germany' (p. 167).

Dr Keiger's study throws fresh light on the organization and structure of the French foreign ministry before 1914, the advice proffered by ambassadors like the Cambon brothers, and the manner in which Poincaré continued to exercise an influence on foreign policy after his elevation to the Presidency. Dr Keiger is also to be congratulated for having mastered Poincaré's appalling handwriting. It is, however, unfortunate that this book is marred by factual errors such as the assertion that in June 1905 'Rouvier assumed control of the Foreign Ministry until October 1906 when Stephen Pichon became Foreign Minister' (p. 22): a statement which overlooks both the problems created by French diplomats by Rouvier's resignation in March 1906 and Léon Bourgeois's tenure as foreign minister. Moreover, the description of Delcassé as 'the Germanophile French Ambassador in St. Petersburg' (p. 138) is surely a typographical mistake of the first order. It might even have baffled the clever cryptographers of the *cabinet noir*.

In his parallel study, Dr Lieven traces in somewhat less detail the evolution of Russian foreign policy in the same period. His book is based upon an impressive list of archival sources, but it seems to arrive at no very surprising conclusions about Russia's relations with the other European powers. Far more illuminating is Dr Lieven's examination of the decision-making processes within Russia, and in particular his analysis of the divisions within the ruling elite between those in the majority who thought it necessary to deter a potentially expansive Germany, and those who would have preferred a reconciliation with Berlin. In this context he also considers the rôles played by, and opinions expressed in, the press and the Duma. And while he maintains that the Emperor and his ministers remained largely responsible for framing policy, and that it is not apparent that Nicholas II paid any great attention to so-called public opinion, he points out that since the regime 'had always derived a major part of its legitimacy from its claim that the autocracy alone had been capable of creating a Great Russia and ensuring that the Empire was respected', humiliation in foreign policy 'struck directly at the regime's *raison d'être*' (pp. 53–4). Indeed, given Russia's lack of success abroad and Slavophile tendencies at home, its government was severely constrained in the choices which it could afford to make when faced by the prospect of seeing the empire's prestige and position in the Balkans undermined by the Austrian chastisement of Serbia. At the same time, however, Dr Lieven contends that in territorial terms Russia was a satiated state, and that this and the awareness of the authorities in St Petersburg of the 'fragility of their society' made Russian policy 'much less aggressive than Germany's' (p. 153).

Both of these books, which are published in Macmillan's series, *The making of the twentieth century*, make valuable contributions towards filling gaps in the historiography of the First World War. They should be of use not only to undergraduates but also to researchers in this period.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth K. A. HAMILTON

1939: a retrospective forty years after. Proceedings of a conference held at the University of Surrey, 27 October 1979. Edited by Roy Douglas. London: Macmillian. 1983. 107 pp. Index. £17.50.

THIS slim volume brings together a collection of lectures, the common theme of which was to take a fresh look at the outbreak of war in 1939, with the advantage of forty years of hindsight and a wealth of official documentation, and to see if the countries concerned could have acted in any way other than they actually did in those final few crucial months before the invasion of Poland in September 1939. There are individual chapters which consider, in turn, the British, French, German, Polish and Russian appraisals of the situation, and inevitably these differ considerably in their approach and in the amount of detailed information provided. The chapters are rather short—between ten and fifteen pages, except for the German chapter—and in most cases they serve to whet the appetite rather than to satisfy it fully. What might well have been a brilliant and stimulating lecture when heard in the flesh can appear rather flat and

superficial in print. Many readers may find it disappointing that the five main chapters concentrate on the outbreak of war rather than on its longer-term origins, with only one introductory chapter covering in general terms the years before 1939. From the point of view of the original conference, this clear and limited focus undoubtedly contributed to the effectiveness and success of the gathering, as did the eminence of the lecturers, including in their number the British historians Professors D. C. Watt, A. J. P. Taylor and Douglas Johnson and the German historian Dr Lothar Kettenacker. However, in terms of the available literature on the origins and outbreak of the Second World War, this volume tells us little that is not told elsewhere, and the deliberate omission of detailed discussion about what action individual countries might have taken in 1936 or earlier to stop German expansion will lessen its usefulness to students. They might also find the price for its 101 pages of text rather steep.

University of Lancaster RUTH HENIG

Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Vol. 4: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. By Horst Boog *et al.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1983. 1170 pp. Index. DM 72.00.

THIS is the fourth in the very ambitious and impressive ten-volume history of Germany and the Second World War which is being produced by the Military History Research Office in Freiburg, West Germany. (Collectors of this series ought to note, however, that volume three, dealing with the early stages of the war in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, will not appear until some time in 1984.) Although written by a 'house team' from the government-funded *Forschungsamt*, this is not an official history on the British or American model and is in fact much wider-ranging in its conception and execution than, say, the Cabinet Office-controlled *Grand strategy* series. In the first place, certain differences of emphasis and interpretation are permitted to the six contributing authors here. Secondly, being acutely aware of the scholarly debate which has been raging upon Hitler's war aims, they have decided to set the Barbarossa story fully within the context of the ideological, racial and economic ambitions of the Third Reich. Thus, unlike many strictly military accounts of the Russo–German campaign, they devote considerable space to the ghastly plans for the plunder and virtual extermination of the Russian people and prisoners-of-war.

Nevertheless, this is first and foremost a military history in the grand manner, accompanied by a separate maps section and based upon a staggering array of archival sources as well as upon a wide range of secondary writings in many languages. The German army's strengths and (very considerable) weaknesses are fully analysed, and the story ranges from the actions of individual panzer divisions up to the deliberations in OKW itself. When describing the (admittedly minor) role of the Italian Expeditionary Corps, reference is naturally made to Italian accounts. When discussing economic aspects of the campaign the records of the OKW's military-economic branch (*die Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung*) and of civilian departments have been fully studied. And it comes as no surprise to discover a weighty section on 'The conduct of the war from the Soviet viewpoint', discussing the operations from the perspective of Stalin and the Red Army.

The narrative part of this volume stops at the turn of the year 1941–2, when the German offensive against Moscow failed and the High Command began to organize for a much longer war than it had previously anticipated, while more sinister organs of German administration prepared to exploit the *Lebensraum* in the east. Both the military and the non-military aspects will be picked up again in later volumes. It is worth noting, however, the final ten pages (pp. 1079–88) of reflections on the historical significance of Hitler's attack upon the Soviet Union, which is a very impressive summary of the ideological as well as the geopolitical meaning of 'operation Barbarossa'. In sum, this volume confirms the high reputation which the series has already secured in the historiography of the Second World War, and makes readers look with anticipation to the succeeding volumes.

Yale University PAUL KENNEDY

History of the Balkans. Vol. 1: Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; Vol. 2: Twentieth century. By Barbara Jelavich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. 407, 476 pp. Index. £25. $49.00 per vol. Pb.: £9.95, $17.95 per vol.

A modern and comprehensive history of the Balkans has long been overdue, and Mrs Barbara Brightfield Jelavich, a noted American scholar, has now filled that gap admirably. To be competent as a historian of peoples so different as the inhabitants of today's Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey is no mean achievement, yet Mrs Jelavich, aided by her husband Charles Jelavich, manages to include in her engagingly written book even a history of the Hapsburg monarchy until its demise in 1918. The work assumes no prior knowledge and the two volumes can be read separately. (The contents of volume 1 are summarized in the introduction to volume 2.)

After briefly surveying Balkan developments in classical and medieval times, the main narrative of volume 1 unfolds with the peace treaty of Karlowitz (1699) from which the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire started, and covers events until the achievement of Greek, Montenegrine, Bulgarian, Romanian and Serbian independence at the end of the nineteenth century. Major emphasis is given to the various national liberation movements, their programmes and their revolutionary activity. While they were all united in an ardent wish to get free of Ottoman hegemony, they never even tried to come to a mutual understanding about the boundaries between the states they were anxious to establish. All the later controversies over such issues as the desire of the Albanian national movement for a state including all Albanians or the position of the Macedonians had their roots in the nineteenth century, yet no one seemed to grasp that 'absolutely just' frontiers could never be drawn and that minorities left on the 'wrong' side needed and deserved protection.

Volume 2 gives a vivid picture of events in the twentieth century up to 1980 and Tito's death, extending the narrative on Greece to the installation of the Papandreou government in October 1981. It is a history of two Balkan wars (1912 and 1913) and two world wars, both involving the Balkans heavily and changing everything from top to bottom. Up to 1939, it is a story of political and economic backwardness, aggravated by the incompetence of the new and autocratic rulers (with the arguable exception of King Petar of pre-1914 Serbia, whose regime was the nearest to real democracy). The peace settlements after 1918, putting an end to the role of Turkey as a European power and establishing frontiers similar to today's, fulfilled many nationalist demands, but created at the same time new injustices, such as the inconsiderate treatment of the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania, which became part of Romania. The newly created Yugoslav state was built up as a kind of Greater Serbia, alienating the Croats and riding roughshod over the rights of the national minorities. After 1945, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania came under communist one-party rule, Greece alone, though suffering for the second time years of brutal dictatorship, sticking to the principles of Western democracy. The old conflicts between Albania and Yugoslavia, between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and between Romania and Hungary (over Transylvania) led again to almost constant tensions. The complicated story of Cyprus is, like all other controversial matters, treated by the author with commendable objectivity. The social and economic progress achieved by the communist regimes, as well as their failures in other fields, are faithfully recorded.

Mrs Jelavich's excellent narrative leaves one little to wish for, through some readers may miss the mentioning of familiar names like that of Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb and his trial or of Nicolae Titulescu, Romania's long-standing foreign minister between the two world wars. Others might feel irritated by the accolade 'socialist states' (without quotation marks) frequently given to communist dictatorships. The valuable bibliography at the end of both volumes is unfortunately confined to publications in English, while works in other languages are quoted in the text. Some repetitive statements could have been avoided although the author obviously prefers readability to extensive cross-referencing. And readability throughout she has achieved in these two volumes which promise to be the standard work on the history of the Balkans for a long time to come.

J. W. BRUEGEL

The struggle for a democracy in Siberia, 1917–1920: eyewitness account of a contemporary. By Paul Dotsenko. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1983. 178 pp. Index. $16.95.

WHILE memoirs of the Russian Civil War are legion, this book is far from typical. The author's perspective is an unusual one: Paul Dotsenko was a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party who was exiled to Siberia in 1914; following the February Revolution, he engaged in political work for the SRs until arrested by the Bolshevik authorities in February 1918. After escaping from prison, he took part in the overthrow of Soviet power in Siberia, becoming commissar of Yeniseisk province. He resigned from this post in December 1918 to work, in an unspecified capacity, in the anti-Bolshevik Siberian Army.

Naturally enough, Dotsenko's main concern is to emphasize the significance of the role played by the SRs in the struggle against Bolshevism, and to lay the blame for the failure of that struggle on the military commanders ('the Black reactionary layers of the ruling class') who expelled the SRs from the leadership of the White movement and installed Admiral Kolchak as 'supreme ruler' or dictator. He is rather more successful in the second task. The picture he draws of intrigues, illusions, corruption and ruthlessness is a grim but convincing one. It is hard to imagine a better example of the fatal weaknesses of military rule than that of the White generals in the Russian Civil War. With opponents like these, the Bolsheviks' victory appears not only inevitable but also desirable.

The account of the SRs' role is less plausible. Dotsenko is at pains to demonstrate that the overthrow of Soviet power in Siberia which set the Civil War in motion was the result primarily of the SRs' activity rather than of the Czech Legion's revolt. All he succeeds in showing, however, is that the SRs were preparing for an insurrection when the Czech revolt gave them the opportunity to replace the defeated Bolshevik administration. His analysis of the SRs' fortunes and the fate of liberal democracy in Russia subsequently lacks depth. The stupidity and incompetence of right-wing politicans and generals, the self-seeking aims and ignorance of local conditions on the part of the foreign interventionist powers, especially Britain, are described in detail. These unquestionably contributed to the eventual outcome. What is lacking here is any analysis of the SRs' policies, of their strengths and weaknesses. Why was it impossible for them to transform the great support which Dotsenko claims they enjoyed among the population of Siberia into political influence? In the absence of any assessment of the SRs' strategy and tactics this crucial question is unanswered. But in any case the picture of Siberian society which this interesting if incomplete account provides suggests that the conditions for democratic development along SR lines were not present.

King's College, Cambridge JOHN BARBER

Western Europe

Postwar: the dawn of today's Europe. By Richard Mayne. London: Thames & Hudson. 1983. 336pp. Index. £10.50.

DR MAYNE is well known as one of Britain's leading 'Europeans'. From an early stage he has been a participant in, observer of and publicist about the process which is loosely described as 'European unity'. Most notably he is the author of the highly-regarded *The recovery of Europe* (1970).

It is difficult not to compare the present and earlier studies. Both focus on the period between the defeat of Germany and the signature on the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, although the earlier work had a few pages taking the story up to 1970. But there is a clear contrast between them in emphasis. Whereas *Recovery* was more concerned with the diplomatic process and the institutional arrangements affecting European integration, *Postwar* highlights what were subordinate themes in the 1970 study—social and economic change, the impact of science and technology, decolonization, and the reflection of these in European 'culture'.

The chapters featuring these topics are certainly the best written and most stimulating in the book, utilizing the author's recognized skills as a literary and film critic and ranging over such seemingly diverse topics as jet travel, plastics, architecture, urban alienation,

existentialism, fashion, 'coca-colonization' and many others. Against this, the parts of the book devoted to 'straight' politics and history are often less satisfactory than in *Recovery*. In one case, describing the destruction and dislocation existing in the Europe of 1945, it would be hard for any author to improve upon the sensitive and perceptive passages which Mayne wrote in 1970. In others, such as those dealing with the German question and developments in Eastern Europe, it is the need for brevity which clouds the quality. Yet, in the latter case, it is also focus. To offer the case of Czechoslovakia as typical of the outcome of the 'pattern' of Sovietization begs as many questions as it answers, and to 'personalize' these developments through the admittedly interesting character of Jan Masaryk only obscures some fundamental questions even more.

This leads to another point. The Resistance delegates who met together in 1944, 'determined to put a stop to Europe's civil wars', came from East European and Nordic circuits as well as from Western Europe. Yet save for odd statistics and quotations, the former countries—along with the wartime neutrals—far from figuring in any European dawn, disappear into the night. This fact is emphasised by the index, where one can find Omar Sharif and Margaret Lockwood, yet look in vain for the name of any country. In the end, we are left with a study of what 'Europe' meant to the familiar 'Six' of the Rome Treaty and the ambivalent British.

This criticism is more sorrowful than angry. Dr Mayne could doubtless have told us much about for example Irish or Norwegian attitudes to European integration in the period. It would be churlish to make too much of it, or of some half dozen errors of fact. Overall, the present study is an eloquent and stimulating addition to our knowledge of the period. Its best sections are indeed excellent. It can be used with profit by the growing numbers of teachers and students of European Studies.

TONY SHARP

A political geography of Community Europe. By Geoffrey Parker. Borough Green, Kent: Butterworths. 1983. 141pp. Index. £15.00.

THERE have been a large number of general accounts of the workings of the European Communities from the economic, legal and political perspectives. This book by Geoffrey Parker, a Lecturer in the University of Birmingham's Department of Extramural Studies, focusses on the geographical dimensions of Community Europe. The objective is to unravel the extent to which Community Europe has acquired its own distinctive geopolitical characteristics. In addition to examining the factors which have brought about the emergence of the European Communities, attention is paid to the spatial features of the individual member states. There is also an interesting chapter on the three Euro-capitals: Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg. A large part of the book is devoted to the external dimensions of Community Europe: in particular, whether the EEC is a potential superpower and the likelihood of its achieving an international importance comparable with that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The final part of the book looks at the ideals and realities underlying Community Europe and its possible future development.

Overall, Geoffrey Parker has provided a well-written narrative which ably combines complex historical, political, and economic data within a geographical framework. The argument is well illustrated with many useful maps and diagrams. The text, however, is only some 130 pages (including the maps and diagrams) with the inevitable result that, given his vast canvas, Mr Parker only touches the surface and leaves many questions unanswered. The value of the book as a reference work for students is limited by the absence of a select bibliography. Nevertheless, it should be consulted by all those concerned with the geographical dimension of Europe integration. The book is a pleasant *hors d'oeuvre*, whetting the appetite for more.

KEN TWITCHETT

The price of victory. By Michael Charlton. London: BBC. 1983. 316pp. Index. £10.75.
Policy making in the European Community. 2nd edn. Edited by Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb. Chichester, New York: Wiley. 1983. 451pp. Index. £24.50; $45.55. Pb.: £8.95.

'THE price of victory' was a phrase used by Jean Monnet to explain what he thought was the reason why Britain failed to join the original Six in establishing the European Community. It was, he told his British friends, 'the illusion that you could maintain what you had, without change'. These are the last words in Michael Charlton's book, expanded from the BBC Radio Three series of the same title, extracts from which have also appeared in *Encounter*. The present publication is thus a more than twice-told tale; but the witnesses assembled and questioned make it fresh, lively, and revealing. The better known of them include Hervé Alphand, George Ball, Lord Butler, Maurice Couve de Murville, Lord Franks, Lord Gladwyn, Lord Gordon-Walker, Walter Hallstein, Edward Heath, Lord Plowden, Sir Frank Roberts, Lord Roll, Lord Soames, Lord Stockton (then Harold Macmillan), Lord Thorneycroft, and Lord (then Sir Harold) Wilson. All, especially Lord Butler, provide important testimony. No less crucial, however, are the contributions from such officials as the Reverend Sir Herbert Andrew (a much-respected participant in the Heath negotiations of 1961–63), Russell Bretherton (Britain's representative, for a time, on the Spaak Committee), Sir John Colville (Joint Principal Private Secretary to Winston Churchill from 1951 to 1955), and Lord Sherfield (formerly Sir Roger Makins, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in 1947–8, and Deputy Under-Secretary from 1948 to 1952). What they say, and what some of them still seemed to feel when talking with Michael Charlton, very broadly confirms the truth of Monnet's verdict.

Scepticism, based partly on lack of interest and partly on ignorance, was the characteristic reaction of British officials to the initiatives proposed by Monnet, Schuman, and the Six. Lord Sherfield, in a memorandum to Attlee quoted here (p. 122), spoke of an 'Atlantic Community', but without explaining either its possible structure or its viability, with one member so much more powerful than all the rest. He also canvassed 'close association with Europe in every field', making very clear his and others' opinion that 'Europe' was something alien, 'over there'. Sir Herbert Andrew recalls: 'We rather prided ourselves, I think, on "thinking bigger" than the Europeans' (p. 241). And even Sir Anthony Nutting, although critical of British insularity, seems still to believe that 'we could still have had the leadership of Europe if we had joined in Messina' (p. 167). So illusions persist. But for the most part this is a painful *mea culpa* on the part of British officialdom, documenting from the Second World War until 1963 and after the sad and familiar story of missed opportunities and a final Herculean effort by Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath, thwarted for ten years by President de Gaulle.

The European Community that Britain finally joined, as several of Michael Charlton's interlocutors point out, looked very different from the 'federalist blueprint' they ascribed to Jean Monnet. Its workings also differ from the 'neofunctionalist', 'spillover', and other political theories evolved by analysts such as Ernst B. Haas. In the new edition of 'Wallace, Wallace and Webb' (first published in 1977), Carole Webb makes rather heavy weather of the revisions, hindsights, disillusions, and fast intellectual footwork imposed on Community-watchers initially misled by rhetoric or facile assumptions. Monnet himself was always less dogmatic, and found it easy to acknowledge his semantic errors. 'We were wrong', he once said in private to the present writer, referring to early talk of federation and supranational government. Nor did he have any qualms about proposing 'summit' meetings of the 'European Council': he had a nose for where power really lay and how to get practical things done. *Policy making in the European Community* is strongest when, Monnet-like, it sinks its teeth into reality, for example in chapters on monetary policy (by Loukas Tsoukalis), agriculture (a newcomer since the first edition, by Joan Pearce), competition policy (by David Allen), external textiles policy (another newcomer, by Chris Farrands), and sugar (by Chris Stevens and Carole Webb). Its third new chapter, on fisheries, finds its pessimism somewhat confounded by a postscript noting that a common fisheries policy has at last been agreed upon. Other chapters too have been substantially revised and rewritten, partly to take account of the changes which the editors note in their preface (p. vii): the recession, East–West tension, unemployment, falling revenue, government concentration on short-term self-interest—in a phrase, harder times. It is surely no accident that in such times 'political cooperation' looks

more attractive to governments than the restraints and rituals of 'economic integration'. Yet, as William Wallace's chapter on the subject shows, even political cooperation now involves both ritual and restraint.

Is the Community, as Walter Hallstein maintained, 'a federation in the making'? William Wallace's concluding chapter diagnoses it as 'Less than a Federation, more than a Regime'. Carole Webb calls it 'a partially-integrated policy-making system at the regional level' (p. 9). What emerges from this book is a true, complex picture of a truly complex entity—far less streamlined than its promoters wish or its opponents fear, but also stubbornly resistant to the centrifugal forces which its analysts either grudgingly or gleefully detect. Perhaps the time to worry is when a revolution becomes routine.

RICHARD MAYNE

Institutions and policies of the European Community. Edited by Juliet Lodge. London: Pinter. 1983. 264 pp. Index. £16.50. Pb.: £6.25.

The European Community: bibliographical excursions. Edited by Juliet Lodge. London: Pinter. 1983. 259 pp. £17.00. Pb.: £7.50.

PROBABLY only EC addicts or students will read these books in conjunction, but they have clearly been conceived to be complementary and many of the chapters in the critical bibliographical guide are written by the authors of the corresponding chapter in the discursive book. Both books show the firm and sensitive guiding hand of the editor, in the judicious selection of authors, the succinctness and accuracy of the contributions, the breath-taking range of the coverage. Even though the European Community seems further than ever away from integration, these two books present a clear and consistent series of snapshots of its institutions, internal policies and external relations.

Institutions and policies consists of over 160,000 words of closely printed text at a very reasonable cost. After the editor's introduction, part I consists of brief chapters on the European Community decision-making institutions, the role of pressure groups, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Because this volume is intended primarily for an undergraduate and general public, a great deal of familiar ground must be covered. The chapter on pressure groups could have usefully said more about the early, open stage of the EC decision-making process, precisely because more can be accurately known of this than of the later, more secretive stages. The discussion of the European Court of Justice, particularly the 'piecemeal development of the law by judicial activism' (p. 49), is of particular interest to a British audience unaccustomed to this style. There is a rather longer section on the EC's internal policies, dealing successively with the common agricultural and fisheries policies, regional policy (but unfortunately not industrial policy), social policy, the free movement of workers, legal aspects of the common market in goods and monetary integration. A rather narrow and subjective definition of the key concept is offered at the start of the common agricultural policy chapter: 'Policies exist because governments believe that they can change circumstances in preferred directions' (p. 54). Governments are not the only formulators of policy, but even if one accepts such a formal view, one must still establish how the policies came into existence and were blocked, bargained or forced through to implementation in a context where there are national governments but no EC government in the usual sense. The notion of a 'policy community', developed from the initial concept of an 'expenditure community' formulated by Heclo and Wildavsky, would be especially appropriate to the European Community decision-making process, because of its elitist-pluralist features. While 'governments' usually play an important part in policy-making, we need to unpack this conglomerate into its constituent parts and see how the various public and private actors make their impact in a number of policy areas. There is scope here for interesting comparisons to be made but this opportunity has not been taken. Nevertheless, a great deal of useful information is assembled and pertinent judgements of a policy-specific nature are made.

Part III of *Institutions and policies*—which takes up nearly two fifths of the book— consists of chapters on the EC and Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the Mediterranean, the United States, Eastern Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China and concluding with the EC's relations with international institutions. This will be the part of the book that will take even specialists over unfamiliar ground. Although some chapters are breathtakingly brief, Ginsberg is allowed more space to deal with the crucial relations between the EC and the United States. He makes very good use of it, showing how the early 'partnership' has

degenerated with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, remarking: 'For the first time since 1945, a US Administration treated the EC as it would a hostile state' (p. 175). Since then protectionist trends on both sides of the Atlantic have increased the tension.

The volume of detailed bibliographies broadly follows the pattern of *Institutions and policies*. However, it opens with a critical review of integration theory by the editor, who also deals with decision-making. She refers to the idea of 'subsidiarity: namely that the EC should deal with questions member states cannot solve alone, while the member states independently deal with issues they can manage best alone' (p. 40). This deceptively simple-sounding concept would have deserved more thorough investigation in the general volume. There are companion guides to reading on most topics, with some unavoidable overlap between the two volumes. Both contain (not identical) lists of abbreviations, which will be gratefully consulted by those who have been overwhelmed by the tidal wave of more or less obscure organizations. Juliet Lodge is to be congratulated on the successful accomplishment of a mammoth task. The results will be invaluable to teachers and students of European Community affairs, as well as helping some of the publics that make up the general public to reconsider their prejudices while not necessarily abandoning either their enthusiasm or their scepticism.

University of Hull J. E. S. HAYWARD

Britain and the EEC. Edited by Roy Jenkins. London: Macmillan. 1983. 249pp. Index. £20.00. Pb.: £7.95.

Britain within the European Community: the way forward. Edited by Ali M. El-Agraa. London: Macmillan. 1983. 356pp. Index. £25.00. Pb.: £8.95.

THE essays in Jenkins's book assess the impact of EC membership on Britain's economic and political institutions and note choices open to Britain in shaping a very fluid organization. The chapters originate in the 1982 meeting of Section F of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

The book opens with pieces by Jenkins and Northedge examining the current and past international environments. The latter concludes that, in the light of the Falklands débâcle, Britain is still afflicted by a schizophrenic inability to decide its place in the world, having joined the EC not 'through conviction of its merits but from a sense of despair about alternatives' (p. 36). This pessimistic analysis is largely shared by other contributors. Marsh depicts the CAP as promising to be 'the explosive which finally wrecks all hope of European unity' (p. 38), and goes on to indicate alternative agricultural policies that could achieve those of the CAP's aims that have not yet been met. He condemns price policy as inequitable and ineffective and calls on policy-makers, in an era of technical change, to explore potential movement of resources between agriculture and other sectors. Ultimately, he advocates reform of the CAP, not its abolition. Tugendhat defends the CAP. Grant makes an interesting study of the impact of EC membership on British industrial performance. Reassessing pro-EC arguments of 1973, he concludes that membership caused substantial intra-industrial reorganization 'with important consequences for productivity' (p. 105), a redirection of trade to the EC and 'no evidence of any benefits being generated' (p. 108). Cripps takes up trade flows in a piece on macroeconomic policy and calls for 'mechanisms for shifting the balance of advantage between countries to accommodate their otherwise incompatible domestic objectives' (p. 130). Wood examines the EMS and Wolf reflects on the problems inherent in the politicization of international economic issues and the EC's unresponsiveness at times *vis-à-vis* GATT. The EC and the Third World are considered by Wall, and Pinder and Morgan conclude the book with reviews of institutional developments. In all, this is a sober look at conventional pro- and anti-marketeer arguments about the impact of EC membership on Britain. Critical (and sometimes negative) as the conclusions may be, Britain's continued membership of a flexible Community is not seriously challenged.

In contrast, the El-Agraa volume strongly condones continued membership of the EC, arguing both that Britain's economic problems are deep-seated and that they have been eased by EC membership. While this book also focuses principally on economic issues (customs union, trade, industrial and competition policy, the CAP, transport, energy, social, monetary, fiscal and regional policies), it also looks at defence, alternatives to EC membership and EC politics and institutions. (The chapter by Pinder on the latter is, in parts, similar in content to that in the Jenkins volume.) The editor also carefully—and rightly—points out the

fact that the EC was proposed for political rather than economic reasons but 'sold' in terms of expected economic gains. He explains the premises behind economic integration and offers an econometric analysis of withdrawal from the EC together with the advantages of staying in the EC. Butt Philip critically appraises the lack of effective industrial and competition policies, arguing that failure to secure a genuine common market may be politically understandable but 'is economic and intellectual lunacy' (p. 143).

Calls for action and reform of the structure of the EC's budget are echoed in the chapters on the true cost of the CAP, EC fiscal policy and EC monetary arrangements. Of its three aims—to explain major areas in which the EC is or will be a key actor; to identify costs and benefits of each policy, notably for the United Kingdom; and to propose feasible ways of altering policies to accommodate the United Kingdom without unduly constraining EC partners—the book achieves the second best and most consistently. It is stimulating and, while it commends itself primarily to economists, deserves to be read by others having expertise in Community matters.

University of Hull JULIET LODGE

Socialism and European unity: the dilemma of the Left in Britain and France. By Michael Newman. London: Junction. 1983. (Distrib. by Hurst.) 292 pp. Index. Pb.: £6.95.

THIS book is described on its cover as 'an important piece of historiography', and for once the blurb-writer's claim is justified. Remarkably comprehensive, superbly written, very well organized and beautifully produced, it is one of the most useful works of contemporary history to be published over the past decade. For those who wish to understand how the attitude of Her Majesty's Opposition towards the EEC came to be what it is, I can think of no better guide. It should prove equally indispensable for those concerned with the 'European' outlook of the present French government or with the views of the French Left as a whole.

The book is in two almost equal parts, each followed by a useful summary. Although the first is concerned with the Left in France and the second with the Left in Britain, cross-references abound, while the reflective concluding chapter performs the functions of synopsis and synthesis admirably. Inevitably some of part one traverses part of the ground recently covered by the Oxford historian R. W. Johnson, whose *The long march of the French Left* was reviewed in the Autumn 1981 issue of *International Affairs;* but Dr Newman spends a considerable time on the Fourth Republic, exclusively on the Left's attitude towards West European unity. In part two the book gains to some extent by virtue of the nakedness of the surrounding land: in giving some share of attention to the 'European' attitude of almost every strand in the British Left, his book is virtually unique.

Throughout, the 'dilemma' referred to in the title turns out to have more than one form. Principally the author seeks to explain why Attlee's Labourites and Blum's Socialists have had such persistently differing views on European internationalism; why, in effect, the clashes between Foot and Cheysson in 1981 so closely resembled those between Blum and Dalton forty years before. The examination is careful and thorough; even so, I think that the role of such diverse Labourites as Lord Shinwell and Stephen Swingler is considerably underrated. (The former's 'I have nothing *against* the Common Market; I wish merely to have nothing whatever to do with it' carried, I recall, carried considerable weight at Annual Party Conferences at the time). By contrast, the role of such relatively neglected figures as William Warbey is given some prominence, but not, however, that phrase of his which most aptly sums up the attitude of much of the British Left at the end of the Macmillan era: 'No surrender of national sovereignty, except to the United Nations'; this is unaccountably omitted.

The 'dilemma' which confronted, and still confronts, the French Communist Party is given equally full treatment. In the eyes of a party which is stridently nationalist as well as ostensibly Marxist, the EEC may well represent the last stand of European capitalism, but may also have some temporary use in preventing the living standards of French workers from falling too far.

Because the book is primarily a work of historical rather than political analysis, the kind of theoretical groundwork which, by associating 'common ownership' with the people rather than the state, links socialism with internationalism, is missing, and some will regret this. There are, too, a few blemishes. Barbara Castle's influential *New Statesman* article of 30 March 1962

is wrongly titled as well as misdated (pp. 170, 198); the Labour MP mentioned in a footnote on p.200 should have been S. O. Davies; and a well-known book of Donald Watt's is wrongly named on p. 153. But the narrative is accurate throughout and the comments fair. This book is essential reading for students of both British and French politics, and can be warmly recommended to all interested in the subject.

Polytechnic of North London BRIAN THOMAS

Policy styles in Western Europe. Edited by Jeremy Richardson. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 209 pp. Index. £15.00.

THE concept of 'policy style' is not easy, and is—like many of the central concepts in political science—open to criticism as too broad and too open to misunderstanding. 'Policy styles', as defined here, are 'different systems of decision-making, different procedures for making societal decisions' (p. 2), which are characteristic of particular political systems. The contributors intend to direct our attention towards the conventionalization of policy-making in different European countries, organized within sectors (health care, education, economic policy, for example) in which governmental bureaucracies bargain with the organized interests concerned.

With different emphases in each chapter—the countries covered include West Germany, Norway, Britain, France, Sweden and the Netherlands—the authors conclude that there has been a general trend towards the incorporation of representative groups into policy-making in Europe since the Second World War, which had indeed been evident earlier than that in a number of countries; that this trend reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, in the shared management of gradually increasing resources within expanding economies; that it was limited, in different ways in different countries, by the willingness of the state authorities to impose policies on representative groups when necessary, by the expectations and values of the governmental and non-governmental participants within each sector, and by the intervention of outside groups into such established systems, giving rise to 'unconventional participation'—parliamentary or, often, extra-parliamentary—until the interests and values of the new groups could successfully be accommodated. In the late 1970s and 1980s the shortage of resources to distribute, the increasing clamour of groups to influence and reshape policy, and the technical complexity and range of the issues to be faced, have led to 'overload' on governments and have forced them to reconsider their acceptance of this corporate approach to policy-making.

This is not an easy book. Its language is technical, its chapters compressed, drawing on and summarizing a mass of academic studies on policy-making and public administration in Western Europe. This makes it, however, an excellent volume for the interested outsider who wants to catch up on recent trends in policy studies; the text is well referenced, and theoretical works and case-studies are briefly discussed in chapter after chapter.

Two criticisms, however, apply. First, the absence of a chapter on Italy is regrettable; we have policy-making in Northern Europe, without the distinctive constraints and values of the Mediterranean style. Secondly—and much more seriously—the framework of the volume is determinedly domestic. The concluding chapter discusses 'convergent policy styles' without mentioning the question of economic interdependence, and the uninformed reader would remain unaware that four of the six countries are members of the European Economic Community. Twenty years ago Theodore Lowi, whose approach to the policy-making process has influenced so much writing on policy studies, was already discussing the awkward overlap between domestic policy management and international interdependence. Why have so few political scientists followed him in this?

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

France in the troubled world economy. Edited by Stephen S. Cohen and Peter A. Gourevitch. London, Boston: Butterworths. 1982. 190 pp. Index.

THIS is an American book written for an American audience—but it deserves to be read in Europe as well. Its contributors are all North American academics with particular interests in French public policy and the French economy, who initially prepared their papers for

discussion at conferences in the United States in the course of 1980. The chapters reflect a constructive dialogue among the different authors, and the outcome is a valuable collective work which assembles a range of expertise around a central theme.

The time-span covered coincides with that of the Giscard Presidency, with the main emphasis on the Barre premiership and the pursuit of 'advanced liberalism' between 1976 and 1981: 'a liberalisation of sorts' (p. 73) which did not disturb the underlying structure of a state-led national economy. The theme is of 'industrial adjustment' in the wake of the oil shocks of 1974; with a subordinate counter-theme in the confused response of the political and trade union opposition to that crisis, the 'crushing defeat of the left' in March 1978 and 'the unparalleled opportunity provided by the dissolution of the Union of the Left in 1978' to implement an 'austerity policy in a way which hits labor especially hard' (p. 66). The authors, like many others, were clearly surprised by the Mitterrand victory of May 1981; a brief postscript notes 'the narrow space' within which the Socialist government had to manoeuvre (p. 180), and the underlying continuities of structure and approach which lay behind the sharp initial changes of policy.

There are a number of irritating features about the American orientation of this volume. The early chapters pay almost as much attention to the American debate on economic management as to the French, and rely much more heavily on American than on French sources. Thankfully, the authors' grasp of French economic policy takes them thereafter beyond generalizations into specific sectoral studies.

The contributors are generally sceptical about Giscardien economic strategy: its concentration on the softer option of Third World markets, where political influence can help economic competitiveness; its parallel concentration on military and civil capital goods, where price may be less of a central factor, and government-to-government relations may be crucial; its obsession with economic independence, leading successive administrations to impose additional costs on the domestic economy (as in oil policy) without any apparent long-term return.

Sadly, there is little in the volume on the shift in industrial strategy to the 'télématique' and 'informatique' sectors; one wonders if the conclusions reached from examining automobiles, aerospace, armaments and nuclear power would have carried across the fields of civil and military electronics. Nor (except in the chapter on agriculture) is there much about the European Community dimension, or about the French obsession with 'Modell Deutschland' and the threat of German economic and industrial dominance.

The contributors are unimpressed by *Giscardien* 'advanced liberalism', on several counts. They agree that it did not attempt to prise open 'the closed communities of the financial and industrial system' (p. 72). Its aim was, rather, to use state power more effectively to modernize the French economy and to equip French industry to compete in an increasingly difficult international environment. From this perspective, the policy of the Mitterrand administration looks more like an evolution from that of its predecessors than a sharp break. Two years later I doubt if many of the authors would wish to alter their analysis, or their sceptical conclusions, radically.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

USSR and Eastern Europe

The Soviet budget. By Raymond Hutchings. London: Macmillan. 1983. 204pp. Index. £25.00.

THIS book presents the results of an intense and persistent research effort on a vitally important subject. One major part of the study is an assessment and account, based on Soviet and Western literature and on Hutchings's original research, of the place of the Soviet budget in the country's economic and financial system; of its structure, composition, presentation and implementation; and of the relevant legislative provisions. The second major part includes a meticulously established numerical record, and Hutchings's analysis, of the evolution through the years 1945–81 of total (budgeted and actual) receipts and expenditure, and of the two main components of receipts (turnover taxes and deductions from profits) and the three main

components of expenditure (finance of the national economy, social and cultural measures and defence appropriation).

The method adopted by the author of establishing long series of budgetary totals and details for the second main part of his study has its strength and its limitations: he accepts budget figures 'as true in the first instance'; considers the budget as 'an integrated whole'; and maintains that 'study of a quantitative series stretching over a series of years will reveal more than study of a single year'. By relying on this method of fact-finding and analysis he has made a valid contribution to research into, and the understanding of, the Soviet budget as the principal financial instrument for sustaining the country's economic and military effort. Hutchings developed the analysis of the budgetary item 'finance of national economy' into an analysis of expenditure from all sources of finance (also including enterprise own funds, bank credit, and subsidies), with relevant detail of both total expenditure and investment expenditure for industry and other main sectors of the economy. His analysis of the budgetary item 'defence', in turn, demonstrates that decisions concerning Soviet defence spending are taken within the overall budgetary framework—even if totals and details of such spending are surrounded by official secrecy: the item 'defence' in the budget in the years 1969–81 appears to have covered one practically unchanged part only of total defence expenditure while dynamic elements of defence spending seem to have been included in expanding unpublished residual items—primarily under the heading 'finance of national economy'.

This short study, in spite of limitations inherent in the author's method and sometimes awkward wordings or presentation of statistics, is a rich store of authentic information on Soviet budgetary history and practice. The first major part is a useful compendium, summing up and assessing legislative and literary sources from an institutional angle, and the second, complementary to the compendium, can be considered by itself as an important starting point for further research into the workings of the Soviet budgetary system, its integration into annual and five-year plans, and its impact on economic development, social progress, and military capacities.

St Antony's College, Oxford RUDOLF NÖTEL

Managing change in the USSR: the politico-legal role of the Soviet jurist. The Goodhart Lectures 1982. By John N. Hazard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. 182pp. Index. £17.50.

WESTERN specialists on Soviet law always have been aware that Soviet jurists have a significant and sometimes important role in the formulation and execution of Soviet policies. Whether one understands Lenin to have said that law writ large or legislation writ small is policy or is politics, law in all its senses becomes simultaneously a medium for formulating, expressing, approving, and executing policy, a product of the political process, a mechanism for social change, and a standard against which legality is measured. The numbers of Soviet jurists are believed to have doubled during the past decade, and still supply falls well short of demand. Indications are substantial that the Soviet leadership increasingly recognizes the need for individuals skilled in managing rules, processes, and institutions, and not solely those who are technically trained.

These concerns are implicit in much of what John Hazard has to say in these lectures, devoted to what he believes the informed lawyer would wish to know about recent trends in the Soviet legal system, or for that matter, what Professor Goodhart would have liked to know were he being briefed today. The result is a very readable set of twelve essays in lecture style exploring major developments and events and distilling the learning and lore from five decades of involvement in Soviet legal studies since enrolling at the Moscow Juridical Institute in 1934. Now he believes the Soviet leadership is 'haunted by the spectre of unmanageable change' but well aware of their problems, chief among which are a frustrating bureaucracy, corruption, rising economic demands and expectations, resentment against constraints or contacts with foreigners, lax labour discipline and conflicts with other communist countries.

The lectures detail these reflections, giving some attention to the international legal system and to the relevance of the Soviet legal model for Third World countries, but dwelling upon the traditional areas of legal regulation: property, copyright and patent, economic law, crime, civil rights, tort and family law, among others. In all these areas, which affect the daily lives

of every Soviet citizen, law is a key to the development and to the implementation of party and state policy. Students of Soviet politics and international relations will find much to savour in this very readable volume. A legal system represents both what is preached and what is practised in a given society, and Hazard demonstrates why a command of the legal system is absolutely essential for anyone who presumes to proficiency in Soviet affairs. Under the post-Brezhnev leadership law and lawyers are being emphatically reinforced as indispensable elements of socio-economic and cultural policy.

University of London W. E. BUTLER

Soviet foreign policy 1930–33: the impact of the depression. By Jonathan Haslam. London: Macmillan. 1983. 172pp. Index. £25.00.

THE period 1930–3 was an important one for Soviet foreign policy. Stalin needed peace to push through the massive economic and social revolution of industrialization and collectivization; but the world depression, however flattering to his view of capitalism, appeared to threaten another bout of Western intervention and imposed formidable tasks on Soviet diplomacy. The theme is certainly worth a book.

Jonathan Haslam's monograph throws important new light on the period. Soviet dumping, for example, essential in the circumstances of the depression to support the vast foreign exchange burden of the first five-year plan, provoked widespread anger abroad; and it took the threat of closing the Soviet market to imports to put paid to several proposed counter-measures. Then, too, Soviet economic and military responses to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, itself resulting from the pressures and the opportunities created by the depression, put immense strain both on the five-year plan and on the pursuit of peace in Europe.

Haslam's scrupulous combing of a very wide range of Soviet and other sources also reveals much that is new on the internal debate on foreign policy. There was apparently more disagreement than is generally thought over interpretations of German developments. Khinchuk, the Soviet *polpred* in Berlin, for instance, was only one of the voices warning—vainly—against the danger from Hitler's rising Nazi party. Haslam's analysis of Litvinov's accession as Foreign Commissar and of the 'unmistakable imprint' (p. 19) he placed on Soviet diplomacy in a situation where Stalin was both realist and drifter is particularly valuable.

On the whole, however, the book is a trifle disappointing. The dust-jacket presents it as the first in a trilogy, the preface as the first of four volumes. More serious perhaps is the difference between the title, which takes Soviet policy to 1933, and the content, which takes it only to the end of 1932. In fact, the end of 1933 would have been a more natural division; and the premature break undoubtedly adds to the eclectic character of the entire volume. It is an interesting series of chapters on aspects of Soviet policy. Its roughly 50,000 words of text are also a little dear at £25 and, though often dramatic, they never establish the depression as quite so important for Soviet foreign policy as they seem to claim—which is as well, since it was not.

University of Glasgow WILLIAM V. WALLACE

The Soviet Union and the Third World: an economic bind. By Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier. New York: Praeger. 1983. 188pp. Index. $21.95.

THIS interesting book traces the development of Soviet attitudes towards the economic policies of the Third World and Soviet economic relations with the Third World in the post-Stalin era. Its major strength is that it is based on a detailed knowledge of the work of scholars in Soviet academic institutes and research centres specializing in area studies. As a result Professor Valkenier has been able to identify different schools of thought in Soviet academic and official circles which she has utilized to analyse changes in more public Soviet official policy statements.

A long-term Soviet policy (traced here back to 1952) is the export of Soviet machinery and capital goods for repayment by raw materials. This policy, politically orientated under Khrushchev, evolved to embody a more commerical strategy under Kosygin and Brezhnev.

Soviet policy in the Khrushchev era was still influenced by Stalin's concept of two separate world markets. Economic backwardness as attributed to imperialist exploitation, and Soviet development policy proposed that Third World countries should distance themselves from the West and capitalist institutions by nationalizing the means of production and embracing planning and rapid industrialization, and establishing economic relations with the Soviet Union. Consequently Soviet trade relations were predominantly concentrated on a small number of states that displayed an anti-Western bias. As these countries were basically resource-poor, trade and aid were effectively inseparable with the Soviet Union supplying capital for prestige projects, to be repaid in local currencies or traditional exports over long periods and at low interest rates.

The failure of Khrushchev's policies to bring economic benefits to either partner was politically counterproductive and Soviet policy has evolved towards a global approach emphasizing economic interdependence between the East, the West and the South. Greater emphasis is placed on balanced growth and attention is placed on specific retarding factors in individual countries. The need for Western financial and physical capital is recognized and trade with the West encouraged. Soviet trade has entered a more commercial phase with the espousal of viable co-operation ventures which involve the delivery of Soviet capital goods to be repaid by deliveries of scarce raw materials.

This policy has encountered economic obstacles. Resource-rich countries with the ability to earn hard currency have not favoured bilateral deals and the growth of Soviet exports has been largely confined to arms sales, while the sheer scale of poverty in high-population, resource-poor countries is beyond the scale of Soviet assistance.

Professor Valkenier provides an important and penetrating analysis of changes in Soviet perceptions and the emergence of realistic analyses of the problems encountered by Soviet policies. My only reservation, albeit a personal one, is that she attributes (p. 97) to the contributors to Peter Wiles' study of the New Communist Third World conclusions that are the opposite of those they actually reached.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London ALAN SMITH

Soviet strategy in Latin America. By Robert Leiken. New York: Praeger for Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. 1982. 124pp. (Washington Papers No. 93.)

IN the space of a mere 102 pages, Robert Leiken aims to set Soviet strategy in Latin America within the context of both Soviet Third World policy and what he sees as Soviet global strategy. He also describes the emergence of Latin America from the 'hegemonic presumption' of the US into a period of resurgent popular nationalism, a mood which has provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to penetrate Latin America, using Cuba as proxy. Leiken concentrates on Soviet policy in Central America and the Caribbean, making only brief forays into the rest of Latin America. This is an ambitious project and it is not entirely successful. Although Leiken collects an impressive array of facts, he works so hard to fit them into his idea of a Soviet 'hegemonic presumption' that his interpretations sometimes seem strained or contradictory.

The author believes that Soviet intervention in Angola marked a new global strategic offensive. This offensive was extended to Latin America in 1979, when the situation in Central America created propitious circumstances for Soviet penetration. By that time Cuba had turned into a docile Soviet dependency, enabling the Soviet Union to use it to promote the new global offensive. The extent to which this offensive resembles Cuban tactics of the 1960s is glossed over. In the southern cone of Latin America tactics of peaceful transformation are still encouraged, but elsewhere armed struggle is fostered cautiously, with Cuba as intermediary. Leiken maintains that 'the Soviets move cautiously in Latin America, out of cunning, not restraint' (pp. 41–2). Although he ascribes much cunning and a truly global vision to the Soviet Union, he also catalogues a series of diplomatic and revolutionary failures in a number of Latin American countries. Moreover, he implies that Cuban dependency is an unmixed blessing to the Soviet Union, dismissing the view that Moscow is unwilling, 'especially with its current economic difficulties, to assume the burden of another Cuba' (p.87). Military aid, it seems, is less costly than economic aid, which plays no part in the new Soviet strategy.

Leiken is convincing when he recognizes the genuine economic and political hardships which have turned so much of Central and Latin America into societies urgently requiring reform. He is less persuasive in the ubiquitousness with which he endows the hand of Moscow. He correctly perceives Soviet failures to be caused by infringements of domestic sovereignty and advises against a similar American error: 'The United States must recognize once again the strategic imperative of a Good Neighbor policy' (p. 103). Prophetically, while giving no credence to the tourism needs to be fulfilled by the Cuban built Grenadian airport, he warns that 'Grenada is hardly the source of the Caribbean security problem, and making a major issue over the airport will not help the United States in a region where economic problems are so widespread and profound' (p.69).

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

Communist nations' military assistance. Edited by John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 201pp. Index.

WITHOUT question, studies of the military assistance provided by communist nations are greatly needed. The entire subject has not been given the attention it requires. This symposium, which devotes chapters to the military assistance of Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and the Soviet Union (two chapters), plus an initial 'overview' and a conclusion, must therefore be welcomed. It covers a great deal of ground and in general is well documented.

The book's more original sections are those which deal with the activities of China and with the lesser communist powers. Their widespread activites add up to a good deal more than is often supposed. A serious attempt is made to expound the ideological or philosophical basis of arms sales by countries such as North Korea and Vietnam. An interesting section explains why Cuba is such an important force in Third World military affairs.

The chapter on Soviet aid to Eastern Europe provides a surprisingly large amount of information, but Kanet's chapter on Soviet military aid to the Third World is somewhat less satisfactory. He baldly announces that 'the major purposes of Soviet arms assistance and sales have been political' (p. 51); even if that is the case, a research study ought to reach such an important conclusion as the outcome of evidence and argument, and moreover it clashes with the judgement that 'arms exports to Third World countries have become an important source of hard currency for the USSR and that arms exports now play a major role in covering deficits in the USSR's balance of payments' (p. 60). And there is other evidence too—relating to the sequence over time of Soviet arms exports to the Third World—which places in question any presumption of an overwhelmingly political framework of decision. Kanet alludes briefly to this (p. 60), but reaches only the weak conclusion that 'it is conceivable' that the economic factor comes increasingly into consideration.

The lack of any overall quantification of Soviet annual deliveries of arms to the Third World before 1966 (Table 3.1, p. 45; see also other tables in this chapter), has to be noted, and must have handicapped the exploration of motivation *inter alia*. If there are no CIA published data for before 1966, surely recourse should and could have been had (even with any desired qualification) to estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The book does not contain any diagrams, maps, or other kinds of visual display, and any mathematical apparatus, other than simple tables, is also lacking. It cannot be ruled out that such exercises could have made a contribution to the analysis. In short, though on the whole a competent catalogue of the facts, and certainly a valuable addition to the literature, particularly in the directions mentioned above, the study is not invariably convincing in method or presentation. The consequence is that one is left with some reservations as to the reliability of the assessment.

RAYMOND HUTCHINGS

The planned economies of Eastern Europe. By Alan H. Smith. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 249pp. Index. £16.95.

THE study of East European economic systems and their performance has traditionally received less attention than that of the Soviet economy, general interest tends to increase only

in a period of major crisis such as the present Polish drama. The present book, which will be read by specialists as well as the general public, constitutes a valuable contribution which might somewhat reduce this imbalance.

The purpose of the book is to examine how the Soviet system was adapted to the varying conditions of the East European communist countries upon and since its implantation there after the Second World War. Special attention is paid to the issues of domestic consumer equilibrium and external relations (both intra-Comecon and East–West). Accordingly, the text is divided into three parts. Part one outlines the essential principles of the Stalinist model and discusses its modifications developed as a consequence of East European economic reforms. It also deals with some of the systemic causes of resistance to production innovation and with attempts at their removal. Part two addresses the subjects of banking, money, consumer equilibrium, macroeconomic equilibrium, wages pressure and inflation. Part three concentrates on international economic relations, discussing the foreign trade system of the communist countries and its effect on Comecon integration and East–West trade relations. It also contains chapters analysing the theory and disastrous outcome of the strategies of import-led growth pursued, mainly by Poland and Romania in the 1970s. Finally, there is a chapter discussing the impact of the energy price rise on East European domestic and external performance.

Alan Smith's strength lies in his authoritative grasp of the theory of communist economic systems and in his ability to give a whole host of lucid insights into their functioning and adaptation to internal and external change. The most important feature of the communist systems is the abandonment of active monetary relations and the adoption of a system of plan directives, and in this book, the behaviour and functioning of the East European economic systems are compared with those of the market-based Western systems. This is done with the greatest benefit in respect to the subjects of innovation, micro- and macroeconomic equilibria, inflation, adjustment to changing terms of trade, international regional integration, technology transfer and other issues. In doing so, Smith brings to the fore the results of recent research and an essential account of all major controversies on the subjects under scrutiny; the latter quality makes this book a good introductory reading or a textbook for people wishing to study a given problem at greater depth. Finally, this work also has considerable value as a source of information, especially the final chapters dealing with Comecon integration, East–West relations, the energy crisis and the problems faced by Poland and Romania.

St Antony's College, Oxford V. SOBELL

The People's Republics of Eastern Europe. By Jürgen Tampke. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 178pp. Index. £14.95.

THE author's aim—to incorporate historical evidence from both East and West to come to a better understanding of the contemporary situation in Eastern Europe—is a noble one. Eastern Europe has often had unsympathetic treatment at the hands of historians who have concentrated on justifying a political point. Parts of the book summarize facts and figures otherwise collected only in dry statistical yearbooks. But while promising a broader vision of Eastern Europe, the author disappoints by producing a work of at times quite astonishingly narrow perspective.

Establishing at the start the interesting (if, on the evidence, dubious) proposition that the Red Army had less to do with the coming to power of communist-dominated regimes in Eastern Europe than 'many historians' maintain, the book then closes its eyes almost entirely to the Soviet factor in the development of Eastern Europe. That omission alone would explain the book's failure to grasp the politics of the region. Long on the content of five-year plans, but very short on analysis, it describes, for example, the fusion of the Social Democratic and Communist parties in East Germany as a 'commendable step' and leaves it at that. Collectivization of agriculture in Eastern Europe merely 'proved difficult'.

More worrying than the superficial is the misleading. The author is correct in his observation that there was brutality on both sides during the Hungarian uprising in 1956. But asking his readers to think what the response of a Western government might be to such an insurrection begs the question he studiedly fails to address throughout the book: the question of government and, above all, party legitimacy in Eastern Europe. This omission is most glaring in the chapter on Poland. The Polish government, it is claimed, 'leaned over

backwards to come to an all-round agreement' in the crisis which began in 1980. Solidarity, we are told in a brief mention, was not a force for moving Poland to 'progressive socialism'. The first statement is breathtakingly naïve; the second largely irrelevant in the Polish context of 1980. Solidarity was not a band of angels, it was a spontaneous and broadly-based popular movement forced to cope with a Soviet veto, a government that had itself lost the confidence of its people, a criminally mismanaged economy, and a Communist Party collapsing inwards, largely of its own accord. None of these issues is raised anywhere in this book.

What the book leaves out, therefore, tells more of the history of Eastern Europe than what it leaves in. The result is a bland restatement of some known information and a failure to capture any of the vitality of the individual East European states. The irritating habit of quoting large chunks from other secondary sources on Eastern Europe adds to the air of staleness. Contrary to the author's sweeping assertion, there is much good scholarship on Eastern Europe, which does grapple fairly with the difficult issues blithely ignored in this book.

EDWINA MORETON

Revolution gegen Jalta: Friedens- Arbeiter- und Völkerkampf. Die ungelöste nationale und soziale Frage in Osteuropa. By Wolfgang Strauss. Berg am See: Vowinckel. 1982. 211pp. DM 24.80.

THE author of this book is an *Ausland*-German born in Liepaja (Libava) who in 1940 witnessed the Soviet military occupation of Latvia and its 'incorporation' into the Soviet Union. At the same time Stalin—with Hitler's permit in his pocket—grabbed Estonia and Lithuania. While Soviet security detachments were deporting eastwards some 151,000 Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian patriots, the German consular authorities were transporting 189,000 Baltic Germans to the western Polish provinces newly annexed to the *Grossdeutschland*—and Wolfgang Strauss was one of them. After the war he remained in the Soviet occupation zone, was arrested there in 1949, sentenced to fifty years' forced labour, and deported to Workuta in northern Russia. In 1956 the Soviet authorities sent him back to East Germany, but soon afterwards he escaped to the Federal Republic, and subsequently started writing about his experiences; this book is the sixth in a series.

Strauss, as a German patriot, has at heart the idea of a reunited Germany—but not as an outcome of a third world war! He recognizes that such a war would be a nuclear one and its only consequence would be a 'thermonuclear holocaust from California to Kamchatka' (p. 192). He is, however, convinced that the destruction of the existing *Roterkolonialimperium* remains a precondition of the dismantling of the Yalta system, and the question obviously arises as to whether this is a credible proposition.

Strauss is in no doubt about this. His book is a diagnosis of Soviet power's health, and his judgement, if sound, should disturb the Kremlin. He claims that both in the people's democracies and among the peoples of the Soviet Union Marxism–Leninism is a spent force, and that the majority of these peoples are eager for change. In Soviet industrial areas strikes are frequent and sometimes accompanied by demands for free trade unions. The writer reminds us, too, that the notion of 'Soviet people' is meaningless, for half of the 270 million inhabitants of the Soviet Union are not Russians; that the non-Russian half is composed of more than fifty nationalities deprived of sovereignty; and that 55 million people of Turkic race and Islamic faith have a higher natural rate of increase than the Russians.

All these factors contribute to the growing crisis within the Soviet bloc, the self-destruction of which would create a situation in which a series of national, free and sovereign republics could become parts of a free Europe. The author suggests no timetable for such events. Everything he dreams about could come about but that kind of transformation can take many decades. The Soviet empire may be rotten, but it was victorious in 1945. The critical years for its survival will begin when the generation of 1939–45 has passed away.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

Middle East

Shifting sands: the British in Saudi Arabia. By David Ledger. London: Peninsular. 1983. 232pp. Index. £13.95.

DAVID LEDGER here uncovers part of the ugly story of the Labour government's abandonment of Aden Federation, Britain's ally. A serving officer, he has loyally avoided direct criticism of his former chiefs, but in simple quotations from the participants he devastates the political chicanery of those mainly responsible. Today it is difficult to comprehend the readiness of certain Labour politicians to play into Nasser's hands out of an affection not shared by those suffering under his oppressive regime in Egypt itself, or their vehement dislike of the treaty chiefs whom they (incorrectly) called 'feudal sultans'. The present reviewer was in South Arabia for most of 1964 and can confirm that late in the year when Labour came to office, security was good, the NLF a tiny minority, Asnag fighting for political survival (p. 61); but the new government, as Ledger says, took the road to ruin 'with scarcely a backward glance'.

Anthony Greenwood, who was in contact with the TUC leader, 'Abdullah Asnag, for some time, saw the issue not as between Egypt and Britain (Nasser wanted Aden) but between Asnag's blue collar socialists and reactionary Federal rulers. 'The harsh realities of power politics were not his *métier*', Ledger mildly comments. Greenwood's first major error was to sack Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, architect of the Federation and highly experienced in Arabian politics—it is said under Asnag's persuasion. Trevaskis had previously and over a considerable period been engaged in conversation with Asnag, who seems, however, to have been party to his attempted assassination in December 1963. The reviewer is convinced (not from Ledger's account alone) that the culprit was Khalifa (whom he met in San'a' in 1969). Yet 'a posse of Labour members of Parliament descended on South Arabia. They made it quite clear that they had not come to sympathise with those injured by the bomb [two bystanders were killed] but to bring succour to those detained after it' (p. 52). After Labour came to power Greenwood 'as a gesture of goodwill released Khalifa from detention' (p. 59).

'At a moment when the militants were in disarray and the fortunes of their Egyptian sponsors were at their lowest ebb' (p. 67) due to sweeping Royalist victories, Labour announced its decision to abandon Aden. Lord Beswick arrived to announce the withdrawal and 'Nasser let out a cry of joy, proclaimed his intention of staying on in the Yemen' to liberate South Arabia 'and reversed his plans to withdraw'. Sultan Salih told Beswick, 'It is said that the reason for the British Government's decision is economy. You must understand that you are economising at the expense and lives of other people' (p. 9). His prophecy came sadly true—many thousands were murdered, tortured or exiled.

The height of Labour's wilful folly was Lord Caradon's call for a UN mission 'to facilitate South Arabia's advance to independence'. This mission, so biased as to make failure inevitable, left behind it a tension the reviewer recalls vividly. A head had to roll to pay for the British government's blunder in accepting it, and the second High Commissioner, though entirely blameless, was sacked.

Ledger's highly informative personal account of faithlessness and tragedy makes bitter but essential reading.

R. B. SERJEANT

Imperialism and nationalism in the Middle East: the Anglo–Egyptian experience 1882–1982. Edited by Keith Wilson. London: Mansell. 1983. 172pp. Index. £14.50.

THESE eight papers come from a Leeds University symposium commemorating the centenary of Britain's occupation of Egypt. Six are by British scholars, four of whom teach at Leeds, and two are by Israelis. They vary widely in subject matter, but all are written very much more from a British standpoint than an Egyptian one.

A prominent feature of the contributions is a tendency to devalue the idea of 'the jugular vein of Empire' as a sufficient explanation for Britain's prolonged presence in Egypt. In addition, the Islamic dimension—the implications, real or fancied, that Christian control of this central Muslim land might have for imperial interests elsewhere—is emphasized by several contributors, most notably in David Steele's 'Britain and Egypt 1882–1914'. It is a feature of the Anglo–Egyptian relationship that might advantageously have been summarized

in a preliminary essay. The disparate contents need pulling together, and the three-page introduction, 'Myths and realities' seems perfunctory and inadequate.

The editor, in 'Constantinople or Cairo: Lord Salisbury and the partition of the Ottoman Empire 1886–1897', challenges the idea that the occupation speedily or decisively modified British thinking about the importance of denying Russia control of the Straits. But is that view still held as generally as he implies? Richard Whiting's 'The Suez Canal and the British economy 1918–1960' shows how by the 1930s 'the Canal was becoming as much a channel for competitive forces from elsewhere as it was a means of indirect protection' (p. 83). Oded Eran's survey of Anglo–Egyptian negotiations between the two wars, and Eran Lerman's analysis of 'The antecedents of the British offer to evacuate, 7 May 1946' (which incidentally reveals that the British Embassy contributed an annual £2,000 to help the Egyptian Premier settle his gambling debts), both criticize British policy-makers for their readiness to believe that protection of vital imperial interests could be obtained without some measure of intervention in Egypt's internal affairs. Eran's references to Milner's 'lack of will to face consequences' and a 'weakened resolution to invest in defending the Empire' are reminiscent of the doctrines of Professor Kedourie, whose six pages on 'Egypt, the Arab states and the Suez expedition, 1956' take a bird's-eye view of subsequent rulers' attempts to repeat Muhammad Ali's short-lived achievement of establishing a regional predominance—an aspiration facilitated (we are once more reminded) in its later stages by the ineptitudes of British policy but meeting its nemesis in 1967. Other papers deal with ' "Collusion" and the Suez War' (Geoffrey Warner) and 'The Suez Canal in Western strategy since 1956' (Edward Spiers)—most of this having little to do with 'The Anglo–Egyptian Experience'.

This is a lively and stimulating book, if rather bitty. The proof-reading has been sketchy in places; and it is a pity that none of the papers is by an Egyptian.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

The economics of peacemaking: focus on the Egyptian–Israeli situation. By Ruth Arad, Seev Hirsch and Alfred Tovias. London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre. 1983. 170pp. Index. £20.00.

THIS book, which is extremely variable in levels of analysis, is based on a useful attempt to break free from the war-tension stalemate between Egypt and Israel by linking together American-derived structural analysis of international relations and the economic changes occurring or likely to occur in the two states. Although there are some sections where the analysis of international relations theory reaches a high level (as in pp. 10–20), especially the point which needs to be repeated over and over again of not simply regarding 'politics as external to economics' (p. 20), there is throughout the book an insufficient relationship developed between the theory and the economic structure of Israel and Egypt. It is not merely that there is a tendency to take economic examples from other states, but that there is an insufficient depth of economic analysis of Egypt and Israel throughout the work.

Since all the authors show conscientiousness in their respective sections, it is evident that the failure of the work to match up to its title is largely derived from the way in which the subject has been treated. The book concentrates mainly on international relations theory and developing mathematical formulae to represent all possible permutations of this theory. To treat the subject of the book's title successfully, it would be necessary to reverse the approach. First, the economic bases of each state would need to be established and illustrated in the text and by statistical tables (which in this work are on the whole poorly presented) showing what projections could be made. Secondly, the structural theory would need to derive from this firm economic basis and not, as the authors have tried to make it do, vice versa. The authors could profitably take a look at the economic work of Bela Belassa, where detailed economic analysis forms the basis for reliable generalizations but without constant recourse to theory.

As is well known, President Mubarak of Egypt has constantly stressed that Egypt is an Arab state and has been trying to draw closer to the Arab states and to distance himself from Israel and from the Sadat–Begin agreement. Under these circumstances, one of the most useful sections of this book concerns the part which third parties might play in breaking the Egyptian–Israeli stalemate (see pp. 77–82). An assessment at this stage of the increasing economic and other linkages among the Arab states and how Israel could fit into such an informal Arab economic market would have been very useful as essential contextual

information. Instead, mainly much further on in the volume, information is given on EEC links,GATT's work amongst LDCs and the role of UNCTAD (pp. 89, 118–32).

To conclude, this book makes a game attempt at providing solutions to one of the world's most difficult problems. There are many useful concepts but most of them are not highly developed. The field is still wide open for further analysis of the subject.

M. J. GRIEVE

A land of two peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs. Edited by Paul R. Mendes-Flohr. New York: Oxford University Press. 1983. 314pp. Index. £22.50.

MARTIN BUBER was a philosopher and theologian who throughout his long life insisted on relating thought to action, morality to politics. The writings collected here, admirably linked by the commentary of Paul Mendes-Flohr, a Senior Lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, relate to Buber's long and close involvement with Zionism. They illustrate his constant preoccupation, through more than half a century, with the moral problems facing the Zionists in the pursuit of a political goal.

Buber was not alone in recognizing the moral dilemma; but whereas most of his contemporaries evaded it, arguing that the need of the Jews was so overriding that what Balfour insensitively called the 'desires and prejudices' of the Palestinians could be overlooked, Buber refused to accept a solution based on such rough justice. It was above all humanity which inspired his attitude, which he saw as the only realistic one. If Zion was to be redeemed at all, he insisted, it must in Isaiah's words be 'redeemed with justice'. It would be unrealistic to pursue a righteous goal by unrighteous means.

Buber's opposition to the mainstream of the Zionist movement grew more pronounced as he saw its political leaders adopting more and more openly what he regarded as the fatally wrong means for the achievement of their ends. It was a terrible mistake, Buber said, to try to build the kind of Jewish state that he envisaged under the aegis of an imperialist power and against the resolute opposition of the Palestinian Arabs, since this could only be done by force. He urged his fellow Zionists to use their imagination, 'as if we were the residents of Palestine and the others were the immigrants who were coming into the country in increasing numbers, year by year, taking it away from us. How would we react to events?' (p. 87). The only rational solution, and the only one that could bring peace, was 'that both peoples should together develop the Land without the one imposing his will on the other' (p. 120), and for that there was no reason for either side to be in the majority.

Buber lived to see the ideas which he propounded with such enduring integrity and humanity disregarded by those who gained control of the Zionist movement. Yet until the end of his life in 1965 at the age of 87, he never gave up. What is perhaps the most striking thing about the writings in this collection is their consistency in the face of every conceivable discouragement. He refused to despair, urging only that 'Those with sight must therefore speak the truth more forcefully than ever' (p. 224). The solution which he had always advocated, of a bi-national state in which Jews and Arabs would live in harmony and mutual trust, had been rejected in favour of the militant and exclusive Israel which to Buber was not Zion. On this basis, he wrote towards the end of his life, there could be no peace between the two peoples who must nevertheless learn to live together. Still he did not give up, but urged that 'Today, under such manifoldly aggravated circumstances, the command of the spirit is still to prepare the way for the cooperation of peoples'.

MICHAEL ADAMS

Syria: modern state in an ancient land. By John F. Devlin. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1983. 139pp. Index. £12.95.

Linkage politics in the Middle East: Syria between domestic and external conflict, 1961–1970. By Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov. Boulder, Col.: Westview for Harry S. Truman Research Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 176pp. Index. £16.00.

ALTHOUGH the key importance of Syria to an understanding of the contemporary Middle East should be startlingly obvious, this has scarcely been reflected in the rather pitiful amount of Western literature on the country's history and problems. In the main, Syria has not enjoyed a

good press in the West, particularly in the United States, where its actions seem fated to provoke hostile comment or even armed conflict. The appearance, then, of two books, one by a former analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, the other by an international relations lecturer at the Hebrew University, is to be welcomed as a contribution towards dispelling the prevailing ignorance of the country.

The books operate on quite different levels. John F. Devlin's book is part of the 'Nations of the contemporary Middle East' series which aims to provide succinct, but informed, accounts of the countries of the region. Within the limited space allowed, it examines the emergence of Syria under a number of headings: its history under the Ottomans and the French mandate; its geographical setting; the nature of its people and their culture; the political, social and economic history of the country since independence in 1946; and finally, its foreign relations. As an experienced analyst of the Ba'ath party, Devlin is particularly well equipped to provide a clear explanation of the unique role the movement has played in modern Syrian development. He explains the cruel dilemma of a party which had originally dedicated itself to the ideal of Arab unity when the first tangible attempt to achieve this—the United Arab Republic—turned sour. Nasser's failure to fulfil the role the Ba'athists had cast for him and the heavy-handed Egyptian attitude to the UAR are well related. Devlin is also ableto move on from his earlier study of Ba'athist politics to show how the party has operated since 1970 under the Presidency of Hafez al-Assad. He discusses the important issue of alleged Alawi dominance in Syrian politics, pointing to the elements of strength and weakness in the regime's position. That there is determined opposition to Assad's government is well known; but Devlin is careful to point to the continuing cohesion of army, party and bureaucracy under Assad's direction and to his careful policy of associating Sunnis and Christians with his rule.

Syrian foreign policy, which has to embrace all its contentious neighbours, as well as the Palestinians and the superpowers, is inevitably complex. Here, too, Devlin's book performs a useful service in summarizing Syria's prime foreign policy considerations, notably, of course, 'the Lebanese morass'. His account of how the country came to be involved in Lebanon from 1976 serves as a timely reminder of Syrian perceptions in that conflict. All of this is done in a cool manner refreshingly different from much of the tendentious comment on Syrian affairs. Overall, the book must be judged a successful introduction to its subject.

Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov's book is of a very different order; the author assumes some knowledge of Syrian affairs and an appreciation of contemporary issues in the theory of international relations. He uses Syria in the period from the collapse of the UAR to the accession of Assad to explore the theory of the relationship between internal and external politics—linkage—a topic which has for some time engaged the attention of historians and international relations specialists alike. The author takes as his starting point his conclusion that there are currently two broad categories into which investigations of linkage have fallen. The first, the 'traditionalists' or 'theorists', have accepted the hypothesis that domestic factors have their effect on external policies. The second, the 'quantitative school' has concentrated on establishing data banks to subject the theories of the 'traditionalists' to statistical analysis. What concerns the author is that 'statistical research of the quantitative school has confirmed little or no relationship between internal and external behavior' (p. 14).

The book falls into two parts. The first examines this apparent dichotomy by analysing the literature, providing a critical analysis of the quantitative school and setting out the author's own research method. He has accepted that there is a connection between the two, but seeks to resolve the apparent conflict between theory and empiricism by adding 'historical, qualitative analysis' to the quantitative method (p. 37). It is this position which is explored in the second part of the book through the medium of Syria, chosen because the two schools could not agree on whether Syria's political instability in the 1960s was linked with its foreign policy. Using the model he has constructed, the author provides an interesting demonstration of a method which shows the linkage between internal and external affairs. It is not a book for the novice, but it can certainly be read with profit by anyone interested in the politics, domestic and foreign, of the region.

In their different ways, these two books both add to the store of resources on the contemporary Middle East.

Indiana University at South Bend T. G. FRASER

The shaping of an Arab statesman: Abd al-Hamid Sharaf and the modern Arab world. Edited by Patrick Seale. London: Quartet. 1983. 237pp. £7.95.

THESE fifteen essays by well-known writers on Arab affairs are all impressive in their own way. Whether the result is wholly satisfactory as a memorial to a very unusual Arab is less certain. As a man singularly little concerned about acquiring personal credit, Sharaf himself would have applauded a memorial focussed much less on his own person than on the state of affairs surrounding him. Many readers, however, might have welcomed more personal light on the sadly short life of this man, whose qualities, achievements and rare cast of mind deserve to be much more widely known. In his foreword Patrick Seale gives an admirable biographical summary and assessment, but only much later in the collection does he again receive more than a passing mention.

Roger Owen, Umayya Tukan, Hazem Nuseibeh and Malcolm Kerr record, more or less briefly, aspects of Sharaf's development and thinking, the last two in the light of close personal friendship. But one misses, for instance, an inside assessment of the quarter of his life he spent in the United States, first as the Ambassador of Jordan and then as Permanent Representative to the United Nations, where he was regarded by colleagues from other countries as unquestionably the most impressive of all Arab representatives. And could not something from his own pen—perhaps one of the addresses he gave during his six months as Prime Minister—have been reproduced to illustrate just where the shaping of this Hashemite statesman had led him and his political thought-processes, from his time as an ardent, and evidently republican, Arab Nationalist in the American University of Beirut to his emergence as King Hussein's closest personal adviser?

The essays, divided into three sections, include seven on different aspects of Jordan, three on Palestine and four on current trends in Arab society. It is startling to learn from Rami Khouri that there are more Jordanians pursuing higher education in the Soviet Union and Romania than in the United States and humbling that Britain, despite its historical intimacy with Jordan, does not figure among the six principal host countries at all. Roger Owen gives measured credit to the efforts of Jordan's leaders to grapple with that awkwardly placed country's economic problems. Anything written by Edward Said is magisterial, and here he again forces upon our attention the way in which the Western world has treated the Palestinians as though they were incidental to the problem of Palestine, 'the better to absorb them mutely and anonymously in someone else's scheme' (p. 144). It is always good to hear a front-line figure like Prince Hassan pleading that, in approaching the Palestine question, 'we must understand the need to develop political middle-ground' (p. 154). The Western contributor with the closest long-term involvement in Arab thinking is doubtless Malcolm Kerr, whose recent murder in Beirut was an appalling blow to so much this book stands for. Many Westerners will find his percipient essay on Arab society and the West refreshing, particularly since he represented so strongly an unfashionable belief in 'the essential harmony of Western and Arab-Islamic culture'. So, surely, however clearly he recognized the discordances, did Sharaff; the more people that read this memorial to him, the better for us all.

GLEN BALFOUR-PAUL

Documents on the foreign policy of Israel. Vol. 3: armistice negotiations with the Arab states, December 1948–July 1949. Edited by Yemima Rosenthal. Jerusalem: Israel State Archives. 1983. 2 parts, 758, 229 pp. Index. $69.50.

ISRAEL operates a British-type thirty-year rule to regulate the release of official papers while emulating the admirable American practice of publishing selections of recently declassified documents on foreign policy. In general format the series of *Documents on the foreign policy of Israel* is very similar to *The foreign relations of the United States* and in some ways even surpasses it. The series is edited by a small team of professional historians who have complete discretion with regard to the choice of documents to be published and editorial policy in general. Israel's Foreign Ministry was set up while the country was engaged in a prolonged and exhausting war against the invading Arab armies—a situation not conducive to the writing of reflective memoranda or to orderly filing. The editors have however coped very resourcefully with the manifold problems facing them and have maintained throughout their work the highest possible professional standards. The result is a series which throws a great deal of new light on the diplomacy of the fledgling state of Israel and is of immense value to students of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

This particular volume covers a single subject—the negotiations which led to the signing of armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria in 1949. Chronologically, therefore, it overlaps with volumes 2 and 4. Its editor, Yemima Rosenthal, provides a clear and helpful introduction and useful editorial notes. Most of the documents published in this volume were selected from the Foreign Ministry files, complemented by some documents from the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives and some tantalizingly brief editorial references to Cabinet discussions and decisions. Apart from the exchanges between the Israeli delegations which conducted the negotiations on the one hand and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army General Staff in Tel Aviv on the other, the selection includes memoranda, records of discussions and working papers of the UN Acting Mediator, Dr Ralph Bunch.

Like other volumes in the series, this one is accompanied by an English companion volume which includes translations of the introductory material and of the entire annotation, as well as extensive English summaries of the Hebrew documents and an English index. As a matter of editorial policy, all documents are published in the original language but a surprisingly high proportion in the early volumes, about 80 per cent, are in English. Among the most prolific contributors to this volume is Dr Walter Eytan, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry who headed the Israeli delegation to the armistice talks with Egypt, directed others from his headquarters and participated in some of the crucial behind-the-scenes meetings with King Abdullah which led to the conclusion of the formal Israel–Jordan armistice agreement in Rhodes. A former Oxford don, Eytan was much more eloquent in English than in Hebrew and his detailed reports to Foreign Minister Sharett add a great deal by way of literary grace and lively personal commentary to the all-too-frequently turgid style of international diplomacy.

Eytan's reports are particularly interesting for the light they throw on the differences of opinion between the diplomats and the soldiers who represented Israel in the armistice talks with its Arab neighbours. Whereas the diplomats accorded the highest priority to the development of peaceful relations with the Arabs, the soldiers were preoccupied with Israel's immediate security requirements and were consequently reluctant to make even minor concessions. With Sharett's help, the diplomats usually succeeded in obtaining from the Cabinet sufficient flexibility to ensure the success of the talks, and the rivalry between the two incipient schools of thought was in any case nowhere as acute at this stage as it was to become only three or four years later. But it is one of the many merits of this volume that it spotlights themes which were to have a continuing significance in Israel's relations with its Arab neighbours. Scholars are considerably indebted to Mrs Rosenthal for this expertly produced volume and they will eagerly await future instalments in this valuable and promising series.

University of Reading AVI SHLAIM

Lebanon: the fractured country. By David Gilmour. Oxford: Martin Robinson. 1983. 209pp. Index. £9.95.

THE civil war in Lebanon began in 1975 and has continued, in one form or another, ever since. At the beginning, it was a war between the Palestinian commandos and those Maronite Catholic militias who saw themselves as the defenders of Lebanese sovereignty against a Palestinian 'state within a state'. Lebanese 'progessive' militias were soon drawn into the fighting, making the war one between the Lebanese nationalism of the 'rightists' and the wider Arab nationalism of the 'leftists' and their Palestinian allies. Closely bound up with this was a class conflict between the urban poor and the bourgeoisie, but this was often obscured by the confessional malevolence between Muslims and Christians. David Gilmour traces the social and political roots of these conflicts in the first part of his book, and then discusses the history of the major ideological disputes which fuelled the various rounds of fighting. In the third part of the book, he gives a blow-by-blow account of the war from 1975 to the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the massacres of Sabra and Chatila.

The book is well written and informative, showing how Lebanon's prewar liberal democracy, dominated by fragile coalitions of neo-feudal landlords and urban political bosses, was unable to deal with growing social tensions. Behind a façade of cosmopolitan tolerance and financial prosperity were the slums of Beirut and the corruption of a venal political establishment. When the issue of the Palestinian resistance provided the spark which ignited

the civil war, the Lebanese state could not prevent an explosion of communal and sectarian violence. Nor could it prevent the manipulation of the multiple points of conflict by the Israeli, Syrian, Libyan and other regimes. But although Gilmour has a good feel for the socio-economic background to the war, what is missing is a detailed treatment of the Lebanese political economy. In particular, he does not show how the development of finance and service capitalism created an extremely individualistic society in which communal ties of clan and sect became resources in a highly competitive market. Political responses to this included the elaborate patron–client structures established by the traditional politicans, which provided an effective means of social control—albeit with a degree of factional violence—up to the eve of the civil war. The reasons for this 'clientelist system' breaking down are complex, but of central importance were the growth of concentration in the service and finance sectors, and the development of capitalist agriculture in the Bekaa valley in the 1960s. Sharecroppers were forced off the land and swelled the ranks of the urban poor, who were increasingly divorced from their patrons and the clientelist structures of political control.

Much of this is implicit in the book, and it is perhaps unfair to criticize Gilmour for not using a particular theoretical framework. Nevertheless, a greater emphasis on a changing social structure might have provided a more adequate explanation for the rapid collapse of political order in the 1970s.

University of Sussex MICHAEL JOHNSON

Africa

Nigerian foreign policy: alternative perceptions and projections. Edited by Timothy Shaw and Olajide Aluko. London: Macmillan. 1983. 257pp. Index. £25.00.

THE study of the foreign policies of African states is still at a very underdeveloped stage. There is both a paucity of detailed case studies and severe theoretical shortcomings in much of what has been written. Either it is assumed with little attempt at emprical validation that concepts developed elsewhere are irrelevant to the African experience or, conversely, these conceptual frameworks are applied with little sensitivity to the changed political and economic realities. This collection of essays, in bringing together writers within the neo-Marxist and realist perspectives, serves to sharpen thinking about the correct approach to the study of Nigerian foreign policy. Underlying these essays are questions relating to the key problems facing black Africa's major power in the contemporary world and the relevance of various levels of analysis and key concepts.

However, apart from an introduction by Shaw and a concluding chapter which he co-wrote with Orbola Fasehun, there is no dialogue between the various contributors. In other words they do not address similar problems and issues but focus instead on different concrete situations. In part I, entitled 'Alternative perceptions of Nigerian foreign policy', Ojo and Aluko concentrate on the machinery of foreign policy making; Shaw, Bach and Wright on various aspects of Nigeria's external relations. Ojo in discussing the administration of Nigeria's foreign service and Aluko on the role of the bureaucracy in the making of Nigerian foreign policy are both firmly within the orthodox perspective. Should there not have been a radical essay on this aspect of foreign policy-making? Bach's article on Nigerian–American relations is one of the better contributions. Stephen Wright asks whether Nigerian foreign policy is a case of dominance or dependence and concludes that dependency inhibits the pursuit of certain goals by the Nigerian state. An interesting essay is spoilt by a failure to provide an adequate definition of dependency, thus making it unclear why the constraints on policy he describes should be labelled dependence. Part II is concerned with alternative projections for Nigerian foreign policy. The first two essays, however, are mainly evaluations of two crucial aspects of the Nigerian political economy. Thomas Biersteker discusses the indigenization programme and concludes, not surprisingly, that the efforts of successive govenments at nationalization have benefited only a small elite and have done very little to increase Nigerian control over the economy in general. Tyoden discusses the changing nature of Nigeria's development strategy and attempts not too successfully (mainly because the elaboration of class and the relationship between the government and various class interests is

rather sketchily developed) to relate changes in the strategy to internal class and factional interests. The contributions by Aluko and DeLancey on future projections for Nigerian foreign policy suffer from the usual unreality attendant on such exercises in speculation. This is an uneven collection and one wishes that firmer editorial control had been exercised in the selection of essays, thus giving greater shape and coherence to the exercise.

University of Sussex MARC WILLIAMS

An anatomy of Ghanaian politics: managing political recession, 1969–1982. By Naomi Chazan. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 429pp. Index. £24.00.

LIKE so much else, the Ghanaian studies industry has been in recession for the past few years. The nationalist and early years of independence of this first African state to escape from colonial rule produced a series of major studies which included some of the pioneering works on modern African politics. As a result, Nkrumah and CPP have become the academic equivalent of household terms. However, since the publication in 1975 of the Austin-Luckham volume. *Politicians and soldiers in Ghana*, which deals with the 1966–72 period, no substantive study has appeared which updates the analysis of trends in Ghanaian politics in the turbulent years after the demise of the Second Republic.

Self-consciously, Naomi Chazan's new book seeks to do precisely that. Within the framework of this 'impressive tradition' of study, she aims to 'make a contribution of a synthetic, integrative and additive sort' (p. 371). In so doing, she has borrowed ideas, concepts and generalizations from a range of different methodological approaches, which unquestionably adds to the breadth of the synthesis but at the same time renders the final product a slightly uneasy mix of different analytical styles.

Part one is an exercise in political sociology. It seeks to disaggregate the components of politics in Ghana, examining the role of class and ethnicity, the functions of the state and alternative political institutions and the structure of leadership and brokerage patterns in the country. It is heavy going in parts, thanks to an excessive deployment of sociological jargon. Part two is entitled 'the meanings and uses of politics' (p. 115), and comprises two chapters. The first is an interesting discussion of the various ideologies, both official and protest, which were developed in Ghana in the period, although it is again flawed by the use of jargon. What are idea-logics? The second is a particularly succinct account of Ghana's changing political economy, including a consideration of the *kalabule* system. Part three is in effect a piece of contemporary political history, namely, a description and analysis of the political interactions of the Ghanaian elite during the Busia, Acheampong, Rawlings and Limann eras. This needed doing and has been done clearly and effectively. Part four represents the additive part of the diet for it contains an elaboration of the major analytical theme of the book. Chazan seeks to relate the obvious political instability and economic decay experienced by Ghana between 1969 and 1982 to what she calls the political deflation of the state. She considers the loss of power, legitimacy and authority on the part of the state and argues that what has occurred in Ghana in the last decade is a 'dispersion of social, economic, and political life away from the state and towards more enclosed, self-reliant local and horizontal entities' (p. 312). It is an important thesis which, as the author suggests, might have applicability to the analysis of other African states such as Chad, Uganda after Amin and the Central African Republic.

Huddersfield Polytechnic ANTHONY PAYNE

Senegal: an African nation between Islam and the West. By Sheldon Gellar. Boulder, Col.: Westview; Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 145pp. Index. £9.50.

The resignation, in December 1980, of President Senghor signalled the end of an era in Senegal. With a final flourish of the political finesse he has so long personified, he had prepared the way for the successor he had chosen, Abdou Diouf, whose takeover was convincingly confirmed in February 1983 when he won 83 per cent of the vote in the Presidential, and 111 of the 120 seats in the Legislative, election. One of Diouf's earliest acts after taking over had been to remove any limitation on the number of political parties and seven contested the election besides the governing Socialist Party. As in all Senegalese

elections, there were violet denunciations of the electoral frauds alleged to account for the results. Many factors make malpractices only too probable but that is not to say that without them Diouf would not have won.

Senegal's political stability has been matched by an almost equally continuous economic stagnation. At least in the last decade much of this has been due to causes quite outside the control of anyone in Senegal: disastrous droughts, oil prices, and continuing world recession. While blaming Diouf quite as much as Senghor for Senegal's economic plight, the opposition parties showed few signs of ascribing responsibility for it to their socialist ideology except to the extent of demanding more radical versions. An attempt to assess Senegal's prospects for the rest of this century as well as a retrospective appraisal of the Senghor era is thus opportune and Dr Gellar's well-informed, lucidly written, and balanced survey goes a long way to providing both.

The author first lived in Senegal in the early 1960s when working on his Columbia doctoral dissertation on the politics of development in Senegal and has since worked as a development consultant in Francophone Africa. His thorough acquaintance with the farily extensive literature about Senegal is also displayed in a well chosen bibliography.

Open, as it has historically been, to both Islamic and Western influences, Senegal has been able under the politics of accommodation pursued in the Senghor era to consolidate its existence as a separate entity instead of being, like many new states, torn apart by extremes of ideology or regional division. In that process French support and that of the leaders of the three great Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal have been crucial. 'Senegalese society', Dr Gellar says, 'is moving rapidly to assert its own national identity' (p. 122) with greater emphasis on Islamic values and the use of the national languages in education and political life and a decline in the cultural hegemony of French. He thinks that the special relationship with France will continue and and that an Islamic republic is unlikely. Meanwhile, the critical factor is the state of the economy: the great disparity between relatively prosperous 'maritime Senegal' and the dire poverty of 'Sahelian Senegal', and whether the major development projects now under way and dependent on continued external finance can be brought to a successful conclusion soon enough to prevent a breakdown of the present fragile containment of some sharp conflicts of interest as well as ideology. Dr Gellar's final chapter should be studied by anyone concerned not merely with Senegal but with the relations of the West and Africa.

KENNETH ROBINSON

The rise of the South African security establishment: an essay on the changing locus of state power. By Kenneth W. Grundy. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 39pp. Pb.: R10.00.

South Africa in southern Africa: the intensifying vortex of violence. Edited by Thomas M. Callaghy. New York: Praeger. 1983. 420pp. Index. $45.00.

KENNETH GRUNDY'S study of the South African security establishment is the first in an annual series (the Bradlow Papers) from the South African Institute of International Affairs. In appearance it is remarkably like the International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Papers. Grundy has given the series an excellent start by providing an incisive, revealing study of the role of the security establishment in the South African government. He identifies the security establishment as a series of interlocking groups within the government—the defence force, the arms industry, (now the tenth largest in the world), the intelligence services, the police, and the centres of strategic studies. This establishment, which has its own inner rivalries and loyalties, operates at the heart of the government through the State Security Council, which the Prime Minister himself chairs. In a special press conference, called to refute Grundy's revelations, the government claimed that the council was simply an ordinary cabinet committee with no special powers. In contrast Grundy sees it as an alternative, and increasingly important, source of decision-making to the cabinet itself.

According to Grundy the security establishment is increasingly prominent because it operates in a white society which perceives itself to be faced by a 'total onslaught' which it can only defeat by adopting a 'total strategy'. This involves not only a military response, but the whole range of social and economic activities—education, culture, political propaganda etc. Therefore the security establishment (particularly the military—operating under the benign eye of P. W. Botha, who before becoming Prime Minister was Minister of Defence) can

legitimately claim to involve itself in all aspects of government activity. Added to their activities inside South Africa, Grundy describes the involvement of the military in neighbouring territories, which has led to destabilization there. However, Grundy concludes that this military action, which superficially reflects strength and purpose, is in reality a 'counsel of desperation' (p. 31), and will lead to increasing problems for the South Africans. Whether that proves a sound judgement, or whether the military will be able to dominate South Africa's borders, is still an open question.

The book edited by Thomas Callaghy is based on papers given at a conference at the Pennsylvania State University in October 1980. Although the papers have been updated there are the characteristic problems of publishing conference papers. Inevitably there is unevenness between them, and as they were originally prepared for a particular audience at a particular time, reading them later (even updated versions) gives a sense of *déja vu*. Yet, having said that, there are some interesting papers in the collection. Owen Kahn's on the political economy of minerals is especially welcome, and there are sound contributions from Jeffrey Butler on South Africa's role in southern Africa, Jack Spence on the country's international setting, and Larry Bowman, Michael Bratton, and Rukudzo Murapa on the relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa.

University of Durham JAMES BARBER

Asia and Australasia

Threats to security in East Asia–Pacific: national and regional perspectives. Edited by Charles E. Morrison. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. In UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 221pp. Index. £22.50.

The great power triangle and Asian security. Edited by Raju G. C. Thomas. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot). 200pp. Index. £18.50.

THE dominant concern in both these conscientious books is the interaction between the role of the great powers, especially the United States, and regional responsibility for security. Between them they provide comprehensive coverage of security issues and nationally perceived threats in East Asia and the Pacific.

The volume edited by Charles E. Morrison has all the strengths and weaknesses of most volumes based on symposia. The diversity of the points of view expressed about national security from Australia through to South Korea and Malaysia may be initially confusing, but the overriding interest in American policy helps to bind them together, some readers may feel to the point of distortion. For though an Indonesian centre and a Japanese research institute were among the sponsors of the meeting at Waikoloa, Hawaii in February 1982, the funding came from the Carthage Foundation and the orientation of the study is more or less consistently American.

In this respect the tone is set by the chapter on 'Soviet strategy in Asia: a US perspective' by Jacquelyn K. Davis. This is brief and adds little to conventional thinking about the Soviet Union's global purpose. Having stressed the Soviet Union's reliance (p. 23) on economic incentives, the author goes on to emphasize (p. 25) 'the projection of power through the deployment of superior military forces' and, in discussing intervention in Afghanistan in terms of 'an extension outside Europe of the Brezhnev Doctrine' (p. 29), implies without explanation the probability of the overt use of military power much further afield. Even so this leads neatly into the chapter by Bernard K. Gordon and Lloyd R. Vasey which succinctly discusses security throughout the region covered in general terms. Here the dangers of Soviet activity are effectively put into perspective alongside the possibility that the direction of US policy may be in the process of undermining pro-Western sympathies over large parts of East Asia. In some quarters the US relationship with China is seen as too close, an attitude which is not discouraged by a continuing obsession, for example in the Philippines and Indonesia, with the potential of the overseas Chinese as a communist fifth column (p. 48). In this context it would clearly be possible for the United States to appear as authoritarian and insensitive where its own perceived interests are concerned. One important lesson from this book is that military

security considerations must not be allowed to prejudice progress towards economic prosperity for the peoples of the region, in which also the United States has a prominent role to play.

In the search for a balanced and considerate US policy strategy for the East Asia–Pacific region, the Japanese security posture is clearly critical. One by-product of this study was consultation with national participants about what they expected of Japan: their ambivalence on this issue was marked, wanting the Japanese to be involved but not militarily to go beyond self-defence. The symposium also highlighted a major institutional deficiency in the region, if broadly Western security interests are to be integrated and coordinated. Neither of the existing organizations, ANZUS or ASEAN, provides an adequately constituted forum for the discussion of these issues. The scope for a US initiative is clear, but its success will clearly depend on conscious recognition of the national aspirations of the states of the region.

The country-by-country accounts of threat perceptions are authoritative and to the point, including some discussion of the dangers of acting as host to American bases. This aspect underlines not only the intimate involvement of the United States in almost all aspects of the life of the region, but the range of complicating domestic factors, including endemic insurgency, in many of the countries involved.

In many respects appreciation of these problems is a necessary preliminary to the more formal studies of security policy contained in the book edited by Raju G. C. Thomas. The one book is a complement to the other and any overlap is more apparent than real. It is interesting, for example, to compare the paper on Indonesia by Peter Lyon of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, in the second volume with that by Jusuf Wanandi and M. Hadisoesastro of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, in the first. The sections on Afghanistan, perhaps not the pivot of great power relations it is made out to be, Pakistan, India, Taiwan, Vietnam, and North Korea all make useful contributions and extend the range of specific understanding, as well as of analysis of the issues.

Taken together these two books constitute an invaluable resource both for specialists in the region and for students of security issues more generally. The publishers are to be congratulated on having the courage to publish two books on convergent themes and covering similar ground within a month of each other. However, most purchasers will need both for reference and they will be disappointed and frustrated to discover that, while Raju Thomas' book has admirable author and subject indexes, the other inexplicably has none.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Towards the end of isolationism: China's foreign policy after Mao. By Michael Yahuda. London: Macmillan. 1983. 279pp. Index. £15.00. Pb.: £5.95.

CHINA'S door to the outside world has never been open wide. Since 1949 it has been virtually shut to the West while open to the East, or vice versa. Certainly it has never been more than ajar, and currently seems to be pulled somewhat closer to keep out the blasts of 'bourgeois' ideas. Michael Yahuda perceptively explains the swinging hinge of Chinese foreign policy with two analytical tools. First, by emphasizing the 'societal' dimension of policy, he persuasively points to the Chinese dilemmas of whether to open up to foreign ideas. Second, and less persuasively, he assesses the 'strategic geopolitical' dimension.

Yahuda is undeniably one of the most original students of Chinese foreign policy. He was one of the first to point to the need to be sympathetic to the 'Chinese' qualities of Chinese foreign policy and assess issues less in terms of Western policy. Yahuda's insight this time is equally challenging and important; that Chinese dilemmas as to whether to open its doors will continue to create an ambiguous foreign policy: 'The dilemma in domestic terms is how to introduce "practicality" without undermining the Party "essence" of socialist China . . . the dilemma is how to establish deeper and more extensive links with the international economy without finding that the country's freedom of international manoeuvre has been limited . . .' (p. 247). If any confirmation were needed that China had not resolved the dilemma by clearly opening its door to the West, the Party rectification campaign begun in October 1983 has singled out 'spiritual pollution' from the West as the major target. This new anti-rightist campaign, coming as it does in conjunction with a foreign policy tilt away from the West and towards a more balanced position between the superpowers, suggests that Yahuda is right to see the Chinese door as unlikely to open very wide.

Yet, curiously for a book that makes much of dilemmas of policy on societal aspects,

Yahuda argues that China's strategic dimension has remained remarkably stable (p.167). This alleged continuity from Mao's strategic precepts ignores the wild fluctuation in China's alliance policy, from inclination towards the Soviet Union to rabid anti-Sovietism and now to a more equal view of the superpowers. It also ignores such hypocrisies of policy as selling arms to Iraq and Iran while calling for a ceasefire and opposing superpower arms sales. Yahuda acknowledges changes in 'diplomatic style' but not substance (p.170). Perhaps the real problem lies in the separation of strategy and society as dimensions of policy. It seems more probable that the strategic view is largely shaped by the changing needs of domestic policy. Therefore, as Yahuda so perceptively points out, as domestic politics faces dilemmas, so Chinese strategy is contentious and capricious.

University of Bristol GERALD SEGAL

The Chinese defense establishment. Edited by Paul Godwin. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping). 197pp. Index. £20.50.

THIS book is clear, to the point, and contains consistently high-quality analyses. One could hardly ask for more, especially from an edited book. In a defence policy field all too often dominated by hardware freaks, mad model builders or institutional hermits, Godwin and his contributors offer sensible analyses of the changing politics of Chinese defence policy. For China scholars there is much new information, and for students of comparative politics there is a comprehensive study of the special Chinese case.

There is not a bad chapter among the seven, but several are quite superb. Godwin himself ambitiously tries to divine the meaning of China's new military strategy, 'People's war under modern conditions'. His conclusions are wisely hedged with caution. Godwin sees the retention of some Maoist principles, in large part because China cannot afford a strategy based on new technologies that goes beyond what poor peasant China can realistically attain. Thus the emphasis must necessarily remain on man rather than weapons and deterrence by denial rather than by punishment. Godwin's stress on the human component of defence policy is in fact a key theme of the book as a whole.

Richard Latham looks in detail at command and 'work style' problems in the PLA. Although the chapter is long-winded, its emphasis on modernizing the officer class as a central component of overall modernization is to be welcomed. Two more successful and innovative analyses of aspects of PLA modernization are by Wallace Heaton and Harvey Nelsen. Heaton's chapter on military education is the first ever, and is written with great clarity. His suggestion that military education is a 'microcosm' of the PLA as a whole (pp.122–3) is well supported, and is made without resort to narrow-minded analysis of bureaucratic institutions. Harvey Nelsen dissects the management of the PLA. He emphasizes the strengths, including recruitment, morale and political education, and discusses weak spots, including education, civic action, and above all the rigid promotion system. But, as Nelsen trenchantly argues, to loosen up the promotion system would undermine strong party control, and that is unacceptable to any communist party.

These excellent chapters are supplemented by ones from Jonathan Pollack on security problems, David Shambaugh on the defence industries, and June Teufel Dreyer on the militia. All these are more than acceptable. The editor has put together this coherent, high-quality product despite starting with 1980 conference papers and providing no introductory chapter. Remarkably for an edited book, the coherence flows naturally from each chapter, and the quality is derived from letting specialists loose on new material. All editors should be so fortunate, and so good.

University of Bristol GERALD SEGAL

Vietnam under communism, 1975–1982. By Nguyen Van Canh. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1983. 312pp. Index. $34.95.

THE subject of this study is the transformation of southern Vietnam since 1975. It is both an impassioned and a relentless account of the domination by the communist regime in Hanoi of all aspects of life in a country where peace has not brought an end to forty years of suffering.

The book concludes with a discussion of Hanoi's foreign policy and its implications for American and ASEAN policy-makers.

In the fields of economic life, politics, culture and ideology Hanoi is depicted as having rapidly and often brutally mastered the south. The precipitate 'reunification' of Vietnam in 1976 following the military victory of April 1975 saw the speedy demise of the NLF and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the latter long touted as the core of a postwar southern regime of reconciliation. In the new political order few southern cadres remain in positions of power, and regional and 'mass' organizations have thoroughly regimented the southern population. Attempts to push through a rapid collectivization of property and production have had to be modified in the face of economic disasters though private business has been destroyed by seizures and currency manipulations. The author paints a picture of a corrupt and inept but inflexible regime presiding over an economic debacle which its outdated Stalinist ideology prevents it from comprehending. This is to be explained largely in terms of the domination of the Vietnam Communist Party by the factions of Le Duan and Le Duc Tho, men in their eighth decade who are in matters of policy and outlook the prisoners of the mould of past experience.

Though Canh systematically documents the VCP domination of every aspect of life his account of the regime's treatment of religious figures and of supporters of the former Republic of Vietnam makes particularly chilling reading. Despite claims that 1975 saw no significant reprisals against the previous regime Canh cites many instances of government-sanctioned killings. Moreover, perhaps the most significant section of the book is devoted to a well documented analysis of the fate of government functionaries, army personnel and other former opponents of the communists. Refugee and other sources support the view that there are more than 200,000 prisoners in scores of camps throughout Vietnam in which the inmates are tortured and starved in the name of re-education but actually to exact revenge.

In the author's judgement Vietnam is at an impasse. Internal and external policy are tied to an ally whose interests would not be served by any improvement in the nation's prosperity or security. And despite unification the very different conditions of north and south, recognized in the relaxation of economic policy in the latter in 1979, pose ideological and political problems beyond the apparent powers of the Hanoi regime to solve.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JAMES COTTON

Policy and trade issues of the Japanese economy: American and Japanese perspectives. Edited by Kozo Yamamura. Seattle, London: University of Washington Press. 1983. 332 pp. Index. £18.75.

UNDER the auspices of the Japan–United States Friendship Commission, five leading Japanese economists and six American specialists of Japanese economic affairs got together to thrash out the key issues related to the current tense, potentially explosive, state of Japan–US economic relations. The result is a volume of significant substance.

Two of the articles, by Yasusuke Murakami and Ken-Ichi Imai, assess the evolutionary course and sources of Japan's economic performance and the dynamics of its changing industrial structure. Kozo Yamamura and Yukio Noguchi analyse the direction and mechanisms of Japan's industrial policy, Kazuo Sato reflects upon the role that Japan's high savings rate has had on domestic economic development and its international ramifications, while Yoichi Shinkai shows how and what the Japanese learned from the first oil crisis that allowed them to avoid stagflation after the second oil crisis. Hugh Patrick and Hideo Sato provide an in-depth analysis of the evolution and occasional revolutions in one sector of bilateral trade relations, namely steel. Gary Saxonhouse uses the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson Theory of Comparative Advantage to determine the nature and extent of Japan's imports of manufactured products. Finally, Koichi Hamada and John Makin tackle the thorny issue of the yen-dollar exchange rate.

There is a clear convergence among all the authors to lay stress on primarily economic causes for all aspects of Japan's economic performance and its consequences for relations with its trading partners. Indeed, Saxonhouse complains that 'too much of the discussion on the modern development of the Japanese economy stresses the unique characteristics of Japan as explanations of this development', a situation for which he holds responsible both American scholars of Japanese studies and many Japanese. Murakami insists that 'a Japanese firm's

long-run orientation was not so much a characteristic inherent in Japanese culture as a product of a certain mixture of three economic environments, that is, the borrowable technology, the risk-reducing financial system, and the Japanese employment system, particularly intrafirm job mobility' (p. 40). Yamamura, in characteristically controversial form, identifies a recurrent pattern consisting of connivance between the ruling Liberal–Democratic Party, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and big industry 'in creating price-fixing (and/or output-limiting) cartels and a more oligopolistic market structure' (p. 80). Collusion is the name of the Japanese industrial policy game, he asserts, hence his belief that 'a desirable decision is for Japan to discontinue all administrative guidance that now restricts domestic competition and contributes to international trade conflicts' (p. 107).

Since the 'oil crisis compelled Japanese corporations to save energy and increase productivity because of an almost life or death situation', Ken-Ichi Imai puts forward the paradoxical but convincing proposition that 'the oil crisis in Japan might be viewed as another one of the "divine winds", the chance storms that have, at least in Japanese folklore, appeared miraculously to save the nation from external threats' (p. 58). Short of another 'divine wind', however, a consensus of pessimism regarding the future prospects of the Japanese economy and its relations with the United States emerges. While a comparable study on Japan and Europe is definitely called for, so far as this volume is concerned there is one snag. The editor chose not to write a concluding chapter indicating possible guidelines. Hence, as is generally inevitably the case when economists get together, although we are provided with substantive analysis, it is still not clear what should be done.

Euro-Asia Centre, INSEAD, Fontainebleau JEAN-PIERRE LEHMANN

Prime Ministers and diplomats: the making of Australian foreign policy, 1901–1948. By P. G. Edwards. Melbourne: Oxford University Press for Australian Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 240pp. Index. £20.00.

THIS book deals with the process of foreign policy making rather than with the outcome, and traces the evolution of Australia's diplomatic efforts from the founding of the federation until the massive expansion of the Department of External Affairs under Dr H. V. Evatt between 1946 and 1949. During those three years the staff more than trebled, and the number of overseas missions grew from nine to twenty-six. The department was given its basic administrative shape by two of Dr Evatt's remarkable appointees to the post of its Secretary, W. E. Dunk and J. W. Burton. At that time it had been in existence only since 1935, when the portfolio for external affairs was for the first time held by a separate minister responsible for a separate set of officials.

Peter Edwards asks why Prime Ministers have been so dominant in the making of Australian foreign policy, and why Australia took so long to establish its own diplomatic service, particularly when compared with Canada and the Irish Republic. His answers to both questions are found in the balance which Australian political leaders attempted to strike between the demands of 'the imperial system' and those of their own country. He argues that Prime Ministers were discouraged from starting their own organization for the collection and analysis of diplomatic information because they enhanced their status through direct participation in the making of policy for the Empire as a whole. The centre-piece of the book is the part played by S. M. Bruce as Prime Minister from 1923 to 1929, with R. G. Casey as his liaison officer in London, and then as minister without portfolio himself in London after the Ottawa Conference and as high commissioner there from 1933 to 1945.

The book also provides detailed accounts of the three abortive attempts made before 1935 to create a foreign affairs ministry and a diplomatic service. The major break-through in establishing a diplomatic service was the scheme introduced in 1943 to provide training at Sydney University for selected cadets. This provided openings for graduates who hoped to make a career in diplomacy, and after 1948 a university degree was a prerequisite for entry. The External Affairs Department of Dr Evatt and Dr Burton outclassed the humdrum school-leaver tradition of entrants to the Commonwealth Public Service.

This book would have been a little more interesting if there had been more comparisions with Canada and other self-governing Dominions. A few organizational diagrams would also have helped understanding. But the author has thoroughly explored his subject. There is a

bibliography, an index and a series of pictures of the principal characters. The book will be a standard work of reference.

University of Bristol J. M. LEE

India at the polls, 1980: a study of the parliamentary elections. By Myron Weiner. Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 1983. 198pp. Pb.

THIS book is a sequel to the author's volume on India's 1977 general election. The serious general reader, for whom it is mainly intended, will find it a valuable way into Indian electoral politics. It also offers plenty of substance for specialists, despite our grumblings about certain aspects of it.

Weiner begins with a brief survey of the history of Indian elections and with the Janata Party's unhappy spell in power between 1977 and mid-1979. He provides admirably lucid and succinct accounts of Janata's messy disintegration and of the campaigning and byzantine inter-party manoeuvrings that ensued during the long run-up to the election in the first week of 1980. He then offers analyses of results nationally, in regional and urban arenas, and among certain minorities. There is much to appreciate here. The forty-eight tables are particularly valuable, as is Weiner's caution about drawing firm conclusions from them and from opinion surveys in a country where polling organizations are largely unequal to their enormous task. The author's final summation is stimulating throughout, even (or especially) when it fails fully to convince. Page 135 alone could serve as a primer for the study of Indian elections.

There are, inevitably, quibbles. Very occasionally, Weiner remains needlessly tentative or silent on important issues. He advances no opinion about President Reddy's refusal to call Jagjivan Ram to form a government in mid-1979. In Rajni Kothari's view, this thwarted a realignment of forces in Parliament and beyond, and precipitated an unnecessary election. Nor does the author comment on the criticism of the Election Commission for delaying polling—which may have assisted Mrs Gandhi—or on the reporting of results by polling station rather than by constituency which made some voters anxious about the secrecy of their ballots.

This brings us to a more general point. Most of the discussion, perhaps necessarily, deals with high politics so that the doings of national leaders and a few state-level figures dominate the discussion. This means that conditions within various parties' organizations nearer the grass roots receive too little attention. A historic change in Indian politics since the late 1960s is therefore underemphasized. It is not as clear as it should be that this election took place amid serious organizational decay within most parties—including, especially and crucially, Mrs Gandhi's Congress. Weiner certainly makes this point. But the title and most of the text of his conclusion, 'A reinstating election', stress continuity with the Congress victories before 1977, when discontinuity and change would be more appropriate. Because most major parties have decayed so severely at a time when Indian voters were growing more aware and assertive, ruling parties in both New Delhi and many states have been unable to respond adequately to public demands. Incumbents since the early 1970s have therefore found it exceedingly difficult to win re-election. That is the opposite of the situation in Congress' pre-1970 heyday.

Nevertheless, this book deserves a warm welcome and a wide readership.

University of Leicester JAMES MANOR

Royal Bhutan. By Ram Rahul. New Delhi: ABC. 1983. 85pp. Index. Rs 50.00.

THE eastern Himalayan state of Bhutan, sandwiched between China and India, is virtually closed to foreign academics and has therefore received scant attention from the scholars despite its immense strategic importance. Normally a publication on this picturesque but often forgotten territory is a welcome occasion. Professor Rahul's *Royal Bhutan* is, however, rather disappointing. The author, 'the foremost expert on central Asia' (as the blurb on the dust-jacket claims) intended to provide a history of the Bhutanese monarchy since the establishment of the Druk Gyalpo or the Thunder Dragon Kingdom in 1907. What in fact emerges is a disjointed and somewhat incoherent attempt to chronicle the rule of the four rulers of the Wangchuk dynasty. The narrative lacks any theme or historical selectivity. There

is little that is new and the reader will be sadly disappointed if he or she is looking for a discussion of the Bhutanese society or economy. Numerous names of places are mentioned but in the absence of a map—despite the author's frequent references to 'of the map'—it is not possible to locate these places easily.

The underlying concern of the author is to demonstrate Bhutan's cultural and historical links with, and subordination to, India; at the same time, somewhat paradoxically, he is at pains to stress the independent status of the country. That there are some limitations on Bhutan's sovereignty is not in doubt. By a treaty of 1910, Bhutan had placed the control of its external relations in the hands of the British in India; in 1949 the treaty was renewed transferring that control to the government of independent India. Bhutan's position in the comity of nations has always been ambivalent. But following the Chinese take-over of Tibet in 1950–51 and the extension of its claims to Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, the Government of India has had to be more tactful in the handling of relations with Bhutan. Nepal and Bhutan are now the only buffer between China and India, and after the Sino–Indian war of 1962, the importance of the buffer states has increased substantially. The Bhutanese rulers were not slow to take advantage of their new situation. In 1970 India made conciliatory gestures to settle Indo–Bhutanese border disputes; in 1971 India supported Bhutan's entry into the United Nations; India both trains and arms the Bhutanese forces and is responsible for Bhutan's communications. The Bhutanese, like the Nepalese, enjoy the rights of Indian nationals and are eligible to reside and work in India; and India also provides most of Bhutan's technical, food and power requirements. While Bhutan remains precariously poised between two great regional powers with imperial pretensions and might well meet the fate of Sikkim or Tibet in the long run, for the moment it is milking India quite well.

University of Warwick GOWHER RIZVI

North America

Dead ends: American foreign policy in the new cold war. By Stanley Hoffmann. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger; London: Harper & Row. 1983. 299pp. Index. £21.00.

STUDENTS of international relations in the 1960s for whom the name Stanley Hoffmann meant the addition of *Contemporary theory in international relations* to their reading lists may be glad to have some of his more attractive writings in a collected format. But they are likely to be outnumbered by those who, in an election year, would like to have renewed access to the assessments of President Reagan's foreign policy which the author contributed on four occasions to the *New York review of books*. All four appear here, with postscripts attached; but there is much else besides. The substantial part of the collection begins with the by now famous portraits of Henry Kissinger which appeared, again in the *New York review of books*, in 1979 and 1982. These act here as an introduction to the assessment of President Carter's policy which follows, and which Professor Hoffmann considers in somewhat uncomplimentary terms. Not only is the Carter administration 'best . . . described as a constant collision of incompatible world-be strategies, some explicit, some implicit, and never carefully worked out' (p. 16), it 'never had a clear policy toward the Soviet Union' (p. 97); and here the author includes part of his SALT II testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 10 September 1979.

Not surprisingly, he has rather different criticisms to make of President Reagan, for the latter's attitude to the Soviet Union is relatively clear-cut. So is Professor Hoffmann's. For him there is 'no Soviet master plan' and 'Soviet perceptions and actions are shaped by American moves' (p. 107); the 'Soviet Union still has an overriding fear of encirclement, and is determined to pre-empt any attempt at enclosure' (p. 108). Nothing, of course, could stand in greater contrast to the President's own assessment, given only nine days after inauguration (*The Times*, 30 January 1981); but there is little in the rest of Hoffmann's analysis to prove the President wrong. Like the old-guard revisionists of the 1960s, with whom he has admittedly little else in common, Hoffmann is concerned only with the consequences for American foreign policy of this alleged misreading of Soviet intentions. He never suggests in what respects, if any, the President was mistaken in the first place; and those of us who attempted

to do so at the time (*The Times*, 6 February, 2 March 1981) find no support in these otherwise powerful pages.

Polytechnic of North London BRIAN THOMAS

The faces of power: Constancy and change in United States foreign policy from Truman to Reagan. By Seyom Brown. New York: Columbia University Press. 1983. 672 pp. Index. $45.50. Pb.: $16.00.

IN the revised edition of a deservedly influential study which was first published in 1968, Seyom Brown brings up to date his analysis of the continuities and changes in American foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. He has amended the initial work by taking into account recent scholarship on the policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, and the Pentagon papers plus recent biographical studies on the Kennedy–Johnson period. Previous analysis of the impact of Henry Kissinger on foreign policy since 1968 is included in revised form in the light of Kissinger's memoirs, while analysis of the Carter and Reagan administrations relies on available evidence at this time.

The study as a whole is comprehensive and clear in setting out the essential premises and factors which have influenced the implementation of foreign policy by successive administrations. It is thorough without ever becoming dull, providing detailed analysis of decisions while never neglecting the environment within which they are made. It is, for example, an excellent guide to the premises of power which underlay the ultimately unhappy involvement in Vietnam. Much of the new material, however, is concerned with attempts to extricate the United States from this costly commitment, and revive 'domestic and foreign belief in America's dedication to peace and world order' and 're-create international respect for the United States as a constructive and competent superpower' (p. 382). Here Professor Brown is especially adept in assessing the vices and virtues of the Kissinger contribution in helping the United States adapt to the realities of the enlarged strategic power of the Soviet Union, recognizing it as a coequal superpower in exchange for Soviet international moderation and restraint.

Brown indicates the irony in the fact that the Carter administration more accurately reflected the uncertainties of the nation at large, and sought to fashion a new domestic consensus for a progressive foreign policy by managing rather than resolving the contradictory pressures of the time. Hence the often contrasting and clashing priorities and approaches of Andrew Young, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance accurately represented the season of confusion in US policy goals. Carter's own views came more into congruence with those of Brzezinski, but sadly appeared to confirm the views of the 'unreconstructed cold warriors' (p. 562) surrounding Reagan. Reagan's election victory gave them the opportunity to develop a 'grand strategy' which Brown sees as an unhappy throwback to 1947. The ideological tone of the Reagan administration so far seems too simplistic and an inadequate substitute for new and deeper thinking about US foreign relations.

Substantively this study is of high quality, but it is regrettable that as meticulous but expensive a book as this should contain an irritating quantity of typographical errors.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

New frontiers in American–East Asian relations: essays presented to Dorothy Borg. Edited by Warren I. Cohen. New York: Columbia University Press. 1983. 294pp. Index. $39.00. Pb.: $19.50.

FOR more than twenty years Dorothy Borg has been one of the driving forces behind historical writing on relations between the United States and China, Japan and Korea. Two indispensable volumes of essays, on America and Japan in the decade 1931–41 and on America and China in the years 1947–50, owe a great deal to her inspiration, and when a *Festschrift* to her was mooted, this was the form she asked it to take.

The nine participants have in the main put together a survey of work in the field during the 1970s, with the focus as much on East Asian as on American studies. This emphasis on keeping abreast of scholarship on both sides of the Pacific has been one of Dr Borg's greatest contributions to the subject. It stems from a long lifetime scarred by the traumas of the Pacific War, the collapse of the Kuomintang in mainland China, and what was very largely a

Sino-American war in Korea. Whether mutual understanding between Asian and American academics could have prevented these cataclysms may be doubted, but that is not to say the effort is not worth making, and the revelations of Asian attitudes made available here are consistently interesting. This is especially true of the essay by the two historians from the People's Republic of China. Their very presence at the 1981 conference where the papers were first read was, of course, a solid token of the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, though it is depressingly clear that in post-Mao China the party line still prescribes the direction of historical inquiry.

Another leading theme of the volume is the cultural dimension of international relations, in its broadest sense. The importance of cultural influences is undeniable: the sympathetic portrayal of Asians in 'MASH', for instance, cannot have failed to make an impact on its mass audience. The problem for historians, however, is how to gauge the significance of such nebulous phenomena, and most of the writers at the symposium seem happier to continue to base their work on the primary source material from government and private archives (though they were writing before the release of the drastically-weeded State Department records of the early 1950s, which are proving such a disappointment to diplomatic historians).

In sum, this is an extremely useful guide to recent Asian and American historiography in this area, as well as a stimulating pointer to the huge tracts of territory that remain to be explored. Dorothy Borg could not have had a more fitting tribute.

University of Hull JOHN MAJOR

Gambling with history: Reagan in the White House. By Laurence I. Barrett. New York, London: Doubleday. 1983. 511pp. Index. £12.95.

THE author is senior White House correspondent for *Time* magazine, and this book finds its place in the extensive literature from assiduous journalists in the United States. Mr Barrett is not in the same league as Walter Lippmann, Theodore White or William Manchester, but he has a serious purpose, and he is at pains to rid his book of the more egregious inflexions of *Time*-ese. President Reagan has clearly trusted Mr Barrett with a great many confidences over the years, but this has not produced sycophancy. On the contrary, Mr Barrett has written a balanced and at times a very critical account of Reagan's Presidency to date, and his book is not to be confused with those campaign biographies which appear around the time Presidential hopefuls are seeking nomination, election, or in the present case, re-election.

Mr Barrett's purpose is entirely different. He seeks to unravel Reagan's policies, to throw light on the personalities of the man and the people he appointed—and in many cases dismissed. We learn a good deal about Reagan's personal philosophy, his approach to the Presidency, his well known technique of delegating (but also the rationale behind it, which can be too simply dismissed as a preference for getting back to the ranch).

Reagan emerges as a much shrewder politician than we are wont to recognize. If he is not good at remembering names, this could be at least partly because the man who never forgets a person's name may be of a more calculating disposition than the next candidate for high office. Ronald Reagan is clearly not destined to be one of the outstanding Presidents in American history, and Europeans are rightly concerned about his simplistic native Americanism, not least in the complexities of superpower relationships. But this study of yet another Californian resident in the White House is useful for reminding us once more that Los Angeles and Santa Barbara are nearer to Tokyo than to London; that the American West coast is nearer to China than to central Europe.

University of York EDMUND IONS

The hidden-hand Presidency: Eisenhower as leader. By Fred I. Greenstein. New York: Basic Books; London: Harper & Row. 1983. 286pp. Index. £10.95; $16.95.

THE time is ripe for an Eisenhower revival, and Professor Greenstein is its high priest. Concentrating not on policy but on Presidential style, his interpretation convinces in detail without quite destroying the older view. The allied commander famed for political skills is shown after all to have retained as President his clarity of mind, comprehension of politics and capacity to plan strategy—but to have consciously underplayed them. Before one of those bumbling press conferences, he reassured his anxious press secretary 'Don't worry, Jim, if that

question comes up, I'll just confuse them' (p. 69). (Greenstein admits that intended recipients of the message could be confused too.) By feigning ignorance of current controversies, Eisenhower preserved his own popularity and transferred the odium to subordinates. But he was never the tool of Sherman Adams or Foster Dulles. His conscious strategy was to play up in public the President's 'monarchical' role—as symbol of national unity—while under-emphasizing his 'prime ministerial' activities in promoting divisive policies. Twenty sensible concluding pages discuss how far other men in other circumstances could use his approach. There are some minor errors (Senators Dworshak and Case were not from Iowa or North Dakota).

Greenstein uses a quarter of the book for a long detailed case-study of Eisenhower's handling of Senator Joe McCarthy. The general, long experienced in judging and using individual allied and subordinate commanders, had a strict rule against voicing personal criticisms. Nor would he demean the Presidency by 'getting down in the gutter with that man'. (Were silence and slanging-match the only alternatives?) For two years Greenstein has little new to say. There is a feeble defence of Eisenhower's silence about the senator's illustrious victim General Marshall, his own hero and mentor, when he and McCarthy spoke together in the 1952 campaign. Greenstein does show that when McCarthy over-reached himself early in 1954, Eisenhower (without breaking his rule) moved actively to encourage opposition from Republican senators and hostile comments from his own staff. He had woken up at last: 'it won't be long before McCarthy starts [attacking me]. He wants to be President'; so 'I've made up my mind that you can't do business with Joe, and to hell with any attempt to compromise' (pp. 186, 200). After two years which wrecked many private lives and morale in the public service, as the author admits, Eisenhower's semi-public stand at last encouraged (just as his previous silence had discouraged) other wary politicians to take a stand too. Another topic for presidential silence, never broken and never mentioned in the book, was the Supreme Court's decision on desegregation. Eisenhower carefully conserved his capital of popularity, as Greenstein shows—not to spend it in a good cause but to hoard it like a miser, while leaving the nation's wounds to fester dangerously.

Nuffield College, Oxford P. M. WILLIAMS

The American system of government. 6th edn. By Ernest S. Griffith. London, New York: Methuen. 1983. 203pp. Index. Pb.: £4.95.

Financing the 1980 election. By Herbert E. Alexander. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 524pp. Index. £28.50.

The road to the White House: the politics of Presidential elections. 2nd edn. By Stephen J. Wayne. London: Macmillan. 1983. 317pp. Index. £20.00.

THE sixth edition of Dr Ernest Griffith's handbook takes account of the events of the Reagan Presidency: his election and the events that succeeded it down to the end of 1982. His outline retains its familiar features and virtues—clarity, concision, accuracy. It remains stronger on the institutional than the political, on the hardware rather than the software of government, and it continues to give the American system the benefit of most doubts and the credit for consistently unexceptionable intentions. Dr Griffith has been poorly served by his indexer, whose product falls well below the level of the text it is supposed to delineate.

Dr Griffith's Presidential candidate resembles Don Quixote in his seeming ignorance of the need for money to finance his knight-errantry. He should meet Dr Alexander. No one knows more about who needs how much and how and where he gets it. *Financing the 1980 election* is the sixth such product of Dr Alexander's labours in respect of each leap year, and one can hardly accord it greater praise than to say that it is a fitting sequel to its predecessors. Everything is here—the legal setting, the pre-nomination spending, the costs of the convention and the ensuing campaigns, the role of the interest groups (particularly of those powerful and proliferating newcomers, the PACs, the Political Action Committees), and (not least interesting) 'the aftermath', including the inescapable political payoffs to the contributors to victory. More than $70 million was spent before Reagan was even nominated, but this does not mean that it has escaped Dr Alexander's net. The actual campaigns of the principal contenders were the most expensive ever, totalling $275 million. This, Dr Alexander points out, is $115 million more than last time round. Characteristically, however, he also points out that 'communication costs' (basically television) have taken a 'quantum leap'

in recent years; also that even if the costs of all the other 1980 elections—for congress, governorships etc.—are added in, the total is less than 1 per cent of the amounts spent in the same period by the national, state and local governments of the United States. Significantly, critical as he is of many features of the system, particularly the overweening role of the PACs, Dr Alexander does not advocate further tinkering with the already complex legal framework, preferring instead to put his faith in a development in any case intrinsically desirable, the reviltalization of the political parties.

Will 1984 surpass 1980 in costs and expenditures? The reader who wants a preview of this and other possibilities and, still more, a guide to the intricacies of the whole vast operation that stretches from New Hampshire to the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, cannot do better than equip himself with the second edition of *The road to the White House*. Professor Wayne lays out the whole complex process and its legal and political technicalities with great clarity. Helpful tips are given, too, such as his tabular exposition of 'How to raise $2 million by direct mail'. The whole is set in a historical context, with comparisons with earlier elections including, most conspicuously, that of 1980. Professor Wayne is a scrupulously fair guide to the antics and gambits likely to be employed, and has almost embarassingly explicit illustrations such as that drawn from Carter's advertising plan in 1980 (Reagan's presumably unavailable?) of 'How to project a positive image'.

If Professor Wayne has a fault of his own it is indeed over-explicitness. He believes in telling the reader in each chapter what he is going to say before he says it, and in reminding him afterwards of what it is that he has said. But if the reader is prepared, when bored, to skip, he can hardly fail to become better informed and more shrewdly discerning after a draught of Professor Wayne's Pierian spring.

It is distressing to record that all three of these volumes have their 'footnotes' inserted at the most inconvenient places of all, at the end of each chapter.

New College, Oxford H. G. NICHOLAS

Latin America and Caribbean

The Latin American integration process in 1981. Buenos Aires: Institute for Latin American Integration, Inter-American Development Bank. 1983. 297pp. Pb.

SINCE it was first established, the Institute for Latin American Integration (INTAL) of the Inter-American Development Bank has produced a steady flow of valuable material on integration theory and more particularly on the practice of integration in Latin America. The publication here noted is the twelfth of its reports on the progress of integration in the region which began in 1968 and which from 1972 have been issued on an annual basis. The 1981 report contains the usual detailed chronicle of the main events of the past year in each of the three Latin American groupings, namely the Latin American Integration Association (which in 1981 succeeded LAFTA following the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo), the Andean Group, and the Central American Common Market. The Caribbean Community is also covered. Other forms of multinational economic cooperation including the River Plate Basin System and the Amazon Pact are also briefly discussed, as is the agreement to form URUPABOL between Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia. The report takes an optimistic view of the outlook for integration in Latin America, in part because of the new sense of pragmatism which it claims to discern which has led the countries of the region to favour more flexible methods of achieving their objectives in the place of the counterproductive legalism of the past. The report provides a wealth of information which is not easily obtainable elsewhere, and includes many statistical tables on trade flows. It remains an indispensable source for students of Latin American integration.

University of St Andrews P. ROBSON

Power through bureaucracy: urban political analysis in Brazil. By Richard Batley. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 214pp. Index. £15.00.

THIS book is an examination of the application of organizational analysis in urban planning in general and of its relationship to housing problems in Brazil in particular. The author is

attached to the Institute of Local Government Studies at Birmingham University. The study has chapters on: the political significance of organizational analysis; incorporation and exclusion in Brazilian development; the housing finance system; administration and the housing market; the allocation of public housing; urban renewal and expulsion in Bras (an inner-city working class district in São Paulo); and urban politics and bureaucracy. The text is liberally interspersed with tables and graphs, and there are a glossary, bibliography, and author and subject indices.

The first chapter is mainly an evaluation of the findings and researches of various political scientists and sociologists on aspects of organizational analysis, especially as regards managerialism in urban research and official action as a response to urban pressures (pp. 7–24). The second considers the evolution of the country's political process and economy during the twentieth century with particular reference to expanding urbanization, and it draws heavily on the writings of two of the most distinguished of Latin American political scientists, Cardoso and O'Donnell (pp. 29–57). The third chapter looks in detail at the workings of the National Housing Bank (BNH), the financial institutions that function under its aegis and the programmes that the Bank operates, especially those administered by state and municipal housing companies (COHAB) and cooperatives (pp. 58–97). The fourth examines the housing market itself and highlights the close linkage between marketing and administrative factors (pp. 100–126). The fifth analyses public housing problems, with regard to experiences in applications and ownership rights (pp. 127–153). The sixth, and perhaps the most interesting, surveys the impact made by a large officially backed and partially externally funded prestige infrastructure project on small businesses and residents in a confined urban area. The project is the building of the São Paulo underground railway system and the area Bras, a well-established working-class area of the city of São Paulo. It shows that the building of the metro did not result in strong and widespread resistance and that many of the inhabitants of Bras reluctantly accepted upheaval as inevitable in the cause of progress (pp. 171–3). The concluding chapter endeavours to draw together the book's themes, concentrating on 'distinguishing between the point at which admission is gained or avoided for particular administered benefits or penalties, and the more general admission of interests into account for the formation of policy' (p. 192).

The book would appear unintentionally to cater for two separate readerships: the academic political scientist and the specialized Brazilianist. The first of these will find the preliminary chapters and the conclusions valuable, and the second, the middle chapters illuminating. For the Brazilianist, it would have been most pertinent and interesting to have had Mr Batley's views on housing and urbanization problems in relation to the general economy, at a time when the country is in the throes of its deepest recession since the 1930s depression. All in all, the book must be seen as something of a curate's egg, very worthwhile in parts, but rather disjointed in its sum.

Robin Chapman

Crisis in the Caribbean. Edited by Fitzroy Ambursley and Robin Cohen. London: Heinemann. 1983. 276 pp. Index. Pb.: £6.95.

An unambiguous Trotskyite approach characterizes the intent of the editors although its application by all of the contributors is by no means uniform. Ostensibly, this is a collection of essays concerned with the problem of socialist transformation in ten countries in the Caribbean Basin, plus an introductory chapter by the authors. It is also concerned with crisis, in three specific senses. One is at the level of the state whereby Caribbean peoples have to choose between capitalist or socialist models of development. The second lies at the level of the progressive forces of the region: how can they analyse and combat conditions of underdevelopment as 'there is certainly a good deal of confusion and uncertainty in evolving the strategies, tactics and ideologies appropriate to a socialist transformation' (p. 24)? The third is more sinister, that of the assertion of US power in the Caribbean Basin, the threat of which makes difficult any prediction of 'the exact contours of mass struggle'.

The editors are also anxious critically to oppose theories of non-capitalist development which, in their application, they see as raising even more barriers to revolution. Worse, the theory, 'which has no real basis in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin' (p. 6) in no way tackles underdevelopment, caused by class relations 'and the insertion of these countries into a subordinate relationship with the capitalist world economy' (p. 2). Alliances, even tactical,

with the parasitist, retrogressive and surrogate local ruling class, such as pursued by Manley in Jamaica, are regressive.

The substance of the alternative is, however, not clear. What may be gleaned of it involves some intelligent guesswork based on what the various contributors deplore in their analyses, rather than what is prescribed. However, Ambursley's answer for Grenadians is clear: 'a major economic realignment of Grenada with Cuba and Eastern Europe' (p. 218). He is happy to accept that a 'certain amount of domestic upheaval' would follow a sharp deepening of the revolution. But an apparent attempt at that ended in tragedy and bloodshed with the US-led invasion of that unhappy island. The same catechism is apparent in his chapter on Jamaica. But it is important to note that, in common with all other chapters, the information given on political and economic structure and recent history is very useful.

Other chapters are less prescriptive and ideological. Weber, for instance, supports the Sandinistas' respect for private property and Beauvais is critical of the creeping Sovietization of the Cuban economy in an otherwise bland essay. Dunkerley on El Salvador is difficult to comprehend given his mass of detail and near indigestible language, such as 'we are left with insuperable sociological reductionism as objectively regressive for revolutionary politics in the capitalist periphery' (p. 157). Those on Guyana by Thomas and Nanton on St Vincent are outstanding while that of Hira on Suriname contains much useful information previously denied English-speaking readers, as does that by Blérald on the French Antilles. The latter is particularly interesting in its analysis of 'assimilationist hegemony', a cultural variant upon the *dependencia* theme.

Overall, what might have been an excellent book is marred by an attempt at an ideological perspective which, although a valuable contribution to intellectual debate by itself, is difficult to apply to the countries of the Caribbean Basin given the concrete realities of their geographic position, histories and social structures. The enormous strides in social services provision by the revolutionary Cuban regime did not stop the Mariel boatlift, which is brushed aside. The restraining influence of Cuban and Soviet foreign policy on radical developments in the region is however, noted. But will the masses be peaceably persuaded to follow the path of the progressive forces in a region that has now become a top issue area for *both* superpowers?

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TONY THORNDIKE

Bibliography and reference

Political dissent: an international guide to dissident, extra-parliamentary, guerilla and illegal political movements. Compiled by Henry W. Degenhardt. Harlow, Essex: Longman. 1983. 592p. £48.00.

THIS new title in the Keesing's Reference Publications series covers organized political opposition movements currently active outside the legal structure of the state, worldwide. Legal political parties are not included. Revolutionary or liberation movements which have come to power—in Nicaragua or Zimbabwe, for instance—have also been excluded. The various peace movements active in Western industrialized nations are omitted 'as they do not present a political threat to the established state'. The arrangement of entries, which is politico-geographical, covers Eastern Europe and the USSR, Asia and the Far East, Middle East and Arab world, central and west Africa, southern Africa and Indian Ocean, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western and southern Europe, North America, Australasia and the Pacific. Within these groupings, for each country, a brief description of the established form of government and its political powerbase is followed by an outline of illegal opposition and a resumé of its recent activities. The systems of penalties for offences against the state are described; in some cases numbers of political prisoners are given.

Both internal and external movements are listed with their leadership, history, objects and a chronology of their activities. In the case of individual dissenters there is a brief outline of their ideas.

Entries vary considerably in length, by reason of the clandestine nature of a large proportion of the organizations. There is a subject index, as well as an index of personal names.

This useful if uneven compilation will need revising at frequent intervals if it is to remain a reasonably up-to-date reference tool.

Chatham House Library N.G.

World human rights guide. Compiled by Charles Humana. London: Hutchinson. 1983. 224pp. £9.95. Pb.: £5.95.

THE guide sets out by means of a questionnaire to rate the range of rights and the degree of freedom enjoyed by the inhabitants of the countries of the world, in order to enable comparisons to be made. The introductory chapters include the text of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the bulk of the work consists of the answers to the questionnaire, comments and assessment, country by country for the regions of Africa, North and Central America, South America, Asia and Australasia, and Europe. Sources acknowledged are both official and clandestine.

The countries high in the chart are, expectedly, those where information on individual and political freedom and its enforcement is easily and freely documented, while for those countries with the poorer record, often a disappointing speculative assessment is offered to the reader.

Chatham House Library N.G.

International organization and integration. Vol.II.B.–II.J. Edited by P. J. G. Kapteyn *et al.* The Hague, London: Nijhoff. 1983. 976pp. DFl.330.00; $143.50.

EARLIER volumes of this excellent compilation of treaties and other texts were reviewed in *International Affairs* Summer 1983. The present volume covers regional organizations (other than the European Communities) of a broad political, economic or military nature, as distinct from the 'functional' bodies reserved for Volume II.K. As before, it includes brief accounts of history, structure and activities.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1982. Edited by Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels. Bonn: Europa Union for the Institut für Europäische Politik. 1983. 535pp. Index. DM 78.00.

THE third edition of this admirable yearbook follows the lines of its predecessor, reviewed in *International Affairs* Autumn 1983, although the articles are slightly fewer and shorter. They cover in detail the institutions and policies of the Communities; pressure groups and public opinion; and the European policy of the member states, with Spain and Portugal. The editors claim that the bibliographical, chronological and documentary sections have been found particularly useful. All texts are given in German only.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Official publications of Western Europe. Vol. 1: Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and Turkey. Edited by Eve Johansson. London: Mansell. 1984. 313pp. Index. £28.00.

THE title of this work promises much, but the performance gives even more. It supplies an eminently practical guide to official publications and how to obtain them, with accounts of their bibliographic control and their availability in the libraries of the country concerned. Grey literature and local government publishing are included. Each chapter, written by a national, is rounded off by a short bibliography which includes non-official material. Apart from its main purposes, the book is useful as a guide to administrative structure. The chief criticism relates to the subject index, which is full of the most unlikely entries. Many librarians will find this a work of great value.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

American foreign policy: basic documents, 1977–1980. Washington, DC: Department of State. 1983. 1458p. Index. $27.00.

THIS is a very welcome resumption of a series last published in 1969, when 1967 was covered; the gap will be filled by two future volumes, and annual publication will begin again with

1981. The present work is admirably produced, giving an impression of compactness despite its bulk. The contents consist mainly of the statements, messages and interviews of government spokesmen, but include some treaties, United Nations texts and miscellaneous documents. Arrangement is by topic, for global and general matters, and by region; an index is provided.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

The Far East and Australasia 1983–84. 15th edn. London: Europa. 1983. 912pp. £50.00.
The Middle East and North Africa 1983–84. 30th edn. London: Europa. 1983. 721pp. £40.00.

BOTH these yearbooks have been streamlined in format, with fewer but larger pages and more compact statistical presentation. Brief regional articles—including new ones on 'Islamic politics in the Middle East' and 'The Pacific Basin'—and sections on regional organizations are followed by the country surveys. These often provide the most up-to-date available political and economic overviews of the nations concerned, with very full directories. Their pre-1945 content has been drastically curtailed in favour, it is claimed, of increased coverage of recent events. The publishers fail to mention that the useful who's whos have disappeared.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Select documents on India's foreign policy and relations. 1947–1972. Vol. 1. Compiled by A. Appadorai. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. 751pp. Index. £22.00. (First published in Delhi, 1982.)

THIS is designed as a companion to the compiler's and M. S. Rajan's *India's foreign policy and relations 1947–72*. Documents are divided somewhat artificially into five groups: 'foreign policy' (general principles), 'foreign relations' (with individual countries), 'foreign economic policy', 'promotion of international peace' and 'diplomacy'. The present volume, the first of two, contains the first group and that part of the second which deals with Pakistan, Bangladesh and China. The contents are mainly diplomatic correspondence, official statements, United Nations texts, and treaties and agreements.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Atlas of the Third World. By George Thomas Kurian. London: Mansell. 1983. 373p. £47.50.

BY the author of the three volume *Encyclopedia of the Third World* (1982), the *Atlas* aims to depict important aspects of the current economic political and social conditions in the developing countries in South America, Asia, Africa and Oceania.

In the first part, fourteen broad topics including population, health, food and agriculture, aid, defence, education and law enforcement are analysed in a series of maps, as well as in statistical graphic form, in order to enable comparisons to be made. The stylized maps in this section are entirely devoid of names and the use of confusing shades of red/pink make it practically impossible to effect exact analysis. No sources are given for the data represented in each case.

The second part, devoted to alphabetically arranged profiles of eighty developing countries, is clearer in layout and more useful. Maps are larger and display at least the named capital and sometimes a major geographical landmark—a lake, a bay, or a river.

Basic economic data are represented graphically in each case, in a set pattern. Geographical, ethnic and natural resources data are in map form.

Most of the information found in the *Atlas of the Third World* is available from other sources such as the *World Bank atlas*, published annually, which displays admirably more recent, sourced, data.

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Books reviewed, Spring 1984

'Our and the world's advantage': the constructive Commonwealth

SHRIDATH RAMPHAL*

The role which any grouping of states can play in world affairs is determined at least in part by the global setting in which it functions. Today, the global setting in which the Commonwealth functions is a particularly challenging one. Heightened suspicion and confrontation between the two superpowers; a decline in the spirit and practice of internationalism, including diminished support for the United Nations; a rise of militarism and increased disregard for established rules and principles of world order; an accelerating arms race acting as both a threat to human survival and a menace to development; a global economic recession from which recovery worldwide is halting: a virtual standstill in the North–South dialogue on international economic cooperation, and faltering responses to the desperate needs of the world's poorest people; failure of the world's financial institutions adequately to adapt to the changed conditions of the 1980s: the environment is unpropitious to multilateral cooperation.

Conversely, however, the need for such cooperation was never greater. The apparent drying-up of political will for change in many international quarters means that fresh opportunities, and responsibilities, devolve upon those organizations equipped to make a creative contribution. The modern Commonwealth is, I believe, such an organization. Its unique evolution has given it a character significantly different from other international organizations—different in ways which enable it to contribute distinctively to contemporary affairs. The form of this contribution will be shaped, both as to constraints and as to advantages, by the Commonwealth's essential nature, deriving from its history.

A beneficiary of the British political tradition of pragmatism, the Commonwealth is most of all a pragmatic, practical association. In many respects it is indeed a 'concert of convenience', in the evocative phrase of Professor Bruce Miller, the Commonwealth's Australian historian.[1] It exists because it has been found by its members to be useful. How it is useful, what it is in the Commonwealth's character which makes it so, and whence that character historically derives, are my subjects in this article.

I write with the experience of last November's Commonwealth heads of government meeting in New Delhi still fresh in mind. It was both the spirit and the form of India's decision in 1949 to remain in the association, and the desire of the older Dominions that it should do so, which made the modern Commonwealth possible. India was the first Asian, first non-white member, and later the first republic to be a member. Republican status, in particular, had profound implications for the Commonwealth relationship—a link no longer fashioned from allegiance to the British Crown but from acceptance of Britain's monarch as symbolic head of a Commonwealth pluralistic in forms of political organization as well as in races and religions. In going to New Delhi in 1983, the modern Commonwealth was going

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1 J. D. B. Miller, *The Commonwealth in the world*, 3rd edn (London: Duckworth, 1965), pp. 271–2, and *Survey of Commonwealth affairs, problems of expansion and attrition 1953–69* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 524–5.

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back to its roots, seeking there reaffirmation of its deepest principles and of their continuing relevance to the eighties.

New Delhi did not fail the Commonwealth. I would go further and claim it as among the more successful of Commonwealth summits. It did not produce as spectacular a political advance as the 1979 meeting in Zambia, which signposted Zimbabwe's road to nationhood; yet New Delhi was perhaps even more of a triumph for the principles of multilateral diplomacy, coming as it did at a time when those principles had been ill-served in other major international meetings: in UNCTAD VI, in the GATT ministerial meeting, in Cancún, and in the Geneva disarmament talks which actually broke down while Commonwealth leaders were in session.

New Delhi illustrated that one of the Commonwealth's strengths is in the ideas and ideals which inform action. The Commonwealth does not belong to the world of major power blocs, it has no first-rank power among its members (a positive advantage in the quest for consensus), but it does aspire to influence, and it can only do so from positions of principle. Commonwealth leaders have repeatedly found it useful to summon up the Commonwealth's basic principles in order to give consistency, heart and direction to their conclusions. The two declarations made in India, the New Delhi statement on action to resolve the global economic crisis and the Goa declaration pledging Commonwealth efforts towards a relaxation of world tension, were calls to specific action. Yet, like the 1981 Melbourne declaration on ending global economic inequalities, they were rooted in shared beliefs in human equality and the rights of the individual to self-determination and self-expression, and in the idea of cooperation to promote international understanding and world peace. These beliefs were articulated preeminently at Singapore in 1971 in the declaration of Commonwealth principles, later amplified by the 1979 Lusaka declaration on racism and racial prejudice. The things the Commonwealth does best together are things it does because it believes them to be right. The Gleneagles agreement of 1977 against apartheid in sport is a case in point; it exemplifies collective Commonwealth endeavour resulting in precise undertakings firmly founded on Commonwealth principles. Professor Miller's 'concert of convenience' has a moral orchestration.

And if New Delhi did not fail the Commonwealth, neither did the Commonwealth New Delhi, because the solid advances made there, with the daughter of Nehru in the chair, were in fulfilment of the clear-sighted expectations with which Nehru took India into the Commonwealth. As he had explained to his people, India joined the association 'obviously because we think it is beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance'.[2] In 1953, having gained an insider's experience, he told the Lok Sabha:

> I think we have gained positively by being in the Commonwealth. Definitely so. During the past five years specially, many avenues have opened out to us which may not have been open if we had not been there . . . we have somewhat affected world policies, not only directly in so far as we can, but to some extent indirectly also, through the Commonwealth, and I think that that is to our and the world's advantage.[3]

2 Speech to Indian Constituent Assembly, 16 May 1949, cited in N Mansergh, ed. *Documents and speeches on British Commonwealth affairs 1931–1952* (London Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol II, p. 853.

3 India, Lok Sabha Debates, 1953, part II, Vol 2, coll. 2244 6, cited in N Mansergh, ed , *Documents and speeches on Commonwealth affairs 1952 1962* (London Oxford University Press, 1963), p 754

'Our and the world's advantage' eloquently conveys the dual character of Commonwealth purposes. The hallmark of collective Commonwealth action over the years has been a sustained endeavour to render the association of direct benefit to every member state and, where appropriate, to employ that same combined energy to advance international causes serving all their interests and, it may be said without false pride, often the world's with them.

In its evolution, the modern Commonwealth benefited from certain distinct characteristics which equip it to play a particular role on the international scene. That role is to enable, to make connections, to work at the interfaces of the international system, to build bridges between different political, economic and geographical interests; it is a role of searching for compromise and consensus in the service of the association's membership and the international community as a whole.

The Commonwealth's profile is inevitably formed by its origins in the postwar movement of decolonization. Not surprisingly, therefore, critics have portrayed the Commonwealth as a largely anomalous institution resting on little else besides its 'club' atmosphere and the intangible links that derive from shared historical experience; others have been led by those historical origins to level charges of neo-colonialism. The evidence argues the very opposite of either neo-colonialism or irrelevance. Irrelevance can hardly be ascribed to an organization which for several decades has commanded the voluntary support of an expanding community. In these hard-headed times, international organizations are judged increasingly as delivery systems; governments are prepared to expend time, energy and finance to support them only if they offer concrete returns. The association has constantly to earn the continued commitment of participating states. Membership, and continuing membership, is not automatic but an act of choice; and it is not one dictated by self-evident criteria such as geographical proximity, religious and ethnic identity or coincidence of specific interests and attitudes.

The range and diversity of the Commonwealth is well typified by a comparison of the three latest members: Brunei, St Christopher and Nevis and Maldives. Between them they encompass the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and south-east Asia; Christianity and Islam; one oil-rich economy and two small island states with very limited resources. Such increases in membership have refreshed the association continually with the contrasts, concerns and creativity of the newest countries. Since the great majority of Commonwealth nations are from the Third World—many of them playing important, sometimes leading, roles in the Group of 77 and the non-aligned movement—the Commonwealth cannot but be a channel for expressing their most urgent concerns. It is one of the basic Commonwealth strengths, however, that implicit in its membership is the recognition that old colonial confrontations must give way to new cooperation and the awareness of the world's deepening interdependence. Since the association also includes the industrialized, 'Northern' nations of Britain and the old Commonwealth, from three different regions, the concerns of developed countries equally cannot be absent from its major deliberations. The coming together of North and South, in an atmosphere of friendship and understanding, gives the Commonwealth connection an unusual tensile strength and a special contemporary relevance.

From the very nature of its membership, the Commonwealth has a special opportunity of responding to that need. Indeed, it has a vested interest in bridging the differences between North and South, since to some degree its very survival

depends upon the continuous perception and exploration of common ground. The quest for consensus among differing power and interest groups is now an imperative of global political realities. The interdependence of Commonwealth membership accurately reflects the interdependence of contemporary world society. It is hardly surprising that, despite its critics, the Commonwealth is not withering away with the ending of colonialism but finding new strengths in service, if not in sentimentality, amid prevailing international conditions.

In New Delhi, interdependence, the fusion of different kinds of power and interest, was dramatically highlighted by a meeting of three women. When Mrs Thatcher was welcomed by Mrs Gandhi, and when both were received by the Head of the Commonwealth who is head of state of eighteen of its member countries, West and East, North and South, the First World and the Third, came together in the service of the larger principles of international cooperation, peace and understanding which had brought all the leaders to India. More than symbolically, an exceptional chemistry was at work in New Delhi.

In Commonwealth affairs, that chemistry is not the exclusive property of the biennial summits, but a feature of all Commonwealth occasions. In the governmental sphere it is to be found right down the scale, from the regular meetings of Ministers of Finance, Law, Education, Health and Labour (meetings of Ministers of Industry and of Women's Affairs are also on the forthcoming calendar), through regional meetings to specialized workshops. It justifies the increasing Commonwealth practice by which ministers take advantage of other major international meetings to explain and explore positions among themselves, as Commonwealth trade ministers did before the GATT ministerial meeting in 1982 and as ministers of health and food regularly do before their WHO and FAO conferences. And at the non-governmental level Commonwealth professionals and like-minded individuals further their interests and exchange experience in a whole range of fields. The multifarious activities of the voluntary 'Commonwealth of peoples' (seen at its best in the Commonwealth Games) valuably underpin governmental cooperation and consultation. These constituent elements of the chemistry produce a Commonwealth style and method which go far towards defining the association's differences from other international organizations, explaining the relative success of its dialogue and attesting to its value to the international community.

So pronounced are these differences that the eminent Commonwealth lawyer Sir William Dale, in an article based on his book *The modern Commonwealth* has inquired: 'Is the Commonwealth an international organization?' before concluding that it is, though 'of an exceptional nature, having certain special qualities, derived from its long history, which are not possessed by the generality of international organizations'.[4] They have also led Dr A. J. R. Groom of the University of Kent to conclude, in a recent anthology, that the Commonwealth 'is an unusual but legitimised and useful part of the institutional structure of contemporary world society' and, in a telling phrase, that 'the world could survive without it, but not as well'.[5] Increasingly, I find that said to me, in different ways, by a variety of people beyond the Commonwealth.

4 W. Dale, 'Is the Commonwealth an international organisation?' in *Commonwealth Law Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No 2 (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, April 1983), pp 635, 655, reprinted from *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 31 (London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, July 1982), see also W. Dale, *The modern Commonwealth* (London, Butterworth, 1983)

5. A. J R. Groom and P Taylor, eds. *The Commonwealth in the 1980s* (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 303.

Commonwealth chemistry: the ingredients

There is no secret about the essentials of the Commonwealth's style and method which give it an appeal to the international community and make it both useful and unique among its organizations. Flexibility, informality, friendliness, direct speaking, trust and optimism are basic to the style. And over the years, the style has given rise to a method which incorporates such features as a preference for minimal bureaucratic procedures, small meetings rather than large (or, at summits, thrashing out difficult issues in small informal groups before putting a consensus to the main conference), and direct personal contact between decision-makers in dialogue assisted by the shared facility of the English language. The facility of a common language is truly a priceless heritage from an imperfect past. It builds on the common heritage of law, administration, education and business methods which forms a firm foundation for cooperative endeavours. These are all distinctive assets which have evolved with the association and which survive undiminished. Common to the association's meetings at all levels, they are best exemplified at its summits.

Modern suspicions of summitry stem from the type of summits in which the international community has too frequently become involved: over-prepared, brief-ridden encounters which do little to encourage movement from rigid national positions. At many international meetings, not just at summit level, political dialogue easily becomes lost in the thickets of bureaucracy or stifled by the contentions between bloc or group positions. Commonwealth experience, by contrast, proves the advantages of regular meetings of Commonwealth leaders and ministers, conducted in a friendly spirit, conditioned by a family atmosphere, seeking agreement and advancement. The political decision-making which alone can bring about change is best achieved if the politicians themselves are directly involved and are not repeating lines scripted for them by their officials.

The Commonwealth's membership has grown dramatically—nine in 1954, forty-nine thirty years later. Over those years the style and format of Commonwealth summits have been very carefully nurtured and adapted to preserve the essential virtues of friendship, flexibility, informality and direct contact within this much larger family. In New Delhi, for example, the oval table in the not over-large conference chamber was specially designed to encourage intimate, informal discussion. The conference room itself was contracted down from a much larger one in the Vigyan Bhavan—as had been the case at Melbourne in 1981. Moreover, it might surprise many to learn how few and short are the position papers prepared in the Commonwealth Secretariat for heads of government meetings. The object is to leave the way clear for fresh encounters of minds and feelings in an attempt to facilitate real dialogue and genuine consensus.

At Commonwealth summits the views of every leader have equal weight, so that individual qualities can emerge and improve a dialogue conducted in a spirit of mutual respect and free from rancour or confrontation. Over the years the Commonwealth has been enriched by the political and social philosophies of a variety of world leaders from countries great and small. Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and Pierre Trudeau have been to the fore in recent years in providing a humane and philosophical context to consideration of particular issues. These and other Commonwealth elder statesmen form a link between the Commonwealth of Lester Pearson and Harold Macmillan and the Commonwealth of Ieremia Tabai of Kiribati, who passionately articulated the concerns of the Commonwealth's new small island

nations in New Delhi. The association has gained immeasurably from the wisdom and experience of other highly individual leaders, such as Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. The Commonwealth, however, is about partnership, even of the most individual talents, and it was entirely in the Commonwealth spirit that the creative impetus for the new Commonwealth came from statesmen of both the Third World and the First, principally from Nehru and from Attlee, when a solution was sought in 1949 to permit India's continued membership as a republic. Similarly, Nkrumah's example of independence to Africa in 1957 was later matched by Macmillan's appreciation of the power of the wind of change (a phrase first used by Macmillan in Accra and repeated, with celebrated impact, in Cape Town).

The value placed by Commonwealth leaders on direct personal contact with and ease of access to their colleagues has been demonstrated by the willingness of leaders from both North and South to bring their personal initiatives to the Commonwealth conference table. The Commonwealth summit thus sometimes acts as a sounding-board for ideas which will receive fuller articulation elsewhere; sometimes it is a significant element in a broader political strategy. The Sri Lankan initiative which led the UN General Assembly to adopt a declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was first raised for discussion by Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike at the Commonwealth's Singapore summit in 1971. And Commonwealth discussions can be not only a starting-point but also a stimulus for initiatives already well launched. Pierre Trudeau brought to New Delhi last year his important ideas for a 'third rail' of 'confidence and communication' to give political energy and firmer political will to disarmament negotiations and the whole East–West relationship. In New Delhi it received substantial encouragement from all Commonwealth leaders, support later spelt out in the Goa declaration on international security. New Delhi also offered an opportunity to Robert Muldoon of New Zealand to seek still wider support for his views on restructuring the global economy, already shared by many; Commonwealth finance ministers meeting in London in 1982 had encouraged his lead by calling for an expert enquiry which resulted in the Helleiner Report *Towards a new Bretton Woods*, considered in New Delhi.

To bring informal personal contact even more prominently into play at summits, the practice has become established of organizing a 'retreat'—a weekend break which the leaders take together in relaxing surroundings, away from the main conference location, unaccompanied by advisers and undistracted by excessive media attention. The Commonwealth owes this idea, like many others, to Pierre Trudeau, and it was first featured at the Ottawa summit in 1973. The retreat has since yielded some of the most substantial gains of Commonwealth dialogue. The Gleneagles agreement in 1977, the Lusaka accord on Zimbabwe of 1979, the 1981 Melbourne declaration (actually worked out at the Canberra retreat) and now the Goa declaration—all were the product of dialogue in small groups and together during the retreats. An intangible but no less positive and durable benefit is the knowledge which leaders thus gain of each other and the personal relationships that develop.

A further advantage of the Commonwealth is the method of its deliberations. Unlike the great majority of international organizations which, perhaps inevitably, must take decisions by voting, the Commonwealth's long-established practice is decision-making by consensus. Consensus has served it well both in reaching decisions resolving outstanding problems or initiating immediate action, and in establishing broad areas of agreement which can be built upon at future Commonwealth meetings or which can benefit other international negotiations in

which Commonwealth members participate. Increasingly, consensus decision-making is gaining currency in the broader international community. Agreement on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which itself owes much to a succession of gifted Commonwealth internationalists, was very nearly reached in December 1982 by consensus—and it remains to be seen whether a few countries can go it alone in defiance of the consensus approved by the many or whether, as is to be hoped, internationalism eventually triumphs. The search for consensus is a bridge-building pursuit. To promote it can only be to the detriment of confrontation. Consensus may not always emerge; but the process of reaching after it is a 'healing' one.

The United Nations has been the major sufferer from confrontational politics. Yet the UN must remain the natural focus of hope for all our futures. The Commonwealth's function is a supportive one—to work for a fully operational and effective world organization. The Commonwealth has drawn inspiration from the internationalist ideals enshrined in the UN Charter. In its turn, it must welcome every opportunity for its own practices and proposals to assist in clearing blocked UN machinery and enabling the organization to adapt in order to reflect more accurately the needs and aspirations of the international community as it faces the twenty-first century.

None of this is meant to imply that the Commonwealth is immune from the ills of our time which afflict other bodies. What happens is that the Commonwealth ambiance sometimes permits those ills—North–South divisions, for example—to be seen as less terminal than they appear elsewhere, and more amenable to rational and concerted treatment. It enlarges hope and encourages effort. All problems benefit from the kind of appraisal which the Commonwealth's multidimensional membership can make. The special value of Commonwealth dialogue is that it operates within a cross-cultural community dedicated to keeping alive the values of pluralism. In this the Commonwealth is meeting the needs of its times. It is broadly representative, and proud to be, of our modern interdependent multiracial world, a multi-ethnic global society of a kind already glimpsed in many major cities. The Commonwealth will inevitably attract, as it has done already, the hostile rhetoric of racialism. It must not be deterred, however, from contributing as it uniquely can to building a more cooperative international system which is among other things a requirement for durable peace.

On the evidence, the Commonwealth is a contemporary organization equipped to make a special contribution to the well-being of its members and towards the resolution of some of the daunting problems facing the international community. I recall a message Malcolm Fraser sent to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London in the run-up to the 1981 summit. He declared:

> We should not underestimate the importance of our own will and determination in thinking about what the Commonwealth can or cannot do. The scope for Commonwealth action is not fixed by some objective law. To a very considerable extent it depends on our own attitudes and commitments. Of course, there are objective limits, but we should not allow timidity or exaggerated modesty to circumscribe that role unnecessarily. Indeed, we should be alert to any opportunity to expand it.

The history of Commonwealth collective action, particularly over the last decade, affords numerous examples of the association seizing its opportunities 'to our and the world's advantage'; but one area especially has been the focus of sustained effort: the

search for agreement on international economic issues. Here the Commonwealth, with its membership from both North and South, has special responsibilities. Advocacy of international economic equity is a logical consequence of the Commonwealth's own evolution as an association of both rich and poor nations. The 1971 Singapore declaration identified the progressive removal of the existing wide disparities of wealth as a major aim, and pledged Commonwealth efforts to overcoming poverty, ignorance and disease, raising standards of living and 'achieving a more equitable international society'. Four years later, in Kingston, Jamaica, heads of government squarely placed the Commonwealth at the service of efforts to bring about a re-ordered international economic system.

Promoting a new world order

The manner in which the Commonwealth embarked on its quest for international equity is instructive. It began not merely as a result of pressure from the South (at a meeting which was chaired by Michael Manley, a powerful champion of Third World interests), but out of an initiative by Harold Wilson over commodities, which was broadened in discussion to embrace the new international economic order as a whole. A major Commonwealth concern thus originated in a North–South partnership for change, just as the Commonwealth was later to take up the issue of reform of the Bretton Woods institutions with developing countries supporting the initiative taken by Robert Muldoon, leader of a developed member country.

The mechanism employed to fulfil the 1975 mandate set a Commonwealth precedent and established a pattern. A high-level group of experts was set up drawing a membership of recognized eminence from both North and South. The normal barriers between governmental and non-governmental expertise were also crossed in the group's composition; the experts served in their individual capacities but worked and reported within the intergovernmental framework provided by official mandate with professional support coming from the Commonwealth Secretariat: an arrangement combining independent professional judgement with a capacity for official consideration and implementation. The brief of this first group of experts, the McIntyre Group—so-called after its chairman Alistair McIntyre, the eminent Grenadian economist and international civil servant—was to propose ways of narrowing the growing economic gap between the developed and developing countries. Its report[6] established itself as a timely and constructive analysis of the issues involved in the North–South dialogue, and gave the Commonwealth a rightful prominence as a forum for clarification and creative consideration of North–South matters.

Since then, Commonwealth involvement in the dialogue has grown steadily. Each subsequent heads of government meeting has set up at least one expert group of prominent professionals of North and South to examine major international economic issues and suggest ways to solutions. Each has produced a report known, for convenience, by the name of its chairman. The London meeting in 1977 resulted in the Campbell Report on the Common Fund for commodity price stabilization.[7] The call of the 1979 Lusaka meeting for an examination of constraints to global economic growth led to the Arndt Report, *The world economic crisis*.[8] The 1981 Melbourne

6. *Towards a new international economic order* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1977).
7. *The Common Fund* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1977).
8. *The world economic crisis: a Commonwealth perspective* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980).

meeting set up two groups: the results were the Cairncross Report, '*Protectionism: threat to international order*,'[9] and the Clark Report, *The North–South dialogue*.[10] Also, finance ministers called in 1982 for an examination of the whole Bretton Woods system of international financial and economic institutions, foremost among them the World Bank and the IMF. They thus charged the Commonwealth machinery with its most far-reaching task to date: the preparation of the first study since Bretton Woods made under intergovernmental auspices in the clear context of a political acknowledgement of the need for reform.

The group, chaired by Professor Helleiner of Toronto University, produced the report, *Towards a new Bretton Woods*,[11] which filled an obvious international need for an in-depth professional study conducted not as a polemic by North or South but as a joint North–South exploration. Finance ministers forwarded the Helleiner Report to New Delhi, where the reports on protectionism and the North–South negotiating process were also considered. In its turn, New Delhi gave rise to a further expert group charged with examining the developing-country debt problem. New Delhi also moved the Commonwealth's detailed examination of global financial and trading reform, so ably launched by the Helleiner Report, to an intensive governmental level by the establishment of an intergovernmental consultative group, which is now at work and will report to finance ministers in September.

I claimed above that the Commonwealth role was to be supportive of and complementary to the efforts of the United Nations. The constructive input into the international system made by the Commonwealth expert groups is practical evidence of this role. The McIntyre Report helped to move action forward at the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly. The Campbell Report on the Common Fund was the basis for discussions at a Commonwealth trade ministers' meeting which helped to produce the breakthrough at the UN on the Common Fund proposal. The Arndt Report on the world economic crisis received much attention at the Eleventh Special Session on development. More recently, the Cairncross Report on protectionism was widely acclaimed by both developed and developing countries at the 1982 GATT ministerial meeting. In 1983 both the Cairncross Report and the Clark Report on the North–South dialogue were official documents at UNCTAD VI in Belgrade, and the latter report's proposals for improving the negotiating process were acknowledged as timely and valuable by many participants. Indeed, the Clark Report has been widely hailed as a major contribution towards perfecting the process of dialogue. Its ideas have been carried further by the second Brandt Commission Report, *Common crisis* (which also drew on the Cairncross Report). The Clark Report was a precursor to last year's New Delhi declaration of the non-aligned movement and the Buenos Aires declaration of the Group of 77. The Helleiner Report remains relevant to the continuing effort to make the global financial and economic institutions better geared to the world of the 1980s.

The work of the Commonwealth expert groups demonstrates that the Commonwealth, to 'our and the world's advantage', has been fulfilling its quota of intellectual leadership on issues which have defied ready solution within the international system. The establishment by the Commonwealth of these small groups of highly professional experts from both North and South has enabled the development of thrusts which

9. *Protectionism. threat to international order. the impact on developing countries* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1982).

10. *The North–South dialogue. making it work* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1982)

11. *Towards a new Bretton Woods* (London. Commonwealth Secretariat, 1983).

offer better negotiating possibilities than proposals prepared by any single country or interest group. At a time of North–South stalemate, the possibilities which the Commonwealth's expert reports offer as a basis for negotiations have attracted considerable international attention.

At this stage in the 1980s the Commonwealth's track record of contributing creatively to the North–South dialogue has placed it in a position to exert considerable intellectual influence internationally on both the form and the substance of the dialogue. And as the impasse persists, the Commonwealth must do all in its power to act as a catalyst in getting the dialogue going once more. The association's commitment to the achievement of a more equitable and efficient global economy, responsive to the changing needs of the international community which the modern Commonwealth well represents, is an enduring one for the future.

Caring about Commonwealth partners

The other side of the Commonwealth's concern with the structure of the global economy is its practical work for development. The evolution of the Commonwealth to its present character could not have occurred without this underpinning of everyday cooperation. In this the association can claim to have been a front-runner. In 1950, it was a Commonwealth initiative that led to the launching of the Colombo Plan to assist all Asian countries, not only Commonwealth members, to 'raise their living standards', and to 'focus world attention on the development problems of the area'. The Colombo Plan provided an early example of the Commonwealth working both for its members and more broadly, to 'our and the world's advantage'. Through it, the Commonwealth helped to pioneer the idea of multilateral cooperation to meet the developmental needs of the Third World, at a time when the whole concept of development was only just beginning to emerge as an international priority. It is a tribute to the Commonwealth pioneers that the Plan is still in operation, with a membership of twenty developing and six developed countries.

Changed circumstances necessitate different institutions, and the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965 was a recognition both of the evolution of the Commonwealth to that point and of its increased potential. The rapid growth in membership during the early 1960s encouraged governments to consider the establishment of a central organization to coordinate the association's expanding activities. The need to extend technical cooperation was one of the main purposes of the decision taken in 1964 to replace British organization of the association's affairs with an internationally staffed secretariat funded by and serving all member states. The communiqué issued by heads of government that year was explicit in its commitment to explore 'how best the members of the Commonwealth could make a further distinctive contribution of their own to the development of its member countries'. And they further stipulated that 'the purpose of any new initiative in this respect should be not merely to increase the economic strength and material well-being of the recipients . . . but also to strengthen the links between the countries of the Commonwealth by encouraging their peoples to work more closely together in a variety of practical ways'.

Today the Commonwealth's cooperative programmes cover education, science, health, law, management development, industrial development, export market development, food production and rural development and broader economic cooperation. In addition, three important across-the-board, multidisciplinary

programmes have been mounted. One of these, the Commonwealth Youth Programme, operating through permanently established regional centres, is aimed at promoting the involvement of the young in the development of their communities. The second assists the participation of women, on a basis of full equality, in all major spheres of activity in member countries. The third, launched in 1979, is a programme tailored for island developing and other specially disadvantaged member states encountering particular difficulties caused by a combination of smallness, geographical isolation and extremely limited human and natural resources. Moreover, recognizing that human resources are one of the greatest assets in development, the Secretariat has recently taken steps to coordinate its activities affecting this field by combining several programmes into a Human Resources Development Group.

The Commonwealth has, of course, to be guided not only by high aspirations but also by a realistic sense of its capabilities. Hence the stress laid in the 1964 communiqué on a 'distinctive' contribution. An appropriate and typically unusual structure for funding and managing cooperative activities was created with the establishment in 1971 of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC). What makes the CFTC a unique mechanism for mutual assistance is that its finances are supplied by all member countries and that it operates on the principle that development expertise is often more satisfactorily transferred from one developing country environment to another than from a developed to a developing country. Thus, the majority of the experts sent from one member country at the request of another and of places for Commonwealth trainees at training centres are provided by Commonwealth developing countries themselves. For these reasons, the CFTC is an acknowledged pioneer of TCDC—Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries. Through it, the Commonwealth has made a conceptual contribution, backed up by practical example, to South–South cooperation. The CFTC continues to look for new ways of improving its service to member countries. At New Delhi, Commonwealth leaders endorsed a system of forward planning in three-year cycles with pledges encouraged on a multi-year basis. Here too, the Commonwealth is offering a lead to others.

Governments have shown the value they place on the CFTC's proven relevance to their needs by pledging additional resources, despite the economic difficulties most members have faced in recent years. From modest beginnings of £400,000 in 1971 the Fund's finances have grown to an expected £26 million by 1985–6. At New Delhi, Commonwealth leaders were heartwarming in their praise for the CFTC's cost-effectiveness and its efficient, flexible and unbureaucratic handling of requests for assistance.

The thread of concern for the welfare of individual members is woven strongly into the Commonwealth's evolution. The association's effort to be of service to all its members has entailed a readiness by governments to use it as a means of providing extra collective assistance that might be needed by an individual member undergoing a period of crisis or particular hardship. In 1972, for example, the Commonwealth marshalled crash aid contributions to assist Bangladesh to surmount the devastation of the war through which it had gained its independence. Similarly, in 1979, with the fall of the Amin regime, the Commonwealth undertook a major interdisciplinary study on the rehabilitation of the Ugandan economy and later, in 1982, it initiated a special training programme for the Ugandan army at the request of President Obote's government. In 1983 it sent a team of experts to advise the Lesotho government, at

its request, on measures it could take to counteract the effects of South Africa's incursion the previous December.

The credibility which the Commonwealth has established internationally, but especially among its members, cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of its extensive work of technical and other assistance or of the benefits this brings both to developing and developed member states. In Britain, as distinct from developing Commonwealth countries, this work usually attracts little attention, but it was fully recognized by Sir Geoffrey Howe in an address which the Foreign Secretary gave to the Royal Commonwealth Society shortly before the New Delhi meeting. Frankly acknowledging that 'not all in Britain are now automatically convinced of the value' of the Commonwealth, he itemized a number of specific benefits Britain has gained from participation, among them access to 'a unique channel for developing contacts and understanding between the industrialized and developing world'.

If the Commonwealth were not relevant to its members, it could not be relevant to the broader international community and contribute to 'the world's advantage' through the advancement of 'certain international causes', to recall Nehru's keynote phrases. The Commonwealth is aware of its limitations on the international scene, although, as I have indicated, many of these limitations have been turned into Commonwealth strengths. It might, for example, be considered a limitation, as well as a practical impossibility, that Commonwealth members have deliberately chosen not to form a recognized voting bloc in global organizations (though occasionally they may serve as an informal pressure group operating discreetly behind the scenes). The association is thus seldom in a position to take direct action to change international conditions to advance its causes. Yet while the Commonwealth may lack political and economic power, it seeks to make its mark by influence, and by maximizing ways in which this can be constructively brought to bear. The collective opinions of the leadership of over a third of the world's nations containing a quarter of the world's people are not negligible. Similarly, at a variety of official and unofficial levels, the Commonwealth forms a vast reservoir of intellect and ability which can contribute valuably to the advancement of international causes.

Speeding decolonization

There is one outstanding exception to the rule that the Commonwealth operates to bring about change not by action but by influence. This is the vitally important area of decolonization. The Commonwealth has had a symbiotic relationship with the great movement of decolonization from which it springs. As decolonization gathered momentum, so the Commonwealth grew in membership. Today the Commonwealth's bedrock support for independence for Namibia and for self-determination and an end to apartheid in South Africa are evidence of this central concern. Over the years, Commonwealth efforts have significantly speeded the independence of countries within the British orbit, almost all of which have become members of the association. And, by example, the independence of Commonwealth members has advanced decolonization elsewhere.

Independence for the Indian subcontinent, and the subsequent growth of Afro-Asian independence movements elsewhere which saw Ghana become independent as a Commonwealth member in 1957, all took place before the swelling 'wind of change' made decolonization an international cause under the UN banner in 1960.

With Britain still at that time the world's largest colonial power, the Commonwealth provided a uniquely relevant forum for promoting this cause. The newly decolonized member states were able, through Commonwealth channels, to exert an added influence on Britain to hasten the decolonization process.

Nor did Britain, for its part, ever question their right to make use of the Commonwealth for this purpose. Indeed, on occasion it called upon the association to give practical assistance by monitoring particular exercises in self-determination that had to be carried out in difficult political situations. The Commonwealth played this role in the elections held in preparation for the independence of both Guyana and Mauritius, and also in the 1967 referendum which established, for the benefit of a somewhat sceptical international community, that the overwhelming majority of Gibraltarians really did want to remain British.

The one colonial issue that gave rise to serious strains within the Commonwealth was, of course, Southern Rhodesia. Rhodesia remained a dominant Commonwealth concern from UDI in 1965 until Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The communiqués issued in the years immediately following UDI made no attempt to minimize the divergence between Britain and the newer member countries which were seeking to pressure it into taking firmer action to crush Ian Smith's rebellion. Yet in the end it was the Commonwealth which provided the framework for bringing Zimbabwe to independence on the basis of majority rule, through the agreement with all Commonwealth leaders worked out in 1979 in Lusaka. British spokesmen have themselves admitted that it was very doubtful whether Britain would have been able to achieve the Lancaster House independence settlement if it had not been for that Commonwealth agreement. The activities of a Commonwealth observer group in monitoring the pre-independence elections in Zimbabwe, in helping to keep the electoral process on course and pronouncing it free and fair, played a notable part in securing international acceptance for the result, thus materially assisting Zimbabwe's progress to independence. Later in the same year, the Commonwealth's monitoring function was extended to elections in an independent country, at the request of all parties concerned, when Uganda sought a return to normality after the devastation of the Amin years.

The Commonwealth was also able to take direct, if discreet, action to assist Belize, whose independence had been for so long delayed because of the Guatemalan claim to a substantial portion of its territory. In this instance the Commonwealth, working through its Caribbean members and the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize, did take the unusual step of agreeing to form a pressure group to work in international circles, particularly in the United Nations. So successful was this effort to mobilize support for Belize's cause that by 1980 even the United States had withdrawn its backing for Guatemala. Finding itself almost totally isolated, Guatemala subsequently became more amenable in the negotiations with Britain, making it possible for Belize to proceed to independence in 1981; Belize remains on Commonwealth agendas, however, since the dispute over the Guatemalan claim remains unresolved.

An outstanding cause, linked to decolonization, to which the multiracial Commonwealth has staunchly dedicated itself, has been the elimination of racism in all its forms. So far as collective action is concerned, Commonwealth leaders inevitably have focused most of their energies on the problem of South Africa. They have consistently recognized, as they did in New Delhi, that the apartheid system is the root cause not only of repression within South Africa itself but of violence and

instability throughout the region. It was the intense hostility of the Commonwealth, reinforced by a growing Afro-Asian membership, which led to South Africa's exit from the association in 1961. More recently, the Commonwealth has been active in working to reinforce UN policy on South Africa and on Namibian independence.

The Commonwealth has made a particularly distinctive contribution to the United Nations' sustained attempt to subject South Africa to maximum isolation short of full-scale mandatory sanctions. By the Gleneagles agreement of 1977 Commonwealth governments committed themselves to take all practical steps to discourage contact or competition with sporting organizations or sportsmen from South Africa. That this Commonwealth stand has largely succeeded, despite a few significant breaches, in frustrating South Africa's persistent efforts to break out of its increasing isolation in all international sport, is amply confirmed by the increasing desperation of South African efforts to circumvent the embargo. Not surprisingly in view of these efforts, at New Delhi the Commonwealth launched a new practical initiative by asking the Secretariat to cooperate with the UN in disseminating information to counteract South Africa's insidious propaganda campaign, directed mainly at certain Western countries. One recent development which has been particularly welcomed and supported by the Commonwealth has been the positive start made by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), a grouping mainly of Commonwealth countries, in pursuing the integrated development of their region as a way of reducing economic dependence on South Africa. Heads of government in New Delhi specially noted the CFTC's assistance to SADCC, which complements bilateral support from several Commonwealth governments.

The Commonwealth, then, has exhibited over the years a capacity to take the kind of action which is directly beneficial 'to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance', to recall Nehru once more. It is no accident that much of this action has been in response to situations in Africa. Africa, more than any other continent, has suffered the evils of colonization in all its dehumanizing aspects, compounded by the abhorrent doctrine of apartheid. Due to its own origins, which mandate a fundamental commitment to decolonization, the Commonwealth has a duty to provide moral leadership, even when it cannot provide political muscle, to eradicate the last vestiges of colonialism and its sinister offshoot of apartheid. Its constructive concern with developments over Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa have been, and continue to be, in accordance with this role.

Economic and political security

Colonialism implies an inequality which operates on many levels, including the human and the economic. Colonialism has been largely eradicated, but extremes of economic inequality, both between and within nations, remain a feature of contemporary society. As with decolonization, so with global economic inequality: the Commonwealth's history, composition and basic principles give it a special obligation to take action as well as to exert influence. Moreover, the Commonwealth is particularly well placed to appreciate and impart the lessons which interdependence holds for the world. The work and influence of the Commonwealth expert groups on international economic issues have already been described. The detailed aspects of Commonwealth economic discussions are the prerogative principally of Commonwealth finance ministers, who meet every year just before the annual meetings of the World Bank and the IMF. In both Bank and Fund the Commonwealth can claim

influence and, through its individual members, some power to take action, though most Commonwealth members share the conviction that the management structure of the international financial institutions does not accurately represent current political realities, most importantly the attainment of independence by over one hunded new nations since the Bretton Woods institutions were established in the 1940s. The Commonwealth finance ministers' meeting is now recognized as being of particular importance as a forum for the preliminary discussion of Bank and Fund issues and preliminary exploration of positions. It additionally provides an opportunity for the smaller countries to learn more about the issues and to have their say, an opportunity not fully provided by the large Washington fora. Some of the smaller Commonwealth members do not have embassies in capitals such as Washington, or for that matter New York and Geneva, and papers prepared for the finance ministers' meeting as well as other Commonwealth occasions are greatly valued as briefs on the current issues.

Commonwealth finance ministers have also been able to take positions on some issues which have helped to nudge along progress on the world stage. The International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan agency of the World Bank, is a particular case in point. Twice in the past, discussions at Commonwealth meetings have helped to overcome difficulties which developed over the provision of resources to IDA—the latter case arising recently when, because of the backsliding of the United States from its commitments to IDA's sixth replenishment, the maintenance of IDA lending was seriously threatened. The replenishment of IDA VII has still more recently posed an even greater threat to the already inadequate resources available to the world's poorest countries, at a time when need is greater and the recipient community has expanded to include China. The Commonwealth spoke with one voice last year, both at the finance ministers' meeting in Port-of-Spain, and at the New Delhi summit, in arguing strongly against any diminution of IDA's effectiveness. The positive role of Britain in seeking to minimize the damage done by the United States to IDA VII is in accordance with its Commonwealth role and with its highest traditions of support for multilateralism. It is to be hoped that in this crucially important matter Commonwealth influence will have a catalytic effect.

The association has also sought to bring its influence to bear in statements of political intent on economic issues. The Melbourne declaration affirmed the Commonwealth's resolve to break the circle of poverty binding so many millions throughout the world, and its will to work for solutions to global economic inequality in full acknowledgement of the facts of interdependence. The New Delhi statement on economic action recognized that, for developing countries, problems of international trade, finance and employment had been imposed on deep-seated problems of poverty and hunger, while small states had their own special economic problems. At the heart of the statement was the belief that the Commonwealth, as a representative group of developed and developing nations, was most effective when speaking with a common voice to the rest of the world. The way in which the Commonwealth itself functions was seen by leaders as proving that the North-South dialogue was not only possible but fruitful.

I have attempted up to this point to illustrate the dual aspect of Commonwealth action: its service to member nations and to the wider international community. I have also sought to show what power or influence it has deployed in this task. It would be inappropriate to fail to consider some of the ways in which our most recent collective consultation in New Delhi advanced the Commonwealth's dual objective.

The association's commitment to assist its members faced two special challenges, since the Delhi meeting took place at a moment of crisis for two member states, Cyprus and Grenada.

On Cyprus, Commonwealth leaders listened with genuine sympathy to President Kyprianou's passionate explanation of the damaging implications of the unilateral declaration of independence issued on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community only a week before the meeting opened. Ever since Turkish troops occupied the northern part of the island in 1974, Commonwealth governments have consistently demonstrated their solidarity with the government and the people, all the people, of the Republic. On this occasion they set up a five-member Commonwealth action group on Cyprus to assist in securing compliance with Security Council Resolution 541, adopted on 18 November, which had denounced the UDI of three days earlier as legally invalid and called both for its non-recognition by other states and for its immediate withdrawal. The action group met at head of government level immediately after the Delhi summit. It was agreed that consultations with the UN Secretary-General should be held as soon as possible, and I convened a meeting of foreign ministers and UN representatives from the five countries—Australia, Guyana, India, Nigeria and Zambia—for this purpose in New York in mid-December. We decided that the group's task must be to do what it could to assist Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's mission of good offices, endorsed by Security Council Resolution 541, to bring about a just solution for Cyprus. It was further agreed that the group should carry out its task through quiet diplomacy, working both in New York and the relevant capitals, and this course continues to be pursued.

The crisis in Grenada was of a different order in that it threatened to create a crisis for the Commonwealth itself. All heads of government were deeply upset by the assassination of Maurice Bishop, but they were as deeply divided over the action of some East Caribbean member countries in associating themselves in the subsequent military intervention in Grenada. In the eyes of the great majority the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention enshrined in the UN Charter should be priority principles in international relations and must be upheld no matter how much governments might deplore or fear violent events that may be taking place within a neighbouring country. But it is indicative of the constructive character of Commonwealth debate that all leaders were able to express their views in the frankest terms and that the East Caribbean leaders in particular were able without inhibition to convey to their colleagues the danger to their own countries they had sensed from developments in Grenada and which had led them to take the action they did. Both groups understood each other's positions much more clearly after that exchange. It was because of that exchange that they found it possible, while maintaining their respective positions, to reach out for a measure of accommodation and to agree that 'the emphasis should now be on reconstruction not recrimination'.

These words appeared in the communiqué paragraph on Grenada, the substance of which was agreed by heads of government in the seclusion of the retreat at Goa. During those very private discussions Commonwealth leaders agreed to reaffirm their commitment to the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. They welcomed the establishment of an interim administration in Grenada, but looked forward to its functioning free of external interference or pressure and of the presence of foreign military forces. On this basis, and noting the administration's intention to hold early elections which would be seen by the international community to be free and fair, they expressed their readiness to give 'sympathetic consideration'

to requests from Grenada for assistance. However, as the communiqué also makes clear, Commonwealth leaders took this decision in the belief that the countries of the Caribbean community would be able to return to the spirit of fraternity and cooperation that had formerly animated their relations.

The 'expectations' of Commonwealth leaders at Goa have not all been fulfilled. On the contrary, a process of 'militarization' of the Caribbean, one of the ills to which the act of intervention was itself a response, seems to be in train. The result could be continuing problems, and not only for the Commonwealth.

The Grenada issue had many dimensions. The Commonwealth's strong reaction to the intervention was both predictable and inevitable, as had been its reaction against Argentina's military intervention in the Falklands the year before. Indeed, had Britain been associated with the United States in the act of military intervention in Grenada—as some have suggested it should have been—the consequences would have been appallingly serious for the Commonwealth. But the Grenada affair also highlighted that the new phenomenon of small states requires much more imaginative responses from the international community than it has so far received. With as many as twenty small states (that is, states with populations of less than five hundred thousand each) among its members, the Commonwealth, in fact, had been focusing on their special needs for some time, particularly in the context of development. Events in Grenada now underlined in addition the basic insecurity of these states, the need to make the world a safer place for them and, in some respects at least, to make them safer for the world. This aspect of the matter was prominent in the discussions in New Delhi: indeed it was a logical result of looking towards 'reconstruction'. Additionally, however, the Commonwealth has by now accumulated a body of experience concerning the special security needs of small states: The Gambia, Lesotho, Seychelles, Vanuatu and now Grenada. Not surprisingly, Commonwealth leaders asked themselves at New Delhi: can the Commonwealth help in ensuring, perhaps by helping the larger international community to ensure, a more secure environment for all small states? As a result, I was asked to initiate an urgent study of the question, drawing as necessary from the experience and resources of the Commonwealth. This study is now in hand. It offers a major intellectual challenge, a challenge to the Commonwealth's political improvization. It offers, therefore, another opportunity for the Commonwealth to give a lead in a matter of concern to ourselves and the wider world.

The connection between the leaders' discussions on Grenada and their call for a study on small states' security which might benefit the larger international community shows how closely related are the two aspects of the Commonwealth's dual role. It is hardly surprising that, in a world dominated by superpower rivalry and riven by wars and suspicions, international security has long been a special concern of Commonwealth summits. Member governments have always been deeply conscious that the Commonwealth itself cannot take any direct action to put an end to the confrontation between the superpowers, and that the Commonwealth voice necessarily speaks from the sidelines of the East–West conflict. But at the same time they have seen themselves as having the collective potential to make a positive contribution, by means of influence and persuasion, to the relaxation of world political tensions, and on occasion have felt able to suggest solutions for resolving a particular deadlock.

As long ago as their March 1961 meeting, for example, they took the opportunity to issue a statement containing a concise set of principles as possible guidelines for

reactivating the negotiations on disarmament which had been broken off after the 'U2' incident the previous June. Six months later the United States and the Soviet Union, by then poised on the brink of the period of detente, agreed to adopt the McCloy-Zorin principles that substantially ushered in a new and relatively fruitful phase of disarmament negotiations and which, it is worth noting, were similar to the Commonwealth's statement of principles in a number of important respects. More than twenty years later, the Goa declaration on international security demonstrates the consistency of the Commonwealth quest.

It also shows the constructive nature of Commonwealth consultations. The Goa Declaration sturdily refutes the negativism which would have us believe that, in the current security climate, international institutions have a diminishing capacity to play an effective role in international affairs. Heads of government recognized the urgent need for practical steps to improve the capacity of the United Nations to fulfil the security objectives of its Charter. In this context, they undertook to play their part in helping the international community to make a positive response to the UN Secretary-General's recent call for a strengthening of the UN collective security system as well as in promoting the ethic of non-violence and adherence to the principles of peaceful settlement. The international community's moral obligation to provide effectively for protecting the territorial integrity of its smaller member states was specially acknowledged.

But the Goa declaration was also concerned with the broader aspects of international security. The most compelling impetus behind the decision to issue a separate declaration was the perception of the danger to the future of world civilization inherent in the increasingly confrontational posture of the two major military alliances in the context of the continuing build-up of nuclear weapons. Believing that East–West relations had reached the point of crisis, Commonwealth leaders asserted that it was imperative for the superpowers to summon up a vision of the world in which their nations could live in peace and that the first objective must be to work for a resumption of genuine political dialogue which would lead to a relaxation of tensions. They also recorded their belief that the Commonwealth could make a practical contribution towards encouraging them to do so in the framework of increased contacts between the people and governments of East and West in order to replace the prevailing climate of fear and mistrust with one of confidence.

Emphasizing the supreme importance of political will, Commonwealth leaders welcomed Prime Minister Trudeau's call for a new political dimension in the quest for international security and expressed readiness to help his and other efforts to restore active East–West political contact. On the subject of disarmament itself, they agreed that halting the nuclear arms race is the central issue in securing wider progress in this sphere, stressing their view that if the resources released by the disarmament process were 'in some measure' ploughed back into world development the needs of developing countries could be met to a significant degree. Herein lie the seeds of mighty ideas for a not too distant future.

Like the 1961 Commonwealth summit, the New Delhi meeting took place at a moment when disarmament negotiations had been abruptly terminated. This time, however, member governments did not attempt to formulate any clear-cut principles which might be offered to help resolve the impasse. In their judgement the priority need now is to work to change the mood of disharmony pervading the international environment. The Goa declaration was intended to be their first endeavour in this direction and the emphasis was therefore placed on striking a positive note. It is

essentially a declaration of faith, 'faith in human capacity to overcome the dangers and difficulties that threaten the world', as well as a commitment by Commonwealth leaders and governments to work together to fulfil that faith.

Last November, the Goa declaration may have seemed like a voice crying in the wilderness, out of synchronization with the discordant sounds of confrontation and challenge issuing from Moscow and Washington. Only three months later, as world leaders—including some who had been in New Delhi and helped shape the Goa declaration—greeted the new Soviet leadership and tested the wind for signs of detente, it became clear that Commonwealth leaders in Goa had caught the tide of the mood for change, responsive to the desperate need of the world's people for freedom from insecurity and fear. It began to look as if the Commonwealth's faith in humanity had not been misplaced.

Service to humanity, to Commonwealth members and through them to the wider international community, will continue to be the Commonwealth's watchword for the rest of the 1980s and beyond. I have tried to indicate some of the practical ways in which the association has been of service, and the special qualities it brings to its tasks for the future—both to the specific commissions arising from Commonwealth consultation, and to the enduring goals written into our statements of principle. As we fulfil the mandates of New Delhi in working towards next year's Commonwealth summit in the Bahamas, we do so reinforced by a sense of the Commonwealth's continuity, convinced of its contemporary relevance, and encouraged to face up, together, to the challenges of our times.

Unfinished business: the German national question and the future of Europe

EBERHARD SCHULZ*

For the Germans, the national question has been open since 1945.[1] At that time, the victorious powers were unable to agree on a final settlement to the German national problem, which was subsequently rapidly enveloped by the budding East–West conflict. Viewed from Germany, the national question has two main elements: first, how can the unity of the German nation be maintained and secured institutionally, and secondly, how can the people in that part of Germany which came under Soviet rule in 1945 gain their freedom? As a rule, these two component questions are combined, thus: how can those Germans thus far excluded from it also come to enjoy the right to self-determination? For it is taken for granted that the Germans forced to live in the second German state created by the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, would, given the chance, vote for union with the Federal Republic of Germany, thus 'to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany', as the Basic Law puts it.[2]

To define the problem thus, however, is to define it only in part. Not only the German question is open; so is the question regarding the future structure of Europe as a whole—of a continent where, since the late eighteenth century and the French Revolution, the structural principle of the nation state has gradually asserted itself. The Ottoman Empire's rule over south-eastern Europe had to give way to the advance of this principle, as did the Russo-German hegemony over Eastern Central Europe; even the multi-ethnic state collected under the Hapsburg dual monarchy proved unable to survive under the new conditions.

Europe's position in an age of bipolarity

The European structure which emerged from the final stages of this process, however, turned out to be unstable. The principle of the nation state did not permit a lasting or, most of all, peaceful cohesion of Europe. It is to the recognition of this fact that the idea of European unification, emerging during the Second World War, owes its force. And yet, the age of nation states was not replaced after that war by an era of European integration; rather, it was replaced initially by a phase of superpower

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1. For the purposes of this study the phrases 'German question' and 'national question' are employed interchangeably and refer to the open relationship between the nation and its political organization in one or several states. In the long run, the term 'nation' can be subject to change. Especially in periods of incongruence of state and nation the national question is open until a consciousness emerges allowing for the safe existence of a nation organized in several states. In this context see Eberhard Schulz, *Die Deutsche Nation in Europa* (Bonn: Europa Union, 1982). Accordingly, in using the terms 'German' or 'national question' this article will not discuss concerns relative to the Germans which have recently arisen abroad with reference only to the Federal Republic, such as those regarding tendencies towards pacifism or neutralism. Nor will it treat either the Federal Republic's current quest for its own identity, or the question whether Germans feel safe protected by an alliance in which they neither control the nuclear weapons nor in the final analysis even contribute to deployment decisions

2. Concluding sentence of the Preamble to the Basic Law.

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bipolarity which, for the time being, has forced the European structural problem off the scene. Indeed, this is a phase in which the Europeans have lost the determining influence over their fate, finding themselves divided in two in the role of wards of their respective protective and hegemonial powers.

The end of the era of nation states is not the only major historical event of this kind to which this century is witness; several other significant processes are also drawing to a close. First, the rapid rise of the two superpowers coincides with the end of the colonial era. It is not simply ushering in its second phase. Unlike the European Great Powers of a century ago, the United States is not a power whose policies are determined by an imperialist concept, and the Soviet Union proves incapable of permanently imposing its system upon the East European states, even though its stupendous military potential enables it to maintain its predominance. There is, therefore, no reason why Europeans need to resign themselves to a perpetual position of subordination to their two superpower 'guardians' as a matter of inevitability.

The assumption that this bipolar phase of dominance by the two superpowers will be only a relatively short-term phenomenon is reinforced by the fact that two further historical periods are drawing to a close in this century. One is that of intrinsic legitimation of political rule. The monarchies which still dominated the states system early this century have for the most part disappeared. Their legitimacy derived from hereditary right, certainly not from the will of their subjects. Today, the leading politicians of the Western industrialized states, and to a certain extent even those of the Soviet Union, require legitimation by the actual or (in the case of the Soviet Union) at least the alleged popular will. As a corollary of this shift, the primacy of domestic politics has inexorably been substituted for the previous primacy of foreign policy.

The primacy of domestic politics and the need for domestic legitimation, however, no longer allow the pursuit of a consistent foreign policy and thus preclude a truly imperialist foreign policy. Instead, they necessitate policies designed to maximize the citizens' prosperity, the more so since the unusually long period of increase in economic prosperity after the Second World War raised the expectations and magnified the demands of the Western industrialized states' citizens in their various groupings. The gains in productivity resulting from precipitous technological progress can no longer be accumulated primarily in the hands of the investors, but must be distributed in large part among the population, whose consumption has grown into a significant pillar of the economy. Today, expansionism founded on military means is no longer a viable means of raising the prosperity of citizens in powerful states at the expense of others; at best, such an objective can be reached by means of economic policy, and even then only to a limited extent, given the plethora of interdependencies now prevailing.

None of this, of course, rules out either aggressive behaviour by strong powers towards weak ones, or wars; but it does rule out a consistent imperialist policy, and thus a lasting subjugation by the superpowers of Europe's two parts.

The other period concluding in this century is that of the belief in the creation of a new man through education. This idea's genetic version, drawing on Darwin, foundered in National Socialism. But the pedagogical variant, too, reaching back to Rousseau and probably advanced most persistently by the Russian revolutionaries, has been robbed of its force by Stalin's brutal power politics and the disappointment of intellectual communists. In contemporary Soviet Marxist–Leninist ideology it has been hollowed out to an empty formula. According to this doctrine's proponents, two

aspects of it were particularly important to European politics: the notion that with the end of class society war would disappear from the life of nations; and the idea of internationalism, the levelling of national differences and thus of international conflicts as well as, finally, the blending of nations in the final phase of communism. Had these goals been susceptible of realization, structural problems of power politics would be nonexistent, not just in Europe but worldwide.

The failure of these ideas, though, has a direct bearing on the Soviet Union's hegemony over Eastern Europe. With its struggle against 'bourgeois remnants' in the minds of people, the Soviet leadership has precipitated a powerful nationalist countermovement both within its own borders and inside the 'socialist' countries. This movement has been given further momentum by the failure of the Soviet economic model, which could have functioned only had the education of the 'new man' succeeded. Thus, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon), the European Community's counterpart in Eastern Europe, is a stillbirth. The Soviet leadership faces, then, the dilemma that, on the one hand, the economies of the East and Central European states cannot live up to the expectations placed in them while the Soviet system must be practised there, and that on the other hand, Soviet predominance cannot be maintained indefinitely if the Soviet Union tolerates further deviation from the Soviet model. In the not too distant future developments should present the Soviet Union with the question whether other routes may not hold out greater promise of success in guaranteeing its security than the attempt to commit the East and Central European states forcibly and absolutely to its yoke.

However power relations in Europe unfold—and a reliable prognosis is of course impossible—the Europeans would do well to give some consideration to the time subsequent to the intermediate bipolar phase. For Europe, in the nuclear age and in view of worldwide economic interdependence, there can be no turning back to the age of nation states; the Europeans will be able to survive only by looking to wider horizons. However, nothing would be gained by the simple substitution of the new principle of European integration for the old principle of the nation state without ascertaining that it will make for a durable structure. After all, it was not the principle of a Europe broken down into nation states *per se* which prevented a lasting peace in Europe, but the impossibility of striking a balance between the various nation states or their alliances which would have been able to foil the hegemonial ambitions of individual members. For this reason the Europe of a future age of integration requires a structure incorporating an internal balance, or possibly some other factor, guaranteeing stability over a certain historical period. With this in mind, the content of the European question can be defined as follows: how can the nations in East and Central Europe regain their freedom, and how can things be arranged so that the European nations no longer pose any danger to each other's existence?

The German nation is by far the largest among the European nations. Following the Second World War, the East–West conflict split it in two. Each of the resulting two states is welcomed by its part of Europe as a useful member; neither is sufficiently powerful to develop hegemonial momentum inside its respective integrational group, respectively the European Community and Comecon. This may be irrelevant for Comecon, dominated as it is by the Soviet Union. The EC could be happy with 'its' Germany provided the Germans were ready to close the dossier on their national question. But there is no sign that they are prepared to do this, and hence it would be disastrous for West Germany's European partners to base their contribution to the

building of the European Community on the expectation that the Germans will resign themselves to their nation's partition. It would be similarly dangerous for the Germans to make their contribution to West European unification in the belief that one day a reunified Germany could belong to the Community, without asking themselves whether the foundations of the common West European house are sufficiently strong to carry such a substantial addition on one side, and whether their fellow lodgers are prepared to approve such an alteration of the blueprints.

This brief account shows how very closely the German and the European questions are interlinked. Against this backdrop the following few observations are offered as to what part the EC might play in German policy on the national question and under what circumstances the Federal Republic could benefit from the European Community in this context.

For such observations to possess practical value they must differentiate between short-term and long-term perspectives. In the short term, that is, approximately the period of the 1980s, the Federal Republic's policy will have to concentrate chiefly on keeping the German question open, since a lasting settlement seems all but impossible for the time being. In the process, of course, it must not lose sight of the long-term problem; indeed, a solution to the German problem along the lines of German interests is conditional upon the satisfaction of certain prerequisites in the interim. To be sure, constructing scenarios for the long-term perspective from which to derive the precise shape of this outcome is impossible; since, in the nuclear age, the Germans cannot overcome their national problem by riding roughshod over any opposition, they must develop long-range proposals which seem at least bearable, if not desirable, to their partners. Furthermore, the German people as a whole must be acquainted with such a concept—possibly in the form of a set of alternatives—if it is to support a corresponding long-term policy and not fall prey to a dangerous despair, from which some day 'delivery' might be offered by an unscrupulous Pied Piper.

Keeping open the German question as a current task of politics for the 1980s involves four highly complex aspects. First, legal acts or *de facto* situations tending adversely to prejudice a future settlement of the German question must be prevented. Secondly, the viability of West Berlin, which is subject to special circumstances on account of its peculiar geographic and legal situation, must be maintained. Thirdly, Germans in the Federal Republic owe practical solidarity to those in the GDR. The moment this lapses, any sense of national belonging will be forfeit in the Federal Republic; nor could the GDR's population then be expected to retain such a sense. Fourthly, everything undertaken to achieve the above tasks must be fitted into an overall framework for the eventual settlement of the German and European questions; otherwise it has little chance of lasting.

While the tasks needing to be tackled in this decade must be spelt out in some detail in order that they may be addressed in practical political terms, the long-term problems require intellectual preparation within a more general framework. A similar degree of detailed prescription is not appropriate for a more distant and correspondingly uncertain future. However, one can outline certain essential points in any approach to the long term, as follows. First, a structure must be found and realized for the European Community which represents a durable organizational form for the European nations based on an internal balance or other suitable factors. Secondly, the East and Central European nations, by tradition closely tied to Western Europe, must either be offered the opportunity to join the Community, or alternatively an arrangement with them must be found which enables them to coexist

openly and peacefully with the Community. Thirdly, a settlement effecting German unity is to be found in a European framework, thus safeguarding a life in freedom for all Germans without endangering the nation's cohesion.

The role of the EC in the short term

Anyone conscious of the catastrophic results wrought in this century by the anarchy of a Europe organized into nation states—most recently in the Second World War—knows that integration is not merely a general task facing all European states but also in the immediate interest of Germany's survival. Therefore, European unification represents to the Federal Republic a national interest of the very first order, and the settlement of the German question itself cannot take priority over it. In terms of practical politics this forces the Federal Republic to retain the objective and actively advance the process of European unification, even if this apparently renders the settlement of the German question impossible in the short term.

In this context one must take into consideration that the reunion of the German nation has not been blocked solely or primarily by the Federal Republic's accession to the European Community *per se*, but rather by the superordinate global East–West conflict. While this lasts a political union of the entire German nation is impossible; this applies not just to a transition from the Eastern bloc to the Western Community by the GDR or some sort of slide into the Soviet sphere of influence by the Federal Republic, but also to a neutralization of both parts of Germany. Only subsequent to a diminution of the East–West conflict can German unity be placed on the agenda of practical politics.

Under certain conditions, though, the Federal Republic can even now encourage the European Community to make a positive contribution towards keeping the German question open on all four counts mentioned above. On closer examination it is clear that on all these points the EC can assume a function which, while varying in detail, is far from unimportant.

Avoidance of prejudicial legislation

Consideration of the danger of a premature legal consolidation of the German partition may begin naturally with the Treaty of Rome's vacillation between the terms 'Germany'[3] and 'Federal Republic of Germany'. Both Article 227, pursuant to which the Treaty applies to the 'Federal Republic of Germany', and the Protocol on German internal trade and connected problems, which is far from being a logical derivative of Article 227, appended to the Treaty 'considering the conditions at present existing by reason of the division of Germany',[4] are unequivocal. The Protocol states that 'trade between the German territories subject to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and the German territories in which the Basic Law does not apply is a part of German internal trade'.[5]

With these formulations the state territories of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the German Democratic Republic—not recognized at the time by either Bonn or its partners in the EC—are delimited. This is not the place for a debate of the conclusions to be drawn from these subtle differences. What is politically relevant is the provisional character they express, which is consonant with the position under international law assumed by the Federal Republic, namely that the German question remains open.

3. As in Articles 138, 148 and 194.
4. Preamble to the Protocol on German internal trade and connected problems of 25 March 1957.
5. Article 1 of the Protocol.

To be sure, much has changed since 1957. The Federal Republic, and with it practically the entire community of states, have recognized the GDR as a subject of international law, albeit with certain reservations. The Protocol on Intra-German Trade, however, remains in force, even though from time to time the Federal Republic has had to parry, energetically and on occasion by exerting its economic strength, advances designed to treat the Protocol as obsolete. Without the Federal Republic's consistently withheld consent it cannot be suspended. All changes notwithstanding, then, the German question has been kept open on this ground. It is important that German policy-makers note this, and that both the Community as an entity and all its individual member states should be committed to domestic and international support of Germany's concern. If this position can be successfully maintained until after the East–West conflict has subsided, the German question can once again be placed on the agenda.

This, however, is but one aspect of the problem. To assume that through the Treaty the Germans have gained some legal title which in some relatively distant future could be employed as a lever to overcome Germany's partition would be naïve. For not only are the statements on the future of Germany contained in the text of the Treaty very vague, but international law is generally a weak means for overcoming extant conditions. Also, even with regard to the current task of keeping the German question open, the Federal Republic will find backing in the Community only proivided its partners can be convinced that their security interests will not be endangered if all Germans should one day exercise their right to self-determination. If the Federal Republic wants to mobilize the Community's support in effectively keeping the German question open, it must make clearer than it has in the past the advantages of doing so.

In any event, one must bear in mind that the Community will not be too ready to answer calls concerning the German question, for the main responsibility for all issues concerning Germany as a whole continues to rest with the four victorious powers, who guard this prerogative jealously. Only two of those four powers belong to the Community, and even they are not prepared to discuss the German problem in Community bodies. On the other hand, the very fact that the responsibility still rests with these four powers attests to the unresolved nature of the issue, and it can serve no interest of the Federal Republic to call their primacy into question.

This aspect apart, of course, the Federal Republic itself has to bear the main responsibility for the national task. The German question can be considered open only so long as the Germans themselves insist on it. The Federal Government must always take care that it does not obscure the provisional nature of the current situation by making rash concessions to any party whatsoever, even in the rare event of one or more of the four powers raising no objections.

Maintaining the viability of West Berlin

The Community's backing and solidarity are of particular significance for the second current national task: preserving the viability of West Berlin. West Berlin's inclusion in the European Coal and Steel Community and then, above all, in the Treaties of Rome, is a fact and, from the German perspective, an essential component of the Treaties, even though the formal wording of this inclusion leaves something to be desired.[6] Berlin's delegates even enjoy full voting rights in the European Parliament, which they do not in the Bundestag.

6. See Schulz, *Die Deutsche Nation*

To date Germany's partners in the Community have allowed no doubts to arise of their solidarity with the Federal Republic when it comes to preventing any subversion of West Berlin's free existence. This solidarity has found expression in such events as the opening of the European Commission's Press and Information Office in West Berlin in June 1968; the Berlin branch of the Bonn office is the first of its kind to be established by the Community, after offices in member state capitals. Again, the European Centre for the Advancement of Vocational Training was established in Berlin in 1975. In addition, Berlin receives financial assistance from the Community, though its extent by no means approaches the Federal Republic's payments. Finally, the Community's presence in West Berlin carries political weight. Leading personages have visited the city, and the Lomé Committee, for instance, has held one meeting there.

Berlin remains a symbol of the entire West's determination to meet head-on any expansion of communist power. In the future, the Federal Republic will continue to be highly dependent on its partners' solidarity on this issue, even though what applies to the German question in its entirety goes for the Berlin problem, too—namely, that the immediate responsibility rests with the four powers, in the case of West Berlin for the time being with the three Western powers; and the main responsibility for maintaining the city's viability rests with the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senate of Berlin.

Solidarity with the Germans in the GDR

The above comments on the first two aspects of the task apply equally to the necessity of making practical demonstrations of solidarity with the population of the GDR. This will be the easier for the Community states as they have always emphatically championed human rights in the East European countries. Indeed, from a Community perspective, the task far exceeds a national German concern. Certainly, however, Germans should not expect much beyond moral support and vigorous rhetoric: practical solidarity remains the Federal Republic's job, and neither the four victorious powers nor anyone else can relieve it of that responsibility.

The European framework

One essential problem involved in keeping the German question open is frequently overlooked. Keeping the issue alive cannot be understood in merely passive terms; it does not exhaust itself in inactivity and forestalling legal acts. Nor can it be done simply by upholding and constantly reiterating claims. After all, the achievement of Germany's unity and freedom at the appropriate time is not just up to the Germans, but requires the assent and cooperation of Germany's neighbours both inside and outside the Community, precisely because the German question is but one facet of the European question and can be settled only in the European context.

Consequently, the Germans must undertake efforts designed in the first place to interest their Community partners in a reconstitution of German unity, no matter how distant. No realistic observer of the situation can deny that the other member countries have at best paid lip service to German unity or expressed rather muted concurrence—expecting, perhaps, never to be presented with the promissory notes they signed. Only Charles de Gaulle, shortly after his election to the Presidency of the French Republic, made a short-lived attempt to convince the Germans on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other of the worth of a concept he had developed,

and it is remarkable enough that this concept immediately met with universal rejection.[7]

Nevertheless, the German question concerns not merely the West but all of Europe, and concern for its solution must extend to those nations who are not members of the Community. The fact that the Warsaw Pact states rule out any alteration of the German situation, and will continue to do so in the near future, is no reason not to seek a discussion with them. Considerations of bloc solidarity compel them to defend the existence of the unloved GDR. Of course, their stance is rendered more convincing by the lack of any alternative which makes realistic allowance for their legitimate security interests. Unless the Federal Republic seeks forms of German unity compatible with these countries' vital interests,[8] the German policy of keeping the national question open risks being interpreted as revisionism and aggressiveness irreconcilable with the renunciation of force to which it is bound by treaty obligations. Consequently, the discussion of acceptable forms of a future German unity, albeit envisaging it in a possibly rather distant and uncertain future, requires considerable imagination, constitutes a current task of German policy and is an essential element in keeping the German question open.

The EC in the long-term European perspective

Warnings against losing sight of a development's long-term perspective are seldom popular, particularly when tied to concrete demands for political action. For instance, most people would accept the need for improved long-term protection of the environment. But practical measures—even those taking effect only after considerable lead-time—can be implemented politically only after woods have started perishing on a large scale. The same goes for the European question. At the end of the First World War agreement was widespread that such an inanity must not be repeated. But it took the catastrophe of the Second World War and the new conflict between East and West which rapidly emerged in its aftermath to set off the process of European unification. Meanwhile, millions of people had died all over the world and the European states had both lost their role as world powers and forfeited their self-reliance in security matters.

But the preponderance of the two superpowers and the protective function of the United States for Western Europe are not here to stay. At some juncture the Europeans will once again have to stand on their own two feet; it will then become apparent whether they have learned to develop structures enabling them to settle future conflicts among themselves by non-violent means and spare themselves a lethal internecine war in Europe. A foremost task of European politics is the creation of an organizational form which will also survive the next historical epoch.

7. See Ernst Weisenfeld, *Frankreichs Geschichte seit dem Krieg* (Munich, 1980), pp. 176ff.

8. Ever since the early days of its existence the Federal Republic has taken steps to counter concerns among its European partners and neighbours which could be traced to its potential power. Above all they include the irrevocable commitment to European integration and accession to the Western alliance, also, the renunciation of ABC-type weapons, and finally the policy of agreement by treaty to renounce the threat or use of force. However significant these decisions may be, they are probably still insufficient. The decisive reason for the neighbours' concerns probably relates to excessive German power in Central Europe. The Federal Republic's federal structure did not remove it, perhaps the Federal Republic could diminish it most readily by grounding its long-term objective of German unity on early structural forms of the entire German nation embedded in a European structure—something like, for instance, the Accord reached at the Congress of Vienna in 1815—rather than the reconstitution of the 'nation state' of 1871, the more so since the German nation in the European Community is no longer dependent on a strong German state in the traditional sense.

Towards political integration

Some two decades ago the argument was frequently advanced that the European Community had reached the 'point of no return', and that further integration would ensue, if not automatically, at least irreversibly. The sceptics have since become more numerous. The problem is not just that France has frequently displayed a fatal penchant for giving national interests precedence over Community tasks (beginning with its 'policy of the empty chair'), or that Norway went back on its accession when it was already assumed to be going ahead, nor even the difficulty of predicting whether the powerful isolationist tendency in Great Britain might not one day prevail; rather, it is that European enthusiasm has lost much of its momentum in the Federal Republic. Not only do German politicians who previously rejected with moralistic vigour the others' demands for a *juste retour* suddenly opine that the Germans must not turn into the 'paymasters of Europe', but for some years now those believing in their ability to keep German interests out of world quarrels and pursue a national neutralist course—however marginal their political influence may still be—have become a noteworthy force.[9] The bitter lesson learned in 1945 by the wartime generation, namely, that in the long run Europe cannot survive organized strictly by nation states, is liable to fall into oblivion. This statement refers not merely to the danger of military conflict, but also to the increasingly evident fact that, left to their own devices, the European nation states can no longer weather the increasingly harsh and competitive economic climate.

To prevail in the dispute with the growing nationalist forces the European Community must be strengthened politically. In the long run, it will not be spared two fundamental decisions in particular. In the first place, the European nations must ultimately, that is to say, when the East–West conflict loses its overwhelming influence and the importance of NATO decreases, place their armed forces under a joint high command to which battlefield nuclear weapons will also have to be assigned. In the process, horizontal nuclear proliferation should probably be avoided. Secondly, if not in the medium term, then certainly in the long term, the Community requires a common currency system and a joint economic policy.

Past experience makes clear beyond any doubt that such further development of the Community will come up against the most vigorous resistance. To overcome it will be no easy task. Lobbyists of all persuasions will press their governments, already none too willing to relinquish any national competency, to stick to their individual national paths; the deeply rooted national mentality will assist them. To make matters worse, failure is inevitable unless the concern that advancing integration will place the strongest member in a hegemonial position can be refuted. But in the long run an all-German nation state would undoubtedly be the strongest member. At the moment German national interests quite evidently pull the same way as national interests elsewhere in the Community; should German preponderance seem on the cards, however, the partner states would not only resist Community membership for a united Germany, but also the necessary advances in political integration.

9. Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, 'Patriotismus von Links', in Wolfgang Venohr, ed., *Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt* (Bergisch Gladbach: 1982), pp. 119ff. Something of the same line of thought, albeit with several unclear points and (perhaps tactically motivated) contradictions, is conveyed by Ralf Dahrendorf, 'Schriftliche Stellungnahme (und mündliche Erläuterung) zum Thema "Deutschlandpolitik im europäischen Kräfteverhältnis" ', in *Zur Sache* Nr. 4, 1977: *Deutschlandpolitik. Öffentliche Anhörungen des Ausschusses für innerdeutsche Beziehungen des Deutschen Bundestages 1974*, pp. 13ff. and 33ff.

Structural changes in Eastern Europe

There is another, closely related, problem in the long term. If the West European nations really succeed in bridling national egotisms to the extent of terminating the era of nation states in Western Europe, then this trend will in all likelihood also affect East-Central and South-Eastern Europe, because 'balkanization' in these regions would be dangerously at odds with the all-European need for security. With a solidarity fostered by history, the West European nations today champion freedom and self-determination in the East-Central and South-East European nations. Should these actually regain an independent political capacity to act, the West Europeans would have to press for a superordinate structure encompassing those nation states as well, so as both to preclude military conflict among the states there and to prevent these nations from being drawn into the West Europeans' conflicts of interest, either by victimization in a new policy of *Lebensraum* or by playing them off against others in a 'little entente'. At some point this could confront the EC with the question of whether to accept the East European states (excluding the Soviet Union) as members,[10] or, should these form an integrational group of their own, whether to try to institutionalize political and economic cooperation, placing on a broader base the representation of the European nations' security and vital interests *vis-à-vis* the outside world. Relative to the German question this would have the associated effect of more readily assuaging concerns lest Germany come to assume a hegemonial position.

German self-determination and the Europeans' need for security

The current condition of Germany's partition into two states is temporary and unstable because, on the one hand, the Germans themselves disapprove of it and, on the other hand, the remaining European nations do not believe the Germans' attitude will change in the foreseeable future. Consequently—at least theoretically—all European nations are in agreement as to the desirability of overcoming the instability and consolidating European conditions; thus far, however, no model able to generate consensus has emerged.

While the German question lies dormant, due to the East–West conflict, a clash of objectives which might break out among the various principles of proclaimed European policy, between the right to self-determination and the right to security, will remain muffled. The readiness of Community members to venture forth towards and into integration rests on the tacit premise that no member state seeks to alter the territorial *status quo*. Both among the members of the European Parliament and in the Council the weighting of votes is based on a proportionate distribution preventing any one country from outvoting all others.[11] Should the Germans ever be in a position to exercise their right—uncontested in principle—to self-determination for reunifica-

10 The Preamble to the EC Treaty contains the passage ' and calling upon the peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts Whether the East European *peoples* will want to profess the same ideal and when they might be permitted to do so must be kept as open in this context as the question regarding the passage's political meaning, that is, whether the signatories were prepared to view it as anything beyond a mere empty phrase. They certainly were not thinking of Eastern Europe.

11 The term 'Germany' in Articles 138, 148, and 194 of the EC Treaty possibly serves as an abbreviation. But it also corresponds to the Federal Government's notion of German statehood at the time and the theory maintaining the (legal) identity of the Federal Republic and the German *Reich* though its proponents were not prepared to draw the logical conclusion that the 'Soviet zone' would thus no longer be perceived as part of Germany. After all, the EEC partners may have warmed to this term because a formal legal argument to deny 'Germany' greater representation in Community bodies in case of a German reunification within the Community could be based on it.

tion in one nation state, the political balance in the Community would shift. This could not but affect the partner countries' notions of security. Whether they could adjust in time to life with a larger Germany is uncertain. Equally uncertain is the Germans' readiness to exercise their right to self-determination in a manner such as to avoid reactivating the fears of previous periods among its partners.

No one in the Community is likely to dispute that lasting integration cannot be built on discrimination against the Germans. Nor can the solution simply consist of passing over the German question in silence. Rather, the task consists of finding the common denominator of the other European nations' security needs and the Germans' desire for unity. Unless the Germans are willing to take into account their partners' security needs, they will not regain unity; unless the other members grant the Germans their national unity, the Community cannot endure. Particularly during the past few years, the realization has increasingly taken hold that the notion according to which European security can be warranted only by antagonistically tying the two German states into their respective alliances only serves to subject the Western alliance time and again to severe tests. For the duration of the sharp East–West conflict this may be unavoidable and bearable—but a stable European Community can scarcely rest on this foundation.

Not the least of Konrad Adenauer's justifications for the Federal Republic's Western integration in the 1950s was to present it as the only route to German reunification. Whether Adenauer really believed this is difficult to say and hardly relevant. The fact is that without Western integration the Federal Republic would not at the time have achieved the capability to act politically. It is equally a fact that all European nations, including the German, can only survive if the European states relinquish that part of their sovereignty which had earlier enabled them to wage wars against each other, which also amounts to voluntarily limiting their right to self-determination. Therefore, it would be nonsensical to set up the recognition that reunification is impossible for the duration of the East–West antagonism and that each part of Germany is tied to 'its' half of Europe as an argument against the Federal Republic's Western integration. Nevertheless, this argument causes concerned politicians such distress as to lead them to avoid an open discussion of the issue.

One welcome tactic is recourse to the continued existence of the victors' rights. Of course, no one in 1945 imaged that these rights would still be called upon forty years hence. That they are still called upon is superficially attributable to the fact that under the aegis of the East–West conflict none of the victorious powers can forfeit its rights without granting the opposing side a gain in political power. What would happen, though, if sometime during the coming decades the folds of history were to swallow the East–West conflict? Then the reasoning which moved the four powers during the Second World War to assume these rights will unquestionably be revived, in Paris and London, but also in Copenhagen, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, and Berne as well as Warsaw and Prague: the desire to keep Germany's power under control. Untimely though this desire may seem today, it is essential.

As in the year 1815, the only sensible way to maintain the control function over Germany would then be found in a linkage of the German question and the political building of Europe.[12] In other words, both the Germans and their partners in the Community should be interested in someday substituting intra-Community agreements for the victors' rights. If this is to be achieved without a political crisis, a

12. See Schulz *Die Deutsche Nation*, p. 105.

timely and long-term approach is called for. Pointing out the extreme alternative provides a sufficient argument: if the victors' rights were simply to wither away as none of the four powers could or would exercise them, then two German states would face each other directly. They might be able to come to terms; the future of West Berlin, however, would be entirely up in the air.

The Community and the German question: limited utility

Much too little thought is still given to the role played by the nation state in Europe today. Small wonder, then, that only the vaguest notions exist regarding the close connections between the part played by the problem of nation states in the German question on the one hand, and in European politics on the other. While the protective claim of the 1950s, that the road to reunification passes by European integration, no longer finds credence, no other convincing concept has been substituted for it, so that the view of Western integration and German reunification as irreconcilable opposites has spread.[13]

The above reflections have shown that the EC can be turned into an instrument for settling the German question only to a very limited extent. Certainly, the Federal Republic needs the Community's backing for its policy on Germany—not least for maintaining the *status quo* in the sense of legally keeping the German question open[14]—yet overall the EC currently plays a smaller role than NATO, where the German problem is regularly addressed at foreign ministers' meetings. It forms part of the base from which the Federal Republic's foreign policy operates, but it cannot be recruited as a dynamic factor for this foreign policy.

To an even greater extent this applies to European Political Cooperation. The German question has no place here; it is referred to the Group of Four (the United States, France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany). The Community has not yet discovered its interest in the German question. To be sure, formal inclusion of the German question on the EPC agenda cannot be in Germany's interest; the three Western powers would react with extreme irritation while the other member states would at best feel embarrassed, lacking as they do any means of influence. This does not mean, though, that the Federal Government, like its predecessors, should continue to keep the German question entirely out of the Community bodies. Both German interests and the continuing integration process can only benefit from the reduction of unnecessary concerns by the Federal Republic's clarifying its objectives and stating its readiness (and even assuming the initiative) to discuss with its partners in the Community forms of a future settlement of the German question. The Federal Republic can then also expect greater support for its objective.

13. As expressed, for example, by the former ambassador to Moscow, Horst Groepper. See Knut Teske, '"Deutsche Einheit nur ohne Europa", Ex-Botschafter Groepper geisselt Wiedervereinigungspolitik von CDU/CSU und SPD', *Die Welt*, 11 March 1982.

14. Thus, the Federal Republic, supported by its partner countries, succeeded in inserting into the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1 August 1975 the passage '. . . among their States and *throughout Europe* ', by implication including West Berlin, not a state in its own right, for only with reference to Berlin does this sentence make sense. See *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act* (London, 1975), p.1.

The GDR and the German nation: sole heir or socialist sibling?

RONALD ASMUS*

In his report on the State of the Nation delivered before the Bundestag on 23 June 1983, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl addressed the question of the future of the German nation, and stated:

> There are two states in Germany, but there is only one German nation. Its existence is not contingent upon governmental or majority decisions. It is a product of history, a part of the Christian and European cultures, and shaped by its location at the heart of the continent. The German nation's existence preceded the formation of a national state and has outlived it. This is important for our future.[1]

Kohl's statement not only reflected his personal convictions, but also confirmed a fundamental continuity in the official West German view of the German nation. Throughout the postwar period, West German statesmen have clung to the concept of a single German nation and the FRG remains legally committed to an eventual reunification of Germany, a commitment anchored in its Basic Law or Constitution.[2] Shortly after Kohl's speech in the West, East German Party leader and head of state Erich Honecker articulated the official East German view of the subject. When asked in an interview with the French communist weekly *Révolution* if a revival of German national consciousness was taking place today, he brusquely dismissed any discussion of German reunification, saying:

> Two independent states with different social systems have arisen on German soil, the socialist GDR and the capitalist FRG, [states] that belong to different alliance systems. One can unite them just as little as one can unite fire and water.[3]

For the Federal Republic, therefore, a single unitary German nation continues to exist and the 'German question' remains open, despite over three decades of partition and no prospects of any changes in the status quo in the near future. Richard von Weizsäcker, President of the FRG, eloquently summed up West German expectations when he stated: 'Experience teaches [us] that a question does not cease to exist simply because one does not have an answer for it, particularly when the nature

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1. For the full text of Kohl's Bundestag address see Helmut Kohl's, *Fur eine Politik der Erneuerung* (Bonn, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, October 1983).

2. According to the Preamble of the West German Basic Law or Constitution, 'the entire German people are called upon to achieve in self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany'. See *The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Bonn Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1979), p. 13 The Federal Republic's commitment to reunification is also clearly stated in the so-called Letter of German Unity attached to both the Moscow Treaty of August 1970 and the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR of December 1972, finally, this commitment was also reconfirmed by the July 1973 decision of the West German Federal Constitution Court in Karlsruhe on the constitutionality of the Basic Treaty. See *Auskunfte zur Deutschlandpolitik A–Z* (Bonn. Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1983).

3. See Honecker's interview in *Révolution*, 6 Jan. 1984.

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of the issue is such that the question returns again and again.'[4] For the GDR, on the other hand, the German question has officially long been put to rest, solved not only by the creation of two German states from the rubble of Hitler's Third Reich but also by the development of two separate German nations, the 'socialist' German nation in the GDR and the 'capitalist' nation in the FRG. Yet the East German government's constant shrill urgings that the FRG recognize these alleged 'realities' of history are hardly a solid testimony to its own self-assurance in this sphere. Behind the party's current 'two nation theory' lies a far more complex chapter in the GDR's history. The GDR was, of course, officially founded as a temporary structure to last only until Germany could be reunited under the banner of socialism. Indeed, the vociferousness with which the Ulbricht regime voiced its national aspirations at times suggested that the GDR aspired to play the role of a German Piedmont, catalysing reunification under socialist auspices,[5] despite the fact that the prospects for such a development were then and remain now practically nil.

In response to the West German *Ostpolitik* of the early 1970s the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) finally dropped its pan-German aspirations, or so it would seem, and party spokesmen have since attempted to present the founding of the GDR, along with the development of a separate 'socialist' German nation, as inevitable and the logical culmination of the German historical process. In backing up such assertions, East German historians have undertaken major revisions in the official views of previously reviled German historical personalities such as Martin Luther and Frederick the Great, among others, and now paint them in a much more positive light as proof of the GDR's deep and widely spread roots in the German historical past. The evolution of official views on the German nation and its history has of course been influenced not only by political developments in the Federal Republic but also by evolving attitudes within East German society and the regime's attempts to foster a sense of separate state and national identity. With theories of proletarian internationalism having proved too schematic, and the traditions of the German labour movement insufficient as an effective historical basis of regime legitimacy, the SED has been forced to resort to a new strategy tracing the GDR's roots deep into the German historical past and presenting the GDR as the continuation of all progressive German historical traditions. All the variations on the theme of the German nation, its past as well as its future, which have been offered by East German theorists over the years, however, should be seen in a single context, namely the elusive attempt on the part of a chronically insecure political leadership to legitimate its own existence.

The early years

The leaders of the German Communist Party (KPD—Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands) recognized the tactical utility of the theme of German national unity immediately upon their arrival in the Soviet occupation zone in the spring of 1945. The KPD's emphasis on national unity along with its initial stress on the inapplicability of the Soviet model for postwar Germany must be viewed in the context of Soviet hopes to control a unified Germany and the necessity to enhance

4. See Richard von Weizsäcker's article 'Only cooperation can create peace', *Die Zeit*, 30 Sept. 1983.
5. See Melvin Croan, 'New country, old nationality', *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1979–80, No. 37, p. 145.

the party's domestic appeal.[6] Such considerations undoubtedly lay behind the KPD's adoption of the thesis of a special 'German road to socialism' penned by CC member Anton Ackermann in early 1946 during the final push for a merger of the KPD and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD—Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) in the Soviet occupation zone, a process that reached its institutional culmination with the formation of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in April of that year.[7] At its first official congress the SED dedicated itself to the goal of German national unity, calling upon all 'anti-fascist democratic parties' to work for the 'establishment of German unity in the form of an anti-fascist democratic parliamentary republic'. At its second congress in 1947 the struggle for the unity of the German nation was elevated to the party's 'main task'.[8]

By autumn 1948 the SED had officially abandoned the notion of a special 'German road to socialism', deeming it a nationalist deviation and a tool against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.[9] The emerging conflict with Tito had made any further discussion of special paths to socialism not only dangerous but in many ways superfluous, since the GDR was already being turned into a People's Democracy to be run by a 'party of a new type', a process which would leave painfully little room for any deviation from Soviet norms.[10] The commitment to the goal of a unified socialist Germany, however, remained a key component in the SED's programme; it is often forgotten that Stalin himself marked the official founding of the GDR in October 1949 with a resounding appeal to German nationalism.[11] Indeed, coming a mere four weeks after the first West German government under Konrad Adenauer had taken office, the timing of this move was clearly planned to demonstrate who bore the real responsibility for the division of Germany.[12] The goal of reunification was also firmly embedded in the first East German constitution which, like its West German counterpart, laid a claim to representing all Germans and adopted pan-German terminology, referring to a single German *Volk* and a single German citizenship.[13] The German bourgeoisie, the SED maintained, had led the German nation into two disastrous world wars, thereby forfeiting its right to national leadership; it was time for the German working class to take up the national mission.

6. For two personal accounts of the KPD's tactics in this period see Carola Stern, *Ulbricht: a political biography*, (New York: Praeger, 1965) and Wolfgang Leonhardt, *Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder* (Cologne, Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1955); See also Wilhelm Bleek, 'Unity Party and the National question', in *Der X Parteitag der SED: 35 Jahre SED Politik Versuch einer Bilanz* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1981), pp. 87–91. For Soviet policy see Hans Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik* (Stuttgart. Klett-Cotta, 1980), pp. 201–69, and, for the official Soviet view, V. N. Belezki, *Die Politik der Soviet Union in den deutschen Angelegenheiten in der Nachkriegszeit 1945–1976* (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1977), pp. 11–106.

7. For excerpts of Ackermann's original article entitled 'Is there a special German road to socialism?', published in the first issue of the SED theoretical journal *Einheit* in 1946, see Hermann Weber, ed., *Der Deutsche Kommunismus, Dokumente* (Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1963), pp 513–18.

8. See the SED's official *Geschichte der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Marxistische Blätter, 1978), pp. 159–65.

9 The theory of a 'special German road to socialism' was officially dropped in mid-September 1948; in a resolution passed by the party leadership it was stated that such an attempt signified a total disregard of the great historical experience of the Soviet Union as well as a total renouncement of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism on the question of achieving the victory of socialism. Ackermann himself recanted in an article in *Neues Deutschland* on 24 September. See Hermann Weber, *Kleine Geschichte der DDR* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1980), p. 45.

10. See Weber, *Kleine Geschichte*, pp. 45–6.

11. See Croan, 'New country', and Gerhard Wetting, 'The Soviet Note on Germany of March 10, 1952', *Deutschland Archiv*, 1982, No. 2, p. 136.

12. See Hans Peter Schwarz, *Die Ara Adenauer 1949–1957* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), p. 61.

13. Carl Christoph Schweitzer, ed., *Die Deutsche Nation: Aussagen von Bismarck bis Honecker* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1976), p. 503.

East German attacks on West German 'separatism' and the 'McCloy Republic', its accusations of national treason, and its passionate appeals against West German rearmament or European integration and for national unity in the early 1950s were all strictly in keeping with Stalin's efforts to hinder Adenauer's policy of Western integration and to keep Germany neutral. Adenauer's policies and the increasingly likely prospect of a rearmed West German state participating in a collective Western defence effort prompted Stalin to address a series of official proposals to the Western allies which, at least on paper, called for a unified, peace-loving democratic German state. This campaign culminated in Stalin's famous March note of 1952 in which he called for negotiations among the four occupying powers that would lead to a peace treaty with and unification of Germany, the withdrawal of occupation troops, and, what was new, a *rearmed* unified German state pledged to neutrality. The GDR also played a role in such campaigns, contributing its *'Deutsche an einen Tisch'* proposals and other determined attempts to initiate formal discussions with the FRG over Germany's future. Nothing came out of these initiatives, however, since neither the Western allies nor Adenauer were willing to abandon the visible progress of the FRG's Western integration in return for another endless round of negotiations to find out what Stalin really meant. Whether Stalin actually might have been prepared to sacrifice the GDR to prevent West German rearmament has of course been a subject of considerable academic debate.[14] The die was probably cast in any case shortly afterwards, since the Soviet Union clearly committed itself to the Ulbricht regime by intervening in the June 1953 uprising.[15]

The two state theory

The West German entry into NATO in May 1955 signified that Soviet attempts to prevent the emergence of a rearmed West German state had failed. This led to a revision in Soviet policy on Germany in so far as Moscow then adopted the 'two state theory', emphasizing that the German question could be solved no longer by a unified federal German state but rather by a pan-German confederation of two autonomous states. In May 1954 the Soviet Union ostensibly granted the GDR full sovereignty and Moscow now boldly insisted that reunification had become a matter for the two German states to resolve between themselves, a tactic designed to draw the FRG into negotiations with the GDR, thus breaking the latter's international isolation. In 1957, undoubtedly at Soviet prompting, the SED began yet another campaign in which it again took up the idea of a German confederation in a document entitled *The road of the German nation in ensuring peace and reuniting Germany*. The proposal envisaged the creation of an All-German Council to discuss gradual cooperation between the two German states, their withdrawal from their respective alliances, and increased economic cooperation leading eventually to confederation based on a treaty grounded in international law. The seriousness, or lack thereof, of this proposal,

14. See Wetting, 'The Soviet Note', pp 130–47; and Hans Peter Schwarz, *Die Legende von der verpassten Gelegenheit: die Stalin Note vom 10. Marz 1952* (Zürich, Stuttgart: Belser, 1982).

15. There remains the fascinating account of rumours circulating in East Berlin shortly before the uprising that the Soviet Union had ordered major correctives in its German policy which might have opened the way for the reunification of Germany, see the personal account of former SED functionary Heinz Brandt, *Ein Traum der nicht entführbar ist* (Munich: Paul List, 1967), pp. 217–40. Excerpts of Brandt's account are also published in the excellent collection of contributions in Ilse Spittmann and Karl Wilhelm Fricke, eds, *17 Juni 1953: Arbeiteraufstand in der DDR* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1982).

however, was underlined by a series of preconditions that would have amounted to a *de facto* Bolshevization of West German society. That the SED still clung to its goal of German reunification was nevertheless confirmed in a statement delivered by the former East German President Otto Grotewohl who, in defending the initiative, stated:

> In making this proposal, therefore, the government of the GDR is motivated by a profound sense of national responsibility. It has never considered—and still does not consider—coming to terms with the existence of two German states. It joins forces with all German patriots in their unflagging efforts to achieve the exalted aim of Germany's reunification.[16]

The final concrete step in the brutal partition of Germany, the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, had little effect upon the SED's attitude about the unity of the German nation. The party's so-called National Document of 1962 once again attempted to place the onus of Germany's partition on 'West German imperialists aided by Western powers'. The SED's party programme of 1963 also contained a seemingly unequivocal commitment to reunification and a confirmation of the SED's self-chosen 'national mission'.[17] In May 1965 Ulbricht added a slight clarification to the SED position on the future of the German nation when he stated that a process of 'democratization' and resistance against imperialism and 'monopoly capitalism' would have to take place in the FRG before a rapprochement between the two German states could take place.[18] The prospects of this must have appeared fairly dim to most East Germans, given the remarkable economic recovery and political stability demonstrated by the West German political system at the time. Yet, the reunification goal was again confirmed at the SED's seventh congress in April 1967 and codified in the GDR's 1968 constitution which defined the GDR as a 'socialist state of the German nation' and described it as being 'burdened with the responsibility of showing the entire German people the way to a future of peace and socialism'.

Yet again signs of change were becoming evident. Whereas the first constitution of 1949 had spoken of a single German people, of a *Volk*, the 1968 version referred to the 'people of the GDR'.[19] In April 1967 Ulbricht had added another new twist to the party line. In a speech delivered shortly after the introduction of a separate East German citizenship, the 'Iron Saxon' claimed that the 'single German nation' had existed only in 'theory' at the end of the Second World War and that the German nation consisted essentially of two independent national groups (*Staatsvölker*). He reassured the party faithful that the goal of reunifying Germany under the leadership of the working class was being pursued 'with great fervour'.[20] Although there is no doubt that Ulbricht remained committed to this goal, signs of creeping ambivalence became evident in party documents in the late 1960s that referred, on the one hand, to a single German nation, yet, on the other hand, to its division into two parts. The first edition of the *Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch*, published in 1967, for example, spoke of 'two types of nations', the socialist and the capitalist; a formulation that

16. As quoted in J. K. Skowden, *The German question 1945–1973, continuity in change* (New York: St Martin's, 1975), p. 187.

17. See Karl Wilhelm Fricke, ed., *Programm und Statut der SED* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1976), pp. 14–17.

18. As quoted in Schweitzer, *Die Deutsche Nation*, pp. 558–61.

19. Schweitzer, *Die Deutsche Nation*, p. 504.

20. Schweitzer, *Die Deutsche Nation*, p. 575.

proved to be the harbinger of major changes in the SED's concept of the nation in the 1970s.

The challenge of *Ostpolitik*

In the 1970s the official East German concept of the German nation underwent a fundamental change, largely as a result of the ideological challenge posed by Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* formulated under the aegis of the Social Democratic–Free Democratic (SPD–FDP) coalition. The reorientation of West German policy under Brandt, incorporated in the vision of *Wandel durch Annäherung*,[21] underlined the SED's need for a more cohesive 'national' policy to stabilize the regime and to guard against potential ideological contamination. In his first State of the Nation address in January 1970, Brandt modified the official West German view of the German nation by speaking of 'two states in one German nation' while recognizing the 'special relationship' between them. The SED promptly responded to this implicit challenge, and on 19 January 1970 Ulbricht stated: 'This is the historic reality: the German Democratic Republic is a socialist German national state and the West German Federal Republic is a capitalist NATO state with limited national sovereignty.' Ulbricht and the SED, however, continued to find themselves on the defensive. With the successful conclusion of negotiations for the Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow treaties, along with the tremendous appeal that Brandt evidently enjoyed among East Germans (as demonstrated, for example, by his reception in Erfurt in March 1970), it became increasingly difficult for the SED to uphold its commitment to the existence of a single German nation; shortly thereafter Ulbricht went a step further in proclaiming that:

> the GDR is the socialist German national state. Within it, *the evolution of a socialist nation is proceeding* [emphasis added]. The FRG is an imperialist NATO state and embodies the remnants of the old bourgeois German nation under a state monopolistic ruling system.[22]

Ulbricht's inability or unwillingness to accommodate himself to Soviet detente policy at this time, along with his increasing testiness in challenging Soviet views and his attempts to present the GDR as a model for 'the developed system of socialism', all contributed to his forced and unexpected 'retirement' in May 1971 and his replacement by his former protégé Erich Honecker. In his report to the eighth SED congress in June 1971 Honecker rejected all discussion about a single unitary German nation as 'twaddle' and officially codified the SED's new official view on the nation by proclaiming the formation of a 'new type of nation' in the GDR: the 'socialist German nation'. Attempting to refute Brandt's insistence on the existence of a single German nation despite two German states, Honecker maintained that the differences and contradictions in the socioeconomic systems prevailing in the FRG and the GDR had led to an inevitable process of 'delimitation' (*Abgrenzung*), a catchword that has dominated the SED's *Deutschlandpolitik* ever since.[23]

21. The phrase *Wandel durch Annaherung*, or change through rapprochement, was originally coined by Egon Bahr in the early 1960s The degree to which it actually served as a policy guide of Social Democratic *Ostpolitik* of the early 1970s is debatable. On the other hand, it is clear that many West German Social Democrats, both then and now, were and are motivated by a vision of West German policy creating the preconditions for and if possible assisting a process of social change in the GDR that would help render Germany's partition anachronistic. For excerpts of Bahr's speech, delivered in the West German town of Tutzing in July 1963, see *Lesebuch zur Deutschen Geschichte, Vol. III* (Dortmund: Chronik Verlag, 1984), pp. 247–50.

22. See *Neues Deutschland*, 14 Jan. 1971

23. For Honecker's comments at the eighth party congress see Erich Honecker, *Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 15–19 Juni 1971* (Berlin: Dietz, 1971).

In July 1972 Politburo member and party theoretician Albert Norden, previously a leading advocate of German unity, delivered a key speech at the SED's Karl Marx Party College, 'clarifying' the new party line. Adopting Ulbricht's characteristic distinction between the 'Krupps' in the West and the 'Krausses' in the East, Norden claimed:

> There is no bond between them because a nation based on the law of the exploitation of man, and a nation free of such exploitation cannot be held together by any so-called national links. The one nation develops as a part of the world socialist system, whereas the FRG belongs to the imperialist world, a world with which we do not and cannot have anything in common. There are not two states in one nation but rather two nations in states with differing social systems.[24]

Norden went on to deny the existence of any elements in common, either in territorial or economic terms, or in terms of moral and psychological attributes. The SED Politburo also sought to diminish the significance of the common German language, claiming:

> The Russian-speaking worker in Moscow, the English-speaking miner in Scotland, the French-speaking employees of Renault, and the Italian-speaking farmers are all a thousand times closer to us than the German-speaking Messrs Siemens, Abs, and Krupp.

At a theoretical conference for the district party leaderships in June 1973, Politburo member Hermann Axen also clarified the new party line. He conceded that the goal of reuniting Germany under socialist auspices had been unachievable due to the unfavourable 'correlation of forces' in both the international and the national context. At the same time he spoke of the genesis and formation of a socialist German nation in the GDR as a result of the socialist revolution, the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat, and the building of socialism in all spheres of life.[25]

That a certain amount of uncertainty remained within the party leadership on how best to handle this issue, however, was reflected in a renaming process of various official organizations and institutions, a process that some West German newspapers referred to as the *Entdeutschung* ('de-Germanizing') of the GDR. With the exception of the party's title and its publication *Neues Deutschland*, the apparently offensive words 'German' and 'Germany' were eliminated and replaced by the abbreviation 'DDR'.[26] Even the GDR's national anthem fell victim to the censor's pen. Undoubtedly with the best communist intentions, Johannes Becker, while in Moscow in 1943, had written a text including the passage: 'Arisen out of the ruins and headed for the future, let us serve Germany, our united fatherland.' The last three words no longer corresponded to the spirit of the times and East German schoolchildren were subsequently taught to hum their national anthem. As SED historian Stefan

24. As quoted in Schweitzer, *Die Deutsche Nation*, pp. 505–6.

25. See Axen's speech entitled 'On the development of the nation in the GDR' in Hermann Axen, *Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze* (Berlin: Dietz, 1976), pp. 275–312.

26. Thus, the former German Radio was renamed Voice of the GDR, the German Union of Journalists received the title Union of Journalists of the GDR, and the German Academy of Sciences was rechristened the Academy of Sciences of the GDR. The letter 'D' for 'Deutsch' also disappeared from numerous abbreviations, and, after the Hotel Deutschland in Leipzig was renamed Hotel on the Ring, a local newspaper managed to come up with the following sentence: 'The Hotel on the Ring will in the future be called the Hotel on the Ring' (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 1 Oct. 1979).

Dronberg put it: 'Sentimentalizing about being German is an old trick in certain circles in the FRG for covering up imperialist class interests.'[27]

Despite—or precisely because of—the multitude of inter-German arrangements being hammered out in East–West German negotiations, the SED agitprop apparatus continued to remind the party and the public that they were German citizens of German nationality. There were Germans of the FRG and Germans of the GDR, but there was no longer a Germany. The FRG was a 'foreign country', Honecker stated, 'and an imperialist foreign country at that'.[28] At the 13th CC plenum in December 1974 the SED Secretary General coined an apt phrase that summarized the SED's new policy: 'Citizenship: GDR; Nationality: German.' The new approach was codified in several revised documents such as the new GDR constitution of 1974. Whereas a preamble to the 1968 version referred to the GDR as a 'socialist state of the German nation', the 1974 version adopted the phraseology of the Soviet constitution and stated blandly in Article 1 that the country was 'a socialist state of workers and farmers'. The 1968 reference to 'the vital interests of the nation' was also dropped and replaced by the assertion that 'the people of the German Democratic Republic . . . have realized their right to socioeconomic, political, and national self-determination'.[29] Similarly, the new SED programme of May 1976 dropped the 1963 version's unequivocal commitment to national unity and merely asserted that, by taking power, 'the German working class had created the necessary preconditions for the construction of the socialist nation'. Moreover, relations with the FRG were characterized as subject to a lawlike process of 'delimitation'; the 'blossoming' of the socialist German nation was to occur in conjunction with the GDR's rapprochement with other socialist states.[30]

Nation versus nationality

Throughout the early 1970s a certain ambivalence persisted in official East German proclamations on the concept of the nation, an indication perhaps that the party leadership itself was not yet quite clear on its new line and that, in any case, there were difficulties in explaining it both to the *apparat* and to society at large. Above all it remained unclear whether the 'socialist nation' in the GDR already existed or whether it was still developing and, if it was still developing, when this development had commenced and when it would be completed. In attempting to answer this question, two leading East German theorists in this area wrote in early 1975 in *Neues Deutschland*: 'The formation of the socialist nation in the GDR does not result from a decree or a "stroke of the pen", but rather as an inevitable consequence of the objective social transformation leading from capitalism to socialism.'[31] In other words, while rejecting the unity of the German nation *per se,* the SED insisted that the substance of the nation had been preserved and was incorporated in the German working class and its representatives, that is to say, the SED, and that the German nation had now reached a higher, more progressive stage than its West German

27. As quoted in Norman N. Naimark, 'Is it true what they are saying about East Germany?', *Orbis*, Fall 1979, p. 536.

28. *Neues Deutschland*, 7 Jan 1972.

29. See *The Constitution of the German Democratic Republic* (Dresden: Staatsverlag der DDR und Verlag Zeit und Bild, 1974), p. 9 and the Preamble p. 8.

30. See Fricke, *Programm und Statut der SED*, p. 15.

31. See the article by Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt in *Neues Deutschland*, 15–16 Feb. 1975.

'bourgeois' counterpart. In contrast to Brandt's vision of a pan-German *Kulturnation*, the SED posited that nations could not be based upon criteria such as national will, character, or a common language, but rather that they had to be differentiated in the first place according to the character of the national economy and the political organization, and only secondarily by such characteristics as customs, tradition, and mentality, the last, of course, being constantly subject to a dynamic process of social change.[32] Further dialectical acrobatics attempted to differentiate between 'nation' and 'nationality', with the latter defined as 'the totality of ethnic attributes, features, and ties within the population and the classes, groups, and individuals that are its components', and the former as 'a dialectical unit containing economic, political, social, and ideological relations of a class nature'. Such theoretical pirouettes provided the basis for the following conclusion:

> In the FRG the old capitalist nation survived. In the GDR, on the other hand, socialism produced its own form of national development adequate to its needs, the needs of the socialist German nation. [The socialist nation] differs in its economic, social, political, and ideological principles, in its essential content and features from the capitalist nation in the FRG and inevitably demarcates itself from it, while simultaneously further moulding its new socialist quality. In terms of its sociohistoric type, the nation in the GDR is socialist and in terms of its nationality, German; whereas the nation in the FRG is capitalist in its sociohistoric type and in its nationality likewise German.[33]

A nation, however, cannot be created or dismissed by unilateral decree. At least, if one is to attempt such a manoeuvre, one must of course simultaneously create a history for it. It is from this vantage point that one must view the SED's increasing interest in and broader treatment of the German historical past which has been evident in recent years. Since the SED's ninth party congress in 1976 there has been greater consistency in the party line on the socialist nation, a factor which does not of course necessarily make the theory itself any more plausible. Equally important, however, there have also been 'intensified' efforts to create a broader and more comprehensive historical framework to explain the development of the 'socialist German nation', indeed, to trace its origins back into the depths of German history itself. The resulting historical revisions have at times been nothing less than remarkable.

The rewriting of history

Viewed in broad terms, the SED's attitudes towards the German historical past have been consistent in so far as the party has always claimed that the GDR had incorporated all that is 'progressive' in German history and successfully broken with all that is deemed 'reactionary'. The variable that has been changing, however, has been the increasingly elastic definition of what is 'progressive' as opposed to 'reactionary'. Since the ninth party congress in 1976 the SED has openly called for a broadening of the GDR's historical framework to meet the demands of a sharpening

32. For perhaps the definitive East German work on the nation see Alfred Kosing, *Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Berlin: Dietz, 1976).

33. See Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt, 'Birth and growth of the socialist German nation', *Einheit*, 1979, No. 9/10, pp. 1073–4.

class struggle with West German bourgeois historians.[34] Such appeals for historical revisionism have been taken up with vigour in so far as the spectrum of historical figures to which the SED now lays claim has been systematically broadened and East German citizens have discovered that there is far more that is 'progressive' in the German past than they had previously been led to believe. One of the more astonishing periods of German history which has been chosen for rehabilitation has been that of the state of Prussia, large portions of which, of course, are now East German territory. Although certain 'enlightened' Prussian generals, such as Scharnhorst, Gniesenau and Clausewitz, had in the past been singled out by the SED for praise, any direct association with Prussia—the most militaristic state in German history—would have been inconceivable in years past. Now East German historians plead for a more 'differentiated' view of the Prussian historical legacy in all its 'complexities', with the change in official attitudes symbolized by the reappearance of Rauch's equestrian statue of Frederick the Great on Unter den Linden in autumn 1980.

The 'Prussian renaissance' propagated by the SED sparked off considerable interest not only in the West, but also among some of the GDR's Eastern neighbours familiar with certain of the less 'progressive' aspects of Prussian rule.[35] There has also been speculation concerning differences within the party leadership on exactly how to deal with such controversial historical themes.[36] Perhaps the leading academic figure in the Prussian renaissance in the GDR has been Dr Ingrid Mittenzwei, head of the Department of German History 1648–1789 of the GDR Academy of Sciences and author of a recent biography of Frederick II.[37] Mittenzwei's contention is that Prussia was not simply a reactionary and militaristic state, but that its ruling classes also contributed to progressive social developments. While clearly serving the interests of the Junker class, government policy also spurred on industrial development and helped create the conditions for the political and social maturation of the German working class. Mittenzwei and others continue of course to criticize many aspects of the Prussian legacy and emphasize that their writings are not meant as an apologia. While conceding that past official views on Prussia were coloured by polemics, Mittenzwei, for example, insists that a more open confrontation with the Prussian past is absolutely necessary if East Germans are to understand better their own history, as well as providing an antidote to attempts of 'flexible bourgeois historians' in the West allegedly trying to manipulate the Prussian legacy to 'justify the current imperialist system in the FRG'.[38]

34. See, for example, the article by CC member and Deputy Director of the SED's Institute for Marxism–Leninism Ernst Diehl, 'Tasks of the historical sciences of the GDR since the Ninth Party Congress', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1977, No. 3.

35. See Wolf Oschlies, 'Prussia, "Red Prussia", and Poland', *Deutschland Archiv*, 1982, No. 2, pp. 152–7.

36. That not all SED party leaders are equally enthusiastic about the GDR's Prussian renaissance is hinted at by an interesting comment attributed to Kurt Hager, SED Politburo member in charge of ideology and culture. When asked his opinion about Mittenzwei's book on Frederick II, Hager replied sarcastically 'Mrs Mittenzwei is not yet a member of the Politburo'. As quoted in Klaus Bolling, *Die fernen Nachbarn* (Hamburg: Stern Buch, 1983), p. 129.

37. See Ingrid Mittenzwei, *Friedrich II von Preussen* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1980).

38. As quoted by the West German historian Michael Stürmer in his article 'To whom does German history belong?' in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 22 May 1982. See also Horst Bartel and Ingrid Mittenzwei, 'Prussia and German History', *Einheit*, 1979, No. 6. According to Bartel and Mittenzwei: 'Our attitude to Prussia was coloured by polemics which were made necessary by the struggle of the revolutionary labour movement of the 19th and 20th centuries against the reactionary Prussian spirit . . . The conflict with Prussia, above all with such a phenomenon as militarism of the Prussian type, was absolutely necessary following the catastrophe of the Second World War. Today these matters can be viewed in more differentiated terms. Even more, such distinctions have proven to be particularly important at the present time.'

Equally sensational, and furnishing another example of the SED's changing views on German history, were the celebrations in the GDR in 1983 commemorating the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther. Having been denounced for years as the 'princes' lackey' and 'betrayer of the peasants', Luther's official image has undergone a major refurbishing and the Great Reformer is now considered a major German revolutionary, 'one of the greatest sons of the German people', and even a philosophical trailblazer of Karl Marx. The elevation of Luther into the socialist pantheon is a fascinating story in itself.[39] It should be stressed, however, that although it is the celebrations of such controversial figures as Luther or Frederick II which occasionally dominate Western headlines, it is the SED's views on German history in its entirety—or what the party refers to as the 'socialist understanding of heritage'—which has been changing. In 1982 it was Goethe, in 1983 Luther, for 1984 Schiller, and for 1985 it is Bach, Händel and Schütz who have been predestined for the socialist Valhalla. In other words, the entire span of German history from the genesis of the German *Volk* to the present is being reevaluated, with East German historians ferreting out various 'progressive' traditions to create a new national history designed to strengthen the foundations of SED rule. In the words of Horst Bartel, director of the Central Institute of History at the GDR's Academy of Sciences: 'Socialism is the legitimate heir to everything revolutionary, progressive, and humanistic in all of German history.'[40]

East German historians are quite candid about laying claim to previously untapped historical traditions. Under the rubric of developing the 'national history of the GDR' they speak of a three-dimensional expansion of the GDR's historical legacy—chronological, territorial, and sociostructural. Chronologically, the national history of the GDR is not to be limited to the genesis and development of the East German state but rather is to include the entirety of German history 'since the appearance of the German people as an ethnic unit'. In other words, the history of 'the first complete break with the reactionary past on German soil', as the GDR is referred to, is to be traced back to prehistoric times. The genealogy of socialism on German soil should include not only the 150-year struggle of the German working class but also the efforts and aspirations of the progressive bourgeoisie and the democratic, lower middle class in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the Reformation and the peasants' war in the sixteenth century; and the peasant uprisings, plebeian revolts, and antifeudal heretic movements of the Middle Ages.

Territorially, the GDR's historic claims are by no means limited to those parts of Germany that currently constitute the GDR. Although the history of these areas receives priority, the historical heritage of the GDR is to include both the revolts in southwestern Germany and Thuringia in 1525, the efforts of the south German Jacobins after the French Revolution, and the Mainz Republic of 1793, as well as a variety of strikes, uprisings, and revolts that took places in Silesia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Finally, from what East German historians refer to as the sociostructural vantage point, the GDR has embarked upon an examination of the historic accomplishments of all classes and social strata in German history, including the 'exploiting' classes, in an attempt to ferret out 'progressive positive elements that must be included in our store of traditions'. Historians are interested not only in the Hohenzollern dynasty but also in a larger historical spectrum that

39. See Ronald D. Asmus, 'The GDR and Martin Luther', *Survey*, Summer 1984, Vol. 28, No. 2.
40. See Horst Bartel, 'Historical heritage and tradition', *Einheit*, 1981, No. 3, p. 272.

includes medieval German emperors and kings, representatives of the nineteenth-century liberal aristocracy, and even 'representatives of the monopolistic bourgeoisie who were not only imperialists but also great scientists, such as Abbé Siemens'.[41]

The third category is clearly the most elastic, as it opens the gates to countless new interpretations. It is in this category that SED historians place recent 'differentiated' revisions of controversial figures such as Luther or Frederick the Great. More recently, there have been attempts to come to grips with the weighty historical legacy of Otto von Bismarck. In February 1983 the official East German youth newspaper *Junge Welt* published an interview on Bismarck under the title 'A statesman of high rank'.[42] Although Bismarck 'was certainly not the patriotic heroic figure and infallible master of the art of statesmanship' he is often made out to be, one could not, the paper claimed, make him 'personally responsible' for the disastrous course of German history that ensued. In December 1983, Kurt Hager, an SED Politburo member and CC Secretary for Ideology and Cultural Affairs, also took up the subject of Bismarck, labelling him not only a 'reactionary' but also a 'realist', above all in the sphere of foreign affairs, where his 'sober' calculations and advocacy of good relations with Russia in the 1880s deserved praise. Moreover, Hager claimed that the ability of a conservative figure such as Bismarck to think in realistic terms had to be emphasized at a time when 'certain circles' in the West were pursuing an adventurist course of confrontation. Indeed, the SED Politburo member implicitly pointed to Bismarck as a model (perhaps for the FRG?) as he called on Western statesmen to note Bismarck's realism and not to allow themselves to be coopted into joining the 'adventurist' course being pursued by the Reagan administration.[43]

A new socialist national history

The SED has clearly set itself ambitious goals, indeed, nothing less than the creation of a new national history. Although plan goals on the writing of history are constantly reported as having been fulfilled, plenty of work remains to be done as no 'gaps' are to remain unfilled. The SED is rapidly moving towards a claim of sole representation or *Alleinvertretungsanspruch* for, in the words of Honecker, 'all that is good in German history'. The explicit purpose is to present the GDR as the embodiment and keeper of all progressive traditions in German history and as the inevitable culmination and highpoint of the German historical process. German history is no longer viewed as 'The erroneous path of a nation', to quote the title of Alexander Abusch's 1947 book which so aptly captured the ambivalent attitudes of many early German communist leaders in the postwar period towards the German historical mantle, but rather as a source of political and historical legitimacy. The goals are threefold. First, the creation of a set of traditions with which East German youth, now constituting over 60 per cent of the total population, can identify, thereby stabilizing (or perhaps creating) not only a separate state, but also a separate socialist national consciousness. Secondly, to supply a historical justification spanning centuries for the founding of

41. See Walter Schmidt, 'The past is never finished—what must provide the basis for a national history of the GDR?', *Sonntag*, 1981, No. 27; see also the excerpts from Schmidt's speech delivered at the Seventh Historians' Congress of the GDR, reprinted under the title 'Socialist nation and German history', *Sonntag*, 1983, No 7.

42. See the interview with the East German historian Heinz Wolter in *Junge Welt*, 10 Feb. 1983.

43. See Hager's speech entitled 'The historical laws of our epoch: the driving forces and values of socialism', delivered at a party conference on the task of the social sciences in the 1980s held in December 1983, *Neues Deutschland*, 16 Dec 1983.

the GDR not as a historical 'accident' but rather as the invariable outcome of German history. Finally, the cultivation of history and of patriotism for the socialist 'fatherland' is not only to secure a sense of national identity, but also to serve as an ideological booster at a time of economic austerity and international tension. 'Delimitation' or *Abgrenzung* in the political ties with the Federal Republic is to be complemented by demarcation in the competition over the mantle of German history.

The prescriptive as opposed to descriptive writing of history is by no means unprecedented in Eastern Europe; all the Eastern bloc regimes have at one time or another attempted to wrap themselves in a national cloak to secure their positions of power.[44] The GDR, however, was from the outset in a unique situation. First, it had to share or compete over the German historical legacy with an economically more potent and politically attractive West German state whose very existence posed a fundamental challenge to the regime's legitimacy. Second, the nature of German history itself and its often catastrophic course often seemed to demand more apology than salutation, especially in the early postwar period, and thus did not necessarily appear as a potential political asset. The GDR itself was founded not only as a legal but also as a spiritual break with the Third Reich and Imperial Germany. Consequently, early official histories concentrated on selected aspects of the German historical past, above all the GDR's socialist and communist precursors and so-called radical-democratic and revolutionary traditions. In justifying some of their more creative historical interpretations of recent years and the significant broadening of the historical framework, East German historians argue that the question of power has long been settled, that society has become sufficiently 'ripe' or mature with the pillars of socialist power secure enough to afford a more open confrontation with the German past, including that of the imperialist ruling classes. Moreover, in the words of one historian, 'the same history does not have the same meaning if it is considered and accepted by different people living under different social and national conditions'.[45]

The lengths to which East German historians will be allowed to go in the future in redefining German history remains a question of speculation. One fact is clear, however; namely, that the official discussion in the GDR over history is really a surrogate debate about the German nation, its past as well as its future. The SED, of course, claims that there is nothing to discuss: the German question has long been solved through the creation of two separate German states and the development of separate 'socialist' and 'capitalist' German nations. West German claims to the contrary are dismissed as revanchist rhetoric and a disguise for imperialist aims. A certain ambivalence has nevertheless remained evident, above all over the question of what is to happen when the Federal Republic undergoes its 'inevitable' revolution and socialist transformation. If and when the 'capitalist' German nation in the Federal Republic also reaches its 'socialist' stage, would there exist one or two German 'socialist' nations? Although the performance of the DKP in the most recent West German Federal election in March 1983, where it received a mere 0·2 per cent of the vote, should serve as a sober reminder of the theoretical nature of the question, the

44. Undoubtedly the most extreme case of the rewriting of national history to suit the purposes of a communist regime has been Ceauşescu's Romania. See Vlad Georgescu, *Politica si Storie cazul Communistilor Romani 1944–1977* (Munich: Jon Dimitru, 1981); and Michael J. Rura, *Reinterpretation of history as a method of furthering communism in Romania: a study in comparative historiography* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1961).

45. Walter Schmidt, 'German history as national history of the GDR', *Geschichtsunterricht und Staatsbürgerkunde*, 1983, No. 25, p. 302, quoted in Karl-Ernst Jeismann, 'The unity of the German nation in GDR historiography', *Das Parlament, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 13 Aug. 1983, pp. 3–16.

point remains that the SED has never definitely excluded the possibility of reunification under socialism. Writing in 1976, Dr Alfred Kosing, the leading East German theorist on the nation, wrote that the question of what would happen to the nation following a socialist revolution in the Federal Republic could 'under the current circumstances be answered neither negatively nor positively'.[46] Yet the fact that old visions die hard was demonstrated by a remarkable statement by Honecker himself on reunification in February 1981, ironically at a time when Günter Gauss, the FRG's permanent representative to the GDR, had questioned the utility of retaining the concept of the nation:

> And when certain people in the West nowadays harp upon greater German dictums and act as if the reunification of both German states were closer to their hearts than to their pocketbooks, then we would like to say to them: Be careful! One day socialism will come knocking at your door; and when that day comes when the working class in the Federal Republic proceeds with the socialist transformation of the Federal Republic of Germany, then the question of the reunification of the two German states will appear in an entirely new light. And no one should have any doubts about how we will then decide.[47]

Finally, it has also not escaped the attention of Western observers that the SED struck a few pan-German chords during the Warsaw Pact 'peace offensive' designed to hinder INF deployment in the FRG; for example, Honecker appealed in 'the name of the German people' for a halt to deployment plans in October 1983.[48]

Change and continuity

The SED, as this article has tried to demonstrate, was founded in 1946 as a party for which national and proletarian unity in Germany were inseparable. The GDR was not to be merely another German state, but rather the nucleus for a reunified socialist Germany. For more than the first two decades of the existence of 'the first socialist state on German soil' the SED passionately clung to the concept of a single unitary German nation. Whether this ostensible commitment to reunification really was reflective of pan-German aspirations, or rather an attempt to legitimize the GDR's existence by placing the burden of partition on West German shoulders, remains a question of historical debate. Tactical considerations have always been a key component of SED policy and an official commitment to German reunification in the early years clearly served the dual purpose of trying to lure the FRG into negotiations over Germany's future, thus breaking the GDR's international isolation, and of reminding the world that another Germany did indeed exist. Domestically, the pledge to reunification was also clearly an attempt to gain a modicum of legitimacy by appealing to national aspirations, aspirations which were undoubtedly quite strong.

Following the inauguration of Social Democratic *Ostpolitik* and the first serious attempt to establish some sort of working relationship with the GDR, the SED was put on the defensive. The question of the nation now threatened to become a destabilizing factor as opposed to one which might enhance the regime's standing. Although the SED had for some time attempted to foster a separate sense of state

46. Kosing, *Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, p. 106.
47. As quoted in *Neues Deutschland*, 16 Feb. 1981.
48. For the text of Honecker's letter to Kohl see *Neues Deutschland*, 10 Oct. 1983.

consciousness and loyalty, the dropping of the concept of a single unitary German nation in the early 1970s marked a watershed in the regime's endeavours to mould the theme of the nation to fit its operational needs. Since then we have witnessed a conscious attempt by party ideologues and historians to recast past official interpretations of German history and to construct a more 'differentiated' national history for the 'socialist' German nation. Although the GDR has always asserted that it is the more 'progressive' German state, there is now a conscious attempt to portray the GDR as more 'German' and as the true spiritual heir not only of selective traditions from the German labour movement, but all that is worthy of acclaim in German history as opposed to a rootless, 'Americanized' West Germany.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the discussion over the German nation and its history in the GDR takes place exclusively on the official level and within parameters carefully set by party ideologues. The degree to which the SED's views reflect or correspond to those of society is of course difficult to determine.[49] Although it has become quite common and fashionable for Western journalists and visitors to the GDR to note, either to their delight or dismay, that there exists a quiet conservatism and awareness of past German traditions in many small towns in the GDR that one does not find in the Federal Republic, it remains to be seen whether such nuances of cultural distinctiveness and parochialism can be nourished into something more sturdy like a separate national consciousness of the type desired by the SED. Of course, the frequency with which the party has been forced to modify its views on the nation over the past three decades is hardly a solid testimony to success and one wonders whether the two nation theory will prove to be of longer duration.

Two factors are likely to have a decisive influence on official East German attitudes on the nation in the future. The first will undoubtedly be the resonance which the creative historical interpretations on the part of East German historians and the occasional ideological pirouette necessary by party ideologues to clarify the new line will evoke within society itself. Will the average East German *Bürger* come away from the historical jubileums and exhibitions currently sponsored by the SED convinced that the 'socialist' nation and the GDR represent the continuation of all progressive German historical traditions, as the party clearly hopes, or is he more likely to be reminded of the common historical ties which bind Germans in the East and West and conclude that the phrase contained in the 1968 constitution and since dropped was indeed correct, namely that 'the GDR is a socialist state of *the German nation*' [emphasis added]?

This question is as unanswerable as it is tantalizing. There has been speculation in the Federal Republic that the new official interest in German history in the GDR could backfire, leading to ideas and notions which by no means correspond to those of the SED. In the words of one commentator, East German citizens might 'digest the materials, relics, and memorabilia of history in the same fashion with which they have read the priceless German classics—without reading the SED's summaries and

49. Perhaps the two best attempts to deal with the question of societal attitudes in the GDR towards the national question have been Peter Christian Ludz, *Die DDR zwischen Ost und West: von 1961 bis 1976* (Munich: Beck, 1977), pp. 221–61; and Gebhard Ludwig Schweigler, *National consciousness in divided Germany*, Vol. 15, Sage Library of Social Research (Beverly Hills, London. Sage, 1975). Ludz cites private sources according to which over two thirds of East Germans in 1975 did not view the FRG as a foreign country (Ausland). As Schweigler points out, however, the amount of hard data on the state of East German national attitudes and consciousness is limited and any conclusions must remain tentative if not tenuous. Although the SED is known to have conducted its own public opinion research, the results have never been published.

conclusions as ideological guides'.[50] Such a speculation was recently rejected as 'built on sand' by Kurt Hager; yet the fact that it was deemed necessary to respond to such conjecture at this level indicates that the party leadership is aware of the risks inherent in its current approach. Finally, official East German attitudes have in the past and will undoubtedly in the future be influenced by developments in the Federal Republic. Ulbricht was able to cling to his claim to represent the entire German nation only until actively challenged by Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. The changes in the SED's views on German history which have been evident in recent years have certainly aroused both interest and amusement in the Federal Republic, but thus far few people appear to have taken the GDR's claims on German history all that seriously.

50. See the editorial by Hans Schuster entitled 'A picture gallery for the SED state', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 Jan. 1983.

Should INF and START be merged? A historical perspective

PHILIP A. G. SABIN*

The Soviet Union's (hopefully temporary) withdrawal in November 1983 from the Geneva talks on both intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and strategic arms reduction (START) has re-opened debate in the West about whether these two sets of negotiations should be merged. Although such a merger has been suggested by several defence commentators, official reaction to the idea remains cool.[1] There are so many problems associated with INF arms control that it is hard to judge which negotiating strategy offers the least unpromising approach.

One way of tackling this question is to study the historical background. Intermediate nuclear forces (or 'theatre' nuclear forces as they were somewhat insensitively termed prior to 1981) have been playing a prominent part in arms control discussions between East and West for the past three decades. The historical record is thus surprisingly full, containing several instances both of an 'independent' approach to theatre nuclear arms control (that is, one dealing exclusively with theatre systems) and, on the other hand, of attempts to draw intermediate-range systems into negotiations on strategic forces. More recent experience helps to suggest whether it is useful or even feasible to engineer some form of compromise between these two different approaches. An analysis of the various negotiating strategies adopted in the past may thus help to throw some light on the current arms control dilemma.

The independent approach

The independent approach to the restriction of nuclear forces in Europe has a longer history than does the less straightforward strategy of drawing theatre systems into strategic negotiations. During the late 1950s and early 1960s there was a steady flow of Eastern bloc schemes for 'atom-free zones' or the evacuation of foreign bases in Europe, the most famous such proposal being the 1957 Rapacki Plan.[2] The virtual Warsaw Pact monopoly of these early TNF proposals owed much to a basic and continuing asymmetry in the European strategic environment. This asymmetry takes three specific forms. In the first place, it is a military asymmetry. The imbalance of conventional forces in the European theatre makes NATO far more dependent on its nuclear arsenal than is the Warsaw Pact. The second level is the geographical: the greater proximity of Europe to the Soviet Union than to the United States gives an inherent asymmetry to any mutual force withdrawals. Thirdly, there is a political discrepancy: the fact that NATO is an alliance of free and sovereign states makes

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1. See A. J. Pierre, ed., *Nuclear weapons in Europe* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984); F. Hiatt, 'NATO ministers reject merging talks', *Washington Post*, 8 Dec. 1983.

2. See R. Ranger, *Arms and politics, 1958–1978: arms control in a changing political environment* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979).

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nuclear deterrence an issue of extreme political sensitivity, and raises problems in terms of the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France.

Because of these strategic asymmetries, the West has usually been far less willing than the Soviet Union to discuss radical and comprehensive restrictions on theatre stockpiles. This has obvious propaganda advantages for the Eastern bloc, as the current appeal of the notion of European Nuclear Disarmament makes abundantly clear.[3] It has also meant that far-reaching TNF proposals have traditionally been more effective as vehicles for populist rhetoric than as starting points for serious discussion. Independent theatre arms control initiatives since the early 1960s have therefore tended to assume a more restricted form. This is not only because of the unacceptably one-sided nature of the comprehensive approach, but also because of two basic structural drawbacks to wider TNF negotiations.

In the first place, there has never been overall parity at any particular level of theatre nuclear forces. The West has traditionally enjoyed an advantage in battlefield systems, while the Soviet Union has fielded many more medium-range weapons.[4] These numerical imbalances have precluded the classic arms control approach of attempting to codify existing equality.[5] A more fundamental obstacle to comprehensive TNF negotiations has always been the lack of a distinct class of theatre nuclear weapons. The doctrinal requirements of flexible response, and the technological ambiguities inherent in long-range or dual-capable systems, have ensured that the notional categories of strategic, theatre and conventional forces are inextricably interlinked.[6]

To get round the formidable problems associated with a comprehensive approach to the TNF issue, independent initiatives on theatre arms control have drifted towards the less ambitious alternative of proposing straightforward trade-offs between specific weapon systems. During the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev suggested the reciprocal removal of intermediate-range rockets from Cuba and Turkey,[7] and in the 'bomber bonfire' scheme of 1964, the United States proposed equal reductions in the medium bomber fleets of East and West.[8] Later trade-off suggestions were not always confined to equivalent weapon systems, nor even to the theatre nuclear arsenals themselves. NATO's 'Option III' proposals, put forward at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna in December 1975, involved trading the Western advantage in short-range nuclear systems for the Soviet preponderance in tanks.[9] Whatever their content, however, such straightforward independent initiatives on TNF have so far failed to produce a single East–West deal.

There appear to be three main reasons for the recurrent failure of the trade-off approach. The first of these is the inherent non-negotiability of independent schemes

3. See M. Kaldor, 'END can be a beginning', and L. Freedman, 'A critique of the END campaign' in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Dec. 1981.

4. See D. R. Cotter, J. H. Hansen and K. McConnell, *The nuclear 'balance' in Europe: status, trends, implications* (Washington, DC. US Strategic Institute, 1983).

5. See, for instance, Fred Ikle's remarks in R. P. Labrie, ed., *SALT handbook: key documents and issues, 1972–1979* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 372.

6. For a discussion of the formidable problems surrounding a comprehensive TNF negotiation, see J. Coffey, 'Arms control and tactical nuclear forces and European security', in *Tactical nuclear weapons: European perspectives* (London: Taylor & Francis for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1979).

7. See D. L. Larson, *The 'Cuban crisis' of 1962* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 156–9.

8. See R. Ranger, *Arms and politics*, pp. 85–6.

9. The Warsaw Pact made several counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached, and the offer was eventually withdrawn. See *Strategic Survey, 1975* (London. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), pp. 110–11, and *Strategic Survey, 1978*, pp. 121–2.

developed solely by one particular bloc, which means that such plans have always tended to elicit equally unacceptable counter-proposals, rather than leading to a more constructive East–West dialogue. In a climate of mutual suspicion, it is hard for one side to accept in unmodified form a package proposed publicly and unilaterally by its opponent, however reasonable the suggested deal might actually be.

A second, and related, reason for the failure of the trade-off approach is that bargaining and compromise are hindered by the need to make any independent scheme appear to an outside audience as intrinsically simple, significant and balanced. This imperative stems in part from the requirements of propaganda, and in part from the need for an artificial bulwark against the domestic disagreements which would plague any attempt at uninhibited horse-trading. Unfortunately, the clear-cut simplicity of proposals such as the INF zero option[10] militates against amendment through later negotiations. This rigidity is especially serious with regard to TNF, because the inherent asymmetries of the strategic framework and the restricted scope of most trade-off proposals ensure that the shadow and the substance of equality are very unlikely to coincide in any one particular scheme.

The third reason for the historical failure of the independent approach to theatre arms control lies in the inherent contradictions of 'bargaining chip' diplomacy. In this respect, proposals for independent trade-offs seem to garner the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, they are unable to escape from the straitjacket of numerical balance which binds more comprehensive arms control schemes. On the other hand, the emphasis on trading specific weapons rather than legislating overall parity evokes the most naked attempts to negotiate from strength.

Theatre nuclear force planning has repeatedly been distorted by the acquisition or retention of particular systems more as bargaining chips than as military necessities. President Ford admitted that obsolete battlefield nuclear weapons were retained in Europe primarily for negotiating purposes.[11] The NATO TNF modernization programme of 1979 was deliberately set at the high level of 572 new missiles to allow scope for later reductions through arms control bargaining,[12] and a similar motive seems to have underlain Soviet dilatoriness in scrapping obsolete SS-4s and SS-5s.[13] The Titan missile accident of September 1980 illustrates the dangers which such policies can entail.[14]

The central problem with weapon systems used as bargaining chips is that they are difficult to keep within the narrow channel between the Scylla of political veto and the Charybdis of military backing. Even if a credible yet dispensable system can be found in the first place, the very act of proposing a deal tends to cast doubt on the weapon's utility, especially if the trade-off involves systems which are strategically unconnected. In the words of Henry Kissinger, a staunch proponent of bargaining chip diplomacy, 'One cannot obtain appropriations for what one is seeking to ban through negotiations'.[15]

These problems hamstrung Western attempts in the late 1970s to constrain the Soviet SS-20 missile by means of evolving American weapons programmes. When

10. The zero option was President Reagan's 1981 proposal for a complete abrogation by both the superpowers of medium-range land-based missiles. See R. Burt, *Alliance strategy and the INF negotiations* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1982).

11. See G. R. Ford, *A time to heal* (London: W. H. Allen, 1979), p. 323.

12. See Z. Brzezinski, *Power and principle* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 308.

13. See W. Pincus, 'US says Russia delays retiring missiles', *Washington Post*, 15 Oct. 1979.

14. See 'Radiation leak averted in Titan missile explosion', *The Times*, 20 Sept. 1980.

15. See H. Kissinger, *Years of upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 260–7.

President Carter proposed that SS-20 deployment be halted in return for US restraint on the neutron bomb or the MX missile, the Russians realised that these systems were in trouble, and so refused to cooperate.[16] When NATO finally did produce a bargaining chip which impressed the Russians, in the shape of the cruise and Pershing missile programme, so much political commitment was required that the price of abandonment became virtually intolerable.[17] The pursuit of specific trade-offs, despite in principle evading the many drawbacks of a comprehensive approach to the TNF issue, has proved no more successful in generating direct arms control linkage between the theatre forces of East and West.

The composite approach

The composite approach to theatre nuclear arms control dates from the opening of strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and Russia in 1969. Throughout the ensuing decade of SALT's life, each side attempted to draw certain of the other's theatre systems into the strategic negotiations. In the early 1970s, the principal weapons concerned were Soviet medium-range missiles and American forward-based attack aircraft (FBS).[18] Later in the decade, the focus shifted to the new systems of Backfire bombers and cruise missiles.[19] American hawks invoked verification problems or ambiguities of range to justify including Russian 'grey area' weapons in SALT,[20] while the consistent Soviet argument was that Western nuclear systems based in Europe could hit Russian territory just as easily as could intercontinental weapons, thus constituting a 'fourth arm' of the strategic triad.[21] Whatever the merits of such arguments, theatre nuclear systems came to play a prominent role at every stage in the strategic negotiations.

The distinctive characteristic of TNF proposals within the SALT framework was that each side justified its specific claims with reference to the unique capabilities of particular opposing weapons, rather than to any form of horizontal linkage or 'Eurostrategic balance'. This meant that the strategic asymmetries which hamstrung *independent* initiatives on theatre arms control were transformed into positive assets in the pursuit of a composite approach. The Russians often claimed that their own theatre systems were needed for defence against third countries, an argument rather compromised by simultaneous Soviet pressure for British and French forces to be taken into account in any strategic agreement.[22] Both sides, however, could find ample justification for including opposing theatre systems in SALT while excluding their own dissimilar forces.

As might be expected, such contradictory positions on where and how to deal with TNF at first produced an impasse. The whole SALT process was often deadlocked for

16. See R. P Labrie, ed *SALT handbook* (Washington, DC American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 421, Z Brzezinski, *Power and principle*, pp 302–5, D. K Shipler, 'Russia hints neutron bomb no bargaining chip in talks', *New York Times*, 13 March 1978

17. See G. F. Treverton, 'Arms control. the new missile test facing NATO', *The Times*, 7 Dec. 1979

18. See G Smith, *Doubletalk: the story of the first strategic arms limitation talks* (New York. Doubleday, 1980)

19. See S. Talbott, *Endgame: the inside story of SALT II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).

20. See, for instance, W. Beecher, 'US satellites detect Soviet ICBMs in medium range missile complexes', *New York Times*, 11 Feb 1970, and C. A. Robinson, 'Backfire draws focus in SALT', *Aviation Week*, 25 Aug. 1975. It is noteworthy that many American arms controllers took an entirely contrary position to US hawks regarding which side's theatre systems should be included in SALT. See, for example, N. Kempster, 'Carter Pentagon changing views of Soviet Backfire', *Los Angeles Times*, 2 Feb. 1977 and S. Talbott, *Endgame*, pp. 46, 57.

21. See S. M. Millett, 'Forward-based nuclear weapons and SALT I', *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1983.

22. See G. Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 129, 395–6.

months or even years on end over incompatible demands concerning theatre nuclear forces. These protracted stalemates led many Western observers to wish that the whole TNF issue could somehow be excluded from SALT, perhaps by passing the buck to the MBFR talks, thus clearing the way for a purely strategic agreement.[23] However, the limited practicality which such a separation might once have possessed was progressively eroded by two strategic developments. In the first place, the theatre arsenals gradually shifted from a stagnant relic of the 1960s into a burgeoning area of military expansion.[24] Secondly, new 'grey area' technology such as the cruise missile made the boundary between theatre and strategic systems increasingly blurred.[25] Both these trends militated against the simple exclusion of TNF from the SALT process. The dream of bypassing the theatre quagmire and pursuing a purely strategic agreement seemed to be becoming more and more chimerical as the decade passed.

The SALT negotiations, then, were invariably bogged down in their early stages by reciprocal claims for the inclusion of certain of the other side's theatre nuclear forces. Initial attempts to break these deadlocks predictably involved recourse to the notion of a direct trade-off between the grievances concerned. Frequent proposals were made for creating a straightforward horizontal linkage between the systems in dispute, either by mutually excluding them from SALT or by imposing mutual restrictions upon them. These proposals were no more successful than were their independent counterparts outside the SALT framework. American suggestions for reciprocally deferring the issues of forward-based systems and medium-range missiles, or of Backfire and cruise, were consistently turned down by the Soviet Union.[26] A similar fate befell the incoherent ideas in the early 1970s for a TNF freeze, as well as Kissinger's scheme in 1975 for a one-for-one allowance of Backfire bombers and cruise missiles, over and above the Vladivostok ceiling of 2,400 strategic launchers.[27] Neither positive nor negative linkage could overcome the basic problem that such simplistic and artificial trade-offs were bound to appear disadvantageous to one side or the other.

It was in the resolution of this fundamental problem that the SALT process came into its own. On three occasions, in 1972, 1974 and 1979, the TNF impasse was broken and an overall agreement concluded. These successes rested on four crucial advantages which discussions in SALT enjoyed over the method of independent trade-offs. First, the desire for a strategic agreement provided an external incentive for a TNF compromise to be reached. Secondly, the SALT framework allowed more flexible negotiations than were possible for one-off proposals in the public arena. Thirdly, SALT deals on theatre forces could be more complex and asymmetric than independent TNF schemes such as the 'bomber bonfire' proposal. Fourthly, and most important of all, the SALT approach allowed for tacit compensation at the strategic level, which helped to bridge the gap between real and apparent equality in theatre trade-offs.

These four advantages are evident from the nature of the agreements which were

23. See, for instance, D. Healey, 'Defusing the arms race', *Guardian*, 2 Feb. 1971; G. Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 184–5; J. G. Tower, 'Senate debate on SALT 2: a nay . . .', *International Herald Tribune*, 4 July 1979.

24. For a discussion of Western attitudes to TNF before the advent of the Backfire and SS-20 threats, see U. Nerlich, *The Alliance and Europe, Part V: nuclear weapons and East–West negotiations*, Adelphi Paper 120 (London: International Institute Strategic Studies, Winter 1975/6).

25. See R. Burt, ' ruise missile and arms control', *Survival*, Jan./Feb. 1976.

26. See G. Smith, *[illegible]talk*, pp. 146–7, 183–4; G. R. Ford, *A time to heal*, p. 358; R. P. Labrie, ed., *SALT Handbook*, pp. 420–1, 439

27. See *Strategic Survey*, 1973, pp. 60–1, and *Strategic Survey*, 1975, pp. 108–9.

finally concluded. The SALT I Interim Agreement of May 1972 excluded theatre forces by compensating for the American FBS advantage through an asymmetric freeze on strategic launchers.[28] Repetition of this tactic was precluded by the Jackson Amendment, which demanded inherent parity in any future arms control agreement.[29] Despite this restriction, the TNF issue was again deferred in the Vladivostok Accords of November 1974, by means of a more complex and subtle package involving high force ceilings, the inclusion of heavy bombers, and American restraint in challenging the Backfire and the SS-18.[30] After years of fluid bargaining, the SALT II agreement of June 1979 imposed minor asymmetric restraints on Backfire bombers and cruise missiles, and balanced the outcome by informal trade-offs at the strategic level.[31]

In achieving these compromises, the SALT negotiations did very little to limit theatre forces themselves. What is significant, however, is that the two blocs did actually conclude deals (albeit negative ones) on theatre nuclear weapons, implying that the strategic imbalances which constitute the fundamental obstacle to theatre arms control had been overcome. An approach which has on three occasions surmounted this initial problem would seem to have more chance than the historically abortive pursuit of independent trade-offs of eventually obtaining positive restrictions on the theatre stockpiles.

The drawback of the composite approach to theatre nuclear arms control is that it has proved in the past to be extremely divisive within the NATO alliance. The very fluidity which enabled successful SALT bargaining also provoked tension and suspicion between the United States and its European allies. Fearful that America might bargain away TNF options in return for Soviet concessions at the strategic level, the European nations reacted disapprovingly to the most anodyne restrictions on Western theatre systems.[32] Even transatlantic consultations failed to reduce this sensitivity—when US officials did discuss TNF options within NATO in 1977, they were suspected of deliberately disparaging the cruise missile in order to reconcile the Europeans to its possible limitation in SALT II.[33]

European governments were not opposed in principle to theatre systems being dealt with in SALT. They advocated the restriction of Soviet medium-range weapons as fervently as American hawks,[34] while maintaining a dovish preference for a negotiated (as opposed to a military) solution to the nuclear dilemma. This latter preference came increasingly to outweigh uneasiness about restricting the West's own TNF arsenal, as European public demand grew for an end to the growing theatre arms race. A compromise negotiating strategy was therefore sought which would avoid both the technical sterility of the independent approach to theatre nuclear arms control and the political divisiveness which plagued SALT II.

28 To justify this asymmetry, supporters of SALT I also pointed to the US qualitative superiority in strategic weapons, and to the fact that most US force levels were static in any case. See the *Congressional Record*, Vol. 118, No. 108, 30 June 1972.

29. See R. P. Labrie, ed. *SALT Handbook*, pp. 147–55.

30. See S. Talbott, *Endgame*, p. 33; L. H. Gelb, 'Soviet–US arms deal: how pact was reached in Vladivostok', *New York Times*, 3 Dec. 1974; M. Getler, 'Some new atomic weapons not covered by the arms pact', *Washington Post*, 5 Dec. 1974.

31. See S. Talbott, *Endgame*, and P. Warnke, 'Diplomacy at home and abroad', *Arms Control Today*, May 1979, pp. 6–7.

32. See R. Dale, 'European concern grows on arms limitation talks', *Financial Times*, 6 Dec. 1977 and Lord Chalfont, 'SALT II and America's European allies', *International Affairs*, Autumn 1979.

33. See G. F. Treverton, 'Nuclear weapons and the gray area', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, p. 1081.

34. See M. Woollacott, 'US inaction on freeze dashes hopes at talks', *Guardian*, 17 Nov. 1969; A. Dick, 'Apel warns on medium range N-weapons', *Financial Times*, 30 Aug. 1978.

The search for compromise

In the later 1970s, the question of how to structure arms control talks after SALT II became the subject of strenuous debate within Western defence circles. It was clear that the mutual inclusion of 'grey area' systems in East–West negotiations was now both technologically and politically imperative.[35] What was less easy to decide upon was the institutional forum in which these systems should be discussed. Some commentators suggested that the TNF issue should simply be incorporated in a composite SALT III,[36] while others (especially in France) advocated the alternative extreme of an independent, multilateral European arms control conference.[37] Most observers, however, supported some form of compromise between these two negotiating strategies.

This search for compromise was driven by the desire to avoid a number of pitfalls. American analysts realized that mobile systems such as the SS-20 would be difficult to constrain within a regional negotiating framework, but they also wanted to stop SALT III from becoming bogged down in a worse TNF impasse than ever before.[38] European nations demanded more significant representation than they had enjoyed in the 1970s, but were wary of multilateral negotiations because of their tendency to fall into the grip of inertia and the difficulty of continuing to exclude national nuclear forces.[39] Most important of all, concern among European NATO members about a 'Euro-strategic balance', which the United States was neglecting through its concentration on intercontinental systems, was matched by the fear that codifying such a balance would decouple Europe from the American strategic guarantee.[40]

To pick a way through this maze of conflicting priorities, Western thinkers evolved the idea of a 'parallel track' SALT III, with the TNF negotiations proceeding semi-independently of the strategic arms talks.[41] The negotiations themselves were to be bilateral, but special consultative arrangements were made to coordinate Western strategy.[42] To avoid becoming entangled in the technical complexities of the full theatre arsenals, the talks would focus specifically upon long-range land-based missiles.[43] NATO leaders decided to insist upon *de jure* equality in any TNF agreement, in order to avoid the institutionalization of Soviet predominance at the theatre nuclear level.[44] However, the Western alliance agreed not actually to exercise its right to TNF equality, lest this decouple European security from that of the United States.

This delicate compromise may be viewed either as a masterly plan to resolve NATO's nuclear dilemma or as the typically hybrid product of an international committee. Whatever its theoretical merits, however, the scheme proved highly vulnerable to the exigencies of public debate and East–West relations. For all their

35. See C. Bertram, 'SALT II and the dynamics of arms control', *International Affairs*, Autumn 1979.
36. See K. G. de Vries, 'Responding to the SS-20: an alternative approach', *Survival*, Nov./Dec. 1979.
37. See F. de Rose, 'European concerns and SALT III', *Survival*, Sept./Oct. 1979, C. J. Makins, 'Negotiating European security: the next steps', *Survival*, Nov./Dec. 1979.
38. See P. Doty and R. Metzger, 'Arms control enters the grey area', *International Security* (Winter 1978/79).
39. See *SALT and the NATO allies*, A Staff Report to the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1979).
40. See H. Schmidt, 'The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture', *Survival*, Jan./Feb. 1978; G. F. Treverton, 'Nuclear weapons and the gray area', p. 1088.
41. See U. Alexis Johnson, rapporteur, *Arms control and the gray area weapons systems* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, July 1978).
42. See R. Burt, 'US plans to consult NATO on SALT issues', *New York Times*, 18 Dec. 1978.
43. See *NATO communique 126/79* (Brussels: NATO, 12 Dec. 1979), para. 9.
44. *NATO communique 126/79*, para. 9.

ambivalence about a separate 'Euro-strategic balance', NATO leaders were forced to invoke a more and more simplistic link between cruise missiles and SS-20s in an attempt to justify their INF policies to a bewildered and frightened public. This direct linkage was inevitably reflected in arms control initiatives, and the appearance of radical populist proposals such as the zero option marked a distinct lurch towards the single, inauspicious precedent of independent schemes for specific theatre trade-offs.

NATO's fragile compromise strategy was also undermined by world events. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dealt a mortal blow to the ratification of SALT II, and although preliminary East–West discussions on TNF in 1980 continued to envisage a SALT III framework for the eventual negotiations, the election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States finally shattered the traditional arms control edifice.[45] In the new cold war climate, it was all that the Europeans could do to salvage an orphaned bilateral negotiation covering theatre forces alone, an unforeseen and hastily contrived arrangement intended more to placate public opinion than to generate an actual deal.[46]

The breakdown of the 'parallel track' compromise turned the actual INF talks into a classic example of the independent approach to theatre arms control. Caught between the inapplicability of 'parity' and the contradictions of 'negotiating from strength', the talks soon degenerated into a propaganda competition to construct the most convincing 'balance' out of arbitrarily selected segments of an asymmetric strategic situation.[47] The establishment of a formal negotiating structure at Geneva did permit some East–West bargaining, but the negotiators had very few options at their disposal, and when they did suggest a deal in July 1982, it was swiftly repudiated by both superpowers.[48] Given the gulf between Russia's opposition to any new US missiles and the West's insistence on obtaining the right to more forces than it intended (or even threatened) to deploy, this lack of agreement is hardly surprising.

A more interesting question is whether the 'parallel track' scheme as originally envisaged either could or would have made agreement easier. It does seem likely that the breakdown of this negotiating strategy owed more to the specific developments of 1980 than to the inherent instability of compromise arrangements. The Soviet Union was certainly in favour of a SALT III framework for future discussions on TNF,[49] and the commencement of the START negotiations in June 1982, in the same Geneva forum as the INF talks, belatedly established a formal negotiating structure very similar to that envisaged in the 'parallel track' idea. This would suggest that there are no overwhelming practical obstacles to adopting a middle way between the independent and composite approaches to theatre arms control.

Whether such a compromise offers the best of both worlds is, however, open to serious doubt. The essence of NATO's 1979 plan seems to have been that laying down formal strictures about TNF equality would free the alliance as a whole from the divisive infighting which SALT bargaining invariably produced within the US defence community. The Europeans, in other words, were to reap the advantages of negotiating flexibility, with none of the associated risks. Trade-offs would

45. See *Strategic Survey, 1980–1981* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981) pp. 83, 109–10.
46. See *Strategic Survey, 1981–1982* (London. IISS, 1982) pp. 118–21.
47. See L. Freedman, 'The great missile gap—between Andropov and his generals', *The Times*, 19 March 1983.
48. The 'walk in the woods' compromise worked out by the Geneva negotiators involved the cancellation of Pershing 2 missiles, a ceiling of seventy-five on SS-20s and cruise launchers in Europe, and a freeze on SS-20s in the Far East. See J. Newhouse, 'A reporter at large—arms and allies', *The New Yorker*, 28 Feb. 1983, pp. 70–3.
49. See Bzrezinski, *Power and principle*, p. 310.

automatically have to be slanted in their favour. It needs little imagination to foresee the resentment which such preferential treatment might produce in the United States, especially if skilfully exploited by Soviet proposals. Transatlantic acrimony would thus continue, while the inherent non-negotiability of TNF equality would encourage the Americans to defer the whole issue of theatre arms limitations. The 'parallel track' idea has not yet been put to the test, but there are strong grounds for believing that real negotiating flexibility cannot be achieved without political divisiveness, no matter what structural or consultative arrangements are adopted.

The merger dilemma

Historical experience suggests that the choice between independent and composite approaches to theatre nuclear arms control is (at least for the West) a devil's dilemma. Independent initiatives have very little chance of success, while negotiations in the context of strategic arms talks have a distressing potential to divide the NATO alliance. Compromise strategies are theoretically possible, but promise little more than a combination of evils. This being the case, it is evident that the specific question of whether the INF and START talks should be merged raises the much wider issue of how far NATO harmony should be prejudiced in the quest for an arms control deal.

The dilemma is especially acute for Europeans. America's NATO allies have traditionally been extremely sceptical of theatre nuclear arms control, but are now being driven by both popular and informed pressure to pursue real restrictions on the theatre stockpiles. Governments which try to appease this concern by supporting negotiations for cosmetic purposes merely store up greater trouble for the future.[50] The domestic controversy which the theatre nuclear arms race is generating in Europe is thus yet another factor which must be taken into account when balancing the advantages and drawbacks of the merger idea.

It is difficult not to conclude that the dilemma of how to pursue theatre arms control will only be resolved once a new defence consensus is established in the West. Since NATO's negotiating strategy on INF is (or should be) critically dependent on the function which Western theatre forces are intended to serve, the current debate about 'flexible response' and conventional deterrence has profound implications for arms control as well as strategy.[51] Only when the issues of defence, deterrence, arms control, disarmament and foreign policy are themselves arranged within a coherent overall framework will it become possible to address lesser problems such as the INF merger on anything like an objective basis.[52]

It is not the task of this article to attempt such a wide-ranging treatment of the current strategic dilemma. Certain specific points may, however, be made with regard to arms control itself. The first is that future negotiating policies cannot start from a clean slate. The INF talks have institutionalized the artificial concept of theatre parity, and it would now be impossible to adopt a wholly composite approach to INF limitation, even if this were accepted theoretically as the best strategy to pursue. It would also be difficult (though not impossible) to harmonize the separate negotiating strategies which have now been developed for INF and START. Arms control structures are so notoriously prone to bureaucratic inertia that the Soviet

50. See G. F. Treverton, 'Intermediate nuclear force negotiations: issues and alternatives' in M. M. Olive and J. D. Porro, eds, *Nuclear weapons in Europe: modernisation and limitation* (Lexington: Heath, 1983).

51. See L. Freedman, 'NATO myths', *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1981/82.

52. See M. Howard, 'Reassurance and deterrence: Western defense in the 1980s', *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83.

MBFR has had moments of hope, raised by the achievement of some significant concessions, but these have been rare and always doomed to disappointment. Vast differences still separate the sides in Vienna, and no formal agreement has been achieved. CSCE, on the other hand, produced a substantial concluding document in 1975—the Helsinki Final Act—and a modest document at the end of the first review session in 1978.[1] The second, recently concluded, review went through some trying times right from the outset. The opening of the session was postponed under an unusual procedure—'clock-stopping'—because of disputes over the agenda.[2] Specifically, the East wanted only a minimum review of human rights and argued that the main business of the conference was security. The Western participants, maintaining that human rights are as important as the other two broad areas of issues or 'baskets'—scientific, economic and technical cooperation, and security—insisted on more than a cursory review of implementation of human rights provisions.

The most serious blow to progress at the Madrid review session was the imposition of martial law in Poland. Many neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries, along with the Western states, saw events in Poland as demonstrating flagrant disregard for the goals of the CSCE process. As a consequence, the conference resumed only briefly in early 1982, and, having agreed merely that the existing climate was not conducive to productive negotiations, was adjourned.

On reconvening in November 1982, one of the primary tasks facing the Madrid review conference was the establishment of a mandate for a CDE. Negotiations among the Western countries on such a conference had been going on since early 1978. In March that year France circulated a draft plan outlining its ideas for a CDE, and in summer 1978 the plan was brought up by President Giscard d'Estaing at the UN Special Session on Disarmament.[3] In December 1980 the French draft proposal was tabled at Madrid, and following this a number of other proposals appeared. The Western participants agreed to use the French proposal as the basis of its negotiating position.

The French plan, first discussed within the framework of European Political Cooperation, subsequently came under examination in NATO as the focus shifted more on to the military consequences of possible confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).[4] CSBMs are of great importance; strengthening them goes further towards diminishing the chance of war in Europe than any other available means. The aim of such measures is to make a conventional surprise attack less likely. If an attack is contemplated, CSBMs provide more warning time to the other side, which gives them more time to prepare defences; this lowers the chances of an effective offensive, which makes the attack a less attractive option. Furthermore, since the most plausible scenarios for the outbreak of nuclear war in Europe involve an escalation of conventional warfare, by reducing the chances of a conventional war CSBMs also reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange.

The proposal tabled in Madrid is slightly different from, and of course more detailed than, the rough outline first offered by the French. As the discussions among the Western nations proceeded, much of the substance of the provisions was filled in

1. The problems with the Belgrade Review are discussed by Geoffrey Edwards, 'Belgrade and human rights', *Government and Opposition*, Summer 1978.

2. See 'How Brezhnev pushed human rights on to the front page', *Economist*, 15 Nov. 1980, p. 53.

3. Excerpts from Giscard's address to the UN Special Session on Disarmament are reprinted in *Survival*, Sept./Oct. 1978, pp. 222–4.

4. The original measures in the Helsinki Final Act were known as 'confidence building measures'. For uniformity, 'CSBM' is used below to refer to both groups of measures.

and some of the initial provisions developed further. The proposal offered a two-stage conference, the first stage to deal only with CSBMs and the second with conventional force reductions in Europe.

Options open and objections raised

The Western group at the Madrid review comprised the members of NATO together with Spain, which was not a member during the initial discussions on a CDE. These countries had among them many competing ideas about a CDE mandate, and despite two years of discussions had still not reached full agreement when the proposal was tabled. A number of objections had been raised, many of which still carry persuasive force. The security interests of the Western nations are clearly bound together; yet differences in approach persist, arising from different judgements on how to achieve their security goals and from different political conditions within the various Western countries.

When the Madrid review opened, the West had a variety of options at its disposal apart from the offer of a CDE. One such option was to stay with the existing arms control negotiations: SALT, MBFR, and the imminent INF negotiations. (Once NATO formed the Special Group it was inevitable that it would eventually offer negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces; the opening date of the talks was, however, retarded by the change of administration in Washington.) Another was to try to negotiate extensions to the existing CSBMs at Madrid itself, without setting up a new conference. Or a separate set of CSBM negotiations could be opened, either within the CSCE framework or independently of it. The decision to offer a CDE still left several major courses open to the West. For example, the CDE could either be an independent conference or it could be kept inside the CSCE framework. Furthermore, there are various ways in which the second phase of the conference might be linked to the first, either as an automatic follow-on or as contingent upon the satisfaction of any number of additional conditions.

The initial US position was to endorse one of the first set of options, those not including the offer of a CDE. The United States had several objections to a CDE, two of which deserve special note. First, it deemed a proposal for a thirty-five-sided discussion on disarmament unworkable. The United States had long been involved in arms control negotiations with the USSR and had experienced the difficulties of trying to define a balance between two powerful and, in at least some ways, similar nations. The CSCE includes participants as diverse as Liechtenstein, the United States, Malta and Britain. Such diversity could lead to enormous problems in attempting to reach an equitable arms reduction formula. Secondly, the United States was concerned about the detrimental effects a CDE might have on existing negotiations, particularly MBFR, which had already been under way for over five years without any discernible sign of a breakthrough.[5] The prospect of another set of negotiations on conventional arms in Europe seemed likely to exacerbate the difficulties being experienced in Vienna by diverting attention and scarce political will towards the search for results in the new forum. The two objections were linked in that it seemed unreasonable to hope for success in a second phase of a CDE as a

5. See the discussions of MBFR in Lothar Ruehl, *MBFR—lessons and prospects*, Adelphi Paper No. 176 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1982) and S. Nunn, 'Mutual Balanced Force Reductions—a need to shift our focus', *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Spring 1978

stitute for success in MBFR, when the problems presented by the multiplicity of participants made the former seem highly unlikely.

Among the West European states, too, there was disagreement as to which of the various options should be chosen. While they all agreed that there should be improved CSBMs and lower arms levels, they did not immediately concur that a CDE alone was the best means to achieve these goals. Norway, for example, held that the greatest priority should be given to negotiating extensions to the CSBMs at the Madrid review itself. The reasoning behind this view was that CSBMs are of crucial importance and that it was safer to negotiate improvements in Madrid (and then hope for a CDE at which further improvements could be negotiated) than to pin all one's hopes for improved CSBMs on the uncertain fate of the CDE proposal,[6] which could founder on a number of potential difficulties. At best, to negotiate CSBMs in a CDE would entail substantial delays, and at worst—and this was seen as the real problem—it could mean that there would be no improvements in existing CSBMs. For a small flank country bordering on the Soviet Union, CSBMs are of the utmost value, since such a country suffers the worst of the consequences of uncertainty and increases in military tension.

A further factor in the Norwegians' wish to negotiate improvements in CSBMs at Madrid was the desire to come away from the review session with tangible gains. Visible results of the CSCE process have become scarcer and scarcer, increasing the very real danger that the whole process might collapse. Clear progress, such as actual CSBM improvements, could mitigate this danger more effectively than a mere agreement to meet again, for example, in another review session or in a CDE.[7]

The decision eventually made by the West, however, was not to press for CSBM improvements at Madrid, but to unite behind the two-stage CDE proposal. One reason the West did not support the Norwegian call for CSBM improvements at Madrid was that there would not be enough time, the Madrid session only being expected to last a matter of months. No-one foresaw the developments, particularly in Poland, that protracted the session through three years. Another reason that Madrid CSBM negotiations were not supported was that they would be based on the same parameters as those of the Helsinki Final Act, which exclude much of European Russia, whereas the inclusion of all of the European portion of the Soviet Union was a major goal of the CDE proposal. It was feared that if new CSBMs were negotiated on the Helsinki parameters, the USSR would not be interested in later negotiating the much more ambitious CSBMs, on extended parameters, envisioned by the CDE proposal.

Most Western European countries were highly receptive to the idea of a CDE, both on political grounds and because of the possible security advantages of CSBMs and lower arms levels. The Federal Republic of Germany is the Western country that would be most affected by a CDE, abutting as it does directly on to the Eastern bloc and being the Western focus of MBFR. The second stage of the CDE could have an important impact on MBFR and accordingly West Germany has a considerable stake in the outcome of the CDE proposal.

In some ways West Germany's position in MBFR is an uncomfortable one. An MBFR agreement that appears to be balanced between East and West could place

6. The importance of CBMs for Norway is advocated in Johan Jørgan Holst, *CBMs: a conceptual framework*, *NUPI Notat* No. 254, Dec. 1982.

7. This danger is discussed by the US representative to the CSCE, Max Kampelman, in 'Helsinki process in danger', *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1982, pp. 174–8.

singular limits on the Federal Republic, for there is a basic asymmetry in MBFR. All West German territory is within the MBFR zone, while the Soviet Union is entirely outside it; however, both West German and Soviet forces figure prominently in the negotiations. Thus any reductions in Soviet forces allow the Soviet Union to retain the extra forces by simply moving them east on to Soviet territory, while West German forces that are over the limit must be disbanded. The overall result of such a 'reduction' could be an effective increase in the conventional advantage of the Warsaw Pact, at the expense of the Federal Republic. While the West German government was receptive to the CDE proposal, then, its Foreign Ministry had one major reservation: how the second phase of the conference would relate to MBFR.

The CDE proposal had two primary attractions for West Germany. One was the opportunity to produce substantially improved CSBMs, which are especially important to the Federal Republic because any conflict with the Warsaw Pact would almost certainly include its territory.[8] The second was that it offers a possible way to avoid becoming a 'special arms control zone', a situation which could arise because of the above-mentioned anomaly in MBFR. Because the French CDE proposal emphasized that all of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, would be included, the problem of unique limitations would not arise. Soviet forces that were removed could not be redeployed only days, or even hours, away from their present positions, as MBFR limitations might allow, but, if not disbanded, would have to be redeployed east of the Urals. The decision to support the CDE proposal reveals that, from the German perspective, the political merits and potential security advantages outweighed the concerns about damaging effects on MBFR.

The French proposal, 1978–83

When the French first brought up the idea of a CDE few expected that they would follow through with it. The French did not have a strong record as initiators of arms control; rather, they had a reputation for avoiding arms control agreements. Not only did they refuse to engage in major power negotiations, they had not even consented to participate when the number of signatories reached triple digits, for example in the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, the proposal appeared to be stimulated not by some new concern for arms control but rather by a domestic political challenge. In December 1977 the French Socialist Party published an ambitious arms control programme in *Le Monde*, which included nuclear weapons limitations.[9] Barely three months later President Giscard d'Estaing announced his CDE proposal, which, though less dramatic than the Socialists' and limited to conventional arms negotiations, nevertheless represented a new departure for the French government. The proposal was seen by many as an expedient to meet the short-term goal of minimizing the impact of criticisms from the Socialists, and it surprised many West Europeans that Giscard continued to press for the CDE after the 1978 elections in France. However, his persistence is entirely consistent with an explanation of the origin of the proposal in terms of domestic political forces. The surprise resulted simply from observers failing to appreciate (unlike Giscard himself)

8. This is true for a number of reasons. For example, West Germany is militarily and economically one of the most important countries in Europe, almost all invasion routes on to NATO territory pass through it, and one of the possible sources of conflict is Berlin.

9. The article was published (in two parts) just after the Socialist Party conference in December 1977 and is signed by François Mitterrand See *Le Monde*, 14 Dec 1977, pp. 1, 19, and especially 15 Dec. 1977, p. 14.

the magnitude of the challenge that the Left posed; this challenge motivated him to keep the CDE proposal in the public view. Giscard reiterated his interest in the proposal at every opportunity—in public addresses, at the UN, and in bilateral and multilateral meetings with other CSCE participants.

The importance of domestic influences on Giscard's support for the CDE is suggested, too, by the way in which the proposal was finally presented in Madrid. The Western caucus considers in advance which of its members will ask to be recognized and what they will discuss; yet some members of the caucus were taken by surprise on the day the French tabled the proposal. Furthermore, the United States had not yet offered its support for the proposal, support which would have boosted the status of the proposal. It was indeed extremely unlikely that the French would win the assent of all thirty-five participants to their CDE proposal without the unanimous backing of their allies. One can easily interpret their early tabling of the proposal as an act resulting from a need, strongly felt by Giscard, to counter criticisms from the opposition Socialist Party as elections approached. After two years of discussions in a variety of fora, the French tabled the proposal without having reached a clear consensus with their allies and without fully informing them that they were about to table the proposal.

In the years following this first presentation of the proposal, the outline of the draft was filled out. Two basic structural features emerged, namely, that the conference was to have two phases, respectively covering CSBMs and disarmament, and that it was to remain within the CSCE framework, with participants reporting back to CSCE review meetings.[10] The original idea was that the conference would be independent of CSCE, but one group in the French Ministry of External Relations, which favoured placing it within the CSCE framework, prevailed in mid-1978, after the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

The substance of the CDE proposal has four important conditions: (1) the provisions must be verifiable; (2) they must be militarily significant; (3) the provisions are to be politically binding; and (4) the area to be included is all of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. There was little difficulty in reaching agreement on the first two conditions. The third provision represented a change from the initial French proposal, which stated that the provisions be *legally* binding. The Helsinki Final Act CSBMs are politically binding. Some Western countries feared that a demand that the CDE provisions be legally binding, and thus somehow more forceful than those of the Final Act, would denigrate the status of the existing CSBMs, and indeed, the status of the entire Final Act document. The change in the proposal was easily made by the West, and other Madrid participants agreed to it.

The greatest debate and discord in Madrid was generated by the last condition. The CSBM zone defined in the Helsinki Final Act was, from the point of view of the West, deficient because it did not include all of European Russia, but only a 250-kilometre strip inside Soviet territory. The language was also very vague in that it described the zone as including the adjoining Atlantic Ocean, but did not specify how much of it. In exchange for including Soviet territory up to the Urals, the Soviet Union asked for a 'corresponding' concession in the area of the Atlantic Ocean covered, but they were slow to make it clear just how much of the ocean this was to encompass. The Western countries remained united in their resolve to have any

10. The two-stage approach was already evident in the original proposal by Giscard. See *Survival*, Sept.–Oct. 1978, p. 224

portion of the Atlantic included only if the naval manoeuvres conducted there were an integral part of land exercises; that is, the definition of the naval manoeuvres to be included in the CSBMs should be based on the function of those manoeuvres, and not solely on their geographical position in the ocean. The last NNA proposal contained language that used such a functional definition of the manoeuvres to be included, and the agreement that was finally reached made use of this approach.

The US position

When the preparatory meetings for the Madrid review took place in autumn 1980, the United States was in the middle of an election campaign. Without foreclosing the option of eventually supporting the CDE proposal, the Carter administration continued to express its doubts about it. The United States was in favour of extending and revising CSBMs, but was concerned both about divorcing security issues from human rights and about the effect a CDE could have on MBFR. Consequently, it did not support the CDE proposal until the second round of talks in Madrid, in February 1981, after the new administration had taken over. (Some contend that this was the best thing that could have happened, since approval by Carter would have resulted in subsequent withdrawal of support by the Reagan administration.)

Domestic political considerations may have had a bearing on Carter's reluctance to endorse CDE. The President was facing a conservative opponent who was making an issue of his arms control policies, and Carter was having difficulty countering charges against the signed but unratified SALT II, in part because of limited public knowledge of the agreement.[11] The Carter team may have felt that if they were to support the CDE they would simply be handing the opposition an issue to exploit; the public was even less informed about CDE issues than about SALT II, and consequently it would be impossible convincingly to rebut any accusations against their support for a CDE.

Changes have been made in the CDE proposal that address the Carter administration's concerns about possible adverse security effects. These alterations were achieved largely through extensive consultations with the Western allies. The concern about disengagement of security from human rights in CSCE was assuaged by the decision to keep the CDE strictly within the CSCE framework. The CDE talks, while taking place at another site (Stockholm), remain strictly within the CSCE framework, and progress in the CDE is to be reported back to the CSCE. The problem of overlap with MBFR was dealt with by decoupling the second phase of the CDE, on arms reductions, from the first phase, the CSBM conference. The Carter administration would have preferred to hold only a CSBM conference, with the next best option an immediate CSBM conference with a disarmament conference off in the distant future and contingent upon fulfilment of various conditions; this is the course the West has adopted. After the first phase is completed, the results must be reported back to the next Madrid-type review conference, and only then will a decision be made, in the light of current conditions, as to whether or not to proceed with the disarmament phase. Thus it is quite conceivable that the conference on CSBMs will never be followed by a disarmament conference. The name of the conference has even been changed to reflect the difference in emphasis; it is now the Conference on

11. A CBS News–*New York Times* poll conducted on 23–6 January 1979 revealed that over three-quarters of those asked could not correctly identify even the participants in the SALT II negotiations. Data are presented in *Public Opinion*, March–May 1980, p. 27.

Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE). CSBMs are not only mentioned explicitly in the new name, they are given pride of place.

The final mandate

The Western nations committed themselves to the CCSBMDE proposal early in the Madrid review session. Before the session concluded in September 1983, a CDE mandate was approved which is very close to the Western proposal. The Western participants succeeded in widening the CSBM zone to include all of European Russia, yet avoided conceding the Soviet request for a geographical extension westward into the Atlantic Ocean. This success must be attributed in large measure to the unusual unity and excellent coordination of the Western delegations at Madrid. The unity within the Western group dates from the initial agenda problems that arose in autumn 1980, even before the session formally opened, and was powerfully reinforced in reactions to the imposition of martial law in Poland. Unity in Madrid remained a clear and explicit objective of the Western states, despite differences in specific national policy preferences and bitter trade rows outside the CSCE context. This determination was very apparent to Eastern negotiators, who had to contend with it in formulating their views on what sort of wording would be acceptable to the West in a final document and a CCSBMDE mandate.

The question must be asked: how wisely has the West acted in adopting the course it has chosen? Given the political factors at work in some of the countries, they have chosen well, but perhaps not impeccably. CSBMs are of great importance; the decision to pursue CSBM improvements was a sound one, and the move to create a conference for that purpose within the CSCE framework was the best of the available options. It avoids the stringent time constraints under which CSBM negotiations in Madrid would have operated, yet keeps security affairs within the CSCE. A primary Soviet aim in Madrid was to create a separate security forum independent enough to be able to shake loose the human rights discussions, either by turning CSCE into a security conference alone or by creating a separate and independent security conference.[12]

The decision to tie the CSBM negotiations to a disarmament conference is not quite such an unalloyed blessing. First, the difficulties, noted above, facing a thirty-five nation disarmament conference are genuine. Solving these problems for that number of countries stands every chance of being a far more daunting task than the difficult enough job of solving them for two, three, or even six countries. The additional security advantages for Europe of including such neutral states as Switzerland and Ireland in the calculations will not be commensurate with the difficulty resulting from compounding the complexity of the problem. The primary threats to the security of most NNA and many allied countries are not related to the level of conventional armaments in Europe.

Secondly, the problem of overlap with MBFR has been eased, but not solved. It is eased to the extent that MBFR participants now have lower expectations of a rapidly

12. The Soviet Union did achieve the early commencement it desired for the Stockholm CCSBMDE, which began in January 1984. It preferred an early opening presumably to continue its drive to halt NATO INF deployments in Europe, as it appears to have viewed the Stockholm conference as an expedient for this purpose. Its interest in an early start for the CCSBMDE takes on added significance in the light of their decision to cease negotiating with the United States in the Geneva INF talks after the first US cruise missiles arrived in Europe.

approaching CCSBMDE phase two. This has been accomplished by loosening the link between phases one and two, so that now many Western participants in MBFR do not take seriously the distant and uncertain prospect of CCSBMDE phase two arriving to compete with MBFR negotiations at all. However, there are serious dangers in this approach. If phase two never comes about, the CSCE process will have suffered a blow, in that an element of it for which provisions have been made (albeit in a contingent way) will have failed. Public confidence in CSCE will suffer, since it will appear that the much-discussed disarmament element of the CCSBMDE has fizzled out. The danger of a collapse of the entire CSCE process would be sharply increased by such an outcome. If, on the other hand, the second phase does come about, then the problems of a thirty-five-sided table and of overlap with MBFR will arise—the latter particularly if there has meanwhile been progress in MBFR and armaments have come to be included in the negotiations,[13] leading to a direct conflict between CCSBMDE and MBFR. Thus, absent or present, phase two of the CCSBMDE proposal has important drawbacks.

Perhaps the most serious effect of the second phase of CCSBMDE could be the danger inherent in proliferating arms control negotiations, namely, loss of political support for the negotiations. Like other political instruments, arms control negotiations cannot succeed without broad political support. This appears to be more and more evident as time passes. The PTBT and NPT were successful, at least in part, because of broad global support for the agreements. The SALT I and Vladivostok Accords occurred at the height of detente in the early 1970s when there was widespread enthusiasm for the treaties in the participating countries. While it is hard to show a causal relationship, the lack of progress in arms control since then has certainly coincided with plummeting political backing for this type of arms limitation effort. Broad political support is of course not a sufficient condition for successful arms control efforts, but it does appear to be an important necessary condition.

Now that there appears to be a chance of regaining political support, the effect on such support must be considered when arms control decisions are made. It is an advantage to be flexible and open to improvements when such possibilities arise. But the difficulties that a CCSBMDE phase two would ultimately raise show that it is not a clear improvement over the existing approach to the problem of enhancing security in Europe. While the short-term gains of backing the CCSBMDE were too great for Western countries to resist, the longer-term dangers of eroding fragile political support for real security-improving measures must be carefully considered.

13. The scope of the negotiations has contracted and at present only troop levels are being discussed.

Reflections on the economies of the West

John Pinder*

In defence of the mixed economy. By Andrew Shonfield. Edited by Zuzanna Shonfield. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 1984. 231 pp. Index. £15·00.

Andrew Shonfield's great book, *Modern capitalism*, which showed how public power is used in the market system, still stands as the best explanation of the success of Western economic management in the 1950s and 1960s. But it did not foresee the economic failures and the backlash against big government of the 1970s and 1980s. So he set out to write a new book, to which he gave the working title *Modern capitalism two*, in order to explain the reasons for these developments and to suggest what should be done about them. He died leaving three completed chapters and a rich vein of drafts, articles, notes and an outline for the rest of the book.

The first three chapters, published in 1982 as *The use of public power*, told the story of Western stagflation in the 1970s. Shonfield rebutted 'modish political monetarism' (p. 91) which ignored the success of the 1960s (pp. 11ff); but he accepted that a critique of earlier thinking was needed, which did not 'lead simply to new traditionalism' (p. 67). The rest of the material, which continues the critique and goes on to indicate solutions to which it could lead, has been edited by Zuzanna Shonfield and is now published as *In defence of the mixed economy*.

In a chapter on the growth of public expenditure, Andrew Shonfield recognizes the force of the popular resistance to it. But while large numbers have turned against the 'nanny state', the majority want more efficiency and choice, not the sacrifice of a security that used to be the prerogative of a privileged minority. He supports Okun and Schultze in preferring a 'market economy which is more regulated than today but which may well be wider in extent', encompassing 'in some modified form, considerable areas of the public sector' (p. 185). But he also underlines the importance of Hirschman's concept of 'voice', or the use of political methods of bargaining where the perfect markets which are an implicit postulate for so much Friedmanite thinking do not apply (p. 23). Shonfield would, had he had time to complete the work, surely have related Hirschman's thinking about 'collective political choice' (p. 183) to his own major theme: corporatist methods of economic management and the behaviour of interest groups.

Shonfield does not pull his punches in criticizing the weaknesses of earlier interventionism. He calls addiction to conjunctural fine-tuning the 'cult of arrogant Keynesianism' (p. 54) and dismisses the 'command planning' elements of earlier French plans as having been 'full of holes' (p. 149). But he is also severely critical of the monetarist backlash, stressing the wastefulness of reliance on deflation unsupported by an incomes policy to deal with pay push, and the low profits, and consequent low investment and high unemployment, which have been the result. This leads him on to consider the ways in which public power can be used to manage the economy better.

Shonfield observes that the economies which performed the more successfully in the 1970s—Japan, Germany, France and a number of smaller 'social democracies'—had institutions that 'rest on some sort of corporatism . . . not the authoritarian system of management familiar from the experience of fascism . . . [but] a systematic dialogue between interest groups both public and private' (p. 127). Such corporate institutions were needed, he found, both for effective incomes policies and for the sort of long-term planning that makes possible a 'fundamental restructuring of our economies so that they may remain open and continue to grow' (pp. 127, 151–2).

His main treatment of the subject of long-term planning of economic development, which had been so central to *Modern capitalism*, is in a chapter on the VIIIth French Plan and the four-year German Finanzplan, both formulated in the late 1970s. He shows how both French

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and Germans had converged, from their earlier commitment to opposing philosophies of comprehensive planning and *laisser-faire* in the choice of industrial investments, on to a form of planning that focused on the coordination of big investment decisions in which the government has a role. Some of the most important private sector investments are so big, risky and long-term in character that they require cooperation between the public and private sectors; and this reinforces the need for a corporatist process of working out and implementing the plans, which is already inherent in economies where the consent of workers or their representatives is a condition of technological progress.

Much of parts two and three of the book revolve around the corporatist theme. Part two is an admirable outline of the Japanese system of political economy. While the book would be worth buying for this alone, its logic in the development of Shonfield's argument is to show how public power can be used subtly, yet effectively, to promote—not inhibit—market forces, and how this is based on consensus painstakingly cultivated between managers and employees, employers and trade unions, government and industry.

In part three, Shonfield goes on to review literature and experience on the different varieties of corporatism: 'new corporatism, neo-corporatism, the societal corporatism of Schmitter, the liberal corporatism of Lehmbruch, social democratic corporatism'. He himself advocates a form of 'benign corporatism' in which the state 'does not dominate' but acts mainly as a persuasive 'decision broker' (p. 133); and he relates this to the outputs of both economic development and price stability. The other side of this coin is the selfish use of power by interest groups, which it would be a function of Shonfield's benign corporatism to keep in check. He set this balance of power between particular and public interests in the context of a cycle of fluctuation from the permissive to the authoritarian and back. He realized that a corporatist system could favour a tyranny of the majority over 'victim' groups, but concluded that in contemporary society, collective strength derives from 'social structures which accommodate diversity' (p. 195).

By setting corporatism in the contexts both of economic policy in a mixed economy and of political ideas such as authority and diversity, Shonfield brought to bear his gift for broadening the perspective to illuminate the subject as a whole. Given his commitment to international studies, both during his many years at Chatham House and later at the European University Institute in Florence, he would certainly have gone on to do full justice to the international dimension as well. He points out that the proportion of output directed to foreign markets has grown so much that we can no longer afford trade wars, and that there are 'dangerous risks ahead of a clash between the welfare-state ideal—of which the mixed economy is one expression—and the international order among advanced industrial countries'. Although 'so far, we have been strikingly successful in keeping this source of conflict under control' (p. 56), he was deeply concerned that the Western economies should remain open in a properly functioning international system.

One source of anxiety was the failure of international monetary coordination since the introduction of floating exchange rates. Shonfield cites an essay by Niels Thygesen on the obstacles to international coordination of national monetary policies (p. 60); and it is Thygesen who has contributed an appendix to the book, analysing Shonfield's writing on the subject, including his advocacy of a European Community balance-of-payments fund and of the development of a European parallel currency. Another concern was the need to give 'priority to matters of international industrial policy' in order to maintain the openness of the economies (p. 172). In general, he held that 'some sovereignty has to be relinquished in exchange for international control over those factors of our economic system which are no longer bound by national frontiers' (p. 186), and found that the European Community was 'most particularly useful for managing transnational relations during a period in which states and their apparatus have . . . become weaker in relation to organised interest groups' (p. 189). Unfortunately, apart from a brief section on multinational firms and national governments, the argument about the relationship between interest groups, corporatism and international economic policy was cut short at that point.

Here, as elsewhere, Andrew Shonfield squarely posed the problems that arose in the past decade; and he completed a much fuller analysis of the issues of public expenditure, long-term planning and corporatism than of international interdependence. But he was not given the time to do more than sketch out his solutions. The book is like an unfinished fresco, full of fascinating detail within the outline of a grand design. Zuzanna Shonfield has shown great

skill in editing the material into a readable form, in which the insights stand out clearly and the synthesis can be discerned. The two books, taken together, should become a basic source for those who are not satisfied by the Friedmanite diagnosis of our economic ills and an inspiration for social democrats of all parties. They are far removed, however, from anti-monetarist polemics, being rather an open-minded search for a sustainable balance between public and private power. Friedmanites too would be unwise to ignore this important work.

Book reviews

Chatham House books

International gas trade in Europe: the policies of exporting and importing countries. By Jonathan P. Stern. London: Heinemann for Policy Studies Institute and Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1984. 204 pp. Index. (British Institutes' Joint Energy Policy Programme, Energy Papers No. 8.) £16·50.

JON STERN has produced a useful synopsis of the nature and background to European natural gas trade. The book is split into two halves: the first discusses the policies of gas exporting countries, the second, gas importing countries. Throughout, the style is descriptive with occasional personal judgements about likely future trends. It is therefore likely to appeal most to anyone wanting a first glance at some facts and figures of gas trade. A second volume on North American and Asian gas trade is promised for the future. Because international trade in natural gas is a confused and confusing picture, a guide of this nature is invaluable, and the author is to be congratulated on his distillation of the essential features from a welter of information and, as he stresses on more than one occasion, from a context of comparative secrecy about the actual contracts engaged in. The exporting section of the volume comprises separate discussions for Norway, the USSR, Algeria and Canada, with some discussion of 'others' (Libya, Nigeria, etc.). The importing section generally treats imports as a collective unit, although clearly acknowledging the heterogeneity of the individual trade contracts.

In a work largely of description, conclusions are likely to be limited in scope. Some are rather bland, as with the statement that Norwegian high cost gas reserves are unlikely to be developed without high prices to induce development. The same is true of remarks about depletion policy. Thus, on page 144 the author states of gas production that 'even if the higher resource estimates are correct and even if the effect of different taxation policies would be to substantially increase production levels, it would not necessarily follow that production should be raised substantially without reference to an appropriate depletion policy'. Effectively, this tells us that a depletion policy should determine the rate of depletion. There is also a somewhat unsatisfactory treatment of the appropriate pricing policy for gas. Reference is made to the fact that gas does not compete with crude oil but with oil products, and that substitution is limited. It would have been helpful to have some indication of the potential for this substitution so as to judge the forceful policies, which are well described in the volume, of countries such as Algeria, which have held out for oil-parity pricing.

The absence of policy judgement must not however be allowed to detract from the real value of the book. Jon Stern has brought together a very wide range of sources in a complex international market for an important energy source. His marshalling of the historical facts and figures is to be applauded and it is certainly difficult to imagine any student of energy foregoing the ownership of this book, albeit at a high price for just over 200 pages.

University College, London DAVID PEARCE

International relations and organizations

The new diplomacy: international affairs in the modern age. By Abba Eban. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1984. 427 pp. Index. £15·00.

THE title of Abba Eban's new book is back to front. Only the last chaper concentrates on the new diplomacy; the preceding eight dwell on the principal aspects of the international scene since the war, with only occasional reference to the changes that have come about in diplomatic practice. The rival performances of the two superpowers are examined first, followed by chapters on the areas that have principally preoccupied them: Europe, the Third World and the Middle East. The second part of the book considers the proliferation of

international organizations, above all the United Nations, the way in which the existence of nuclear weapons has changed everything for everybody, and, finally, what it has all meant for diplomacy.

The author surveys his world from a lofty vantage point. Without ever forgetting that he is an Israeli who has spent twenty-five years as his country's Ambassador and Foreign Minister, he almost completely avoids a partisan approach.

The main concern of the book, apart from the new diplomacy, is the Soviet–American relationship. Surprisingly, he is harder on the American performance than the Russian. He condemns the Americans for swinging from exaggerated optimism about the prospects of collaboration with the Soviet Union straight to a crusading anti-communist mentality which excluded all chance of compromise until President Nixon attempted it. The Russians, he thinks, have been more moderate. 'The central aim of [Soviet] diplomacy', he says, 'is to secure world-wide recognition of its status as one of two super-powers'. If this is correct, the deal with the Russians of which Roosevelt dreamt should soon be possible, because they have caught up militarily, and established better relations with the Third World than the Americans, although giving far less aid. They have in fact secured worldwide recognition of their status. But they show no sign of relaxing. Evidence supporting Abba Eban's hopeful thesis seems to be lacking.

But he is absolutely right to be hopeful, to refuse to write off the United Nations, despite all its faults, and to insist on the importance of East–West dialogue. A practising politician must always be an optimist, and Eban is very much a practising politician with a hope of returning to ministerial duties if Labour wins the impending election in Israel. For that reason it is particularly interesting to note that he speaks of the Arab–Israel conflict in terms which suggest that he might support territorial concessions if a moderate Palestinian leadership emerged, ready to live in peace, and perhaps in confederation, with Israel. That approach would call for daring diplomacy from both sides.

Eban is surely right, too, in arguing that diplomats still have a valuable function to perform in the modern age, despite the difficulties created for them by publicity during negotiations and summitry at key moments. They should not be discouraged by apparent loss of prestige. Their value consists not only in finding solutions but also in helping to prevent explosions, the supreme task of the nuclear age. Abba Eban's book will be profitable reading to all those who are looking for ideas on how to keep the international temperature down.

BERNARD LEDWIDGE

The moral dimensions of international conduct: The Jesuit Community Lectures 1982. Edited by James A. Devereux SJ. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 1983. 112 pp. Pb.: $4·95.

IN autumn 1982 Georgetown University inaugurated its new Intercultural Center in a new building splendid even by American campus standards. To celebrate the event the Georgetown Jesuit Community sponsored a series of lectures on the moral dimensions of international conduct, delivered to a selected audience; this book proposes them verbatim to a wider one. Or almost verbatim, for Professor Denis Goulet has annotated a talk already extensively seasoned with quotations from an array of authorities with seventy-eight references. This anxiety to adduce corroboration is a reflection of the general impatience pervading his treatment of the relations between rich nations and poor. Development policies are declared failures because of the bankruptcy of development paradigms themselves, 'the global paralysis of institutional imagination', and social and political impediments at the receiving end. He concludes that those who would better the lot of the poor should look to the poor themselves: 'the most basic need of poor people is the freedom to define their own needs, to organise to meet them and to transcend them as they see fit' (p. 53).

Goulet's nervousness is perhaps exaggerated by the position of his lecture between Shirley Williams on the conduct of affairs between Western democracies and the Soviet Union, and Jose Zalaquett on human rights. Mrs Williams has the politician's way with words; she uses a lot of them in broad general statements, leaving her audience at the end with the impression of having listened to a nice woman for whom they might indeed vote. One suspects, however, that her particular audience on this occasion might not have been much wiser. They would

have found more interesting Zalaquett's analysis of the evolution of human rights from the civil and political to the economic, social and cultural and his contention 'that a system of basic values which is universally accepted is gradually being forged and that it takes the form of international human rights norms' (p. 68). His conclusion—that the promotion of human rights is a task both for governments and for ordinary men and women—has implications more heroic than its formulation, yet accords well with his remit.

Pride of place, however, must go to Bryan Hehir on the use of force in the international system. Speaking shortly after the publication of the first draft of the American bishops' pastoral letter on nuclear arms, Hehir adapted his original scheme: he treated his listeners to some reflections on the international system and the evolution of Catholic teaching on the use of force, but then locked onto the specific issue of teaching on nuclear weapons. Hehir contributed to the letter itself; and he illuminates both letter and teaching by looking at the Papacy and at the bishops themselves. To a Catholic audience this must have been of the greatest interest; the Intercultural Center recognizes that there is a wider audience and Hehir's contribution alone would have been a worthy celebration of its opening.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

The future of conflict in the 1980s. Edited by William J. Taylor Jr and Steven A. Maaranen. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 504 pp. Index. £32·50.

It is perhaps inevitable that the first years of every decade should spawn books which peer into the crystal ball and attempt to forecast the problems that lie ahead. This book distils the findings of a study group at The Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University which was directed to investigate challenges to the security of the United States. It starts by concluding that the 'future of conflict in the 1980s' for the United States will consist essentially of what are called 'low-intensity-conflict situations', largely in the Third World. The book is structured around five aspects of future conflict; perspectives on the future of conflict; some of the causes of low-intensity conflict; selected military operations for combating such conflict; the future of conflict in six regional settings, outer space and the oceans; and the strategic implications of the projected spectrum of conflict.

The problems with this study relate not to the value of individual contributions which, on the whole, are well-argued syntheses of specific causes of conflict, possible military and politico-military responses, and problem areas (though the scenarios appended to several of the chapters add little to the force of the arguments, merely to the length of the book); but rather, to the implicit assumptions behind and the prescriptions derived from the study, which are particularly critical to a piece of work which is orientated directly towards the future. The world of this study is tightly bipolar; the Soviet threat is increasing not only in traditional cold war areas, but in new regions of the Third World which themselves pose indigenous threats to US security interests. (With the exception of the short chapter by James Schlesinger, there is no attempt either to differentiate US and allied interests, or even to put US interests into some order of priority.) This global zero-sum environment must be matched by an expanded range of military capabilities, particularly at the lower end of the force spectrum. It is a world that John Foster Dulles would have recognized, and it certainly evokes Robert MacNamara's tenure of the Department of Defense (for 'low-intensity' read 'subconventional'). Perhaps the Vietnam War never happened—though one contributor appears to have learnt all the wrong lessons from that conflict. It is precisely this rather simplistic view of the world and the essentially military responses prescribed, mirrored in policy terms by the current US administration, which continues to concern many people in Europe.

Nevertheless, there is much interesting and up-to-date material in this book and, in its own terms, it is comprehensive, though far too long to be easily digested at one bite. The broad sweep of the analysis—not to mention the price—will ensure that it serves as a reference work on library shelves.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic BRIAN WHITE

International and regional conflict: analytic approaches. Edited by Walter Isard and Yoshimi Nagao. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1983. 236 pp. Index.

ALTHOUGH the focus of scholarly interest in conflict studies and peace research has grown quite dramatically since the Second World War, the participants in this emerging discipline do not yet have a unified sense of identity. Whereas European students grapple with normative issues and the development of a fundamental perspective, their American counterparts are determined to get rid of such an approach and substitute for it a quasi-scientific mathematical discipline with a set of general propositions about human behaviour. Perusing this book, one cannot but be distracted by the extent of transatlantic disagreement, and yet feel that the more rigorous the principles on which the approach to conflict is designed, the more likely they are to be wrong.

Isard and Nagao bring together some of the contributions presented at an international symposium on conflict management held in Japan in 1981. The papers that comprise the book can be put into three categories. The first set of papers introduce a basic conflict model, designed to provide parties in conflict (be they individuals, groups or organizations) with the knowledge to identify superior conflict-handling procedures. The second set of papers focuses on applied issues and examines various social situations which are particularly prone to conflict (e.g. committees, project evaluation, planning groups) and which involve decision-makers faced with multiple objectives. The third section relates to resource disparities, both national and international, as an aspect of conflict resolution, and the development of a model to determine the most efficient allocation of resources. Individual papers offer many fresh insights, but the overall effect is remarkably unilluminating.

The authors are undaunted by the fact that even a mathematically sophisticated system of equations is too primitive to deal with the dynamics of reality. They seem none too concerned about the futility of an axiomatic approach to conflict. They erect an elegant scientific edifice by suggesting that all conflict situations are resource-based, or that participants in conflict do not learn from their interaction, or that any information produced by a mediator is, by definition, good information. They exhibit a positive inclination to show that the exercise of conflict resolution resembles a mechanical procedure. Maximization of utility is posited as the only concern of conflict participants, and rational cost-benefit analysis as the only mode of behaviour of which they are capable.

Science is indeed built from facts, but these are organized within a structure of ideas. We do not yet have an adequate model to mirror this structure, nor do we have an adequate language to describe it. Too many insuperable obstacles or vexed questions are overcome by the simple expedient of assuming that all human beings undergo experiences similar to ours, or respond to their environment in a manner of which we are conscious in ourselves. That, unfortunately, strains credulity. If the price paid for scientific rigour is acquiescence in a set of improbable assumptions, then I think one ought to question it seriously.

University of Canterbury, Christchurch JACOB BERCOVITCH

Unspoken rules and superpower dominance. By Paul Keal. London: Macmillan. 1983. 262 pp. Index. £20·00.

'THERE is much to be said', Oliver Harvey noted in his diary on 15 December 1944, 'for Russian claims to play leading part in East (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania) as we claim in West (Greece, Belgium, France, Italy, etc.). We can't have our cake and eat it as HMG always expect.' *The Times*, with E. H. Carr writing the leaders, took the same view, as did the UDC stalwarts on the Opposition benches such as Seymour Cocks. Paul Keal ignores these particular contributors to the thesis he examines. He points instead to Walter Lippmann and George Kennan; and it is Kennan's forthright 'Why could we not . . . divide Europe frankly into spheres of influence—keep ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?' (p. 72) which is at the centre of the argument.

Not that Keal is concerned, as an academic specializing in strategic and defence studies, with providing an answer to Kennan's question. What he does is to suggest some excellent reasons why it should have been asked. The result is a thorough and convincing demonstration that the United States and the Soviet Union each have a sphere of influence which is fairly well defined, and that each recognizes in practice the sphere of the other on the basis of some

'unspoken rules'. Applied, for example, to Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet coup of 1978 proved acceptable to the United States, whereas the invasion of 1979 did not. Clearly, the benefits of this arrangement are stability, detente and international 'order'. The casualties, presumably, are freedom, justice and international law.

Perhaps surprisingly, this thesis is relatively new, partly because some who might have advanced it have allowed themselves to be sidetracked by the 'revisionist' controversy. Tentatively suggested at the end of a broadcast talk on Henry Wallace by the present reviewer back in 1966 (and in *The Political Quarterly* three years later), the argument moved forward decisively over the next decade with the appearance of T. M. Franck and Edward Weisband's *Word politics: verbal strategy among the superpowers* (Oxford University Press, 1971), Geir Lundestad's *The American non-policy towards Eastern Europe 1943–1947* (Tromsö, 1975), and, most important of all, Edy Kaufman's *The superpowers and their spheres of influence* (Croom Helm, 1976). Keal acknowledges each of these except the last, which is surprising, considering that Kaufman charts contiguous territory and reaches similar conclusions. Certainly Keal's book is more comprehensive than Kaufman's; Balfour's 'fine distinction' between the 'spheres of influence we have never admitted' and the 'spheres of interest we have never denied' is by no means fine enough for Keal, who provides no fewer than seven subdivisions of the general term, together with comments on their relationship to international order and to international law.

The book, as the author admits, has been a long time in the making. The preface, which is dated August 1982, is some two years later than the text, which means that a number of important works which appeared during the interval and which bear upon his argument, notably Cecil Crabb's *The doctrines of American foreign policy* (Louisiana State University Press, 1982), remain unconsidered.

In the light of the continuing debate over great power roles in Poland and in Latin America, this is clearly an important book. Unfortunately its publishers have not produced it accordingly. The title pages and index apart, the text is set in a typewriter face and unjustified; the book as a whole is difficult to handle and extremely tiring to read. There are at least ten misprints, and the notes and references, located at the back, are particularly heavy going; there are thirty pages of these, not one of which has a cross-reference to the page of the original text. The author deserves better treatment.

Polytechnic of North London BRIAN THOMAS

Negotiating peace: war termination as a bargaining process. By Paul R. Pillar. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 282 pp. Index. £21·70.

UNTIL recently there has been remarkably little interest in the process of war termination. Diplomatic historians as well as political scientists have been much more concerned with the factors leading to the outbreak of war than they have with the processes which have brought wars to an end. It seems to be assumed that wars terminate when one side wins or the parties run out of steam and stop fighting. Either way, little of interest is left to examine at the end of a war. Further investigation quickly reveals, however, that war termination is a complex and fascinating process. Why did the Japanese concede so much that there were riots in Tokyo after their decisive victories in the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the century? Why did the negotiating position of the French harden, contrary to conventional wisdom, after their defeat in 1954 by the Viet Minh at Dienbienphu? This book starts from the premise that it is possible to establish a theoretical framework which can be used to answer questions of this kind and provide a general explanation for the outcome of negotiations undertaken to terminate war.

Pillar is not concerned with all the ways a war can end. He focuses on those occasions where negotiations are undertaken prior to the conclusion of hostilities. In an analysis of 142 wars fought between 1800 and 1980, he shows that nearly half were concluded with a negotiated settlement, but that in only nineteen cases did the negotiations take place before the war ended. He justifies his decision to look at the latter category on the grounds that there is a growing tendency in the contemporary international arena to conduct negotiations while fighting is still going on. He attributes this development to an increase in the technical capacity to coordinate combat and diplomacy. In the two central chapters of the book, he

examines the dynamics of the bargaining process and then explores how this process can be affected by events on the battlefield.

The analysis is conducted on two fronts. On the theoretical front, Pillar draws upon the bargaining models developed in economics. He devotes most attention to the model established by Frederik Zeuthen in *Problems of monopoly and economic warfare* written in 1930 and the progenitor of many subsequent models. On the basis of this model, bargaining is associated with making and reacting to offers of concession. Zeuthen's model predicts that when a concession is offered, it will be reciprocated. Pillar argues, however, that reciprocation is dependent upon how a concession is interpreted. If the offer is seen as a sign of weakness, for example, then the concession will not be reciprocated. Other models, therefore, are drawn upon to provide a fuller picture of the bargaining process.

On the second front, Pillar relies upon case studies to develop a deeper understanding of war termination. Only five of the available nineteen cases are examined in depth. In two cases, the war of 1812 between Britain and the United States, and the French Indochina War, the conflicts were brought to an end after negotiations lasting under six months. In the other three cases, the Korean War, the Algerian War, and the Vietnam War, the negotiations went on for much longer periods.

Pillar has produced an exemplary piece of research. The theory is rigorous, but the careful use of case study material ensures that the analysis is always easy to follow. The balance between case studies and theory is very effectively managed and many intriguing insights emerge during the course of the analysis.

University of Lancaster RICHARD LITTLE

International organizations: principles and issues. 3rd edn. By A. LeRoy Bennett. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1983. 498 pp. Index. £23·70.

International organizations. (Key concepts in international relations: 1.) By Clive Archer. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 193 pp. Index. £10·95. Pb.: £5·95.

IN the teaching of international relations, the very richness and complexity of the subject-matter makes the choice (some would say the very notion) of a textbook a source of uncertainty and frustration. On the one hand, the teacher and student may plump for the narrative and the encyclopaedic, on the grounds that a large amount of information should be absorbed as the basis for analysis and evaluation. On the other hand, there is a strong and growing case to be made for less encyclopaedic and more analytical texts which can illuminate the modes of thought characteristic of a given area, and which can encourage the student to think and find out for him- or herself. The first of these alternatives gives rise to the classic American 'course text', while the second has spawned an increasing range of series devoted to related concepts or problems covered in the literature.

The books under review here exemplify the contrast, with particular reference to what has become a rather problematical area of enquiry. No longer can 'international organizations' be studied simply by reference to the great institutions and matters of war and peace; they have spread, some would say to the extent that they have become simply part of the general process of international relations. Both A. LeRoy Bennett and Clive Archer would disagree with this assertion, but they take very different approaches to the study of the problem.

Bennett's book is in all respects the 'heavyweight text'. It covers everything, on the explicit normative assumption that the 'shrinking world' necessitates an expansion of international organizations. The problem is that the treatment rarely gets beyond the level of *Everyone's United Nations*: large numbers of events, processes and trends are described with little attempt at analysis or the application of concepts. The result is a book which only libraries will be able to afford, and which leaves the reader with a mass of information unaccompanied by any criteria for evaluation. A typical Bennett judgement is that international organizations have 'done quite well' or 'been fairly effective'.

Clive Archer, on the other hand, is at once more and less ambitious. He is more ambitious where (for this reviewer) it counts—in the analysis and evaluation of his target—and less ambitious (though not neglectful) in the provision of information or 'facts'. The series of which his book is the first volume has the stated intention of providing a guide to concepts in international relations, which will be of use both to students and to their teachers as well as to the interested layperson. In what is described by the series editor as a model for later volumes

in the series, Archer explores the evolution of international organizations both as a phenomenon and as a focus for study, and provides an object lesson in some of the ways in which the reader might pursue the subject further. The book has four central chapters—on the evolution and definition of international organizations, on classification of organizations, on the literature of the area and on the roles and functions of the wide range of bodies surveyed—and Archer is throughout trying to *do* something in the way of applying or evaluating ideas.

The result of all this is a far more stimulating and 'teachable' book than Bennett's (and at a quarter of the price). There are some problems, however, not the least of which is encapsulated in the title of the book. Are 'international organizations' really a concept, rather than a set of phenomena about which concepts have emerged and been deployed? Another difficulty arises from the compression of some of the argument: the editor's introduction refers to a 'concept' as meaning 'a bundling together' and sometimes it appears that Archer has taken this too much to heart in his anxiety to get everything in. Despite these reservations, there is no doubt that Archer provides a fertile source of ideas and avenues for the potential explorer, whereas Bennett fails to penetrate many of the more questionable aspects of 'international organizations'.

Coventry (Lanchester) Polytechnic MICHAEL SMITH

Guide to UNESCO. By Peter I. Hajnal. London, New York: Oceana. 1983. 578 pp. Index. $45·00.

PETER HAJNAL'S *Guide to UNESCO* parallels his earlier *Guide to United Nations organization, documentation and publishing,* on which it is modelled. Part I provides an overview of UNESCO's origins, constitution, purposes, structure, activities and financing, and of the role of national commissions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in its work. Part II analyses the agency's 'modes of action', namely: programmes, normative action, conferences, and what are identified as three types of information work (documentation and publishing; the UNISIST world science information system; and the 'new world information and communication order' and related issues). Each of the eleven chapters in these two parts concludes with a section indicating sources of further information, while part II consists of a 135-page select annotated bibliography. The tables, figures and appendices group a wealth of useful material previously scattered or relatively inaccessible: lists of general conferences with places and dates; of directors-general with nationalities and dates of office; of national commission addresses; of UNESCO offices away from headquarters; of conventions and other texts adopted under UNESCO auspices; of national distributors of UNESCO publications and depositary libraries; budgetary trends including allocation of resources by type of activity and distribution of assessed shares between member states for 1981–3; membership lists; organization charts and acronyms; and so forth. The scope of the *Guide* ranges from the macro-level (UNESCO's place in the United Nations system) to the micro-level (model of a UNESCO document cover).

While relatively brief, the text itself directs the reader succinctly and clearly through nearly four decades of UNESCO history and is at its best in describing the intricacies of the agency's workings. The author's stated aim of providing a 'factual and balanced' account of UNESCO is perhaps not always wholly achieved: accounts of certain debates (notably those on the 'new information order' and on Israel–UNESCO relations) may on balance be seen to reflect dominant American perceptions of 'politicization' and 'consensus' somewhat uncritically, possibly because drawing rather heavily on American sources. In the more documentary sections, it might have been worth providing data on trends in the distribution of headquarters and field posts as between major groups of states, in the distribution of assessed shares of the budget over time, and in the award of funds and contracts to the various NGOs.

Such minor criticisms aside, the author has accomplished a prodigious feat in assembling and making intelligible a vast body of material. Commended in a foreword by the current (Senegalese) director-general of the agency, the *Guide* constitutes a valuable reference work for the author's target audiences of professionals in UNESCO's realms of competence and the thoughtful general reader, and will also save those interested in UNESCO and international organization much laborious research and compilation. It is only to be hoped that the contents, which cover developments up to May 1982, will be updated in subsequent editions.

CLARE WELLS

Defence and disarmament

The command and control of nuclear forces. By Paul Bracken. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 252 pp. Index. £14·95.

IN his early rhetoric on the Berlin crisis of 1958–61, Khrushchev spoke of the possibility of the city becoming 'a second Sarajevo'. Bracken refers to Sarajevo in a different way for a different purpose: 'the possibility of a nuclear Sarajevo has been understated . . . a nation's actions in a crisis are profoundly influenced by the security institutions built years before the crisis occurs . . . even if leaders today understand the enormously destructive consequences of war . . . the construction of fantastically complex command organisations in the United States and the Soviet Union parallels the conflict institutions built in the decade before 1914 but on a far more spectacular and quick-reacting scale' (p. 3).

This consideration leads him into a fascinating and disturbing examination of the command and control of nuclear forces. He warns the reader that it is essential to his approach to examine the most vulnerable and dangerous aspects of nuclear command organizations in order to isolate especially reckless tactics, and admits that this can also serve as instruction in the actual conduct of a nuclear war. The consequence has to be accepted if these forces are to be governed in a democratic or any other kind of society.

One puts down the book deeply impressed. Bracken's vivid description, analytic clarity and facility of expression would be outstanding even were they not deployed, as here, to convince the reader that in a time of crisis nuclear command systems in both the United States and the USSR are likely to pass rapidly from political to highly fragmented military control, making political direction of a nuclear war virtually impossible. The key term, of course, is 'a time of crisis'; essentially political, crises are likely to occur as long as politics endure. To avoid them becoming catastrophes, Bracken in a modest conclusion calls for more attention to certain types of arms control which focus on operational issues, rather than rely on cuts in weapon inventories. Addressing one critical issue starkly exposed in his analysis, he calls for a Soviet-American agreement to ban short-time-of-flight weapons and the restriction of systems that can reach national command centres. This book was written before the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe had finally been agreed. In January 1984 it was reported that Soviet submarines had moved into closer patrol of the US Atlantic seaboard, a development which corroborates his analysis and confirms his prescription.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

The neutron bomb controversy: a study in alliance politics. By Sherri L. Wasserman. New York: Praeger. 1983. 151 pp. Index. $21.95.

IT makes for a rather pleasant change in an area which attracts investigative journalists almost as much as corruption in local government to be presented with a straightforward piece of academic research, complete with references, on one of NATO's great nuclear debates. The story the author tells is not one of scandal and conspiracies, but of incompetence, confusion and mis-communication.

The story is of the 'neutron bomb' or the 'enhanced radiation weapon' as NATO wished it to be known, which burst into the headlines in June 1977, erroneously described as something which could 'kill people while leaving buildings intact'—the 'ultimate capitalist weapon'! It was in fact designed for battlefield use against tank crews. If it was vulnerable to criticism it was the foolishness of believing that by reducing collateral damage it would be more acceptable to NATO commanders than more traditional types of 'tactical' nuclear weapons. This would be particularly unlikely given that the weapon was to concentrate on the most distinctive of nuclear effects—radiation. It was the more sensationalist critique, however, that was picked up. The 'neutron bomb' became the first nuclear issue to become a matter of intense public debate since the early 1960s,and was responsible for setting in motion the protest movements that, having helped dispose of this weapon, then went on to challenge the much more serious cruise and Pershing missiles.

As soon as this issue, which had hitherto been moving without fuss through the American and NATO decision-making processes, turned into a political hot potato the American and

West European governments became very equivocal indeed as to whether they wanted to proceed. The buck was passed back and forth across the Atlantic. It eventually stopped with President Carter who, unimpressed with either the weapon or the European commitment to its deployment, decided against production. As Wasserman notes, the President's grasp of alliance politics was itself unimpressive. In his case this was reflected in a failure to provide a clear lead; she suggests that a similar failing in President Reagan may take the form of too much leadership.

One of the legacies of the neutron bomb episode was a determination that it should be handled more effectively next time. Indeed, recent memoirs from members of the Carter administration suggest that the decision to go ahead with cruise and Pershing missiles was in no small part due to a desire to erase the aftertaste left over from this failure in nuclear policy-making. This time the allies indeed demonstrated their ability to take and stick to a complicated decision, though at the cost of revitalizing the protest movements.

This useful book serves as a valuable reminder to NATO's political leaders of the difficulty in managing all nuclear issues, and NATO's military leaders of the one that got away.

King's College, London LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

The European missiles crisis: nuclear weapons and security policy. Edited by H. H. Holm and N. Petersen. London: Pinter. 1983. 274 pp. Index. £13·95.

THIS is a compilation of papers presented at a conference on nuclear modernization in Europe held in Denmark in April 1983, subsequently revised, and in most cases now accompanied by comments by Danish experts. The contributors are distinguished and it must have been an interesting conference, at a time when it was still possible to hope that intermediate nuclear forces (INF) would not have to be deployed in Western Europe. Now that this deployment has begun, the agonizing choice has been made, and last year's academic debate cannot help being a little stale. The value of the papers has therefore to be found in occasional more lasting insights into the motives of the parties.

David Holloway's paper on the INF policy of the Soviet Union, for example, makes several points which will be new to the non-specialist reader and which are of lasting concern to us all since they will affect the Russian attitude in negotiation, if this ever starts up again. The deployment of the SS-20s probably seemed to Soviet leaders to be a sensible way of using new technology to replace the previous unsatisfactory systems. It may not have had any important political purpose, and the Western response may have seemed out of proportion. On this view it was the West who introduced a new element by deploying weapons which could reach Soviet territory from Europe, whereas the SS-20s could not reach the United States. Nevertheless, the Russians did not make much effort to prevent Western INF deployment. How much more effective the peace movements would have been if they had been armed with genuine Soviet concessions

The editors conclude, as others have before them, that the prospects for successful negotiation on the limitation of nuclear weapons would be better if we all got away from the existing rather unreal distinctions, and lumped together the strategic forces and INF on both sides, plus the British and French nuclear forces, as a total negotiating package. As if this were not difficult enough, we are invited in Lawrence Freedman's paper to ponder the question whether arms control negotiations as such can ever succeed if they are not included in the much wider context of the means of conducting relations between hostile states. As Mr Oberg puts it more epigrammatically, 'the peace concept of disarmament policies is poor'.

The Federal Trust for Education and Research BERNARD BURROWS

Defence and consensus: the domestic aspects of Western security. Edited by Christoph Bertram. London: Macmillan for International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1984. 136 pp. Index. £20·00.

THIS is the latest in the series of conference papers selected from the IISS Annual Conference, but with a difference. Normally selected papers appear in the Adelphi Paper format and priced accordingly: now they come in hardback, with gold embossed titles, a perspex cover, and a corresponding price tag. Is the extra really worth it—at almost 15p a page?

Obviously, the papers presented at IISS conferences warrant serious attention. More often than not it is for who is doing the writing rather than what specifically they say. With the contributions averaging eight pages, it is less than likely that scholarly analyses will be found and more probable that position papers or generalized opinions be offered. Their purpose, quite properly, is designed more to prompt and stimulate discussion than to educate or even enlighten. Indeed, few of the papers contained in this volume did much to draw back the veil of ignorance or widen understanding on the subject of the domestic aspects of Western security.

The editor's introduction contains two controversial assertions, both of which warrant refutation. The first was that the selection of papers, being devoted to 'the most ambiguous, imprecise and elusive aspects of security—that of domestic political factors influencing defence policies, doctrines and burdens', was examining a 'subject [that] has been unexplored in traditional strategic studies'. It is never made clear why this subject is necessarily of concern to 'traditional strategic studies' in the first place, and why Dr Bertram, once Director of the IISS, should think that the subject has not already been well and thoroughly investigated by researchers in political science, economics and sociology, and from the interdisciplinary approach of civil–military relations. It is highly presumptuous to imply that the IISS, as a body, principally, of strategists, has the prerogative to be the first to recognize the relevance of domestic influences on defence policy.

Just because there has, over the past few years, been a decline in consensus over declared nuclear strategies, it does not follow that the situation has not prevailed in the past, or that there are no other domestic aspects of security. Which brings me to my second refutation. The editor goes on to note that 'nuclear issues have become more controversial and that there is now a widespread, *if unjustified*, fear of nuclear war' (my italics). How can a fear of nuclear war be unjustified? And as the contributors to the book, whether of the United States, Europe or the Far East, repeat time and again, there is ample ground for the public's fear of nuclear war to be more than justified. One reason may well be that they no longer trust their political leaders and strategic leaders and strategic advisers. Moreover, since the contributors to the volume are recognized strategic experts, some of whom either have access to or have served in government—Harold Brown, Sir Frank Cooper, Michael Howard, Sam Huntington, Johan Holst, Lothar Ruehl and Lawrence Keagan—the very content of this volume is some testimony that fear of nuclear war is very much a justified public concern.

Worthy of note, however, is Michael Howard's contribution, suggesting that the Western concept of deterrence should be enlarged to encompass the idea of nuclear reassurance which, he argues, offers a more positive dimension. As an invitation to widen our terms of reference, his paper is timely, though it needs to be made clear of what the public needs to be reassured: ideally, one would hope, it would be, in Einstein's phraseology, recognition by all of the quite unjustified use of nuclear weapons as instruments of policy. More practically, it could well be public reassurance that, given nuclear weapons exist, governments give every evidence that their defence and foreign policies will be conducted with reason and restraint.

All in all this book is an expensive buy. The papers doubtless succeeded well in prompting elevated discussion at the conference, but as an eclectic volume, rather than an Adelphi Paper, to add to collections or library holdings on either strategy or civil–military relations, it is decidely marginal.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

Alternative approaches to British defence policy. Edited by John Baylis. London: Macmillan. 1983. 247 pp. Index. £20·00.

ANY collection of essays must command respect when its authors include three former Chiefs of the Defence Staff (Lords Cameron, Carver, and Hill-Norton); eminent defence academics of the calibre of John Baylis, Ken Booth, Lawrence Freedman, and David Greenwood; and unorthodox thinkers like Michael Chichester, Adam Roberts, Dan Smith, and John Wilkinson. None of them proclaims unreserved support for the present defence policy of Her Majesty's Government, and some have very considerable reservations.

British defence policy rests on the 'four pillars' of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the United Kingdom base, command of the Channel and Eastern Atlantic, and a contribution to the defence of Central Europe. A theme running through the book—emerging especially from

Greenwood's financial projections—is the difficulty of maintaining much longer the present scale of effort in each of these four areas. But the authors diverge on which roles should be abandoned or substantially diminished, and how the priorities should be allocated. The toughest questions concern the balance between conventional and nuclear forces and the rival claims of continental and maritime strategies.

Most of the authors affirm that NATO strategy should place less emphasis upon nuclear escalation, with Roberts the most explicit (p. 196) in questioning its credibility in an era of nuclear parity; but Smith suggests, with thinly veiled anti-Americanism and against most of the evidence, that the Americans would not welcome less reliance on nuclear weapons in Europe since this would diminish European reliance on the United States. Cameron seeks greater cost-effectiveness through new technology; Smith seeks it through greater simplicity.

Hill-Norton, Chichester and Wilkinson variously advocate a 'blue water' strategy, based principally upon the security of the United Kingdom itself and the maritime defence of British interests worldwide. Carver recognizes (p. 83) that by geography and history Britain is best placed of the European allies to make a major maritime contribution, but reminds us (p. 76) that for centuries we have been at pains to ensure that the continent is not dominated by an unfriendly power. Freedman, coolly sceptical of the supposed implications of the Falklands War for John Nott's 1981 defence review, suggests consultation with our allies since 'there would be no justification for a series of unilateral measures taken in the belief that, as an island with a fine maritime tradition, we know how to look after ourselves without the help of others' (p. 73).

Carver recommends that Britain should 'waste no more money' on nuclear weapons (p. 89). Cameron finds frightening the 'stunning confidence' of 'some distinguished UK commentators' (p. 113) that the United States will be prepared in ten years' time to give full nuclear support to NATO. Most of the other contributors join one or other side of this punch-up, here as throughout the book seeking with lively diversity yet high seriousness to chart a course through problems of daunting complexity. In his lucid introduction Baylis expressly makes no apology for the absence of agreed conclusions. No apology is called for; every student of defence should read these arguments himself and form his own judgement on their merits.

ARTHUR HOCKADAY

American military space policy: information systems, weapon systems and arms control. By Colin Gray. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt. 1983. 128 pp. Index. $28·00.

A substantial knowledge of the subject area is a prerequisite for getting through this book. An unwary layman, without a glossary, is soon likely to be deterred by a bewildering array of acronyms enveloped in specialist jargon. A complicated argument is developed in a not particularly orderly fashion through concepts that may well seem peculiar to anyone unfamiliar with the way in which the world is seen from the Pentagon. Gray is writing very much for specialists.

This is a pity, for much interesting material is brought together, especially in a descriptive chapter on 'The non-weapon military uses of space'. As Gray correctly points out, the opportunity for maintaining space as a non-military sanctuary was passed over years ago when it was recognized to be the ideal medium for keeping an eye on what the other side was up to and for transmitting all kinds of information. The recent trend towards preparing for sophisticated and 'prolonged' nuclear operations creates an even greater dependence on space systems, despite their considerable vulnerabilities. A number of writers have pointed to these vulnerabilities as evidence against this trend; Gray, who is a leading advocate of it, is anxious to refute the charge, while acknowledging that survivability will require continuing investment in both offensive and defensive space technology.

The persistent reader will also discover that, despite his instincts, Gray does not expect a great deal this century by way of directed energy weapons. This is significant because in his now notorious 'star wars' speech of March 1983, President Reagan set great store by these technologies when offering his vision of a future invulnerability to nuclear attack. Gray cannot quite bring himself to admit that this vision was nonsense. This is the way in which he would like the strategic relationship to develop; he also believes that some less exotic systems, well within the current state of the art, can already serve as part of a 'multi-layered defence' (if only such things were not prohibited by the 1972 Treaty limiting anti-ballistic missiles).

Furthermore, Gray is a great believer in technological progress and keeping options open (which renders him suspicious of the sort of arms control that limits options). So, instead of questioning the wisdom of squandering vast quantities of scarce scientific and economic resources in what he warns may well turn out to be a technological wild-goose chase, he commends the President for his 'strategic vision'. However fantastical and ill-informed this vision, it will, Gray argues, at least animate the bureaucracy and force it to take the wider military issues of space more seriously.

One might have more patience with this were he not so dismissive of alternative 'visions' based on arms control rather than arms racing. Here Gray counters the supposition that the United States has more to gain from a ban on anti-satellite weapons (sorry–ASAT) than the Soviet Union because it has placed so much more of its military infrastructure in space—command and control, surveillance, early warning and such like. He argues that if this is so then on past experience the Soviet Union is not going to relinquish the option of dealing a decisive blow at the American war-fighting capability. The draft Soviet treaty fails to deal with the most dangerous Soviet developments; any treaty that did deal with these developments could not be adequately verified.

As always, Gray's message is that the United States has little option but to buckle down to an arms race. The political and broad strategic judgements upon which this gloomy assessment is made masquerade as professional insights and are not subjected to the same degree of analysis as the second-order questions of technical feasibility.

King's College, London LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Strategy and defence: Australian essays. Edited by Desmond Ball. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 402 pp. Index. £18·00.

NO-ONE has yet explained satisfactorily why it is that studies of strategy and international relations have flourished in Australia to such an extent that the country is now better known abroad by its experts in this field than by its swimmers and tennis players. This volume is an indication of the way in which Australian studies in this field have developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Along with the editor, Des Ball, who has written six of the chapters, there are contributions by Robert O'Neill, T. B. Millar, Geoffrey Jukes, James L. Richardson, Harry Gelber, Coral Bell, Andrew Mack, Joel Langtry and Ross Babbage. Some of these authorities acquired their skills in Britain and the United States but others, like Ball himself, are home-grown products. Some of the essays deal with Australian topics (the Australian Defence Force, defence decision-making, nuclear policy, Australia and the Third World), but most provide a general introduction to the main topics of contemporary strategic discussion, of the kind that could very suitably be used in university and staff college courses in any English-speaking country. The contribution I liked best was the joker in the pack, the 'Critique of strategic studies' by Peter King—not entirely convincing perhaps, but striking a rare note of irreverence and intellectual honesty.

Balliol College, Oxford HEDLEY BULL

The arms race. By Michael Sheehan. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1983. 242 pp. Index. £16·50. Pb.: £5·95.

MICHAEL SHEEHAN'S book is concerned with the nature of the contemporary arms race. He starts off by saying that the arms race is the central danger currently facing mankind. This is discussed by means of an examination of the main aspects of the arms race: the superpower balance; horizontal proliferation; space; nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe; and the chemical arms race. This analysis is sandwiched between an introductory chapter on the nature of arms races and military power, and a concluding chapter on arms control and disarmament. Apart from a few rather unfortunate proofing errors (e.g. 'The MK12A is so accurate that each warhead has a 50 per cent chance of destroying any Soviet missile silo. If two are targeted on one Soviet silo, the estimated 'kill-probability' increases to 40 per cent' (pp. 29–30); and the discussion of MAD and the triad at the foot of page 22 is confused by a reference to the fact that these have guided US policy for *four* years), this is generally a very well-balanced and well-written survey. The chapters are full of information and represent a sensible balance

between summarizing the current situation and explaining the issues from different perspectives. This is especially so in the case of the chapter on the chemical arms race, which is a very impressive survey of such a complex field. Sheehan is fair in his treatment of the rival claims of the superpowers, and comes down very hard on what he sees as the pretences of the Reagan administration over arms control. There is a very useful bibliography at the end of the book.

This book will doubtless be used by many teachers as it is explicitly written at the right level for most undergraduate courses. There are bound to be problems over the selection of evidence in any such book, and this reviewer found a few assertions that were questionable—for example, the claims over the accuracy of the SS-N-8 SLBM in comparison to the Minuteman III ICBM made on p. 52, and the discussion of the effect of SALT II on MIRVed launchers on p. 58—but it would be misleading to imply that these are important areas of disagreement, or that Sheehan is 'wrong'. This is a book which deals with an extremely complicated area in a very sensible manner. It does not claim to make any new theoretical advances, nor does it claim to lead to solutions to the current malaise; what it does do, very effectively, is to introduce the various areas of the arms race in a logical and clear manner. It will be a very useful book for students taking courses on strategic studies to look at for a good summary of the current situation in each of the main areas. One hopes that it will also get a wider audience.

University of East Anglia STEVE SMITH

Nuclear arms control with effective international agreements. By Julie Dahlitz. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1984. (First publ. Melbourne, McPhee Gribble, 1983.) 283 pp. Index. £15·00; $25·00. Pb.: £4·95; $8·95.

Decisionmaking for arms limitation: assessments and prospects. Edited by Hans Günter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1983. 332 pp. Index.

DR DAHLITZ hies from Australia, that breeding-ground for arms controllers, where she has practised law, and been a government official with the United Nations. Her book is claimed to have 'provided the first comprehensive account of all international agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons' and to have reached after 'careful analysis' the not too startling conclusion that 'nuclear arms control is possible . . . provided the competing nations are sufficiently determined to achieve it'. Her approach is legalistic, the book consisting largely of a review, and discussion, of possible legal restraints on the production and use of nuclear weapons. There is a substantial if rather haphazard bibliography, as well as tables listing relevant agreements. Her prime concern is the creation of 'norms', that is to say, recognized international standards, for negotiation and 'deliberation' on nuclear arms control, and there are chapters on the role of international law in that process. Painstaking work has evidently gone into all this, and some useful information is no doubt to be found in it, but the method is sometimes confused, the writing turgid and the argumentation hardly such as to compel either the general reader or the expert. In fact there is little new or original here, and many of her observations tend towards the artless or the platitudinous. Some also, despite a plethora of notes, are unsupported by evidence, such as the assertion that 'there can be no doubt Iraq was in the process of acquiring the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons'. This is not what the IAEA in Vienna had to say on the matter.

Indeed, Dr Dahlitz's treatment of non-proliferation as a whole disappoints, culminating as it does in the statement that 'the most serious impediment to horizontal proliferation . . . is the continuation of vertical proliferation'; a piece of conventional unwisdom that few people can actually believe, even if they pay lip-service to it. Does the scale of superpower nuclear arsenals really affect the motivation for Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa or Argentina to develop their own deterrents? She is equally conventional in characterizing superpower competition as an arms 'race', rather than, as Michael Howard has pointed out, an arms 'match'; and in regarding the existence of weapons themselves as the likeliest cause of war, when we should know by now that war is primarily the result of national ambitions. She also believes it to be 'universally accepted that nuclear arms control can best be achieved by the conclusion of appropriate treaties'; against which it may be contended that effective arms

control depends not necessarily or even mainly on such instruments, but on the general behaviour of states, and the restraint exercised by them in respect of their strategic power. The book's final warning that 'the law of the jungle and a disarming first strike capability are incompatible' can perhaps be accepted for the thought behind it, if not for its actual formulation, or for the surmise on which it is apparently based that the 'contemporary stance' of the United States is one of seeking 'omnipotence over all nations'.

The second work is more rewarding, and has indeed claims of originality—are there any other comparative studies of national decision-making machinery for arms limitation? The main portion of the book analyses this in the case of the United States (including some of its non-governmental agencies), the Soviet Union, France, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and Norway. Rose Gottmoeller's balanced and informative account of the Soviet arms control establishment is perhaps of special interest. Some might think she underestimates the ultimate say of the military, but it would need a John Erickson or a Malcolm Mackintosh to argue that issue. On home ground, where the chapter by Nicholas Sims is generally sound, this reviewer's erstwhile involvement may justify one or two minor comments. While Sims duly emphasizes the potential of the Foreign Office's Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (ACDRU), and deprecates its progressive relegation in status and function, he may be unaware that in 1969 a decision was actually taken to abolish it, although the strength of outside reaction, the pressure of international negotiating requirements, and the eventual return of its founder Lord Chalfont to the Office combined to frustrate this. At the same time, to say that 'external research ceased to be commissioned, and contacts with academia became more distant' is somewhat misleading. Only insignificant outside work was ever commissioned by ACDRU; and relations with the academic world were fully maintained. Again, the valuable pioneer study of chemical and biological weaponry done by Deryck Viney as a member of the Unit did not 'lead almost directly' to the successful UK initiative on biological weapons. This was launched for largely extrinsic reasons, earlier attempts to interest ministers in the subject on its merits having made little impression.

Part II of the book deals knowledgeably with three aspects of the consultative process within NATO. The third section consists of a chapter, on predictable lines, by William Epstein about the role of the public, and a conclusion by the co-editor Duncan Clarke. This latter has some sensible suggestions to offer for organizational improvement, both nationally and internationally, without perhaps quite making up its mind how decisive these could be expected to prove. If, moreover, he is right in saying that, in the arms control field, the attention of governments 'has tended instead to concentrate . . . on substantive issues', this need not, surely, be regarded as altogether a criticism.

European Cultural Foundation MICHAEL CULLIS

The disarmer's handbook of military technology and organization. By Andrew Wilson. London: Penguin. 1983. 318 pp. Index. Pb.: £2·50.

Crisis over cruise: a plain guide to the new weapons. By Philip Webber, Graeme Wilkinson and Barry Rubin. London: Penguin. 1983. 112 pp. Index. Pb.: £1·25.

DEFENCE has become a field too important to be left to politicians, soldiers, officials and a platoon of academics. A rather larger elite has become actively concerned, even if the great majority of the British people still care little about the mysteries of military policy. Many of those with a recent interest in defence are, of course, hostile to the current path of UK and NATO policy. With the advent of the cruise missile and the UK procurement of Trident, they have realized that technological advances in armaments are continuing and roughly what nuclear war would mean. In consequence, the British government has been conducting a public relations campaign in the attempt to win public opinion over to its viewpoint, and a Defence Minister has been appointed, it is believed, partly because of his perceived capacity to deal with the anti-nuclear lobby. In contrast, both these books are designed to help those who oppose current government policy to clarify and articulate their views.

Andrew Wilson, who has written the more ambitious of the volumes, is a veteran of defence matters, having been defence correspondent for *The Observer* for sixteen years. He is, however, by his own admission a recent convert to pacifism after a decision that the threat to destroy millions of people, inherent in nuclear deterrence, is morally unacceptable. His book is, to say the least, wide-ranging, beginning with different schools of conflict theory and ending with

support for peace research. In between the history of war, the organization of armed forces, most aspects of war technology, the economic aspects of defence and arms sales, the law of war and much more are discussed. The topics are briefly explained and a guide to further reading is offered.

As a continuous read, the book has limitations. It moves from subject to subject with a speed that I suspect will confuse most newcomers to the defence debate. Moreover, its coverage of most matters is of necessity superficial given the space allowed for each. But as a work of initial reference the book should prove extremely useful, for it does have something on almost everything. (One important omission is that the discussion of deterrence does not include consideration of extended deterrence.) Members of the anti-nuclear lobby will have to read much more than this to debate effectively but they ought to have it on their bookshelves. Regrettably the author does not offer a glossary of defence acronyms which would have added further to the book's usefulness.

Webber, Wilkinson and Rubin are experienced writers opposed to nuclear weapons. Their book is specifically concerned with cruise and Pershing II missiles, although it does address the wider problem of nuclear weapons in general in the context of European defence. It, too, provides considerable technical information and its summary of the cruise missile launcher's accompanying convoy is particularly illuminating. Also worth reading is its analysis of 'information' provided by the British government on defence matters. But the authors are less convincing in their prescriptions, especially their approved arms control proposals list (pp. 83–4). No discussion is given of how the suggested measures might be negotiated and the authors seem to rely on the common sense of decision-makers (see p. 54). This, coupled with their belief in the impact of ideas on human behaviour, seems to identify them as treading a well-established Utopian path. There is very little mention of the threat and motivation of the Soviet Union. At least one proposal, for a worldwide halt on weapons research and development, has minimal immediate prospects for implementation.

Nevertheless, these authors—and Wilson—have a coherent and substantive intellectual position which they articulate at the end of the book. They argue effectively that a world of nuclear deterrence has real risks. Governments henceforth are going to have real difficulty if they pretend that it doesn't.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TREVOR TAYLOR

Peacekeeping and technology: concepts for the future. Report of the International Peace Academy Task Force on Technology Workshop held at Ditchley Park, Oxford, 30 June–2 July 1983. Edited by Hugh Hanning. New York: International Peace Academy. 1983. 65 pp. Pb.

THIS report—No. 17 of the International Peace Academy—is a slim and unpretentious volume, the opening third of which is taken up by a miscellany of minor items: foreword, statement of the requirement, introduction, list of participants, a report of the workshop outlining the discussion, and comments on the discussion by the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. The report thus gives a discussion of the papers before the papers themselves. Despite its title, the report does not provide 'concepts for the future'.

There are three substantive papers. Alan James writes thoughtfully and carefully on the politics of peacekeeping in the 1980s, but his paper contains little that is explicit on technology. Although technology receives a slightly higher profile, the same general comment can be made of Jonathan Alford's paper on confidence-building measures and border security. Only James Wallen, under the title 'The application of technology to peacekeeping' makes a direct assault on the question of technology and peacekeeping, and this is mainly a survey of the available technologies and experience derived from the US early warning system in the Sinai.

What emerges very strongly from both Professor James and Colonel Alford is the very delicate nature of peacekeeping exercises—whether UN-sponsored or not—and that technological aids are likely, in many cases, to be a further complication to political agreement. The 'man on the ground', even if he is less efficient than listening devices and remote surveillance cameras, may be politically more acceptable and thereby more effective.

The volume is as low key as its subject matter.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

Technology in the policy process: the control of nuclear power. By David Collingridge. London: Pinter. 1983. 254 pp. Index. £16·00.

TO give a book this title and then to discuss only one technology and to discuss the policy process only obliquely through two decision models seems rather odd. The sub-title gives a clue, for this volume is concerned with making the case that investment in nuclear power, especially in the UK, has been totally mismanaged, if not actually wasted—the volume is liberally peppered with the term 'misinvestment'.

Central to the book is the contention that nuclear power technology is different in every way from other technology, and much of it is devoted to producing arguments designed to support this contention: long lead times, slow learning curves, high capital costs, high cost of errors, etc. This basic contention must be open to doubt, however. Is nuclear power *totally* different from previous technologies and experience? Canals, main line railways, box girder bridges and jumbo jets all exhibit many of the same characteristics. On a Collingridge-style analysis none of these enterprises would have proceeded. Of course, to date only Dr Collingridge has perceived this difference in nuclear power technology (p. 213).

Decision-making is the concern of the first two chapters, one chapter looking at synoptic rationality and the other at incrementalism *à la* Lindblom. There follow case studies of Britain, France and the United States. All these chapters are used as vehicles to further Dr Collingridge's thesis. Applied to a possible next stage of nuclear power development—the breeder reactor—the author makes his case even more shrilly.

Dr Collingridge, although highly critical of nuclear power, offers no alternative. All that is offered in a disappointingly weak conclusion is a retrospective recommendation that there should have been more, but smaller, nuclear stations (small is beautiful?) or the taking out of nuclear technology options that could quickly (*sic*) be converted into power-generating facilities should the need arise.

Dr Collingridge's insights are not limited to nuclear power; he is not averse to informing us of the 'best of all outcomes' on several occasions (see, for example, page 179 on nuclear weapons). It is, however, the very lack of agreement as to what constitutes the 'best of all outcomes' that makes this volume so vulnerable and unreal. The policy process is not about contending theories but *Realpolitik*—economic and political—in which academic arguments, however elegant, play only a minor role. Dr Collingridge cannot be so wilfully ignorant and expect his volume to carry credibility.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

Politics, economics and social

Redefining politics: people, resources and power. By Adrian Leftwich. London, New York: Methuen. 1983. 307 pp. Index. £14·00.

THIS is a study in depth of political process and its constituent elements. Despite the title, the approach is not new. Professor J. D. B. Miller in his admirable *The nature of politics*, published more than twenty years ago, penetrated the institutional facade of politics and examined its inherent aspects. Yet Adrian Leftwich has made a timely contribution to the analysis of political power. He ranges from nation states in the developed world to the formative stages of political structure found in many parts of the Third World, and from political action within and between large-scale collectivities such as great powers to political action taken by small groups such as bands of food gatherers. He also pays careful attention to the political significance of transnational entities in the contemporary interdependent global political system.

This comprehensiveness of treatment is valuable in itself, and is made more so by the author's application of an interdisciplinary approach to his vast concerns. Archaeology, history, economics, sociology and psychology are all drawn upon to illustrate the complex material Mr Leftwich handles with authority and cogency. 'People, resources and power', the author's basic organizing ideas, in their profound interrelationship tellingly illustrate, in the course of his argument, the tragic predicament of mankind both in the modern world and throughout history. There are, among other things, excellent chapters on politics in the Third

World, on the politics of 'despair, dustbowls, disease and devastation', on the politics of European expansion, with its beneficial and destructive effects on the world Europe dominated for more than a century, and on 'the poverty and possibilities of politics'. The author's discussion of 'Equal rights, unequal opportunities' leads to a forceful conclusion that emphasizes the *necessity* rather than the desirability of democracy—which he defines not merely in terms of free elections, free speech and a free press but in terms of people's genuine participation in the processes of reaching and implementing decisions about the use of resources within society, and of the power to which access to resources gives rise. His advocacy of equality in politics carries less weight than other parts of his argument. Men being naturally unequal, no way has yet been found of reconciling real equality with liberty. Only by coercive constraints could men be prevented from reaping the benefits or the disadvantages arising from their natural inequalities.

However, while Mr Leftwich insists that students of politics should emerge from their studies equipped with interdisciplinary tools of diagnosis and explanation, and fired with the urge not only to understand the world but to work for its betterment, he is wise enough to stop short of any detailed prescription as to how his concept of democracy may be applied in the real world. Any such prescription could so easily sound glib or simplistic. Indeed, one of the impressive things about this book is the sense it conveys of the extreme difficulty in practice of inducing human groups to act in ways that transcend their own perceived interests for the sake of serving a larger good. Not quite 'naught for your comfort' here, perhaps, but, in an honest and convincing way, very little. Throughout his remarkably broad analysis Mr Leftwich shows that if it is not altogether a mad, mad world, my masters, it remains an obstinately and intensely problematic one. For that very reason this thoughtful and intelligent study deserves attention. The book is analytically rigorous, compassionate in tone and, not least of its merits, thoroughly readable. It is cordially recommended.

ROBERT PURNELL

Politics and human nature. Edited by Ian Forbes and Steve Smith. London: Pinter. 1983. 198 pp. Index. £14·00.

TO organize a panel on politics and human nature at the 1982 Political Studies Association annual conference was a useful idea, for it no doubt stimulated the contributors to look at their own particular areas of interest in a fresh and searching manner. It is less certain, however, whether it was wise to gather together the papers and publish them in a book, along with five other specially commissioned chapters.

From such origins it is to be expected that the topics covered would be highly disparate, but the following list suggests what a mixed bag the book is: political theory, Marx, Mill, conservatism, Utopianism, critical theory, psychoanalysis, feminism, work, bureaucracy, and war. It is not clear that all these are on the same level as 'theories of politics', as the editors implicitly claim in their introduction. Nor do the individual chapters follow systematically the programmatic list of six questions set forth in the introduction.

The editors are aware of the limitations of their undertaking, but have a rather uncertain view of the role of human nature in theories of politics: 'Human nature becomes the untestable bedrock of many theories of politics; its presence can be assumed, its effects can be asserted, and yet it is only rarely made explicit or, in any sense, justified by reference to empirical criteria. In this way human nature can be a powerful theoretical term, without any prospect of testing against the evidence' (p. 2). But this approach overlooks the irreducibly philosophical element in views of human nature. Questions of the form 'what is the nature of man' are requests for definitions, not appeals to evidence. To admit at the outset, therefore, as the editors do, 'that those who write about human nature do so with a bewildering variety of definitions, and all too often without any at all' (p. 2), is accurate but in effect an admission of defeat. A partial remedy would have been the inclusion of a chapter by an analytic philosopher who would have tackled these more fundamental definitional issues. As it is, there is no reference to some important philosophical work in this area, such as Mary Midgley's *Beast and man: the roots of human nature* (Hassocks, Sussex, 1979); a surprising omission in the chapter on Marx is any mention of John Plamenatz's *Karl Marx's philosophy of man* (Oxford, 1975).

That said, the editors have done their best to tie the book's disparate materials together in the introduction and conclusion, and in Graeme Duncan's more general survey of political

theory and human nature. An opportunity was missed in this respect by the compiler of the index, which is woefully inadequate as a means of access to the principal subjects of the book.

There is much of interest in the individual chapters, although readers of this journal are not particularly well served by the chapter on war and human nature, which is a fairly pedestrian updating of Kenneth Waltz's three levels of analysis in *Man, the state and war* (New York, 1959).

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. WRIGHT

Territory and power in the United Kingdom: an interpretation. By Jim Bulpitt. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1983. 246 pp. Index. £17·50.

'WHERE in Britain does power lie?', enquired the Sultan of Socotra of a journalist of my acquaintance in the late 1960s; 'Is it in London—or in the hills?' This book is an elaborate attempt to answer this simple if curious question.

The relations between the centre and the periphery of a country, or 'territorial politics', as the author calls them, is a strangely neglected subject. Yet of all state politics it is the most basic, a prime concern of rulers in earlier times, but now so overlaid with considerations of central government, local government, party politics and administration that we have largely lost the habit of looking at matters from this perspective. In this stimulating and original book, the author, after a discussion of various theoretical approaches, examines the territorial politics of Britain, seeking at the same time to elucidate the complex nature of the structure and governance of the British state.

The United Kingdom, he argues, was not an inevitable creation. The unions of England with Wales, Scotland, and Ireland were ad hoc responses, reluctantly undertaken, to particular crisis situations. The 'Centre', the London-based elite of monarchs, their ministers and civil servants, did not aim directly to manage the rest of the country, relying for this purpose upon collaborative provincial elites. Parliament played a key role here in legitimizing the policies of the Centre and mediating between it and the periphery. The unions with the Celtic countries simply extended the system, although developments in late-Victorian Ireland fatally undermined the traditional collaborative elite there, the Protestant Ascendancy, before an alternative could be built up. The eventual breach in the Union, by removing Irish territorial radicalism, allowed the Centre to pursue its profoundly conservative course.

Indeed, the leading theme in the book is the habitual skill of the Centre in monopolizing 'high politics' in return for allowing considerable latitude to the periphery in matters of 'low politics'. Not until the 1960s and 1970s did this arrangement come under any serious threat, which it did with the breakdown of the collaborative elite system in Northern Ireland, the growing political effectiveness of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, and a general loss of deference of the periphery for the Centre. The book ends with a discussion of how these challenges were met, of how economic considerations have led the Centre under Mrs Thatcher to encroach upon such traditional areas of peripheral control as local government, and of how ethnic minorities, the politics of 'Bennism', and a possible resurgence of Scottish devolution demands could affect the autonomy of the Centre in the future.

Whether the author's interpretations would at all points be accepted by the generality of historians may be doubted, yet the book is a refreshing challenge to more conventional approaches, and opens the way not only to comparable studies of other countries, but to reinterpretations of such major upheavals in our own history as the Danish and Norman Conquests and other violent dynastic changes, and perhaps even to a general theory of revolution and civil war.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth BRIAN PORTER

Political opinion polling: an international review. Edited by Robert M. Worcester. London: Macmillan. 1983. 246 pp. Index. £25·00.

IN the last two decades opinion polls have moved from the jokey periphery to the serious centre of political life in most Western democracies. It was a good idea, therefore, to put together the 'first transnational record of political opinion polling', as this assortment of conference papers is dubbed. The result is patchy. In the ten countries covered Scandinavia is

unrepresented, and more space is devoted to Spain and Ireland, where polling is relatively recent, than to France and Australia, where there are more important stories to tell. Bob Worcester provides an excellent introductory history of opinion polling in Britain and Mervin Field writes thoughtfully, although more revealingly than perhaps he intended, about the United States. But other chapters are more notable for what they leave out than what they keep in, the bland omission of any reference to the opinion poll scandals in France being a conspicuous example.

The historical sections often turn out to be the most instructive. Sigeki Nishira traces polling back to the reign of Wu Ti in 140–87 BC; in most other countries the Second World War was the launching pad, even if a few experimental polls had been conducted earlier. The role of the US occupation forces in Germany, France and Japan—in need of intelligence on civilian morale and political outlook—is brought out clearly. The media sustain opinion polling nowadays but in most countries it was government agencies that first encouraged their use.

Each chapter is at pains to convince the sceptic of the predictive accuracy of election polls. The evidence is overwhelmingly on the pollsters' side. No one could close this book without acknowledging that national polls conducted by established and reputable companies are the only reliable means of obtaining a true picture of public opinion. Sometimes the book protests too much, reflecting perhaps the fact that all the authors are executives of polling companies rather than detached critics. In explaining away the failure of the forecast polls to predict the margin of Reagan's victory in 1980, Mervin Field discloses the over-clustering of nationwide samples in the United States, without tracing this defect to the pressures to pare down costs in the intensely competitive world of American polling.

Readers wishing to discover how polls adapt to the special circumstances and laws of other countries will come away light-handed. The implications for polling of compulsory and preference voting (in Australia), of STV (in Eire), of the limited vote (in Japan), of a highly fragmented multi-party system (in the Netherlands) and of the banning of the publication of polls in the final week of the campaign (in Spain and France) are only dealt with sketchily. And next to nothing is written on the impact, if any, of opinion polling on the making of party policy and the conduct of government. We await an international study of the place of polling in the modern constitution, for which, perhaps, the practical experience of pollsters needs to be supplemented by the wider institutional concerns of the academic political scientist.

University of Essex IVOR CREWE

Corruption: causes, consequences and control. Edited by Michael Clarke. London: Pinter. 1983. 290 pp. £17·50.

A PROBLEM with edited works that grow out of conferences is that the whole rarely represents the sum of the parts. This book, which deals with the subject of corruption, falls into that category with something of a thud. The fault probably rests with the editor, for two reasons. First, it is a very uneven collection of papers, ranging from what may best be described as anecdotal to fairly rigorous and analytical. It was not possible to ascertain any rationale for their inclusion or for the order in which they were presented. Second, unless quite clearly defined and delimited in the introductory chapter, a concept is often unable to hold a collection together. Thus, from the outset this work is flawed, because the editor fails to define with any clarity what corruption is other than suggesting several loose ideas which are wholly inadequate for the task. To compound the problem, after this all-too-brief introductory chapter, no conclusion summarizes what the different authors have contributed to the general discussion of the concept. This would not have been easy, but some effort may have improved the end result.

All this aside, several papers were of particular interest because some effort was made in each to tie elements of theory to the 'real world'. Both Maurice Punch and Anon Katsenelinboigin developed typologies and categorizations that seemed most useful. Nick Smart's elegant piece on Sicily—introduced by some unfortunately anecdotal remarks—raised a number of especially interesting points, so interesting, in fact, that the paper might have been more appropriately published in a journal. And Morris Szeftel's economic and thoughtful discussion of what corruption is was such an excellent conceptualization of the subject that sections of his contribution would have made a more suitable introduction to the volume than

the one actually used. In sum, the volume contains some interesting works, the authors of which are let down by organization that is too flimsy and an introduction that is too weak.

University of Lancaster A. S. COHAN

Fascism. By Nöel O'Sullivan. London, Melbourne: Dent. 1983. 223 pp. Index. (Modern Ideologies Series.) £9·95.

ACCORDING to its author, this book is not only about fascism: '. . . it is also about the emergence in the modern world of a revolutionary new style of politics of which fascism is only one manifestation'. His main thesis, summarized in the preface, is that fascism can only be explained as an extreme manifestation of what he terms the 'activist' style of politics. By 'activism' O'Sullivan means 'the main characteristic of all modern radical ideologies, which is the assertion that no government can be legitimate unless it offers scope for active participation in politics by 'the people'. This new style of politics, he claims, owes much to two 'phenomena which have tended to converge in communist and fascist visions of utopia'; millenarianism and civic humanism.

This is a curious way of approaching the subject of fascism. Millenarianism and civic humanism do not inevitably accompany each other; indeed, they are frequently in conflict. Nor are they a sufficient explanation for the emergence of modern political ideologies and their patterns of political development. We need to take into account many other factors, including the growth of secularism, the growth of modern science and rationalism, urbanization, the rise of the nation state, and the history of international relations. Moreover, even when we have accounted for the rise of secular revolutionary thought and ideologies of mass participation in politics we have not begun to explain why and how the particular blend of doctrines, movements and regimes we call fascism emerged. Far from providing what the dustjacket claims is a more plausible account of its origins and significance, this book tends to create unnecessary confusion and ambiguity by attempting too many things at once, and fails to do what its title promises.

The survey, attempted in the introduction and chapter one, of the literature dealing with theories and historical interpretations of the rise of fascism, is superficial and simply wrong in its dismissive generalizations; and the reader searches in vain through the rest of the book for any viable alternative theory for the rise of fascism, finding merely an affirmation that fascism's significance lies in the fact that 'it made explicit implications of the new activist style of politics'.

O'Sullivan is very hard on the historians and biographers of fascist leaders, yet his own excursions into historical detail give one little cause for confidence in his judgment. O'Sullivan rejects the view of Michael Ledeen and others that it is 'impossible for one to claim that there was an important ideological continuity between D'Annunzio's Fiume and Mussolini's Italy'. He tries to argue that fascism took over the Fiume Constitution's modified ideals of the sovereignty of the people, a participatory democracy of producers. Anyone who compares the Fiume project rhetoric with the actual practice of fascism under Mussolini and Hitler will know that this is sheer twaddle.

There are some interesting passages in chapter five, 'The fascist Weltanschauung', which students will find sensible and well-informed. Even this discussion is severely handicapped, however, by a failure to deal adequately with the concepts of nation, race, state and war in fascist ideology.

It is an extraordinary omission in a volume of the 'Modern Ideologies' series that it contains no chapter on fascism today, despite the large number of parties and movements, in over twenty countries, consciously attempting to spread these ideas. One indication of the author's confusion about and ignorance of contemporary fascism is his assumption (p. 190) that this reviewer's own work *The new fascists* (1981, and new edition 1983) is solely about terrorist groups. Small wonder that some political scientists and more than a few of their students are still under the impression that fascism is a phenomenon of the past when they are not prepared to read the literature which analyses the explicitly fascist groups of our own day!

University of Aberdeen PAUL WILKINSON

The United Nations and the control of international violence: a legal and political analysis. By John F. Murphy. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1983. 212 pp. Index. £22·50.

The war against terrorism. By Neil C. Livingstone. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. 291 pp. Index. £19·50.

THESE two very different books share not only a theme (one third of Professor Murphy's book deals with 'non-traditional' violence, including terrorism) but also an underlying attitude: reluctance to apply to the behaviour of the United States the standards by which they confidently judge others.

For one who has been so closely associated, in recent times, with the US government, John Murphy is surprisingly, though discriminatingly, sympathetic to the United Nations, praising its performance over Suez, Cyprus and the Falklands Islands, seeing hopeful aspects in apparent manifestations of its futility (for example, the World Court's involvement in the Corfu Channel, 'cod war', and Iran hostages cases), yet questioning, with reason, the General Assembly's support for turning the Korean War in 1950 into a war of national unification (pp. 32–3) and Western condemnation of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in 1979 ('. . . almost any alternative to the butchery of Pol Pot is an improvement', p. 64). It is, however, a defect in one who commends the UN's value as 'a forum for exposure of acts of aggression or threats to the peace' (p. 124) not even to consider the applicability of such terms to, say, the US intervention in the Dominican Republic of 1965; again, when accusing the General Assembly, by 'some' of its actions in recent years, of 'inflaming passions and contributing to an atmosphere that supported traditional international violence' (p. 125), it might have been asked whether the same could also be said of some actions of the General Assembly in its era of Western domination, such as branding the People's Republic of China as an aggressor and persistently denying it the Chinese seat.

Where 'non-traditional' violence is concerned, Professor Murphy finds the UN's performance, with one exception, 'disappointing' (p. 203). The exception is the Congo operation, 'the high-water mark of UN involvement with the revolutionary warfare'. The crux of the main controversy over that operation, ONUC's response to the Kasavabu-Lumumba split, is clearly shown to be partisan, but defended, unconvincingly, as being dictated by the need to avoid civil war (p. 157).

Notwithstanding its unconscious bias, *The United Nations and the control of international violence* can be recommended as a succinct (though expensive) introduction to its subject.

Neil Livingstone, by contrast, dismisses the United Nations out of hand. His 'first practical counter-terrorist manual', as its blurb describes it, is strong on information, technical expertise and assessment of purely strategic possibilities, but weak in logic and political awareness. Sometimes, as in his 'terrorist profile', where he stresses the psychological consequences of having killed, he equates 'terrorism' with the threat and use for political ends of violence against the person. Elsewhere, he includes the morally distinct phenomena of economic sabotage and disruption, and threats to works of art. Sometimes (p. 73) he shows how limited the scale of terrorist violence now is (fewer die from it throughout the world annually, according to the CIA, than on American roads in one week). Elsewhere again he calls it 'one of the most serious and intractable problems confronting the world in the years ahead' (p. 151).

His remedies, addressed to an American readership, are private as well as public. A former vice-president of 'an international security and crisis-management firm', he advises those who can afford it how to protect themselves, how to hit back, and if necessary how to pay kidnappers' ransoms, even where that is illegal. States, however, should never negotiate with terrorists 'since, historically, one successful case of blackmail has often stimulated another' (p. 248). The contradiction is not resolved.

Politically, Livingstone's indignation is selective. 'The USSR and its Eastern bloc allies are . . . the chief sponsors and patrons of global terrorism' and have taken over most major terrorist movements, including the IRA and the Basque ETA (p. 12); yet he also shows that the Afghan rebels, whom the West supports, employ terrorist tactics, and that the United States has repeatedly tried to assassinate Castro (p. 133), even, in the missile crisis, considering the bombardment of Cuba with biological agents (p. 114). He disapproves, mildly, of torture, but also, rather more vehemently, of 'villifying' (*sic*) friendly governments

that practise it (p. 243); and his remedy, paradoxically, is to give the CIA a freer hand in helping foreign police forces (p. 162). Nor would he have any qualms about suspending most-favoured-nation status, regardless, presumably, of treaty obligations, to third states that do not toe a US line, or about inciting foreign citizens to murder, for reward, those whom US intelligence deems to have contributed to the death of US representatives.

The main strengths of the book lie in chapter 4, on the media's handling of incidents; chapter 5, on measures taken to control air piracy; and the section on 'commando operations' in chapter 8 (Britain, by virtue of the SAS, is called a 'superpower'!). Its style is lively; but his conclusions are far from secure, and much ammunition is provided for enemy use.

Taken seriously, a book like this could promote the creation of national, commercial and individual fortresses, and even help to generate an arms race between terrorism and counter-terrorism; at best it does nothing to integrate us with our fellows.

University of Sussex RODERICK OGLEY

The transformation of the world. Vol. 3: Culture and thought. Edited by Anisuzzaman Adbel-Malek and Anouar Adbel-Malek. London: Macmillan for United Nations University. 1983. 105 pp. Index. £10·00.

THIS book is the edited record of a conference on 'The transformation of the world' held in Algiers in 1981 as part of the United Nations University's project on 'Socio-cultural development alternatives in a changing world'. The conference took as its text Dr Anouar Adbel-Malek's formulation of the structure of the transformation: the resurgence of Africa and Latin America to contemperaneity (*sic*); the eruption of the labouring people into power, nearly half of mankind now living under socialism; and social change associated with the development of science and technology.

The theme of the conference was what was called the principal contradiction in contemporary world society between the mainly Western hegemonic power centres and the rising national power centres in what was previously the global periphery. And this contradiction was sharpened, in regard to the concern of the conference with culture and thought, into questioning the presumption that the depository of post-Enlightenment Western thought represented the core of a universal principle of rationality around which human beings could organize their thought and action. The conference dealt with this theme in four aspects. In the first place, the conventional dichotomy between tradition and modernity was challenged. Both these things were asserted to be plural not singular, the interactions between them complex, and the association of Europe or the West with a modernity to which everyone else aspired a vulgar mistake. Secondly, the cultural hegemony of the West was scrutinized. John Dunn, in a paper that is reported briefly in the book, brilliantly analyses the claim of the West to know better. He shows that with regard to science and technology, this claim is hard to refute. The difficulty, he suggests, is to know when a claim is based on this firm ground, and when it is spurious cultural conceit (pp. 23–5). In the third place, the emergence of new socio-political forces was examined, though to this reviewer these seemed quite familiar (class, race, nation, ideology, religion). Finally, something called a civilizational dynamic was reviewed, amounting, it seemed, to the suggestion that each national formation find its own way to transformation.

The tone of the argument of the book is Marxist: and there seemed to be little difficulty either with Marx's Westernness or with his belonging in the post-Enlightenment tradition which it was the object of the conference to confront. The idea of modernization was much criticized, but a more satisfactory alternative did not emerge, unless we were to accept the rather obscure distinction between hegemonic 'modernism' and liberated 'modernity' (p. 22). Cultural relativism got, not surprisingly, into the act: 'Most important of all we must abjure the comic but also potentially tragic fantasy that our own thinking could be or should be a model for mankind' (p. 84). One wonders, in this respect, whether a United Nations University project on *the* transformation of the world is a comedy or a tragedy.

University of Keele R. J. VINCENT

The political economy of growth: classical political economy and the modern world. By David Simpson. Oxford: Blackwell. 1983. 165 pp. Index. £14·00.

DAVID SIMPSON'S short book offers a valuable introduction to some central issues in economic theory and economic/industrial policy. The primary purpose of the volume is to highlight the critical distinctions between classical political economy and contemporary, orthodox ('neo-classical') economic theory. The central concern of classical political economy, in Simpson's presentation, is economic growth. Institutions, broadly defined, are fundamental influences upon economic growth, or its absence. In marked contrast to this classical vision, modern 'neo-classical' economics is condemned to a static, and ultimately sterile, view of the economic realm by its emphasis upon general equilibrium, determinate analysis and undue formalism. Indeed, Professor Simpson contends, with not a little force, that contemporary economic theory is quite lacking in any real theory of economic growth.

Such contrasts between the classical and neo-classical approaches are established, most effectively, within parts I and II of Professor Simpson's book. Part III then offers a review of many of the problems that have arisen within the advanced industrial economies of the capitalist world and a discussion, within the classical perspective, of the prospects for their resolution. This latter section is rather less satisfactory than the earlier parts, however, for it jumps from one issue to another and leaves the reader with a rather bitty impression.

Overall, Professor Simpson offers innumerable points of value. He is particularly effective, following Schumpeter, in emphasizing the internally generated problems and pressures that tend to undermine the vitality and popular acceptance of a capitalist system. Prominent here are the increasing transaction costs, and popular pressures to reduce the inevitable uncertainty, engendered by an economic system that is characterized by higher levels of internal interdependence (as generated by the progress of the division of labour).

Against the considerable virtues of Professor Simpson's discussion must be set some serious shortcomings. That the volume remains tenaciously within the 'liberal' perspective may be a serious failing for some readers. Moreover, the treatment of Marx, apart from one or two interesting observations, is simple-minded to a startling degree. Further, it will come as something of a surprise to numerous North American political economists to read that '. . . the American institutional school has sunk without trace' (p. 45). Many of the structural characteristics of modern capitalist societies, beyond some popular sentiments, are also given little more than passing and oblique reference (as at the top of page 82).

Lest such criticisms deter the potential reader, it must be said that Professor Simpson's short book is essential reading for all those who would study 'political economy', however defined. It provides an invaluable corrective to those who have been too thoroughly steeped in conventional, 'neo-classical' economic theory, while informing those of other dispositions of the important distinctions between recent economic orthodoxies and the classical approach, which continues to offer much to those who would pursue contemporary economic issues.

University of Reading R. J. BARRY JONES

The management of the world economy. By Evan Luard. London: Macmillan. 1983. 270 pp. Index. £25·00. Pb.: £7·95.

HERE is the idealism of the early postwar period in Britain, refurbished for all the world in the 1980s: take from the rich and give to the poor wherever they may be, and the outcome would be a fairer and more efficient world economy.

Much empirical evidence is provided in order to show not only that inequalities exist but also why they have arisen and how they should be remedied by new administrative agencies. Thus, a merger between GATT and UNCTAD would lead to an agency which should organize world trade so as to give a larger share of it to poor countries. Leaving aside the question whether poor countries would really have more trade if only their share in it were increased, the author has an 'effective protection' case when he complains of the greater stringency of trade controls on processed than on raw commodities and on manufactures poor countries can produce than on those beyond their capabilities. (He is realist enough to argue for gradual change and appropriate adjustment assistance for injured interests elsewhere.) The same sort of reasoning appears even more forcefully in the chapter on investment. Grade the countries. Give most to the poorest and give them less when their income rises. Autonomous

administrative agencies are to be in charge, unencumbered by any consideration other than need. Were poor producers' responsiveness of supply the same as everyone else's, such argument would be proven.

On the whole, this approach seems appropriate to a given world economy where policy is a zero-sum game and leads to zero-sum results. That was relevant in the early postwar days when we had to make a fresh start, and it may become relevant again if the slowdown in the world economy persists and forces us towards another fresh start. But the book should not be shelved until some such day, be it near at hand or far distant. The evidence of how current problems have arisen should command immediate attention, even by those who see the solutions along different lines. For instance, the threat to world food supplies by the end of this century is not just forecast but explained. The reason given is that, during the last thirty years, the developing countries have become massive importers of food. Perhaps the suggested redistribution of incomes would be a palliative. But can it be more than that? In another chapter, the redistribution of world economic activity is mentioned but explained in terms of relative wage costs and not comparative abilities. Would not the latter point to a more lasting alternative solution?

This is a book replete with learned economic history and highly controversial policy suggestions.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

Reflections on a troubled world economy: essays in honour of Herbert Giersch. Edited by Fritz Machlup, Gerhard Fels and Hubertus Müller-Groeling. London: Macmillan for Trade Policy Research Centre. 1983. 381 pp. Index. £20·00.

REVIEWING this collection was a daunting prospect: seventeen extremely diverse essays by leading economists on the nature of the 'troubled' contemporary world economy. In the words of the preface, 'the volume does not attempt to address systematically the troubled state of the world economy' (p. xxv); hence what is presented is an eclectic group of papers, broadly sharing the same economic perspective (and that of Herbert Giersch), fitted somewhat arbitrarily into six parts: three on international topics, two on national economic policies and the last on philosophical concerns. As each contributor has apparently considered his own choice of problem, in his own fashion, the coverage of the problems of the world economy is consequently very patchy. Money, payments and exchange rates fare well with eight chapters, but international trade policy merits only two. The point is not that there should be fewer chapters on money, but that the net effect is rather like shining a powerful narrow beam torch at a large complex object: some parts we see well and in great detail, but others are hidden and we do not know how the parts fit together. And, although each contributor broadly fits into a market-based perspective, each approaches his chosen topic in a different way. This makes some essays clear and accessible to the non-economist reader (those by Tumlir and Brunner, for instance) while others need greater knowledge of the discipline (Vaubel, Machlup).

So, if the book is not a consistently written and systematic evaluation of the world economy, what does it offer, particularly for the student of international affairs? First, it offers some interesting and challenging ideas on the relationship of economics and politics (usually interpreted as 'government') and on the nature of international and national economic phenomena, particularly international money, although the reader might have to dig deep in some cases. Second, it offers seventeen individual analyses, by acknowledged experts in their fields. If the reader is interested in the same range of problems he or she will find much of benefit. Finally, and most important, the book represents perhaps the 'state of the art' of mainstream economic thinking on the world economy, and it is as this that it must ultimately be assessed. The book's strengths and weaknesses reflect the assumptions of the contributors' perspective. This perspective is encapsulated in the two characteristics of 'realism' and 'a belief in the market' (W. M. Corden, p. 60). Here, 'realism', not unlike that of Morgenthau and Carr, means seeking out the 'logic of the system' in order to understand and improve it. Not many of us would deny the relevance and importance of this task, even if some would query the way in which understanding is sought. However, 'belief in the market' is much more problematic in its centrality and acceptance. But whether the reader 'believes in the market' or not, these essays offer interesting and valuable insights into important aspects of the world

economy. More is the pity then, that the editors made no attempt to locate the contributors in some general framework.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic ROGER TOOZE

International money and credit: the policy roles. Edited by George M. von Furstenberg. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 1983. 596 pp. Index.

COLLECTED in this book are the eight papers delivered at an IMF conference held in Washington in March 1983. Chapter 9 is a summary and chapters 10 to 13 are background papers which originate from the IMF's Research Department and Treasury and were distributed in advance to conference participants. From the background papers it seems clear that the 'policy roles' envisaged by the IMF staff relate to the SDR. The SDR question is less visible in the conference papers themselves, which treat a somewhat broader set of issues in very different ways. Some of the papers are directed towards a specialist audience and employ equations and models, but some authors seem to think that just as war is too important to be left to the generals, so the world's monetary problems are too important to be left solely in the hands of econometricians and bankers.

Professor Kenen's contribution bears the inelegant title 'Use of the SDR to supplement or substitute for other means of finance', but it explores the complex subject in a gentle fashion to elucidate the policy choices realistically available. We are, he says, in a market-based system in which 'Governments are made to behave like ordinary economic actors—large ones to be sure—in credit and currency markets alike' (p. 330). He goes on to point out: 'In the 1970s, the banks were part of the solution. In the 1980s they are part of the problem. Governments must still choose between financing and adjustment on terms set by credit markets, but those terms have changed abruptly' (p. 332).

Richard Cooper and John Williamson comment on international money in a market-based system. Cooper points out that national money may serve but warns that 'external dollar holdings sooner or later will surpass domestic holdings of dollar assets; and long before that time, concern about shifts of dollar holdings will place constraints on, and then perhaps dominate US monetary policy' (p. 366). Williamson concludes that 'the most persuasive case for seeking a move to an SDR system . . . lies rather in the possibility of reducing the total amount of uncertainty in the system by adopting as vehicle currency a unit that represents an average of the major currencies instead of using one or more of those currencies themselves' (p. 368).

Many other papers, notably those by Cordon and Willett, review and evaluate the IMS informatively. The equation-laden piece by Buiter and Eaton produces some very worldly-wise comments from Arriazu and Bruno. The suggestion by Frenkel that we need a capital account analogue to GATT—a sort of GACF—is interesting. In total, the papers constitute an up-to-date overview of the IMS and provide copious references. One is left to reflect, however, that collections of conference papers make for repetitive and untidy books. This paperback is not small.

Bristol Polytechnic FRANK GARDNER

Investing in Europe's future. Edited by Arnold Heertje. Oxford: Blackwell for European Investment Bank. 1983. 218 pp. £15·00.

WHEN the European Investment Bank (EIB) was founded in the late 1950s, its main task was thought to be the correction of regional imbalances. In the 1970s, energy problems became part of its concern, and it supplemented the hospital services for ailing industries which were then considered to be the appropriate function of public authorities. A survey of such activities can be found in the EIB's publications on its activities in 1958–83, but not in this volume, which is more in the nature of a *Festschrift* for the bank's 25th birthday. The past is brushed aside. Concern is with the future, and in particular with the newly emerging technology gap between Europe and Japan and, to a lesser extent, with the United States. Each of the eight authors is worried by the fall in investment in a Europe which chose to raise its consumption by no less than 30 per cent in the course of the 1970s despite heavy transfers to oil producers.

With real wages rising in line with, or by more than, productivity, there was not enough left for investment. Hence unemployment rose, bringing in its wake higher social security payments which further squeezed the corporate sector. Attempts to deal with the problem through depreciation and inflation proved to be chimerae. Europe got itself into a vicious circle, with only one clear result: it lost the technology race to Japan, which was consequently able to boost both output and employment. In the view of one of the authors, Europe suffered a 'technology shock' of much greater significance than any oil shock (p. 52).

One result was that high technology products became relatively less important in Europe's exports of manufactures, though such products retained their importance in US exports and rose in Japan's. One of the reasons given is a still imperfect liaison between universities and industry, another the concentration of state aids on a few industries which leaves them isolated from others. Broader R & D aids, on Japanese and German lines, are suggested. Even better would be concerted Community action, though this has so far been restricted to 'pre-competitive' R & D and hampered by outdated rules of competition.

After surveys of energy and regional requirements, the book concludes with an essay on the growth of international capital and credit markets. Although the amounts borrowed and lent by Community institutions, including the EIB, have been relatively small, such transactions enjoy the highest credit standing. On this basis, the EIB could become an investment bank for the healthy industries of the future.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

Transnational corporations in world development: third survey. By the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations. New York: United Nations. 1983. 385 pp. Pb.

Multinationals and political control. By John Robinson. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 507 pp. Index. £25·00.

The threat of Japanese multinationals: how the West can respond. By Lawrence G. Franko. Chichester, New York: Wiley. 1983. 148 pp. £11·50.

Multinational corporations, technology and employment. By Edward K. Y. Chen. London: Macmillan. 1983. 247 pp. Index. £25·00.

Multinational companies and economic concentration in Europe. By Frank Fishwick. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1982. 113 pp. Index. £12·50.

THE debate about multinational companies now takes many forms. As can be seen from this collection of books, there is still room for studies ranging from basic source books or analyses of the political reactions triggered by such companies to descriptions of the multinational scene in specific countries or to the economic analysis of the whole area of direct investment. If one tries to identify any trends in the literature, there seems to be an increasing emphasis on non-American multinationals and host economies.

The source book is provided by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (the body set up in the early 1970s in the aftermath of the exposure of ITT's activities in Chile). This is the third major report sponsored by the CTC and, even though it concentrates on multinationals and the Third World, it is an essential part of any serious library on the subject.

The value of this report is the way it mingles statistical analysis with a discussion of trends in the relationship between these companies and the host countries. It provides some eighty tables of varying originality and ambition, which between them cover everything from conventional lists of inward and outward investment flows to analyses of the pattern of multinational ownership in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. The sources of such statistics are of variable quality and inevitably tend to be official. However, the sheer variety of the information thus presented, and the great breadth of countries covered, means that it would be a dull reader who could not benefit from this part of the report.

This is, though, far more than a mere statistical compendium. The authors go into some depth when analysing developments at the policy level. Those who want to know more about how the United Nations code of conduct for multinationals is evolving will find a complete section breaking down the code as it now stands and indicating those areas in which

agreement has yet to be reached. The report is also useful in more diffuse areas, such as indicating the different kinds of political responses which governments have made to these companies. Its examination of various non-equity approaches to the multinational phenomenon is particularly valuable. Once again, only the most blinkered will fail to find important ideas raised within the text. Obviously, it is written for a politically sensitive United Nations agency, but it is not concerned with scoring cheap points at the expense of these companies. Its tone is dispassionate, its coverage is wide, and it is always stimulating.

Robinson's book concentrates to a great extent on the political response to the multinationals which has been developing within the EC, OECD and the United Nations. He is of the opinion that there is a new political reality in the early 1980s, which stresses corporate accountability and social responsibility. He argues that the multinationals have not yet come to terms with these new demands, and that they need to develop a new sensitivity to this emerging political environment.

His analysis will irritate most multinational managers, because it is heavily corporatist, assuming that the debate within trade unions, the United Nations and the EC accurately reflects underlying political trends. Consequently, the book gives relatively uncritical descriptions of developments such as the Vredeling initiative, the OECD Code of Conduct, and the various ILO declarations of principles. Undoubtedly, some of these developments are significant, and, in particular, there is a form of case law emerging around the OECD Code of Conduct, while the EC anti-trust authorities have ground out a few significant judgements (normally against non-EC companies). On the other hand, Robinson views the world of international organizations through an extremely uncritical eye, and he expends rather too much space on the text of effectively dead resolutions from bodies such as the ILO, when this space could have been used more profitably to provide some hard critical analysis of which approaches have been most effective, and why most of them have had little impact on the multinationals. So, if readers need to know the details of various initiatives like the OECD code, they will find this book quite useful. However, most will find it irritatingly weak on analysis. Basically, Robinson comes through as a child of the 1970s, hopeful that developments like the Vredeling initiative constitute important steps toward democratising the multinationals. Viewed from the mid-1980s, his optimism looks less justified. The multinationals have effectively gutted such EC initiatives, and there are precious few signs at the moment that they will be forced to regret this.

Franko has also written a flawed book, though his at least has the virtue of being extremely stimulating. His subjects are the emergence of Japanese multinationals and the ways in which the Western economies can adjust to these new challengers.

This book feels as though it started in some business school classes, with Franko setting out to mount his own challenge to the preconceptions of Western businessmen about the Japanese challenge. Accordingly, a lot of stimulating ideas are presented about the reasons for Japan's success. The author downplays the role of the central authorities, emphasizing rather the extreme competitiveness (and fallibility) of the Japanese business culture, and the way these companies have put their research effort into process and product improvement and miniaturization. He then analyses a series of industries including semiconductors, colour televisions, steel and synthetic fibres to show that there is nothing irresistible about the Japanese successes.

There are a number of drawbacks to this book. First, it is mistitled. There is only one chapter specifically on the Japanese multinational phenomenon, and this is particularly slim and uninformative, resting heavily on other people's work and on conclusions which are probably wrong. (Franko stresses Japan's investment in the NICs, and is totally unilluminating about the current wave of Japanese investment into Europe and North America.) In practice, this book is really about the cut and thrust of competing industrial strategies and has little serious to tell us about Japanese multinationals themselves.

This mistitling would not have mattered too much, but the book has also been written too hurriedly. The ideas are certainly fresh, but the empirical foundations are second-hand and thus refer to an earlier period of Japanese expansion, which probably tells us little about what they are up to today. One final gripe is that there is no index, which reinforces my impression that this book should be treated as a polemic—fine for stirring debate, but not substantial enough to form a base on which to build sound conclusions.

By way of contrast, Chen has produced a sound, scholarly analysis of how multinationals

have affected Hong Kong; an analysis which is put firmly in the context of the wider literature on multinationals and the Third World. He has surveyed 369 companies based in Hong Kong, and makes out a reasonable case that they have generally made a positive (though not always a significant) contribution to the colony. For instance, while he has not identified massive amounts of research by incoming multinationals, he shows that those which do carry it out take it seriously. He shows, too, that companies involved in garments, plastics and toys show signs of adapting their technologies to the abundant labour found in Hong Kong. All in all, this is a useful piece of empirical work, which gives a fair amount of information about the economic impact of multinationals in Hong Kong, and also summarizes a lot of other related work on the wider Asian area.

Finally, moving on to a book aimed primarily at economists, Fishwick has produced a slim, technical but stimulating volume on the relationship between multinational companies and economic concentration in Europe. He concludes that the well-known concentration of multinationals in oligopolistic industries does not mean that the oligopoly follows from the multinational involvement. If anything, he suggests that the presence of multinationals in such industries may be leading to their fragmentation and to greater competition.

British Institutes' Joint Energy Policy Programme LOUIS TURNER
London Business School

Trade and structural change. By Leslie Stein. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1984. 186 pp. Index. £15·95.

THIS book is based partly on material presented in an undergraduate course at Macquarie University, Australia, where Leslie Stein is Associate Professor in Economics. The book begins with a discussion of the causes of international trade. It describes how the comparative advantage doctrine of Ricardo has given way during the past few decades to the ideas of Heckscher and Ohlin. Their theory's most significant prediction is that a country will export the good that is relatively intensive in the use of its relatively abundant factor. It emerges, however, that the trouble with trade determination theories is that in an attempt to incorporate within their scope the whole of international trade experience, they either demand assumptions that are unrealistic, such as perfect competition and full employment, or descend to such banalities as that the 'same forces that give rise to trade within each of the countries create trade between them' (Linders; p. 13).

The second chapter assesses these trade theories empirically. We read of the 'budding awareness of the need to evaluate new hypotheses' (p. 33). This budding awareness leads to conclusions that are hardly confidence-building. Thus we learn of the 'lack of any conclusive confirmation of the Ricardian hypothesis' (p. 25) although, apparently, this 'may not be unduly disturbing considering the hypothesis' limited usefulness'. On page 34 we find Hufbauer quoted as asserting that 'no theory monopolizes the explanation of manufactures trade'. Finally, Mr Stein concludes that 'while the H/O theory is still dominant . . . within the realm of the typical undergraduate textbook, its empirical standing is not above reproach. . . . By persistently maintaining it in the *foreground*, the economic profession brazenly displays an inertia and conservatism which appears to flout the open mindedness and impartiality which they would have us believe they profess' (p. 49). Indeed, as Stein himself says in words of magnificent common sense, 'the search for *the* solitary yet comprehensive theory is a chimera which should be abandoned'.

There follows a useful discussion of multinational corporations in world trade, written, naturally, from an Australian viewpoint. We learn that 'there are grounds for supposing that an overwhelming proportion of MNC affiliates are enticed abroad to pre-empt actual or potential trade obstacles' (p. 64). These obstacles have apparently been a useful weapon in Australia's armoury. 'Tariffs contributed substantially to the historic influx of overseas capital and labour . . . It is doubtful whether Australia's GDP would have reached its present level in a completely free trade environment . . .' (p. 92). However, it appears that things have changed and that these tariffs are perhaps 'currently an economic hindrance' (p. 93). Or perhaps Australia has got out of them what it wanted, or what Mr Stein wanted.

Unfortunately, protection is a drug of addiction. 'Once MNC's migrate to overcome tariff hurdles, they are naturally reluctant to countenance any trade liberalising moves which could

jeopardise their new investments, and hence they generally adopt a strong protectionist stance within host countries' (p. 94).

This book is useful reading for anyone inclined to the belief that the world is easily understood.

EDMUND DELL

The military origins of industrialisation and international trade rivalry. By Gautam Sen. London: Pinter. 1984. 277 pp. Index. £16·00.

THIS book is a welcome contribution on two grounds: it addresses an important issue on a grand scale, and its analysis is set within an impressively broad international political economy framework. The author finds the orthodox liberal and Marxist explanations for trade conflict and protectionism both narrow and inadequate. He seeks to develop an alternative theory by examining the impact of state interests, particularly security interests, on patterns of development and trade.

His argument rests on a rather crude realist model of international political relations which assumes that state interests are defined by military insecurity and a continuous struggle for power (pp. 66–7). He rightly sees industrialization as a key factor in this power struggle, and therefore argues that the process of industrialization has been both pushed and shaped by state security concerns. The heart of his case is that states will seek to establish and to maintain a core of 'industrializing industries'. They will pursue this goal for security reasons, and their behaviour will not therefore be governed by economic logic. As the number of industrialized states increases, this policy will result in overall surplus capacity. But because states need to maintain a core set of industries for security purposes, they will resort to protectionism and trade war rather than allowing the process of economic rationalization to take its course. The author does not commit himself to a conclusion about where all this will lead us, but he does argue that transnational corporations, with their need for relatively open trading arrangements, now constitute the principal bulwark of the liberal economy.

This argument is both stimulating and important. But although the structure of the argument is clear, the way it is supported is at best inelegant, and at worst inadequate. In its detail, the book shows too many signs of its origins as a doctoral thesis. Data come in indigestible chunks. These are almost never well integrated into the detail of the argument, and sometimes seem excessive (chapter 1), and sometimes thin (chapter 2), in relation to the point being made. The basic problem is that the author's case hinges on a question of motive, whereas his evidence very largely concerns outcomes (that is, the actual patterns of industrialization and trade). Consequently, although the logic of his argument is strong, the evidence in support of it is inferred rather than causal. One can imagine other, more plainly economic, explanations for the same outcomes, and consequently the author's rather strident assertion of his case often seems unconvincing.

This book will not, I hope, be the last word on the subject. But it does lay down a stimulating challenge, and should be rewarded by giving rise to an important debate.

University of Warwick BARRY BUZAN

National security and technology transfer: the strategic dimensions of East–West trade. Edited by G. K. Bertsch and J. R. McIntyre. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 258 pp. Index. £21·75.

THE sub-title of this volume is more illuminating than the title as only a minority of the papers reproduced concern themselves with the theme of the title. The volume is divided into seven 'chapters', each containing an introduction by the editors followed by one or more readings. The first three chapters are concerned with an overview of East–West trade, and the economic and political implications of this trade. These chapters serve to introduce the reader to the complexity of the issues and major arguments involved. Only chapters four and five specifically focus on technology transfer. Chapter six purports to deal with the views and policies of America's allies, but a single paper from Giovanni Agnelli is less than adequate to satisfy the needs of the chapter heading. The final chapter returns to broad generalizations

with two papers representing the contending American views by J. Fred Bucy and the ubiquitous Henry Kissinger.

The volume is hampered by its interpretation of East–West as almost exclusively US–Soviet, with a resulting lack of representation of the views of Britain, Germany, France and Japan. Views from Switzerland and Sweden, as technologically advanced states outside the scope of direct alliance to the United States, would also have added appreciably to the volume. The aim of the book in fostering 'a better understanding of the key policy issues' (p. x) might have been better served by broadening the perspective to include a greater appreciation of the views of US allies and also of Soviet attitudes to technology.

Despite the frequent assertion by US hawks that calamity can be the only consequence of trading with the Soviet Union, the examples to which allusion is most frequently made are the Great Grain Robbery and the Kama River Truck Plant—hardly matters of high technology or posing very great threats to US national security. The other much-quoted example is the sale of US high-precision micro-ball-bearing grinders, but this only followed several years after a French sale of comparable equipment. Those who would stop trade, or more rigorously control it, appear therefore to be rather short of evidence to support their case. The presentation of a near hysterical case by the CIA (pp. 92–112), suggesting, *inter alia*, that the Soviet Union developed a nuclear weapons capability solely as a result of stealing secrets (p. 98) and that it has no capacity to be innovative or to apply new technology effectively (p. 99) can only detract from the credibility of the arguments being presented.

The volume is successful in highlighting a problem area of US foreign policy, in particular by exposing the debate on restrictions on technology transfer, their effectiveness, and how this effectiveness should be judged. To a European these papers make interesting, if depressing, reading, illustrating again the apparent disarray in US policy-making. The United States urgently needs to resolve this area of confusion, and in doing so reduce the tensions in one area of its alliance relationship.

The price of the volume, at almost 10p per page, seems high for what is basically a collection of reprinted journal articles.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

Oil: the real story behind the world energy crisis. By Jack Anderson, with James Boyd. London: Sidgwick & Jackson. 1984. 386 pp. Index. Pb.: £10·95.

Oil crisis and economic adjustment: case studies of six developing countries. By Andrew MacKillop. Edited by Salah Al-Shaikhly. London: Pinter. 1983. 180 pp. Index. Pb.: £16·50.

WERE the oil shocks of the 1970s avoidable? We have become used to regarding them as the consequences of political and economic trends which had acquired such momentum that some form of upheaval was inevitable. Mr Anderson will have none of this. In his view, oil reserves were quite sufficient to meet growing demand, OPEC could have been foiled in its attempts to raise prices, and the oil companies could have maintained their command over reserves in the Middle East. But for the 'blunders, negligences and timidities' of US politicians and government officials, the oil crisis and the ensuing economic miseries need not have occurred.

He certainly has a case. Scarcity was created in the early 1970s by the failure to search for and develop new oil and natural gas deposits in the United States, particularly as a result of price controls, and by delays in building the Alaskan oil pipeline. The outcome was a sharp rise in US imports of oil from the Middle East. Abroad, the US government held back in 1970–1 from confrontation with Qadhafi, or with the OPEC nations at the Teheran conference; and Egyptian and Saudi overtures in 1971–2 were treated with indifference (Nixon's eye being fixed on the Jewish vote as the 1972 federal elections approached). An opportunity to prevent Egypt waging war with Israel, or Saudi Arabia aligning itself with the radical Arab states in using the oil weapon, may therefore have been missed. The period between 1974 and 1979 receives only a handful of pages, but again it is a tale of ineptitude in government as oil imports carried on rising, price controls remained, oil stocks were not replenished, and President Carter's five-dollars-a-barrel incentive to oil companies to bid on the spot market sent the oil price through the roof in May 1979.

Why does this detailed and often acute narrative remain unsatisfactory? Jack Anderson is an

eminent, if controversial, American political columnist. Although among its sophisticates, he falls within the American tradition of puritanical, 'muck-racking' journalism which sees government as malign and politicians as corrupt in both vision and practice. This may be a useful starting assumption for the investigative reporter, but it is definitely not an outlook to be admired in the serious historian. Throughout, Anderson plays down the complexity and sheer uncertainty of political and economic relations, allowing historical events to be all the more easily attributed to the stupidity and venality of political leaders (Nixon and Kissinger in particular). At the same time, the systemic forces which give shape to historical development remain buried by surface noise. What is it, for instance, about the US body politic, and the manner in which the nation elects its leaders, that has so diminished its ability to deal effectively with events at home and abroad or to develop a mature and consistent view of where its international interests reside? Although perhaps too broad a question to be answered in this instance, Mr Anderson's failure to recognize its pertinence diminishes his book's stature.

Mr Anderson's book is nevertheless provocative and deserves to be read. The same cannot be said for Mr MacKillop's. The idea of assessing the impacts of higher energy prices and other pressures on the economic performances of six of the poorest developing countries (Bangladesh, Jamaica, Kenya, Peru, Senegal and Sri Lanka) is admirable, but in style and content MacKillop's analysis is so pedestrian that the book is virtually unreadable. Some of the information contained in it (mainly from the 1970s) is interesting, although most is gleaned from World Bank reports that are already widely available. The book is also riddled with printing errors.

University of Sussex WILLIAM B. WALKER

Uranium and nuclear energy: 1983. Proceedings of the eighth international symposium held by the Uranium Institute, London, August 1983. London: Uranium Institute. 1983. 330 pp. £35·00; $52.00.

THE volumes that emerge from the Uranium Institute's annual symposia have themselves become an institution. The status has its charm, but also its dangers. In an inevitably restricted field, the convention of reproducing almost all the formal papers, statements and speeches—twenty-five in the present case—makes it impossible to avoid an accumulating repetition of hallowed pleas and assertions. Some of what is reproduced here, on public attitudes to nuclear power, for example, or on the problems of nuclear trade, falls readily into that category. Just as predictably, there are almost ritual policy statements by spokesmen from governments or international agencies. For anyone who has read the preceding volumes, it may sometimes be difficult to remember the year from which such contributions are drawn.

What makes the publication, like its predecessors, worth its place in the library is the other half of its content. One function of that remainder is to bring knowledge of familiar subjects up to date. The Uranium Institute's own work on uranium supply and demand is a case in point, and Michael Townsend's report on it here is well complemented by Frank Hahne's racier commentary on depression in the United States uranium industry. Bernard Montfort on French nuclear plans, Ilkka Mikkola on the Finnish programme and a useful trio of papers on nuclear waste disposal by Rudolf Rometsch, K. D. Reeve and D. G. Walker, and Ivar Neretnieks, all serve a similar purpose.

A second function of a few papers is to introduce topics less familiar in this context. Apart from the techical strength of the section on waste management, the notable feature of the present volume in that regard is a stronger emphasis on the economics and financial requirements of the uranium industry, exemplified in papers delivered by Dennis Etheredge and Paul Ammann. If the Institute builds on that foundation in future years, by probing the economics of other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, successor volumes may have an added vitality. As it is, a sense of the need to develop is shown by the decision to include for the first time lists of power reactors and uranium production facilities (the latter of which would be more useful if it gave some indication of reserves or available output). Such an evolutionary need does indeed exist. This volume is well up to the standard previously set. As the years pass, however, nothing is harder to imitate successfully than one's own success.

A last word. The symposium was held at the end of August 1983. The volume appeared, well edited and admirably printed, in December. Other learned institutions, please copy.

IAN SMART

Comparative industrial relations: ideologies, institutions, practices and problems under different social systems with special reference to socialist planned economies. By J. Wilczynski. London: Macmillan. 1984. 256 pp. Index. £25·00.

THIS book sets out to compare industrial relations in the capitalist, socialist and Third World countries. This is an ambitious objective, especially in view of the broad interpretation of industrial relations. One would expect coverage of areas such as employment and unemployment, work discipline and conditions of work, trade unions and collective bargaining, industrial democracy and industry disputes. What is more surprising is the extension of the coverage to many areas of labour economics such as technology and labour, wages, incentives and living standards, inflation and labour and international migration. It must be clear from the outset that there can be no adequate treatment of such a wide range of topics in relation to the three major blocs in a book of relatively modest length. No economist would expect to offer a useful treatment of the relationship between wages and inflation in a chapter of fourteen pages, either at a purely theoretical level or in relation to a single country. Here such a chapter has to cover the world scene. Explanations of inflation in capitalist countries are offered without any indication that these are the subject of bitter controversy rather than consensus. Within the same chapter, Soviet sources are used for a table showing changes in real wages betweeen 1960 and 1979. These suggest a fall of about 6 per cent in real hourly earnings in Britain between 1975 and 1979, but there is no conformation for this from any British source.

The treatment of wages and living standards is also curious. Wilczynski states that despite '*limited information available*, [my italics] in Britain in 1973 a quarter of the adult working population earned less than £625 gross (in the whole year), but 10 per cent of non-manual workers earned over £2000 gross' (pp. 114–5). One is bound to ask if the author is familiar with the *New earnings survey* and, if so, how he can consider the mass of information it contains to be *limited*. It would certainly allow the construction of a table showing the distribution of earnings in a manner similar to that for Czechoslovakia in Table 7.2. The inclusion of such a table would have allowed a direct comparison of earnings distribution in two countries from different blocs.

Although this book has severe limitations it does, nevertheless, try to present fairly the different philosophies of the rival blocs and to show where practice may fall short of theory. It will be a useful starting point for the serious student, especially for the wealth of its references and suggestions for further reading. This is particularly the case for material about the socialist countries and originating in those countries. For those not intending to pursue more detailed studies in this area, however, there is a danger that they will too readily accept the oversimplified generalisations that are offered.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

Employment policy in a developing country. Proceedings of a joint conference of the International Economic Association and the Indian Economic Association held in Pune, India. 2 vols. Edited by Austin Robinson, P. R. Brahmananda and L. K. Deshpande. London: Macmillan for International Economic Association. 1983. 738 pp. Index. £25·00 per vol.

THESE volumes are concerned with the 'employment problem' in India; a problem at once formidable, intractable and growing steadily worse. In its present form, it is the problem of continuing, substantial *under*employment (the existence of a large proportion of the working population, and especially in the countryside, which might be removed with no appreciable reduction in output), but, menacingly, being joined by increasing open *un*employment. It is a problem inextricably linked with massive, disfiguring poverty and great inequality.

It is, however, in the context of a country like India, a problem that raises peculiarly unyielding analytical and conceptual difficulties. There is, for example, no agreement among

economists on the definition, or even the existence, of underemployment; the complexities of measuring unemployment in a poor country mean that no truly satisfactory estimates of its magnitude in India are available for any single year (though some have been made), certainly no time series is in existence, and the government of India has thrown up its hands in despair at trying to secure official estimates; there is irreconcilable disagreement over the causes of the employment problem; there is a welter of confusion over what the appropriate policies for its eradication might be, and, indeed, over whether its eradication should be an immediate or a future goal; there is utter consternation over how appropriate policies (if they could be agreed upon) might be implemented. Here is no terrain for the faint-hearted or the muddle-headed.

The present volumes concern themselves with policy. They consist of thirty-five conference papers, a record of the discussion of those papers, and an introduction by E. A. G. Robinson. The papers were written by Indian economists, with the International Economic Association sending a group of foreign experts, with some knowledge of India, to participate actively in the discussion and criticism of the papers. Certainly, the discussion was lively, sophisticated and illuminating—as far as it went. The following themes are covered, by between two and five papers each: in volume 1, 'The dimensions of the problem', 'Constraints on expansion and job creation', 'Capital intensity and mechanisation', 'The objectives of development' and 'Incentives for development'; in volume 2, 'Employment strategies of Indian plans', 'The conflict between employment and other objectives', 'Employment problems of technical manpower', 'Employment problems of individual states' and 'The lessons'.

Never before has the Indian employment problem been subjected to such detailed examination. Here, surely, we have an invaluable collection of papers on a crucial issue, which will serve, for several years to come, as a quarry for those concerned to understand the employment problem in India or elsewhere in the Third World. On that score it is to be warmly welcomed.

I would, nevertheless, record two sources of dissatisfaction, for me, at least. The first is the inadequacy of the estimates of the magnitude of the problem. Little serious effort is made to provide estimates of the scale of underemployment and how this may have changed since the 1950s; while the papers in which the scale of unemployment is discussed are disappointing. It appears that Raj Krishna had originally agreed to contribute a paper on 'The dimensions of the problem of unemployment', but had to withdraw because of official duties. That is a pity, since an earlier paper by him is one of the landmarks in this area. The second disappointment is more fundamental. It relates to the methodologies represented. These are (as John Toye points out in his summing-up paper on p. 736) either that of the planners and the defenders of planning, or that of the 'liberal *laisser-faire* viewpoint' (displayed by three at least of the visiting critics). Missing is 'a radical political economy or structuralist viewpoint'. The one exception is the intervention by Pranab Bardhan (an expatriate Indian who was one of the visiting experts) in the earlier sessions. That absence is a great pity. The missing intellectual presence has an immense amount to offer in the analysis of the employment problem, and there is certainly no lack either of Indian political economists eminently well qualified to pursue the task or of foreign economists with a knowledge of India. The omission was presumably deliberate, on the part of the organizers of the conference. It is most unfortunate, since these volumes are thereby significantly deficient in the analysis they have to offer.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London TERENCE J. BYRES

Fiscal and monetary policies and problems in developing countries. By Éprime Eshag. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. 287 pp. Index. £22·50; $39·50. Pb.: £8·50; $14·95.

THIS book presents a broad analysis of the use of fiscal and monetary policies in resolving three basic problems shared in varying degrees by most developing countries. These are: first, the inadequacy of capital equipment in relation to the size of the labour force and area of unused cultivable land in the developing countries; secondly, the misallocation of investment resources; and thirdly, the vulnerability of developing countries to internal and external imbalances. The book is divided into six chapters, the first two of which analyse the potential value of fiscal and monetary policies on the basis of the Keynesian and Kalecki models of income determination and financing investment respectively. The remaining four chapters examine the role of fiscal and monetary policies within the framework of these two models.

Although dedicated 'to students who care about the underprivileged and unemployed', the clear and concise exposition of the various propositions involved in the concept of economic development should give the book a much wider appeal. The analysis of the neo-monetary approach (Appendix 2A, p. 65) and the counter-revolution against Keynes (p. 50) are particularly interesting. The Friedmanite doctrine is criticized on the grounds that it 'tends to obscure the important distinction between the concepts of "income" and "money" ' (p. 76). The IMF, 'a leading advocate of the monetary approach' (p. 211) is shown to have followed a 'monetary approach which differs in some important respects from that adopted by some members of the Chicago School' (p. 244). This is seen in the IMF's declared policy of 'blending "qualitative" considerations with "quantitative" results of monetary models' (p. 248) without, as the author remarks, providing any information on how this is to be done. Other divergences from the pure monetarist view are the Fund's insistence on 'realistic exchange rate policies, and its recognition that 'factors other than "monetary mismanagement" may be responsible for balance of payments differences' (p. 249). The monetarist approach to the diagnosis of imbalances, because of its heavy reliance on the supply of money, 'leads to misleading conclusions by exaggerating the level and the rate of growth of demand, thereby importing a deflationary bias to policy prescriptions' (p. 267). As the chief source of official credit available to developing countries, the IMF, with its present terms of reference, cannot 'play a major and effective role in promoting growth and development in the world economy' (p. 268). The possibility of introducing an International Clearing Union is examined, but the prospects of its creation under present circumstances are not rated highly.

This clearly written book should lead to a better understanding of the use and misuse of fiscal and monetary policies.

RICHARD BAILEY

Capital goods production in the Third World: an economic study of technical acquisition. By Daniel Chudnovsky, Masafumi Nagao and Staffan Jacobsson. London: Pinter. 1983. 232 pp. Index. £16·50.

THE importance of the development of a capital goods sector in the process of industrialization is widely recognized. It is seen both as promoting the integration of economies through helping to develop local sources of capital and intermediate goods which previously had to be imported, and as a dynamic agent in accelerating wider technological transformation. This very useful book, based on research carried out by UNCTAD, describes how some of the NICs (newly industrializing countries) have succeeded in developing their capital goods industries, and how they have acquired the necessary technology. The case studies described cover aspiring capital goods producers as well as the semi-established NICs.

The aspirants discussed in most detail are Peru, Thailand, Tunisia and Tanzania, and their experience is related to three models for initiating capital goods production: evolutionary, policy-induced and vehicle-assembly based. Within any of these, tactics may involve copying, adaptive imitation or the use of technical licences. Whatever the mix of strategies and tactics employed, the conclusions from detailed studies at the enterprise level seem to be summarized as follows: 'the entry into capital goods production is a formidable task . . . since the entry is not a one-time affair . . . but rather a continuing process'. Despite the generally neo-classical flavour of the book, the crucial role of government in providing a suitable environment for technological development and the promotion of exports is emphasized. But the distinction between the possible models is somewhat blurred by the contention that 'these policy measures are, in effect, interventions tending to accelerate the pace of the evolutionary entry'.

Three countries which have reached the stage of production of complex capital goods, Brazil, India and South Korea, are then discussed, and their experience related to the economics of technology acquisition and government policy. The conclusion is that the development of the sector has owed little to foreign capital or market forces, but rather was made possible 'through explicit government decisions'.

More dramatic than these relative success stories (or that of Taiwan) is the case of China, discussed in another case study. 'The progress made by China in developing its capital goods industries is remarkable . . . [the] share in total manufacturing output is the highest among developing countries. This achievement was made possible by the planning model

applied . . .'. On the other hand, China's enterprises are over-integrated vertically, and ability to manufacture complex (as opposed to standard) machinery and equipment is less.

The book concludes with a useful summary of the production of electronics-based machine tools, describing the dominance of Japanese companies and the barriers to entry created by their strategy. Case studies of firms in Taiwan, South Korea and Argentina producing CNC lathes clarify the very considerable problems faced by any entrants, let along those in developing countries.

University of York COLIN STONEMAN

The pharmaceutical industry and dependency in the Third World. By Gary Gereffi. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 291 pp. Index. £21·60. Pb.: £8·65.

THE title is not really justified: the main part of the book is a case study of the steroid hormone industry in Mexico, and is based on the author's PhD thesis. The last two chapters, which do provide an overview of the pharmaceutical industry in the Third World, are somewhat disconnected from the first five. The author knows the Mexican situation thoroughly, but for other countries adds little to the literature he surveys, apart from some useful tables. The generalizations at the end are hardly related to the very thorough theoretical discussion of dependency, while the Mexican case study is related to it closely and interestingly.

Mexican national firms dominated world production of steroid hormones in the early 1950s, thanks to a wild plant which provided the best raw material. The main interest of the case study is in the analysis of why this position of dominance gave way to dependency on transnational corporations, maintained despite some attempts at state intervention in the 1970s; and also in the discussion of how this dependency has affected the national welfare of Mexico and the interests of consumers of the hormones.

On the consequences of dependency as compared with feasible alternatives for the steroid hormone industry, Gereffi's conclusions are unambiguous: the leading Mexican firm could have developed and controlled its own finished products ('original research of the highest quality was not only feasible in Mexico but had actually been carried out successfully for over a decade' (p. 109), and this would have been very much better for national development and would have led to lower prices for the consumer: 'The TNC price was usually many times higher than those of Mexico's national producers. Although Mexican prices at the intermediate level continued their downward spiral, finished drug prices of the TNCs remained high. The result: income lost to Mexico was coming to rest in TNC coffers' (p. 120).

Yet despite his evidence, which points to the political arena of policy formation and, crucially, the detailed implementation of policy when the crunches come, as decisive for whether transnational corporations are to be allowed any place in the development of an industry and if so on what terms, Gereffi's own conclusions are much more fatalistic: 'Their global spread means their control in industries is not easily broken, especially where it rests with technology and marketing expertise' (p. 163). In fact, while the author has taken care to discuss some feasible alternatives to transnational dominance in one industry, he does not discuss the general option of industrialization based on self-sufficiency—a policy which might allow a developing country to exclude transnational corporations altogether, in a way which may not be possible when seeking export markets for finished products.

ALASTAIR WHITE

Rural development: putting the last first. By Robert Chambers. London, New York: Longman. 1983. 246 pp. Index. Pb.: £2·00.

ROBERT CHAMBERS is here concerned with the 'alleviation of poverty' in the Third World, concentrating upon the great centres of poverty, which lie in the countryside. The parts of the Third World which he knows best are in sub-Saharan Africa and in south Asia, but he argues that what he has to say relates equally to other parts (such as Latin America or south-east Asia). What he fails to point out, however, is that his concern is with the non-socialist Third World. Countries like China or Cuba make no appearance. That is a pity.

From his own considerable experience in poor countries, and on a basis of wide and critical

reading, he has written a book which has five central and connecting components. The first is the argument that almost all the 'outsiders' (the non-poor), foreign and indigenous alike, who have analysed, formulated policy and strategy which relate to, and administered those many programmes which have implications for, rural poverty, have been grossly defective in their analysis and their practice. The second is the demonstration that the rural poor themselves have a vast reservoir of knowledge, a set of survival strategies, and an identifiable set of priorities concerning the relief of poverty. These should be at the heart of both the analysis of rural poverty and the devising of the means for its alleviation, but have been ignored. The third is a treatment of the nature of rural poverty, the forces which give rise to it, and the mechanisms which sustain and reproduce it. Again, the 'outsiders' display a woeful ignorance. These three components constitute the launching-pad for the final two elements. The fourth is a carefully reasoned formulation of how the analysis should proceed from a totally new set of premises; and the fifth, pursued with no little boldness, a statement of a programme for action, which, if pursued, might begin to have some small impact upon the pervasive and disfiguring rural poverty that blights the Third World.

If, in the end, Chambers fails to convince, as he failed to convince me, that his proposals for action—in the non-socialist Third World, let me stress—will have the passionately desired effect, he has, nevertheless, written a thoughtful, eloquent and stimulating book, the essential achievement of which is to give searching scrutiny to much of what passes for 'received wisdom' in this area. I found especially persuasive the argued plea that the poor should cease to be the distant, reified objects of analysis, and become, instead, active subjects in attempts to understand and act upon rural poverty. But the rub comes with respect to action. Chambers is optimistic that a whole series of small, individual initiatives—which he is at pains to identify—can have the cumulative effect of shifting things in the direction of reducing poverty. I do not share that optimism. He is aware that his optimism and his agenda may be dismissed as 'an Alice in Wonderland fantasy, or an unobtainable saintly ideal' (p. 188), or as 'naive reformism' (p. 91). Unfortunately, he has little to offer by way of illustration that his kind of solution can, in practice, work. The rock upon which it is likely to founder is that of the entrenched power of dominant classes in the countryside itself (and in the city, although I think that he exaggerates the supposedly pervasive role of so-called 'urban bias' in perpetuating rural poverty) and the representation of those interests (in both town and country) by a powerful state via a varied state apparatus. Chambers is not unaware of this, but he does, in my judgement, significantly underestimate the strength of resistance to action on behalf of the poor. One wonders if he might not have found it useful to examine the experience of, say, China or Cuba—where an effort has been made to disinherit dominant classes— upon which he remains resolutely silent. Might one suggest the possibility of an extra chapter in a future edition? It is, I hope, a book that will run to future editions.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London TERENCE J. BYRES

The challenges of South–South cooperation. Edited by Breda Pavlič *et al.* Boulder, Col.: Westview for Research Centre for Cooperation with Developing Countries, Belgrade. 1983. 455 pp. Pb. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) £21·75.

THIS book brings together papers delivered at an international workshop held in Bled, Yugoslavia, in November 1981, on 'the promotion of economic and technical cooperation among developing countries, with particular reference to developing countries' joint investments and their financing'. Presumably the objective of the exercise was to have a wide-ranging discussion on as many issues and aspects of this theme as possible. If that was the intention, then the organizers clearly succeeded. No topic worth attention seems to have been excluded from the discussions. However, to have a wide-ranging discussion is one thing. It is a rather different matter to combine these discussions into a coherent and tightly reasoned book, which in fact, is the major problem with this one. It attempts to cover far too many issues, with the result that much of what it has to say has already been better and more fully developed elsewhere, and the quantity of new material tends to get crowded out.

In all there are twenty-two chapters covering the internal (part 1) and external (part 2) aspects of regional integration and cooperation. Part 1 is further divided into a general and a sectoral approach. The general approach covers such matters as factors of inter-regional

cooperation, the organizational infrastructure of self-reliance, the non-aligned nations and the Group of 77, and the operational modality of economic cooperation among the developing countries. The sectoral approach covering twelve chapters deals with such matters as trade, financial cooperation, monetary and payments agreements, multinational corporations, joint ventures, agriculture, industrial planning, and information and communications.

Part II deals with the external aspects—which seems to be a catchphrase for anything not covered elsewhere. It includes chapters on the North and ECDC (economic cooperation among developing countries), transnational corporations and technical cooperation, the role of telematics, technology transfer between developing countries and Eastern Europe, and support activities by international organizations and developed countries. The conclusions and recommendations are brought together in part III and three background papers are thrown in for good measure.

What is the sum of all this? Clearly there is potential for South–South cooperation in all of the areas mentioned. However, everything cannot be done at the same time. The issues have to be clarified, priorities determined and strategies agreed. This, in fact, is where the real work begins. Unfortunately, this book does not get to grips with any of these problems. Rather, it comes over as a general handbook of what can and should be done. It is not helped by the absence of an index; readers will have to thumb through vast sections before they finally find what they are looking for. An index would also have indicated the need for more judicious editing.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

Law

Multilateral treaties: index and current status. Edited by M. J. Bowman and D. J. Harris. London: Butterworths. 1984. 516 pp. Index. £60·00.

THIS volume is an index to more than eight hundred of the most important multilateral treaties concluded between 1856 and June 1983, when the book went to press. The treaties are listed in chronological order, but subject and word indexes are provided which facilitate rapid location of a treaty even if the precise title is not known. The treaties which are included are not restricted to a small number of areas of public international law which may attract greater academic interest, but cover a broad range of subjects relating to both private and public international law. The entry for each treaty provides information (including dates, where applicable) in respect of the treaty's conclusion, entry into force, duration, signatories, parties, territorial scope for parties, reservations, denunciations, amendments, authentic texts, and official and unofficial sources of publication, and concludes with brief but useful notes regarding the treaty and providing cross-references to other related treaties.

As noted by Judge Sir Robert Jennings in the Foreword, while treaty texts are rather widely available, it can be quite difficult and time-consuming to obtain the essential details noted above. In compiling and annotating this treaty index, the editors sought and received the assistance of the various depositary institutions and governments to which one must resort in order to obtain the information first-hand. Anyone who has endeavoured to obtained such details first-hand, check the printed, typed or occasionally handwritten lists and annotations for discrepancies, seek confirmation of details, and then collate the material, will understand the painstaking effort involved, and hence the editors' significant contribution in making such information more readily available.

The value of this type of work is closely tied to the accuracy of the details provided and, with the vast amount of citations, it would be difficult to make a preliminary assessment other than to recognize perhaps the inevitability of certain errors in the mass of data (such as listing one of the parties to the first treaty as 'Havana' instead of 'Hanover', an error not unknown to other publications including the index if not the text in the British and Foreign State Papers). This should only highlight the difficult nature of the task which the editors have undertaken. As the value of this type of work is also closely tied to the information being up-to-date (one could have easily envisaged such a volume in a loose-leaf format similar to certain private law digests) it is reassuring to read that it is intended to issue supplements.

This volume should be a welcome addition to any international law library and, in view of the breadth of the subject matter, should be received equally well by both scholar and practitioner.

RICHARD KENNEDY GUELFF

Human rights in international law: legal and policy issues. 2 vols. Edited by Theodor Meron. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1984. 566 pp. Index. £20·00 per vol.

THERE are no books quite like these two volumes in the whole field of international law, still less in the area of human rights. They are neither text-books nor expository monographs but teaching manuals designed to provide assistance and encouragement to those giving instruction to students on international human rights. Assistance and encouragement they certainly do supply; and it is as certainly needed. The editor's introductory essay makes clear enough the problems confronting human rights teachers, especially the need to steer a course between an 'all human life is here' approach, seeking after universal justice, and one which is merely an investigation of the international attention given to familiar national constitutional laws and practices. The path chosen here begins on familiar ground with Professor Henkin's essay pointing out the differences between American constitutional rights and international human rights. This is the right place to start because students inevitably bring with them perceptions of their national, constitutional systems and an inclination to measure international standards against them, rather than the other way round. There are, however, important excursions into unchartered regions, most notably in Professor Trubeck's excellent essay on economic and social rights.

In addition to the introduction, there are twelve chapters, following a common pattern. The main part of each is an introduction to the subject matter, some more descriptive than others. The innovative parts are teaching suggestions, syllabi and reading lists. The latter are designed both for whole courses and, by 'mini-syllabi', for two or three class hours within the confines of another course. There is some overlap, of course, between the various chapters but it is a measure of the ambition of the undertaking that there are outlines here for twelve courses. Although the utility of the contributions will vary from reader to reader, I should be surprised if any teacher did not find ideas, information and, above all organization of materials which would benefit his own course. I was particularly impressed by the chapters from Mr Greenberg on discrimination (a pervasive and central topic, the sheer legal complexity of which is best appreciated against the American domestic experience), and by Professor Trubeck's account of social welfare rights, which is a thoroughly stimulating attempt to make something of the programmatic obligations in the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant. As would be expected, there are good essays on the inter-American system by Judge Buergenthal and by Professor Higgins on the European Convention (which brings up to date some of the references in Professor Lillich's chapter on civil rights). Other chapters, all making significant contributions, are by Professor Shestack on the jurisprudence of human rights, by Professor Humphrey on political rights, by Dr Wolf on the ILO, by Professor Weisbrodt on NGOs and by Professor Sohn on the UN.

The title of the book suggests some objective notion of human rights independent of positive prescriptions of international law. This is an idea which is unacceptable to a substantial number of states. A more widely acceptable approach, and one which helps to make the subject matter more manageable, is to focus on those international obligations which states undertake with respect to the treatment of individuals regardless of their nationality (although elsewhere Professor Meron has expressed his doubts about this). That leads on to the one major reservation I have about the collection: there is no consideration of the legal nature of international human rights law. It is essential that students are given at least a rudimentary introduction to the sources of international law and the law of treaties if they are to appreciate the obstacles in the way of making human rights law and in making human rights law work. Otherwise, we send forth crusaders without swords against states protected by the formidable shields of domestic jurisdiction. My final observation would be this. There is an evangelical quality to the books. The absence of doubts about the international human rights enterprise (doubts teachers will certainly encounter among their students) reminds me of the early works in English on European Community Law—not only were the Communities a good thing, they were unblemishedly a good thing. Something more

might be appropriate than the odd footnote, say, to the observations of Professor Watson, whose scepticism deserves better answers than the patronizing replies of his elders and should-know-betters in the United States.

I do not want to end on a cavilling note. As a teacher of human rights, these books are as valuable as any I have.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

Implementation of human rights covenants with special reference to India. By H. O. Agarwal. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal. 1983. 210 pp. Index. Rs 80·00.

AFTER an uneven start, this little book is redeemed by an interesting final chapter on the relationship between the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Indian constitution. The opening chapters present a low-key and unexceptionable introduction to the Covenants, but Dr Agarwal despairs of the measures of implementation which they provide—a 'farse' (*sic*; one of so many misprints that they almost cease to be an impediment). He is led to suggest some highly unlikely international judicial remedies to put the matter right, not that he seems very impressed with the achievements of the judicial process under the European Convention on Human Rights. When he calls for 'international law' to take effective measures against delinquent states, he writes oblivious of the fact that the states and the international legal system are one and the same.

But the last chapter is much happier. Although India has ratified the covenants, it has not made their provisions part of domestic law, an omission of which Dr Agarwal is critical. This has mattered less in the Indian context than it does, say, in the United Kingdom, because the wide terms of the Indian constitution and the increasingly protective attitude of the judges have made it possible to achieve indirect implementation. The device is 'implied fundamental rights', a concept independent of India's international human rights obligations, which the judges have used to supplement the express guarantees of the constitution. The notion is roughly similar to the standard adopted by the European Court in *Golder* v. *United Kingdom*. Dr Agarwal shows how the Supreme Court has expanded the conception of what rights are necessarily implied for the enjoyment of the express rights by making reference to the International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights. He draws attention, also—though not enough, I think, given its originality—to the development of judicially inspired public interest litigation before the Court. In another section, he draws some comparisons between the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant and the 'directive principles' of the constitution. While he does not address specifically the relationship between the protection of political and economic rights, the theme is ever-present. The irrelevance of the judicial process to starving and unclothed people and the obstacles to the enforcement of judicially declared rights of disadvantaged minorities are made clear enough, but Dr Agarwal gives proper prominence to the *Shobraj* case, where the Supreme Court held that lack of resources could not be pleaded by the state as a justification of the denial of fundamental rights (in that instance, free criminal legal aid).

The texts of various international instruments are appended to the book but it would have been very useful to have also had Parts III and IV of the constitution.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

Equality and discrimination under international law. By Warwick McKean. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1983. 333 pp. Index. £30·00.

THE historical development of the principles of equality and non-discrimination since 1919 is the subject of this work. The period has witnessed both a heightened awareness of human rights, including those of minorities, and renewed vigour in the state system itself, as many new countries have joined the international community, in the process raising new questions of minority rights.

The resulting tensions were first dealt with as a problem of protecting certain minorities by treaty in some of the countries that obtained independence after the First World War. Mr McKean shows that these treaties were resented as imposing special burdens on selected states

while other established states accepted no similar obligations. Added to this was ill-feeling in the non-Western world provoked by the refusal of the Western powers to accept Japanese proposals to include a provision on racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant.

Nevertheless, as the author demonstrates by a close examination of the relevant cases, the minorities treaties did on occasion serve the useful purpose of permitting the Permanent Court of International Justice to clarify some basic points on the nature of equality as a legal principle.

The new international legal regime that developed at the end of the Second World War shifted the focus from the rights of minorities to human rights in general. This was thought to avoid both the invidious distinctions between states under the minorities treaties and also the danger that emphasizing minority rights *per se* would encourage separatist or irredentist aspirations. Thus the new human rights regime took existing state structures as its framework, even though some minority groups might have been better served by redrawing of boundaries or fundamental political changes towards federal or autonomous structures.

Within the limitations thus imposed, however, the human rights of equality and non-discrimination have been firmly entrenched in international law through the combined processes of United Nations declarations and resolutions, treaties, and national and international jurisprudence. Mr McKean examines this process in considerable detail and reveals the important interplay of politics and law in this area. He offers interesting insights into a number of controversial issues, such as the legal character of United Nations General Assembly resolutions and the scope of *jus cogens* peremptory norms in international law. He also considers the propriety of what is sometimes called 'reverse discrimination'.

Mr McKean leaves the reader with a clear picture of the progress achieved over the last sixty years, although in the end one may still question whether the problems of minorities will ever finally be resolved without a more imaginative response than the values of the state system seem to permit.

University of Aberdeen DAVID H. OTT

Origin and development of the law of the sea. By R. P. Anand. The Hague, London: Nijhoff. 1983. 249 pp. Index. DFl 115·00.

A COMPREHENSIVE historical treatment of the law of the sea from a universal perspective has long been called for. In attempting this difficult task Professor Anand has produced a controversial and thought-provoking work which carries a somewhat misleading title. His main concern is the freedom of the seas, to the almost total exclusion of other aspects of the law of the sea, such as the international maritime law of neutrality and prize. Moreover, the first 158 pages, dealing with 'the origin', are focused on the experience of the Indian Ocean, the centre of Professor Anand's concern.

The author's Indocentricity is, so far as this reviewer is concerned, wholly welcome, as it helps to correct the traditionally heavy Eurocentricity in the historiography of international law which has by no means been counteracted sufficiently yet. If one has to voice some reservations about the work, they are related to the author's method of presenting and evaluating his evidence. His principal error in this respect consists in approaching his subject with an *a priori* notion of a hard correlation between free trade, on the one hand, and the freedom of the seas, on the other. However, there is no compelling logic by which the two can be so paired.

A great deal of circumstantial evidence in the way of maritime practice in regard to navigation and trade is adduced to show that because of unimpeded navigation and trade in the Indian Ocean before the arrival of the Portuguese, there must of necessity also have been freedom of the seas in the legal sense. Among the numerous witnesses cited in support of this thesis is Marco Polo (1256–1323) whose country, Venice, was a beehive of activity in international shipping at the very time when Venice was trying to impose her dominion of the seas in the Adriatic. Where the imposition of a dominion of the seas was not technically feasible, as it patently was not in the Indian Ocean—even over relatively narrow stretches of the sea—the freedom of the seas was a factual, not a legal condition. As the author informs us, 'Asians were generally land powers and the ocean was of secondary importance' (p. 152). They 'never cared to have big navies' (p. 51). 'The vast sea could not be conquered by anybody'

(p. 227) until the Europeans brought to bear their technical superiority which was due to their being 'trained in the rough waters of the Atlantic and the North Sea whose challenges had hardened them to become expert navigators and naval warriors' (p. 227).

It is true that an inter-state system containing rules of inter-state conduct existed in Asia before the arrival of the Europeans, but no evidence drawn from state practice is produced from that period to show the existence of the freedom of the seas in the Indian Ocean as part of that international law. Yet evidence from state practice would have been needed to corroborate Professor Anand's circumstantial evidence to render his thesis iron-cast.

Considerable doubt must be expressed over Professor Anand's surprisingly confident assertion that 'whatever else may be said about some other rules of international law, the freedom of the seas . . . is one principle which Europeans learnt or got from Asian State practice through Grotius' (p. 86). While Grotius was right in claiming that the East Indies were not *res nullius* (p. 82), this is a far cry from saying that there was in the Indian Ocean a freedom of the seas in the legal sense. That Grotius attempted to learn as much as he could about India and the East Indies from various sources proves no more than that he was a keen advocate of the Dutch East India Company. It is Professor Anand himself who reminds us that in propounding his doctrine of the freedom of the seas, Grotius relied, *inter alia*, on Roman law (p. 82).

None of these criticisms is voiced in a carping spirit, and I hope that students of the history of international law perusing this work in a critical spirit will greatly profit from it. The history of the law of the sea in universal perspective deserves all the debate it can possibly get.

University College London F. PARKINSON

History

Strategy and diplomacy 1870–1945: eight studies. By Paul Kennedy. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 254 pp. Index. £15·00.

ONE of the features of strategic studies during the 1970s was the reassertion of the historical approach. The 'scientific' approach to strategy which developed in some quarters in the 1960s is dead, creatively speaking, though it is not yet altogether buried. 'Scientific' strategy now seems curiously old-fashioned, like mini-skirts and optimism. For those who want to understand the world of military power and force, it is scientific methodology rather than history which is behind the times.

At the forefront of the reassertion of the historical approach in the 1970s were Bernard Brodie in the United States and Michael Howard in Britain. Steeped in history, their works have helped to fertilize our thinking about the present and future. In their shadow has emerged a growing list of books, monographs, and articles on general themes and particular topics in strategic history. Paul Kennedy's latest book, *Strategy and diplomacy 1870–1945*, is a marginally useful addition to this growing literature.

The phrase 'marginally useful' refers to the book as a book, rather than to the individual 'studies' themselves. For those who have not read them already, these are well worth reading. The trouble is that they are not new and do not cohere as a collection. All but two have been published elsewhere, the earliest as long ago as 1968, when Kennedy was a student; and, as it happens, the two unpublished pieces are not the best. The biggest disappointment, however, is the author's failure to take the opportunity to write a sparkling introduction to the collection, giving it at least a cloak of coherence and offering the reader the benefit of his reflections on nearly a century of strategy and diplomacy. Without such a cloak, there is no disguising the fact that the book is a rag-bag, though like rag-bags it does promise to be convenient from time to time. Those who buy this book will occasionally save themselves the trouble of going to a library and searching out a journal. But at £15, I do not know who will buy it: certainly no student I know.

Kennedy's strength is in writing broad theme history embedded in detailed historical investigation. The eight studies pushed between the covers of this book are made up of an examination of the tradition of appeasement in British foreign policy, a discussion of Mahan and Mackinder, an essay relating economic and military issues in British policy in the

twentieth century, two essays on the Anglo-German naval race, an account of arms races and the causes of war 1850–1945, a review of Japan's strategic decisions 1939–1945, and a broad survey of why the British Empire lasted as long as it did. Diplomatic, economic, and military history are ably interrelated by the author.

Strategy is much too serious to be left to conventional historians, but some, like Kennedy, do have something to say, in general as well as in particular. It is a pity that he did not take the opportunity presented by the republication of these essays. As a result, this book is somewhat less than the sum of its parts.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

Britain, Europe and the world 1850–1982: delusions of grandeur. By Bernard Porter. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 173 pp. Index. £10·00; $25.00.

BERNARD PORTER has written a stimulating, provocative and occasionally perverse assessment of Britain's position in the world. In *The lion's share*, he has already demonstrated his capacity to synthesize and summarize. The present book is more pungent and more superficial but is obviously based on a wide general knowledge of the issues it discusses. The author firmly resists any notion that the facts speak for themselves and vigorously interpolates opinions. It is, indeed, an extended interpretative essay. There is nothing pedestrian about the analysis or the presentation, but the pyrotechnic display contains, if anything, too many dazzling rockets.

The opening contention is that Britain's decline from power stemmed from the reasons which had led to its rise. Hence, the decline could not have been reversed by wiser statesmanship, different world conditions or any measures designed to restore Britain's economic health. Those who had ostensible responsibility for shaping policy were in fact prisoners of events, with far less freedom of action than they thought. The argument is avowedly determinist—typically, Porter disclaims knowledge of whether it is also 'Marxist'. In any event, no kind of constructive 'lesson' is intended. It is hoped that the reader will find a little sense in the book somewhere. Such remarks convey the flavour and tone of what follows. All the way through, the author tries to distinguish between rhetoric and reality. The treatment that follows is chronological, from the 'mid-Victorian heyday', through 'doubts and fears' in the last decades of the century to 'crisis' in the twenty years before 1914. Thereafter, it is a matter of 'holding on' until 1945, followed by 'revolution' down to the present. In puncturing many of the claims by those who aspired to the making of policy, Porter performs a valuable service, though he is not perhaps the first to observe a gap between pretension and performance. In the process, there is much tilting at windmills and a tendency to discover conventional wisdom under every bed.

It is not easy to discern precisely what Porter is asserting because he is so good at elaborating the rationale of views which he in fact seems to reject. The prose oscillates between the oracular and the casual. Its climax is achieved in the conclusion, where we read that by 1980 Britain was clearly reduced to penury and impotence, and to a position where it no longer had an effective foreign policy at all. What was left was simply bowing and scraping. Yet, into this barren landscape came the Falklands crisis and it leaves the author quite baffled. He concludes that no British government before had ever made so great a material sacrifice over a principle. But, whatever we may think of this action, 'bowing and scraping' hardly seems an adequate description of the state of Britain. In the end, therefore, we are as decently provoked as the author obviously intends us to be; but we are not much wiser.

University of Glasgow KEITH ROBBINS

The British between the superpowers 1945–1950. By Elisabeth Barker. London: Macmillan. 1983. 270 pp. Index. £25·00.

ELISABETH BARKER has written a balanced account of British foreign and defence policy-making between 1945 and 1950, based on extensive research in the Public Record Office archives.

In 1945 Britain found itself isolated, facing the increasing hostility of the Soviet Union in Europe and the Middle East, and receiving little or no support from a United States which was

suspicious of British 'imperialism' and determined not to become involved in an Anglo–American front against the USSR. Britain was physically and economically exhausted by its wartime exertions and it was clear that none of the war-ravaged countries of Western Europe were capable of defending themselves against a Soviet attack. In this event little assistance could be anticipated from the United States, which cut off lend-lease supplies and then put forward onerous terms for a much-needed loan to Britain. America proved to be hostile to British policy in Greece and Palestine and, contrary to Roosevelt's wartime pledges, refused to divulge any information to Britain about the atomic bomb. To add to the British government's difficulties, a sizeable faction within the Labour Party began to clamour for a British-led 'third force' independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States—a nonsensical demand given the bankruptcy of Britain and Western Europe and the refusal of Canada and South Africa to collaborate in any Commonwealth defence policy.

Foreign Secretary Bevin emerges as the hero in this book. In the face of seemingly overwhelming difficulties, Bevin clung tenaciously to the belief that eventually the United States would come round to the British view of the dangers of Soviet expansionism, and would then bring its immense resources to the assistance of Western Europe. He could see no alternative to close cooperation with the United States, and with this, given Britain's appalling problems in this period, it is difficult to disagree. It was greatly to Bevin's credit that he skilfully played for time in 1946 and 1947 while the United States moved gradually towards intervention. Of course, without the assistance (albeit unwitting) of Stalin, the process might have taken much longer than it did. Soviet actions, culminating in the Berlin blockade, finally convinced an already suspicious Truman of Soviet malevolence, and there followed Marshall Aid and the North Atlantic Alliance, Bevin's 'most important and lasting achievement' (p. 131).

Bevin does not emerge from this account as an uncompromising cold warrior. He resisted Chiefs of Staff schemes for the setting up of a British Central Intelligence Agency, and rejected Foreign Office proposals for an all-out diplomatic offensive against the Soviet Union. He insisted on upholding British interests against the United States, and indeed, during the Korean War, relations between the two countries often seemed to be near breaking point over their differences about relations with communist China. The author concludes that the Labour government's 'achievements were far bigger than the country's actual strength warranted' (p. 242).

King's College, London M. L. DOCKRILL

The lion and the white falcon: Britain and Iceland in the World War II era. By Donald F. Bittner. Connecticut: Archon. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Clio, Oxford.) 207 pp. Index. £20·95.

THIS work can be thoroughly recommended as the definitive history of Britain's occupation of Iceland as seen through the former's eyes. A study focused on Icelandic sources might conceivably alter the general picture in detail. Dr Bittner, a lieutenant colonel and military historian at the Command and Staff College of the USMC, has done everything right (except in spelling a few German words and the surname of the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office). He has read all the archival sources, pointed out the gaps and tried his best to fill them by extensive correspondence with participants and others who might know. He has ordered his material rigorously to tell in lucid, interesting and often amusing fashion every aspect of this rather unusual interlude. There are maps, charts of the British occupation machinery, fascinating contemporary photographs, and an extensive bibliographical essay.

The British arrived in Iceland on 10 May 1940, unheralded, uninvited, unwelcome and understrength. The period from this date until primary responsibility for the island's defence passed to the United States on 22 April 1942 is the focus of the study. But the transfer was not as clear-cut as this might suggest. Neutral American forces began to occupy neutral Iceland from July 1941. British naval and air units increased in size from 1942 and did not finally leave until 1947. Canadians and Norwegians participated in the occupation at various stages in 1940–2. The absentees were the phantom Germans, whose non-existent invasion plans justified the British preemptive strike. British decision-makers, after a prewar period of studied disinterest, had discovered geopolitics. Iceland presumably had not moved. But an

island which in 1939 had commanded sufficient interest to warrant £11 expenditure to buttress the financial fortunes of the Anglia Society, almost overnight got the full 'vital interest' treatment.

It was indeed fortunate that the Germans were otherwise engaged when a small British force of untrained marines sailed from Greenock. Their commander had received his orders at Euston station. The men familiarized themselves with inadequate weapons at sea. In Reykjavik they were met by their guides: most of the ten-strong British colony, gathered 'under the pretense of a birth in the family of the British vice-consul'. But what began as *opera bouffe* muddled through to success. The initial mission of denying Iceland to the Germans was converted by circumstance and sense into use of the island for vital convoy protection and anti-submarine activities.

The occupation provided mixed blessings. Iceland obtained port and airfield facilities, a favourable trade balance, an end to unemployment, an exacerbated housing shortage and inflation. At peak there were 28,000 British troops in a country of 121,000 inhabitants. They appeared to take no undue advantage of the less than arctic sexual mores prevailing there, killed only two pedestrians and settled all civilian claims against the occupation forces punctiliously. The promised respect for Icelandic sovereignty went by the board, but as diplomatically and infrequently as is possible with these things. The Icelandic government cooperated in drafting and distributing provisions for martial law which were never used. The British deported a few potential enemies to Britain, most noticeably the editor of the communist daily, whose best lines suggested he was a regular reader of Julius Streicher. Usually less draconian methods were applied; one young lady had her picture of the *Führer* confiscated and replaced by one of Clark Gable. The only major land battle on the island took place between two groups of Scotsmen, from Tyneside and Ottawa. Perhaps the overall relationship was best summed up by the backhanded compliment of a local newspaper: 'Iceland had been allowed more independence and better conditions of life than any other occupied nation'.

TONY SHARP

The crisis of Austrian socialism: from Red Vienna to civil war, 1927–1934. By Anson Rabinbach. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1983. 296 pp. Index. £18·70.

IN the election of April 1927 the Austrian Social Democrats won 71 of the 165 parliamentary seats, thereby depriving the conservative Catholic government of its absolute majority. By the end of February 1934, however, the party was routed, rendered impotent by the suspension of parliament in March 1933, extinguished as a fighting force in the insurrection of February 1934, but as much as anything destroyed by the confusion and self-doubt that beset its leaders. It is the story of that confusion, and the party's inability to find an answer to Dollfuss's prevarications and the increasing power of rightist paramilitary organization, that Anson Rabinbach traces in this book.

The central figure in the drama is Otto Bauer, the Social Democratic leader, a man sadly out of joint with his time. It is the author's thesis that 'Bauer's commitment to a constitutional and democratic republicanism grew increasingly unrealistic as the anti-republican and authoritarian forces in Austria gained in strength' (p. 4). Rabinbach contends that the party's 'electoral gains were illusory as long as it controlled neither the legal structure of the state nor the instruments of violence' (p. 33), and within such a context the debates and dilemmas that beset the Social Democrats as Austria staggered towards fascism are cloaked in a poignant irony. Rabinbach draws on a wealth of Austrian and German texts, including archival sources only recently made available, to give a clear analysis of Otto Bauer's personal beliefs, the Linz Programme, the Schutzbund, the contribution of Wilhelm Reich, the impact of the youth movement and the emergence of a left-wing opposition within the party that drew much of its strength from that movement, the 1933 Congress, the factions that developed along regional lines, and the final collapse of Red Vienna. It is a concise yet comprehensive account of many intertwining threads.

Events meant that by July 1927 anxiety and indecision had supplanted the euphoria emanating from electoral success earlier in the year, and from then on, according to Rabinbach, the Social Democrats were doomed. But given the circumstances of those

years—the gravity of the economic situation, which Bauer was unwilling to exacerbate with a general strike, the feebleness of the political centre, and the flight of the middle classes to the extreme right—the weakness and demoralization of the party was surely inevitable. The tragedy of Otto Bauer was that he was a moderate at a time when moderates were out of place; he lacked the stomach for a bloody fight. In Rabinbach's judgement, 'he consistently saw power, not in terms of conquest of the state apparatus, but as a long-term struggle for hegemony in economic, social and cultural life' (p. 119). But conditions were not ripe for the socialists to gain national power by peaceful, evolutionary means. The mentality and mechanisms that proved so fruitful for municipal socialism in Vienna in the years immediately following the First World War were ill-equipped to deal with economic catastrophe and the viciousness of Nazism.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Encounters with darkness: French and German writers on World War II. By Frederick J. Harris. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. 384 pp. Index. £20·00.

PROFESSOR HARRIS has written a book with two aims. First, to examine 'what kind of war it was' that has been portrayed by selected French and German writers in 'fiction, drama, and some diary excerpts and other autobiographical notations'. Secondly, 'to show just how and by what literary means they described the war'. The study is restricted to the war fought between the French and Germans and the home-front experiences of these two peoples. In recognition of my ignorance of literary techniques, at least in the way the game is played by experts, this review is restricted to the literary portrayal of war. I approach it subjectively, frequently third-hand and from the principle that I am interested in any source which offers a relatively unfamiliar perspective to heighten my perception of social and political developments in the 1940s. Therefore, it seems of no great importance whether the selections conform in detail to the historical record (although Professor Harris has interpolated the main outlines of this into his text with greater effect in the chapters on France than in those on Germany). Rather, the central concern would seem to be whether the writers' 'imagery' facilitates and/or intensifies our 'feeling' for these developments, whether, for want of a better expression, it adds emotional depth to the two-dimensional record.

The answer is unsurprisingly both 'yes' and 'no'. While Harris is to be congratulated upon introducing so many writers who have been ignored or forgotten, I found parts of the book tedious or unstructured or both. Here I would include: those units which presumably are investigating techniques; the rather rambling sections on the German home front which would have benefited from a use of Marlis Steinert's *Hitler's war and the Germans*; and the pages which attempt to quicken our interest in or show the relevance of some pedestrian and/or peripheral posturings. To be more specific, I was very surprised that Camus' *La Peste* was put down in one paragraph in the chapter on resistance, while the paedophiliac anti-hero of Tournier's *Le roi des aulnes* wanders through several pages of 'signs, which are essentially of a non-genital sexual character'. There may be some point in depicting the liberation of the French capital by a German soldier sodomizing a *milicien* prosaically on the Paris rooftops. But this really tells us more about the state of Jean Genet's mind than the supercharged atmosphere of those days, which called forth and calls for something more exceptional.

The best sections of the book were those dealing with the German conquest, French POWs, the fate of the Jews, everyday life under the occupation, and the last dreadful days of the war in Germany—ironically, depicted best by a Frenchman. I suspect that the extra pace and interest of these sections owes a good deal to the authors who are assembled to provide the source material. Saint-Exupéry, Dutourd, Doubrovsky, Guéhenno, Perret and Céline have more in common than their literary abilities, however; they also have a direct experience of events (which does not seem to be the case with all the writers studied). While one of the above group is specifically a diarist of very high quality, none of the others is writing works of 'pure' imagination. Because theirs is thinly-disguised memoir or a form of 'faction', their imagery has an immediacy and concreteness, which for me did add new dimensions of sensitivity to an often flat historical record.

TONY SHARP

The French colonial lobby, 1889–1938. By Stuart M. Persell. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1983. 235 pp. Index. $24.95.

THE colonial lobby that is the subject of this study represented a concerted attempt by various interest groups to stimulate enthusiasm for the colonial cause in the apathy-ridden cabinets of the Third Republic. Between 1889, the year of the first great Congrès Colonial, and the outbreak of the First World War, the colonial lobby was at the peak of its influence, intriguing and propagandizing for the colonial cause in the corridors of power and in the country at large. Yet even within that period the central message which the colonialists were trying to convey was sharply amended, from the *mission civilisatrice* of the early years to a much more economic, more sternly pragmatic rationale by the end of the century. In many ways it is this change of emphasis and appeal during the course of the 1890s that is the most interesting aspect of Persell's study—the decline of the Comité de l'Afrique Française, with its humanitarian appeal for empire and assimilationist belief that only complete integration into the structure of the French colonial system could answer the needs of the native populations, and its replacement as the leading exponent of colonialism by the Union Coloniale Française with its emphasis on the economic value of empire for France and French interests.

Persell shows how humanitarian values were quietly dropped, along with the interest in French language and civilization, in favour of a view of colonies as 'producing units generating their own prosperity and that of France'; how the *érudits* and businessmen from local geographical societies who supported the original Comité gave way to a much more clearly commercial clientèle in the Union Coloniale. He discusses the considerable achievements of the colonial lobby over these years, whether in their successful campaign for a separate Ministry of Colonies within the government or in their creation of an effective parliamentary group, a '*parti colonial*', dedicated to the furtherance of empire. Over a period of twenty-five years from its first appearance in 1892, the author estimates that some 167 members of the Chamber and the Senate used their parliamentary influence to help the colonial cause, and he analyses their social and economic interests, their political affiliations, and their geographical spread across France.

In this way the reader is given a most interesting profile of the lobby and its techniques, though it is a continual irritation that Dr Persell never really ventures beyond the narrow confines imposed by the lobby itself. After all, no pressure-group works in a vacuum, and its effectiveness can only be measured in relation to the political system of the day; yet of the susceptibility of the Third Republic to parliamentary and extra-parliamentary influence we hear nothing. There were other groupings which arguably made a greater impact, especially when the Radicals were in office, like the Ligue de l'Enseignement that Katherine Auspitz has studied so illuminatingly. There were other issues, like Dreyfus and anticlericalism, which occupied a more central role in French political life even at the time of the colonial movement's greatest achievements. The role of the colonial lobby would be more sharply focused, I feel sure, if the structures that are so excellently discussed in this book were more firmly anchored in the political and constitutional context of their time.

University of Manchester ALAN FORREST

Western Europe

The impossible Europeans. By Luigi Barzini. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1983. 267 pp. £12·50.

OVER half a century until his death in March this year, Luigi Barzini developed as journalist a fine record of writings that are both elegant and entertaining. These qualities remain eminently apparent in this latest book, where the author of such best-sellers as *The Italians* and *O America* focused on Western Europe as a whole. Its inhabitants are dubbed 'impossible', in the sense that over the last twenty years or so they have proved unwilling to sustain the earlier dynamic impulse towards integration among their countries. According to Barzini, their pursuit of economic coordination can now be interpreted as having fetched up in a cul-de-sac,

rather than in an avenue affording prospects of deeper union of the sort that would involve most particularly a full subscription to common external and defence policies; if progress does come, it will have more to do with reintensified fear of Soviet hegemony than with any higher idealism. At his gloomiest, he proclaims that 'in spite of the verbiage, the rhetoric, and the elegant euphemisms, Europe is no nearer integration today than it was, say, after 1815'.

The root of the problem, so Barzini argues, is the stubborn attachment of Europeans to their very diverse range of national characteristics. Thus he proceeds to present in turn the 'imperturbable' British, the 'mutable' Germans, the 'quarrelsome' French, the 'flexible' Italians, and the 'careful' Dutch (with a coda on the 'baffling' Americans, for good measure). The whole approach is based on a belief which, while having some measure of sense in it, is really stronger on plausibility than reliability. The author expresses this as follows: 'It may not be impossible to study and predict the behaviour of nations as if they were creatures with *almost* fixed characters, inclinations, and preferences'. A more persistent concern for the significance of his own qualifying italicization would doubtless have inspired a far less witty book. However, it would also have made Barzini less vulnerable to the kind of criticism voiced long ago by Mill and Tocqueville alike—that extensive reliance on reference to national character can all too easily become, in effect, a superficial paste merely obscuring the holes and crevices of an otherwise defective explanatory structure. Here, once the models have been established, the necessary nuancing tends to fade. In that respect especially, the absence of more detailed analysis of Britain under Thatcher or France under Mitterrand (consistently mis-spelt), where leaders have perceived themselves as striving to alter, in different ways, certain patterns of recent national drift, is disappointing.

This book draws on deep wells of political and journalistic experience, is rich in anecdotes, and contains a number of perceptive and challenging insights (perhaps most of all into the Netherlands and the author's native Italy). Yet, viewing it overall, one is left with the impression that Barzini could have written a better, if less neat, work had he been less enchanted by the explanatory potency of formulae based on models of national character.

University of Reading MICHAEL BIDDISS

Coalition government in Western Europe. Edited by Vernon Bogdanor. London: Heinemann for Policy Studies Institute. 1983. 282 pp. Index. £17·50.

THE difficulty of studying coalition government in a comparative perspective is that the object of study is itself conditioned by so many other elements of the political system that it is hard to pinpoint features which are exclusively characteristic of the object of study. Coalitions operate at different levels—Bogdanor distinguishes between the electoral, parliamentary and governmental levels—and they are of interest for different reasons: their impact on the working of institutions, their capacity to bridge socio-economic and other political divisions, and their effect on policy outcomes. Because of this, the burgeoning literature which appeared on coalition theory a little over a decade ago—based on models of actor rationality and decison outcomes—has rarely been of much use in comparative studies of the real world. The editor of this collection has therefore, perhaps wisely, abjured that literature in favour of a less formal, more inductive approach. The result is a richer, more varied volume than might have emerged from a framework designed to test a series of rigorously formulated propositions. It is also, inevitably, a looser volume, although Bogdanor's concluding chapter is a lucid summary of the variations in national practice which can be found across Western Europe. It would, in any case, be unfair to suggest that the book lacks a framework; coalition government is essentially about the *style* of forming governments and making policy, and style in political behaviour is an elusive, if important, concept, and certainly not one susceptible to predictive hypotheses.

The value of the book therefore lies primarily in the insights gained into national political systems by means of an approach focused on coalition behaviour. This applies particularly to those countries on which the literature is rather thin. Thus the chapters by Sarlvik (Scandinavia) and Gladdish (the Netherlands), both on the policy consequences of coalitions, are especially useful. Similarly, that by Mellors has much interesting data on the mysterious world of alliance-building in British local government. It is perhaps a pity that France, because of its presidential system, has been excluded, for while the constraints on government formation are

clearly different, the ways in which the institutions function, and policies are arrived at, are clearly influenced by party alliances.

Overall, however, this is a sound and illuminating collection, and, as the editor himself says, while it will not resolve the complex issues surrounding the debate over the merits or defects of coalition government, it will at least help to clarify them.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID HINE

The European Community at the crossroads: the first twenty-five years. Edited by Nils Ørvik and Charles Pentland. Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University. 1983. 301 pp. Pb.

An introduction to the European Community in the 1980s. By Martin Holland. Cape Town: Juta. 1983. 152 pp. Index. Pb.

ALTHOUGH both these books make the European Community their focus of interest, they are in many respects quite different. The South African book is an introductory text aimed at first year students in colleges and universities, while the Canadian publication is a collection of conference papers addressed to readers well acquainted with the EC as either academics or practitioners. Inevitably, perhaps, the latter book is uneven in quality and coverage. West Germany, arguably the dominant power in the EC, is the subject of a brief chapter of six pages, while France gets no attention at all. On the other hand Ireland, surely one of the less important members of the EC, is treated generously, with a chapter of forty-seven pages! The better parts of the book are not the country studies, but those that examine policy areas, some of which are rather tangential to the EC itself. For example, Miljan's chapter on energy is a lucid attempt to disentangle the political and economic strands in West European reactions to the Soviet gas pipeline. Solem's appraisal of Scandinavian relations with Western Europe argues that the Nordic balance, once a paragon of regional stability, is now under stress in the context of changing superpower relations as well as the sea-change within NATO itself. Stingelin's brief analysis of monetary integration, as a touchstone of political integration, portrays the European Monetary System as a pragmatic attempt to achieve a zone of 'stability' in Western Europe. But, the author wonders aloud, are we all agreed what we mean by 'stability'? Are we talking about stable exchange rates, or stable domestic prices?

Martin Holland's book is more integrated. It starts by looking at the institutions of the EC, although a whole chapter on the direct elections of 1979 seems rather excessive in a short text of this kind. There is a chapter on the various 'policies' of the EC and another that weighs up the prospects for future integration in the EC. Here, the author makes good use of opinion surveys to assess the extent of popular support for integration—although British idiosyncrasies are too readily assumed to be the main obstacle to further progress. If the section on enlargement of the EC had been longer, there would have been ample scope for identifying both the causes and the culprits of stalemate. As befits a book written in Africa there is an assessment of the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. Here the author rightly argues that 'the concessions won by the ACP states have in practice done little to alter the Community's hegemonic position in trade relations: Lomé II remains an unequal partnership' (p. 109).

Each book concludes with a theme reflecting its provenance. In the South African book there are two chapters examining relations between the EC and South Africa. One chapter evaluates the usefulness of the EC trade sanctions against South Africa and decides that on the whole these have been counterproductive—forcing South Africa either to look elsewhere for suppliers or to become virtually self-sufficient (as with armaments). The other chapter analyses the EC as a model for regional cooperation in southern Africa but concludes that, by and large, the differences between the two areas (and especially the economic hegemony of South Africa in its region) preclude adoption of the EC as a model for emulation. The Canadian book is rounded off with a look at transatlantic relations in the light of changing circumstances in Western Europe—less supranational decision-making, and new perceptions of the East–West balance in Europe. All in all, the EC is deemed less crucial to Canada than it once was; and preoccupations with the Middle East, and the Pacific rim, seem set to persist.

Queen's University of Belfast E. MOXON-BROWNE

Europe's industries: public and private strategies for change. Edited by Geoffrey Shepherd, Francois Duchene, and Christopher Saunders. London: Pinter. 1983. 276 pp. Index. £16·00.

State investment companies in Western Europe: picking winners or backing losers? Edited by Brian Hindley. London: Macmillan for Trade Policy Research Centre. 1983. 293 pp. Index. £25·00.

BOTH of these books are concerned with economic change, industrial adjustment to that change, and the role of the state in the process in Western Europe. The first volume, from the Sussex European Research Centre, confines its geographical coverage mainly to West Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom; the second, a product of the Trade Policy Research Centre, covers these four major European economies and also the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. The subject focus of the second volume is narrower, concentrating on the performance of state investment companies, such as the UK Industrial Reorganization Corporation, while the Sussex study considers the nature of the pressures for industrial adjustment and the responses, both private and public, to these pressures.

Of the two, the Sussex volume is the better and more useful. It looks at adjustment on a sectoral basis, rather than the more normal country-by-country approach (although a companion volume with a division of chapters by country is promised in the preface). The sectors covered are textiles, steel, shipbuilding, motor cars, electrical power plant construction, process plant contracting, machine tools and semiconductors. These are industries with very different prospects and problems and it is interesting to see the way in which their problems have been tackled differently in different states. It is also useful to consider government policies in this highly disaggregated framework, because it is all too easy to fall into the trap of making broad generalizations about national economic strategies which conceal a variety of different responses to the requirements of different industries. On the other hand, the editors are forced to conclude that 'the evidence of the sectoral studies suggests far more useful generalizations by country than by industry' (p. 15).

Among the generalizations by sector which can be made is the interesting observation that, with the exception of the textile and shipbuilding industries, the newly industrializing countries have not been a major disruptive pressure for adjustment, and that the 'challenge from Japan appears altogether more formidable' (p. 15). It is for this reason, presumably, that a particularly interesting and valuable chapter has been added on the role of industrial policy in Japan in the fields of shipbuilding, motor cars, and semiconductors. The conclusion is that this role is diminishing, but as the editors say, 'it would be difficult to deny the importance of heavy, broadly-based intervention in the launching of many Japanese industries' (p. 20). What appears to have happened subsequently, though, is a switch of government activity to what the editors call 'environmental intervention', aimed at providing an environment in which industry can operate profitably, rather than 'structural intervention' aimed at supporting a specific size of industry, specific firms, or specific strategies. It is this environmental intervention which they would advocate for Western Europe, though operating at the level of the European Community rather than at the national level, because national markets are too small for effective competition between national producers. Competition within a framework of environmental intervention is seen as a more promising formula than the national strategies of structural intervention, which have a poor record of success.

On the poor record of national interventionist policies, Brian Hindley would presumably agree with the editors of the Sussex volume. What is less certain is that he would agree with their alternative of EC-level environmental intervention. Although the alternatives to state intervention are not explicitly discussed, there is an underlying sense of faith in free market forces about Hindley's introduction to the Trade Policy Research Centre volume, and about the analyses of some of his contributors. There is no recognition here that, great though the inadequacies of existing forms of state intervention may be, the results of abandoning it and replacing it with no intervention at all would probably be disastrous for many of the states considered in this book. State intervention through investment companies may cause 'misallocation of capital' (p. 24), but from the point of view of the individual national economy, a greater misallocation of capital occurs when investment leaves the country altogether. There is little attempt to locate national economies within the context of a world capitalist economy in most of the studies in the Hindley volume, while the internationalist perspective is one of the strengths of the Sussex essays.

The fundamental weakness of the Hindley book is the narrowness of its focus on state investment companies. Diana Green, in the best of the individual country studies, on France, makes the point that it is difficult to distinguish the economic impact of one institution in isolation from other measures of state intervention. Nevertheless, there is a good deal of valuable empirical information in the book, which can be added to that in the Sussex study, and in several recent publications on similar themes, to build up a composite picture of national responses to common economic problems.

University of Sheffield STEPHEN GEORGE

Competition and industrial policy in the European Community. By Dennis Swann. London: Methuen. 1983. 212 pp. Index. £11·95. Pb.: £5·50.

THIS is a very useful book. Competition policy is usually treated in isolation from other microeconomic policies, and too seldom from an economic rather than a juridical perspective. Here full justice is done to Community law, but it is illustrated by cases chosen for their economic significance and recounted clearly and readably for the layman; and competition policy is widely interpreted to include the removal of non-tariff barriers from the Community's internal market and the common commercial policy's treatment of competition from outside.

Industrial policy concerns many of the same problems as competition policy, but is far too often discussed in different books by different people. Dennis Swann has, however, drawn together the disparate threads of industrial policy as part of the same web. He shows how Community policies have developed from the early 1970s, when the principal aims were to create a 'single industrial base', facilitate the cross-frontier integration of business and promote coordinated efforts of research and development, to the more recent attempts to restructure industries such as textiles, shipbuilding and steel.

The combination of all these elements inside two hundred pages of text must be helpful to students and to practitioners who need a general knowledge of Community policy as it relates to industry. Because the focus of most specialists is narrower than the scope of the book, moreover, they will find in it a review of contiguous fields about which they probably know too little. Readers who want a factual account will get it—accurately, clearly and concisely.

Those who want to explore questions about how the policies relate to the needs of the contemporary economy, and in what directions policy could or should move in future, are not so well served. For example, there is no suggestion in the section on the Community's steel policy (pp. 171–6) that we would have been better off without it, but doubt is later thrown on the desirability of such schemes in view of the need to preserve competition (p. 180). Yet it is also implied that the 'devising of detailed restructuring interventions' is a suitable activity for member governments (p. 179). The reasons why member governments are thought more suitable than the Commission for this task include their tendency in Council meetings to seek a market share for their own countries' industries (do they do this less when they make the detailed plans themselves?) and their likely opposition to giving the Commission such a role. But it is also shown that when the manufacturers of man-made fibres sought the Commission's approval for a restructuring programme under the competition policy, thus giving the Commission the opportunity to exert influence in detail, it was not at the behest of the governments but of its own volition that the Commission sat on the fence (pp. 95–6).

Neither the case for or against rationalization cartels, nor the appropriate role of the Community institutions, is convincingly analysed; and the book's analysis of the justifications for industrial and competition policies and for the Community's role in them does not in general match its strength in expounding the Community policies as they have developed up to now. But this strength in exposition is ample justification for the book.

Policy Studies Institute JOHN PINDER

The crises of the European regions. Edited by Dudley Seers and Kjell Öström. London: Macmillan for European Association of Development Studies. 1983. 176 pp. Index. £25·00.

Regional economic development and policy: theory and practice in the European Community. By David Pinder. London: Allen & Unwin for University Association for Contemporary European Studies. 1983. 130 pp. Index. (Studies on Contemporary Europe; No. 5.) £10·95; $24.95. Pb.: £4·95; $10.95.

ALTHOUGH they both discuss regional economic policy in the European context, the book edited by Seers and Öström is a rather disparate collection of specialist conference papers, while the Pinder book is a succinct summary of the state of knowledge (or ignorance) about the subject. The nine contributions to the Seers–Öström book include a very brief preface and introduction by each of the editors, short accounts of Austrian, Finnish, Yugoslav and Portuguese regional development problems and policies, and longer accounts devoted to Sweden and Spain. These mainly empirical studies are followed by concluding essays on 'The state and regional social movements in southern Europe', in a neo-Marxist mode, and Cassandra-like utterances by John Friedmann on the Taoist dialectic between 'Life space and economic space'! In so far as one can discern a consistent theme, it is that of the conflict between regional development from above and from below. Most of the authors who discuss this theme regard planning and policy-making from above as undesirable and even (in the case of one of the editors, Öström) as 'obsolete' (p. 5). One of the discussants pertinently points out that 'Schaffer argues that public policy-making is necessarily central, top-down, sectoral and compartmentalized', but this is not discussed further.

The author of the paper on Spain sceptically comments that 'there are, unfortunately, far fewer concrete experiences than intellectual suggestions' of the 'bottom-up' approach. Gonzalo Saenz de Buruaga expounds the 'autonomist approach to regional policy' in the Spanish context, which seeks to reconcile the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches, itself no mean task. 'What this approach attempts to do is to tackle the basic problem in any organisation: how to establish a structure for the process of decision-taking, whether it is a question of planning or of administering public sector programmes and projects, which will combine the efficiency of decisions taken at the centre, controlling and compensating interregional externalities, with the efficiency of local decisions, reflecting the wide range of preferences of those most directly affected' (p. 88). This is easier said than done, as the current experiments in Spain and France (the latter is not discussed in this volume) will doubtless demonstrate. They will be none the less interesting for that, because they will introduce the politico-administrative dimension that is so often missing from both the heroic theorizing or the humdrum description of piecemeal regional action in which the geographers, economists and planners who dominate the field frequently engage. For example, John Friedmann looks to Yugoslav experience in self-management to secure the triumph of life over livelihood, yet the essay on Yugoslavia in this book does not merely give us no grounds for indulging in such hopes: it does not face this kind of issue at all.

Both books are pessimistic upon the score of overcoming regional disparities; but an incapacity to act effectively has never precluded a desire to teach the subject. Let us therefore turn to Pinder's unpretentious pedagogic text, sponsored by UACES. This is a level-headed, informative and accessible discussion of both the theory and the practice of regional economic development policies in the European Community and its member countries. After a discursive and not particularly useful introductory chapter on 'origins', the book makes theoretical headway in a chapter focussing mainly on regional disequilibrium theories. There is a useful account of the classic 'trickle down' theory of Hirschman, with ancillary remarks on the Myrdal and Friedmann lines of argument, dealing with the centre–periphery and North–South debates. Pinder discusses the role of private and public sectors in the development process, compares national strategies to correct regional disparities with those of the European Community and discusses the perennial problem of policy evaluation: 'the identification of changes that can be attributed with certainty to the implementation of policy' (p. 90). He touches on the bureaucratic and political factors that are interposed between theory and practice, but the nature of this publishing exercise precludes going any further. The book contains a useful critical bibliography.

So, the more ambitious Seers–Öström book (at an exorbitant price) does not do much more than gesture towards the strategy of self-reliance to make up for the failure of the 'trickle

down' approach, while Pinder's book fulfils its modest purpose of helping those who want a brief and circumspect account of the conventional wisdom to acquire it cheaply and easily.

University of Hull JACK HAYWARD

European integration and the Common Fisheries Policy. By Michael Leigh. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 228 pp. Index. £17·95.

WORLDWIDE, the fishing industry is in trouble. Systematic overfishing and, in some waters, pollution have depleted fish stocks and put in jeopardy the livelihoods of thousands of small communities. In south-east Asia, where the problem is most acute, the consequence could be a transformation in the pattern of food consumption from fish to meat over the next twenty years. The European diet is not fish-based and fishing is only a tiny industry in turnover and employment terms. Nevertheless the conflict for access to fishing grounds is a live issue—the cause of the only shooting war Europe has seen in the last three decades.

Mr Leigh has produced a meticulous study of the development of Europe's Common Fisheries Policy, which over two decades has striven to replace an open, and at times anarchic, fishing regime with a system of management which balances the short- and long-term interests of Europe's very diverse fishing sector. The value of the book, both for the specialist and for those with a more general interest in European affairs, is as a study of policy-making in the Community. The CFP, as presented here, was a triumph of Community spirit against the particularist interests of various member states. At almost any time in the last twenty years the odds must have been against a settlement; but persistence and skilful use (by officials as much as by politicians) of the Community's interlocking institutions produced a common policy which was finally agreed in January 1983. We have yet to see its consequences, but as an evolutionary development from all the earlier agreements and compromises it should cause no dramatic change unless fishing conditions cause a drastic revision of the quotas available.

This is an official's book, a generally cautious, straightfaced record of events. That, in many ways, is to be regretted. Mr Leigh, presumably constrained by the fact that he works for the Community, would obviously be well placed to deal with the questions he leaves unanswered. Why has the CFP turned out to be so markedly different (and more economically efficient) than its older, but wayward, sister—the Common Agricultural Policy? What is the future of the fishing industry and does the CFP provide the prospect of growth, or simply managed decline? Is the perception of the success of the policy, set out here, shared by those whose livelihoods are at stake, the fishermen of Grimsby or the Faroe Islands? These are political questions, perhaps too sensitive for any official to tackle, but deserving answers if the story of the CFP is to be complete.

Mr Leigh has produced a most useful book, which deserves to be read, but, as they say, you should have seen the one that got away.

NICK BUTLER

Ireland and the European Communities: ten years of membership. Edited by David Coombes. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. 1983. 202 pp. Index. £20·00.

THE experience of Ireland as a member of the European Community can teach us a lot about how the Community has functioned over the last ten years. As one of the smaller and economically weaker members, Ireland has tested the redistributive and regenerative policies of the Community in a particularly rigorous fashion. As an important agricultural producer, Ireland has been an almost textbook example of the benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy. As the only neutral in the Community, Irish efforts to marry its own policies with those of European Political Cooperation have forced Western Europe to think about where it stands in the East–West confrontation.

This book is welcome for all these reasons, and it is in fact the first full-length academic study of Irish membership to have appeared. Individually, the authors examine the impact of membership on Ireland in such sectors as social policy, law, agriculture and foreign policy; and there are chapters dealing with public opinion and central government. Collectively, the authors conclude that the impact has been considerable, although not always beneficial.

Economically, for example, it is clear that there are problems which the Community is either too big or too small to solve. Energy problems may be beyond the reach of Western Europe; but, on the other hand, inflation is something that only the Irish government itself can tackle. Matthews shows that even Ireland's courageous decision to join the EMS had unforeseen, and not entirely salutary, effects on the Irish economy (p. 129). More generally, he concludes that 'the solution to present economic difficulties in Ireland lies more in internal institutional and structural change than in tinkering with our relationships with the external world' (p. 132).

In a chapter on foreign policy, Laffan examines how Ireland has been involved in a much wider range of issues; in particular, how a neutral country assesses its role in relation to countries who are, for the most part, committed to fairly partisan positions on major questions of foreign policy. On occasions, Ireland has broken ranks with its EEC partners (over the Falklands conflict, for example) but there is a surprising amount of congruence among the Community countries in their attitudes towards the Middle East, Eastern Europe and South Africa. Conversely, Laffan notes that the 'most significant long term consequence of political cooperation for Irish foreign policy is that the member states are increasingly viewed by third countries as a coherent force in international relations' (p. 96).

Despite a rather mixed experience in the Community, Irish public opinion remains supportive of European integration. Coakley identifies an apparent paradox in the high support in Ireland for both national independence and European integration: 'Irish people appear, then, not to perceive any conflict between nationalist values and support for membership of the Community' (p. 61). The paradox can be resolved since it is clear that the Irish see their membership of a wider Community as the best insurance against being suffocated by their immediate neighbours.

Queen's University of Belfast E. MOXON-BROWNE

Continuity and change in France. Edited by Vincent Wright. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1984. 248 pp. Index. £18·00.

THIS collection of essays started life as an overview of the Giscardian presidency. Mitterrand's 1981 victory prompted the editor to extend its scope to incorporate a partial analysis of the early years of the socialist presidency, the better to assess the nature and extent of *le changement*. The authors have responded with varying enthusiasm to this new challenge, and the overall effect is uneven. Some chapters have visibly had bits tacked on; some have made a greater effort to take in an analysis of 1981–3. And, inevitably, when these latter have attempted a provisional conclusion, some of their points are already slightly dated. It would probably have been better to confine the scope purely to the Giscard years, and thus perhaps to have published the book a year earlier, for it is an extremely valuable addition to the still meagre work on Giscardism.

The chapters cover a wide range of policy areas and some of the best deal with economics. Diana Green shows with her usual clarity the largely ad hoc nature of Giscardian industrial policy beneath the rhetoric, and in a detailed case study of the 'priority action programmes' Jack Hayward illustrates how the vestiges of the French planning procedures were used as a fig-leaf to cover that improvization. He also brings out well the bureaucratic infighting which the PAPs provoked between ministries bent, as ever, on defending their corporate interests. On decision-making, H. Machin has a judicious piece on presidential advisers and P. Birnbaum a rather indigestible, statistic-littered one which repeats familiar conclusions from his earlier work. On local government reform an original piece by Y. Mény shows the failure of Giscardian strategy, which backed stagnant countryside against dynamic town; here lies clearly one of the underlying causes of the 1981 defeat.

Foreign affairs are restricted to R. Formesyn's piece on European policy which is an *attaque en règle* against Giscard for being a bad European, a mere confederalist unable to see beyond 'rigid anti-supra-nationalism . . . very much "manufactured by politicians" and the result of Gaullist pédagogy after 1958' (p. 235). This enthusiastically integrationist view suspects that Mitterrand may be more integrationist than his predecessor but concludes, doubtless rightly, that little will come of it. Wider foreign policy issues are not treated, nor is defence—an unfortunate gap, given the growing suspicion that Mitterrand is more of an Atlanticist than his conservative predecessor. But there are compensations in the shape of a very clear analysis

of the media by R. Kuhn, which genuinely spans both regimes and a brief but informative overview of social policy by X. Gardette.

Perhaps the most useful essay is the editor's long overview, which examines both presidents across a whole range of issues. Such synoptic essays are notoriously hard to write. This one is detailed, informative and judicious in its conclusions. It is hard to dispute its verdict, which all the other papers endorse in their way, that 'the break with the past is not as radical as government rhetoric would claim or opposition spokesmen fear' (p. 74). But these are still early days, and while awaiting Dr Wright's views on Mitterrand's performance some time around 1990, the serious student of French politics and the interested general reader will both gain much from this book, which is undoubtedly the most comprehensive one yet to appear on the Giscard years.

University of Reading DAVID HANLEY

The Thatcher government. By Peter Riddell. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1983. 262 pp. Index. £15·00. Pb.: £5·95.

The new British political system: government and society in the 1980s. By Ian Budge *et al.* London, New York: Longman. 1983. 231 pp. Index. Pb.: £5·50.

PETER RIDDELL speaks of his 'sympathy with the necessity for the broad change of direction in economic policy which began in the mid-1970s under Labour and has been sustained and extended by the Thatcher administration' but adds 'I am out of sympathy with many of the social priorities of Thatcherism'. The reader of this review should know that these are also my views.

Riddell traces current economic policy back to Healey's actions during the IMF crisis in 1976. I was in the Treasury from 1974–6 at a time when the politics of the new era began to be formulated. Ian Mikardo once paid me the compliment of asserting that monetarism was brought to Britain not by Howe and Joseph but by Healey and Dell. But the policy for which I had been arguing in the Treasury since 1974 was not monetarism. It would be better described as economic self-defence. Suddenly we were in a world in which there was only one rule: look after yourself, for no-one else will do it for you.

If I have any criticism of Riddell's book it is that the international scene is not delineated with sufficient force. The recession, the doubling of the oil price in 1979, the threatening flows of money across currencies; these factors created an environment in which keeping one's head above water was the highest expectation of British economic policy even with North Sea oil on stream. It is to the credit of the Thatcher government that at least they did that. Riddell speaks of the Tories' initial 'naïve monetarism'. I wonder how many leading Tories even of the Thatcherite persuasion really placed much credence in monetarist dogma. It so happened that some of the economic imperatives of self-defence, such as interest rate policy, keeping the PSBR down, and talking conservatively about the money supply, appeared to correspond with some of the dogmas of monetarism. If they called it monetarism they were merely following the age-old policy of British government, which is to describe one's expedients in the language of the latest fashionable ideology.

One can now argue with the benefit of hindsight that certain things could have been handled better. The exchange rate was no doubt allowed to go too high, though Riddell in making the criticism is fair enough to acknowledge that with sterling a petro-currency it might not have been possible to prevent it. Some economists argue that although unemployment was bound to rise, the policies of the Thatcher government added significantly to the total. Riddell provides some of the calculations of these economists. He presumably wishes to indicate to the reader the unpersuasive nature of these 'computer artefacts', to use his own phrase.

Given the pressures of day-by-day economic management, the claim that there was no viable alternative stands up. Labour's policy was a recipe for suicide. But Riddell cruelly emphasizes that even the Alliance *via media* was based on out-of-date experience derived from another world. The 'wets' in the Cabinet failed in two respects. They failed to provide an alternative economic policy—but here at least they had the excuse that they knew of none. However, they failed also in not doing everything possible to mitigate the social impact of the

policy on the poorest sections of the population. This is the real charge against the Thatcher government.

Riddell follows Professor David Henderson in the discovery that Thatcher is a mercantilist. How is it, he appears to ask, that a government which in appearance is so devoted to liberal economics is also mercantilist? The answer is very clear if one sees the economics of Thatcherism not as monetarism but as self-defence. We live in an age of mercantilism in which the inevitable priority of governments is self-defence, even at some cost in welfare and liberalism.

Riddell shows persuasively that however successful the Thatcher government may have been in economic self-defence, any improvement in economic performance resulting from economic policy remains unproven. Governments have to claim that the sufferings of today will be compensated by a happy tomorrow. That helps to win general elections. But despite all the claims, their policies have nothing to do with economic performance except perhaps in the sense that if people realize how serious our economic situation is they may bestir themselves to do something about it. In that psychological sense there may be a link between economic policy and economic performance. But even if we cannot improve our economic performance so as to be as rich as our neighbours, it is still a matter of pride not to be knocking on their doors begging for charity.

The new British political system is a useful and comprehensive guide to a system that should be newer than it in fact is. The book contains a great deal of information about how the system works or, alternatively, does not work. Like other such books it perhaps lacks something of the taste of politics. The authors do their best by using extensively original sources such as the Crossman diaries. Nevertheless, anyone wanting the real flavour will have to get themselves elected.

EDMUND DELL

USSR and Eastern Europe

The Soviet Union 1980–81: domestic policy, the economy, foreign policy. Vol. 6. Edited by Wolfgang Berner *et al.* New York, London: Holmes & Meier. 1983. 347 pp. Index. $39·50.

THIS is the sixth volume in a series which began in 1973, issued by the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien in Cologne. Some forty German scholars have contributed the twenty-four papers and twenty-one appendices. The writing appears to have been concluded late in 1981. In Soviet domestic affairs the 26th Party Congress, held in February–March 1981, is a focal point, and in external affairs the period covered is marked by the invasion of Afghanistan, the development of the Solidarity crisis in Poland and the NATO decision to deploy intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe.

Like its predecessors, this volume is essentially an authoritative work of record, with a strong analytical element. An excellent standard of translation has helped the series to become a valuable periodic survey and reference source in the English-speaking world. Although there is a single Western intellectual community in study of the Soviet Union, the German viewpoint of this series inevitably gives it some emphases of approach different from the American or British, which adds to its interest in the English-speaking countries.

The opening paper in the section on domestic policy sees the USSR as stable but over-rigid and thus potentially unstable due to difficulties of adjustment to changing domestic and world circumstances. Other papers in this section cover the 26th Party Congress, the domestic political importance of the 1980 Olympic Games, legal reform since the 1977 Constitution, ethnic aspects of the 1979 census returns, the Islamic populations, the 'second culture', which transcends dissent, and 'How expansionist is the Soviet regime?'

A theme running through most of section II, on the economy, is the slowing down to near stagnation of economic growth, and some of the efforts to overcome this, which yet stop short of tampering with the political–economic system. (The Andropov period showed some rise in growth rates.) Among the particular topics addressed are the degree of dependence on imports

for food, export of capital goods and technology, and directions taken by the search for efficiency.

The most interesting paper in section III, on foreign policy, concerns the difficulty of making a 'Eurostrategic' comparison of nuclear forces and the wide differences among Western sources in such comparisons. West Germany receives the most thorough treatment in studies of Soviet external relations; the other such papers are on relations with the United States, China and Japan, Indochina, and the international communist movement. The Afghanistan question is treated in its regional setting.

The volume constitutes a successful combination of reference, record and analysis.

University of Glasgow JACOB MILLER

Soviet marketing and economic development. By Roger Skurski. London: Macmillan for Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham. 1984. 190 pp. Index. £20·00.

IN Marxist theories of economic development, production has normally been regarded as paramount, with marketing and distribution at best viewed as subsidiary and frequently disregarded altogether. This attitude was reinforced in the Soviet Union by the planners' persistent pressure for rapid economic growth. On the one hand, for many years this dictated a high priority for heavy industry as against other branches; on the other, it generated an imbalance between the growth of personal incomes and the availability of consumer goods and services. In such shortage conditions, enterprises came to believe that they could sell virtually anything they could produce, and so had little incentive to pay attention to questions of marketing.

Skurski's timely book begins by arguing that this comfortable (for producers!) period has come to an end. When incomes were low, it was possible to treat consumption as a residual or buffer while protecting the all-important planned investment outlays. As a result of the system's own success, however, incomes are now much higher and consumers more discriminating. Accordingly, it has become essential to put more effort into the marketing and distribution sector, not least because further increases in productivity are only likely to be forthcoming if workers can see their efforts rewarded in terms of more and higher quality consumption: in other words, it is a question of incentives.

In his investigation of Soviet distribution, Skurski begins with a couple of introductory chapters, one on the Soviet Union itself together with some methodological observations, and the second on the role of marketing in economic development. He then develops measures of output, labour and capital for the distribution sector, as well as an inventory series. Interestingly, both outputs and inputs grew more rapidly than the corresponding totals for the economy as a whole; productivity appeared to grow rapidly until the early 1960s and stagnated thereafter. Chapter four's production function analysis merely confirms this general picture and helps to break down growth in the distribution sector into its main components.

After this relatively technical analysis, the remaining chapters investigate inventories and wholesaling, trends in quality of service and the current position of distribution in the Soviet economy. On the latter, it appears that despite the rapid growth of recent years, Soviet trade is still quite backward compared to other developed economies. There are fewer outlets (with correspondingly less selling space), a serious neglect of wholesaling, poor mechanization, and relatively low wages, still reflecting the sector's traditional status. Skurski is rather pessimistic about the prospects for radical change, however, and merely expects a continuation of the existing muddle, with a few marginal improvements.

Overall, this is a useful book which makes a valuable contribution to a neglected area of the Soviet economy. It is clearly written, and only a few errors remain to confuse the reader (for example, on page 82, the left hand side of the equations should be β, not X; and on page 132, table 6.1, some headings are missing). Aside from these, the book can be highly recommended to students of the Soviet economy.

University of Stirling PAUL G. HARE

Modern Soviet society. By Basile Kerblay. Trans. by Rupert Swyer. London: Methuen. 1983. 321 pp. Index. £16·00. Pb.: £7·95.

As I read this book, the words of the immortal Kuzma Prutkov kept coming into my mind: 'If you see a giraffe in a cage and the label says "Buffalo", don't believe your eyes'. Here is a book about Soviet society, which goes into much practical detail, with hardly a mention of the second economy, privilege or corruption. But as I read on, I became aware that, in spite of its faults, *Modern Soviet society* has considerable merits. Yet I am not sure who is going to profit from it. It is called a textbook and must therefore be designed for students, presumably advanced students, but they will not get the feel of the Soviet Union or of Russia from it. And they will be tempted to think that the letter of the law counts for much more in the Soviet Union than it actually does.

On the other hand, those who are already experienced in Soviet ways will find much of interest. They will know what discount to put on official descriptions of how things work. And many of them will be fascinated by the many tables of statistics. I am no statistician and can only say, as a layman, that M. Kerblay gives me the impression that he has done his homework carefully. But what is the point of telling readers that 'the Union Republics have the right to secede' from the Soviet Union without saying that in practice it is made impossible for them to do so? The amount of time the peasants on a collective farm spend working for the Kolkhoz and for themselves respectively is carefully analysed without a reference to the notorious fact that they are generally slack and careless when working for the Kolkhoz but work hard on their own plots, which are rather deceptively described as 'family farms'. Fifteen pages later there is a reference to 'the poor production of collective labour, the rather nonchalant attitude towards farm machinery not owned by the peasant himself and the high rate of theft of public property'. But it would take a very good student to put the two passages together. Many of the necessary qualifications are stated somewhere in the book, but not where you expect to find them; and they come in throw away sentences without much indication of their importance. There are no highlights.

Soviet wage differentials are given and compared with those prevailing in France, but the reader is not told then and there that some people are paid in 'funny money' which has a purchasing power many times that of a rouble in a working man's pocket, or that for Soviet citizens access to privileged sources of supply is more important than the actual amount of their salary.

It is not that M. Kerblay is a partisan of the Soviet regime. He is not even a Marxist. And his historical sections are interesting. But his approach is enigmatic and hard to pin down. Is this just an extreme case of academic *déformation professionale?*

There are a good many interesting facts to be picked up as one goes along. I did not know that even now '13% of all Jews are party members, which is twice as many as for the population as a whole'. In such a long book there are bound to be some slips, but I did not detect an undue number, though a confusion between Cossacks and Kazakhs did made me raise my eyebrows.

JOHN LAWRENCE

Soviet–Jewish emigration and Soviet nationality policy. By Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym. London: Macmillan. 1983. 185 pp. Index. £20·00.

THIS book is a well written and thorough account of Jewish emigration from the USSR from 1971 to 1981, during which decade more than a quarter of a million of Jews left the country. It is an analytical study of that movement's causes, its social, economic and political dimensions, and its consequences. Fifteen tables sum up the crucial data, concerning, among others, the distribution of the Jewish people in the Soviet Union, motivation for emigration, assistance provided to the emigrants upon arrival abroad and their original and ultimate destinations in the West.

The authors base their investigations upon memoirs and in-depth interviews with carefully balanced samples of emigrants as well as published research reports and statistical records. In addition, they discuss at some length the historical development of Soviet nationality policy and its complexities. As they explain in the introduction, their aim is to assess the correctness or otherwise of an 'extrinsic' and an 'intrinsic' interpretation of Jewish emigration. The former

tends to locate the main reasons for the emigration outside the Soviet Union, the latter in certain social processes within the USSR.

The authors first examine the modernizing functions of the Jewish minority in the Soviet Union after 1917, when 'in the arts, the sciences and the professions, in government, the bureaucracy and the Party, the percentage of the Jews was soon higher—in some spheres much higher—than their proportion in the Soviet population' (p. 12). This process continued, and as late as 1970 the Jews were by far the most highly educated national group in the USSR, having been transformed from 'a destitute community . . . with no future' (p. 15). It follows logically that the Jews in the USSR were economically very significant, if not indispensable; hence the system's unwillingness to let them go. On the other hand, the prospect of losing a good position might appear to a prospective emigrant himself a valid reason to stay put, rather than to seek an uncertain future elsewhere.

Examination of the individual motivations for emigration by the authors reveals that only just over a third of all emigrants have left the USSR for political reasons, indicating that (as earlier investigations have suggested) the typical Jewish emigrant may not be particularly concerned with developing his Jewish identity, and may 'quite simply [be] interested in a less stressful economic environment where [one] could pursue the good life' (p. 60).

This is only one of the many issues which the authors investigate in greater detail; others are no less complex. Having examined several different aspects of the problem, the authors come to the conclusion that most Soviet Jews will neither emigrate nor fully assimilate. They also believe that the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union may be of direct significance not only to the Jews themselves: if it 'continues to be supported as part of a general and concerted push towards democratising the USSR, it may even come to have world-historical significance' (p. 153).

Whichever may be the case, the book is well worth reading with care. It deals with a very important socio-political phenomenon, for which the authors suggest a fascinating interpretation.

University of London Institute of Education
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London J. J. TOMIAK

Soviet law in theory and practice. By Olympiad S. Ioffe and Peter B. Maggs. London, New York: Oceana. 1983. 327 pp. Index. $35·00.

THIS work is primarily an account of the Soviet legal system in action. It devotes comparatively little attention to the unfolding of Soviet legal theory, which has had its own exciting history and dramas. The book is uneven in texture and, at times, marked differences of approach to the subject are discernible. Both authors have taught in the USSR; Professor Ioffe has participated in the preparation of Soviet legislation during the post-Stalin era. The authors' perspective in their approach to such a vast subject can be seen in the titles chosen for the six chapters that comprise the book.

Chapter 1 treats of the 'General characteristics of the Soviet state'. The historical legal background in Russia presented no great tradition of respect for law. Two centuries of Mongol ascendancy, followed by the rule of the Moscow Princes, and then of Imperial Russia until 1917, produced a tradition of absolutism in which law was held in little regard. Lenin had much to say about revolution but less about the theory of the state that would emerge after a successful revolution.

Chapter 2, 'Soviet law' deals briefly with its antecedents. There was no organized legal education until the nineteenth century. There was no truly Russian jurisprudence; Russian legal theory was borrowed from the West in general, and from Roman Law thinking in particular. The authors' treatment of Soviet legal theory is sparse and unimpressive. Chapter 3, entitled 'Law and politics', clearly demonstrates the subordination of the former to the latter. Indeed, Marxism could yield no other theory, given its premises. Sometimes, as in 1976, the highest organs of state and Party confirm this subordination (see page 94).

Chapter 4, 'Law and the economy', is probably the most interesting, and certainly the most complicated, part of the work. The perennial difficulties in the Soviet economy are attributable, according to the authors, to '. . . the unlimited political power of the State [which] rests upon centralised ownership, while the productive use of the same ownership

requires its decentralisation' (p. 133). If this be true, a central tenet of Marxism is a major cause of Soviet economic disasters. It also means that Soviet planning law is riven by a disruptive dichotomy.

Chapter 5, 'Law and the individual', is disappointing. It is too brief, and attempts little exploratory comparison with Western ideas of human rights. Soviet law is strong on economic rights, but weak, even fragile, on such matters as the 'right' to a residence, particularly in the cities. The subject of the law of arrest is not mentioned.

Chapter 6, 'Legal responsiblity', subdivides into criminal, administrative and civil law varieties. The first two are pretty effective. Any car owner in the USSR who can avoid 'administrative responsibility' is as lucky as he is rare. Much law enforcement, particularly against dissidents, is achieved by administrative control of residence permits and involuntary treatment in psychiatric establishments, measures which tend to attract less public interest than court trials. The writers may have understated the role of the Procuracy as an agency for enforcing legal responsibility, but it cannot be gainsaid that it is singularly ineffectual when confronted with the Party or the KGB.

This book, in spite of certain imperfections in style and language, is an admirable attempt to cover a huge subject in a narrow compass. It will hold considerable interest for legal scholars. It adds to our understanding in the West of the many purposes to which law can be harnessed. Perhaps every society gets the legal system it deserves: the USSR is no exception.

G. I. A. D. Draper

The Soviet Union after Brezhnev. Edited by Martin McCauley. London: Heinemann Educational; New York: Holmes & Meier. 1983. 160 pp. Index. £14·50. Pb.: £5·50.

Leadership changes are usually momentous affairs in the politics of communist party states, and there is a good deal to be said for marking them by drawing up a balance sheet of a past leader's term of office. Such a balance sheet is provided by *The Soviet Union after Brezhnev*. The title may to that extent mislead— the distinction between 'after' and 'since' can serve a publisher well—but the book itself does a good job. What it offers is a statement of the USSR's economic, political and diplomatic situation at the time of Brezhnev's death. As a symposium it is well balanced and well organized. It will be of most use to students of the social sciences who are looking for a competent briefing work on the Soviet Union at its present stage of development, and it is consistently good at that level.

Its strength lies in the clarity with which the USSR's current problems are identified and the often thoughtful perspective in which they are presented. The ten chapters are necessarily short, and some of the best ones are unfortunately the shortest. But in a work of this kind editing is all-important, and the gain in coverage has to be allowed to compensate for the feeling which this reader frequently had that the end of the chapter had come too soon.

It would be as invidious to single out for special mention any one or two particular successes in accommodating both information and perspective in a little space as it would be to query the detail of any of these exercises in selection and emphasis. Instead I shall draw attention to a feature of the work which was presumably part of the editorial design, but which is disconcerting and raises problems of a kind which the book, with its racy 'briefing' approach, is not geared to dealing with. For most of the work we are presented with the internal problems of the Soviet Union. Even the chapter on 'military build-up' helps the reader to see that topic in terms of Soviet responses to a Soviet situation. But with George Schöpflin's chapter on Soviet–East European relations, and much more so with Hugh Seton-Watson's chapter on detente, we become concerned less with the Soviet Union's problems than with the Soviet Union as a problem for others. This opens a Pandora's box of questions about the nature of the communist movement, about the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Third World, and about ideology and power on the world stage. These are essential questions and they are, of course, germane to the subject matter of this book. But they are questions which the other authors manage not to get too involved in, because they are addressing themselves to problems of a different order. To tackle these questions head on in a work of this kind is to risk prejudging them.

Michael Waller

University of Manchester

Andropov in power: from Komsomol to Kremlin. By Jonathan Steele and Eric Abraham. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1983. 216 pp. Index. £9·95.

THE authors of this most readable political biography have been unfortunate in having their subject passing on, despite the CIA 'ghoul squad' predictions and their own inclinations. With hindsight Andropov was dead even before achieving supreme power and his successor, Chernenko, appears to be in a comparable predicament. As it is the authors cannot even sum up the short 'reign' of Andropov, though their effort is not wasted: they amassed in their study quite valuable material. Apparently they divided their tasks: Steele did most of the writing, while Abraham collected the research material, particularly the interviews. Interviews in depth, as a source material, are an American invention and they are an innovation in British sovietology. In addition they had recourse to the 'apocryphal' sources of Moscow, where Jonathan Steele worked as a journalist, and access to Radio Liberation research.

In its analysis of the most contemporary events in the Soviet Union, of the struggle for succession and of one year in power, the study appears most plausible, and all its speculations sound very rational and probable; the consummate skill of Steele in dealing with all the hypotheses so as to make them almost credible is reminiscent of Michel Tatu's Sovietological writing. There are rare gaffes—Shelepin was not an Ukrainian, but a Russian born in Voronezh who belonged to the Komsomol Mafia rather than the Dniepropetrovsk one—and the narrative is based on few hard facts. Thus, it is claimed that Andropov, or rather his ancestors, used to be called Andropian; his mother's maiden name was apparently Erinshtein, but nothing can be verified, so it must be the famous Soviet 'hearsay' demonstrating clearly that even such basic biographical details are state secrets. Though officially Russian, Andropov was detailed for work in minority areas, particularly in Karelia, where his political fate became connected with the famous Finn, Kuusinnen, who protected him even after the Russian leader of the Karelian Communist Party had been purged. Kuusinnen probably got him a job in the central committee in Moscow. Then, after a short spell in 'diplomacy' in Hungary, Andropov was back in Moscow helping to control East Europe for the ruling 'Russian Ukrainians'. In the end he outwitted the powerful 'Dniepropetrovsk' faction to become a shortlived successor to Brezhnev.

Andropov's life and work in the central committee and the KGB is surrounded by fascinating suppositions, but no one knows for certain what imprint the future leader had left on these power apparati. Curiously, his short sortie into 'diplomacy' is the best documented and possibly the most interesting period of his life. Significantly, he dealt directly with people, even though foreigners, and he became known as the butcher of Hungary, responsible for genocide. Then he became a faceless *apparatchik* for the rest of his life. But perhaps the Hungarian experience put him off mass terror, albeit his previous service in Karelia may have had something to do with this aversion. Since he did not want to employ terror he had to face the famous dilemma of all Russian rulers: how to govern a continent peopled with unruly Russians and endlessly troublesome minorities? His short months in power indicated that he thought he had found a new way of resolving that problem, but it will never be known whether his way would have worked. Hopefully the authors have ready on Chernenko material as interesting as that displayed here. However, they should wait for at least two years before publishing it.

University of Bordeaux JOHN F. N. BRADLEY

World power: Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev and Andropov. By Jonathan Steele. London: Michael Joseph. 1983. 287 pp. Index. £14·95.

BREZHNEV'S foreign policy is a sad story of decline. Replacing Khrushchev's rumbustious, unpredictable, often dangerous extroversion with a policy 'less adventurous, energetic and threatening than conventional Western wisdom proclaims' (p. x), Brezhnev was deeply but cautiously committed to Soviet national security. Nevertheless, in region after region, initial hope and success was followed by disaster: from the ignominy of having to abandon Egypt and Somalia, and being unable to abandon Afghanistan, to the expense of maintaining Cuba and the impotence of being irrelevant in the Middle East. The bitterest disappointment was the failure of detente, which Mr Steele attributes mainly to the fact that 'the United States found

the psychological and political burden of giving up nuclear superiority and accepting parity too hard to bear' (p. 49).

By the time Brezhnev (and, for that matter, Andropov) died, Soviet military power had grown, but Soviet influence had declined everywhere except in Indochina. Afghanistan 'had confirmed what a majority of Third World countries had long suspected. . . The Soviet Union is a superpower that has no hesitation in defining its security in a way that can threaten the security of its neighbors' (p. 249). This undermined what remained of Soviet moral and ideological credibility. Events in Poland showed that workers would no longer be satisfied with 'consumer socialism' (p. 114). Relations with China offered little more than peaceful coexistence. Moreover, confronted by social, economic and demographic difficulties, 'the Soviet Union is a society with a tired regime and a host of foreign and domestic problems' (p. xi).

Mr Steele does not agree with John Nott that the tired giant will strike out in desperation. Nor does he believe that only Western power will restrain it from doing so. Some fundamental positions will certainly not be abandoned: there will be no weakening of party rule, no destabilization of Eastern Europe, no American nuclear superiority, and no unilateral ideological disarmament. But the Soviet Union, like the United States, will have to come to terms with the end of superpower domination of international politics. There will be 'awkward choices between competing priorities and . . . the possibility of a radical break with previous policies' (p. 254). The prospects for the rest of the 1980s are not very encouraging.

There are two immediate reasons why Mr Steele's book is a pleasure to read: tone and style. Moderate without being apologetic, his tone is a much needed antidote to the alarmism which has latterly been a feature of both political statements and much academic writing on Soviet foreign policy. His style is relaxed and easy, a welcome relief from the high rhetoric that has characterized East–West discourse in the 1980s. But his book is also based on a variety of carefully documented sources and an analysis of both the actions and the words of Soviet politicians and scholars. It is both academically sound and highly readable. I shall certainly put it on the top of both my undergraduate and postgraduate reading lists.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

The threat: inside the Soviet military machine. By Andrew Cockburn. London: Hutchinson. 1983. 338 pp. Index. £9·95.

'WELCOME to the world of strategic analysis, where we program weapons that don't work to meet threats that don't exist'. These words of a Pentagon planner, quoted by Andrew Cockburn, are not far from the mark, according to *The threat*, which is a comprehensive, fascinating, and seemingly authoritative antidote to all the smooth presentations and glossy literature produced by the various threat-inflating agencies in the West. Cockburn's book is one which has been waiting to be written for some time, and he has done a first-rate job.

The threat exposes all the grit and shoddy workmanship in the Soviet military machine: the appalling living conditions of Soviet conscripts; the rudimentary training of tank crews; the dangers posed by Soviet tanks to their inmates as well as their enemies; the poor quality of supply and maintenance, which leads to frequent breakdowns of equipment, and long periods of disuse; organizational cock-ups during military interventions; serious ethnic problems among the troops; widespread corruption; Stakhanovite drunkenness; aircraft of much more limited range and ability than has been portrayed in the West; an exaggerated reputation for rugged weapons; unreliable missiles; unrealistic training and sterotyped learning; tactical inflexibility and low standards of initiative; a minimal re-enlistment rate in the forces, with the inevitable loss of efficiency which this implies; levels of overmanning and degrees of inefficiency which undermine numerical comparisons with NATO manpower; a tendency to copy Western technology, not always wisely . . . one could go on. And Cockburn does, supporting his case with eye-witness reports from Soviet emigrés, talks with outspoken US intelligence officers and military personnel familiar with Soviet equipment, discussions with Israeli soliders, and an examination of recent wars in the Middle East and elsewhere where Soviet weapons and methods have been used. The upshot of all this is to expose the impressive parades in Red Square and the huge naval and military exercises elsewhere as theatrical shams. Clearly, the spirit of Potemkin is alive and well and living inside the Soviet military machine.

But what is one to conclude from all this? Cockburn's main attack is directed at the 'threat inflation' which results from the military establishment of each superpower having a vested interest in exaggerating the quality, numbers, and growing technological sophistication of its adversary. Threat inflation means money, jobs, and prestige for the military-industrial (and intellectual) community—which usually gets its way, because the experts are supposed to know best. Society has to pay in military inefficiency, growing economic burdens, and an exacerbated arms race. Another target favoured by Cockburn is the American penchant for 'hi-tech' solutions, which he points out is sometimes aped foolishly by the Russians. Cockburn obviously finds congenial Mary Kaldor's concept of the 'baroque arsenal'—that is, weaponry which is overpriced, overcomplex, and unreliable. Much of the hi-tech intelligence industry in the West could be described in similar words. What might be called 'baroque intelligence', like the latest fighter aircraft, does not give value for money. Cockburn relates that Cyrus Vance once got better value from a $3 taxi ride from a Soviet emigré than he ever had from his country's estimated $15 billion *per annum* intelligence services.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

The sea in Soviet strategy. By Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till. London: Macmillan. 1983. 240 pp. Index. £25·00.

THIS is a very good survey of the subject, mainly for intelligent readers who are not naval specialists. The authors are both members, respectively past and present, of the Department of History of the Royal Naval College; apparently the book is a joint production throughout. They are not specialists on the USSR, as is shown by the absence of Russian language sources in the bibliography. That may be less important in the current context than it usually is in Soviet studies, owing to the shortage of useful documentation in Russian and to specific features of naval circumstances. Moreover, the bibliography is extensive, though reference is made in the text to only a small number of 'authorities'.

Having set the stage by describing (inevitably, sketchily) the background of politics, ideology, economics and foreign policy, Ranft and Till consider the strategic background and (very briefly) the development of the Soviet navy before concentrating attention on the inventory of warships and on naval missions. These two chapters are the longest ones, and 'The missions of the Soviet navy' may also be called the book's centrepiece; it is, on the whole, excellent. The interpretation here is 'agnostic', naval power being correctly perceived as a 'general-purpose and multicapable instrument of state policy' (p. 204), not to be contained within unduly specific formulae. The envisaged scenarios are interesting and the theme imaginatively presented. The authors are usually able to steer judiciously between conflicting interpretations, though it is debatable whether the balance always comes out quite right. In my view, their analysis of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean places too much emphasis on naval diplomacy, the 'perfectly natural intention to win friends and influence people' (p. 198), too little on the countering of the US Sixth Fleet. One might also read Enver Hoxha on how the Soviets saw the potentialities of a submarine base in Albania. 'The Soviet navy: an inventory' is also well done, but is too brief and cautious in its assessment of what may be learned from the design of Soviet warships. Important work has been done on this topic in the West, and although the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, it is hardly more so than Gorshkov's writings, which are referred to here at length. Also lacking is any systematic examination of naval bases and other facilities (as distinct from shipbuilding yards) available to Soviet warships, which is a significant omission, given the dependence of naval power on base facilities and Soviet efforts to obtain or retain them.

I observed two inaccuracies on page 46. China invaded Vietnam in February 1979, not 1978, and it is certainly not the case that 'the shortest and strategically safest route between European and Asiatic Russia is via the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean'. (European and Asiatic Russia are contiguous, and while the Trans-Siberian Railway is overloaded, and doubtless needs to be supplemented by waterborne transport, it is not evident that the railway is strategically more unsafe than the mentioned oceanic route). There is a good index, and the book is well illustrated, mainly by RAF and RN photographs.

RAYMOND HUTCHINGS

Soviet strategy toward Western Europe. Edited by Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1984. 296 pp. Index. £17·50.

ONE senses the emergence of a 'moderate school' of analysts of East–West relations, determined to carve out a coherently argued and reasonable position between the contending camps of right and left. Several of the contributors to this volume—Lawrence Freedman and Karen Dawisha as well as the two editors—have appeared in other collected volumes on related themes in the past two or three years: arguing there, as here, that the Soviet Union is not ten feet high and relentless in pursuing clearly defined objectives, nor entirely peace-loving, but rather faced with real dilemmas, uncertainties and contradictions in seeking to maintain its position and expand its influence. 'Soviet strategy is neither uncontrollably aggressive nor meekly defensive' (p. 16); 'it is hard to claim that the Soviet Union has been successful in achieving any clear-cut objective in Europe. Instead Moscow seems to have settled for the management of the dilemmas of power' (p. 5).

The nine chapters of this volume retrace relatively familiar ground in a clear and straightforward style, providing the interested reader with a good quantity of detailed information and further references on the way. The excellent chapter by Hannes Adomeit on Soviet decision-making (a revised and updated version of a paper previously published elsewhere) and Angela Stent's thorough study of Soviet economic relations with Western Europe come close to a direct discussion of Soviet foreign policy itself. Jane Sharp's contribution on Soviet aims and achievements in European arms control negotiations, from CSCE through MBFR to INF, summarizes very well both the dilemmas of Soviet policy and the often ill-conceived Western response. I found Gerald Segal's chapter on 'the China factor' a little disappointing; the counterpoint of the Asian front and the European front in Soviet eyes ought surely to extend by now to the Japan factor, if not to the problems the United States poses to Soviet perceptions of security in the Far East.

The book contains no chapter of conclusions; but its conclusions are clear enough. There *is* a Soviet threat to Western Europe; but, from the Soviet perspective, there is also a Western threat to Eastern Europe, more political and economic than military, and requiring substantial military force to counter. The USSR is not confident that it has achieved a preponderance of military power in the European theatre, in spite of its continuing modernization of its forces. It is uncertain whether it ought to be working to get the United States out of Europe, or to ensure that US forces continue to contain 'the German factor' and legitimize the presence of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. It would like to use its economic relations with Western Europe for political ends, but has too much at risk in its own stake in those relations to dare to do so. It is nonsense to suggest that the Soviet Union is about to take over Western Europe, or that Western Europe lies helpless before the Soviet threat. Western uncertainties are balanced by Soviet uncertainties; our weaknesses by their real vulnerabilities.

The message is addressed in part to a European audience, but in part to the transatlantic analysts who portray this exaggerated picture of a passive Western Europe menaced by aggressive Soviet objectives and preponderant power. The book's biggest weakness is the coyness of its references to 'those in the West who point to such Soviet advantage', 'some analysts' who give way to 'scare-mongering' about the Soviet threat (p. 4). We have here an intelligent and conclusive set of answers to the gloomy predictions of Washington analysts; but those arguments would have been sharpened by a more explicit confrontation between the assumptions of the moderate school and those of the revisionist right.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s: opportunities, constraints and dilemmas. By Mark V. Kauppi and R. Craig Nation. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 292 pp. Index. £25·00.

YOU have to feel sorry for them. There they are in 1982, all set to go with an excellent conference and book on Soviet policy towards the Middle East, and another book comes out on the same topic, and even with the same conclusions. What to do? Kauppi and Nation chose to go ahead anyway, despite the publication of A. Dawisha and K. Dawisha (eds), *The Soviet Union in the Middle East* (Heinemann, 1982). So now we have a surfeit of riches: two superbly balanced and well written books. Kauppi and Nation tried to justify their duplication by

arguing that previous books focused narrowly on specific states in the Middle East, over-emphasized the Arab–Israeli conflict, over-stressed the military dimension, or assumed a hostile view of Soviet power (pp. 1–4). That was largely true until 1982; now we have two books redressing the balance. The editors also insist that the subject needed updating for current events, but the strength of their book is in its emphasis on broader trends. And a good thing too, for the death of Brezhnev, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the splits in the PLO and the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold have all taken place since the book was written. The text is no worse for the passage of time, for one of its central points is the essential impotence of the superpowers to direct local events.

Five of the thirteen chapters are especially impressive. R. Craig Nation assesses the sources of Soviet involvement, providing a sensible and sensitive appreciation of Soviet goals of parity with the United States. Udo Steinbach analyses the appeal of Soviet ideology to the Muslim world, and while noting the conflicts, also persuasively argues that the two ideologies are not so distant as might first appear. Galia Golan surveys Soviet–PLO relations, arguing that they form a tactical component of a broader Soviet–Arab strategy. Not surprisingly, the Soviet dilemmas emerge in times of crisis: for example, in recent Soviet disarray over whether to back Arafat in a divided PLO. Malcolm Yapp continues the same theme of an incoherent Soviet policy in the context of Soviet–Iranian relations. Yapp suggests that Soviet inaction on Iran after the Shah's ejection has been due to confusing calculations regarding the Afghan problem, the Iran–Iraq war, and the new challenge of Khomeini's ideology. Finally, R. N. Lebow and J. Cooper summarize the common superpower difficulties in managing local change in the Middle East. They suggest that the American Rapid Deployment Force is 'more trouble than it's worth' (p. 279), as neither superpower finds military force a useful instrument in the Byzantine politics of the area. The conclusion may not be novel, but at a time when too many people believe the superpowers do have a useful military option, it is a conclusion that bears restating.

University of Bristol GERALD SEGAL

Finnish–Soviet economic relations. Edited by Kari Möttölä, O. N. Bykov and I. S. Korolev. London: Macmillan for Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 1984. Index. £30·00.

GIVEN the current precarious state of East–West relations it is good to be reminded that there is at least one Western country which is managing to maintain and further develop its already substantial economic and trade cooperation with the Soviet Union. Although Soviet–Finnish relations ranged from unease to hostility in the period from Finnish independence to the Second World War, postwar Finnish governments have reappraised Finland's geopolitical situation and built a comprehensive Soviet–Finnish cooperation framework which turned their small country into the 'giant of East–West trade'. Since 1974 the Soviet Union has been Finland's largest trading partner and Finland is the Soviet Union's second largest Western trading partner (after West Germany with its incomparably larger economy).

In a sense the book is a reflection of this closeness. It was edited jointly by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). The twenty-two individual papers cover all aspects of Soviet–Finnish cooperation and trade: general principles, instruments and institutional mechanisms, structure and dynamics of trade, production cooperation and joint projects, scientific and R & D cooperation, financial system, and the impact of Soviet–Finnish trade on both economies. The contributors include academics, government officials and planners, lawyers and businessmen. In addition there is a substantial appendix which contains the basic interstate cooperation treaties, statistics, descriptions of major joint investment projects and a list of Finnish and Soviet organizations and firms involved. This collectively amounts to a useful source of information and a great deal of interesting analytical insight.

As with most similarly compiled books the variety of insight gained by having a wide range of contributors is paid for by a certain amount of repetitiveness and fluctuations in quality. However, the present volume suffers from another drawback. It is in itself an exercise in Finnish–Soviet diplomacy—the notion of 'Finlandization' is mentioned only twice (dismissively by Soviet contributors; the Finns do not acknowledge its existence at all!) and none of

the contributors offers any fundamentally critical evaluation of the relationship; nothing but praise seems to have been permissible. One is left wondering whether to regard this as an evidence of the effect of 'Findlandization' or whether the Finnish–Soviet intimacy is really so universally applauded. Nothing would have more effectively dispelled the suspicion of outsiders that the former is closer to the truth than an inclusion of at least one piece produced by an opponent of the Finnish–Soviet closeness.

Finally, since the book is a rare example of Western and Soviet analysts addressing the same subject in the same volume there is a strong temptation to compare the quality of their work. In this respect the Finns have passed with flying colours. Their papers tend to be sharper and better documented (all charts and figures and three quarters of all tables are Finnish), while, with one or two exceptions, the Soviet contributions tend to be bland, repetitive and burdened by verbiage.

St Antony's College, Oxford V. SOBELL

The Baltic states: years of dependence 1940–1980. By Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera. London: Hurst. 1983. 333 pp. Index. £13·50.

IT was perhaps inevitable that recent events in Poland should serve to highlight the fate of the neighbouring Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. There is some justice in the aggrieved claim voiced by Lithuanians that they and the other Baltic republics have suffered and indeed continue to suffer greater national injustice through their incorporation into the Soviet Union. This book allows the reader to judge the extent of denationalization in these republics since the 'secret protocol' in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact assigned Estonia and Latvia to the Soviet sphere of influence. The descriptions of successive Soviet, German and Soviet reoccupations are clear. It is, however, only recently that more soul-searching explanations of the fate of the Jewish population, particularly in Lithuania, have been provided. There is something unsatisfactory about accounts which are confined to such factors as high Jewish visibility within the miniscule indigenous communist parties, making them easy prey for bands of ad hoc executioners. More generally, the tragic dilemma of resistance is summed up by the authors thus: 'The Baltic people could suspect Hitler of wanting to deport them east, but Stalin had actually started doing so. They saw no advantage in weakening Hitler against Stalin' (p. 68). This did not, however, mean that there was no resistance, and infamous Lidice was re-enacted in Pirčiupis and Audrini, putting the Balts amongst those nations to have lost 20 per cent of their population in the war.

While resistance to Sovietization second time around lasted until the fifth, largely genuine, amnesty in 1955, denationalization policies were carried out by denationalized native Balts, some of whom had emigrated to Russia, prior to independence some twenty-five years earlier. Land redistribution, followed by deportation in aid of collectivization in March 1949, all in their way served to undermine support for the 'Forest brothers' and other guerilla groups. Subsequent Sovietization of agriculture, industry, of culture and of population proceeded apace, and by 1953 Soviet rule was legitimated by the brute fact that it appeared to be here to stay. At least total national deportation and complete Russification had been avoided. The limited republican autonomy granted by Khrushchev in his struggle with the anti-party group (coupled to the 'nativization' of local parties) was further bolstered by the relative economic success of the region. Refusal to speak Russian in public and opposition to inter-marriage with Russians was a response to the massive Russian immigration in the 1950s and 1960s and evidence of growing national consciousness in a generation which had not tasted the brief period of interwar independence.

Indeed, it was the combined effects of the Russification programme and economic decline which served, in the authors' opinion, to break the consumerist-led cynicism and indifference towards national identity. The de-Russification of the Soviet Union, they maintain, was being countered by a Russification of the Baltic peoples. Paradoxically (or perhaps inevitably) the campaign appears to have backfired, particularly in Estonia, where at the end of the 1970s less than a quarter of the population sampled confessed to a knowledge of Russian.

There is a wealth of demographic, economic, political and cultural data in the book. Much of it is depressingly familiar to those knowledgeable of Soviet society and its contemporary

ills, but for a change there are some economic success stories, particularly in agriculture and allied industries. Whether it is possible to extrapolate the eventual fate of Eastern-bloc countries from the history of the Balts is not a question addressed by this book. But growing dissent, both religious and secular, must lend support to the author's conclusion that the mere existence of national republics, and the cultural autonomy extant therein, has extended appreciably their historical and sociocultural depth as modern nations (p. 261).

University of Essex GEORGE KOLANKIEWICZ

The birth of Solidarity: the Gdansk negotiations, 1980. Translated and introduced by A. Kemp-Welch. London: Macmillan for St Antony's College, Oxford. 1983. 213 pp. Index. £25·00.

THE negotiations between the Polish Communist (PZPR) authorities and the striking Lenin shipyard workers, which culminated in the Gdansk agreement of late August 1980, have been hailed as a great historical turning-point. But the signing of the agreement can now be seen to have been a largely symbolic act, fundamentally different from October 1956 in Poland's development, in that it represented at best an ambiguous and temporary stand-off between irreconcilable forces; it failed to lay the foundations for a new political order. Nevertheless, although this translation by Antony Kemp-Welch, a Nottingham University Politics Lecturer, of the full text of the negotiations and the agreement covers what is by now very familiar territory, this well presented publication is a useful teaching aid and reference work for students and non-Polish specialists.

I consider that the main significance of these documents is to remind us of the contentious and largely unresolved issues at stake during the birth of Solidarity. Kemp-Welch suggests a rather different view. He presents the historical background (but almost no analysis of the consequences) and what one can term the standard Western liberal interpretation in a short (thirty-odd pages) introduction. The Gdansk exchanges were unique as the workers were accepted as 'equal partners to negotiations with a communist state' (p. 1). They produced unprecedented concessions—the right to strike and to form independent and self-managing trade unions (NSZZs), as well as a whole host of socio-economic welfare promises. Kemp-Welch praises the Gdansk workers for their restrained non-revolutionary methods and aims as they 'did not seek to take power but to bring it within legal jurisdiction' (p. 1). He regards the agreement as a genuine and workable compromise, what in the euphoria of the time was called ' a victory for both sides'. The dominant Western interpretation of the subsequent course of events up to the 'state of war' in December 1981 was initially, therefore, that the agreement was not only morally right but, more questionably, that it provided a basis for reconciling Poland's untamed nationalism and social and religious pluralism with the minimum Soviet strategic and ideological-political requirements. But this was a false analysis of the political realities. It was no more than an optimistic hope that the national renewal could be contained within socialist limits and that the Kremlin and its PZPR allies would show unprecedented forbearance.

Everything at Gdansk turned on the definition of 'free trade unions'. Would the emergent NSZZs merely recognize the socialist constitution and thus act as independent social movements on Western lines, or would they recognize the PZPR's leading role and, implicitly, renewed Leninist direction in the future, which was the maximum PZPR offer for a peaceful, long-term outcome? For the PZPR and Soviet leadership Gdansk was only a tactical retreat, the opening shot in a long campaign to impose the latter framework on Solidarity or, failing that, to repress it at a convenient moment. Solidarity and their Western friends too often made the mistake of viewing Gdansk as a final and irreversible victory; they under-estimated the recuperative and repressive powers of the Polish communist state.

University of Bristol GEORGE SANFORD

The German Democratic Republic since 1945. By Martin McCauley. London: Macmillan for School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. 1984. 282 pp. Index. (Studies in Russia and East Europe.) £25·00.

EAST Germans, this book suggests, suffer just as much from the split personality—between the public and the private persona—as do other East Europeans. They are simply better at

hiding it than, say, the Poles. Hence an appearance of conformity which masks a more complex story of political and economic development. As leadership debates in the 1940s and 1950s had already shown, there was no lack of interest in, and commitment to, a specifically German path to socialism. What was lacking then, and is still largely lacking today, is the political strength to carry through such a programme. All the same, interest in a German solution to the GDR's problems has been revived under the Honecker regime in the greater flexibility being shown by a more confident leadership in tackling some of the country's political and economic problems.

To be sure, the pressures are still greater on the GDR's social stability. Its population's yardstick for political freedom and economic achievement is nextdoor West Germany, not nextdoor Poland or Czechoslovakia. The credibility gap between the public rhetoric of 'really existing socialism' and private aspirations is probably getting wider. Yet, comfortably from the regime's point of view, so is the gap between the two Germanies. East Germany is 'respected but not liked'. It holds no attraction for the Westerners, even for West Germany's legions of unemployed. The reverse is still true—as recent events have shown, plenty of East Germans, given the chance, would prefer to get better rewards for their labours in West Germany. But the transition from one German society to another is getting harder.

Though published before the emergence of neo-*Ostpolitik*, this book explains much of the curious blend of self-confidence and hesitation that has marked the Honecker years. It follows the familiar tale, from the arrival of the Gruppe Ulbricht in war-torn Germany in 1945 to the creation in East Germany of the economic dynamo of Comecon. Indeed, much of the story was told in the author's own *Marxism-Leninism in the German Democratic Republic*. The earlier book will still appeal more to the specialist. This book paints a broader canvas and is suited to the undergraduate audience at which it was presumably aimed. Perhaps one regret is that the seventy pages devoted to the chronology at the end were not better employed to give more space to the author's skill in analysing one of Europe's least understood countries.

EDWINA MORETON

Policymaking in the German Democratic Republic. Edited by Klaus von Beyme and Hartmut Zimmermann. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for German Political Science Association. 1984. 401 pp. Index. $35.00.

COMPETENT literature in English on GDR politics, economics and society is sparse. This is partly due to the propensity of students of Soviet and East European politics to omit the GDR from comparative studies and to the negative political image of the East Berlin regime. The GDR's achievements—among industrial states it ranks about tenth—have been economic and social. The harsh treatment of dissidents, the Berlin Wall and the mined frontier with West Germany have militated against academic and popular interest. There is also the widespread misperception of the GDR as a slavish imitator of Soviet practices.

The aim of this book is to concentrate on policy outputs, although inputs and the decision-making process receive some attention. Hartmut Zimmermann, the leading student of GDR society in the West, provides a superb essay on the distribution of power and the capacity of the average citizen to participate in the decision-making process. He also examines the impact of systems theory—so pervasive in the 1960s—on GDR thinking. The recognition by the GDR authorities that their society is still 'imperfect' has led to the 'upgrading of various forms of participation in the political system and for extending the scope for expression that they offered' (p. 10). The authorities also recognize that it is still possible in the GDR for 'acute interest situations to be inadequately perceived or incorrectly assessed' (p. 10). Zimmermann sees the GDR as a society on the move. Some of the material used is not up to date: for instance, membership of the non-socialist parties has been increasing since 1977 (p. 71); and there is the occasional misprint: Egon Krenz appears as Kreuz. These, however, are minor blemishes in a first-rate piece of work which takes up about a third of the book (not counting the bibliography).

Jürgen Strassburger provides useful information on both economic institutions and the economic policies of the 1970s. A detailed study of social policy by Helga Michalsky pays special attention to housing, health and policy towards the family. The educational system is covered by Gert-Joachim Glaessner, and his chapter provides the background to the present

discussion in the GDR on how to train scientific and technical talent. In order for the GDR to remain internationally competitive in world markets a super-elite of scientists and technologists may have to emerge. Irma Hanke contributes a very interesting overview of cultural policy. Gero Neugebauer deals with military policy, a subject of mounting importance. He limits his compass and thereby does not consider some very intriguing questions. Why, for instance, are the instruments of coercion increasing in influence at a time when the SED and the GDR have never been stronger? Hans-Dieter Jacobsen examines foreign trade and Gerhard Wettig the special problems which confront East–West German relations. Finally, Klaus von Beyme attempts to compare GDR performance within the socialist bloc and provides information which should stimulate debate. The book is rounded off with a bibliography on the GDR by Walter Völkel which is by far the most comprehensive ever assembled.

In all, this is a valuable addition to the literature on the GDR and will please specialist and student alike. What is needed now is a companion volume placing the GDR in comparative perspective in the socialist bloc.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London MARTIN MCCAULEY

Self-management: economic theory and Yugoslav practice. By Saul Estrin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. 266 pp. Index. £27·50; $49.50.

DR ESTRIN'S study of the Yugoslav system of self-management is primarily concerned with an examination of how the system has influenced economic behaviour. The focus is on the industrial structure and on the allocation of resources, and the method is to construct a model of a self-managed society and then to test the hypothesis empirically. Dr Estrin is frank about the assumptions on which his hypothesis is based. A self-managed firm is defined as 'a production unit in which the labour force as a whole takes all the economic decisions through some democratic process'. In the early part of the book he analyses cooperative decision-making at a micro-economic level under perfect competition, and then considers system-wide resource allocation under competitive self-management. It is assumed that the labour force is homogenous and that it distributes the surplus (the Yugoslavs do not like to use capitalist terms like profit and wages) in equal shares to the members of the collective. It is also assumed that each member shares the desire to maximize average earnings per capita.

These assumptions, of course, bear little relationship to the reality of the Yugoslav experience, but they are indispensable to the construction of an elegant mathematical model which shows how a self-managed economy might work—or ought to work.

Chapter 3, 'The Yugoslav environment', gives a concise account of the development of the Yugoslav economy from the abandonment of state centralized administrative planning in the early 1950s, through the early phase of self management, 1952–65, which, following Egon Neuberger, he calls the 'visible hand period', to the 'market self-management period', which began with the economic reforms of 1965. Unfortunately, Dr Estrin's account ends in 1974, with the passing of the new federal constitution. It does not take into account the 1976 Law on Associated Labour, and tells us nothing about the problems of the last ten years, during which the impact of the world recession has knocked the Yugoslav economy off course.

The reader who wishes to learn how the Yugoslav economy actually works, or why it is in crisis today, will need to look elsewhere for answers. Dr Estrin's model of a self-managed socialist society is one which will please the Yugoslavs who believe in the system, and it will provide interesting material for academic discussion among econometricians, but it is not recommended to the non-mathematically minded who do not want to know if workers' self-management can be economically efficient, given certain assumptions, but rather wish to know whether the Yugoslav system is actually delivering the goods, and if not, why not.

University of Bradford F. B. SINGLETON

Small state security in the Balkans. By Aurel Braun. London: Macmillan. 1983. 334 pp. Index. £25·00.

THIS is a stimulating monographic study of the six Balkan countries, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, and their security in the contemporary world.

The author, who teaches international politics at the University of Toronto, first considers theoretical security concepts arising from contemporary international politics, and attempts to apply them in the region from which the word balkanization originates. He concludes that current concepts, particularly functionalism and integration, are largely inapplicable to the Balkans; he therefore forges his own concept, 'concordisation', which 'involves a process that leads to a condition. The process involves the development of certain norms of conduct that place an emphasis on the mediation of intra-regional disputes and make recourse to the use of force increasingly more difficult. There is increased interaction in such areas as trade and communications but these are not incremental steps towards integration. There should be a steady encouragement of multilateral in addition to bilateral cooperation in the region. Membership in extra-regional alliances should not be allowed to impede regional cooperation. Concurrently, there should be attempts by the states of the region to limit external economic, political, military and psychological influences that would divide the region. Lastly, the process should be viewed locally not as an alternative to all types of other measures taken for the enhancement of the security of these states, but rather as a complementary one' (p. 27). He then applies the new concept to the interrelationships of the Balkan states and comes to some interesting conclusions.

In the sphere of defence and security the forces of integration are incapable of gaining the upper hand in the area: the Western integrative forces, namely NATO, are flexible enough to allow for Balkan particularities to play their full role. Curiously, Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia are also able to resist the integrative pull of the Warsaw Pact, thus giving 'concordisation' its chance. It is, however, Bulgaria which is the stumbling block of the Balkans, by not allowing the slightest *rapprochement* of the six countries which would otherwise be possible, despite historical differences and past conflicts. Economic and trade relations have the function of enabling and nurturing friendly bilateral and multilateral relations; this forms the basis of Balkan security, which in fact is rendered impossible by Bulgaria. Thus, because of its history, and the nature of its military and economic relations with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria blocks any favourable development of security and economic cooperation in the Balkans, even though the consequences of the Greek–Turkish dispute over Cyprus are not underestimated.

As a result of his thorough analysis the author comes to pessimistic conclusions, namely that the exacerbated nationalisms of the six countries will once again lead to the same state of affairs as in the past. Copious references attest to the academic competence of the author; an extensive bibliography and useful index make the volume handy as a university textbook, in addition to its value as a volume of research.

University of Bordeaux JOHN F. N. BRADLEY

Middle East

The Middle East remembered. By John S. Badeau. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute. 1983. 271 pp. Index. $25.00.

DURING 1978 and early 1979 Dr Leon Carl Brown of Princeton University recorded on tape John S. Badeau's memories. These have been splendidly edited by members of the Middle East Institute to form this personal memoir of John F. Kennedy's ambassador to Cairo. For the serious scholar, perhaps, oral history has limitations, but this book offers the incisive insights of a man who for forty-six years was absorbed in the affairs of the Middle East, and came to know many of the leading personalities in Nasser's Egypt.

John Badeau first went to the Middle East in 1928 as a member of the Dutch Reformed Mission to Mosul in Iraq, and there he encountered what he regarded as 'the sense of privilege and position' shown by the British administrators in the 'imperial relationship' (p. 18). In Cairo in the late 1930s he diagnosed what he saw as London's dilemma: on the one hand, the 'British were pushing Egypt toward parliamentary democracy, and on the other, they had continuously to interfere to prevent democracy from working, because had it worked, it would have ejected them from the country' (p. 66). In 1942 the British ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, forced King Faruq to allow a Wafd government, and, in Badeau's view, this

brought about a period of stability which lasted until 1945. At that time Badeau returned as president of the American University in Cairo. He recalled that Lampson was not popular with the American group who regarded him as a domineering figure that fitted their preconception of a British imperialist. But the Egyptians were not affected in the same way: they expected this sort of behaviour from the British. Badeau argues that in the immediate post-1945 period the Egyptian campaign was directed against Britain, and the Palestine question was seen by the Egyptians as yet another instance of the consequences of a British imperial presence. Blame for the defeat of the Egyptian army in 1948 was partly placed on Britain for not building up the Egyptian army to strength, and partly on the king.

It was not until the rise of Nasser that 'the Egyptians began to talk much about their Arabism' (p. 113). Nasser's relations with the United States, chilled by the cancellation of the Aswan Dam loan, only began to thaw after John Foster Dulles had ceased to be Secretary of State. When Badeau was chosen by Chester Bowles as Kennedy's ambassador to Cairo, the United States had few direct interests in Egypt, with only a few companies operating there, and no very large investment. Nasser, however, was thought to have the power to harm Western interests generally in the Middle East. Badeau recalls that Nasser was not an ideologue but a pragmatist borrowing from both the communist and capitalist systems. Unlike Nasser's principal Western biographers, Anthony Nutting and Robert Stephens, Badeau attaches little importance to *The philosopy of the revolution*, and feels that it was almost certainly written by the newspaper editor, Haikal. Haikal's *Al-Ahram* articles, in the view of the American embassy, did not represent 'the considered mind of the central government or of Nasser himself' (p. 237). Badeau and the British ambassador, Sir Harold Beeley, established a rapport, and often Beeley was consulted about draft evaluations of American policy. The two ambassadors worked closely together on the issues of the war in the Yemen.

Perhaps the most significant section of the book is the account of the ambassadorship in Cairo. Although that was a relatively calm period in American–Egyptian relations, this is nevertheless an important work for students of Middle Eastern history.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth RITCHIE OVENDALE

Images of the Arab future. By Ismail-Sabri Abdalla *et al.* Trans. by Maissa Talaat. London: Pinter for United Nations University. 1983. 242 pp. Index. £16·50.

ONE especial significance attaching to this book, the joint work of four Egyptian social scientists, is that it is the first product of 'Arab Alternative Futures' (itself the first regional product of the United Nations University). It comprises three parts. The first summarizes six Western global development models of the last thirty years, each of them found wanting for the specific problems of the Arab region. The second examines a key group of specifically Arab strategy documents produced between 1976 and 1980 and dealing respectively with food security, basic needs, energy options, education planning, lifestyles and joint economic action. The third elaborates on the pressing need for *comprehensive* Arab 'futures studies', methodologically appropriate and undertaken by Arabs.

A second especial merit is the authors' recognition that hitherto Arab futures studies, including those examined here, have suffered from a piecemeal, sectoral approach, tending to treat economic planning as self-sufficient, failing to relate economics to political and social realities or to come to grips with the mechanisms needed to effect a transition from the actual to the desired. 'Without this connecting mechanism, strategic visions remain suspended in mid-air, with no relation to reality' (p. 152). The problem, of course, is to design and activate the necessary inter-Arab mechanism, and on this the authors disappointingly make no suggestions—beyond the somewhat glib hint that 'the citizens' democratic participation in the development process' would both 'set out the goals and become the instrument with which to achieve them' (p. 181). But they plant some helpful signposts: that 'real Arab development can only come about in the context of an overall cultural evolution'; that 'areas of conflict between national sovereignties' must be resolved and an 'overall development outlook' agreed upon before planning ('not itself a mechanism') can effectively supervene. And one can sympathize with their insistence that only Arabs, with a natural feel for their past, are fitted to investigate their future, even if there is no escape from a certain subjectivity in the choice of variables to incorporate in the resulting development theory.

The writers display (as who doesn't?) a few prejudices. Some of them are fine—like their rejection of the 'model fetish', and of GDP as the most valid index for measuring economic growth. But they also deplore any tendency to integrate the Arab economy into the prevailing world economy, let alone any idea of interdependence between the Arab region and the industrialized West. But does regional autarky make sense in today's world? And must Western suggestions that would benefit the Arabs be resisted because they would also benefit the West?

In general, though, the reasoning and the message are impressive; and all those concerned for the renaissance of the Arab world (a term which includes, whatever the writers may think, many who are not Arab) will look forward to further productions from this pedigree AAF stable. Let us hope they will bring to birth the missing mechanism which this one recognizes as essential. Let us also hope they will enjoy the same impeccable translation (from Arabic) which Maissa Talaat, though her name is misprinted on the jacket, gives this one. Her only visible weakness is the curious meaning she gives to the verb 'depart from'. But she departs from the usual one so constantly that the reader soon cottons on.

University of Exeter GLEN BALFOUR-PAUL

The tragedy of Lebanon: Christian warlords, Israeli adventurers and American bunglers. By Jonathan Randal. London: Chatto & Windus. 1983. 304 pp. Index. £9·95. Pb.: £4·95.

AN initial glance at the chapter headings and a cold plunge into the bloody events of 1982 in the first chapter might indicate that Jonathan Randal's book is highly personal, prone to journalese and definitely not for the uninitiated into Lebanese politics. Such headings as 'Does the rooster know?', 'The offhand Americans' and 'All fall down' seem to sum up a gimmicky, non-academic approach to the complexities of the region. But first impressions, as in Lebanon itself, contain only part truths.

Chapter one starts with the killing of President-elect Bashir Gemayel and the consequent massacre of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Chatila, graphically portrayed in blood, guts and atmosphere. It has the violent impact of a film opening. But, as if anticipating the reader's shock and confusion, and needing to explain his own, Mr Randal abruptly changes style and key in the subsequent chapters as he tries to unfold what he feels is relevant in Lebanon's past to an explanation of its present.

The author's use of interview as a method of historical research has strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths are that those being interviewed are recounting their interpretation of historical events, which provides more insight into what motivates major players in the conflict than a clinical look at historical fact would reveal. Interviews also help to sustain a credible link between history and the reality of the present. Its major weakness is that it can be consciously or unwittingly abused. The interviewer has the power of selecting who is interviewed, mainly Christians in Mr Randal's case, and what should be used from the interview. The basis for selection is often the need to support one's own theory.

Mr Randal feels that many of the answers to the conflict can be found by examining the relationship between the Maronites and the Druzes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For other answers he turns to the diary of Israel's first foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, written in the 1950s, where he clearly outlined Israel's designs on Lebanon which have functioned as a blueprint ever since.

As the subtitle of the book suggests, it is the Christians, Americans and Israelis who are chiefly examined and held responsible for the chaos in Lebanon. The Christians come in for the closest scrutiny and exposure. Mr Randal's reasons for this emphasis may be from personal conviction or perhaps because he feels that the role and image of the Christians have not been sufficiently questioned by a 'Christian' West not far enough removed from its imperial history of protecting Christian minorities from infidel persecution without question. His criticisms of America are strong, particuarly of Kissinger, but not nearly as strong as those of Israel, which Mr Randal conveys with a kind of tiredness as if no amount of exposure can ever alter Israeli conduct and intentions. Perhaps he should take a more severe look at America on this point.

On the whole Mr Randal is not revealing anything new about Lebanon, but he does place accepted information in different contexts which can alter the interpretation of events. There

is much to disagree with and much to commend. It is stimulating, even colourful. Bits of gossip, one-liners, anecdotes may be irritating to some readers but will be revealing to others. One is certainly left in no doubt that Mr Randal is sincere in his beliefs and persuasive in presenting them. He is also a veteran journalist and it is therefore surprising that in his summing-up about the Christians *en masse* he should ignore some of his own findings and leave himself open to accusations of naïveté which some might choose to call prejudice.

KATE E. MAGUIRE

Party politics in Israel and the occupied territories. By Gershon R. Kieval. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood. 1983. 228 pp. Index. £29·50.

FOLLOWING unexpected successes in the Six Day War of 1967, Israel found itself occupying territories on the West Bank of the Jordan river. The fate of these so-called 'occupied territories' has still not been conclusively determined by the occupying power and it is with the background to this uncertainty that Mr Kieval is concerned. Matters of Israeli foreign policy are peripheral to his internal political perspective. The fact is, of course, that control over the occupied territories has grown and become consolidated, not as part of any systematic plan but because both the Labour and Likud-dominated governments have failed to formulate—still less to implement—any permanent decision concerning the future status of the territories. This is therefore not a study of the Israeli occupation *per se*, nor of policies within the territories.

What Kieval shows is that there are both structural and political characteristics to Israel's polictical system which inhibit decisive choices. The political cause is rooted in the system of proportional representation which operates in such a way as to prevent any one party securing an overall majority. The structural cause—and the root of factionalism—is that the two major groupings, the Labour Alignment and the Likud, both originated in the merger of several predecessor parties which have continued to maintain some semblance of organization and identity within the newly formed groupings. This may well be a perfect vehicle for the expression of public opinion but it is also a perfect recipe for intense factionalism. This applies particularly to contentious issues such as the fate of the territories. In this light, Kieval examines the beginnings of the occupation 1967–9; its consolidation along the ceasefire lines 1969–73; the beginning of the process of withdrawal 1973–7; and the quest for peace and security 1977–81. This catalogue of analyses seems to break out from the antecedent framework at its conclusion when, for example, Kieval writes: 'the fundamental problem for Israel is whether it can afford to yield control over the West Bank when it fears that the creation of a Palestinian state—close to Israel's heartland—would pose a threat to Israel's very existence' (p. 195). Even though Kieval also points out that 'each issue is considered in terms of its ultimate impact on the government's political survival' (p. 195), it is difficult not to conclude that Ranke's 'primacy of foreign policy' plays more of a part than is allowed for here.

This book was written before the war in Lebanon and Mr Begin's withdrawal from office. It nevertheless has enduring value and interest as a fascinating analysis of the interplay of domestic and foreign policy.

University of Warwick LIONEL KOCHAN

The roots of Begin's success. Edited by Dan Caspi, Abraham Diskin and Emanuel Gutmann. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1983. 297 pp. Index. £16·95.

HISTORY does repeat itself, observed Karl Marx, the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. And so it was with Menachem Begin's two electoral victories, first in 1977 and then in 1981. In the light of this renewed, if exceedingly narrow and unexpected, victory, it is no longer possible to write off the 1977 swing from the Labour Alignment to the Likud as a one-off episode, or to regard the Begin phenomenon as a temporary aberration from the natural course of Israeli history. It is the great merit of the present volume that it not only provides an intensive study of the 1981 election but also places the results of this election in the broader context of structural, social and economic change. Three principal factors are

identified as working in favour of the Likud: ethnicity, age and religious observance. Widespread support among the oriental Jews, the young and the religiously inclined, to which the Likud owed its rise to power, also constituted the relatively stable basis of the new dominant party.

The editors and contributors to this volume are all Israeli academics from a variety of disciplines—political science, sociology, communications—but with a common interest in psephology. They examine the 1981 election from different angles, including two articles on the ethnic factor, one on the National Religious Party, one on the Arab vote, one on the impact of pre-election polls and two separate articles on the role of the media. Readers of *International Affairs* will be particularly interested in Yoram Peri's article 'Coexistence or hegemony? Shifts in the Israeli security concept'. Despite the ambiguity in the title, Peri leaves no room for doubt that hegemony rather than coexistence with the Arab world is the aim of the Likud's security policy and that Labour's concept of preventive war has been replaced by a new concept of war as an instrument for attaining national objectives, as exemplified by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Without exception, the contributions to this volume are based on very detailed and thorough research, the results of which are presented in a compact and scholarly fashion and with an elaborate apparatus of statistics, tables, graphs and all manner of quantitative data. This does not make for easy reading, while the editing and proof-reading, leave a great deal to be desired.

This book deals only with Begin's success in the narrow sense of gaining and retaining power. It does not deal with Begin's record as Prime Minister. Few observers would adjudge that record, with its catastrophic mismanagement of the economy and the ill-considered and ill-fated adventure in Lebanon, to be a success. It is arguable that these substantive failures also have deeper roots in the history, composition and ideology of the Likud. It would be highly fitting, therefore, if this book were to be followed by another volume: *The roots of Begin's failure.*

University of Reading AVI SHLAIM

Jordan: crossroads of Middle Eastern events. By Peter Gubser. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1983. 139 pp. Index. £13·50.

THIS is an up-to-date and concise introduction to its subject, written with knowledge and insight. Gubser has succeeded in making the people, economy, history and politics of Jordan intelligible and accessible to the general reader, and his book, which also includes a substantial bibliography and useful statistical tables, forms a welcome addition to the Westview/Croom Helm survey series on the Middle East and North Africa.

The book's brief introduction describes the development of Jordan since 1920, and the various crises through which the country has passed since its evolution as a separate political entity. In his description of how Jordan is governed, Gubser touches briefly on a point that he deals with at greater length later in the book, namely that 'processes and institutions for the people's political expression and participation are either very weak or non-existent' (p. 2). The second and third chapters describe the country's physical and human infrastructure; here the peculiar complexities and effects of the fluctuations in area and population following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 are clearly explained. The regime's essentially paternalistic approach to regional development is mentioned (pp. 33–4), and this theme is taken up in detail in chapters 4 and 5, where Gubser notes: 'The devolution of authority to the people has long been officially envisaged, but none of significance has occurred' (pp. 115, 60–2).

Chapter 4 contains a brief but comprehensive description of the economy; it is clear from the tables on pages 56–7 that Jordan is almost wholly dependent on a combination of remittances from its own expatriates working elsewhere in the Arab world and 'budget support' from other Arab states and the United States. The boom of the period since 1974 thus rests on highly precarious foundations, and although industry's share of GDP has increased from 14 per cent in 1971 to about 20 per cent in 1979, services still account for some 65 per cent of GDP, a figure which is alarmingly high even by Third World standards.

Almost inevitably, the last two chapters suffer most of all from the constraints of the 'country guide' format. However, Gubser is particularly good on 'Abdullah's Machiavellian

grasp of local and inter-Arab politics, and his skilful manipulation of actual and potential opposition, attributes with which his grandson King Husain has also been richly endowed. Husain's staying power is a byword in Middle Eastern politics, although, as Gubser indicates in the occasional oblique and discreet aside, it is not entirely clear whose interests are best served by his maintenance in power. In this context it is worth asking if Gubser is really correct in suggesting that Washington had warned Husain in 1980 that support for Iraq in the war with Iran 'could be counter-productive'; it seems very doubtful whether there was any time in the Iran–Iraq war in which the United States was not generally supportive of Iraq. Again, on Gubser's own analysis (p. 121), it is difficult to see what Jordan might have to lose in taking this stand.

Gubser's study is sensible and illuminating, and he has managed to compress a mass of information into a short account that is neither incomprehensible nor superficial. His long association with the Middle East and his wide experience in Jordan itself are both evident in this intelligent and balanced book.

University of Durham PETER SLUGLETT

Kuwait and the Gulf: small states and the international system. By Hassan Ali Al-Ebraheem. London, Canberra: Croom Helm for Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Washington, DC. 1983. 117 pp. Index. £13·95.

SMALL states have been much discussed of late. The author of this book, who is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kuwait, approves of them and hopes that the UN will accommodate more of them. After discussing their general problems, he presents Kuwait as a model. Since Kuwait's possession of large oil resources and dependence on seawater distillation are far from typical, the meaning can only be that other oil-endowed Arab states of the Gulf should follow examples set by Kuwait.

In Muslim countries, whether monarchies or dictatorships, popular desire for representation or 'consultation' is today undoubtedly strong. The author commends Kuwait for allowing considerable freedom of speech and the press and for having instituted an elective National Assembly in 1961 and revived it after a suspension from 1976 to 1981. Popular opinion, however, is not necessarily enlightened; the author reproaches the revived Kuwaiti Assembly for rejecting women's suffrage and wasting time on minor issues. He gives figures which show that in 1980 immigrants constituted 58 per cent of the population in Kuwait, 68 per cent in Qatar, and 50 per cent in the United Arab Emirates. While many immigrants do not wish to stay permanently, the numerous Palestinians in Kuwait have nowhere else to go. The problem of naturalization and suffrage for immigrants is not discussed.

The author also commends Kuwait's aid to 'have-not' states through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. Abu Dhabi in the UAE has followed Kuwait's example in this.

In the author's opinion, the Arab states of the Gulf are not currently threatened by the Soviet Union, despite its action in Afghanistan, but could be endangered by excessively close links with the United States because of American support for Israel—a consideration clearly of special importance to Kuwait. He gives figures for the large arms purchases made by the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, mainly from the United States, and condemns suggestions that these states should equip themselves to hold the fort pending arrival of a Rapid Deployment Force. He considers that overexpenditure on arms and underattention to social problems (such as housing) caused the fall of the Shah, and that the Gulf states ought to spend less on arms and more on social services and aid to 'have-not' Arab states He places high hopes in the Gulf Cooperation Council, founded in February 1981 on Kuwait's initiative and comprising the small Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, and thinks that 'for the Council to succeed, it must avoid taking sides in inter-Arab conflicts . . . solidify its support for a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli crisis . . . expand its efforts to help the poorer Arab countries in their development schemes . . . [and] . . . aim to neutralize the Gulf and endeavor to keep the superpowers out of this very sensitive and explosive area' (pp. 83–4).

As regards social problems, the author criticizes Kuwait's handling of land speculation and the incapacity of its education system, in particular its Egyptian-model university, to train qualified manpower for today's needs.

Little is said about the most pressing problem for the Arab Gulf states, namely the Iran–Iraq war. Iraq did not consult them before going to war, but has subsequently received a Kuwaiti interest-free loan of $4 billion (p. 100) and altogether an estimated $22 billion from the Arab Gulf States (p. 65), presumably in the main from Saudi Arabia. In the author's opinion, 'Iraq must eventually be brought into the Gulf Cooperation Council if the organization is to have real strength' (p. 83). On a long-term view, this opinion seems sensible, because Kuwait needs a water pipeline from the Shatt al-Arab, and after exhaustion of its oil could have a useful function as a port for Iraq.

The book is interesting as evidence of local aspirations but cannot be considered wholly realistic. The immediate destiny of the small Gulf states seems bound to depend mainly on the Iran–Iraq war, the future type of government in Iran, and the reactions of foreign powers.

F. R. C. BAGLEY

The Iran–Iraq war: an historical, economic and political analysis. Edited by M. S. El Azhary. London, Canberra: Croom Helm for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Exeter and Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Basra. 1984. 144 pp. Index. £14·95.

THE war between Iraq and Iran has generated a substantial literature in the period since its outbreak in September, 1982. Very little that has been written has come from the pens of the uncommitted. In those cases where partisanship is clear, as in the book edited by Mr El Azhary, the viewpoints paraded can be helpful. To an extent the inherent biases of the present volume display not only a part of the motivation for one of the protagonists in the struggle, but also illustrate the difficulties in ending the conflict. *The Iran–Iraq war* takes a moderate but none the less clear stance on the Iraqi side of the fence. Of the ten individual contributions, all but two or three offer interesting but transparently pro-Iraqi reviews of aspects of the war. It is a slight problem, too, that each of the chapters represents a paper given at a conference in Exeter in July 1982, the date of the invasion of Iraqi territory by Iranian troops and a watershed in the war. A great deal of the material thus concerns itself with only the first phase of the war, 1980–2, though some updating of contributions has been effected in several chapters to include information to April 1983.

The balance of the book is heavily towards the contemporary period. Two chapters look at the historical roots of the Shatt al-Arab dispute, both well presented, albeit very brief, especially in the treatment of the principal agreements concerning the estuarine border problem. Both are also defensive of the Iraqi position and are more concerned to present evidence that supports Iraqi claims than to illuminate why the rivalries over the Shatt al-Arab boundary are so intense.

There are three offerings on the economic background and consequences of the war involved, respectively, with the oil industry, the economies of the two belligerent states, and development strategies in Iraq since the start of the war. The analysis of oil in the Iran–Iraq war is competent. It indicates the effects of the war against a deteriorating international market for crude oil and refrains from taking an alarmist position. Assessment of the economic damage of the war by John Townsend is confined to the period ending in 1982. At that time he judged that irreparable structural damage had not been done to either economy; he also foresaw that economic rehabilitation could be brought about rapidly provided that the war came to an early end.

The remainder of the volume looks at the attitudes towards the war of the Arab states and the superpowers and seeks to show the implications of the conflict for the international community. There is a well-balanced forecast of the prospects for peace by Glen Balfour-Paul as a summary to the book. He examines with some sensitivity the issues involved and the weighting that might be given to them. He concludes that the war is not essentially one of personalities but rather a working-out of a complex regional balance of power between Iran and Iraq that has subsumed other frictions within it.

Despite being somewhat dated in parts and taking a sympathetic approach to Iraq, this book provides a useful review of attitudes towards the war.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KEITH MCLACHLAN

Religion and politics in Iran: Shi'ism from quietism to revolution. Edited by Nikki Keddie. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 255 pp. Index. £19·00.

The Iranian revolution and the Islamic republic. Edited by Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund. (Proceedings of a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1982.) Washington, DC: Middle East Institute for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 1982. 210 pp.

THE story is told of an occasion some time in the 1960s when the British Embassy in Tehran had to cut its staff. There was no doubt about who was doing the most unnecessary job: a man who spent his time studying mullahs. So he was dismissed. The Americans fared little better: when the revolution came in late 1978, the CIA had only two analysts who could read Persian, and they had a hard time getting a copy of Khomeini's lectures on Islamic government.

That modern mass movements could develop with strong religious characters and could criticize existing governments in the name of religion, and with its symbols, was not surprising. The Tai'ping Revolt, the Muslim Brethren, even Solidarity, have been cases in point during modern history. What was so striking, and unexpected, in the Iranian case was that such a movement could topple the existing regime altogether and establish a state, based on religious principles and clerical rule, that has consolidated power in the following years. That such a process could take place in the twentieth century, in a society with comparatively high levels of urbanization and income, merits special attention, quite apart from the strategic importance of where Iran happens to lie.

The men, and women, who study mullahs are now back in business. Nikki Keddie and her collaborators have produced a rich, coherent, and scholarly collection on Shi'ism in Iran. It covers a wide range of topics from the early history of Shi'ism, through the doctrinal background, to the twentieth-century thinkers and the gamut of contemporary theorists including Khomeini, Shariati, and Bani-Sadr. The collection has the merit of being historical, bringing out where Khomeini's originality lies: in his conception of political power. Despite the attribution to him of the term 'traditional' and his own claims to Koranic fidelity, Khomeini is, as several authors show, an innovator.

This study is at the same time critical. Montgomery Watt questions the coherence of Shi'ism even in its initial paradigmatic period; Willem Floor, a Dutch scholar who knows contemporary Iran as well as any outsider, demonstrates the degree to which the clergy have accommodated themselves to political power; Shahrough Akhavi expounds and then calmly exposes the incoherence of the thinking of Ali Shariati, the lay preacher who did so much to bemuse Iranian youth with 'radical Islamic' ideas; Azar Tabari analyses the social and political role of the clergy, and criticizes those liberal and left-wing writers in Iran who tried to dilute the determined fundamentalism of Khomeini's thinking; Homa Katouzian assesses the concept of an Islamic political economy, showing that there is little specifically Islamic about it. The most benign contribution is that of Geoffrey Rose on Khomeini's political thought, which manages to avoid discussion of the prominent disciplinarian, or, better, authoritarian, trends in Khomeini's thinking.

This is above all a study of ideas, of the political form of Islamic thought, and of their evolution in the period up to the Iranian revolution itself. It studies not so much the specifically Koranic derivations of Khomeini's and his followers' thinking, but the evolution of Shi'ite thought since the early period. It is one of Khomeini's distinguishing features that to a degree greater than any other leader of modern history he rejects antecedents in the religious and nationalist movements of his country, with the almost sole exception of Shaikh Fazlullah Nuri, a jurist who opposed the idea of a secular constitution in the 1900s. But the specificity of current official thinking in Iran, as of the Islamic revolutionary regime itself, can be seen all the more clearly in the context of this doctrinal evolution over some centuries.

For this very reason it is a weakness of the book that by focusing on the growth of ideas it omits discussion of those social factors which themselves shaped the development of religious thought and conditioned the victory of one, previously minoritarian, strand. This volume omits discussion of a key, if understated, aspect of Khomeini's cultural revolution, namely his attempt to suppress not just 'Western' ideas, but also rival cultural and intellectual strands within Iranian culture itself, some of which predate Islam. The ferocious assaults upon 'foreign' values serve to mask the intra-Iranian dimension of what the regime is doing. It is also a limit of *Religion and politics* that it does not assess the course of Shi'a doctrine in the light of what has happened since the revolution.

The papers assembled in *The Iranian revolution and the Islamic republic* do go some way to continuing the story, with original and uniquely documented analyses of post-revolutionary politics amongst the clergy, and the attitudes of various opposition groups to Khomeini's consolidation of power. There are also succinct discussions of Iran's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as of Khomeini's view of foreign relations as a whole. If there are many topics that are skirted round—we never learn how the IRP actually functions as a party, beyond its ideological conflicts—and others that have been changed by subsequent events, this work, preliminary as it is, remains by far the best study of post-1979 Iran to appear to date.

London School of Economics FRED HALLIDAY

Africa

No shortcuts to progress: African development management in perspective. By Goran Hyden. London: Heinemann. 1983. 223 pp. Index. £12·50. Pb.: £4·95.

'THE point made in this book is a very simple one', writes Dr Hyden, 'fetched straight out of a Marxist textbook' (p. 213): there are no short cuts from pre-capitalism in Africa, or the peasant mode of production, to socialism. On strict Marxist lines, the creation of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat (the one owning, the other detached from, the means of production), and the submission of government to bourgeois values, are seen as historically unavoidable as societies evolve. Capitalism should therefore be pushed forward—as Lenin once put it—rather than held back, implying encouragement of market forces and toleration of socially disruptive and disequalizing innovations. But with Hyden the purpose of this strategy seems to be less an eventual transition to socialism, or even the raising of material levels of living—neither of which ends excites his interest—than the building up of nation states and 'macro-economic entities', capable of promoting 'national concerns' and of pursuing 'macro-economic objectives'.

The peasant mode of production (meaning the concentration of labour in substantially self-sufficient producing units) nullifies those concerns and frustrates those objectives. Not only do most people have sources of income independent of exchange relationships; in addition, they can draw material support from long-established and localized networks of mutual aid—from what Hyden terms 'the economy of affection'. And, most importantly, these affective networks, manifesting themselves as clan politics, strongly influence the uses made of state power; they become sectional pressures which the state, lacking a foundation in the proprietorial rights of a ruling class, is unable to withstand. Much of this book is concerned with the administrative consequences of the swamping of the public realm by factional interests located by Hyden in the pre-capitalist economy of affection, and with the possibilities of mitigating those consequences.

In fact, the book began life as a textbook in public administration in Africa, and the subsequent shift in its author's attention to the historical and social context of development management has not entirely changed its character. One might have expected more economic fact, and more concern with economic concepts, in a book that accepts the primacy of economic conditions. Is the state as structurally unconnected with economic production in, say, Nigeria or the Ivory Coast as Hyden, possibly on the basis mainly of Tanzanian experience, takes to be generally the case in Africa? What are the macroeconomic systems, structures and objectives to which he frequently alludes? Simply a government performing services at tolerable levels of efficiency and probity? What services? While such questions are provoked by Hyden's approach to his subject-matter, there is no denying the importance in Africa of the problem of morality in the public realm, on which his attention is concentrated, and little doubt that he is right in his contention that capitalist development is the most likely, or least unlikely, way in which this problem might be resolved. It is to be hoped that the book will be widely read.

University of Birmingham DOUGLAS RIMMER

…onnor. London, Melbourne: Hutchinson. 1983. 359 pp. £7.50.

THIS book is first and foremost by a geographer for (one assumes) other geographers. As it is being reviewed here by a non-geographer for other non-geographers it would seem sensible to indicate the value of the book in the area studies context rather than the disciplinary one, while raising some questions about it that are of interest to social scientists generally.

As to the first, it can be said that the author has established himself as a leading writer on African urbanization, having already published a standard bibliography on the subject. It is, then, no surprise that in this volume he shows an enviable command of an enormous literature which extends well beyond the narrowly geographical and that this book brings together a great deal of material in a form useful to the non-specialist. This reviewer found particularly useful, for example, the material on ethnic groups (the whole of chapter 4 and parts of chapter 7) and the material on rural-urban migration (chapter 3). Others will doubtless find helpful the discussion of economic sectors (chapter 5) and housing (chapter 6). With reference to the analysis, however, one can have doubts, both at the level of specific concepts and more generally with the emphasis on spatial distributions. Dr O'Connor relies quite heavily in places on a terminology of functions and systems, the utility of which is surely questionable and which may even be misleading. Does the concentration of medical services in cities 'reflect the function of cities as central places for service provision' (p. 277), or is it really an effect of rather more sordid factors like professional group power, status hierarchies and the like? Again, in Dr O'Connor's remarks on the 'international urban system' it is not really clear whether this is an effect of an international economic system or whether such a system is a genuinely autonomous level of international social organization.

The last point perhaps indicates the more general difficulty this reviewer has with the stress on spatial distribution of social activities. In chapter 9, on urban–rural relationships, for example, goods, ideas, power and authority are all conceptualized as flows having spatial distribution. Plainly these activities all exist in space, but it is not plain that this tells us anything very much about them and particularly in what sense if any they are comparable. Perhaps these remarks are a plea to Dr O'Connor in future editions to elaborate a little more on the concepts deployed by his discipline in the African context. In the meantime this book will be a welcome addition to any Africanist's library.

TOM YOUNG

School of Oriental and African Studies, London

Arab aid to sub-Saharan Africa. By Robert Anton Mertz and Pamela MacDonald Mertz. Munich: Kaiser; Mainz: Grünewald. 1983. (Distrib. outside Germany, Austria and Switzerland by Westview, Boulder, Col.) 287 pp. Pb.: $21.00.

THE quadrupling of oil prices in 1973–4 increased the financial resources available to Arab states for use in their pursuit of specific national interests. Afro-Arab cooperation entered a new phase with the increase in financial aid after 1973. This study concentrates on the objectives and motives of Arab aid donors between 1973 and 1980; it looks at both bilateral and multilateral aid and is based on detailed statistical evidence covering total aid flows and the geographical distribution of lending.

The authors conclude that political interests take precedence over economic, humanitarian and religious considerations for both bilateral and multilateral lending. Eighty-five per cent of Arab lending is through bilateral channels, thus reinforcing this political interpretation of aid giving. The aid programmes of Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are analysed, with emphasis on the relationship between foreign policy and economic aid and the role of Islam in foreign policy. Apart from Algeria, the promotion of Islam was found to be an important determinant of donor policies. Most aid has been given to Arab League members and the recipients of various individual donors' assistance have been those countries of greatest interest to the specific donor. States retaining diplomatic and/or non-diplomatic relations with Israel have received little or no assistance through either bilateral or multilateral channels. Aid to the economically disadvantaged countries also reflects prevailing political interests.

Two types of multilateral institutions are identified: secular and Islamic. The secular institutions are shown to be a response to the political and economic environment in the

aftermath of the October War and the rise in oil prices. They were created to retain African support for the Arab position in the Middle East conflict and to provide assistance to ameliorate the impact of the rise in oil prices and to stifle criticism of these rises. Aid flows have reflected the state of Afro–Arab cooperation and the changing importance of these interests. Islamic financial institutions have given aid for economic and social development projects, social welfare programmes, educational and cultural activities and religious-oriented projects and activities.

The statistical evidence upon which the investigation rests takes up over half the text (160 pages). There are two controversial definitional issues. First, non-concessional assistance is included in the definition of aid, and secondly, commitments rather than disbursements are taken as the measure of aid flows. I would be happier with these preferences if greater attention had been given to the quality of aid; particularly the 'softness' of loans and the time lag between commitment and disbursement. Further, the rather narrow foreign policy orientation means that an important aspect of the political economy of aid is neglected. There is no attempt to assess the impact of aid on the recipient countries.

Despite these reservations, this is a welcome addition to the literature on Afro–Arab relations and the detailed statistical evidence makes it a handy reference work.

University of Sussex MARC WILLIAMS

White farmers in Rhodesia 1890–1965: a history of the Marandellas district. By Richard Hodder-Williams. London: Macmillan. 1984 256 pp. Index. £25·00.

Under the skin: the death of white Rhodesia. By David Caute. London: Penguin. 1983. 448 pp. Pb.: £3·95.

THE story which Richard Hodder-Williams has told, in meticulous detail, is the story, in microcosm, of the establishment of white society in what is now Zimbabwe. It is particularly valuable in putting into perspective the relations between black and white in that country, which became such a dominant, and malign, issue in the two decades before the collapse of white Rhodesia. It is salutary to be reminded, for example, that 'the major divisions which affected political action' in the early days of this century were those between Afrikaans-speakers and English-speakers. By the mid-1920s, with whites well established, and the arguments for making more land available to blacks beginning to appear as a politically contentious issue, there was a belief, even among supporters of segregation, that Africans had a case and that they had the capacity to advance. The sticking point was, of course, political power. Interestingly, the author records the use by farmers, during the Second World War, of trained African staff to supervise the curing of tobacco while white assistants were fighting overseas but adds: 'Imported British liberalism, however, only went so far; responsibilities might be granted, but rights, especially political ones, were not.'

Significantly,the author shows that between 1930 and 1945 the great majority of white immigrants to Southern Rhodesia came not from the United Kingdom but from South Africa—bringing South African attitudes with them. Only in 1948 were those born in the UK in the majority, many of them escaping from the rigours of postwar Britain. They, clearly, had a vested interest in preservation of white privilege.

White farmers in Rhodesia is an excellent portrait of the society whose collapse is described brilliantly by David Caute. (Incidentally, in a book costing £25 one is entitled to expect better standards of stitching and binding and less careless proof-reading: 'Bulter' for Butler, 'remined' for reminded and 'agriculature' for agriculture are a few examples of this.) David Caute really can claim to have got beneath the skin of white Rhodesia in its death throes. He presents a series of pen pictures and commentaries which illustrate only too clearly why Ian Smith's Rhodesia came, and richly deserved to come, to disaster. He observes with detachment, drawing attention to the motives of the postwar immigrants from Britain who fled from austerity in search of status and power, turning a spotlight on to the double standards by which white Rhodesia lived, drawing attention to the political prejudices of the judiciary, and so on. As the dismal tale unfolds, we are reminded constantly of the dreadful background of guerrilla war which raged from 1972 until the settlement, which the author presents, with grim effect, as an antiphonal of atrocity.

Mr Caute is particularly good in his descriptions of people, paying just tribute to the

far-sightedness and courage of Garfield and Grace Todd and their daughter Judy, exposing the shallowness of Bishop Muzorewa's support, and showing in their true colours such unpleasant members of Smith's entourage as P. K. van der Byl and Desmond Lardner-Burke ('a fairly standard saloon-bar fascist'). Perhaps his greatest achievement in this study is to show the ordeal of thousands, black and white, in Rhodesia in the last four years of white rule, while the international politicians made their attempts—sadly, often ill-conceived and ignorant attempts—to produce a settlement which came at last only when the realities of power were finally understood.

Wolfson College, Cambridge BILL KIRKMAN

Swaziland: tradition and change in a southern African kingdom. By Alan Booth. Aldershot, Hants: Gower; Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1984. 156 pp. Index. £10·50.

Mozambique: from colonialism to revolution, 1900–1982. By Allen and Barbara Isaacman. Aldershot, Hants: Gower; Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1984. 235 pp. Index. $25.00.

THESE two books, which are in the 'Nations of Africa' series edited by Larry Bowman, are both so short and clearly written that they can be used either as an introduction to the countries, or, for those who have previous knowledge, as stimulating reassessments. However, they deal with two very different southern African countries—Swaziland, a geographically small, traditional kingdom with an easily identifiable national identity; and Mozambique, a great sprawling country of diverse peoples and ruled by a self-proclaimed Marxist government. Also, the authors use different approaches. The Isaacmans' study of Mozambique is a history of that country during this century, with the main concentration on the post-independence period, whereas Booth uses a broader, less chronological approach.

Booth in fact provides a very successful overview of Swaziland. He includes sections on such topics as geography, climate and natural resources, as well as the country's history and recent political and economic development. In his assessment of the past, Booth underlines the great influence of King Sobhuza II, who in his long reign displayed much skill and guile in defending the interests of the Swazi people and balancing tradition and modernity. In doing so he did not fail to enhance his own power and wealth. In balancing tradition and modernity, Sobhuza's instinct was to stress tradition, so that when in 1974 it appeared that the democratic process might start to threaten his authority he suspended the constitution and ruled by royal decree—without any apparent discontent. Sobhuza's death has left great political uncertainty, both about future power patterns within the country, and relations with South Africa, including the vexed question of land transfers.

In examining Swaziland's development, Booth states at the beginning that he will rely on 'underdevelopment theory', but fortunately there are few signs in the study of the simplistic centre/periphery analysis that sometimes emerges from such an approach. Without doubt the Swazis are subjected to external influences that are outside their control, but part of their destiny is in their own hands and Booth recognizes this in relation to agricultural development in particular. He appreciates that, as in many other parts of Africa, traditional land-holding systems and methods and the failure of governments to make farming an attractive private economic proposition are causing a crisis in food production.

The Isaacmans also recognize the problems faced by agricultural development in Mozambique. There, despite experience elsewhere, the government has tried to solve its problems by 'socialist' methods, such as establishing communal villages, appointing production councils, and collectivization. They have had little success, but what must be appreciated is that after the long war against the Portuguese the Mozambique government inherited a wretched economic position. A potentially rich country is now very weak because of its economic problem and because of the security situation in which the South Africans have raided across the border and have supported the MNR armed challenge to the government. It is weakness which has forced the Mozambique government to sign the non-aggression pact with South Africa—a development which neither the Isaacmans nor anybody else predicted. Instead, the Isaacmans discussed the possibility of Mozambique turning to its 'natural allies', the socialist countries, to resist the South Africans. It is a possibility which still cannot be dismissed.

Although the Isaacmans are sympathetic to the Mozambique government they clearly

identify the range of problems that it faces and the mistakes it has made. After outlining the long period of Portuguese rule—in which they are severely critical of colonial rule in general and Portuguese rule in particular—they concentrate on the post-independence period. They do this with considerable authority, understanding and knowledge. Yet it must be remembered that this is a book written by committed people, so that Machel's government is 'progressive', while those who oppose it are 'reactionary', and in sections it reads like a sophisticated apologia for the Mozambique government. However, the values the Isaacmans bring to their study are not indigenous to Africa. However strongly they feel the commitments, the Western values behind 'socialism' and 'feminism' are as much imports as 'colonialism', 'capitalism', and 'communism'.

University of Durham JAMES BARBER

Asia and Australasia

An introduction to south Asia. By B. H. Farmer. London, New York: Methuen. 1983. 253 pp. Index. £11·95. Pb.: £5·50.

AFTER many years as a distinguished student of south Asian geography and agrarian change, B. H. Farmer has written a general introduction to the region, embracing India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. This is to say the least, a daunting task, but he has made a tolerably good job of it.

The book opens with an overview of the natural and social environment of the region and a survey of the British period in the subcontinent. These are followed by chapters dealing with post-independence political developments, international relations and economic change. At his best, before he discusses events since independence and in the discussion of recent agrarian change, Farmer manages to put across numerous important subtleties with great clarity. His discussions of a wide array of topics are also anchored in substantive research and are well integrated with one another.

In a compact volume of such scope, a reviewer will inevitably find things to complain about. Readers who seek an understanding of south Asian culture will find this theme seriously underplayed. The author depends rather too heavily at times on the books and journals published by the Cambridge University Press. Our Marxist colleagues get far less attention than they deserve and the important work of India's social scientists and historians over the last decade is almost wholly ignored. The awakening and decay which have marked India's political history since 1966 never quite emerge from the interesting detail that is provided. And it is a great pity that Farmer has not brought his uniquely experienced eye more fully to bear upon the economic experiment in Sri Lanka since 1977 and its relationship to the twin crises of the survival of the liberal order and social disintegration in the island.

Nevertheless, there is far less to complain about than to enjoy in this book. It can be argued that south Asian (or, some might say, Indian or Hindu) civilization has proved to be uniquely resilient and resourceful in adapting to Westernization and capitalism over the last two centuries. Some would claim that its vast array of subcultures, its rather compartmentalized social structure and the processes and habits of mind which arise out of these things have made south Asia (or India) the one great civilization which has maintained its essential integrity in the face of Western norms and ways. (This can, of course, entail losses as well as gains.) It is not one of Farmer's main aims to address these issues, but a reader who approaches this book with these concerns in mind will find a great deal of useful material here.

University of Leicester JAMES MANOR

Development in south Asia. By B. L. C. Johnson. London: Penguin. 1983. 250 pp. Index. Pb. £3·95.

Land to the tiller: the political economy of agrarian reform in South Asia. By Ronald J. Herring. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 314 pp. Index. £25·00.

GUNNAR MYRDAL, author of that 'landmark for students of development in South Asia' (Johnson, p. 16), *Asian drama*, found it necessary to write a monumental three-volume work

in order to examine the complex development of south Asia; Professor Johnson manages to consider a wide range of issues in the recent development of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal in only 250 pages. His discussion is necessarily condensed; it also relies explicitly on a relatively limited number of sources. The result is an extremely useful handbook of the kind for which Professor Johnson already has a considerable reputation. The objective of providing a broad approach to the problems of economic development is largely achieved, although there is relatively little sense of the political and broader social (ethnic, religious) struggles that continue to shape and deform south Asian economy and society; the common tendency for writings on development to adopt an 'economic geography' perspective is not entirely avoided.

After a brief consideration of the colonial past, the author examines the expressions of intent enshrined in national development plans as reflections of official ideology; next, he reviews the physical environment as a prelude to an assessment of agricultural development, in which he concentrates on irrigation and the 'green revolution'. After a short discussion of land reform and settlement programmes, he considers attempts to create appropriate mechanisms for the 'delivery' of development from above and the problems facing 'bottom-up' strategies. A brief chapter on plantation agriculture precedes a relatively lengthy analysis of industrial development; the subsequent evaluation of the relationship between GNP and population—which provides an indication of per capita income and of income distribution—could usefully have been followed immediately by the examination of 'levels of living and the plight of the poor', but a review of patterns of trade and aid intervenes. The book ends with an assessment of national prospects which is characteristically understated, despite the author's evident concern for the future of the south Asian people; even in the case of Nepal, where he argues that 'it seems impossible to be other than pessimistic about Nepal's prospects, be they medium or long term' (p. 222), Professor Johnson is unwilling to make a drama out of a crisis.

The slogan 'land to the tiller' evokes the image of crude red flags in the hands of peasants confronting landlords and police in the classic conflict over distribution of the land and its product. For Ronald Herring, 'that image is one aspect of the reality in South Asia; but the issue of agrarian reform is simultaneously less dramatic and more profound than its popular image. At stake is the transformation of the basic structure, the political economy, of agrarian society' (p. 1). Thus, while Professor Johnson devotes only six pages to land reform (under the title of 'land to the tiller') in his discussion of *Development in south Asia*, Herring clearly regards it as crucial: 'the importance of land reform', he concludes, 'extends beyond rural South Asia and energizes a broader social debate on inequality and privilege, security and opportunity, and the principles of social justice embedded in social relations generally' (p. 288). It is significant that the book ends with 'The argument for land to the tiller', for the logic of his exposition takes the reader from policy models of minimal redistribution of rights in land to the potentially far-reaching 'land to the tiller', with its implications of the abolition of landlordism and rents as institutions.

Herring identifies three basic policy models: tenure reform, introduction of land ceilings and redistribution, and 'land to the tiller', but also recognizes the complexity of the relationship between rhetoric and reality, theory and practice in agrarian reform. In fact, the bulk of the book consists of detailed examination of particular case studies in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and 'each of the case studies attempts to heed Doreen Warriner's injunction that we should first ask about land reform: what did they do? and then: what did they think they were doing?'; the general conclusion is that 'each measure of agrarian reform represents the outcome of a complex interaction involving the deep political-economic structure (the strength and level of mobilisation of various classes) as distal causative conditions, proximate conjunctural political imperatives (regime interests, electoral tactics, rural violence, and so on) and the perceptual models of elites of the rural world: the prevailing understanding of what is wrong, what is possible, what will work' (p. 4). The language and rather heavy-handed 'theorization' at times should not be allowed to obscure the real value of Herring's study of the theory and practice of agrarian reform in south Asia. Unlike Johnson's view of development, Herring's not merely recognizes conflict and struggle but places them at the centre of the stage and then subjects them to careful examination and analysis.

University of East Anglia DAVID SEDDON

Religion and politics in Muslim society: order and conflict in Pakistan. By Akbar S. Ahmed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. 215 pp. Index. £25·00; $39.50.

DR Akbar Ahmed, who is Director General of the National Centre for Rural Development, Islamabad, has written a fascinating book. His stated aim was 'to attempt to discover, first what is happening in the Muslim world and second the underlying causes'. Not surprisingly, such an ambitious aim has not been achieved; instead he has written with knowledge and practical experience about the tribal and religious background of part of Waziristan, and has tried to formulate some general conclusions—or at least questions—about Muslim society. Dr Ahmed's training is as an anthropologist, and he is an honorary Professor of Anthropology at the University of Washington. He is also a member of the Civil Service of Pakistan and served as Political Agent, South Waziristan from 1978 to 1980.

The book consists of a short survey of Waziristan, its land, lineage and culture. This is followed by a careful analysis of the tensions and rivalry between Wazirs and Mahsuds in the South Waziristan Agency. Then there is an enthralling account of the emergence of Noor Muhammad, a mullah, as a key figure in the Wana area. Here we have an account of the scope given by tribal antagonisms and religious influence for a skilled demagogue to create a power base which was a challenge to the government and a danger to the peace of the area. Dr Ahmed is clearly pleased with the part he had been able to play, after the failure of others, in meeting that challenge and undermining the power and reducing the influence of the mullah.

There follows a series of case studies of threats to the peace and successes in dealing with them. There is, of course, inevitably a good deal of self-congratulation which might irritate were it not for the frank recognition of the author of the dangers which arise from an autobiographical treatment of the data. Many of these cases emphasize the patience necessary to achieve a peaceful settlement of disputes, and the importance attached to honour and the Pukhtun code of behaviour. Yet this is an area where there has been a vast influx of refugees from across the Afghan border. It is remarkable that the frontier regions have remained quiet, and that the tribesmen have been not only welcoming to their fellows, but tolerant of strangers.

After these excursions into the byways of frontier administration, Dr Ahmed returns to analysis, and faces up to such questions as who speaks for Muslim society, and what is the relationship between the Pukhtun identity and the larger Islamic identity. He draws some interesting parallels betweem the emergence of Noor Muhammad and that of Haji Muhammad Marwa in Kano in Nigeria. He asks whether the events in remote parts of Pakistan and Nigera predict future political patterns in Muslim society. He is wise enough not to attempt to answer the question, and finishes with the cautious statement that 'the formulation of questions . . . must surely remain one of the major heuristic functions of social studies'. Other writers in this field would be wise to take a leaf from Dr Ahmed's book and ensure that their own questions are formulated on a solid basis of observation and personal experience.

CYRIL PICKARD

Generals in politics: Pakistan 1958–1982. By Mohammad Asghar Khan. London: Croom Helm. 1983. 230 pp. Index. £10·95.

AIR-MARSHAL Asghar Khan begins his study of generals in politics by pointing out that in many of the developing countries, neither the politicians nor the bureaucrats were sufficiently well trained to administer their countries efficiently when independence came and power naturally fell into the hands of the army, as the only well-organized and disciplined body. In applying this general statement to Pakistan, he begins with a factual account of the assumption of power by Field-Marshal Ayub Khan in 1958. Unfortunately, his prejudice against generals is so strong that he fails to give credit to Ayub either for the way in which he rescued Pakistan from political and economic bankruptcy, or for his sincere attempt to bring the public back into the business of government by means of the basic democracies.

Ayub's successor, General Yahya Khan, was by no means an admirable person, but the author should at least have recognized that he administered martial law with reasonable liberality until he fell under the malign influence of Zulfiqar-Ali-Bhutto.

Although the fundamental cause of the secession of Bangladesh was the hostility between

the two wings, events were precipitated by the overwhelming success of the Awami League in the elections of 1970, which would have put Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman into a position to carry his Six Points in the National Assembly. Hell then broke loose in East Pakistan. The writ of the central government no longer ran there and before long the Awami League controlled the province. Yahya either had to accept this situation or to fight. He listened to the advice of his not very intelligent generals who had no idea of the difficulties they would encounter in suppressing that wing. When India joined in the war on the side of East Pakistan, the end was not long in coming. Before long Yahya was ousted and Bhutto was in supreme power and determined to crush the opposition. At this stage of the book the author embarks on a tedious account of the political struggle between his party, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, and Bhutto. The reader may well skip this and jump to where Bhutto was himself ousted by a military coup and General Zia ul-Haq became Chief Martial Law Administrator and virtual ruler of West Pakistan. The army was firmly in control and when Bhutto was hanged on a charge of conspiring in a political murder, no effective opposition remained. Asghar Khan continued an ineffective struggle until he was placed in detention.

It must be said that the author's wholesale indictment of the rule of the generals is very one-sided and his case is weakened even by his own account of oppression by the civilian regime under Bhutto. Asghar Khan's picture of the present state of Pakistan and its future prospects is much more gloomy than generally reported by foreign observers, many of whom see encouraging signs of development. This is perhaps part of the author's general lack of balanced judgement which pervades the entire book.

PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS

Spotlight on Sino-Indian frontiers. By Karunakar Gupta. Calcutta: Friendship Publications. 1982. 178 pp. Index.

Paths of peace: studies on the Sino-Indian border dispute. By T. S. Murty. New Delhi: ABC. 1983. 319 pp. Index.

DR Gupta has been studying his subject in minute detail for many years, in both India and England; he has now collected a set of essays written in the 1960s and 1970s. They fully deserved reprinting, though as he acknowledges a good deal of repetition comes in, and a complete reworking of the material might have been preferable.

He is a trenchant critic of the handling of north-east frontier issues both by the British and by their Indian successors. British claims were bolstered, on his showing, by methods akin to the *pia fraus* frequently resorted to by the medieval Church when it had property claims to make good. The gravamen of his charges is that Sir Olaf Caroe in the Foreign Department withdrew, with official sanction, all the copies he could find of Volume XIV, published in 1929, of *Aitchison's Treaties*, the standard authority, and replaced it with 'a faked version', intended to prove that the 'MacMahon Line' proposed at the Simla Conference in 1914 had been accepted as binding on Tibet and India, even though not ratified by China (pp. 29–30). This allegation is fully supported by Sourin Roy, a retired Deputy Director of the National Archives, in an introductory essay: he speaks of Caroe's action as 'a daring and unscrupulous act of forgery' (pp. 3–4). Sir Charles Bell, who had been MacMahon's assistant at the Simla Conference, is taxed with similar distortion in his book on Tibet; another culprit is the Sir Hugh Richardson who did his best to bowdlerize the old feudal Tibet into a larger Shangrila. There were some officials of higher calibre; Sir Henry Twynam 'emerged as the main protagonist of the "moderate" school', and crossed swords with Caroe in 1959 when the trouble with China was brewing (p. 148). But Nehru's government was badly served by the historical division of its foreign ministry, and took the British claims on trust. Sir H. A. F. Rumbold, formerly of the India Office, commented later on that British notions had been at the outset quite flexible, but independent India 'elevated lines drawn by cartographers into status symbols with the sanctity of Holy Writ' (pp. 159–60).

T. S. Murty's book is likewise a collection, of a dozen essays or lectures composed between 1964 and 1980. He has a distinguished record of thirty years of frontier service and much academic work and writing. With this background, it may not be surprising that his approach is the opposite of Gupta's; these two books make a good complementary pair. While putting his country's case effectively, however, he is always objective and scholarly. Since independence India has been spared, he remarks wryly, 'the debilitating luxury of trouble-free

boundaries' (p. 252). He contrasts its concept of boundary delimitation, as resting on use and wont, with China's, for which a fresh review followed by a formal treaty is essential. One issue he takes up is that of whether Tibet, for ages in some sense or other a part of the Chinese empire, was ever entitled to make frontier agreements on its own; he must be right in calling it a common error to think of Tibet's status as having been always fixed and unchanging. He is critical of the British commentators who were among the first to point out weaknesses in the Indian case, like Alastair Lamb, and Neville Maxwell whose 1970 book he calls 'highly readable' but too full of 'enthusiastic agreement with China and disagreement with India as to what are the facts' (p. viii).

But the Sino-Indian controversy must leave the Schleswig-Holstein question far behind in complexity. Murty contributes to its elucidation with a group of studies of the technicalities of boundary-fixing and map-drawing, with special attention to the significance of watersheds, mountain passes, and use of pastures by flocks accustomed to migrate to and fro across international frontiers. Some other essays move further away from the 1962 war, and its causes and consequences, to historical and archaeological themes blissfully remote from such acrimonies. There is much to be learned from them about the Himalayan region as a whole, and its predominantly pastoral economy; the old kingdom of Ladakh, depending partly on the trade routes crossing it; and Buddhist or Hindu traditions and beliefs. An account of the founding by Buddhist missionaries of the monastery at Tawang in one of the contested zones, inhabited by the elusive Mon people, is of particular interest. Each essay is carefully documented: some are followed by reading lists, and all by detailed notes and references.

Both writers deplore the still unresolved conflict. Gupta observes that for a long time now India's military spending has gone up by leaps and bounds, while half its population remains below the poverty line. Murty realizes that for Indians the frontier, especially in the nebulous Aksai Chin area, has come to be 'an out-and-out prestige issue', with something like the emotive power that Alsace-Lorraine used to have for France, or Kashmir has for Pakistan; whereas China must feel more real concern over Taiwan or Hong Kong (pp. 132–3). Sooner or later we must hope to see one side, or both, emulate Hotspur, haggling over the map of England with Glendower and ready to 'cavil on the ninth part of a hair', but to 'give thrice so much land To any well-deserving friend'.

V. G. KIERNAN

The fragile entente: the 1978 Japan–China peace treaty in a global context. By Robert E. Bedeski. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 245 pp. Index. Pb.: £17·50.

THE Sino-Japanese peace treaty of 1978 was in one sense salutary and long overdue. It marked Japan taking a more assertive role in East Asia, if one that followed in the footsteps of the United States; it constituted a formal termination of the savage conflict between the two countries that had lasted from 1937 to 1945; and it diminished the close relationship between the right wing of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and Taiwan. However, the treaty had to be viewed in terms of the changing relationship between the powers in the region, and the benefits or drawbacks of concluding it then became arguable. The United States under Jimmy Carter's leadership had moved towards a further reduction of the American presence in the Far East. Carter had campaigned in 1976 on the basis of seeking to withdraw American forces from South Korea; the promise proved impossible to fulfil but the President advanced towards a more positive relationship with Peking. The Soviet Union's relations with China were bad. Russo-Japanese relations had usually been cool and any suggestion of an understanding between Tokyo and Peking was bound to create greater tension. The consequences of concluding a treaty between Japan and China therefore required meticulous consideration.

Professor Bedeski has produced a thorough, lucidly expounded analysis of the treaty from every significant angle. He begins by sketching the background with discussions of the direction being assumed by American policy under Carter. Subsequent chapters explore the nature of the treaty, the development of Chinese foreign policy, Soviet reactions, the extension of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the impact of Sino-American relations, Japan's security and the United States, and defence issues involving Japan. The author sees the treaty as admirable in the abstract and even contends that but for the lack of stability in international relations the treaty 'might have been an innocuous footnote to postwar history' (p. 1). Set against the

background of Deng Xiaoping's fostering of 'an anti-hegemony united front' (p. 76) out of the various countries of the north Pacific region, the treaty assumed far greater significance. When Japan acquiesced to the Chinese insistence upon incorporation of the hegemony clause, the acrid state of Sino–Soviet relations was bound to affect Japan. The Soviet Union regarded the treaty as indicating a growing amity between China, the United States, and Japan aimed at Moscow. Soviet defences in the islands adjacent to Japan were strengthened so as to increase pressure on Tokyo. The tergiversations of American policy and Carter's concentration on the Middle East increased speculation on the extent of the American commitment to assist Japan. Soviet apprehension regarding the combined opposition of China, Japan, the United States, and NATO, probably encouraged the invasion of Afghanistan. The Japan–China treaty became a further landmark in the heightening of tension in East Asia, instead of alleviating strain as Japan had originally hoped. The author concludes that Japanese leaders must keep in mind the vulnerability of Japan's position and 'the necessity of avoiding defence buildups which could upset the fragility of the system' (p. 233).

This is a cogent study but it is surprising that a book produced relatively cheaply in typed format with soft covers should cost so much, even allowing for the pound's continued decline in relation to the dollar.

University of Manchester PETER LOWE

The politics of regional policy in Japan: localities incorporated? By Richard J. Samuels. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 290 pp. Index. £30·30. Pb.: £12·60.

IT is a truism of analyses of the Japanese political system that it is centralized to a considerable degree. This work seeks to test that proposition and, since centralization is a relative term, the author also endeavours to compare the behaviour of local government in Japan with that found in the United States and Western Europe. Behavioural and historical evidence is examined with these two aims in mind and the book is a most useful addition to the literature on Japanese politics and on comparative local policy studies.

Having considered the structure of local and regional government, Samuels complements this with an analysis of behavioural evidence. A sample of local administrators was asked to assess, of a given period, the frequency and nature of their contacts with central government and with other local administrations, and the rather surprising findings demonstrate that, on many issues, cities, towns and villages are as likely to consult each other as they are to consult their prefecture or central government organs. However, the degree of local autonomy implied by this discovery is qualified by the presence, in local governments, of large numbers of central administrators seconded for experience at a particular point in their careers. Samuels then discusses the repeated attempts initiated by the centre to introduce regionalization schemes linking local administrations together, a trend long resisted by a shifting coalition of interests, including many local governments. Though the Ministry of Home Affairs was finally successful in its greater municipal zones scheme, proposed originally in 1969, the position remains complicated by the advocacy of parallel schemes by other Ministries and Agencies. A particular case study completes the empirical evidence reviewed. This is the history of the various Tokyo Bay area plans in which the ad hoc Tokyo Bay General Development Council plays a major role. Although the analysis of this issue does show the considerable importance of linkages between local administrations in policy-making and review, it is tempting to conclude that the plan's provisions, notably the proposed bridge across Tokyo Bay, were never implemented at the most opportune time, largely because of the opposition of Prime Minister Tanaka.

Given that local politics in Japan has attracted much attention in the past decade since it was the focus for a progressive upsurge against Liberal Democratic Party hegemony, it is noteworthy that the case study portrays progressive local administrations when at loggerheads resorting to political stratagems worthy of their conservative opponents. The extraordinary influence of Komori Takeshi, the political fixer for progressive Tokyo Governor Minobe, rivals anything to be found in the LDP of the Tanaka era and, like the competition between Ministries and Agencies at the centre, is a reminder that while we may seek, as Samuels does in his concluding chapter, to integrate the Japanese case into a broader comparative study, its cultural idiosyncracies remain a powerful determining influence.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JAMES COTTON

Japan's reluctant multinationals: Japanese management at home and abroad. By Malcolm Trevor. London: Pinter. 1983. 223 pp. Index. £16·50.

ANYONE who wants a subtle and detailed illustration of what 'the West' means, and why Japan is not part of it, should read this book. Should an Englishman who has had initial difficulty in adjusting to life in a Swedish or American UK subsidiary try working for a Japanese company, he will discover not simply what cultural difference means, but how cultural difference crystallized into specific habits of behaviour and institutions can result in such wide differences in employment practices and modes of decision-making that Euro-America's cultural homogeneity seems almost monolithic by comparison.

Malcolm Trevor's book, and especially its central section which analyses the employment practices of firms in the United Kingdom, both illustrates and explains that point. A Swedish firm can expect, of its British managers, approximately the same degree of commitment to the firm's purposes, approximately the same view of what constitutes a 'job' that you are paid for or a career that you plan, as it expects of its Swedish managers. But Japanese overseas investment—the increasingly likely concomitant of Japan's mounting surpluses in international trade—is a somewhat different matter. Trevor's title is apt. The Japanese have no particular taste for economic imperialism. They go into Europe and America with much the same sense of duty overwhelming inclination as the British went into the northern wastes of Nigeria. The need to expand as slower domestic growth intensifies competition with domestic rivals (and in a life-time employment system threatens the career prospects of middle managers), the rising tide of protectionism and the need to duck trade barriers in established export markets by local manufacture have made overseas investment a reluctant necessity for many Japanese firms and brought several thousands of Japanese managers to Britain—a favourite location in Europe, partly because of the City, but also because English, their main foreign language, happens to be the only one we speak.

The analysis of the position of locally recruited British staff is the most interesting part of Trevor's book, based as it is on a wide range of interviews with both the British concerned and their Japanese colleagues. A very few Japanese companies have tried to create genuinely 'aculturated' subsidiaries under the full, or almost full, control of British managers. Most reserve key jobs for Japanese managers rotated to overseas 'hardship posts' for three or four years as part of their career. They occasionally contemplate recruiting high-flying Oxbridge engineering or economic graduates, not just as 'comprador' experts in dealing with the local society, but as full first-class citizens of the firm. But such attempts rarely come to anything. How could English-speaking Englishmen be expected to play a full part in decision-making by consensus 'feel', how could they be expected to make the long-term commitment to the firm which alone can justify expending many man-months' worth of time and salary in giving them the induction into the firm's technology and procedures that Japanese engineers and accountants receive? How could they make effective use of daily telephone contacts with Tokyo?

The book which Trevor co-authored with Michael White showed how productively effective and smooth could be the relations between Japanese managers—especially technical managers—and British *subordinates*—technicians, supervisors and workers. That account is usefully complemented by the analysis in this book of the more fraught peer and quasi-peer relations between Japanese and British qualified staff, especially in the commercial and financial firms which predominate in the Japanese presence in Britain. Other sections of the book, dealing with the structure of Japanese firms in Japan and with their global strategies are less convincing but convey something of the flavour of Japanese and Western scholarly debate. There is food for thought in the concluding reflection: increasing confidence in the global competitive strength achieved by Japan's 'groupish' enterprises seems to lead to a diminishing, rather than an increasing, readiness to adapt the organization of British subsidiaries to accommodate the individualism of British technical, managerial, and professional employees.

The Technical Change Centre RONALD DORE

An international history of the Vietnam War. Vol. I: revolution versus containment 1955–61. By R. B. Smith. London: Macmillan. 1983. 301 pp. Index. £25·00.

IN 1968 Dr Smith published one of the best 'background' books on the second Vietnam war (*Vietnam and the West*, London, Heinemann, 1968). He has now produced the first volume—there are three more to come—of what promises to be one of the best international histories of that conflict.

The three principles upon which Dr Smith bases this book are stated with admirable clarity on pages 6 and 7: 'the need to look more carefully at the years 1955 to 1960; the need to examine the decisions of both sides simultaneously; and the need to relate Vietnam to the regional and global perspective at every stage in the evolution of the conflict'. The book itself is proof of the attention paid to the first of these principles, while its contents amply demonstrate the attention paid to the other two. Those acquainted with his earlier writings will know that Dr Smith's knowledge of Vietnamese history and culture is profound. He makes good use of it in his examination of the policies of the two states which existed in Vietnam during the period about which he is writing. In addition, he has relied heavily, as he generously admits (p. x), upon Carlyle Thayer's brilliant, but alas still unpublished, doctoral thesis on 'The origins of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam'. But of course he ranges far more widely than Vietnam itself. He rightly emphasizes the importance of developments in Cambodia, Thailand and, particuarly, Laos. 'One possible interpretation of the "origins" of the second war in Vietnam', he writes, 'is that it arose not from anything the Americans did in South Vietnam . . . but rather from the consequences of American policy in Laos' (p. 79).

At the level of great power relationships, Dr Smith firmly situates Indochina in the context of the cold war as a whole. The usual excessive concentration upon American policy is avoided, for the author devotes considerable space to what the Soviet Union and China were doing. Since North Vietnam was as dependent upon Russia and China as South Vietnam was upon the United States this is clearly a sensible approach. The result is a complex and subtle interpretation which is far removed from the simplistic and one-sided explanations which have too often been churned out on this subject.

Good though the book is, it could have been even better. It seems somewhat perverse, for example, to begin in 1955 instead of with the Geneva Conference of 1954. It is true that Dr Smith repeatedly alludes to Geneva and tries to explain what happened there, but an introductory chapter on the conference would have been clearer and more satisfactory.

There are also some astonishing gaps in the sources which Dr Smith has used. To cite only material in English which throws light on communist policies, there is no reference to Allen Cameron's essay on 'The Soviet Union and Vietnam: the origins of involvement' (in Raymond Duncan, ed., *Soviet policy in developing countries*, Waltham, Mass., Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), to Marek Thee's *Notes of a witness* (New York, Random House, 1973), or to János Radványi's *Delusion and reality* (South Bend, Gateway, 1979). These omissions are all the more regrettable in that the sources in question often reinforce points which Dr Smith seeks to make. Thus, he writes on page 85: 'The crisis which erupted in North Vietnam during 1956 must be intepreted on two levels: as an internal conflict within Vietnam, and as one element in the international Communist crisis which followed Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU'. Radványi's account, based upon discussions with North Vietnamese leaders on the occasion of a visit by a Hungarian delegation to Hanoi in April 1959, not only confirms this, but adds a great deal of circumstantial detail. It is to be hoped that in Dr Smith's subsequent volumes, which will be eagerly awaited by all those interested in the subject, he will make full use of these and other relevant sources.

The Open University GEOFFREY WARNER

North America

Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of postwar American national security policy. By John Lewis Gaddis. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. 432 pp. Index. Pb.: $10.95; £8·95.

THE official explanations and justifications of foreign policy by various governments of the United States since the war have been generally defensive in nature. Successive administra-

tions have lamented that they were forced into a particular position as a consequence of the machinations and manoeuvrings of other nations, particularly the Soviet Union. However, George Kennan, the architect of containment (a term which in itself identifies and apportions the source of diplomatic initiatives), warned against a policy that appeared to be merely reactive. He contended that the United States had paramount interests in Western Europe and Japan, and that the extent and nature of those interests should be made widely known. He counselled against the vogue for exaggerated rhetoric in the conduct of diplomacy as it tended to universalize and homogenize problems. Kennan craved flexibility; Presidential doctrines and collective defence treaties such as NATO served only to impose straitjackets. American foreign policy should aim to alert the Kremlin, not lull it. An undefined extension of interests, such as those proposed in NSC 68, gave the Soviet Union no incentive to re-examine its posture and to negotiate since that policy document practically called for a Soviet capitulation.

Gaddis has greater sympathy for the Eisenhower administration's adjustments to the containment doctrine. While Truman proposed parallel and proportionate counter-measures to any changes forcefully initiated by the Soviet Union, Eisenhower and Dulles advocated an 'asymmetrical response', a response that might well exceed the nature of the new threat. Truman offered the Soviets predictability, while Eisenhower kept them guessing. This 'New Look' allowed the United States to choose its own ground in any conflict and permitted curbs on military expenditure. John F. Kennedy, on the other hand, believed that the 'New Look' was based on bluff and that the United States could only act abroad if the military repercussions were politically acceptable at home. Gaddis believes, however, that the policy of flexible response imposed no limitations on overseas intervention and offered 'little incentive to make hard choices among distasteful alternatives'. Ambition had to be trimmed. Henry Kissinger recognized that America's resources were not limitless and that the United States should strive for a stable balance rather than the occasional symbolic victory. But for all Gaddis's proclivity for a discriminating policy, the author is still critical of Kissinger's belief in his own ability to manage the Soviets. It is true that the Nixon–Kissinger diplomacy raised false hopes, but Gaddis cannot eat his cake and have it. Kissinger did attempt a careful reappraisal of America's interests and Gaddis is hard in his counter-charge that Kissinger's review raised public expectations too high.

Notwithstanding the above, Gaddis has written a brilliant history of postwar American foreign policy. It is a thoughtful synthesis of recent scholarship and each page reveals fresh interpretative riches. Gaddis has mastered an enormous subject and has presented it with the lucidity he has exhibited in his earlier works. This book is compulsory reading for scholars and students of recent America and international affairs, and deserves to become and remain a standard text for years.

University of Keele R. A. GARSON

Beyond containment: alternative American policies toward the Soviet Union. Edited by Aaron Wildavsky. Oxford: Clio. 1983. 264 pp. Index. £17·25. Pb.: £7·25.

THIS book is composed of revised seminar papers. Later collections are promised on American foreign policy in relation to defence, allies and the Third World. In this opening volume, the progenitor of the project, Aaron Wildavsky, argues that containment is indispensable but as it stands unsatisfactory. He has no doubt, in spite of at least some reputable evidence to the contrary, that during the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, the Soviet Union engaged in a massive arms build-up while American military expenditure remained static or even declined until an effort to catch up was launched by the administration of President Reagan. And so, whether its own security or a compulsion towards expansion is the basic impulse of the Soviet system, containment will remain a necessity for the foreseeable future. But how can it be improved?

The recommendations given by his fellow contributors and himself fall into three somewhat overlapping categories: moderate, selective and dynamic. Paul Seabury dismisses 'Polyannish students of the Soviet system' who believe that it is evolving towards some kind of pluralism, and sees no alternative to continuing resolute resistance to Soviet destabilization in Italy, Turkey, Northern Ireland, the Basque region of Spain, or wherever else it may be found.

Similarly, Robert W. Tucker considers in turn confrontation, condominium and withdrawal, only to reject them all as inadequate alternatives to the present policy supported by public consensus—'moderate containment'. In contrast, Ernst B. Haas is in favour of 'selective engagement'. He believes that the Soviet Union has shown itself on occasion capable of flexibility and even of restraint, while the United States can no longer hope to act as global policeman. It should therefore have a clear view of priorities, not opposing the spread of communism everywhere in the Third World, Africa and Asia, nor even in Latin America, but insisting on a minimal perimeter of joint defence including Western Europe, Japan, South Korea and the Pacific. The other policy, of 'dynamic containment' is recommended by Wildavsky himself, with the support of Charles Wolf, Jr, Max Singer and James L. Payne. In the view of this group, the Soviet Union should be pushed towards pluralism by a combination of pressures including propaganda and economic boycott. Under the latter heading, they take the states of Western Europe to task for having contributed to the construction of the gas pipeline. They say little or nothing about the continuing vast exports of grain from the United States to the Soviet Union, which are arguably as strategically significant as technological exports, since armies still march on their stomachs. Some other contentions are debatable. Does Seabury really believe that Soviet destabilization makes a greater contribution to the troubles in Northern Ireland than Noraid, or that there are not other factors bearing the prime responsibility for the other problems listed by him? And what makes Wildavsky and his group so certain that a pluralist Soviet Union would be more tolerant of American containment or less in need of it? Generally speaking, this book would have benefited from the inclusion of dissentient views; with the possible exception of Haas, the contributors have much more in common than divides them, and therefore tend to repeat each other without any discussion of their basic assumptions.

University of Aberdeen PAUL DUKES

Staffing for foreign affairs: personnel systems for the 1980s and 1990s. By William I. Bacchus. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 262 pp. Index. £21·70.

THIS is a comprehensive study of the problem in the United States of finding and keeping the necessary top quality people in the Foreign Service. The emphasis is on the system needed to recruit, train, evaluate, promote, reward and separate the appropriate individuals, taking account of the needs of individual members and their families, the specific needs of the different organizations within the Foreign Service, and the broader demands of government as a whole and society at large.

Bacchus begins by examining the changing political environment at home and abroad in which foreign affairs officials operate now and will do in the next decade. He argues that recent practices and procedures have not always produced the right personnel for the three most important areas of specialization: diplomatic work, policy initiation and policy implementation. In examining the defects he points to the continuing ambiguity as to the real role of the Foreign Service, the unnecessary complexity, fragmentation and inflexibility of many structures, and the decline in morale and in the service ethic. He comments on the work of the Murphy Commission, but in particular assesses the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (providing a valuable summary analysis of the Act in an Appendix). He concludes that the legislation was a successful reform and a substantial contribution to producing the foreign affairs personnel systems needed for the future, but is only a part of what is required. He believes that it will not fully resolve the old arguments about specialists versus generalists, nor determine the precise role of the State Department within the executive branch. There is also no guarantee that the quality of the management of the 'foreign affairs system' will be improved. Efforts to strike an appropriate balance between career personnel and political appointees, and between quality and representativeness (i.e. more affirmative action), while establishing a less elitist pattern of recruitments, all seem to be helped by the legislation. More, however, needs to be done to provide sophisticated back-up data systems to help the State Department and the other foreign affairs organizations.

Bacchus affirms the continued need for change in the personnel system, and does an excellent job in analysing the major problems of staffing for the Foreign Service and assessing how far recent reforms may help to improve its capacity to respond to the changing realities of foreign affairs in the future. He also succeeds in making interesting what could have been a

rather boring or esoteric subject, and in demonstrating the importance of giving careful consideration to some of the personnel issues he raises for the future nature of the conduct of foreign relations by the United States.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

Crossroads of decision: the State Department and foreign policy, 1933–1937. By Howard Jablon. Lexington, Ky, London: University Press of Kentucky. 1983. 182 pp. Index. £12·00.

FOR nearly half a century, the United States has been fully involved in international affairs, actively engaged in world politics, and committed to a concept of national security which requires intervention on a worldwide scale. The change from a more traditional isolationism may be dated from President Roosevelt's quarantine speech. The period with which Professor Jablon is concerned may thus be seen as the last years of the old American diplomacy. President Wilson's intervention in the First World War, his programme for the construction of a better international order, and his belief that America must necessarily be involved in the working of a collective security system, had all been swept aside. The tone of the 1930s was that of the Nye committee, convinced that the machinations of armaments manufacturers and bankers had dragged the United States into war. Washington's farewell address, with its warning against foreign entanglements, remained the guiding principle of policy. The most Congressional concern was with neutrality legislation, through which, in a variety of ingenious ways, American involvement in foreign conflicts was to be prevented.

It is the essence of Jablon's argument that the State Department in 1933–7 failed to challenge the assumptions of traditional orthodoxy. The President was primarily concerned with the domestic policies of the New Deal. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, clung to his belief that free trade was the key to a more beneficial world order, concentrated his attention upon a programme of reciprocal trade treaties, and failed to give direction to the unadventurous professional diplomats who staffed his Department.

In a series of brief chapters, Jablon examines the major incidents of American policy. In Cuba, the American intervention of 1933 and 1934 showed the 'good neighbour' policy (itself foreshadowed under the Hoover administration) to be little more than a rhetorical gloss on the Monroe doctrine. In European affairs, participation in collective action, whether towards disarmament or against aggression, was always secondary to the avoidance of commitments. In the Far East, the non-recognition of Japanese expansion in Manchukuo and the assertion of the Open Door policy in China were absurdly inappropriate to changing circumstances. From a critical attitude to neutrality legislation which fettered presidential discretion the Department moved, during the Spanish Civil War, to an acceptance of an attempt to insulate the United States in all circumstances against unpleasantness abroad.

Jablon's book is not a detailed study but a polemical essay. The case for the defence is not presented, and the portrait of the State Department given here is too unrelievedly black. The political circumstances of the country limited the possibilities of new departures. It remains clear, however, that, in the mid-1930s, the State Department lacked the capacity for innovative thinking; and the conduct of American diplomacy was sufficiently flaccid to make more understandable, for example, Neville Chamberlain's lack of enthusiasm, as late as 1938, for greater involvement of the United States in European negotiations.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

The secret diplomacy of the Vietnam War: the negotiating volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Edited by George C. Herring. Austin, Texas, London: University of Texas Press. 1983. 873 pp. Index. $47.50; £35·65.

Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: the unmaking of a President. By Herbert Y. Schandler. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. (First publ. 1977.) 419 pp. Index. Pb.: £8·65.

A DEFENSE Department review of US involvement in Vietnam was authorized by Robert McNamara in 1967 and completed two years later. One set of the forty-seven volume study

was placed with the Rand Corporation, and it was from there that Daniel Ellsberg leaked documents to the *New York Times*. When the Nixon administration failed to get legal support for its attempt to enjoin publication, newspapers gave extended coverage to what became known as the Pentagon Papers, and three separate editions were published in book form: the *New York Times* version, the Gravel edition, and twelve volumes issued by the US government.

The so-called 'negotiating volumes' of the Defense Department analysis, those which dealt with diplomatic attempts between 1964 and 1968 to resolve the war, were not released by Ellsberg although some documents were later leaked. However, when he was indicted for theft and on a number of charges under the Espionage Act the negotiating volumes became central to the government's case, despite the claim that disclosure would be harmful to national security and could disrupt the ongoing Paris peace negotiations. When the Ellsberg case got caught up in the Watergate scandals the trial was stopped, and there followed years of legal wrangling to secure release of the negotiating volumes under the Freedom of Information Act. It is this body of material that is now published.

The papers are photocopied intact, except for occasional pages withdrawn for security reasons, and George Herring's editorial contributions consist of an excellent general introduction on the background to the papers, separate section introductions on the phases of the peace efforts, an admirable series of endnotes, and glossaries of names and acronyms. The documents themselves make engrossing reading, taking the series of abortive negotiations from the mission in 1964 of a Canadian intermediary, via those coded as Marigold, Sunflower, Ohio, Pennsylvania and others, to contacts made through the Italian Foreign Minister in 1968. The problem was defined by Henry Cabot Lodge in May 1964: 'It is a relatively simple concept to go out and destroy North Viet Nam. What is complicated, but really effective, is to bring our power to bear in a precise way so as to get specific results' (pp. 17–18). When he arrived in Rome in March 1968 it was reported that 'nothing new was added to previous communications' (p. 825). Generally well-intentioned negotiators looked for ways out, and perhaps what is most revealing in this volume is its reaffirmation of the difficulty of reconciliation when situations are defined according to ideological premises and entrenched positions.

Herbert Schandler's excellent study of the Tet offensive of January 1968, its impact on American strategy and domestic politics, is already a classic. Its republication in paperback is a welcome event, and inversion of its original title is also a welcome return to an older tradition of informative labelling. Herring usefully discusses Tet, but the new documents do not disturb Schandler's earlier analysis.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Henry Kissinger: his personality and policies. Edited by Dan Caldwell. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 1983. 144 pp. Index.

THE five essays in this book are by American professors of political science. They fall within the corpus of what is claimed to be 'psychohistory', by which is meant psychobiography, an entirely different genre and pursuit. One of the essayists entitles his paper 'Kissinger: a psychohistory'—in forty pages. Elsewhere we are inducted into the complex realm of the 'cognitive map' and 'value analysis' of the subject, or patient. On page 77 an elaborate diagram sets out, in a form beloved of genealogists, Kissinger's 'instrumental value-belief network' which is handily shortened to 'terminal value network' for the purpose of exegesis. Here, among the verbiage, are such old favourites as 'creativity' 'authority' 'determination' and 'risk taking'. The cognitive map runs to twenty-two values and belief statements for purposes of analysis, and items such as 'juggling' and 'tours de force' together with 'adversity' and 'inspiration' find their natural place in the prospectus. Nowhere do we find 'ambiguity'. This may strike some readers as surprising for one of our modern masters of 'statecraft', as Kissinger himself likes to term it, not least for the leading exponent of 'dual track' diplomacy in our time.

There is no discussion of dual track in this work, nor even of the salami-slice aspects of Kissinger's unique form of pragmatism. Neither term gets a mention in the index, though there are nine distinct references to 'depressive personality'. Not for these essayists, therefore, the caution that might accrue from a professional clinical training, or a whiff of clinical

experience. But they do much to explain why political 'science' of this type earns a bad name with ministers of state, with men of letters, with the man in the street, and with people who enjoy reading works of scholarship.

University of York EDMUND IONS

Latin America and Caribbean

The Haitian economy: man, land and markets. By Mats Lundahl. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 290 pp. Index. £16·95.

MATS LUNDAHL has followed his recent book *Peasants and poverty: a study of Haiti* (London, 1979) with this present collection. He begins by discussing different interpretations of Haiti's past, defending his thesis that the country's poverty is due less to external factors than to social and political weaknesses in the internal dynamics of the country. Unfortunately, however, there is little about the role of foreign capital in Haiti and the author's reference to the ailing assembly plants as 'the only bright spark in the economy' (p. 9) is surprising. In rightly stressing the difference between the system of land tenure in Haiti and that which prevails in most of Latin America the author fails to recognize the considerable diversity in the size of holdings and errs in asserting that plantations disappeared as a result of land reforms in the last century.

The Duvalierist phenomenon, the author properly insists, is too complex to be reduced to one or two dimensions. Evidently it is also too complex for him to handle. It is indeed a remarkable achievement to have written 290 pages on the Haitian economy with hardly a reference to the Duvalier family. There are, however, two useful chapters on Haitian migration to Cuba and the Dominican Republic, containing an informed and balanced discussion of the issues. Of the poorer sections of the population, however, Lundahl writes 'it is precisely these sections that we would expect to emigrate' (p. 138). Economists, unlike other social scientists, are in the fortunate position of knowing what happens without the inconvenience of having to examine the evidence. Those who have actually investigated the economic background of Haitian migrants have concluded in almost all cases that they do not come from the poorer, but from the middle sectors of the population.

In this book Lundahl modifies his earlier thesis that coffee marketing in Haiti is a classic instance of perfect competition. The important work of Christian Girault has convinced him that this is not so with respect to the activities of the export houses, but he still wishes to assert effective competition at the level of the middle men (*spéculateurs*). Here, as elsewhere in the book, one gets the impression that the author knows the literature about Haiti without knowing Haiti. Anyone familiar with the Haitian countryside knows that although there may be many *spéculateurs* operating in a region, each has strong commercial and customary ties with particular peasant farmers. The latter do not shop around to find the *spéculateur* offering the best price, but are frequently obliged to sell to one buyer.

A final section returns to more general issues of change and stagnation. The author discusses cooperative structures in the Haitian economy and also the political and technical obstacles to change in agriculture. The book is refreshingly free from jargon and contains excellent notes and bibliographies to each chapter.

DAVID NICHOLLS

Bibliography and reference

The international foundation directory. 3rd edn. London: Europa. 1983. 417 pp. £24·00.

THIS revised edition of the directory of international foundations and non-profit-making institutions also includes some national foundations which have an international impact in a variety of fields.

The introduction to the first edition (1974), which provides a historical outline of the development of foundations first in Europe, then in North America and in the rest of the world, precedes the introduction to the current edition, which is devoted to the political and economic changes affecting both long established and newly created foundations.

The listing of approximately 650 institutions, arranged alphabetically by country, provides details of each foundation's name, address and purpose together with details of its activities, finances, publications and officers. Data are obtained from the majority of foundations by means of questionnaires. Secondary sources are used for revision in a small proportion of entries distinguishable by an asterisk. There is a short bibliography, an index of foundations, and an index of main activities under ten broad headings such as arts and humanities, science and technology, and economic affairs.

Chatham House Library N. G.

An atlas of world affairs. 7th rev. edn. By Andrew Boyd. London: Methuen. 1983. Index. 208 pp. £7·95. Pb.: £3·95.

THE major economic, political, and social problems of the world are displayed in clear, uncluttered black and white maps, accompanied by a short commentary in 600–700 words.

Topics range from oil and nuclear geography to Southern Africa and the three Z's—Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe—to India and Pakistan 1947–1982 in two chapters. Events up to and including 1982 are included.

An excellent source of basic essential facts.

Chatham House Library N. G.

World armies. 2nd edn. By John Keegan. London: Macmillan. 1983. 688 pp. £45·00.

THE new edition of this valuable reference work has been expanded to include a ten page section of photographs of major items of military equipment and eight pages of maps illustrating US, British, French and Soviet military deployment worldwide, military regions and major internal troop deployment in Central and South America, China, India and South Asia. The majority of the volume is devoted to the description of the armies of some 150 countries, arranged alphabetically. The history, budget strength, recruitment equipment, internal and international roles, as well as recent deployment are examined. The slightly smaller type used to set the layout in two columns per page make this otherwise extremely useful volume less practical to handle.

It must be noted that the price is double that of the 1979 edition.

Chatham House Library N. G.

The world of learning 1983–84. 34th edn. London: Europa. 1984. 1790 pp. Index. £60·00.

THIS directory lists over 24,000 educational, cultural and scientific institutions by country alphabetically throughout the world, as well as more than 400 international organizations grouped under broad subject headings. The work has reverted to the one-volume format, on a three column per page layout. While the omission from names of all degrees and qualifications may be regretted, the accumulation of up-to-date information provided in this comprehensively indexed reference work makes it an indispensable volume.

Chatham House Library N. G.

The British yearbook of international law 1982. Edited by Ian Brownlie and D. W. Bowett. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1983. 586 pp. £50·00.

THE yearbook is now in its 53rd year. As before, it is divided into articles, book reviews, summaries of the decisions of British and European courts and UK materials on international law. Among the former are an estimate of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's contribution to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and a study of international relations in the ancient Mediterranean world.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Documents on Australian foreign policy, 1937–1949. Vol. V: July 1941–June 1942; Vol. VI, July 1942–December 1943. Edited by W. J. Hudson and H. J. W. Stokes. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service for the Department of Foreign Affairs. 1982, 1983. 906, 676 pp. $35 per volume.

THESE collections, dealing with Australia's most dangerous years, are handsomely produced with copious annotation and full indices. The biographical guide and list of office-holders, dropped in Volume V to avoid delay in publication, are resumed in its successor.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Documents on British foreign policy 1919–1939. First series. Vol. XXIII: Poland and the Baltic states 1921–23; Vol. XXIV: Anglo–Italian conversations 1922; Central Europe and the Balkans 1922–23. Edited by W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin. London: HMSO. 1981, 1983. 1054, 1115 pp. £60·00, £75·00.

THIS series, which began publication thirty-seven years ago, moves slowly towards its goal of 1930. Volume XXIII covers Poland and the Baltic States from 1921 to 1923, dealing mainly with the Memel and Vilna disputes and the vain attempts to form a Baltic League. Volume XXIV covers the Anglo-Italian conversations of 1922, the Corfu crisis of 1923, and developments in Central Europe and the Balkans during those years.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Historical dictionary of South Africa. By Christopher Saunders. Metuchen, NJ, London: Scarecrow. 1984. (Distrib. in UK by Bailey Bros & Swinfen, Folkestone.) 241 pp. Index. £17·10.

THIS book is the latest of a valuable series, in which the word 'historical' does not preclude the coverage of very recent events. It comprises a chronology, two maps, a dictionary of persons, events, institutions and broader themes, a full bibliography and supplementary indices, which could easily be overlooked by the user. The importance of the subject might have justified a somewhat larger volume; as it is, a few entries which might reasonably have been expected are not there. Nevertheless, this could be a useful addition to many reference libraries, both specialized and general. The author has rightly avoided a pseudo-objective treatment of his material.

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Correspondence

From Mr Percy S. Gourgey

Dear Sir,

The idea of an 'Islamic bomb' made by Pakistan was first conceived not, as is sometimes contended, in 1974, after India's first nuclear explosion, nor subsequently, to help Arab states defeat Israel (with her nuclear capability!). It was first planned by Pakistan's leader, President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in January 1972 at a meeting in Multan, a small town in the Punjab, not far from the Indian border. This was a month after Pakistan's humiliating defeat by the Indian Army when the new state of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) was created. This significant fact was disclosed in a book entitled *The Islamic bomb* written by Steve Weissmann and Herbert Krosney and published by Vision Books, New Delhi, in the spring of 1983.

It is worth noting this in view of the interesting article appearing in *International Affairs* Autumn 1983, entitled 'Nuclear status and policies of the Middle East countries', by Dr Roger F. Pajak, National Security Adviser for Soviet and Middle East Affairs to the United States Secretary of the Treasury.

Dr Pajak writes, *inter alia*: 'An overt Israeli nuclear weapons programme would stimulate comparable efforts on the Arab side . . . The continuing tendency of the Arab states to political contentiousness will also tend to slow technological progress' (pp. 587, 588). On page 603, he refers to Bhutto's warnings 'to the Arab world of the threat posed to it by an Israeli nuclear capability'. He quotes Bhutto, 'The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change' as mentioned in Yager's book *Nonproliferation and US foreign policy*.

In their book *The Islamic bomb*, Weissmann and Krosney describe how 'in January 1972 Bhutto hastily called together some 50 of Pakistan's top scientists and government officials for what was to be a very secret meeting'. Among the scientists were Professor Abdus Salam, who in 1979 was to win the Nobel Prize for Physics, Dr Ishrat Usmani, chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and later at the UN in New York, and Dr Munir Ahmed Khan, formerly of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, whom Bhutto named to replace Dr Usmani. At the meeting the authors describe how 'Bhutto spoke of Pakistan's defeat and humiliation in the 1971 war with India and vowed that he would vindicate the country's honour. He said that he had always wanted Pakistan to take the nuclear road, but nobody had listened to him. Now fate had placed him in a position where he could make the decision, he had the people of Pakistan behind him, and he wanted to go ahead . . . he dramatically thrust forward three fingers and said "I want it in three years . . .". Bhutto's best bet for the money to finance his ambitious venture was the oil-rich Islamic world. And the most prominent among his admirers there was a man who was as charismatic a nationalist as he—Libyan strongman, Colonel Quadaffi.'

It is thus essential to set the record straight not only for reasons of historical accuracy, but also for moral and political reasons should nuclear conflict ever ensue.

Twickenham, Middlesex

European security cooperation and British interests

JAMES EBERLE, JOHN ROPER, WILLIAM WALLACE AND PHIL WILLIAMS*

The issue of defence cooperation is now firmly back on the European agenda. The Ministerial Council of the Western European Union, meeting in Paris on 12 June 1984, agreed to set up a working group 'to examine the prospects for reactivating WEU' as the basis for 'a more assertive European presence in the field of defence and security', to report back to a joint meeting of foreign and defence ministers in Rome on 28–9 October.[1] President Mitterrand, in his speech before the Dutch parliament in The Hague on 7 February 1984, called for Europe to 'be able to provide more and more for our security. Not only through conventional arms but also through the new facilities that are going to burst upon the world soon.' Chancellor Kohl has urged that 'the European pillar of the transatlantic partnership must be strengthened'; adding significantly that 'Franco-German friendship and close cooperation between our two countries in security policy will strengthen Europe in the North Atlantic Alliance', and that 'we cannot allow the slowest vessel to determine the pace of the whole convoy'.[2] The British foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has been rather more cautious but has added his endorsement to the reviving debate.

The aim of this article is to examine the issues which underlie this debate, and to consider Britain's interests in responding to the questions raised. We think it unlikely that Western Europe is on the verge of any great leap forward towards political or military union. The modest achievements of the Fontainebleau European Council which met on 25–6 June offer the prospect of continued hard bargaining and at best incremental change across a wide range of economic and political issues in the next two to three years. We do, however, believe that the combination of pressures from within and without Europe which have pushed the issue of defence cooperation to the surface provides sufficient momentum to carry European governments some distance down the road towards greater collaboration in security policy, in arms procurement, and above all in managing their relationship with the United States. The key actors in the debate—as so often before—are the governments of France and Germany, which have been engaged in a confidential bilateral 'defence dialogue' since the summer of 1982. So far Britain has been more ambivalent, hesitating between scepticism about the possibilities of real progress, misgivings about the perceived dangers of undermining the prior commitment to Atlantic solidarity, and reluctance to be left out. We see real dangers for British interests in accepting a secondary role, especially in view of the political, military and industrial interests at stake. The British government may have responded more

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1. The Memorandum agreed to by the WEU Ministerial Council was published in full in *Europe Documents* 1313, 14 June 1984, Agence Europe, Brussels.

2. Speech to the 27th Conference of Commanding Officers of the Bundeswehr, Travemünde, 15 February 1984; Bundes Presse Amt translation.

positively in private than in public; but it must also take up a more enthusiastic declaratory policy and offer specific commitments rather than bland generalities. If it does not, the European allies could all too readily conclude that British reticence disguises indifference if not disapproval.

Why European defence cooperation?

The idea of European defence cooperation is far from new. But it has remained something of a taboo subject since the collapse of the European Defence Community proposals in 1954 and their replacement, on the initiative of Anthony Eden, by the amendments to the 1948 Brussels Treaty which established Western European Union and thus enabled West Germany to join NATO. Each time Britain approached the European Community in a bid for membership, the United States—which had exerted considerable pressure in support of the EDC as a framework for German rearmament—came back to the question of European defence cooperation and its implications for the alliance. President Kennedy's Declaration of Interdependence on 4 July 1962 conjured up the vision of 'a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American union founded here 175 years ago', in which 'a united Europe' would 'be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense'. Henry Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' initiative in 1973 represented a more hard-headed attempt to persuade the Europeans to shoulder a greater share of the burdens and responsibilities of Western security, both inside and outside Europe.

The first of these initiatives fell with the failure of Britain's first application to join the European Community in January 1963. It was not long survived by the associated US proposals to establish a multilateral nuclear force (MLF), conceived as a means of accommodating German security concerns in a period of declining American nuclear superiority. The second was lost in the transatlantic disputes which surrounded the 1973 Middle East war and the oil crisis which followed. The damage to transatlantic relations was repaired by the Ottawa Agreement of NATO heads of government in June 1974, which established a formal consultative link between the emerging structure of European Political Cooperation[3] and the United States administration. On both occasions, the determination of the French government to pose a choice between 'European' and 'Atlantic' cooperation inhibited British and German policy-makers from offering a more positive response. There were fears both in London and in Bonn that a more separate, visible European entity in security and defence might weaken the US commitment, lead to reductions in US troops in Europe, and so in time unravel the Atlantic alliance. Britain, supported by Germany, responded to American pressure in the late 1960s for European 'burden-sharing' by proposing the establishment of a 'Eurogroup', firmly anchored within the NATO framework. Although the Eurogroup initiated the European Defence Improvement Programme in 1970, this was primarily an attempt to demonstrate European seriousness about defence and thereby counter congressional demands for American troop withdrawals from Western Europe.

The argument that public discussion of closer European defence cooperation is

3. For the development of European Political Cooperation see William Wallace, 'Political cooperation: integration through intergovernmentalism', in Helen Wallace *et al.*, *Policy-making in the European Community*, 2nd edn. (Chichester, New York: Wiley, 1983).

to be avoided for fear of encouraging an American withdrawal, which can still be heard in some quarters, was never entirely convincing. US troops were stationed in Europe in furtherance of American as well as European interests, and will remain there in significant numbers for as long as the United States continues to see the defence of Western Europe as vital to its own interests. The anti-American undertones of Gaullist proposals for European independence in foreign policy and defence did, it is true, discourage others from pursuing the issue in the 1960s and early 1970s. But those undertones have faded in recent years, as French governments have drawn towards their American and European partners in their approach to East–West relations and to the management of crises in the Third World. Fear of provoking a US disengagement should therefore no longer be regarded as either a prohibition on or an excuse for eschewing closer European defence cooperation. Furthermore, as Trevor Taylor argues in his forthcoming Chatham House Paper, 'If NATO cannot withstand further European cooperation, if the American commitment to Europe is so fragile, then surely Europeans should be cooperating as fast and as hard as possible so as to be able to stand alone against the Warsaw Pact when the day inevitably arrives that the delicate American commitment to Europe is destroyed by a disturbance in some other part of the world.' [4]

But in spite of all this, it is essential that Western Europe be sensitive to American concerns. Washington's welcoming reception for moves towards European defence cooperation is, almost inevitably, tinged with ambivalence. If US policy-makers perceive West European defence cooperation as no more than a device to enable the allies more effectively to pursue interests at variance with those of Washington, the consequence could be a loosening of Atlantic links. In other words, West European defence cooperation must be presented as and must be seen to be a means to strengthen the Atlantic framework rather than an alternative to it.

European defence cooperation is also an attempt to adjust the Atlantic alliance to the alteration that has taken place in the balance between the United States and Western Europe, and to contain the strains and conflicts of interest unavoidable in such a long-term partnership. The initial imbalance between the United States as a nuclear guarantor and a global power and Western Europe as an area under protection paralleled a postwar disparity in economic strength which had disappeared by the end of the 1960s. As early as 1958, when the economies of Western Europe were rebuilding their armed forces and arms industries, Konrad Adenauer remarked that excessive dependence on the United States for security 'can and must not remain a permanent position . . . What are vital necessities for European states are not always necessary for the United States and *vice versa*. From this fact there may result differences in political ideas which could lead to independent action.' [5]

There are legitimate differences of interest between the United States and Western Europe. The United States is highly sensitive to events in the Caribbean and in Central America (although European governments can, by and large, take a more detached view). Conversely, developments in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean have the same immediate quality for the European allies. Even more striking is the way in which differences of interest and perception intertwine in approaches to the Middle East, where American political and economic investment in Israel

4. Trevor Taylor, *European defence cooperation*, Chatham House Paper No. 24 (London: RIIA/ Routledge & Kegan Paul, to be published in November 1984), p. 300.

5. Quoted in Alfred Grosser, *The western alliance: European–American relations since 1945* (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 168.

contrasts with European dependence on Arab markets and Arab oil. Probably most important of all, different understandings of the objectives and achievements of detente have led to a divergence of views on the conduct of East-West relations and the nature and severity of the Soviet threat. Although there are varying assessments among the Europeans themselves, there is a far wider gap between the attitudes towards the Soviet Union which prevail in the present American administration and those of most West European governments. Even if the administration in Washington were to change, a substantial gap would remain. As a global superpower the United States is sensitive to a much broader range of contingencies than are the Europeans. Indeed, seen from the continental United States, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has undertones of a clash of wills, 'destinies' and ideologies which echoes only faintly in the European debate.

Within a settled partnership these differences are more likely to be successfully managed. Within an alliance in which the United States still provides political leadership and sees itself providing the preponderant military contribution, they give rise to a sense of grievance on both sides: in the United States that the 'ungrateful' Europeans refuse on occasion to follow the American lead, and in Western Europe that the Americans appear unwilling to take into consideration specific European concerns.

The American sense of grievance with Europe's contribution to the alliance focuses most sharply on the 'inequitable' distribution of the defence burden. The statistics in the current posture statement submitted to the US Congress by Defense Secretary Weinberger make a striking comparison between the economic base of the United States, the European members of NATO and Japan, on the one hand, and that of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies on the other. In terms of combined gross national products, the former are nearly three times as strong as the latter. Almost equally striking is the fact that in 1982 the European members of NATO had a GNP that, at US$2.7 trillion, was significantly larger than that of the Soviet Union (US$1.7 trillion) and the other Warsaw Pact members (US$0.7 trillion) combined. In these circumstances, it is almost inevitable that Senator Mike Mansfield's old question about why 'rich Europeans' should rely so heavily on Americans to defend them against poor Russians comes back to the fore. It is true that the European allies provide a very large proportion of ready combat forces. Nevertheless, the commitment to Europe is still the largest single item in the American defence budget. This is all the more irksome now that Washington, having recovered from the post-Vietnam trauma, once again feels an increasing concern for its commitments outside Europe and sees its efforts as protecting European as well as American interests in containing Soviet power and maintaining international order.

In addition, there is growing American concern that without major steps by the allies to strengthen conventional forces, NATO will not be able to move away from a posture which both General Rogers and Senator Sam Nunn have described as little better than a delayed tripwire. Some of the European allies are seen as doing better than others; but unless all the Europeans contribute more to the provision of adequate conventional defence, the United States will have to face the probability that a war in Europe will escalate rapidly and irreversibly to the strategic level. In other words, European reluctance to share burdens is seen as imposing intolerable risks upon the United States.

Concern over what is regarded as an asymmetry of sacrifice in the alliance has led to a resurgence of congressional demands for American troop withdrawals from Western Europe. Although there had been murmurings of discontent as early as 1980, the most serious manifestation of congressional concern was the Nunn Amendment of June 1984. Senator Nunn, one of the leading congressional authorities on military issues and a senator renowned for his traditional pro-NATO stance, proposed that unless the European allies met their commitment, made in 1977, to increase defence budgets annually by 3 per cent, or else brought supplies of munitions up to the levels necessary for 30 days of conventional hostilities and improved airfield shelters and protective measures for American reinforcing tactical aircraft, then the United States should initiate a phased reduction of 30,000 troops per year for three years. The measure was defeated by 55 votes to 41; but a compromise amendment, proposed by William Cohen and overwhelmingly approved by the Senate, in effect freezes the level of American troops in Europe at 326,414 unless the Secretary of Defense is able to certify to Congress that the allies have taken 'significant measures' to improve their conventional defence capacity. If the Europeans are unable to respond quickly with practical and highly visible measures to the sense of grievance embodied in the Nunn Amendment and the Cohen compromise, Congress may well adopt even more restrictive measures. Yet those very problems which have made most Europeans reluctant to increase their defence spending to anything approaching the same level as Washington also make it harder to respond positively with initiatives which would dispel congressional frustration. In such circumstances, extensive cooperation becomes even more important as a way of demonstrating to the United States that the allies do, after all, take their defence seriously.

There are more positive reasons for moving towards more and better European defence cooperation, even if part of the incentive to do so is a desire to defuse congressional resentment. The debate over strategic issues which has developed in the last few years seems likely to intensify rather than abate—and there are several issues on which European perspectives and interests will probably differ from those of the United States. It has to be recognized that the imbalance in nuclear capacity between the United States and Western Europe ensures that the primary responsibility for strategic decisions will remain in Washington. Even so, the European interest in these matters is very considerable. As well as those initiatives which bear directly on Europe—such as the attempt to revitalize flexible response through the exploitation of emerging technologies—some issues such as strategic defence, which appear to be matters solely for the United States, will in practice almost certainly have far-reaching implications for the Atlantic alliance as a whole. The nature of the arms control agenda for the latter half of the 1980s is another issue which raises delicate questions about responsibility-sharing within the alliance. Such issues threaten to prove as intractable as they are inescapable. It is all the more important, therefore, that the European allies make efforts to coordinate their positions and policy preferences. Not only is this likely to increase their influence in Washington, but it should enable them to go beyond carping criticism of American policies and offer constructive suggestions of their own.

Another area in which decisive European action is needed is weapons procurement. The imbalance of transatlantic flows in procurement affects not only the European contribution to the debate on alliance strategy and tactics, but also

European economic and industrial interests. Some hopes were raised in the mid-1970s about the prospects of an effective 'two-way street' across the Atlantic in arms procurement. But in spite of some partial successes, scepticism is now widespread in Western Europe about the prospects for more balanced transatlantic collaboration, and it is generally accepted that future collaboration and trade-offs must be on a predominantly European basis. Recent estimates have talked of a 6:1 or even 10:1 imbalance in arms purchases in favour of the United States. The disparity is so great that it may adversely affect European reactions to such American defence initiatives as Caspar Weinberger's spirited espousal of 'emergent technologies'—given European suspicions that the new technologies will be sold to Europe by the United States on strict political and industrial conditions. But the limited nature of European cooperation in arms procurement makes it harder for Europeans to press their case effectively with the Pentagon, or to compete effectively with American industry. It is hard to make a two-way street out of one main road and thirteen footpaths.

The prevailing image of Western Europe in Washington, and among the American public at large, is of a Europe in decline. Britain is not singled out from this image of 'economic stagnation and political malaise', which American congressmen, officials and commentators have assembled[6] from observation of the Community's recurrent crises, the rise in European unemployment, well-publicized European concerns over a re-emerging technology gap, the recent strength of the peace movement and the 'Greens' in various European countries, and recurrent European criticisms of American behaviour, from El Salvador to Grenada. We do not accept the accuracy of this image: nevertheless we are forced to recognize the strength of its hold, the likelihood of its persistence, whoever wins the presidential election and whichever party controls Congress, and, therefore, the need for European governments to respond by working to allay US anxieties and to demonstrate the real strength of the European commitment to Western security.

NATO governments on both sides of the Atlantic committed themselves in 1977 to a 3 per cent annual increase in real defence expenditure for each of the next five years. Performance in meeting this target has been patchy. In 1980 and 1981, European NATO members achieved averages of 2.7 per cent; but this has since fallen to little over 1 per cent, and the commitment to roll forward the target of 3 per cent each year has now been abandoned. Technological inflation in the cost of major weapons systems creates new problems with each generation of equipment. Squeezed between American demands, the rising costs of research, development and procurement, competing demands for public expenditure, an economic recession which offers small prospects for future increases in revenue, and public resistance to higher taxation, European governments must perforce examine every possible avenue for greater cost-effectiveness through cooperation. This is all the more important when set against the imperative need now facing NATO to strengthen the conventional element in its deterrent posture—both to enhance credibility and to reassure domestic publics.

An additional argument in favour of European defence cooperation is that it may indirectly help to restore consensus in support of defence policy in European countries where bipartisanship on security issues has been eroded by the INF

6. The quotation is taken from a headline in *Newsweek*, 19 April 1984, part of a long feature article which expresses this image well.

deployment decision. Politicians outside France have looked with surprise and in many cases envy at the way a security consensus has been maintained there. Is this because in France there is a national defence policy to a much greater extent than elsewhere? Is it because elsewhere in Europe the cruise and Pershing II missiles were seen as transatlantic implants rather than related to indigenous defence concerns? In this connection, it is worth emphasizing that President Mitterrand's speech on 21 January 1983 to the Bundestag which urged West Germany to go ahead with the phased deployment of long-range theatre nuclear forces was all the more persuasive because it was clear that he was under no compulsion from the United States. Furthermore, some European political leaders have suggested that they believe it would be easier to rebuild a consensus for defence policies if, within the alliance, the European component could be more sharply defined. Although it may not be possible to duplicate the French experience on the wider European level, it seems likely that European publics might well be happier to feel that there was a more effective balance between European and American interests within the Atlantic alliance. It is asking too much of European defence cooperation as a 'miracle drug' to suggest that it would do away with all existing reservations about NATO's defence policies; but in the longer term a greater stress on the European dimension may prove to be beneficial.

One more argument, of particular importance to Britain, remains to be added. The complementarity of French and German concerns over each other's defence and security policies has fuelled a constructive dialogue between the two governments, and this has served to generate substantial pressure within Europe for closer collaboration in this field. In the light of continuing differences between Paris and Bonn over European defence and the security relationship with the United States, the defence clauses of the Elysée Treaty of 1963 had remained virtually inoperative until 1982. French concern with the rise of the German peace movement and the spectre of re-emerging sentiments of neutralism and nationalism—perhaps exaggerated, but powerful for all that — was then matched by German concerns about possible cuts in French conventional forces and by continuing French ambivalence over their nuclear and conventional commitments. The bilateral dialogue between the two governments has now been under way for two years; it is conducted through ministerial and heads-of-government meetings and through the regular workings of three 'commissions' on strategy, on military cooperation, and on arms procurement. German participants in this dialogue see its potential for drawing French forces back towards integrated defence, taking advantage of the current uncertainties of French defence policy. Some within France see its advantages as placing their government at the centre of the debate on European security without breaking the ark of the Gaullist covenant and re-entering the integrated structure of NATO. Within both governments there are those who see a vehicle for renewing progress towards the long-term goal of European Union—badly battered as it has been by the travails of the European Community.

Helmut Schmidt, in his call in the Bundestag on 28 June 1984 for Franco-German collaboration as the basis for European defence cooperation, made it clear that he felt the forces of inertia would hold Britain back from playing a full part in developing such cooperation. On the other hand there is some doubt among those from London who have listened to the rhetoric of Paris and Bonn whether there is much substance to match it. The change in the French orientation towards European defence has yet to be expressed in action. Furthermore, Britain can claim

that its commitment to the Federal Republic, symbolized by the British Army of the Rhine, is so strong that it does not need to be underlined by any change in declaratory policy. The current German enthusiasm for defence cooperation with France might seem an over-enthusiastic reaction to the return of a prodigal son, neglecting the sustained quiet loyalty of the elder brother; but symbols and rhetoric have their part to play, and a danger exists for Britain, unless it shows more enthusiasm for developing West European defence cooperation, of being relegated to the margins of the debate.

Priorities for European defence

As British pragmatists are fond of pointing out, it is much easier to sketch the outlines of European cooperation than to define the exact details in a shape which might earn the approval of all participating governments. So far, the imprecision of the concepts used has enabled very different governments and political parties on the continent to agree on the desirability of the general objective, while each adds as a gloss its own specific aims and reservations. There are many in Bonn and London who suspect that the French government's proposals to reactivate WEU lack much in the way of precise and binding plans for common action. The characteristic reaction of many in London might therefore be to dismiss the initiative as impractical, insubstantial and unlikely to succeed—as earlier British representatives dismissed the Messina negotiations in 1956 and the European Monetary System discussions in 1978. But the predominant German reaction, demonstrated in the discussions within the Franco-German defence dialogue so far, has been to take the initiative on its own terms and inject into it a number of specific issues of direct interest to German security and its European context: for instance, the future shape and structure of the French army, its commitment to the defence of central Europe, the role of nuclear weapons in French strategy, the conditions of allied access to military supply routes through France. The British government should now be seen to adopt a similar response: to determine its own specific interests in closer collaboration in European defence and to set out on that basis to persuade its partners that their interests and those of Britain can be combined to mutual advantage. Although Britain has already been more positive than it is often given credit for, it could be less inhibited in its support for strengthening the European pillar of NATO. Furthermore, Britain may yet have a vital contribution to make to ensure that a strengthened European identity does not become polarized in opposition to the United States. (This is not to deny that the Europeans collectively will, at times, find it necessary to assert priorities at odds with those of Washington.)

All European governments recognize how tightly their resources for defence are constrained. There is no public support for any further shift in spending from welfare to defence in any West European country. Short of an unanticipated recovery in the European economy, it will be extremely difficult for governments to increase real defence spending. Furthermore, demographic trends will make it difficult enough to maintain current troop strengths over the next decade, let alone increase them. One priority must therefore be to explain, and justify, European views, policies and budgets to the United States. A second, not always easy to reconcile with the first, must be to explain and justify those policies and budgets to the electorates of Western Europe.

If, as argued above, there are long-term, legitimate differences between American and European priorities in foreign and security policy, then it is very much in Britain's interest for the major European governments to articulate their views more intelligently and coherently in Washington. Both the Washington policy process and the various mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral consultation on European foreign policy have a capacity for incoherence which makes for repeated misunderstandings. On occasion (as in the early months of the Reagan administration in 1981) the structure of European Political Cooperation has been tellingly used to concert the messages European foreign ministers wished to convey; but there has been no sustained effort to concert European interests or to ensure that they are understood in the United States.

This is not a task which Britain can hope to undertake, unaided, any longer. The 'special relationship' is still valuable as a working relationship in intelligence, nuclear matters and other specialized military fields, and as a framework of goodwill. But it would be hard to argue that Britain's voice consistently carries greater weight in Washington than that of Federal Germany, or that Britain still has the authority or standing to act as a bridge between the two continents. In succession, the Falklands conflict (where American support was forthcoming) and the Grenada invasion (where consultation was not forthcoming) demonstrated the extent and the limits of the Anglo-American relationship. It is to Britain's advantage to operate as part of a West European caucus, and this in turn requires a clear definition of West European priorities, based on a reconciliation of the differing perspectives of European governments through a multilateral framework for consultation and common action.

It is unavoidable that American nuclear forces should predominate in the alliance; but the accompanying predominance of American strategists and strategic concepts is not so unalterable. Throughout the 1970s, European governments played a reactive role in the debate on alliance strategy. Their contribution to the associated debates over priorities in arms control was also inhibited, and largely limited to the conventional field. Although there has been a little discussion of security issues within the European Political Cooperation framework (most significantly in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its biennial 'review conferences'), and although there exist some active bilateral conversations between most European NATO members on politico-military issues, what is still missing is a European forum in which foreign and defence ministers can come together, without the dominating presence of the United States, to consider and concert their views on the balance between nuclear deterrence and conventional defence, on the nature of the Soviet threat, the implications of new technology for alliance strategy and tactics, and the advantages and risks of using space technology for strategic defence.

A prerequisite for the better representation of European views in Washington is, in turn, a conspicuous European response to American demands that Europe should contribute more to the common defence. The American demand is twofold: for a greater European contribution to the defence of the European continent and its northern and southern flanks; and for a contribution to the maintenance of order outside the NATO area—a burden which the United States sees itself as shouldering virtually alone. The response of the Europeans must reflect both aspects. In any case, budgetary constraints make it necessary for the Europeans to improve cost-effectiveness in defence expenditure, renewing efforts to rationalize

procurement, training and supply structures: objectives which were always in the interests of government but which are sharpened in importance by American pressure to shift additional resources into front-line defence.

The Western European governments have accumulated twenty years' experience of collaboration in arms procurement—some of it painful. Most of the early joint projects were bilateral, a few trilateral; not all had clear central direction, and it has not proved easy to provide an equitable distribution of costs and benefits on a project-by-project basis. As the joint projects initiated in the 1960s pass from development through production to deployment, there have been few new initiatives in recent years. The long agenda of potential common schemes has led so far only to the Anglo-Italian and Franco-German helicopter projects, agreed during the past year. European governments have little choice but to set out on a number of collaborative projects within the next five years. Unless they accept technological dependence on the United States and buy from across the Atlantic, the costs of national development and production of new major weapons systems (such as the future combat aircraft) are too high. If the next round of arms collaboration is to avoid the pitfalls of the last, Europe will have to evolve less cumbersome mechanisms for sharing the costs and the employment and technological benefits. This means a move away from *ad hoc* arrangements towards longer-term military and industrial collaboration across a range of projects.

The scope for making further economies in training and logistic costs will lie principally in the success that can be achieved in rationalizing weapons procurement. The European Logistics Coordinating Group (Eurolog) and the European Training Coordinating Group (Eurotrain) have in general worked well, if unspectacularly (although as subsidiaries of the Eurogroup they have excluded France). Some further rationalization as a means of cost saving is possible, but there are almost certainly no hidden 'pots of gold' to be found at the end of this rainbow. Defence money has been too tight for too long for either officers or officials to have disregarded possibilities for significant sensible savings. The idea of cutting support costs (the tail) to improve front-line fighting units (the teeth) has much superficial attraction. But it is not at all easy to achieve without reducing either efficiency or sustainability, or both. Nevertheless, there are useful savings to be made.

The economies that might result from a greater degree of role or task specialization within the alliance have long been discussed in NATO circles. The fundamental difficulties with the general proposition are threefold. First, there is concern that countries might give up more than they would take on, so as to result in a net loss of military capability. This concern persists. Second, countries have been reluctant to make concessions in their own national interest for the greater good of collective defence. There are some signs, however, that countries may be growing readier to concede some further loss of capability for independent action. Third, there are practical difficulties. Changes in national military force structures inevitably take a very long time to implement, especially in view of differing replacement cycles for equipment. Thus there is little likelihood that agreement on task specialization may come about quickly; and even if this did happen, there do not look to be significant, quick savings available. Yet another obstacle is the desire of the major European states to preserve their defence industrial bases. Nevertheless, a more sensible balance of tasks within NATO must remain one of the alliance's main goals. It is for the European countries to take the lead.

There are other initiatives that European security cooperation must consider. The logistics of individual forces within NATO are a national responsibility. The Agency for Military Standardization (MAS) has achieved considerable progress in this field by encouraging compatibility and some degree of commonality in material and procedural matters within NATO. It may be that the time has now come to consider the possibility of a European Defence Supply Agency, which would act as a stores purchasing, storing and distributing organization for the European military services. This would be a task on a similar scale to that of the United States Defence Supply Agency which, it is claimed, has made major savings in the US defence budget. There may be reasons why similar savings could not be achieved in Europe; but a prima facie case that they could exists.

The problems of increasing European defence capacities outside the NATO area are of a different order. Federal Germany still has strong political inhibitions about the use of forces except for national defence. Britain, France and Italy retain limited capacities for out-of-area intervention. We do not support the suggestion that it would be enough for European governments to offer to compensate in the European theatre for US troops redeployed to meet an emergency elsewhere, rather than to maintain a European capability for extra-European action. Such a course would threaten to increase, not lessen transatlantic tensions by committing European governments to the support of independent US interventions, whether or not they were satisfied with their objectives and with the consultations which accompanied them—but without the visible support, which is so important to American opinion, of European forces sharing the dangers and burdens of the conflict. What is needed is a European capacity for independent action in cooperation with the United States. The Sinai peacekeeping force, in which the despatch of troops from France, Italy, the Netherlands and Britain was agreed within the framework of European Political Cooperation, offers one example of a possible way forward. The Lebanon force, in which the combined Italian, French and British contingents considerably outnumbered the US marines but in which the direction of Western policy remained firmly in American hands, was a less positive example.

There is of course a wide range of ways in which the armed forces of European countries can become involved in situations outside the NATO area. They range from commitments to strict peacekeeping forces, as at present in Sinai, southern Lebanon and Cyprus and in the future possibly in Namibia, to intervention in support of a government under threat, as the French in Chad and the British, French and Italians in Lebanon. It would seem to be possible, on a variable geometry basis, for most of the European Community countries to assign forces to be available for such roles and for some common force planning and periodic training exercises to be undertaken. While some countries, particularly Ireland and Germany, might wish to restrict their forces strictly to peacekeeping functions, others would be ready to prepare for a wide range of combined rapid deployments.

Ways forward

Part of the difficulty in providing a clear prescription is that the idea of closer European security cooperation embraces a wide range of possibilities both short and long-term. These extend from augmented consultation procedures, in order to develop a coherent European viewpoint, to practical measures to improve joint procurement. There are differences, too, over who should be involved in these enterprises and the degree of institutional formality required. On 19 May 1984

The Economist suggested that the rationalization of European defence would be most profitably pursued through practical collaboration between the four major arms producers and military powers—France, Britain, Federal Germany and Italy—outside the unwieldy frameworks of formal multilateral organizations, beyond the glare of the press and the pressure of competing lobbies.

> In the Europe of Brussels, the business of bargaining national interests against each other is done in the full spotlight of public attention, so that each concession draws an indignant howl from the audience back home. Much the same is likely to prove true of the Western European Union. . . .It is too easy for the vested interests to block progress down these roads.

We recognize the problems but we do not accept the analysis. The record of collaboration so far among the major European arms producers does not suggest that such an approach in any way avoids the obstacles presented by domestic lobbies and entrenched industrial and service interests.

Two other objections remain. First, progress in European defence collaboration needs to be inclusive rather than exclusive, if it is not to broaden the gap which already exists between the larger and the smaller countries, thus aggravating 'free rider' tendencies within the smaller countries and reducing their contribution to the common defence. For these, common European procurement will sometimes mean the purchase of equipment from their larger neighbours at greater cost than the American alternative, without offsetting advantages. The rising costs of maintaining small forces incapable of defending the national territory on their own against any potential aggressor incline domestic critics to press for a reduction in defence expenditure and to rely on the protection offered by their larger partners. Yet the joint contribution of the smaller European members to the common defence remains significant. The design of a new framework for European defence must therefore be broad enough to offer them a share both in the policy-making and in the perceived benefits—which may, in turn, require the issue of European defence to be placed within a yet broader political and economic context.

Second, public visibility, whatever its drawbacks, is important: not only to demonstrate to our American allies that there is a real European commitment, but also to convince the European publics of the wisdom and accountability of our conduct of defence policy. Because of the need to signal to an over-anxious American public that Western Europe is shouldering an equitable share of the defence burden, the presentation of any initiative is almost as important as its substance. The credibility of alliance defence and security policies has been all too widely questioned within Western Europe in recent years; and it will not be re-established by intergovernmental consultations alone, conducted behind closed doors.

Consequently, one of the key issues with which any recommendation for enhanced European defence cooperation must grapple is the appropriate institutional basis. In this connection there are two problems. The first is that there is almost a surfeit of possible frameworks for greater collaboration in foreign policy, defence and security. The second is that each alternative has certain drawbacks. In these circumstances, the least unsatisfactory way forward is almost certainly to adopt an eclectic approach using different institutions for different purposes, and thereby move forward continuously along a broad front. This approach is less likely to encounter insuperable obstacles and would almost certainly facilitate steady, if not

always spectacular, progress. The implication of this is that the WEU initiative should provide only one part of a more comprehensive approach to European defence cooperation. Use should also be made of European Political Cooperation, which involves the ten member states of the European Community and will shortly extend to include Portugal and Spain, and of the Eurogroup, which also includes Norway and Turkey as European member states of NATO, but not France. There are a number of reasons for seeking to build on Political Cooperation and the Eurogroup rather than concentrating efforts within a smaller organization. The strongest is the link between Political Cooperation and the European Community: this allows for a broader trade-off between the costs and benefits of European cooperation in different fields, and for a degree of integration between economic and industrial cooperation and the defence procurement sector. Common funding for European research and development in military technology, perhaps to be extended in the longer term to common funding for procurement as a whole, would be most conveniently developed within the Community structure. As it happens, expenditure by EC member states in 1983 on defence equipment, at some 21–24 billion ECU, was broadly equivalent to the total existing budget of the Community. (Member states' total defence spending in 1983, at around 100 billion ECU, was roughly four times the cost of the EC budget.) Any progressive transfer of the costs of defence procurement from a national to a common basis, it should be added, would be likely to prove of disproportionate value to Britain, in contrast to the existing balance of Community revenue and expenditure.

We therefore support the Genscher–Colombo proposals of November 1981 for a more deliberate extension of the pattern of Political Cooperation into the security sphere, with the direct involvement of defence ministers and ministries. Such an innovation, together with the subordinate working groups of officials which would grow from it, would provide the basis for a parallel framework for European security cooperation, to bring together perspectives on strategy, the employment of nuclear weapons, East–West relations and arms control. Such discussions, and the debates on them in national parliaments and in the European Parliament, would benefit from the establishment of a European centre for strategic and political analysis, with access to confidential material but with a degree of autonomy from policy-making, similar in function to the Rand Corporation in the USA or the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Germany. An important part of the objective of European security cooperation, of the work of such a European centre for strategic analysis, and of national and European parliaments and the defence committees, would be to promote a better informed public debate within Europe on defence issues. European security cooperation and the proposed 'centre' would also improve the capacity of European governments to hold their own in the transatlantic dialogue on strategic issues.

The extensive structure of Eurogroup now covers working sub-groups on standardization of equipment, the development of common operational concepts and specifications for future weapons systems, the promotion of cooperation in military training and in logistics, and sub-groups on medical collaboration and communications systems. The refusal of France to join the Eurogroup on the grounds that it was too closely associated with the integrated structure of NATO led in 1975 to the creation of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which brings together the Eurogroup members and France. Much of the Eurogroup's initial activity in promoting arms collaboration was subsequently

transferred to this new body, which covers its more limited agenda relatively effectively. Although this has been involved mainly in matters of detail on defence procurement, its recent reply to Defense Secretary Weinberger's 'emerging technology' initiative provided a European analysis of the military implications of new technology as well as detailed analysis of European capabilities to share in common alliance procurement. There is thus an established structure for European defence collaboration in place, involving all European members of the Atlantic alliance and capable of bearing the weight of increased collaboration if governments wish to promote common objectives.

France and Germany, as we noted above, have provided most of the impetus from within Europe for closer defence cooperation. Although Italy and Belgium have supported their initiative, other European governments have been, at best, reluctant to accept the logic of more active and visible defence cooperation, at worst, obstructive. The Danish government was vigorously opposed to the security dimension of the Genscher–Colombo proposals; the Irish government, formally neutral, was hesitant. The Greek government of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement has gained a reputation in Political Cooperation for independence and obstructiveness. On a few occasions it has come close to preventing common action. The welcome the German government has given to the renewed French proposals for reviving Western European Union as the main forum for European consultation and cooperation within the Atlantic alliance reflects its impatience with these smaller governments and its determination that they shall not be allowed to block progress again. The episode has also highlighted the German government's acceptance of WEU as the way to bring France back into multilateral defence cooperation without forcing the French elite to disown the inheritance of Gaullism.

The institution of Western European Union offers an opportunity to provide a new political impetus for European defence cooperation, and a forum for involving the other major European governments—including Britain—in a debate the terms of which have so far largely been set from within France and Germany. The British government should welcome it on that basis, as providing the vehicle for relaunching the European debate on defence cooperation. But it should resist any further rebuilding of the redundant WEU structure, which can only threaten to separate cooperation in defence and security from wider European cooperation in economic and industrial policy, in external affairs and foreign policy. Article IV of the WEU Treaty states that 'Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military staffs of NATO for information and advice on military matters.' The same principle of resisting duplication should now be extended to the accumulated experience and working groups of Eurogroup, the IEPG, and European Political Cooperation.

The WEU forum may help to provide a sense of union, but much of the substance of defence cooperation will inevitably take place elsewhere. Indeed, it would be too high a price to pay for the reintegration of France into the defence of Western Europe if the flank countries were to be excluded from the structure of a common European defence. The same principle adduced by the French and German governments for the association of other governments with WEU—that it will be open to others to accede to the treaty if they wish not to be excluded—should apply to the French association with Eurogroup. It is now fifteen years since President de Gaulle left office; French perspectives on defence policy have shifted in the interval, leaving behind only a taboo which other governments must

now be ready to question. The disparity in membership between these overlapping organizations, with Ireland an active participant in Political Cooperation but, for historical reasons, not in NATO, and Norway and Turkey outside the European Community, raises more difficult questions. For Ireland, Denmark, and Greece, the argument for accepting a share in the responsibilities of European defence must be couched in terms of the broad balance of costs and benefits of European cooperation. All three derive substantial benefits from their membership of the European Community; Britain, Germany and France contribute, financially and politically, to those benefits, as well as making disproportionate contributions to the security of Western Europe. In the case of Norway and Turkey, a way must be devised to associate them, as non-members, with European political and security cooperation: not an insuperable problem, given goodwill on all sides. The aim must be to include, rather than exclude, in pulling together the efforts of West European governments in the common defence.

Conclusions

In the developing debate on European security, three fundamental conditions need to be met. The first is that the central position of France in European security must be acknowledged—and France's European partners must be sensitive to the historical legacies of the French position, while France in turn must be prepared to exhibit greater flexibility in the light of the political and military pressures demanding closer European cooperation. Second, while France, West Germany and Britain provide the central core, such cooperation must also accommodate and involve the other European members of the alliance. Third, the debate must be conducted as part of a broader attempt to strengthen the Atlantic alliance, ensuring more effective cooperation and consultation between North American and European members.

The need for more progress on European defence cooperation is now urgent. The purpose behind the Nunn Amendment will not go away. From now on, European defence performance will be scrutinized annually with increased vigour. Without an increase in European defence budgets, which is neither likely nor of the highest European priority, there is only very limited room for any short-term increases in European military capabilities. Reshuffling the existing 'pack' may produce a somewhat better deal—but will not result in more cards. The major areas for improvement lie in two fields.

In the hardware field, we need to build upon the proven success of the Independent European Programme Group. Meaningful progress in European arms collaboration must be tackled both at the industrial level and at the government level. European governments must offer to the European defence industries the opportunities which make mergers across national boundaries profitable—for only in this way can they compete with the US defence industries in world markets.

In the area of coordinating policy, a greater consensus must be obtained within Europe on the major strategic issues: how best to deal with the Soviet Union; the balance of nuclear and conventional forces; the reconciliation of NATO's military strategy with the mood of European public opinion. In this process, we believe that the Genscher–Colombo approach offered the best chance of providing a framework for discussion.

None the less, we believe that the new initiative, based on the French proposals for discussion within the framework of Western European Union, is appropriate

and timely; although, as we have made it clear earlier in this article, we do not consider that the WEU structure in itself represents the best basis on which to develop a stronger European pillar of the alliance.

The benefits of a new European defence initiative, in terms of significantly improved European defence capability, are unlikely to be seen before the late 1980s or early 1990s. However, a display of firm political will to create a new sense of identity and purpose for the defence community in Europe would strengthen deterrence and could help to forestall American action to reduce the levels of their forces in Europe, a move that would not be in the best interests of the United States, of Europe or of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole.

The British government formally welcomed the reopening debate on European defence, declaring in the discussion document which it distributed to Community heads of government before the Fontainebleau European Council of 25–6 June 1984 that 'our objective must be to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and improve European defence cooperation'. The discussion document goes on to argue, along lines closely parallel to those we have set out above, that 'we must be willing to look at new openings, including those offered by the WEU', and—on arms collaboration—that 'the general prospects . . . could be greatly improved by progress towards a more integrated European industrial and technological base, and by strengthening the Community's internal market'.

Yet the overall posture of the British government throughout 1983 and the first half of 1984 appeared to be one of scepticism, turning to reluctant interest as the debate progressed. The formal commitment to closer cooperation among armed forces was contradicted by decisions such as the imposition of higher charges for military exchanges and training schemes, leading the Dutch and German defence ministries to reconsider the extent of their exchanges with Britain. Proposals for arms collaboration were handled on a case-by-case basis, without the political commitment so evident in the Franco-German dialogue. There had been little discussion within the British press of the intensity of Franco-German exchanges, nor any evident ministerial attempts to draw public attention to the issue. The very intensity of the Franco-German dialogue, drawing in not only heads of government, ministers, military staffs and officials but also non-governmental experts and representatives of political parties in government and in opposition in a broad range of continuing exchanges, requires a more active British response. Without such a response there is real danger that Britain will be left on the sidelines of a new departure in European cooperation, risking damage to British political, security and industrial interests.

The roots of Soviet foreign policy*

CURTIS KEEBLE†

The conduct of relations with the Soviet Union has caused difficulty to successive British governments from the time of the October Revolution to the present day. The experience of Soviet diplomacy over two thirds of a century leaves us with the essentials of the problem unchanged but its significance sharpened by the rise of the Soviet Union to the status of a nuclear superpower. Is Chernenko's Soviet Union Lenin's state writ large, with its policies firmly rooted in the political philosophy of 1917? Does it really see the world order in terms of a struggle between socialism and capitalism, in which socialism will inevitably triumph and in which the task of Soviet foreign policy is to ensure that the transition is accomplished tidily and safely? Has the old imperial Russian drive been absorbed into the new philosophy to create a force, uniquely malign in character, whose relationship with the West is, by its own choice, one of hostility, modified only by expediency? Or is this major power now guided more by its practical interest than by its ideology and so beset with its internal and imperial problems that it has more to gain from stability than from conflict? Has it now become a power with which the West can create a relationship necessarily characterized by ideological confrontation, but, for all that, safe, stable and on occasion, mutually beneficial?

To pose the problem in these terms is, of course, to oversimplify it at the outset. There is in reality no simple choice among all-embracing policy concepts. In the real world, policy is the product of a multitude of separate acts, unrelated to any philosophical concept, often uncoordinated and not infrequently conflicting. Yet, ultimately, in all their facets, the policies of Western governments towards the Soviet Union turn upon certain assessments, conscious or instinctive, about the nature and objectives of the Soviet state. It may, of course, be argued that there is nothing very remarkable about Soviet policy; that in its essence it is merely the policy which is to be expected from a continental imperial power, newly risen to superpower status and faced with the need to consolidate the areas under its control, to sap the strength of its opponents and to develop the means for worldwide projection of its power. This it is. But we need to look beneath the external manifestation of Soviet policies to the roots from which they spring.

Through their history, their political structure, their economic resources, their geographical location, their beliefs, through a whole range of mutually interlinking factors, states develop the characteristics which make each of them unique as an international personality and unique in reaction to any given set of external circumstances at any given time. It is only too easy to judge international problems

* During 1983 the Royal Institute of International Affairs convened, as part of their programme of Soviet studies, a group under the chairmanship of Sir Curtis Keeble to consider the domestic roots of Soviet foreign policy. The outcome is a book to be published jointly by the RIIA and Heinemann in January 1985 under the title *The Soviet state: the domestic roots of Soviet foreign policy*. The present article is based on the concluding chapter of that book, drawing together the results of the group's work. References to individuals in the text are therefore to their chapters in the book.

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in terms of their observable elements and to underrate the psychology of the protagonists. 'What kind of people do they think we are?' said Churchill. We paid heavily for failure to understand in time what sort of state Nazi Germany was. We are still paying for the failure of successive British governments to understand in time the mood of postwar Europe and the psychology of the founders of the European Community. Lord Franks's report on the events which led to the Falklands War offers yet another illustration. Officials and ministers recognized a situation which was moving towards armed confrontation, studied it with care and reached a reasonable conclusion on the basis of the observable evidence. Their conclusion, as Lord Franks observed, 'proved to be a misjudgement' and prominent among the reasons was the fact that 'sufficient allowance was not made for the possibility of Argentina's military government, subject to internal political and economic pressures, acting unpredictably'. It is only too easy to overlook the fact that those who form policy in any country, no matter how great their political power, are constrained, to an extent which they themselves may not realize, by the political, social and ideological climate in which their own ideas have developed; by the geopolitical situation of their country; by the military and economic resources they can deploy; and by the individuals and institutions through whom they must operate. Dearly though we have paid for past misjudgements, the price of error in relations with the Soviet Union is of another order of magnitude.

It was with these considerations in mind that our group gathered in the autumn of 1983, under the auspices of Chatham House, to examine not so much the nature of Soviet foreign policy as the nature of the state and the society from which it stems.

Ideology and power

In the last year of the Brezhnev regime, after a lunch with Soviet guests in the British Embassy in Moscow, the discussion turned to the conservatism of the Orthodox Church. 'Well,' I said, 'there's nothing wrong with conservatism,' and, pointing across the river to the golden domes of the Kremlin, I added: 'There are plenty of good conservatives over there.' 'Yes, indeed,' commented one of our guests, a Soviet citizen of some distinction, 'conservatism and dogma, the twin pillars of the Orthodox Church and the Soviet state.' I often think back to that conversation when faced with the doctrinaire rigidity of Soviet policy.

The Soviet Union, greater in land surface than the United States, China and India put together, with twenty-two national groups each more than one million strong and a host of smaller ones, is all held in a tight central administration by a single party based on a single political ideology, but it does not lend itself to easy characterization in a few clean strokes. The picture is probably more accurate if we let the inconsistencies stand than if we try to iron them out. Moreover, the contributions by the members of our group are already heavily condensed, and to summarize them is to risk ending with no more than that collection of platitudes which forms the substance of so much contemporary discussion of the Soviet Union. Yet, if our studies are to be relevant to Western policy, we need to assess the ways in which the nature of the Soviet state may be reflected in its foreign policy. Only on this basis is it realistic to explore the kind of relationship which a Western democracy can reasonably expect to sustain with the Soviet Union.

Few people would suggest that Soviet policies always have their source in Marxist–Leninist theory, but it is in terms of this body of theory, elaborated and

codified by its guardians in the Party throughout the whole history of the Soviet state, that they must be argued and presented. Soviet writers see Marxism–Leninism as the ideological foundation on which is erected a 'principled' Soviet foreign policy, different in character from that of 'non-socialist' states. Up to a point they are right. There is a certain qualitative difference between the international conduct of those states which regard a codified ideology as the basis of foreign policy and those which follow a more empirical line. If policy is formulated in Marxist–Leninist terms by officials who have to act as though they believe that there is a scientific accuracy to the theory, the pressure is strong to fit the world into the ideological stereotype and formulate the stereotype solution. In any analysis, the use of a particular method of argument is a constraint on the solutions which can emerge. In a state where Marxist–Leninist indoctrination is all-pervasive, where Marxism–Leninism is the language of political discourse and where all decisions have to be justified in Marxist–Leninist terms, Soviet policy-makers are subject to a constraint which is not always fully perceived from the West. As a result of this, a policy emerges which is that of the tram, not of the bus. The lines are laid down and parallel with them runs the power. There are curves, there are points, there are possibilities of switching from one track to another, but those possibilities are constrained by the system, limited in scope and not easily extensible. Collision will produce a major hold-up.

Yet it would seem that the theory makes a presupposition of collision. 'The world outlook and class aims of socialism and capitalism are opposite and irreconcilable'[1], wrote Brezhnev. He was echoing Lenin, who, arguing that the international system of states was characterized by the struggle between socialism and capitalism, wrote: 'If we lose sight of this, we shall not put a single question correctly, even in the remotest corner of the world.'[2] A contemporary Soviet commentator, Nikolai Lebedev, is only one of the host who make the same point: 'The struggle between two systems, forming the axis of international life, conditions not only the foreign policy of states with different social structures but also the development of the whole system of international relations.'[3] In one form or another, this basic tenet underlies all Soviet foreign policy. We delude ourselves if we believe otherwise. But if a dogma is to serve as the basis for the government of a state it must have its built-in escape clauses. For it is by the power of the state that those who preach the dogma survive, and it serves them little if the purity of the dogma survives only in the ruin of the state.

So Brezhnev used to assert that Marxism–Leninism was not a dogma, but a 'guide to action', and the younger Gorbachev took the same line: 'Leninism is not a collection of congealed dogmas and ready made recipes, but a theory and method of dialectical thinking and analysis'.[4] There is in fact, within the Party, some room for different trends in the development of Marxist–Leninist theory and its application to practical policy. There is also room for tactical flexibility. Lenin can be cited as the authority for this, as indeed for all else: 'We learnt to be flexible, to change our tactics quickly and sharply, taking account of changes in the objective

1. L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's course: speeches and articles*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Progress, 1975), pp. 94–5.

2. V. I. Lenin, *Collected works*, Vol. 41, p. 242, as quoted in N. I. Lebedev, *Velikii Oktiabr i perestroika mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).

3. Lebedev, *Velikii Oktiabr*, p. 19.

4. M. Gorbachev, 22 Apr. 1983, Lenin anniversary address, in *Pravda*, 23 Apr. 1983.

conditions, choosing a different course to our goal if the former one showed itself inappropriate or impracticable at some given time.'[5] Like most religions, Marxism–Leninism has enough precepts to justify virtually any conceivable course of policy, and where a long-term Soviet goal or an overriding Soviet interest requires tactical flexibility, it can go a long way. A doctrine which with no audible hiccup can swallow the pact with Hitler can comfortably accommodate the combined strategic requirements of the imperial legacy of Russia and the contemporary demands of the socialist community. We have seen substantial adaptation and, indeed, reversal of policy in the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty and the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. We have seen a measure of flexibility in the final stage of the Madrid CSCE Review Conference. At a technical, but nevertheless politically significant level, we saw some flexibility in the later stages of the Law of the Sea negotiations. Yet, for all this, changes of course are not easily or quickly attained in a system which is ideologically based and centrally controlled and which lacks an effective machinery for the generation and advocacy of heterodox policies.

It would be idle to suppose that matters will change substantially in the foreseeable future. The ideology will not be abandoned. With the passage of years we can expect it to inhibit rather than to inspire policy, and with the demonstration of its irrelevance to the pressing problems of the day, we can expect to find it progressively less useful as a guide to developments. But those who have been reared in it, cynical though they may be about it, will not escape its influence. The inherent inflexibility and doctrinal hostility will last for many decades yet, and will demand tenacity and firmness on the part of those in the West who have to deal with the Soviet government.

Russian history and Marxist–Leninist philosophy coincide to produce an obsession with power, both political and military, internal and external, which may perhaps legitimately be called a national instinct. What Lenin understood was, above all, the manipulation of power, and today the Soviet leadership look at foreign policy in terms of a 'correlation of forces', a correlation in which, on the Soviet side, they rely upon military power plus socialist doctrine. The official history of Soviet foreign policy states: 'The source of the power and authority of socialist foreign policy is, above all, the might of the Soviet state and the advantages of the socialist system.'[6] The socialist system may be a doubtful prop, but the need to sustain it represents a major policy input. So it is that two principal threads of contemporary Soviet foreign policy begin to come together. In his study of the historical and ideological basis of Soviet policy, Professor Hugh Seton-Watson has drawn attention to the 'either/or fallacy' of seeing ideology and security as alternative motive forces.[7] I would go further. The mantle of Marxism–Leninism has been slipped smoothly over the imperial heritage, shaping itself to the broad shoulders on which it rests. We have to deal today with a power which, over the centuries, has sought security against the threat and the reality of invasion across open land frontiers by the constant extension of its power into areas beyond those frontiers. Having done so, it has found the need to secure tranquillity within areas newly brought under control as well as stable, compliant administration in those adjacent to the imperial frontier. Not that the craving for security has been the

5. Lenin, *Works*, Vol. 44, p. 151.

6. A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev, *Soviet foreign policy* (Moscow: Progress, 4th edn. 1981), p. 11.

7. H. Seton-Watson, 'The historical roots', ch. 2 in Keeble, ed., *The Soviet state*.

sole motive force. The great periods of Russian expansion were characterized by a drive to the east, the south and the west—and, for that matter, to the north too—for which the sheer urge of power must be seen as a motive at least as powerful as the need for security. So it was when the imperial legacy was taken over by the Soviet state and the Tsarist policy replaced by a Leninist one. There was little reason to be surprised at the way in which the Soviet army was used to establish and to sustain control over Eastern Europe, or, more recently, over Afghanistan. The objective factors of geopolitics and imperial management must in many respects determine the course of Soviet policy as they did the course of Russian policy.

Yet to see contemporary Soviet policy simply in terms of an adaptation of Russian imperialism is as misleading as to see it simply in terms of Marxist–Leninist doctrine. The doctrine does of course provide a convenient justification for the use of Soviet power outside the boundaries of the Soviet state. Soviet theorists do not need to advocate the export of revolution and indeed they firmly disavow it. It is enough for them to proclaim the scientific inevitability of revolution and to analyse any situation of conflict in terms of a struggle between socialism and capitalism, in which socialism must win unless it is frustrated by the forces of reaction. It is classic Soviet doctrine that the imperialist powers seek to 'arrest the onward march of history' by the 'export of counter-revolution'. If 'socialism' triumphs, the logical consequence is the addition of a new area to the 'socialist community'. If, on the other hand, this natural course of events is interfered with, the 'peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union' requires action to 'promote . . . the triumph of the new and revolutionary over the old and obsolete'.[8] At the level of socialist theory it all fits very tidily into place as a justification for the external deployment of Soviet political and military power.

It is easy enough to set out a case based on quotations such as these and to demonstrate how they are applied in practice; for instance, in the way the official Soviet chronology of international events notes for 21 August 1968: 'Entry into Czechoslovakia . . . of Soviet military units . . . to help the working people of that country safeguard their revolutionary achievements against encroachments by internal and external enemies of socialism'; to point to Soviet policy in relation to situations of conflict in the Third World; and to conclude that we are faced with a peculiarly malevolent and expansionist conjunction of historical tradition, doctrinal precept and brute power. In various forms an analysis on these lines inspires much current thinking about the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. It contains much that is correct. In our study of the domestic roots of Soviet policy we have, however, questioned whether as an analysis it is adequate.

If the foreign policy decisions of the Soviet leadership reflect their estimate of the power of their state and their ideology, what is that estimate likely to be? After sixty-seven years of Soviet rule, how stable and how strong is the Soviet state? Patriotism may be an old-fashioned word, but the loyalty of the Russian to his country and its rulers is a powerful force. Such direct observation as is possible for a foreign observer suggests that an innate Russian patriotism has, to a significant extent, been transformed into a Soviet patriotism. The Soviet Union is not a wholly artificial creation and the Russian heritage has been carefully cultivated by the Soviet state. In the battle of Kulikovo on 8 September 1380, Prince Dmitri threw back the Tartars and established the supremacy of Moscow. In 1980, the six

8. Gromyko and Ponomarev, *Soviet foreign policy*, p. 22.

hundredth anniversary of Kulikovo was the subject of much official celebration. From Kulikovo through Borodino to Stalingrad and the eventual victory in the 'Great Patriotic War', most of today's Soviet citizens see a continuing tradition of which they feel themselves a part. So, in having harnessed the historical element of Russian patriotism to the Soviet state, the leadership may feel reasonably content. They have, moreover, had some success in establishing the forces of 'imperialism' in the popular mind as the external foe, in a direct line of descent from all those who through the centuries ravaged Russian soil. The emotional scars of war are much traded on by the propagandists, but they are real. It is scarcely surprising that with 1941 still alive in the memory of the older generation, and the allied intervention of 1918 embedded in the folk memory, the current Soviet line about the dangers of American militarism and the threat posed by NATO weapons systems in Western Europe should find a certain resonance among the Soviet public. Similarly, the Chinese threat can be conjured up to awaken ancient fears. Although we may expect the ideological drive of Soviet policy to continue to weaken, the influence of old style Russian patriotism is likely, if anything, to increase. The signs are already there, and the more tense the international scene, the stronger this factor will become.

Social problems

When we turn to an examination of Soviet society and the Soviet economy, we see more reason for concern on the part of the leadership. The pattern is, however, by no means consistent. Our study of Soviet society produces a double image. On the one hand, we find little to suggest that the stability of the Soviet state is itself under immediate threat. On the other, we see massive evidence of a corrosive malaise in society. Much has been written about the consequences of the change in the population structure as a result of the difference in birth rates between the Russian and the Central Asian peoples of the Soviet Union, a change the effects of which are already apparent and could within a few decades become dramatic. Yet, while this poses social and economic problems, it was Alastair McAuley's view that there is not today in the Central Asian Republics a serious menace to stability in classic 'nationalist' terms.[9] The menace may, however, develop if the regime fails to solve the economic and social problems of the region. It may also develop in those other republics, the Baltic states, the Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia, where the political focus of dissident nationalism is always latent. It must, in this multi-nation state, be a constant source of concern, and in various specific ways it is a constraint on foreign policy. There exist differing views on this issue. Certainly, nationalism in the Baltic states has been a constraint on any post-Helsinki easing of external contacts, and the potential risk of Central Asian nationalism a constraint on relations with the Muslim world. These specific factors aggravate the natural inclination of the regime to nervous hostility externally and repression internally, but are not such as to constitute a major inhibiting factor in terms of the leadership's assessment of the power at its disposal.

When we considered the other aspects of the social structure of the Soviet Union today, the picture became substantially more complex and, for the leadership, less reassuring. David Lane made the point that this is a changing society, one which,

9. A. McAuley, 'Nation and nationalism in Central Asia', ch. 4 in Keeble, ed., *The Soviet state*.

in the process of modernization, is becoming more differentiated.[10] The significance of this differentiation, for a political system derived from elementary concepts of a relatively primitive social structure, should not be underestimated. Within a lifetime, the Soviet Union has moved from Lenin's society of workers and peasants to a substantially more complex structure, in which the top strata of those with a vested interest in the system of government have been broadened and strengthened, but in which, beneath them, the underlying strata are beginning to show the fissile characteristics of a more sophisticated state. Our discussions endorsed David Lane's judgement that internal changes in population and social structure do not seem likely to lead to serious problems of political legitimacy. Indeed, one may say that the Soviet Union need not be seen as an inherently unstable society. That said, the social problems are profound, the system is essentially brittle and the strains upon it are severe. Central to them is the problem of the relevance and effectiveness of the Party's philosophy. There is no doubt that one of the characteristic features of the Soviet Union today is the prevalence of cynicism about the Party's ideology and disillusionment about its ability to make the state function in a way which will meet the more complex economic and social requirements of contemporary society. The Central Committee report to the 26th Party Congress in 1981 contained a section entitled 'Strengthening the material and intellectual foundations of the socialist way of life and the moulding of the new man'. In the 'moulding of the new man', said Brezhnev, 'we are faced with quite a few problems'. Later, dealing with the Party's ideological work, he complained of the 'general verbiage' which made people switch off the television or set aside the newspaper and he reminded his audience that it was one thing to address people who were inadequately trained and had little education, but another to speak to the present-day Soviet citizen. Not only are those who ought to be the 'new men'—or at least the parents of the 'new men'—cynical about the ideology; they are depressingly like the old Adam of Tsarist Russia in their addiction to vodka, in their corruption when they have access to the levers of power—levers which in a socialist state are multiplied in number and enhanced in effect by the full scope of the state's power—and in their disinclination to work harder than is necessary to secure their daily bread. While Oblomov is still in his bed, the young are becoming more inclined to ask awkward questions and are showing a taste for some of the frothier manifestations of Western society. The symptoms of social stress are visible in the increased incidence of abortion and divorce.

This is not necessarily the pattern of a society which is disintegrating, but it is evidence of a malaise which can sap the power base and, with that, the self-confidence of the Party. It necessitates remedial action. This action is in essence domestic, but it has a direct effect on foreign policy, in that it incorporates an enhancement o at internal repression which, more than any other characteristic of Soviet domestic policy, aggravates relations with the West. All this has been made apparent in the policies pursued since Brezhnev's death. At the first Lenin birthday celebration after Andropov took over, the keynote speech was given by Mikhail Gorbachev, still in his fifties and representative of the younger generation of Politburo members. It was, *inter alia,* a call for moral revival: 'We cannot assume that the young will automatically take over the legacy of the ideas and morals of their mothers and fathers. . . We live in conditions of the bitterest

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ideological confrontation. . . There is no place in our society for illusions of permissiveness and impunity.'[11] Calls for an improvement in the ideological work of the Party, for greater discipline and for higher moral standards, have been a feature of recent Party pronouncements. Alongside the attempt to revitalize the economy, a reform of the educational system was one of the few initiatives of the brief Andropov regime and it is interesting that it was introduced by Chernenko. The aim was not just to instil knowledge but, as the Central Committee put it, to increase vigilance against imperialist attempts to take advantage of the 'lack of political sophistication among the young'.[12] Soviet citizens, they proclaimed, must be educated to be citizens of a socialist society, active builders of communism, with all the inherent qualities this required.

It is one thing to kindle and to sustain the enthusiasm of those who make a revolution. It is another to rekindle enthusiasm in a generation which has lost it. The regime has, no doubt, few illusions about the difficulty of the task which confronts it and it can scarcely be optimistic about its chances of success. Many of the values it seeks to inculcate would have commended themselves to a Victorian Methodist—hard work, sobriety, honesty, respect for society and even for the family. The problem lies less in the values than in the philosophy to which the Party tries to harness them.

If, as we have noted, Soviet foreign policy claims to derive its strength in part from the power of the state and in part from the socialist philosophy, then in so far as the latter is weakened, the need to rely upon the former is, if anything, enhanced. Current Soviet policy is consistent with an awareness of this. The call for vigilance against imperialist moral subversion requires an intensified campaign against any who may be seen as its agents within the Soviet Union—the Helsinki monitoring groups, the dissenting intellectuals and that alternative focus of loyalty, the Church. It requires a direct effort to block Western influence by measures such as the jamming of radio broadcasts. Against the background of John Lawrence's chapter on the growing strength of religion in the Soviet Union,[13] it was revealing to see *Pravda* find it appropriate to begin a leading article[14] on the need for better atheist propaganda with the double-edged affirmation that religion would disappear in step with the development of socialism. A few weeks later,[15] it was the writers who were being exhorted 'in a situation of bitter opposition of two world systems' to 'uphold the Soviet way of life' and 'unmask the intrigues of the enemies of peace'. The note of concern is apparent. Despite the barrage of internal and external propaganda, there is a sterile defensiveness to Soviet policy in international contact at the personal and cultural level and perhaps even some sign of a lack of self-confidence in the relationship with non-ruling communist parties in other countries. At the same time, the emphasis upon the Soviet armed forces as the guardians of the Soviet state and the international socialist community is clear. To quote Gorbachev again: 'Surrounded by the love of the whole people and the care of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the armed forces of the Soviet Union vigilantly safeguard the peaceful life of the Soviet people, of the

11. Gorbachev, Lenin anniversary address.
12. CC draft decree on educational reform, 4 Jan. 1984.
13. J. Lawrence, 'Religion in the USSR', ch. 5 in Keeble, ed., *The Soviet state*.
14. *Pravda*, 14 Dec. 1983.
15. *Pravda*, 3 Feb. 1984.

whole community of fraternal socialist countries.'[16] With the domestic power base of the Soviet Union affected by cynicism and systemic inefficiency and the external power ratio prejudiced by the failure of the attempt to prevent the NATO development of cruise and Pershing missiles, we must expect a determined effort, internally and externally, to redress the balance. Yet existing adverse internal trends are likely to be intensified. The social malaise is likely to deepen as the regime fails to satisfy the material or spiritual needs of the younger generation. The internal and external decline of the ideology will continue, making both internal discipline and external force the more necessary if power is to be sustained.

Economic problems

The spread of cynicism among the younger generation about the Party and its philosophy may be potentially the most serious problem confronting the leadership, but the inefficiency of the economy is probably the one to which the greatest effort is currently being devoted. The potential strength and practical problems of the economy are linked at every point to the power and the doctrine of the Soviet state. The strength is essentially that of the natural resources which give this country a unique potential for self-sufficiency—not total, but very substantial—at the superpower level. It is a potential of which the leadership are fully conscious and it does much to colour their thinking. Siberia, with its oil, gas, coal, iron, timber, copper and much more, is a powerful psychological and practical symbol of Soviet resources. Yet, despite all the resources of Siberia, all the grain of the Ukraine and the cotton of Central Asia, despite all the potential economic power within their grasp, the leadership are fully aware that their economy, as at present organized, is failing to meet the full needs of the state.

The system can make impressive achievements when it marshals the full resources of the state in the attainment of an overriding objective, be it the re-equipment of the forces after 1941, the creation of a nuclear strike capability, the rural electrification programme, the provision of basic modern housing or the space programme. It is able today to meet the equipment requirements of the armed forces, but it is not able to produce and distribute the necessary total flow of goods of a sufficiently high quality to meet this objective, while at the same time providing adequately for the Soviet consumer and supporting Soviet foreign policy. So, in the essentials of its economic policy, the leadership is brought back again to the twin bases of its policy: power and doctrine. If the people are discontented they are the more likely to question the doctrine and weaken the system. If the armed forces go short, the physical power of the state will be prejudiced. And the price of remedying economic deficiencies may be the system itself.

The primary task of the economy, as defined in the current five-year plan, is to 'ensure the further improvement of the Soviet people's well-being'. Throwing away the jargon at his last Party Congress, Brezhnev put the problem in these terms: 'What we are discussing—food products, other consumer goods and services—are part of the everyday life of millions upon millions of people. People go to shops, canteens, laundries every day. What can they buy? How are they welcomed? How are they spoken to? How much time do they spend on all sorts of household chores? It is on the strength of how these problems are solved that people largely

16. *Gorbachev, Lenin anniversary address.*

judge our work. They judge it strictly, exactingly.'[17] Everyone who has lived in the Soviet Union knows that implicit in the question is the answer. The people are not satisfied. In their dissatisfaction lies an element of considerable significance for the future development of the Soviet state. For half a century or more the basic and urgent needs of a rather simply structured society could be met with reasonable adequacy by the application of centrally controlled resources. Now, as a more complex society develops more complex requirements, the inherent inadequacy of the economic system is becoming ever more cruelly exposed, not least by the growing recourse to a secondary 'black' economy. For the older generation the state's achievements in terms of the housing programme brought a substantial and demonstrable improvement in living standards, but now a younger generation takes those achievements for granted and is bitterly critical of the failings. So the existing social strains are intensified, the questioning of the doctrine grows and the ultimate power of the Party is eroded.

However, while the well-being of the people is defined as the primary task of the economy, the first charge upon the economic resources of the state is the defence programme. The central planning system may be inefficient in meeting consumer needs, but it is essential and effective in ensuring that the armed forces secure the equipment they require, and if, in a tense international situation, the consumer has to tighten his belt, he will do so. The need to make available the resources required by the forces does, however, begin to impose a certain pressure so to manage the foreign policy of the state as to contain those requirements.

There can be little dissent from the assertion that the problems of the economy are inherent in the system of centrally planned state control. The symptoms are various: managerial inefficiency, unresponsiveness to demand, inflexibility, poor quality, poor distribution and a deplorable service sector. The list could be longer. The point is that an effective solution requires radical change in the system, yet to effect such change would be to cast aside a central element of the structure of the state, with the risk of further disintegration and also of direct prejudice to the claims of the defence sector and of all those whose personal position is bound up with the present system. Lenin had the courage to introduce a New Economic Policy, but Khrushchev failed when he tried to effect a radical shake-up of the system; in the last thirty years, while the problems have multiplied, the remedies have rarely gone beyond a mixture of exhortation and tinkering. David Dyker, Alec Nove, Alan Smith and Edwina Moreton have, in their separate studies, analysed different sectors of the economy and shown how, in each, the leadership's freedom of manoeuvre is limited by the constraint of the system.[18] Now, under Chernenko, a new commission is to try yet again. The fact that it is headed by Gorbachev, who must be the strongest contender for the eventual succession, suggests a readiness for drastic action, yet it must still be questionable whether there are any measures which, in a state the size of the Soviet Union, can introduce the necessary economic stimuli without at the same time transforming the character of the state. To do so would be to move into uncharted waters, with great potential

17. 23 Feb. 1981, Moscow.

18. D. Dyker, 'Soviet industry in its international context'; A. Nove, 'Soviet agriculture: problems and prospects'; A. Smith, 'International trade and resources'; and E. Moreton, 'Comrade colossus: the impact of Soviet military industry on the Soviet economy', chs. 6, 7, 8 & 9 respectively in Keeble, ed., *The Soviet state*.

for gain and for loss so far as the leadership are concerned and, indeed, in terms of Soviet foreign policy.

In considering the economic roots of Soviet foreign policy we have, however, taken the economy essentially as it is. The first of the direct inputs which one may note is the self-confidence which stems from the size of the country's resource base. There is a certain sense that, no matter what troubles may befall the Soviet Union, it has the sheer size and the materials to be invincible. Allied to this is the fact that there is no overpowering drive to secure access to new sources of strategic materials. There are, as we have noted, factors making for expansion, but economic pressure is not one of them. Indeed, in a sense, the economy works in the opposite direction. The leadership's inability to develop it to the full means that policy is constrained by a lack of deployable, as compared with potential, resources. There is thus a need to contain the economic cost of existing commitments and to weigh carefully the cost of new ones. Imperial policies contain a nice balance of gain and loss. In the early stages, gains of territory and power bring a material as well as a psychological boost to the centre, a return which a leadership may judge sufficient to justify the cost. Later, as the expansionist zeal diminishes and the economic burden of client states increases, the balance begins to look different. Cuba is estimated to cost the Soviet Union the equivalent of some four billion dollars each year. There must have been occasions in recent years when the governor of the Soviet central bank, contemplating the depletion of his foreign exchange reserves as a result of grain purchases, begrudged the cost of support for Cuba. No doubt the Politburo judgement was that the price was worth paying, or, at least, that a refusal to pay it would have raised unacceptable doubts about the Soviet Union's ability to sustain its allies. Andropov himself, however, in his speech at the June 1983 Plenum of the Central Committee, made clear the limitation upon the Soviet ability to help even those countries 'in the ex-colonial world which have chosen a socialist orientation'.[19] 'It is,' he said, 'one thing to enunciate socialism as an objective, but another to build it.' The socialist countries 'are rendering them aid in the field of politics and culture, and are promoting the strengthening of their defence. We assist also, within our capabilities, their economic development. But, in essence, that development, like the entire social progress of these countries, can of course result only from the labour of their own peoples and the correct policy of their leaderships.'

Within the 'socialist community' of Eastern Europe the requirement for the maintenance of political and military control must be the dominant factor and it must be held to justify some economic cost, but that cost needs to be contained and where possible offset by an economic as well as a political return. To this end, it has been in the Soviet interest, while developing a Soviet-dominated economic integration, to permit a relatively wide degree of latitude to the CMEA members in the development of their own economies, including trading links with the West. The experience of Poland showed that, in economic as in political terms, those countries did so at their own risk and that, at the end of the day, solvent or not, they would have to accept the Soviet strategic requirement.

The constraint of the Soviet economy, then, will compel the leadership to contain the cost of overseas commitments and to deploy resources in close relationship to the strategic importance of the area concerned—although the resources of the

19. 16 June 1983, Moscow.

printing and arms industries make it relatively easy to pursue more lavish policies in the supply of somewhat dated dogma and weapons than in more costly items.

It may in this context be relevant to note that low productivity is reflected in a chronic manpower shortage. It is normal to employ the armed forces on civilian tasks in an attempt to remedy some of the more critical deficiencies. If the real or perceived needs of the Soviet Union require them to be used for military purposes there will be no hesitation about leaving the civilian economy in the lurch, and it must not be supposed that civilian needs will be allowed to detract from the defence effort; but the labour shortage must tend to enhance those other factors which militate against external adventure.

In terms of relations with the industrialized Western countries, the weaknesses of the Soviet economy provide an interesting linkage with foreign policy, but one which is substantially more complex than is sometimes assumed. In a world where the use of armed force by one major power against another carries with it the risk of mutual annihilation, there has been an urgent and largely ineffectual search by the Western nations for some alternative sanction by which to prevent the arbitrary violation of accepted international standards. Inevitably this has led to recourse to economic sanctions. The conclusion one may draw is that the weakness of the Soviet Union in certain specific areas of technology, combined with more fundamental failings in agricultural policy, have led to a situation in which some potential for economic pressure may exist. The very deficiencies of the Soviet economy can, however, be exploited politically against the West and this has been well understood by the Soviet leadership since the earliest days of the revolution. The linkage of trade and politics which was seen in one aspect in the period of detente and in another during the Afghan and Polish crises, can be traced back to the Genoa conference in 1922. Lenin welcomed the conference as an opportunity 'to bargain for the most proper and most advantageous and politically suitable terms for trade'. 'We should,' he said, 'without concealing our communist views, confine ourselves to a brief and passing mention of them (for instance, in a subordinate clause).' But at the same time there was the political objective: 'Everything possible and even impossible should be done to strengthen the pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie . . . to disunite the bourgeois countries that will be united against us at Genoa.'[20] Sixty years on, in a time of economic recession, the Soviet Union showed once again over the Siberian gas pipeline how the shortcomings of its own technology may still serve as a political lever to prise apart its Western opponents. It may, in the context of external economic policy towards the West, be appropriate also to mention Soviet shipping and aviation policy as an area where commercial and strategic interests are closely aligned and where the state monopoly can be effectively used to pursue Soviet interests. This is, in fact, an area where the Soviet Union, operating in an environment not under its own control, has achieved remarkable success in exploiting Western laxity and may, by its consequent over-extension, have placed itself in a situation of some vulnerability.

We can thus see Soviet foreign policy influenced in four ways by Soviet technological weakness: first, by the desire to acquire overtly or covertly Western technology; secondly, in the wish to negotiate for a containment of the more sophisticated areas of competition in defence technology; thirdly, in the wish to stabilize the relatively favourable present balance of weaponry; and fourthly, in

20. Lenin, Draft decision on the tasks of the Soviet delegation at Genoa, 24 Feb. 1922.

working to create disunity between the Western powers. In all this, the Soviet leadership has room for tactical manoeuvre, for a balancing of political and economic objectives, and for flexibility in attaining them. At the same time we may expect—and this is crucial for Western policy—no yielding to economic pressure where strategic essentials are judged to be at stake.

Foreign policy formation

Foreign policy is the product not of a mathematical balancing of different factors, but of the separate and collective will of individuals and institutions in the application of available resources. The final sections of our study show how the collective will is, in the Soviet Union, in respect of the major issues of peace and war, the will of the central, supreme leadership of the Party. It is Malcolm Mackintosh's contention that it is wrong to assume, at this level of decision-making, a separate and distinct military voice.[21] It would be more accurate to see the military as the guardians of that ultimate power by which the Party and the state are preserved, a sector of society which can virtually dictate the resources it requires, but not the use to which they are put. It is impossible to say that there will not in the future be a trial of strength between the military and political leaderships. All it is possible to say is that it does not appear to exist now and that the institutional structure is such as to militate against it in the future.

In fact, if there is one dominant characteristic of the institutional structure, it is that the much-vaunted 'democratic centralism' sharply accentuates not merely the unity of control but also the rigidity of policy. Here we come back to the twin pillars, conservatism and dogma. It is not that there is no debate about policy. It is rather that, at all levels within the institutions of the Soviet state, cautious conformity is likely to produce moderate reward with minimal risk, while dissent will sharply increase the risk, with little likelihood of compensating reward. The institutions are concerned either with the implementation of centrally determined policy, or, in the case of those which are responsible for policy formulation, with the pursuit of Soviet interest by the application of doctrinal precedent and accepted practice. It is in the nature of bureaucracy to be secretive. In this respect, Soviet bureaucracy, building upon a long Russian tradition, excels. Reinforcing bureaucratic secrecy with priestly dogmatism, it ensures that policy is determined within the responsible organizations by processes largely obscured from public view, and communicated to the people only for approbation and implementation. Archie Brown has rightly pointed out that the Soviet Union is not the monolith portrayed by its propagandists or its critics.[22] There is indeed the possibility of public, licensed, criticism of official shortcomings and misdemeanours through the press and the Party organs, and there is, for the *conoscenti*, even some public debate about policy. Yet Soviet policy is inherently more rigid than that of Western democracies, and the secrecy which surrounds foreign policy formation is itself a factor in determining the substance of that policy. By largely eliminating the possibility of public challenge, it powerfully reinforces continuity, and to that extent, incidentally, makes Soviet foreign policy more predictable. This can be a

21. M. Mackintosh, 'The military role in Soviet decision-making', ch. 12 in Keeble, ed., *The Soviet state*.
22. A. Brown, 'The foreign policy making process', ch. 13 in Keeble, ed., *The Soviet state*.

source of strength to the Soviet Union, but it can also produce those harmful genetic consequences which can attend any excessive inbreeding.

Against this background, the course of Soviet foreign policy in recent years ought to have given us little cause for surprise. Our problem in predicting it has been essentially a problem of understanding from a Western viewpoint the Soviet evaluation of the factors in any international situation. If we give only the most cursory glance to those instances in which the Soviet Union has done most to affront international opinion—the occupation of Afghanistan, the repression of the Solidarity movement in Poland, the shooting down of the Korean airliner and the repression of dissenting opinion within the Soviet Union's own borders—the pattern has shown certain consistent features.

It was the occupation of Afghanistan which, more than any other single event, marked the watershed between the years of detente and the current period of tension. In that act the motive forces of history and ideology, power and insecurity came together. Ideologically, the 1978 revolution in Afghanistan had, in Brezhnev's words, brought about a qualitative change in the relationship with the Soviet Union. Historically, it had advanced a stage further the old Russian drive into Central Asia. When it seemed that the revolution was in danger, the only doctrinally permissible explanation was a foreign-inspired counter-revolution and this, ideologically, placed a 'duty' on the Soviet Union to 'assist' in its suppression. Failure to sustain the revolution might, it could be argued in the Politburo, set a precedent for the decay of the socialist community and even carry with it the risk of infection in the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union. The Soviet power instinct called for the use of massive military force and it was calculated that, with no risk of armed involvement by the United States, the operation carried no risk to Soviet security. In several respects the Politburo miscalculated. The Afghan resistance was tougher and longer-lasting than had been expected and so, too, was the international condemnation. But once committed, it was not in the Soviet nature to contemplate withdrawal, despite the damage entailed to wider Soviet interests in remaining. The fact that the occupation took place and the fact that it was sustained were not just a matter of tactical misjudgement. They were a reflection of the nature of the Soviet state, its ideology and its policy-making processes.

In the case of Solidarity there was again, and more seriously, the fear of a crumbling of the ideological empire and again the historical obsession, in this case with the threat to security across the Polish plains. Control had to be re-established. The case for military action must have been powerfully argued. The fact that in the event the action was taken by the Polish, not the Soviet army reflected not only Soviet policy but also Polish realities. Above all, it reflected Soviet caution in a situation where direct military intervention could have led to an escalation with unpredictable consequences for the Soviet Union itself.

The two cases of Afghanistan and Poland illustrate well both the relevance of domestic factors and their limitations as a basis for the full understanding of foreign policy. By contrast, the shooting down of the Korean airliner showed typical features of Soviet policy in a situation which was at the crucial stage dealt with in essentially domestic terms—the deep insecurity, the bureaucratic inflexibility, the brutal use of power and the dogged justification of the unjustifiable. So it has been with the treatment of internal dissent. At a time when the Soviet leaders were beginning to be aware of the extent of disillusion with the ideology, there can have been little opposition within the Politburo to the adoption of measures to discipline

those whose dissent might weaken the ideological power base and with it the very legitimacy of the Party.

It is interesting also to examine Soviet conduct in crises which did not, or need not, directly involve the Soviet Union. The Iranian revolution destroyed a strong point of American influence on the periphery of the Soviet Union and an attempt was made by Soviet theorists to interpret it as an early stage of a revolutionary process which, in due course, would be succeeded by the true socialist revolution. Up to that point there was a net gain to Soviet interests in terms of the correlation of forces, but when the American hostages were seized, the Soviet Union could not bring itself to take an objective view. It made only the most perfunctory reference to the impropriety of such action and did its best to exploit the situation to the disadvantage of the United States. In the process it no doubt contributed to the election of President Reagan and substantially prejudiced its own wider interests, without in any way further advancing its position in the Muslim world. It was an interesting example of an uncovenanted bonus mishandled through obsession with a false doctrinal interpretation.

The Falklands invasion in April 1982 raised another situation of interest. Soviet ideology required that Argentina should be seen as resisting British colonialism, yet Russian instinct was perhaps better expressed by the person who commented: 'Of course if it had been ours we would have had enough troops there to ensure that they did not start it.' The exploitation of unrest in Central America has shown the old ideological imperialism at work whenever the circumstances are favourable, yet tempered now by a greater degree of caution. There is a readiness to supply arms and training, but a noticeable and natural preference to work through proxies. In the Middle East the same characteristics are apparent and the risks of direct Soviet involvement seem to be well understood. In the field of arms control we have seen the balancing of economic and military considerations, of the need for stability and the determination never to yield an advantage once gained. It has been a trial of Soviet instincts, not least in the decision to break off talks, which threw considerable light on the Soviet evaluation of the potential political bonus and economic penalty. In the handling of relations with China we have perhaps now begun to see Soviet interests gaining the upper hand over ideology.

At many points here I have found myself echoing the chill realism of Professor Seton-Watson's contribution. We do not help the attainment of a sound relationship with the Soviet Union if we close our eyes to the less appealing sources from which its policies stem. Some of those sources are profoundly alien to us and in conjunction they can be profoundly dangerous. Yet they need to be seen in the context of the Soviet Union as it is today and balanced against the evidence of the deep-seated economic and social problems with which the Soviet leadership must grapple. Virtually no meeting of the Politburo takes place without foreign policy on the agenda, but the questions which, most of the time, loom largest for the Soviet leadership are those concerned with the internal administration of the country. In the Soviet Union the whole functioning of industry, trade and agriculture is a direct governmental responsibility and there are, as we have seen, few areas of economic or social policy which are not giving serious cause for concern. The capitalist foe is useful as a distraction and the ritual struggle against him must be sustained, but there can be scarcely any significant area in which external adventure will not aggravate rather than ease the internal problems. What is more, there are significant areas in which, both directly and indirectly, a reduction

of international tension could ease, if only marginally, the problems of resource allocation and technological development.

In recent years we have seen the historical and ideological legacy of expansion and conquest sustained with brutal determination up to the very limit of the 'socialist community', and a new wave of internal repression initiated, albeit still well short of the excesses of the Stalin era. Yet more and more the Soviet Union has presented the image of a cautious, unadventurous society, a society with waning faith in its ideology, a society whose stability testifies more to a lack of dynamism than to any positive faith, an imperial power extended up to and probably a little beyond the practical limit of its capacity, a state hostile to most of the ideals of the Western democracies, but with a need—which one hopes is perceived by its leaders—for stability in its relations with them. The situation is not one which we can view with any complacency, since if the correlation of forces is perceived by the Soviet Union to have changed to its advantage, by virtue either of its own success or a weakening of Western will, the Soviet Union will be correspondingly encouraged to take advantage of this. It is, however, a situation in which the West, if it knows its own mind, has relatively greater room for manoeuvre.

If there is a time for major changes of Soviet policy, it is with the advent of a new leader. Our own assessment of the internal scene in the Soviet Union would appear to reflect the thoughts of a number of Russians and there was, in Brezhnev's closing years, a remarkable revival of the nostalgia for Stalin. There was a moment when Andropov came to power, at which one felt a certain new briskness to government, a briskness in the repression of dissent, a briskness too in the dismissal of incompetent ministers and venal officials and in the attempt to enliven the economy. Now, with Andropov replaced by Chernenko, these policies are being pursued, but there is little expectation of a new impulse. The objective factors which we have identified are all there, with all their implications for policy, but, in so far as there is any indication of the new leader's style, it suggests the negative and the cautious rather than the enterprising and risky, at home as abroad. The doctrinal hostility will continue. The Soviet Union may need stability, but if, without significant cost or significant risk, an international situation can be manipulated in such a way as to damage Western interests, this will be done. The avoidance of any risk of armed conflict with a nuclear power will, however, continue to take priority in any situation where the security of the Soviet Union is not directly threatened. The guard will be strong on the ideological frontier, as on the military. There will be a strong incentive to stabilize the military balance, if this can be accomplished at the present level of Soviet advantage in certain sectors.

Detente may again be fashionable. It is a policy which has been much discussed, but which in its essentials is very simple. As we have already noted, Soviet foreign policy is based on the concept of an irreconcilable conflict between socialism and capitalism, but if that conflict were interpreted in terms of armed conflict between states there would be excessive risk to the Soviet state. It is therefore necessary in Soviet theory to provide for a situation in which states representative of the two systems co-exist, and to minimize the risk of military conflict between them. In such a situation, it is held, socialism will triumph because of its own scientific inevitability. The essence of Soviet detente policy is therefore to stabilize the relationship with the principal capitalist powers in such a way that war is avoided, maximum advantage is obtained from capitalist trade and technology and complete

latitude is left for the spread of socialism by means which do not carry the risk of armed conflict with a major power. Detente never meant, and was never intended to mean, abandonment of the essential conflict. It was therefore never a recipe for an easy relationship, but if we are confident that Marxist–Leninist doctrine is fallible, it can be a recipe for a safe one. The Soviet leadership may well see the adoption of a more conciliatory posture as a means of controlling the burden of external commitments and, in particular, the burden of military expenditure, while concentrating its efforts on internal social and economic problems. In order to realize these gains the leadership would be ready to pay some price. There are common interests, for instance in nuclear non-proliferation. As interest overrides ideology, there could be room for a certain measure of understanding with the West in formal terms on questions of arms control and possibly, in implicit rather than explicit form, on the reduction of tension in areas where mutual military involvement could carry a greater risk of accidental conflict than either side would wish. There is mutual advantage to be derived from trade and from a whole range of cultural and scientific contacts. It would, however, be folly to place on any detente policy a load greater than it can carry. At best it will permit the containment of tension at a safe level, a development of advantage to both sides, but it will not permit its elimination. On the Western side, an essential requirement for a detente policy is a commitment to the defence of Western values at least as strong and as effective as the commitment by the Soviet Union to the spread of its own variety of socialism. In conditions of detente the ideological struggle may indeed be the sharper, and with it are certain to arise secondary tensions, for instance in Eastern Europe, which will require cool and dispassionate assessment if they are not in turn to generate new risks. If it is correct that the Soviet Union is already strained militarily, economically and socially, at the full extent of its imperial power, the coming decades are likely to see the gradual decay of that power, a process which, if mishandled, can be as dangerous as the period of its accretion. At such a time the case for closer contact at all levels and better understanding of the motivation of Soviet policy by the West can scarcely be denied.

It is always tempting and frequently misleading to extrapolate directly from a perceived current political scene. The safe prediction is probably that the slowing down of the momentum of the Soviet Union will continue and that social and economic pressures will produce a progressive weakening of the ideology. But those who in the past have underestimated the resilience of the individual Russian and of the Soviet state have paid dearly for their error. If we look beyond Chernenko, the potential for policy change may be greater than normal, since the old guard will virtually have disappeared and new, relatively unknown men will be in charge at all levels. The change could equally well be for better or for worse. The next General Secretary will have risen through the Party machine and have been largely moulded by it. He, like his predecessors, will probably play safe. But this remarkable country has produced leaders of frightening and erratic power. The country which produced Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Stalin could produce another giant of good or evil. The odds are heavily against it. The heroic days are probably gone. Those who yearn for a new Stalinist era are likely to remain disappointed and we may be spared its consequences. But with each shuffle of the leadership pack there must be a chance, however slender, that it will produce a man with the will and the ability to realize and utilize the vast potential power of the Soviet state and the Russian people in ways which we cannot easily foresee.

My guest may have been right in seeing conservatism and dogma as the twin pillars of the Soviet state, but alongside the shrewd, hard-bitten instinct of the Russian peasant there is a wild, irrational element in the Russian soul, and if we are looking for the roots of policy we should not forget that one is buried deeply there. Indeed, I would end this article not with the leaders, the institutions or the policies of the Soviet state, but with its people, for it is on them that the whole edifice rests and it is in the last resort they who will determine its evolution. One should beware of inferring too much from one's limited contacts with a small number of Soviet citizens, but I would consider it just as misleading if I were to leave out of a final evaluation of the Soviet state the warmth, the friendliness, the human strengths and weaknesses, the mixture of indolence and industry, of passion and quiescence, the basic decency of the individual Soviet citizens whom I knew and for whom I developed an increasing respect and affection, as if I were to disregard the more easily identifiable and calculable characteristics of the governmental and Party machine. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has moulded the state to conform to its ideology, but it has signally failed so to mould the people. If the day is to come when the Soviet Union will act as a partner rather than an adversary in the community of nations, it will surely be when the policies of the state come to reflect the interests of its people more than the tenets of its ideology. The way in which the people of the Soviet Union will determine the evolution of their state will be their own, but their perception of the West and its purposes may not be irrelevant. It may even, ultimately, perhaps, be as valid a root of policy as was the perception by a German philosopher of the economy and society of Victorian Britain. One may legitimately hope that what the Soviet people will perceive will be a society capable of meeting human aspirations in ways of which Soviet socialism is manifestly incapable and showing, in its policies towards the Soviet Union, that realism and patience on which a safe and stable relationship can gradually be built.

Consensus of silence: the French Socialist Party and defence policy under François Mitterrand

Jolyon Howorth*

> 'The President of the Republic's statements in support of the deployment of Pershing II were greeted by a consensus which was so unanimous that one wonders whether it concerned the content of those statements or the desire not to discuss them.'[1]

For about two years following the election of François Mitterrand to the French Presidency, comment on French defence policy tended to focus on the emergence of an alleged national 'consensus'.[2] That consensus, it is usually recalled, was sealed in 1977 when both the Socialist Party (PS) and the Communist Party (PCF) abandoned their former hostility to the French nuclear arsenal. It was confirmed, so the story goes, in 1981, when Mitterrand embarked on a pseudo-Gaullist defence strategy involving various military and diplomatic options which had been a constant feature of the defence posture of previous occupants of the Elysée since 1958.

Those options are traditionally considered to be based on four unshakeable principles. First, that the nuclear *force de dissuasion* ('deterrent') is the basic linchpin of France's defences. Secondly, that the strategic component of that nuclear arsenal is specified as 'sanctuarizing' only the hexagonal boundaries of metropolitan France. Thirdly, that although France remains a staunch member of NATO, it refuses to belong to its integrated military command structure. Fourthly, that France's nuclear arsenal remains beyond the reach of arms control negotiations. As we shall see shortly, all four of these time-honoured principles are currently subject to rapid erosion. Fundamentally new questions are being asked in various quarters, coming particularly from the Giscardian UDF, but also from the Gaullist RPR and from the PCF. However, until very recently, these questions have been asked in private behind the closed doors of the defence establishment. In public, the myth of the continuing Gaullist consensus has been rigorously maintained. The old Gaullist theology of the 'three circles' still regularly underpins the defence catechism solemnly incanted on official occasions.[3]

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1. André Glucksmann in *Le Monde*, 1 Dec. 1983.

2. See, for example, Dominique Moïsi, 'Mitterrand's foreign policy: the limits of continuity', *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981/2, Vol. 60, No. 2; Neville Waites, 'France under Mitterrand: external relations', *The World Today*, June 1982; Marie-Claude Smouts, 'The external policy of François Mitterrand', *International Affairs*, Spring 1983, Vol. 59, No. 2; 'Le consensus Français', *Le Monde*, 18 Oct. 1983. Pierre Mauroy, in his first 'defence' speech as Prime Minister, said: 'I am indeed the Prime Minister of change, but there is at least one area in which continuity is a must: the imperatives of defence', *Défense Nationale*, Oct. 1981, p. 27.

3. A classic recent example of this is Charles Hernu's November 1983 speech to the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (hereafter IHEDN), published in *Défense Nationale*, Dec. 1983, p. 11. The theory of the 'three circles' was devised by General Lucien Poirier and underpinned the defence white paper of 1972. The 'first' circle is France, to be defended by strategic nuclear weapons; the 'second' is Europe, in whose defence France is prepared to play a part by conventional means; the third is France's world interests (former African empire especially) for which it needs a rapid deployment force.

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At the same time, since the advent of Mitterrand, that increasingly dubious 'consensus' has been modified by two new (non-Gaullist) attitudes which nevertheless, because of broader changes in French politics, have in practice helped to create the bases of a *new* 'consensus'. The first is France's approach to the Soviet Union. The detente and wide-ranging cooperation which marked the approach of Mitterrand's three immediate predecessors in this respect has been replaced by a much 'harder' attitude to Moscow. From the outset, Mitterrand made it clear that he would not meet Russian leaders as long as Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. Although that attitude has recently been abandoned,[4] historical circumstances ensured that while it lasted it had the approval of a broad spectrum of French opinion. So, too, did the second non-Gaullist attitude noticeable since 1981: the government's outspokenly 'pro-NATO' stance on a variety of issues connected with the defence of Europe (for example, 'Euromissiles' and military cooperation with West Germany and Britain). At first sight, this stance seems incompatible with the Gaullist principles outlined above, which are, as we have seen, still officially adhered to in most official speeches.

However, as several authors have recently suggested,[5] neither the old Gaullist 'consensus' nor the new Mitterrandist one can withstand close scrutiny beyond the vague declaratory principles on which they are founded. The PS, in joining the existing consensus in 1977, was in effect merely appending its signature to a tissue of ambiguities, the outlines of which have been amply documented. Simply stated, they stem from a deliberate vagueness concerning the precise relationship between the explicit function of France's *strategic* deterrent (the defence of its existence at the Rhine) and the implicit function of its *tactical* nuclear arsenal and/or its *conventional* forces (the defence of the Western Alliance—and France's political independence—at the Elbe).[6] The official rationale for this has been the necessity to keep the Soviet Union guessing.

Just as important, however, has been the necessity to create and sustain the 'consensus'. By avoiding specifics, strategists from all points on the political spectrum have been able to interpret the situation in their own way and avoid subjecting defence policy to the hurly-burly of the hustings. In this way, France has been enabled to develop a sizeable, technically independent nuclear arsenal. More recently, seen from the standpoint of the Elysée, it has been able to benefit from what it sees as the 'recoupling' effects of Pershing II and cruise missiles without being troubled by the side-effects of NATO's December 1979 'two-track' decision, consequences which in

4. In June 1984 Mitterrand paid an official visit to Moscow. While stressing the need for detente, mutual security and understanding, he also raised a series of thorny issues such as Afghanistan, Poland and the plight of Andrei Sakharov.

5. Pierre Lellouche, 'France and the Euromissiles: the limits of immunity', *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/4, Vol. 62, No. 2; Jonathan Marcus and Bruce George, 'The ambiguous consensus: French defence policy under Mitterrand', *The World Today*, October 1983, Vol. 39, No. 10; Stanley Hoffmann, 'The props under French deterrence', *Boston Globe*, 19 Dec. 1983; David S. Yost, 'France's deterrent posture and security in Europe', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 190, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (henceforth IISS), 1984.

6. That vagueness was reiterated by the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Jeannou Lacaze, in his speech to the IHEDN on 3 May 1983 when outlining France's military doctrine: 'There can be no question of giving a precise definition of France's "vital interests". On the contrary, we must leave it to the enemy to assess their contours and to appreciate the risk he would run in the event of an erroneous assessment.' *Défense Nationale*, June 1983, p. 17.

other countries have involved political turmoil (a peace movement) and potential strategic danger (the provision of targets for Soviet missiles).

But, as Pierre Lellouche has recently shown,[7] the consensus itself depended on the continuation of several important conditions: first, the maintenance of the US nuclear umbrella over 'non-nuclear' continental Europe; secondly, the welding of West Germany to NATO; and thirdly, the absence of diplomatic pressure to subject France to arms control agreements. To these conditions one could add two others: the absence of a nuclear counterforce capability or ABM system on the part of the perceived adversary and the absence of internal discussion of the ambiguities mentioned earlier.

Over the last decade, these conditions have all begun to evaporate. If it is true that there exists a defence consensus in France today, that consensus is undoubtedly a quite different one from the Gaullist one of earlier years. Far from concentrating exclusively on strategic nuclear deterrence, French military thinking is increasingly concerned with the problem of the conventional defence of Europe.[8] The idea of extending a French (or even an Anglo-French) nuclear umbrella over a West European strategic space is being tentatively discussed in all political parties except the Communist Party.[9] Although nobody is calling openly for France's return to the NATO command structure, that is only because most French defence analysts consider that structure to have reached the end of its natural historical life. They hope it can now be replaced by a new and European one. From every direction, the current talk is of moves to create a 'European pillar' of the Atlantic alliance.[10] One could say that the current defence debate in France revolves around the specific

7. Lellouche, 'France and the Euromissiles' (see note 5).

8. For journalistic comment on this development see Michel Tatu, 'Europe: une défense pour après-demain', *Le Monde*, 4, 5 Dec. 1983; for a more academic study see the special section of *Politique Etrangère*, 1983, No. 2, 'La France et la sécurité de l'Europe'. See also note 11 below.

9. The main proponents of this notion are the Giscardian UDF parties. See their most recent publication, *Défendre l'Europe* (Paris: UDF, March 1984), especially pp. 32–3: 'The concept of a European pillar of the Alliance posits that the European nuclear nations must contemplate the possibility of engaging their nuclear forces in support of their neighbours . . . In the first instance, this implies . . . cooperation between France and Great Britain'. As long ago as 1975, Jacques Chirac had argued that French Pluton missiles should be considered 'authentically European weapons' (*Défense Nationale*, May 1975) and, more recently, in a speech to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation on 17 Oct. 1983, he urged the Europeans to enter into discussions with each other in an effort to produce an authentically European defence system. A full copy of this speech is available from RPR, 123 rue de Lille, 75007 Paris. For comment, see *Le Monde*, 20, 21 and above all 28 Oct. 1983, in which Chirac also raises the prospect of an Anglo-French 'umbrella', a notion which was absent from his speech to the IISS on 30 Nov. 1983.

10. The UDF work referred to in note 9 above is the most complete political expression of this idea. Professor Jacques Barrat, Vice President of the UDF defence commission told me in an interview in Paris on 14 May 1984 that the RPR agrees with the substance of the UDF proposals, although there are clearly important nuances separating the two main right-wing parties. See the interesting sketches in 'Les nuances de l'opposition', *L'Express*, 9 Sept. 1983, pp. 30–1. In general, British sentiment on this issue is less enthusiastic, but see Hedley Bull, 'European self-reliance and the reform of NATO', *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1983, Vol. 61, No. 4. For the moment, PS contribution to this particular debate has come in the form of hints in official speeches. In his first speech to IHEDN as Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy went much further than the customary French eulogies for the Western European Union and actually stated that the American vision of Europe as merely one line of defence 'should make Europeans think about the prospect of a political unit possessing an autonomous defence' (*Défense Nationale*, Oct. 1981, p. 22), and he insisted that 'aggression against France does not begin when an enemy penetrates our national territory'. This message was repeated in his second speech (*Défense Nationale*, Nov. 1982, pp. 17–18). But in his most recent speech to the same body, while stressing France's fidelity to WEU, all notion of a French 'umbrella' had disappeared. See, for an interpretation of this, Pierre Lellouche, 'Les trois messages de Pierre Mauroy', *Le Point*, 26 Sept. 1983. For the most recent official statement see General Lacaze, 'Concepte de défense et sécurité en Europe', in *Défense Nationale*, July 1984, pp. 11–29.

form any such restructuring of the alliance might assume. It is perhaps helpful to see the span of opinion as representing a continuous spectrum. From a scenario involving a much stronger Europe within a much more closely integrated US–European unit, to one necessitating a totally autonomous European defence capability quite separate from the United States, that spectrum also contains every conceivable intermediate position.[11]

However, to the extent to which open discussion of the profound implications of the strategic changes of the last decade seems to present political problems, any consensus that might exist in France remains a 'consensus of silence'. Nowhere is that silence more deafening than within the Socialist Party itself. The PS contains within its ranks divergent factions which among them cover almost the entire range of defence options currently imaginable in France. Yet, for reasons connected with the constraints of 'Presidential solidarity' under the institutions of the Fifth Republic, they have refrained from entering into structured debate on defence issues. Their analyses and even their proposals are nevertheless discernible from internal and occasionally external publications, and above all from interviews.[12] The aim of this article is to try to reproduce the debate which would go on inside the PS if the contending parties would agree to discuss their differences openly. In so doing, it will inevitably oversimplify the often important nuances which separate the various factions one from another and even do violence to the configuration of actors which make up the various tendencies. It is hoped, however, that it will develop the main options and indicate how urgent it has become for those options to be discussed properly.

The Socialist Party factions and defence policy

The Socialist Party officially embraced nuclear weapons at a special convention in January 1978.[13] On that occasion, at least three distinct factions supported the nuclear line (albeit for politically incompatible reasons), while a fourth group mounted a desperate rearguard action in favour of maintaining the party's traditional rejection of all nuclear arms. In the following remarks the factions are referred to

11. The former position is clearly that of the UDF and the socialist 'Atlanticists'. M. Barrat, in the interview referred to in note 10, stated openly that the UDF is in favour of French reintegration in NATO. The latter position is that of the CERES (see note 16) and, possibly, some diehard Gaullists and Eurocommunists. The RPR is clearly concerned to create as independent a Europe as possible within the confines of a restructured Atlantic alliance. The literature on this question is abundant: François de Rose, *La France et la défense de l'Europe* (Paris: Seuil, 1976); André Brigot and Dominique David, *Le Désir d'Europe: l'introuvable défense commune* (Paris: FEDN, 1980); Léo Hamon, *Le sanctuaire désenclavée* (Paris: FEDN, 1982); Michel Manel, *L'Europe sans défense* (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1982); Jean-Paul Pigasse, *Le bouclier d'Europe* (Paris: Seghers, 1982); François de Rose, *Contre la stratégie des curiaces* (Paris: Julliard, 1983). Perhaps the best short account is Dominique David, 'L'Alliance: notre arche et son déluge', *Stratégique*, 1982–3, Nos. 16, 17.

12. The author has had the opportunity to question the following personalities in the PS: Charles Hernu, Didier Motchane, Robert Pontillon, Jean Paucot, Antoine Sanguinetti, Patrick Viveret, Jacques Julliard and Pierre Autexier.

13. The complete text of the final compromise resolution can be found in 'Textes de Référence', *Le Poing et la Rose*, Supplement to No. 73, August 1978. For the debates, see *Le Monde*, 7, 8, 9 Jan. 1978.

by means of labels whose significance is lost outside the French context. The labels are explained in footnotes, but it is nevertheless important to bear in mind that while these groupings do correspond in most cases to more general political divisions within the PS, the way the party breaks down on defence issues is in some ways unique.

The 'Atlanticists',[14] led at the time by Robert Pontillon and supported by Jacques Huntzinger, abandoned their former opposition because, among other reasons, they realised that the 'French bomb' had not led to the disintegration of NATO, as they had originally feared.[15] By 1978, they were confident that it was both electorally popular and diplomatically compatible with NATO's objectives. The CERES group,[16] on the other hand, led by Jean-Pierre Chevènement and Didier Motchane, supported French nuclear weapons for precisely the opposite reason. These socialist theoreticians on the left of the party had believed for almost a decade that only through the possession of nuclear weapons could a socialist France *resist* hegemonical American and NATO pressures to 'conform' to the social, economic and political norms of liberal capitalism. In 1972, at the party congress in Suresnes, they had called for France's total withdrawal from the Atlantic alliance. CERES was the main intellectual force behind the PS's 'Project for the 1980s' which called for dissolution of the blocs and the forging of an autonomous, French-led, European defence capability.[17] It was in a political alliance with CERES that Mitterrand was elected in 1981.

The third pro-nuclear group within the PS is what one might call the 'Jacobin-nationalist' or 'Jaurès-Gaullist' faction.[18] The current defence minister, Charles Hernu, is its political spokesman while a senior officer such as Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti (whose brother, Alexandre, had been a prominent Gaullist minister) acts as its military conscience. This group is extremely close to classical Gaullism in spirit.[19] In 1978, the Jacobins appeared to straddle the two contradictory

14. The label 'Atlanticist' has traditionally been applied to this faction although the implication is usually pejorative. Under the Fourth Republic, close identification with Washington was necessary for the old Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière in order to resist the joint attacks on the republic which were at the time forthcoming from both Gaullists and Communists. After de Gaulle began to rock the alliance, it was 'Atlanticists' like Guy Mollet and Robert Pontillon who argued that France should maintain its links with NATO and forgo an 'independent' bomb. Since the advent of a French 'consensus' on the reality of the nuclear deterrent, 'Atlanticism' in the PS has become more of a mood or prevailing ambience than a clear-cut programme. It probably colours the attitudes towards defence of a near majority of members.

15. See the arguments used against the *force de frappe* by Guy Mollet in *Journal Officiel,* Chambre-Débats, 24 Oct. 1960. An analysis of these arguments is provided by Pascal Krop, *Les socialistes et l'armée* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 1983), pp. 40–2.

16. Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Socialistes. This group, which was set up in the early 1960s within the old Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, has always defined the party's statist left-wing boundary. It was, however, instrumental in bringing Mitterrand both to the leadership of the PS and to the Presidency and its influence on the party is far stronger than its numerical size would suggest.

17. PS, *Projet socialiste pour la France des Années 80* (Paris: Club Socialiste du Livre, 1980), pp. 337–46.

18. Both labels are used to describe this small but influential group. Charles Hernu, who reorganized the *Club des jacobins* in the 1960s, also launched the *Conventions pour l'Armée Nouvelle* in 1974. This military 'think-tank', of which he is President, sought from the outset to provide a socialist defence policy combining the spirit of Jaurès with the achievements of de Gaulle. See, on this, Jolyon Howorth, 'Defence and the Mitterrand government' in Jolyon Howorth and Patricia Chilton, eds, *Defence and dissent in contemporary France* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 97–8, 103.

19. The supreme example of this is Hernu's book, *Nous . . . les grands* (Lyon: Boursier, 1980): 'Already in 1957 . . . I wrote a book, *La colère usurpée,* in which, anticipating May 1958, I called for another Republic, the Fifth. At the time, I didn't realise how right I was. . . . I have often felt myself to be a "Gaullist" in international affairs' (pp. 22–3).

positions outlined above, delighted to 'go nuclear' for reasons of national prestige and independence, but, despite frequent manifestations of 'anti-Americanism', in no hurry to leave NATO.

Finally, there was François Mitterrand himself. It is impossible to classify the President, whose entire political career (and genius) has consisted in synthesizing (or merely maintaining in juxtaposition) factions and policies which are logically contradictory. Mitterrand appears to have resigned himself reluctantly to the inevitability of a nuclear defence for reasons connected with the reality of the military situation he anticipated inheriting.[20]

Opposition to nuclear weapons was mounted by a heterogeneous cohort of ethical and political sensitivities. Mavericks like Jean-Pierre Worms or Charles Josselin joined forces with writers or former members of the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU) or Catholic activists like Claude Manceron, Jean Le Garrec and Patrick Viveret, and were tacitly supported by residual Atlanticists who still saw the French bomb as an obstacle to the cohesion of the alliance. The result of the vote (70 per cent in favour of the pro-nuclear resolution) reflected both the proximity of the vital 1978 general elections—there was a universal desire not to 'rock the boat'—and the sophistication with which the nuclear lobby presented its case.[21] In reality, the party was thrown into tremendous confusion by the defence convention and has to a great extent remained there since.

Differing perceptions of the 'Soviet threat'

It is impossible to draw hard and fast distinctions between the military and the political dimensions of a perceived threat to national security: between enemy capabilities and enemy intentions. Most French socialists tend to analyse nuclear weapons in exclusively *political* terms, and this often produces a strange sense of detachment from their physical implications. Moreover, there have been some spectacular shifts in the varying socialist perceptions of the threat.

The Atlanticists have probably shifted position the least. Since 1945, they seem to have perceived a serious *military* threat from the Soviet bloc and have argued that the credibility of collective security in Western Europe depends upon close coupling of the United States and Europe.[22] With the development of potential counterforce weapons in the Soviet arsenal, they have pointed to the danger of a 'surgical strike' against French land-based nuclear systems as justification for the NATO 'two-track' policy.[23] They are also convinced that the Soviet bloc enjoys

20. Although Mitterrand campaigned mercilessly against French nuclear weapons in the 1960s, he had already, by 1969, come to the conclusion that that arsenal had become the irreversible backbone of French defences. See, on this, François Bourg, 'Dégager l'alternative: le Parti Socialiste et l'étude des problèmes de défense', *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, 1974, No. 6.

21. On the Convention see Krop, *Les Socialistes et l'armée*, pp. 104–12 and Howorth, 'Defence and the Mitterrand government', pp. 101–3.

22. The tone was set by Mollet in 1960: 'A few weeks after the fall of Prague, the nations of Europe and the United States understood that only the threat of a global response, that is to say a response involving the USA, could stop the forward march [of Soviet military might].' Quoted in Krop, *Les socialistes et l'armée*, p. 41.

23. See Jacques Huntzinger, 'Les relations Est–Ouest', *Nouvelle Revue Socialiste*, April–May 1983, No. 63, p. 11. In a debate with the author in Riverside, California in November 1983, the former editor of *Le Monde*, Jacques Fauvet, read out a text by François Mitterrand in which the President argued that France wished to have the (American) Euromissiles because it feared a 'surgical strike' by the Soviet Union against its land-based nuclear installations.

real conventional superiority in Europe. In all of these beliefs, they are at one with the strategic assumptions of Giscard d'Estaing's political following in the UDF.[24]

The Jacobins have usually taken their cue from Charles Hernu, whose position on the Soviet *military* threat recently underwent a strange and complete *volte-face*. As recently as December 1980, Hernu scathingly dismissed all talk of a real military threat from the Soviet Union as NATO propaganda, asserting categorically that the West enjoyed undisputed superiority over the Warsaw Pact in almost every category of defence system.[25] However, from the moment he was appointed defence minister in May 1981, his analysis changed overnight.[26] Like Mitterrand himself, Hernu suddenly detected a potential military imbalance in Europe in favour of the Soviet Union.[27] However, one should not assume that either Hernu or Mitterrand believes that there is a serious danger of Soviet military attack on Western Europe. As we shall see when considering the question of balance in INF, their constant refrain is that war is only likely to break out if the imbalance in favour of one side or another becomes too great.

Hernu's own former analysis has, since 1981, continued to be espoused by Admiral Sanguinetti, who remains a vice-president of the defence minister's private 'think-tank', the *Conventions pour l'Armée nouvelle*.[28] Sanguinetti's view that NATO continues to enjoy clear superiority over the Warsaw Pact is shared by other Jacobins as well as by CERES, even though the latter group, since joining the government, has tended to be ultra-discreet in its public pronouncements on this issue.[29] This is not to say, of course, that these exponents of a measured response to Soviet military developments deny the rapid surge in enemy capabilities since the early 1970s. They recognize across the Elbe a formidable military machine. Where they differ radically from the government is in their analysis of its significance (they tend to interpret the Soviet Union as basically paranoid and nervously 'on the defensive') and in their proposals for an appropriate response. It goes without saying that this vision of the balance of forces, both global and European, is shared

24. UDF, *Une doctrine de défense pour la France* (Paris: UDF, 1980), pp. 15–25; *La loi de programmation militaire nécessaire à la France en 1983* (Paris: UDF, 1983), pp. 10–11; *Défendre l'Europe* (Paris: UDF, 1984), pp. 11–12.

25. See *Nous . . . les grands*, pp. 47–50.

26. When asked about this by the defence correspondent of *Le Monde*, Jacques Isnard, in an interview on his appointment, Hernu implied that demand for balance was a way of getting the Soviet Union to the negotiating table: 'In my book of last summer, I did not believe that strategic parity between the two superpowers had been reached. Since then, it is true that the USSR has reinforced its SS-20 potential. All the same, one must admit that, rather than see the USA deploying, in their turn, new weapons in the European countries, it would be better to start negotiating', *Le Monde*, 11 July 1981, p. 9.

27. 'It is quite useful, as regards the degree of balance between the superpowers, to speak, as the Soviets do, of a "global correlation of forces", but we foresee a potential serious risk that this balance may be broken in favour of the Soviets in the middle of the decade'. Hernu's speech to IHEDN in *Défense Nationale*, Dec. 1981, p. 7.

28. Antoine Sanguinetti, *Le devoir de parler* (Paris: Nathan, 1981); 'La désinformation sur la balance des forces', *Cahiers du Forum pour l'Indépendance et la Paix*, Summer 1983, No. 1, pp. 17–25; 'L'enjeu des Pershing', *Politique Aujourd'hui*, Oct. 1983, No. 2, pp. 43–56.

29. See Jacques Sapir, 'Comment apprécier la menace soviétique?' in Philippe Lacroix, ed., *Eviter la guerre?* (Paris: Maspéro, 1983), pp. 41–58; Pierre-Luc Seguillon, 'Les cent premiers jours de la diplomatie socialiste', *Non! Repères pour le Socialisme*, Sept.–Oct. 1981, *No. 9, pp. 17–36. In an* interview with the author on 6 Aug. 1983, Didier Motchane asserted that the CERES had tried to put this point across inside the party and the government but had decided in May 1981 not to voice open criticism of Mitterrand's policy on defence.

(For footnote 30 see p.586)

by the PCF, even though, at the more general level of strategic doctrine, there is very little common ground between the communists and the socialists.[30]

The most remarkable shift in perceptions of the Soviet threat has taken place within the ranks of the 'libertarian left',[31] among those former members of the PSU who joined the party in 1974 after the illusions of May 1968 had begun to fade. Men like Patrick Viveret, editor of the theoretical journal *Intervention*, belong to that generation of the non-communist left which, as recently as a decade ago, saw the United States as the major if not the sole threat to world peace and the Soviet Union as a cautious, stabilizing force in international affairs.[32] Since then, they have swung rapidly towards a position based on precisely the opposite analysis, a swing explained by military and ideological changes. American withdrawal from Indochina, coupled with Soviet entanglement in Africa, Afghanistan and above all Poland, produced the strategic backdrop to an intellectual itinerary sparked off by the writings of Solzhenitsyn. The awakening of the 'new left' to the concept of totalitarianism came extraordinarily late in France, but the eventual impact of 'anti-totalitarian' writers with once impeccably left-wing credentials like Cornelius Castoriadis or André Glucksmann has been phenomenal.[33] For almost the entire 'intellectual' left in France, anti-Sovietism has become the bedrock of ideology.[34] The purely *military* analysis of the Soviet threat tends to become blurred in the high-flying intellectual maelstrom of 'anti-totalitarian' theses emanating from these quarters. Opinions no doubt differ enormously as to the probability of a Soviet 'dash to the Atlantic'[35] but it seems clear that the majority of the libertarian left sees the threat much more in political terms, a point to which I shall shortly return.

However, the consequence of these ideological developments has been a solid marshalling of this faction (many of whom belonged to the anti-nuclear lobby in 1978) behind the strategic options of the President, even if, as we shall see, they disagree with the way in which he has promoted those options. It would be a serious mistake to confuse the libertarians with the Atlanticists, despite the proximity of their analyses on many issues. It is also very difficult to see any counterpart for this constituency outside the PS, unless it be detected in certain ecological milieux and possibly among sections of the PSU.

30. Whereas nobody in the PS is complacent about Soviet intentions, the PCF remains convinced that those intentions are fundamentally peaceful. Georges Marchais' visit to Moscow on 12 July 1983 resulted in a joint communiqué being issued by the CPSU and the PCF calling for the inclusion of the French arsenal in the INF talks. On this complex question, see *L'Humanité* and *Le Monde*, 12–14 July 1983; Michel Tatu, 'Où sont les désaccords entre M. Marchais et M. Andropov?' in *Le Monde*, 19 July 1983; *Cahiers du Communisme*, No. 6 June 1983 and Nos. 7, 8, July, August 1983.

31. This faction is usually seen as grouping around the current agriculture minister, Michel Rocard. It is, in fact, very difficult to consider as a coherent faction since there are important differences between its leading members. Rocard himself seems to be largely uninterested in defence matters. Jacques Julliard, the political director of *Intervention*, is an ardent supporter of nuclear deterrence, while Patrick Viveret still hopes to see the abolition of all 'weapons of extermination'.

32. Interview with Patrick Viveret, Leeds, 17 Sept. 1983.

33. Cornelius Castoriadis, former intellectual leader of the *Socialisme ou Barbarie* group, analysed the Soviet military–industrial complex as a 'stratocracy' in *Devant la guerre* (Paris: Fayard, 1981). André Glucksmann, former May 1968 Maoist, completed his conversion to Reaganism with his recent book *La force du vertige* (Paris: Grasset, 1983).

34. The leading exponents of this crusading anti-Sovietism are the main intellectual publications of the left, the weekly *Nouvel Observateur* and the monthly *Esprit*.

35. Most of the 'libertarians' follow Castoriadis in believing that the Soviet Union is 'merely' exerting psychological pressure on Western Europe (see 'Le pouvoir au bout du fusil', *Nouvel Obervateur*, 2 Jan. 1982). But anti-Sovietism is so intense in these political milieux that a variety of opinions is inevitable.

To conclude on the Soviet *military* threat, perceptions within the PS produce a strange alliance between the Atlanticist right, some sections of the libertarian left, a fraction of the Jacobin nationalists and the President of the Republic. All openly point to the military threat from the East as justification for the strategic, diplomatic or political response they favour. On the other hand, the CERES, the remainder of the Jacobins and sections of the libertarians remain sanguine about the Soviet military build-up, confident that Europe is not about to suffer a new form of *Blitzkrieg*. However, even these latter groups join forces with the remainder of the party in accepting that Soviet military power constitutes a *political* problem which calls for a response.

Any precise formulation of that political threat is difficult to pin down. There does appear to be consensus (and this is possibly the only element of consensus in the PS) around the notion that the SS-20 is a decoupling political weapon which aims to achieve without war an objective which could normally only be attained through military victory, namely, the neutralization of Western Europe.[36] There is considerable divergence among the factions over the extent to which this is an overt Soviet intention as well as over the extent to which it is an attainable goal, but everybody seems agreed that the *existence* of the SS-20s has created a new political situation which cannot be ignored. The scenario has been sketched out in some detail by Patrick Viveret; his words are reproduced here in the knowledge that they may reflect his own personal beliefs alone:

> What the SS-20s hope to achieve is an increasingly prudent political attitude on the part of West European governments. There are already signs of this happening when even the most anti-communist statesmen in Germany, like Franz-Josef Strauss, begin to discover economic reasons for cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Soviets have never accepted that this tiny promontory at the tip of the Eurasian landmass should be a front-line for them. They find it intolerable that Western Europe should act as a support system for opposition movements within the Eastern bloc. For them, the most effective way of ending that support is to neutralize Western Europe, to allow it to be an economic giant, but to force it to be a political dwarf. The Soviets have a vital interest in ensuring that there be no spoilsports around when they wish to clamp down on Poland. Since 1945, they have never taken any serious risk, but if they were able to eliminate risks altogether by neutralizing Europe, why should they hesitate? I am certain that they do not desire or intend to *occupy* Western Europe and thereby take on the headache of another 250 million Poles. But a situation in which there would be nobody around to support the Poles would be the best of both worlds. For the Soviet Union, the real threat from the West is not military but political and ideological. Internally, they are terrified of a Walesa or a Dubček, but unperturbed by the rantings of a Ceauşescu. Their real reason for maintaining and extending the 'glacis', for attempting the neutralization of Europe, is their terror *before the spread of* democratic ideas.[37]

36. François Mitterrand put this most succinctly in his important television speech on 16 Nov. 1983: 'I am in no way accusing the Soviet Union of wishing to launch a war . . . but rather of placing itself in a position of strength which would in effect result in it being able to obtain through threat alone results which could normally only be achieved through victory in war', *Le Monde*, 18 Nov. 1983, p. 7. Chevènement, Paucot, Motchane, Viveret and many others have, on numerous occasions, made similar statements.

37. Interview with author, Paris, 6 Dec. 1983.

This is undoubtedly one extreme statement of the thesis of 'neutralization' and it owes much to contemporary French analyses of totalitarianism as a dynamic and necessarily expansive system. It is certainly not shared in this form by CERES and probably not by the mainstream Atlanticists, Jacobins or even Mitterrandists. What it does reveal, especially in the observation about Franz-Josef Strauss, is the widely-shared French concern about any potential German 'deal' with the Soviet Union. From the very beginning of the recent peace demonstrations in Western Europe—and especially in Germany—the French press and political elites have consistently denounced the 'pacifists' as 'philo-Soviet' or 'neutralist' or bent on German reunification, or all three.[38] It was through fear that a re-elected SPD might pull back from the NATO 'two-track' decision that, in January 1983, Mitterrand made his controversial Bundestag speech, in effect intervening in the West German election campaign with objective support for the Christian Democrats.[39] The November 1983 convention of the SPD in which an overwhelming vote against the deployment of the Euromissiles was recorded is still seen by large sections of the Socialist Party as a 'sell-out'.[40] Indeed, relations between the French and German socialists had, in the early summer of 1984, reached such a critical state that the Germans issued a 'memorandum' to their French colleagues with a view to opening up a constructive dialogue prior to the elections to the European Parliament.[41]

At the same time, Mitterrand, conscious that these stirrings in Germany represented an increasingly widespread dissatisfaction with American hegemony, and conscious also that, in order to ensure the welding of the Federal Republic to the Western alliance, some military cooperation was essential, celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Franco-German treaty of 1963 by entering into intensive bilateral defence negotiations with Bonn.[42] The entire question of the role of France in the defence of Europe lies, as we have seen, at the heart of the new emerging consensus in French defence policy. How has the Mitterrand government responded to the new strategic situation of Europe?

38. Typical of this attitude are; André Fontaine, 'La carte de la réunification', *Le Monde*, 6 July 1983; Gerard Sandoz, 'Allemagne: pacifisme—la grande offensive de l'automne', *Nouvel Observateur*, 26 Aug. 1983; Pierre Lellouche, 'Réplique à Gabriel Robin', *Le Monde*, 22 Jan. 1983; François-Georges Dreyfus, 'Pacifisme et neutralisme en Allemagne fédérale aujourd'hui', *Défense Nationale*, Jan. 1982, pp. 7–22; Jacques-Marie Denis, 'Les orientations de la politique étrangère allemande: des interrogations légitimes?', *Défense Nationale*, Feb. 1982, pp. 27–32; François Fejto, 'La politique allemande de l'URSS, 1945–1982', *Défense Nationale*, April 1982, pp. 31–42; Joseph Rovan, 'Le problème allemand', Jean Klein, 'Le débat sur la sécurité en République fédérale d'Allemagne' and Dominique Moïsi, 'Un nouveau nationalisme dans le monde occidental', all in *Défense Nationale*, Dec. 1982, pp. 27–36, 45–60, 113–24; Bernard Adrien, 'La France et les interrogations allemandes', *Politique étrangère*, No. 4, 1982, pp. 967–78.

39. See the extracts from Mitterrand's speech in *Le Monde*, 22 Jan. 1983. Speaking of the dangers of 'decoupling', he urged the Germans to remain solidly behind the NATO 'two-track' decision: 'I believe and I assert that decoupling is in itself dangerous . . . That is why the joint determination of the members of the Atlantic alliance and their solidarity must be unequivocally confirmed'. Practically all French weeklies commented on Mitterrand's speech in terms of a warning against 'neutralism' (see extracts from the press in *Le Monde*, 26 Jan. 1983).

40. Information supplied by Patrick Viveret in interview conducted in Paris, 6 Dec. 1983. To this extent, the article published in *Intervention*, Feb.–April 1984, No. 8 (Gerard Sandoz, 'Le SPD et la défense') is a remarkable French attempt to understand the German situation 'from the inside'.

41. *Memorandum à la gauche française pour un débat sur la politique de paix en Europe à l'occasion des secondes élections au Parlement européen du 17 juin 1984*. See *Libération*, 14 May 1984, p. 6. See also Michel Tatu, 'Un réquisitoire implacable', in *Le Monde* 20/21 May 1984, p. 5.

42. Reports on the initial Kohl–Mitterrand defence agreements in *Le Monde*, 22–5 Oct. 1982.

Perceptions of the appropriate 'response'

The government's position hinges on three strategic propositions, each of which has both a military and a political dimension, and which, taken jointly, present considerable problems of internal coherence.[43] The first is the notion that there can exist something called the 'strategic balance in Europe' and that that balance, which has been upset by the SS-20, must be reestablished by cruise and Pershing II. The second is that the French strategic arsenal does not count in this Eurostràtegic balance, and must remain unaffected by arms control; indeed, that in order to maintain its credibility, it must be improved and modernized. These first two propositions are at one level clearly contradictory. They are rendered even more difficult to defend in view of the third proposal, which is that there should be much closer cooperation between France's non-strategic defence systems and those of other European NATO countries, particularly West Germany. These are the complex elements of the new embryonic defence equation in France.

INF balance

The notion of INF balance, which has been an almost obsessive feature of Mitterrand's pronouncements, raises problems from the outset in that it implies that there can be such a thing as a 'regional balance' separate and distinct from the 'global balance'.[44] In Mitterrand's very first Presidential statement on this topic (significantly in an 'anti-neutralist' interview in the German magazine *Stern*) he fused (or confused) the two notions by saying: 'The reason why I condemn neutralism is that I believe peace to be linked to the balance of forces in the world. Deployment of the SS-20s and the Backfires has destroyed that balance *in Europe*' (emphasis added).[45] This statement has been questioned from within the PS. It is of course true (largely through conscious NATO choice ever since 1962) that there is no precise equivalent to the SS-20, but socialist critics from various factions have pointed to the assignment to NATO's European theatre of Poseidon submarines with a total of some 400–500 warheads which in range, precision and numbers are comparable to the SS-20s.[46] In addition, socialist critics have pointed to the problem of differentiating between those strategic systems of each superpower which are targeted on the other superpower and those which are targeted on superpower allies. They have concluded (as, on occasion, have government officials[47]) that the very concept of strategic nuclear balance in Europe is militarily meaningless and arithmetically unquantifiable.[48] The first plank in the new defence 'consensus' therefore seems rather flimsy.

43. It is precisely the element of incoherence which is criticized by an opposition otherwise delighted by Mitterrand's record on defence. See UDF, *Défendre l'Europe*, pp. 44–6, in which Mitterrand's attempt both to reiterate the Gaullist message of 'independence' and to work towards a European defence system is subjected to intense criticism. See also Pierre Messmer, 'Une réorganisation incohérente de l'armée française', *Le Monde*, 28 Feb. 1984, p. 13; Yves Lancien, 'Les dérives d'une politique', *Le Monde*, 9, 10 May 1984.

44. François Mitterrand, *Ici et maintenant* (Paris: Fayard, 1980), p. 234, refers to 'the serious problem of the balance of forces in Europe'. On this topic, see Yves Boyer, 'Contrôle des armements et équilibre stratégique', *Stratégique*, 1983, No. 18.

45. *Stern*, 8 July 1981. For reactions in France, see *Le Monde*, 9 July 1981, p. 3.

46. Sanguinetti, 'L'enjeu des Pershing'; Didier Motchane, 'Editorial', *Enjeu*, July–Aug. 1983, No. 4.

47. Claude Cheysson, *Bulletin d'information du ministère des relations extérieures*, 1984, No. 13. See, on this, Jacques-Marie Denis, 'La notion de parité a-t-elle un sens?', *Stratégique*, 1981, No. 11.

48. Jean Paucot, interview with the author, Paris, 20 Aug. 1983. See also Jean Paucot, 'L'Europe devant l'orage', *Cahiers du Forum*, Summer 1983, No. 1, p. 12. This notion is also supported by S. R. Sloan, 'Nato nuclear forces', Congressional Research Service, Oct. 1984, pp. 8–10.

Moreover, the suggestion that cruise and Pershing II missiles can be seen as a 'balancing' response to the SS-20 is vigorously rejected in several quarters. Admiral Sanguinetti has repeatedly argued that neither politically (in terms of their original conception, R & D, etc.) nor militarily (in terms of range and precision) can they be considered a 'response' to the SS-20.[49] CERES was, from the outset, hostile to the 'two-track' decision,[50] and they continue to reject the more alarmist interpretations of the SS-20's 'surgical strike' capabilities.[51] Indeed, at the recent Congress of Bourg-en-Bresse, Chevènement argued that, on the contrary, the 'two-track' course offers offensive and even first strike capabilities to the United States through Pershing II.[52] Mitterrand himself, on more than one occasion, has drawn attention to the qualitatively enhanced threat which Pershing II poses for the Soviet Union.[53]

The 'libertarians', on the other hand, tend to accept more or less at face value the government's concept of INF balance. They consider the SS-20 to be a counterforce weapon and reject any suggestion that NATO possessed an equivalent system prior to the deployment of Pershing II. For reasons which are almost exclusively political, they consider Pershing II to be a proper response to the SS-20.[54] However, it is precisely the political (as opposed to the military) approach to INF which provides the clue to France's primary reason for welcoming the 'Euromissiles'.[55] That reason has to do with the vulnerability of the French nuclear arsenal in the global strategic situation.

The French strategic arsenal

Before the left 'rallied' to the nuclear deterrent in 1977, the main criticism levelled against '*la bombinette*' was its lack of credibility.[56] Since then, much has changed. Today, CERES and the 'oppositional' Jacobins join forces with the government in

49. Antoine Sanguinetti, 'Les armes eurostratégiques: un dossier truqué', *Le Monde*, 3 Jan. 1980, p. 3; 'La désinformation sur la balance des forces', *Cahiers du Forum*, Summer 1983, No. 1; 'Quelles sont les risques de déclenchement d'une guerre nucléaire?', in P. Lacroix, ed., *Eviter la guerre?* (Paris: Maspéro, 1983), pp. 158–60; 'Parade ou découplage?', *Le Monde*, 4 Feb. 1983; 'Jusqu'au bout avec l'amiral Sanguinetti', *Lui*, June 1983; 'L'enjeu des Pershing'.

50. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, 'La défense américaine de l'Europe: une impasse', *Le Monde*, 15 Dec. 1979.

51. Didier Motchane, in an interview with the author on 6 Aug. 1983, stated: 'We do not believe that cruise and Pershing II are an appropriate response to the SS-20, which is hardly a first-strike weapon.'

52. 'Une interview de Jean-Pierre Chevènement', *Enjeu*, Sept. 1983, No. 5, p. 41; see also Chevènement's speech to the Socialist Party Congress in *Volonté Socialiste*, 15 Nov. 1983, No. 22, pp. 6–7.

53. In his 'Presidential manifesto', *Ici et maintenant*, Mitterrand wrote: 'Pershing IIs, deployed in Germany, can reach Kiev in six minutes. I understand why the Russians are alarmed. For them, Pershing II is an intolerable imbalance' (p. 245). In an interview on French radio on 9 Dec. 1981, he said: 'I believe that the future deployment of Pershing IIs, which are American weapons and which can reach vital strategic targets in the Soviet Union in five to six minutes, while Soviet strategic systems take twenty minutes to cross the Atlantic, would create an imbalance': *Le Monde*, 11 Dec. 1981. However, in his important televised speech of 16 Nov. 1983, Mitterrand implied that Pershing II was not much of a threat because it could not even reach Moscow, could not threaten more than one tenth of Soviet strategic systems and carried only one warhead: *Le Monde*, 18 Nov. 1983, p. 7.

54. Patrick Viveret, in an interview with the author on 6 Dec. 1983, insisted that the only factor of any significance was that both systems (SS-20 and Pershing II) were counterforce systems and to that extent 'balanced' each other.

55. Pierre Lellouche, head of the security section of IFRI, in a talk at Harvard University on 10 April 1984, stated that France, like the United States, positively welcomed the victory which deployment represented.

56. For the vigorously critical arguments of Jules Moch, Gaston Defferre and François Mitterrand, see Pascal Krop, *Les socialistes et l'armée*, pp. 42–4.

asserting the total credibility of the strategic deterrent. Its effectiveness, they have insisted, relies entirely on the element of uncertainty which must always remain in the mind of an enemy. President Mitterrand recently reiterated this notion by stressing that 'the mainspring of France's deterrent strategy is the head of state, that is to say, myself: everything depends on the President's resolution'.[57]

This interpretation of the credibility of the deterrent is often accompanied, notably in Hernu's statements, by an assertion of the solidarity, behind their leader, of the French people, as evidenced by opinion polls. However, recent polls have consistently produced internally contradictory results. In December 1983, a major opinion poll found that 58 per cent of respondents felt that in the event of a Soviet crossing of the Rhine the government should do nothing more than negotiate an armistice. Those favouring conventional resistance made up a further 26 per cent. In other words, 84 per cent of the population accept that the deterrent is virtually useless.[58] However, so sacrosanct does the national belief in that same deterrent remain, that when a leading politician like Michel Pinton dared to express the view that the nuclear arsenal is a dangerous and expensive bluff, his entire political career was immediately put in jeopardy.[59]

Nevertheless, despite Mitterrand's reassurances in his recent speech, there are reasons to believe that, in his heart of hearts, he knows that 'the emperor is naked'. In a speech to the anti-nuclear campaign *Mouvement contre l'arme atomique* (MCAA) in 1966, he himself used all his powers of rhetorical irony (and most of the same arguments as those deployed by Michel Pinton) to debunk the notion that any French President would ever dare press the button.[60] Patrick Viveret, who believes that a counter-city system lacks any vestige of credibility against counter-force weapons, was also remarkably forthright in asserting that 'I am convinced Mitterrand has never believed in the deterrent'. To illustrate his point, he stressed the remarkable verbal contortion with which Mitterrand ended his recent speech on the issue: after insisting that everything depended on the President's resolution, he continued: 'The rest is just inert matter, all the way to the final decision which consists precisely *in doing everything to avoid actually using it*' (emphasis added).

Whether or not the arsenal has any credibility, the government's refusal to consider subjecting it to arms control is exacting a high political price in three separate areas: East–West relations; the national consensus on defence; and the cohesion of the governing majority. Several articles have recently addressed the question of the place of French weapons in arms control.[61] A year ago, former president Giscard d'Estaing created something of a political stir by alleging that Mitterrand's open support for the 'two-track' decision had precipitated Soviet

57. *Le Monde*, 18 Nov. 1983, p. 7.

58. *Le Figaro*, 1 Dec. 1983, pp. 1, 2.

59. Michel Pinton, General Secretary of the UDF, published an article implying unilateral nuclear disarmament for France ('Une nouvelle Ligne Maginot', *Le Monde*, 16 June 1983). He was immediately denounced not only by M. Cheysson (*Le Monde*, 18 June 1983) but also by Michel Debré on behalf of the RPR and by Jean-Marie Daillet for the UDF (*Le Monde*, 24 June 1983). He was obliged to resign as General Secretary of the Giscardian group on 5 Sept. 1983 (*Le Monde*, 13 Sept. 1983).

60. I am grateful to Claude Bourdet for lending me a tape-recording of this important speech made at the Mutualité on 25 Jan. 1966.

61. Jonathan Alford, 'The place of British and French nuclear weapons in arms control', *International Affairs*, Autumn 1983, Vol. 59, No. 4; Lellouche, 'France and the Euromissiles' and also his article in *Le Point*, 27 Feb. 1984, No. 597, and *Le Monde*, editorial 'Les deux Grands et le dialogue nucléaire', 2 Feb. 1984. Both the latter articles express French fears that a hypothetical deal between the United States and the Soviet Union might be prejudicial to the French nuclear arsenal.

demands for inclusion of the French arsenal in the INF talks.[62] Pierre Lellouche has argued that Giscard's charges are flawed on two counts. First, because French 'neutrality' on INF never existed (the original decision was taken at the Guadeloupe summit in January 1979 hosted by Giscard), and secondly because the Soviet Union has too much to gain from playing the Franco-British card.[63] Their demand creates tensions between France, Britain and America by suggesting that 'compensation' for the European arsenals will have to be deducted from American totals;[64] and they also create tensions among the European nations since some sections of opinion will be bound to agree with the Soviet position. There is a third reason why the Soviet Union would have been bound to demand the application of arms control to France and Britain: the current 'modernization' programmes for these systems involve a potential tenfold increase in the numbers of French and British warheads—at a time when US proposals in START are aiming to halve the superpower warheads.

Soviet pressure on Mitterrand was therefore inevitable. But so too was domestic pressure. Atlanticists within the PS as well as the PCF within the governing majority are suggesting (with a greater or lesser degree of frankness and intensity) that France should join the arms control talks. The Atlanticists are concerned lest French intransigence should lead to major disruption of the superpower talks.[65] The communists, by noisily demanding French participation in INF while simultaneously insisting that there can be no question of *reductions* in French weapons,[66] seem to be preparing the ground for Soviet proposals on American reductions as compensation. CERES, which quietly favours as large a build-up of the French arsenal as possible (as the basis of a future European defence) is opposed to any French participation in any arms control discussions. At the same time, libertarians like Viveret and, more recently, the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) have begun to suggest that the West should adopt a more flexible stand on arms control in exchange for a more aggressive attitude towards the Soviet Union on human rights and trade. Viveret and other libertarians joined the CFDT in participating in the Comité pour le Désarmement Nucléaire en Europe (CODENE) peace demonstration calling for a freeze on 23 October 1983.

The arms control question is a seething hornets' nest, and President Mitterrand's reference, in his September 1983 speech to the UN,[67] to an eventual French presence at a conference of the five nuclear powers (on several specific conditions) was clearly an attempt to stall a little longer. But the French nuclear arsenal does not only involve strategic weapons. Proposals to modernize the tactical arsenal (the

62. V. Giscard d'Estaing, 'Une occasion historique pour l'Europe', *Le Monde*, 19 Feb. 1983. Giscard repeated these assertions in 'New opportunities and new challenges', *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, Vol. 62, No. 1, p. 187.

63. Lellouche, 'France and the Euromissiles', pp. 330–2.

64. Jonathan Alford, 'The place of British and French nuclear weapons', p. 572.

65. Jean-Pierre Cot made this proposal explicitly in 1979: 'La France doit participer à Salt III', *Le Monde*, 9–10 Sept. 1979. CERES was still convinced in October 1983 that Cot and fellow Atlanticists were thinking along these lines. Jean-Pierre Chevènement openly attacked such ideas in his speech to the Bourg-en-Bresse Congress. See *Volonté Socialiste*, 15 Nov. 1983, No. 22, p. 7.

66. *Le Monde* and *L'Humanité*, 15 July 1983. Roger Mayer, 'Course aux armements: les faits nous interpellent', *Cahiers du Communisme*, July–August 1983, No. 7–8, p. 72, tentatively repeats the same idea. Even before leaving the government in July 1984, it was clear that the PCF had quietly dropped this proposal for fear of being excluded from office on a foreign policy issue. There is no reason to believe that, since leaving the government, they will reactivate their criticism of Mitterrand's security policy.

67. *Le Monde*, 30 Sept. 1983.

Hades programme), which are vigorously resisted inside the party both by CERES and by the Jacobin nationalists,[68] raise afresh the question of the function of this arsenal and specifically of its relationship to NATO and to the defence of Western Europe.

France and the defence of Europe

The third main plank in France's current defence programme is the formation of a 47,000-man rapid deployment force (FAR) which is in some ways the centrepiece of the 1984–8 white paper.[69] The strategic and military functions of this force remain shrouded in ambiguity and speculation. Some officials, anxious to avoid charges that FAR represents a reintegration into NATO, have stressed that the new conventional strike force will be directly tied in to the logic of the strategic deterrent, that it will be another 'trip-wire' in the structure of which Pluton is currently a part.[70] Others, including Charles Hernu, have been at pains to suggest that it will be totally detached from the strategic arsenal and, to that extent, 'usable' within the parameters of 'forward battle'.[71] From all quarters, the most contradictory interpretations of FAR have been forthcoming.[72]

Behind this specific controversy, however, lies the much broader and ultimately more vital question of the strategic relationship between the armed forces of France and those of NATO. This question has always lain at the heart of fundamental divisions within the PS. Between the out-and-out Atlanticists, for whom no defence of Europe is either desirable or conceivable without strong coupling and physical American presence, and the advocates of withdrawal from NATO (whose proposal is predicated on the prior creation of an authentic and credible European defence system) there are many alternative positions. The fortunes of these conflicting positions ebb and flow within the PS according to the relative position of strength of a given faction at a given moment. Thus, the crushing defeat of the CERES 'anti-Atlanticist' resolution at the defence convention in 1978 was a function of the elimination of that faction from the party's directorate after 1975. However, when the political tide turned inside the party in 1978, and CERES was brought back into the leadership at the Metz Congress in 1979, one begins to find a far less Atlanticist tone in official texts on defence and foreign affairs (see *Le Projet Socialiste pour les années 1980*).

68. Interview with Didier Motchane, Paris, 6 Aug. 1983; Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, 'French defence: a military critique' in Howorth and Chilton, eds, *Defence and dissent*, pp. 173–90.

69. *Journal Officiel,* Assemblée Nationale, No. 1452: 'Projet de loi portant approbation de la programmation militaire pour les années 1984–1988'.

70. Jean-Yves Le Drian, *rapporteur* of the finance commission of the Assemblée Nationale, *Le Monde*, 20 May 1983, p. 28; General Lacaze, 'Politique de défense et stratégie militaire de la France', *Défense Nationale*, June 1983, p. 21: 'It must be understood that the participation of FAR would signify to an adversary that he henceforth runs the risk of rapidly confronting the might of a nuclear country which maintains the independence of its decisions.' Hernu's own presentation of the FAR was rather more ambiguous: 'I should like to make it clear that it would be absolutely contrary to the intentions of France to see in FAR some sort of reintegration in NATO. On the contrary, the very fact that the intervention of FAR remains at the sole discretion of the French government means that its arrival in a certain area could actually deter an aggressor': *Le Monde*, 18 June 1983.

71. Hernu: 'FAR is a classical land force able to intervene with pinpoint precision and its manoeuvres are detached from our nuclear capabilities'; but he then went on to say, nevertheless, that any aggressor would have to remember that, in taking on FAR, he was taking on the 'might of an independent, continental nuclear power'. 'Equilibre, dissuasion, volonté', *Défense Nationale*, Dec. 1983, p. 16.

72. See the contradictory interpretations presented in a series of articles in *Le Monde*, 25 Oct. 1983, 20–1 Nov. 1983 and 7 April 1984. For an overview see Dominique David, 'La FAR en Europe', in *Défense Nationale*, June 1984, pp. 27–49.

To some extent, this is merely a semantic game played out among drafters of resolutions at ungodly hours of the morning on the final days of congresses. There are several distinct levels at which France's relationship with NATO can be defined. The first, and in some ways the hardest to gauge properly, is the 'diplomatic'. For the first twelve months of Mitterrand's Presidency, there was endless speculation about the extent to which his forthright pro-Atlanticism was a tactical diplomatic sop to the Reagan administration in order to defuse US attempts to destabilize France's experiment in socialism. CERES is perfectly frank about this: 'We entirely agreed that it was essential not to cause unnecessary problems with the Americans in the first two or three years. It is only natural that the Left should do certain things aimed at bringing it a minimum of peace and quiet. . . . Tactics in this matter are perfectly understandable, on condition that things remain at the level of tactics and that tactics don't wind up substituting themselves for policy.'[73] The difficulty of course lies in distinguishing between the tactical manoeuvre and the reality.

At a second level of Franco–NATO relations—the 'historico-cultural'—there is probably little disagreement within the party. While official texts (inspired by sincerity or merely by diplomacy) regularly refer to the two-thousand-year-old common roots of Euro–American history, these sentiments can be echoed by CERES theoreticians who, on occasion, will even go so far as to state that Europe and the United States are 'jointly responsible for democracy throughout the world'.[74]

However, once geography enters the picture, coupled with social, economic, political and strategic factors, the debate begins to intensify. Most socialists insist on the need to 'break out of Yalta'. Pledges to pursue the 'dissolution of the blocs' have become *de rigueur* in government speeches and texts.[75] Motivations for this can vary from the Gallic nationalism of a Hernu or a Sanguinetti to the 'Euro-nationalism' of a Cheysson or a Delors; from the resentment expressed by a Chevènement or a Motchane before the fact of American hegemony in Western Europe to the struggle against Soviet totalitarianism of a Viveret or a Julliard. The project can even have a straightforward political dimension: the desire to create a genuine 'third way' between liberalism and communism. Indeed, it is quite possible to subscribe to several or all of these sentiments or objectives at once. Disagreement begins with discussions about method.

Such discussions are subjected to three 'external' constraints. At the level of diplomacy, the problem of how to devise a united European military command

73. Interview with Didier Motchane, Paris, 6 Aug. 1983.

74. Mauroy: 'France sees in the Atlantic Alliance . . . above all a human community to which she belongs', *Défense Nationale*, Oct. 1981, p. 19; Jospin: 'North America and Western Europe share with France a common heritage, rooted in our peoples and our history', *Le Poing et la Rose*, June 1983, No. 101, p. 12; Chevènement: 'Europe and the United States have assumed the heritage of that humanist and rationalist culture which arose more than two thousand years ago on the shores of the Mediterranean. . . . We are jointly responsible for democracy throughout the world', *Volonté Socialiste*, No. 22, p. 6.

75. Mitterrand: 'We must escape from Yalta; I have been saying that for a very long time. . . . But we must at the same time realise that it cannot be done without a wrenching away (déchirement), without preparation. . . . Let's stick to the idea and prepare for the event via a political will for Europe' (*Le Monde*, 18 Nov. 1983, p. 8). Hernu: 'We have always demanded the dissolution of the two blocs . . . the broader objective is that one day the English, the Germans, the Italians, the French will have other means and become masters of their destiny. Frenchmen or Europeans, there is no reason why Yalta should last several decades;' written response to interview with author, Paris, 16 Aug. 1983.

(especially where nuclear weapons are concerned) in a Europe lacking any vestige of political unity is the reef on which all projects for a 'Euro-defence' system have so far come to grief. At the level of strategic balance, there is the problem of transition from one system of collective security to another. Hernu has regularly warned that any *rapid* transition can only happen as a result of war.[76] Finally, at a political level, there is the problem of breaking free from the political culture of Gaullism. There is still plenty of electoral mileage to be derived in France from denouncing 'NATO-leanings' in political opponents (as Giscard discovered to his cost).

What, then, are the various positions inside the PS on France's relationship to the defence of Europe? The President himself is seen by all factions as being far less Atlanticist than he appears. His support for the 'two-track' decision was clearly a diplomatic gamble which failed to achieve its primary objective (zero-option) or even a second best solution (the 'walk in the woods' formula) but the outcome of which—deployment of Pershing II and cruise—Mitterrand considers preferable to the *status quo ante* for various reasons, of which concern about the political credibility of the French deterrent is clearly a major one, and fear of a neutralist drift in Germany another.

Mitterrand has made Franco-German military cooperation a major new policy objective.[77] To what end? Is his long-term vision the same as that of Washington or Bonn? Herein lies the mystery of FAR. The new rapid deployment force can very easily be seen as complementary to the new strategic doctrine commonly known as the 'Rogers Plan'. That plan is extremely ambiguous. When the proposal to increase conventional capacity in Europe was first mooted, Charles Hernu, who remains a Gaullist at heart and is probably even less Atlanticist than Mitterrand, denounced it in ringing terms as an updated version of flexible response.[78] And yet we know that FAR will be integrated into NATO strategic planning and has even been assigned a specific function in the event of hostilities in Central Europe.[79] How does one explain this 'second conversion' of the defence minister? There are two possible explanations. The first has to do with rivalries within the armed forces which require Hernu to play the role of arbiter and/or conciliator.[80] The second is

76. 'We know that if we had to leave the Atlantic Alliance rapidly or precipitately, without there being another security pact into which to move, that could only happen as a result of war'; written response to interview with author, Paris, 16 Aug. 1983.

77. At a summit meeting between Kohl and Mitterrand on 21–2 October 1982, a joint Franco-German military commission was established, which meets every three months to explore cooperation at the level of both procurements and strategy. See *Le Monde*, 5, 22, 23, 24–5 Oct. 1982, 19 May 1983, 20, 21 July 1983, 11 Jan. 1984, 3 Feb. 1984; *Défense Nationale*, Dec. 1982, p. 155. However, it is uncertain whether any real progress has been made. Alain Joxe, director of Centre Interdisciplinaire des Recherches sur la Paix et les Etudes Stratégiques, in an interview with the author in Paris on 14 May 1984, felt that in view of the divergent security requirements of the two countries, this initiative, which clearly came from Paris, would not achieve much.

78. Hernu had already cast doubt on the Rogers Plan in his speech to IHEDN on 16 Nov. 1982; *Défense Nationale*, Dec. 1982, p. 13. In his closing speech to the colloquium on Science and Defence in April 1983, he dismissed the plan as misguided and in any case incapable of making France change its strategy; *Le Monde*, 30 April 1983. Claude Cheysson also, in a speech to the Western European Union in June 1983, strongly rejected the 'battle-fighting' implications of the plan; *Le Monde*, 9 June 1983. See also Claude Le Borgne, 'Le Général Rogers, l'Amérique et l'Europe', *Défense Nationale*, Feb. 1983, pp 25–32.

79. Hernu was obliged, under parliamentary questioning, to admit that the FAR would be dependent on NATO for logistical support (*Le Monde*, 24 June 1983). FAR has now been attributed responsibility for stopping Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMG) inside German territory (*Le Monde*, 25 Oct. 1983, p. 9).

80. See the three very different interpretations of FAR in *Le Monde*, 7 April 1984, p. 2.

that, during the bilateral discussions between France and Germany on military cooperation, France's commitment to a conventional role was turned into a 'test' of its seriousness about trying to create some form of Euro-defence system.[81] Ever since the left-wing government came to power, official spokesmen have attempted to keep all factions in the party happy by channelling all projects for and discussion of European defence through the Western European Union.[82] Recent reports suggest that Mitterrand has now proposed a major upgrading of this thirty-five-year-old institution with a view to forcing the creation of a genuine European pillar of the alliance.[83]

In avoiding the Scylla of 'Gaullist isolationism', have Hernu and Mitterrand sailed perilously close to the Charybdis of 'NATO subservience'? What attitude does France take to the new American strategy of AirLand Battle, which could give the West an offensive 'deep-strike' capacity against Soviet C^3 installations?[84] Hernu is non-committal on this: 'France . . . does not consider itself bound by the tactical subtleties of NATO force deployment. Therefore the notion of AirLand Battle, apart from the technical questions it raises, does not call for any particular comment from the French government.'[85] Government spokesmen continue to stress that the socialists are committed to the creation of a European defence system. Obviously the key to that defence will be Franco–German cooperation. The government has taken several important steps down that road; where exactly it is leading remains a closely guarded secret.

As for CERES, the controversy over FAR was a clear indication of governmental Atlanticism. It coincided with the Williamsburg summit and references to the indivisibility of Western defences, which were implicitly extended to Japan. Both these events were closely followed by the NATO Council meeting in Paris in June 1983. Moreover, prefaced as the defence white paper was with an explicit designation of the Soviet Union as the enemy, and accompanied as it was by statements from Jacques Delors to the effect that the United States were 'the leaders of the free world', the revelation about FAR was the last straw. In the summer of 1983, CERES leaders, convinced that the Atlanticists surrounding Mitterrand and Hernu had produced a massive Atlantic shift in French foreign and defence policy, launched an intensive public counterattack.[86] The results of their attempts to reverse the trend became visible at the party congress in Bourg-en-Bresse in October 1983. Several amendments to the majority motion are noteworthy in this respect. The original motion stated that France was not 'equidistant' between the two blocs and went on to say why close relations with the United States were vital. The sentence

81. It seems extremely likely that what the French learned from these Franco–German contacts was that France's enthusiasm for strategic nuclear deterrence was not shared in West Germany, even by the leadership.

82. Pierre Mauroy, in his speech to IHEDN on 20 September 1983, referred to WEU as 'the only European organism' through which questions of European defence could be addressed; *Défense Nationale*, Nov. 1983, p. 15. Hernu and, to a lesser extent Mitterrand, also regularly sing the praises of WEU as evidence of a purely European commitment to Euro-defence. But the British government has tried to nip this new development in the bud. See Heseltine's interview with *Le Point*, 9 April 1984, No. 603, p. 9.

83. James Adams, 'How France plans to jolt Europe's defence "wets"', *Sunday Times*, 13 May 1984.

84. On Airland Battle, see Konrad Ege and Martha Wenger, 'La nouvelle doctrine AirLand Battle', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Feb. 1983; A. M. Thomas, 'L'AirLand Battle et l'engagement américain en Europe', *Défense Nationale*, April 1983, and Robert Gessert, 'L'AirLand Battle et le nouveau débat doctrinal dans l'OTAN', in *Défense Nationale*, July & Aug/Sept. 1984.

85. Written response to interview with author, Paris, 16 Aug. 1983.

86. See *Enjeu*, July–Aug. 1983, No. 4, articles by Didier Motchane, Alain Joxe, Pierre-Luc Séguillon.

on 'equidistance' was deleted under CERES pressure. Several additional hard-hitting criticisms of the United States, including a denunciation of its action in Grenada, were inserted into a paragraph already packed with references to Franco–American disputes. Again, it was CERES, suspicious about the purportedly Atlanticist intentions of the wording on arms control, which successfully injected into the final text a categorical rejection of any French participation in any arms talks prior to massive reductions in superpower arsenals.[87]

CERES was guardedly optimistic about the significance of these amendments. On 6 December 1983, when asked whether he felt his faction had managed to halt what CERES has always called 'Atlantic drift' in the party, Didier Motchane replied:

> No! There has been a certain raising of consciousness and there are interesting reactions, but we cannot yet say that the drift has been arrested. There are hopeful signs of reorientation, including Mitterrand's new attitude to the Soviet Union. . . . The Congress [of Bourg-en-Bresse] adopted a new tone on foreign policy which we succeeded . . . in shifting just about as far as it was possible to go. Circumstances helped. Grenada happened just days before Congress assembled.[88]

However, CERES continues to argue that the contradiction between the party's Atlanticist leanings and its European aspirations remains total. At the same time, despite the fury with which the wording of congress resolutions is disputed, one may well wonder whether such resolutions have the slightest effect on either policy or diplomacy.

How does CERES see the move towards bloc dissolution and a Euro-defence system? They too consider Germany to be the key. At the level of strategy, they believe that Germany needs to be persuaded that a defensive alliance with France and other European partners is a safer bet than alliance with the United States. In this connection, CERES sees the destruction of the defence consensus in Germany consequent upon the recent Bundestag vote as a highly promising development. Taken in conjunction with the Labour Party's interest in alternative defence and its perceived resurgent anti-Americanism, CERES believes that 'serious possibilities now exist for dialogue at a European level'.[89] Traditionally, CERES has believed that the French deterrent would *eventually* have to play a European role (perhaps in conjunction with the British deterrent, although that would be strictly dependent on an ending of the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States) and the faction is often seen as irremediably wedded to nuclear weapons. In fact, they do not rule out the possibility of moving towards an eventual *conventional* defence of Western Europe, especially in view of their belief that the Soviet Union has no inevitable expansionist designs. Their emphasis on West–West as the key to East–West has involved a constant campaign on their part for a less anti-Soviet attitude on the part of the Mitterrand administration (this also they see as a feature which will prove attractive to the Germans). CERES claim that it was their pressure

87. The complete text of the twenty amendments put by CERES is in *Volonté Socialiste*, No. 22, pp. 12–14.

88. Interview with Didier Motchane, Paris, 6 Dec. 1983.

89. At the press conference held to launch the memorandum cited in note 41, the CERES representative accepted German reproaches about the targeting of French Pluton missiles on German territory and also about Mitterrand's intervention in the Bundestag. But he was not prepared to discuss German suggestions that France should think of winding down its nuclear arsenal.

which resulted in Mitterrand holding out against Reagan over the gas-pipeline deal, sanctions against Poland and other 'punitive' measures with regard to the Eastern bloc.[90]

This, of course, is where the libertarian socialists take the diametrically opposite view. Their criticism of government foreign policy is that it has been nowhere near forceful enough in its economic, political and cultural dealings with the Soviet Union. This is a belief they share with many Atlanticists, but, unlike the latter, they believe in separating military policies from political and economic ones. Patrick Viveret believes that *Europe's* role in the current crisis is to trace the contours of a 'third way' at the level of politics and ideology. This involves a distancing of France from the United States in two areas: arms control, and American policy in the Third World. Confident in his belief that the current crisis is not primarily a military crisis, Viveret argues that the West should adopt a much more flexible approach on arms control but at the same time a much more aggressive approach on human rights. This latter will clearly involve 'sweeping out the West's own back yard' and voicing strenuous criticism over events in places like South Africa, Turkey and El Salvador. But Viveret considers that the West's reaction to martial law in Poland 'smacks of Munich'. He stresses the illogicality of a Western policy to the Soviet Union which hinges on military pressure alone (the one area where the Soviet Union is strong) and undervalues the cultural and political, not to mention economic, strengths of the West. The 'third way' involves a cross-continental policy of support for Solidarity, Charter 77 and other 'dissident' groups within the Eastern bloc (all of which organizations CERES regards with some suspicion as inevitably manipulated by the United States). To this extent, the libertarians within the PS are extremely close to the politics of the 'independent' European peace movements.[91]

The dilemma over how to reforge an autonomous Europe brings us back to the starting point: the analysis of Soviet intentions. Atlanticists who subscribe in one form or another to the 'evil empire' vision of the Soviet Union will continue to feel that the best that can be hoped for in Europe is containment, which, essentially, means military containment and the maintenance of the blocs. Libertarians in the party, concerned mainly with the dynamics of totalitarianism, stress the need for a European counterattack on the political and ideological front. They offer the prospect of a long-drawn-out ideological crusade leading to gradual 'flexibilization' of the bloc system *on condition* that Moscow can be assured that any such 'retreat' will not be followed up by military pressures. Those, like CERES and (in the view of this author) probably the Jacobins and even Mitterrand himself, who feel that the Soviet Union is basically on the defensive internally as well as externally, believe that a genuine *European* detente can create the bases of 'Euro–Soviet' relaxation of tensions, the loosening of the screw in Eastern Europe and Soviet concentration on developing its system within the boundaries of the Soviet Union alone. Thus we find three socialist visions of a Europe from the Atlantic to, if not

90. Interview with Didier Motchane, Paris, 6 Aug. 1983.

91. Viveret, in an interview in Paris on 6 Dec. 1983, told the author: 'There should be massive support for the independent peace movements in the East. We can already see how shaken the Soviets are by those groups. If, at every Western peace demonstration, there was a very clear denunciation of both Soviet and NATO weapons as well as support for independent peace movements East and West, the international balance of forces could be seriously modified.'

the Urals, at least the Soviet–Polish border, visions which seem incompatible both in the analysis of the problem and in the formulation of the solution.

Conclusion

Three general points may be made. In the first place, the old 'Gaullist' consensus, despite frantic official attempts to keep it alive, is cracking rapidly. Budgetary constraints (which this article has bypassed, largely because they appear not to be an issue within the PS, even though the UDF is clamouring for more money to be spent more wisely) and the new technological developments (counterforce weapons and 'star wars' scenarios) have rapidly eroded the bases of the classical theology of '*dissuasion du faible au fort*'.

Secondly, both opposition parties appear to have moved more openly away from the old Gaullist verities than the governing socialist party. In the case of the UDF, this is hardly a new development. They have been pleading the cause of a major rethink ever since the early 1970s. In the case of the RPR, the recent shift towards emphasis on the European pillar remains extremely vague. Chirac's speeches in Bonn and London last year were as ambivalent on the issue of European defence as are Hernu's on the issue of FAR. To some extent, the RPR shift may well reflect the perceived necessities of not allowing the UDF to monopolize an idea which is taking shape very rapidly. One has the distinct impression that most of the thinking on the matter of France's relationship with the defence of Europe is taking place within the UDF rather than within the RPR. But the convergence on defence between the parties of the opposition is a very significant development, the implications of which in terms of the specifics of the 'new consensus' remain to be seen.

Thirdly, if the two main parties of the opposition have difficulty in arriving at a joint statement (we have now been promised one for over a year), their problems are as nothing compared with the difficulties faced by the drafters, not of a hypothetical but inconceivable PS–PCF communiqué, but, more realistically, of a clear statement signed by all the factions of the ruling socialist party. Clearly, all those factions are now addressing the new issues of the day: credibility of the old theology of deterrence; restructuring of the Atlantic alliance; policy with regard to the military blocs; the role of France in a hypothetical European defence system; and arms control. The debate is intensifying. What influence is it likely to have on policy?

Mitterrand is experiencing the most critical year of his *septennat*. His popularity seems largely a function of his foreign policy performance. He clearly has aspirations to emerge as a major world statesman. In his important television address on defence and foreign policy in November 1983, he set himself the task, in the event of breakdown in Geneva, of acting as a sort of honest broker in international diplomacy, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union. Since then, a whole series of bilateral visits have taken place and the President has urged the Americans to pursue dialogue with the Kremlin. The opportunities for him to play a major role are clear, since in many ways he has been instrumental in helping to create the present situation. As he goes about that task, the views of the individuals within the Socialist Party which have been examined in this article will be brought to bear

on him with some force. Mitterrand has always been a solitary man; a man who listens carefully to a wide variety of views and then decides alone in the isolation of his own office and the individuality of his own conscience. Which way he will play his cards is anybody's guess.

The LRTNF decision: evolution of US theatre nuclear policy, 1975–9

JAMES A. THOMSON*

The deployment by NATO in Europe of the so-called intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles in December 1983 marked the culmination of a process largely completed four years earlier. From 1975 to 1979, the United States, together with its NATO allies, fundamentally changed alliance policy concerning theatre nuclear forces (TNF). Although America's European allies played a strong role in initiating this process, the change was ultimately one for the United States to make as the chief nuclear power of the alliance.

In 1975, when the Soviet SS-20 missile first appeared, the United States did not possess nuclear missile forces capable of striking Soviet territory from the continent of Europe, nor had it since the early 1960s. On 12 December 1979, the United States and its allies decided to deploy such missile capability on the continent of Europe. This article summarizes the process by which this change occurred, which may be instructive for future decision-making and the conduct of nuclear diplomacy, especially within the Atlantic alliance. It emphasizes the US decision-making process and the conduct of US diplomacy, so the lessons are most directly relevant to the United States; however, these matters are of obvious wider interest.

Politics and strategy: the military motivation

By its very nature, such a process as that leading to the LRTNF[1] decision is political, and many observers have overlooked the non-political motivations that lay behind it. The LRTNF decision has often been described as purely politically motivated, whereas in fact, in addition to the political aspect, there was a fundamental strategic motive.

This is not the place to go into a lengthy analysis of the strategic foundations of the LRTNF decision. The debate within the United States and the alliance over LRTNF was a complex one, which involved many different analyses and points of view. To oversimplify, the LRTNF decision was a response to two changes that occurred in the strategic balance between the early 1960s, when American missiles were withdrawn from Europe, and the mid-1970s, when the SS-20 appeared. First, the Soviet Union attained strategic parity with the United States. This had been foreseen for some time; it had led to the formal adoption by NATO in 1967 of the 'flexible response' strategy. Western strategic analysts believed that *in Soviet eyes* Soviet strategic parity would reduce US willingness to use its strategic nuclear

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1. The terms intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) are used interchangeably in this article. LRTNF was the term in vogue at the time of the 1979 decision; President Reagan subsequently adopted the term INF.

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forces in contingencies short of nuclear attack on the United States itself, therefore sharply reducing the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella over Europe. The flexible response strategy sought to give NATO leaders a range of nuclear employment options below the level of massive strategic nuclear strikes. These options were believed to strengthen deterrence because they would provide an unbroken chain from theatre conventional war to strategic nuclear war. Although NATO had enunciated this doctrine in 1967, by 1975 there had been no important changes in the structure of NATO's nuclear forces in implementation of it.

The second strategic change was a modernization of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, not only at the strategic nuclear level but also more broadly. During the early 1970s, the Soviet Union began deploying a new family of nuclear-capable fighter bombers and medium bombers, including the Backfire. In 1975, they were expected to begin deployment by the late 1970s of a new family of theatre nuclear missiles—the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23—as well as nuclear artillery rounds. Finally, in 1975 they began testing a new intermediate range missile—the SS-20—apparently intended as a replacement for the older SS-4 and SS-5. Across the board, these capabilities gave the Soviets significant improvements in the employment flexibility of their nuclear forces and put them in a position to counter NATO's nuclear employment options at every level of conflict. Most importantly, the SS-20, which also represented a significant improvement over its predecessors, reminded Western strategists that NATO had no employment options to speak of at the LRTNF level. Soviet nuclear deployments thus exploited strategic nuclear parity and sought to undermine NATO's flexible response strategy. These strategic changes led to growing concern about the state of NATO's deterrent among both American and European experts. On the whole, however, these concerns were rarely enunciated in public.[2]

By 1975, the United States had embarked on development programmes to field air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles in nuclear roles. Cruise missiles have long been a matter of interest and dispute within the United States, especially between Pentagon civilians and the US Air Force, because of the inevitable suggestion that such weapon systems could be substituted for manned aircraft. However, there was also considerable interest in the potential application of cruise missile technology to NATO defence problems, chiefly in the conventional role. Because cruise missile technology was moving forward rapidly and appeared extremely promising, it is hardly surprising that a link was drawn between this technology and the emerging strategic problem that centred on the SS-20. As early as 1975–6, analysts in the Pentagon began to speak of cruise missiles as the US 'counter' to the SS-20 and its medium bomber counterpart, the Backfire.

Phase I: American foot-dragging

It remained for political forces to combine with strategic and technological motivations to push the LRTNF issue forward. The political forces centred on SALT, in particular, the agreement reached between the United States and Soviet Union in Vladivostok in November 1974. This 'framework' agreement was expected to

2. A notable exception was a speech by Fred Ikle, then Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on 31 August 1976, when he described the SS-20 as a 'dark cloud towering over Europe and Asia'. Although Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had informed the press about the SS-20 a year earlier, this speech marked the first notable public discussion about the system and its implications.

be turned quickly into a formal SALT II treaty; however, it stalled on two major problems. First, the United States wanted to see the Backfire bomber programme limited; and secondly, the Soviet Union wanted to place severe constraints on US cruise missile programmes, including a ban on long-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs).

The Pentagon fought hard against the proposed restrictions on US forces. In the course of attempts to justify within the US government the country's right to deploy a long-range GLCM, Pentagon civilians posited a theatre nuclear mission for the system, which at that time was not even in development. They pointed out that a GLCM force would give the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) the capability to hold targets in the Soviet Union 'at risk' and also to provide a political and strategic counter to the SS-20. They also argued that cruise missiles could substitute for tactical air forces in nuclear strike roles. Pentagon insistence that SALT II should preserve the right to deploy GLCMs and SLCMs led to serious frictions within the US government which became readily apparent to European observers.

As they watched the internal American debate, European strategic analysts became concerned that the United States might bargain away capabilities that could be important for Europe's defence—both conventional and nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Many of the SALT negotiating options under consideration in Washington during 1975 and early 1976 included bans on long-range (greater than 600 kilometres) GLCMs and SLCMs, but no limits on the Soviet nuclear forces arrayed against Europe. Some German officials began to express anxiety about the imbalance of 'Eurostrategic forces', underscored by the existence of the SS-20, and suggested that cruise missiles might help redress this imbalance. The American response to such European concerns was a reminder that American strategic forces provided ample target coverage of the western USSR and for that reason the alliance had long forgone a capability to strike Soviet territory from the European continent. However, in the face of growing European worries about the implications of strategic parity and the SS-20, this response was hardly reassuring. European concerns about American SALT policy were magnified into suspicions when it was learned that the United States had included a ban on long-range SLCMs and GLCMs in its SALT proposal of February 1976. However, the Soviet Union did not accept this proposal; soon thereafter the SALT negotiations went into hiatus as the United States entered the 1976 Presidential election campaign.

The Carter administration thus inherited a looming strategic and political problem, which, by virtue of its initial membership and policy inclinations, it hoped to dispel. Yet it pursued policies that exacerbated rather than alleviated European concerns and thereby increased the political pressure on the United States to move forward with the cruise missile programme. The more the United States displayed its reluctance to pursue cruise missiles for NATO, the more its allies wanted them.

The first policy tendency to intensify the political problem was the Carter administration's emphasis on improving NATO's conventional defences. At a summit of NATO leaders in May 1977, President Carter called for a comprehensive, long-term conventional defence improvement plan. Immediately thereafter, the United States mounted a major push to put together what came to be known as the Long-Term Defense Plan (LTDP). Although this was not the first such effort within NATO, it was mounted with unusual vigour, involving all levels of the Pentagon, as well as the State Department and the White House. When coupled

with the President's own well-known aversion to nuclear weapons (exemplified by his call for complete nuclear disarmament in his inaugural address) this enthusiasm led many Europeans to suspect that the administration intended to shift NATO strategy away from nuclear deterrence and towards conventional deterrence. This would be anathema in Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The administration's policy on SALT got it into even greater difficulty. The initial Carter negotiating position collapsed during the trip to Moscow in March 1977 of Cyrus Vance, then Secretary of State. Because a major Soviet objection to the proposals made at this time was their failure to place considerable restrictions on cruise missiles, these missiles now loomed as an obstacle to President Carter's highest priority, a SALT II agreement. Consequently, the administration fashioned a new proposal in May 1977, which included a three-year ban on the deployment of long-range GLCMs and SLCMs; in this respect, the proposal did not differ greatly from the US proposal of February 1976. Nevertheless, when news of this suggestion reached Europe, it aroused a response which combined with suspicions about President Carter's anti-nuclear preferences to produce a strong and negative reaction. The United States appeared to be more concerned about limiting the nuclear threat to the United States than the nuclear threat to Europe, and to be willing to bargain away weapons important to Europe to obtain limits on Soviet strategic forces. The British and the Germans expressed European concern most vocally.[3] Allied governments intensified earlier requests for technical and operational American analyses on the cruise missile issue, which the Carter administration had refused to supply for fear that they would whet the European appetite for the missiles.

After a good deal of internal wrangling between State and Defense Departments, the United States finally decided to respond to these requests. In a typical bureaucratic compromise, it determined on discussion of cruise missiles more in policy than in technical terms, and in an 'evenhanded' way. From the point of view of the administration, the effect of this 'policy evenhandedness' on the Europeans was disastrous, for those aspects of the US paper that described negative policy, especially the arms control implications of potential cruise missile deployments, exacerbated European anxiety about US intentions. The paper suggested that cruise missiles might have negative arms control implications—for example, by posing verification problems—and raised the possibility of vigorous and negative Soviet reaction to any deployments. The paper went even further in implying that cruise missile deployments might be unwise because of a 'decoupling' effect—they would suggest a Eurostrategic balance independent of US strategic forces and thus reduce the credibility of the US strategic nuclear commitment. In addition, Europeans were again not satisfied with the repeated suggestion that because US strategic forces provided ample coverage of targets in the Soviet Union, NATO did not need long-range cruise missiles. This episode led the German government to suggest that the United States alter its SALT position to permit the deployment of long-range GLCMs and SLCMs. The suggestion was preemptorily rejected. Soon thereafter, the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, made his concerns public in the Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the International

3. The British, of course, had two axes to grind: their NATO one, which they shared with the Germans, and their national one; they were beginning to consider options for the follow-up to their Polaris SSBN force, including cruise missile options.

Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and given on 28 October 1977 in London. Contrary to a now popular myth, he did not call for the deployment of cruise missiles, or of anything else, in the speech. But he did go quite far in outlining his analysis of the implications of strategic parity, in particular suggesting that it meant establishing a balance of forces in categories of capability below the strategic level. These remarks were widely interpreted, both in Europe and the United States, as meaning that Schmidt was advocating the establishment of a 'Eurostrategic balance' through the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe as a counter to the SS-20.

The first opportunity to test the true meaning of Schmidt's words came in the initial meetings of NATO's High Level Group (HLG).[4] In these meetings, held in late 1977 and early 1978, British and German officials pushed hard for the adoption of a consensus that there should be an 'evolutionary upward adjustment' in the long-range portion of NATO's theatre nuclear forces. US Defense Department officials initially agreed to this formulation, which implied that GLCMs should be deployed. The State Department and the National Security Council (NSC) staff became angry that the Defense Department could have permitted the United States to become committed to such a position in the absence of a US policy on cruise missile deployments. The NSC staff directed that the consensus be watered down and that formal interagency procedures be established within the US government to manage American participation within the HLG. However, US attempts to back away from the HLG consensus again deepened Europeans' concern about American policy and whetted even further their appetite for cruise missiles.[5] In sum, by the spring of 1978, the Carter administration's policies had increased European pressure for the establishment of an American policy on potential cruise missile deployment in the defence of NATO, although exactly what the Europeans had in mind was by no means clear.

Phase II: American policy shift

This period of American reluctance and foot-dragging on the cruise missile issue ended with the *dénouement* of the 'neutron bomb' affair in April 1978. Thereafter, a policy review process was set in motion inside the US government that sharply shifted the US stance on cruise missiles and more generally on LRTNF. This process took approximately six to eight months and was finally completed during the preparation for President Carter's meeting with the leaders of Britain, Germany, and France at Guadeloupe on New Year's Day 1979.

This is not the place to recount the history of the neutron bomb episode. Suffice it to say that the American officials who participated drew lessons from it, which they then applied to the LRTNF issue. Among them were, first, the importance of a unified American position on politically sensitive issues. The lack of an internal US government consensus during the early phases of the neutron bomb affair in

4. This group had been established as an afterthought as part of the LTDP programme. Fearing that the allies would interpret the LTDP as a shift away from nuclear deterrence, the United States decided to add a so-called tenth task force to the LTDP work programme. This became the HLG, which was chaired by the American Assistant Secretary of Defense, David McGiffert, and included participants from the defence and foreign ministries of other NATO members.

5. Up to this point, the debate was entirely about cruise missiles. However, about this time the prime contractor—Martin Marietta—suggested that the range of the Pershing II missile, then in development, could be extended from 750 kilometres to 1,800 kilometres, thereby giving it a capability to attack Soviet territory. Many American officials, especially in the State Department, began advocating the Pershing II XR (extended range) as an alternative to the GLCM.

the summer of 1977 had contributed substantially to administration dithering over whether it was for or against the neutron bomb. While Washington dithered, the public debate over the weapon careered out of control. Secondly, the importance of American leadership on nuclear issues within the alliance was highlighted. Partly as a consequence of internal divisions, in the fall of 1977 the administration had requested that its allies provide the United States with a decision for or against the neutron bomb. Used to following an American lead on such matters, the allies did not know how to respond and instead asked for US views; these, of course, were not forthcoming. While this inconclusive double-act was under way, the public debate on the neutron bomb spread to Europe and got further out of control, now spurred by Soviet propaganda efforts.

A third lesson concerned the importance of keeping the President closely involved in day-to-day diplomatic activity. President Carter adopted a position more or less in favour of the neutron bomb in November 1977. Because the President had set policy in broad terms, US officials approached the subsequent allied consultations as though they were simply a matter of diplomatic detail. Unfortunately, the details of the proposed alliance position changed in the course of consultations, and of this the President remained largely unaware. US officials viewed these changes as nuances; when the President learned of them, he viewed them as critically important, and disapproved. He withdrew American support for the alliance neutron bomb decision, precipitating a political disaster for the alliance, and, ultimately, for himself.

In addition, the neutron bomb affair changed the view of NSC officials about whether it would be wise to conduct a full-scale policy review of the LRTNF issue within the US government. Up to that time, the NSC staff had agreed with the State Department that such a review was bound to generate leaks (suggesting impending decisions on cruise missiles) that could harm US efforts to negotiate a SALT II agreement. However, now NSC officials became convinced that the LRTNF issue could boil over, just as the neutron bomb question had, with far more disastrous consequences for America's strategic position, to say nothing of the prospective SALT II treaty. Accordingly, the President ordered officials to prepare a policy study, which was known as Presidential Review Memorandum 38 (PRM-38).

An interagency study group chaired by NSC staff completed the study in August 1978. (The NSC staff chaired this study effort and all subsequent activities on LRTNF in order to resolve policy disputes between the State and Defense Departments and ensure a unified US position.) In essence, the study offered decision-makers two options: first, to support the HLG consensus on the 'evolutionary upward adjustment' and to determine the hardware that would be involved in such an adjustment; or secondly, to seek to set the issue aside by offering the allies 'political' solutions such as assigning more US strategic forces to SACEUR. A cabinet-level meeting recommended the first option to the President. In supporting the so-called 'hardware' solution, senior officials stressed that the purpose of any new LRTNF deployments would be 'linkage'—that is, filling the perceived gap in NATO's nuclear options at the level of LRTNF and thus forging the link between theatre and US central strategic forces. They saw the hardware as a 'gap filler' that was not intended to match the Soviet LRTNF on a one-for-one basis and that therefore would not be 'decoupling'. This hardware solution was to be incorporated

into an 'integrated' approach which would anticipate LRTNF deployments and negotiation over LRTNF limits in SALT III.

Immediately following the Presidential decision in favour of this option, the government LRTNF working group prepared an initial analysis of potential hardware options, examining the GLCM, the SLCM, a new medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Pershing II XR, and a new bomber force equipped with ALCMs. The HLG then discussed the analysis. The procedure of internal US analysis, followed by a discussion within the alliance, followed by a further refinement of US analysis, then alliance discussion, and so on, was followed throughout the remainder of alliance discussions over LRTNF.

By 1 January 1978, President Carter was in a position to tell the three allied leaders at Guadeloupe that the United States supported new LRTNF deployments and was prepared to take the lead in forging an alliance consensus around them. The US position had shifted dramatically in a few months. It would be naive to suppose that the reasons for this shift had to do entirely with the strategic analysis contained in PRM-38, which was similar to that described at the beginning of this article. The strategic factors would ultimately have led to a decision of this sort, but political factors were probably more important as immediate determinants of the shift. Specifically, political actors and institutions, namely the State Department, which would normally opt for political solutions and oppose hardware solutions (and had done so previously) did not so opt in the summer of 1978. This abnormal behaviour was a consequence of two factors. First, the neutron bomb affair had left both the alliance and the image of the United States as its leader badly tattered. Many US officials believed that something had to be done to demonstrate that the United States and the alliance could successfully manage nuclear defence matters. Secondly, growing European concern about US defence policy in general, and LRTNF policy in particular, appeared to threaten the ratification of the SALT treaty. Although European leaders publicly supported SALT II, private criticisms—especially from German leaders—had become well known in the US Senate. Offering the Europeans a hardware solution was seen as a way to improve the prospects for the ratification of SALT II.

Phase III: American 'pressure'

The Guadeloupe summit ushered in a year of intense alliance activity. There was much to be done to put flesh on the bones of the HLG's 'evolutionary upward adjustment'—a deployment programme was needed, as were an arms control policy, a public information approach, and so on.

The United States believed that the deployment programme should be agreed upon within the NATO alliance. This decision to seek an alliance agreement was subsequently criticized on the grounds that it abrogated US responsibility for nuclear matters in the alliance and placed heavy political burdens on weak European governments, exposing them to domestic turmoil and Soviet political pressure. Although these are important considerations, they are considerably outdated in the political context of the Western alliance. The shifts in political and economic power that have occurred within the alliance mean that it is politically impossible, both in the United States and in Europe, for the United States to have sole responsibility for the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. European nations, especially West Germany, are unwilling to surrender territorial sovereignty on such important matters, existing status of forces agreements notwithstanding. The American political

tenor is one of disinclination to shoulder major defence responsibilities alone. And, in the case of LRTNF, US officials believed (justifiably) that Congress would not fund weapons production if allied agreement to their deployment was in doubt. Moreover, President Carter refused to be left standing politically alone as the nuclear 'ogre of the world'.

The United States therefore sought an alliance consensus on LRTNF deployments during 1979. American strategy was guided by several considerations. In the first place, many American officials believed that the European allies were likely to change from enthusiasts into worriers as the LRTNF debate shifted from the abstract 'evolutionary upward adjustment' to specific hardware to be deployed in specific numbers in specific countries. The State Department and the NSC particularly believed that the allies would ultimately be unable to muster the political momentum to support such deployments, especially after the neutron bomb fiasco. Concerns of this kind had been behind the reluctant attitude of many Carter administration officials toward LRTNF during 1977 and 1978; and they continued to influence American diplomatic strategy heavily. Specifically, the United States sought to tie its allies as tightly as possible to a deployment programme that specified locations, numbers and types of weapons, and to do this by the end of 1979. Only by firmly anchoring the allied position in concrete, it was thought, would it be possible to weather the political storms that would break over the LRTNF issue.

Secondly, US strategy was complicated by the German government's so-called 'non-singularity' principle. Chancellor Schmidt held that Germany should not be the sole 'host' for the new missiles but that at least one other country *on the European continent* (i.e., not Britain) should also host the deployments. In addition, non-singularity meant to the Germans that it was not enough to obtain the agreement of the host countries to deployments; rather, the entire NATO alliance should join a consensus, thereby spreading the political burden of LRTNF even further. The United States could not possibly object to such a principle, but it made the diplomatic problem all the harder. Bases would have to be found in Italy, Belgium, or the Netherlands—the possibility of which appeared very remote in early 1979—and Norway and Denmark would have to be persuaded to endorse a nuclear programme for the first time. Thirdly, in seeking firm commitments on deployment from Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, American officials believed it was important to include the leaders of those countries in the decision process at an early stage. Otherwise, it would be too easy for allied leaders to let work proceed in NATO committees only to disown the results politically at a later date. By the same token, and again harking back to the neutron bomb affair, it was necessary to show European leaders that the US President was firmly behind the US diplomatic effort. Accordingly, the United States established two diplomatic tracks: one, in the HLG and later in the Special Group (see below), developed the details of the emergent alliance position; the other involved periodic contacts between President Carter, through his designated emissary, David Aaron, and allied leaders. In this latter channel, Aaron usually gave a preview of American positions on the nascent LRTNF programme before they were introduced into the HLG and Special Group.

The United States set in motion a broad and carefully coordinated diplomatic and decision-making process, involving the NSC staff and the State and Defense Departments, and designed to draw the allies steadily into deeper commitments to

a deployment programme culminating in a NATO agreement in December 1979. To guide diplomatic planning and action, an 'analysis/decision track' paper was regularly updated at NSC meetings. This effort was to lead to subsequent charges in Europe that the United States had pressurized its allies into agreement to missile deployments.

The first step in 1979 was to narrow the range of hardware options. In a series of US and HLG studies during the spring of 1979 the Pershing II and GLCM emerged as the sole contenders. The United States and its allies eliminated SLCM on numerous grounds, the most prominent of which was that, as a sea-based system, it was not strategically different from existing alliance SLBM forces. The ALCM-equipped bomber force was eliminated because it would be as vulnerable as the existing dual-capable tactical air forces. The new MRBM was eliminated as it would probably not be ready for deployment until the middle to late 1980s. In addition, the HLG recommended that the deployment size be in the range of 200–600 LRTNF warheads. Finally, the HLG recommended a mix of ballistic and cruise systems on the standard military grounds that a mixed force would complicate enemy planning.[6]

In the course of initial consultations with allied leaders during the spring of 1979, the Germans and Dutch expressed concern that the definition of the hardware programme was moving quite rapidly in the HLG, whereas no parallel effort was being made to develop an arms control policy as counterpart. In adopting the 'integrated' approach in 1978, the United States believed that LRTNF would be covered in SALT III, and that, as SALT II was not yet complete, there was plenty of time. However, these allies believed it was politically necessary to have a definite arms control policy in place when the deployment decision was made. They therefore requested that the United States help form a second group within NATO to develop an arms control policy. This proposal became a matter of dispute within the US government. Opponents argued either that the development of a separate arms control policy might indicate that arms control could substitute for hardware and that the deployment programme could consequently be avoided, or that the arms control programme should also be developed by the HLG after the deployment programme had been agreed. Nevertheless, the United States finally did agree to form the Special Group.[7] The US strategy in this group was to reach a consensus on the broad objectives and principles that might guide the United States in the conduct of negotiations over LRTNF and SALT III. To this end, a so-called 'objectives and principles' paper formed the basis of evolving internal US government decisions and Special Group discussions. From the US perspective, the most important as these principles was that 'arms control should be viewed as a *complement to not a substitute for* force modernization' (emphasis added).

All the progress of the HLG and Special Group notwithstanding, the most important development of the spring 1979 consultations was the emergence of Italy as a strong contender for basing LRTNF. This took American officials by surprise, for they had reckoned that their only hope of finding a second continental basing

6. However, there was a more practical justification for this conclusion. GLCM was judged to be far less expensive than Pershing, especially if new bases for the LRTNF had to be constructed. However, bases already existed for the Pershing in Germany, so it made sense simply to replace the existing Pershing I with Pershing II on those bases and to deploy the GLCM on new bases.

7. This group was chaired by the director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State, first Leslie Gelb, then Reginald Bartholomew.

country was in Belgium or the Netherlands. Indeed, some American diplomats initially suggested that Italy be ruled out altogether as a potential basing candidate on the grounds that it was politically too frail to withstand the political conflict that would probably be provoked by the LRTNF issue. However, for a series of complex internal political reasons, as well as their determination to bring Italy back to the 'top table' in the alliance, the Italian leaders were determined to push through with deployments. This development substantially eased America's diplomatic tasks by making success less dependent upon unpredictable Belgian politics and upon the ability of Dutch leaders to overcome mounting Dutch anti-nuclear sentiment.

By summer 1979, the United States was in a position formally to propose a deployment programme to its allies. This was the now well-known plan to deploy 572 warheads on Pershing II and GLCM in five European countries. In the end, the United States decided to suggest small deployments in Belgium and the Netherlands, despite the uncertain political situation there.

The setting of the figure at 572 was the result of various considerations. At the outset, analysts made a quick judgement that a reasonable deployment range would fall between 200 and 600 warheads. Options involving fewer than 200 seemed too puny to be viewed as anything but a token response to the SS-20. Options involving more than 600 suggested an attempt to establish a 'Eurostrategic balance' and thus to decouple the US strategic deterrent from Europe. Subsequent US and HLG analysis on selective employment options and force survivability pointed towards the higher end of the 200–600 range, as did the fact that the forces would be spread around five countries. An additional consideration in favour of the higher end was the view of senior US officials that the programme should be resilient either to cuts made through arms control or to one or more countries dropping out of the programme.

Following established procedure, the programme for the deployment of 572 warheads was previewed by allied leaders in July 1979, before being formally introduced into the HLG in late August 1979. By this point, it was clear that the two-track US diplomatic strategy was working well with Britain, Germany, and Italy. All three countries addressed the programme seriously, indicating their acceptance or suggesting minor changes, and discussing the requisite political strategy to bring about an alliance agreement by December.[8] However, the strategy was having no effect with Belgium and failing with the Netherlands. Belgian leaders reassured the Americans that they understood well how to handle their internal political situation and would be able to manage successfully by springing the issue late in the autumn. They did not seem to want American help, nor to address the deployment programme in any detail. This strategy precipitated a government crisis in December and led to the adoption of an ambiguous position on deployment. Dutch leaders, by contrast, adopted an ostrich-like attitude, saying it was premature to address the deployment programme because the NATO 'experts'—the HLG—had not yet reached a conclusion. Only after the HLG had pronounced would Dutch leaders consider the programme. This proved to be a fatal mistake. When Dutch leaders did address the programme, in October, the political debate in their country had already gone out of control. Meanwhile, Dutch ability to affect the

8. It was at this juncture that Chancellor Schmidt ruminated about the possibility of including the SLCM in the deployment programme, in the hope that the Danes and the Norwegians would participate in the programme more directly by hosting port calls by SLCM-carrying ships. However, this idea was clearly a non-starter and was quickly dropped by the German government.

NATO deployment programme had been sharply reduced because the programme had become set in political concrete. They had missed their chance.

On the basis of the summer consultations, the HLG and Special Group finished their work in September 1979. The combined work of these two groups outlined policy recommendations that are unchanged to this day: the HLG recommended the deployment programme that is currently being implemented. The Special Group recommended a series of objectives and principles for arms control that have, more or less, guided American behaviour in the INF talks since. Although these became more detailed than the United States had initially hoped—pointing toward the goal of equal global US and Soviet levels of warheads on land-based long-range theatre missiles—the Special Group report continued to contain the admonishment that arms control should not substitute for modernization. By the end of September, all that was required was formal NATO endorsement of the positions outlined in the HLG and Special Group reports. Achieving this would constitute the agenda for the next two months.

As 1979 proceeded, the Americans felt growing disquiet about Soviet silence on the issue. The US diplomatic strategy was working far better than anyone had expected. Although the allies were indeed showing heightening political nervousness, they were responding to US leadership and rallying round the proposed deployment programme. Yet there was little public discussion of the issue. US officials attempted to stimulate press interest in the subject but had little success. They were fearful that, unless a public consensus were built behind the programme, the Soviet Union would execute some political or diplomatic manoeuvre that would precipitate negative political reaction in Europe and destroy the official NATO consensus on the deployments. They kept waiting for the Soviet dog to bark.

It did so on 6 October, when President Brezhnev proposed what amounted to a freeze on the number of launchers for LRTNF missiles, which would have permitted the Soviet SS-20 programme to proceed unabated while blocking the emerging US programme. Contrary to American fears, however, this speech proved quite helpful to US efforts. The Soviet Union was too late, for by now the allied governments were more or less behind the deployment programme; the key governments responded quickly, negatively, and in similar terms to the Brezhnev proposals. Ironically, the Brezhnev speech stimulated the press interest that Western governments had failed to arouse. The press quickly picked up the government reactions, especially information on the SS-20 deployments, thereby setting the political stage favourably for the December decision.

The diplomatic calendar for October and November was full, but most of the activity was not decisively important. However, there was one important shift in the US and allied positions. As allied governments grew increasingly worried about how they would handle negative domestic political reaction to the deployment decision, they began making a series of proposals, the net effect of which would have been to insert a second decision on deployment after December 1979 and before the scheduled initial deployments in 1983. For example, the Danish government suggested the decision be delayed for six months to give time to assess the results of American arms control initiatives with the Soviet Union. The Norwegian government suggested the decision should be reviewed in the light of arms control progress in two years to see if deployments were still necessary. Other governments were attracted to similar ideas. But the United States opposed them on the grounds that to introduce a second decision would effectively nullify the validity of the first

decision, leaving the United States with no bargaining leverage in arms control and no ability to convince the Congress that its allies intended to follow through with the deployments.

Although the United States ultimately beat back these 'second decision' proposals with the help of some of its allies, the basic idea was subtly reintroduced in the form of Chancellor Schmidt's request to the United States that he be allowed to explain to the West German Social Democratic Party in its Berlin convention in December that it would be 'theoretically possible' for arms control results to do away with the need for deployments altogether. Up to this point, it had been the American and the German position that some deployments would be needed regardless of the outcome of arms control negotiations, although the negotiations might affect the overall size and shape of the deployment programme. This was the essence of the Special Group's 'a complement to not a substitute for' principle. However, in view of the Chancellor's mounting political problems within the SPD, the United States acceded to his request.

This was a blunder. It was compounded two years later when President Reagan transformed the 'theoretical possibility' into a formal American arms control proposal—the so-called zero option. By suggesting that zero US deployments were a possible outcome of arms control, this step had the effect of making the implementation of the deployment programme hostage to the INF negotiations in Geneva.

Aftermath and lessons

The NATO decision on LRTNF, reached by a joint meeting of NATO's defence and foreign ministers on 12 December 1979, was viewed at the time as a success. The alliance had managed a sensitive and vitally important issue and had done so in the face of Soviet opposition and mounting political nervousness within Europe.

In the four years since that decision was taken, the gleam of success has been tarnished. The European political weakness which was already apparent in the later stages of the decision-making process grew during 1980; European pressure for some move on the arms control front induced the Carter administration to open LRTNF negotiations separate from SALT III, the originally planned venue. (Of course, the failure of SALT II ratification had made SALT III a distant prospect at best.) The Reagan administration, with its widely perceived anti-arms control attitudes, rhetoric about limited nuclear wars, and ERW production decision, contributed substantially to the growth of the 'peace movement' in Europe. While European governments clamoured for the reopening of the arms control dialogue to stem the tide of the peace movement, the Reagan administration delayed a decision to return to the bargaining table until November 1981. At that point, as noted above, the President decided to propose the zero option, which European governments had advocated as a way to counter the demands of the peace movement. In the following two years, while European political leaders 'waited for Geneva to give the answer' as to whether deployments would proceed, the anti-nuclear movement grew in strength and gained broad political appeal. The impression grew in Europe that a final decision on deployment would not be reached until the very last minute, thus creating the appearance of a deadline and heightening political tension. By the time the deployments actually occurred, the alliance had paid a heavy political price for the 1979 decision.

The LRTNF story is one of both success and failure—a success in pulling together a difficult, but necessary, decision; a failure in not avoiding serious alliance political wounds. In the causes of both, there may be political, bureaucratic, and diplomatic lessons that could be instructive in similar future episodes.

In the first place, internal agreement on policy direction is necessary before the United States seriously enters a diplomatic process that might substantially alter US nuclear weapon deployments overseas. An unclear policy line from Washington or signs of internal political or bureaucratic strife may well doom any initiative. This happened in the case of the neutron bomb and threatened to occur in the LRTNF case until PRM-38 provided a catalyst for internal agreement. Secondly, close alliance consultations to the point of including allies in the US analytic and decision-making process will be extremely valuable. To the extent that allies understand and feel a part of US decisions, they are more willing and better able to support those positions. Until the autumn of 1978, US unwillingness to consult its allies openly about cruise missiles became a source of US–European friction and contributed to a growing allied appetite for these missiles. The subsequent close consultations smoothed the way to the December 1979 decision. Thirdly, national leaders must be involved in the consultation process at an early stage. If they are, the decision can be shaped to meet their political needs, as was the case with LRTNF. If they are not, they may later disown the bureaucratically shaped decision, as President Carter did with the neutron bomb. (The application of this lesson depends naturally on the style of leader, especially his or her willingness to delegate.) And finally, American leadership must be firm. This is a cliché, but it should not be overlooked. In the Atlantic alliance, it is all too easy to find reasons for delay on or obfuscation of difficult issues: if decisions on sensitive matters are needed, only the United States has the political wherewithal to force them and define their terms.

From the failure arise lessons which are equally important. Officials must 'prepare' the public for difficult decisions, through public debate that includes clearly articulated and easily understood reasoning in support of forthcoming decisions. This is easy to say but hard to do. In the LRTNF case, Carter administration officials wanted a debate during 1979 but were unable to stimulate one—perhaps because they did not try hard enough. When the debate did break out during the early days of the Reagan administration, the United States was not ready to lead it. The Reagan administration included officials who either did not enthusiastically support INF (and said so) or who, in supporting INF, caused more political problems than they solved. Also, firm links between the implementation of arms programmes and the success of arms control negotiations should be avoided. This may be the most important lesson of all; and it is hardly original to say that a decision about one's security should not be placed in the hands of an enemy. In its insistence that arms control should complement, not substitute for, moderniz-ation and its desire to avoid a second decision point, the United States recognized this principle. Yet political forces steadily eroded its positions. It is not clear that these forces could have been withstood at the time; but perhaps, if the lesson is now more widely recognized, it will be better heeded in the future.

In drawing these lessons from the LRTNF experience, it is tempting to say: 'if only these principles had been followed, there would have been no problems during

1980–3.' The problems stemmed from far more sources than the organization and procedures of the US government. Streamlining those would not have made the problems go away. The most that can be said is that the problems might have been lessened.

Britain, the Brussels Pact and the continental commitment

JOHN BAYLIS*

Apart from the question of the future of Britain's nuclear weapons, the most important issue in British defence policy in the mid-1980s is the debate between those supporting a continentalist strategy and those advocating greater stress on a maritime/air strategy. As students of British military policy know only too well, this is hardly a new controversy. The question of 'the continent' or 'the open seas' has recurred again and again in defence planning circles throughout the twentieth century. The debates which characterized the 1920s and 1930s have been ably described in numerous books and articles, most notably those by Michael Howard and Brian Bond.[1] Much less attention, however, has been given to the discussions and negotiations which took place in Britain during the war and in the immediate postwar period.[2] Despite the obligations entered into with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and the Paris Agreements of 1954, it was the Brussels Treaty and the decisions made by political and military leaders in mid-1948 which ushered in a radical change in traditional British defence policy. It was this 'continental commitment', firmly established in 1948, which forms the backdrop to the contemporary debate about the future of British defence policy.

The purpose of this article is to chart the process by which, after the experiences of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the Second World War, Britain decided to reorient its traditional, essentially maritime, defence policy and to commit itself, in political and strategic terms, more closely to its West European allies than ever before in peacetime. The article, however, attempts to go a little further than simply providing the background to the contemporary debate, important as this may be. Consideration is also given to the contribution made by Britain, and especially by the Foreign Secretary of the time, Ernest Bevin, to the formation of the West European security system. The importance of this lies in the tendency exhibited in the growing body of historiography on the formation of NATO to play down somewhat Britain's leading role in the organization of Western security after the end of the Second World War.[3] Given the scope of this article, judgements

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1. Michael Howard, *The continental commitment: the dilemma of British defence policy in the era of two world wars* (London: Temple Smith, 1972) and Brian Bond, *British military policy between the two world wars* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980).

2. Notable exceptions are Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British foreign policy in the Second World War*, Vol. V (London: HMSO, 1976) and Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the cold war, 1941–47* (London: Cape, 1982). The present author has also written 'British wartime thinking about a post-war European security group', *Review of International Studies*, 1983, Vol. 9, and 'Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: the origins of NATO', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, June 1982, Vol. 5, No. 2.

3. That tendency is exhibited especially in Timothy P. Ireland's study *Creating the entangling alliance: the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* (London: Aldwych, 1981) and to a certain extent in Escott Reid's book *Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947–1949* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977). Britain's role is also downgraded somewhat in Nikolaj Petersen's article 'Who pulled whom and how much? Britain, the United States and the making of the North Atlantic Treaty', *Millennium*, Summer 1982, Vol. 11, No. 2.

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on this question can only be partial. The Brussels Pact was, however, an important, some would say vital, milestone on the road to the formation of NATO, and Britain's role in its formation is clearly of great importance in the wider evaluation.

Wartime planning for a West European security group

Consideration of postwar security arrangements for Europe began in Britain long before VE Day. Alongside the discussions about a world security organization, considerable attention was given by Foreign Office planners (and in particular by Gladwyn Jebb, the Head of the Economic and Reconstruction Department) from the autumn of 1942 onwards to ideas about a West European security group.[4] Two papers, in particular, were important and influential. The first was the so-called 'combined memorandum on Western Europe' produced by Gladwyn Jebb and submitted to the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and the Chiefs of Staff on 20 June 1944.[5] In this paper Jebb looked at the arguments for and against British participation in a postwar West European regional security system. The six main advantages identified included: contributing to Britain's role within a world organization; reinforcing American and Soviet expressed desires for Britain to assume defence obligations in Western Europe; reducing Britain's defence burden in the postwar period; helping to strengthen France; complementing the Anglo–Soviet treaty; *and the enhancement of British security through 'defence in depth'* (emphasis added).

As far as the disadvantages were concerned, Jebb stressed the chances that a West European regional security group might cause difficulties in relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and the Dominions. It might encourage isolationism in the United States; cause Soviet leaders to believe that a 'bloc' was being formed against them; and convince the Dominions that Britain was turning away from them towards Europe. There was also the '*increased risk of getting involved in the defence of Western Europe and the maintenance of land forces on a continental scale*' (emphasis added). It was argued that British involvement in such a grouping 'should not be at the expense of her overseas commitments'.

After considering these arguments, the memorandum concluded that, on balance, Britain's political and strategic interests *did* require the formation of a Western security group and that Britain should play its part in such a group. Concerning the shape a regional security system might take, Jebb considered two possible alternatives. He argued that it might take the form of a multilateral pact which would include Britain, France, the Low Countries, Denmark, Norway and Iceland (and perhaps even Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Italy). Alternatively, it might involve a series of bilateral treaties of mutual defence between Britain and those states and between the states themselves. Significantly, these two alternatives were to become a source of some controversy between Britain and France on the one hand and the Benelux countries and the United States on the other in January and February 1948.

4. Trygve Lie, the foreign minister of the Norwegian government-in-exile in London, advocated some form of postwar Atlantic pact as early as December 1940. See O. Riste, 'The genesis of North Atlantic defence cooperation: Norway's "Atlantic Policy" 1940–45', *NATO Review*, April 1981, No. 2.

5. *Cab 80/44* Secret COS (44) 113, 3 June 1944, 'British policy towards Western Europe', Annex (Final Agreed draft) (Public Record Office, London: all subsequent documents are also from the PRO). See also Woodward, *British foreign policy*, p. 187.

Arguments in favour of a West European security group were also put forward in a paper produced by the interdepartmental Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS) in November 1944.[6] In a fascinating and prescient report entitled *Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic*, the PHPS argued that Britain's strategic situation had been radically altered as a result of the developments in air power and long-range missiles. Britain, they suggested, would have to be more bound up with the continent than in the past, especially if the main threat to the nation's security turned out (as seemed likely) to come from the Soviet Union or a Russo–German alliance. In balancing 'the greatest land-power in the world' Britain would need 'powerful allies; *defence in depth on the continent* and in the UK; and technical superiority in the application of science to warfare' (emphasis added).

The conclusion reached in the PHPS report was that whether the United Nations Organization proved effective or not, Britain's future security interests lay in the formation of a West European security group which would cooperate closely with the Commonwealth and particularly with the United States. Again, it was thought that the starting point should be with France and that this should be followed by greater cooperation with Belgium, Holland, Denmark and perhaps, one day, even Germany. The next step would then be to create a North Atlantic framework which alone could provide sufficient power to protect Western Europe from a Soviet invasion.

Given the nature of British policy in the postwar period, it is, of course, tempting to conclude that it was this, and other reports like the 'combined memorandum', which provided Ernest Bevin when he became Foreign Secretary in July 1945 with a clear design for Western security which he simply put into effect in the following three years.[7] The truth, however, would seem to be much more complicated than this, and Bevin's influence more significant, as events leading to the formation of the Brussels Pact seem to show.

The Dunkirk Treaty

Despite the wartime studies little progress had been made towards forming a West European security group by 1945.[8] Even in the immediate postwar period, officials in the Foreign Office were complaining that there was still a 'lack of clearly defined policy to guide policy-makers' on relations with Western European states.[9] In August 1945, shortly after he took office, Ernest Bevin indicated to officials in the Foreign Office that his 'long-term policy was to establish close relations between the United Kingdom and the countries on the Western and Northern fringes of Europe, including the Scandinavian countries'.[10] The Foreign Secretary followed this up on 13 March 1946 when he told officials that he was determined to work steadily 'towards the closest cooperation and integration economically, socially and militarily, with our Western neighbours, without at this stage creating any formal regional group. In accordance with this policy we are trying hard to get our relations with France cleared up first.'[11] There were, however, difficulties in

6. *Cab 81*, PHP (44) 27 (0), Final, 9 Nov. 1944. For a debate about the significance of this report see the letters section in *Review of International Studies*, July 1984, Vol. 10, No. 3.

7. As a member of the War Cabinet it is likely that Bevin saw many of these papers.

8. Due to Foreign Office sensitivities about the impact on the Soviet Union and lack of enthusiasm by Churchill himself.

9. *FO 371*, 59911, Z 259/120/72, 9 Jan. 1946.

10. Rothwell, *Britain and the cold war*, p. 414.

11. *FO 371*, 59911, Z 240/120/72, 13 March 1946.

relations with France throughout 1946 which prevented an early start being made on negotiating an alliance between the two countries. Problems initially over the Levant and later the Ruhr were compounded by de Gaulle's simmering resentment over his treatment by the Anglo-Saxons during the war. Even after de Gaulle left office, on 20 January 1946, 'the outstanding issues' still inhibited any movement towards greater Anglo–French cooperation, despite certain initiatives on both sides.

The breakthrough came on 1 January 1947 with Leon Blum's letter to the British Foreign Secretary, in which he urged the signing of a treaty 'with no prior solution of outstanding problems'.[12] As a result, following M. Blum's visit to London on 16 January, a series of rapid negotiations led to the signing of the Treaty of Dunkirk on 4 March. Despite some hesitation the Foreign Secretary had seized the opportunity presented by M. Blum's initiative to lay the foundations for closer British relations with France as the starting point for a wider West European grouping.[13]

Although the Dunkirk Treaty focused on the threat from Germany, it was the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union which increasingly preoccupied the minds of Western policy-makers in early 1947. The lack of agreement, especially on Germany, in the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, Paris and New York from December 1945 to April 1947, coupled with Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, reinforced Bevin's determination to coordinate more effectively the policies of West European states. With the first bloc (the Anglo–French alliance) in place, the Foreign Secretary turned his attention to relations with the smaller states in Western Europe. During the war the Belgians, in particular, had urged Britain to take the lead in organizing West European states into a 'bloc' in the postwar period. M. Spaak kept up this pressure after the war and by 7 May 1947 Bevin had concluded that the time had come to negotiate treaties with Belgium and Holland 'on the lines of the Treaty of alliance with France'.[14] Significantly, the Dunkirk Treaty was to remain the preferred model until February 1948.

By early June, however, despite the preparation of draft treaties, the situation had changed somewhat. General Marshall's speech at Harvard on 5 June on European recovery, and the offer of US economic aid to Europe, had convinced Bevin that everything had to be done to take the initiative and follow up the Secretary of State's offer. The moment was therefore 'inopportune' for a political approach to Belgium and Holland.[15] Events would have to await the outcome of the Conference of Sixteen Nations in Paris. When there was renewed pressure from Belgium for the negotiation of a treaty in July, Bevin continued to argue that attention, for the moment, had to be focused 'on the economic plane'.[16]

To Bevin, Marshall's speech of 5 June was of crucial importance, not only to Britain but to the states of Western Europe as a whole. The main threat facing Western Europe, he believed, was steady economic deterioration with prospects of

12. *FO 371*, 67670, Z 291/25/17. Blum to Bevin, 1 Jan. 1947.

13. Bevin initially hesitated because he believed any initiative would come to nothing, as M. Blum's government was unlikely to remain in office for very long. *FO 371*, 67670, Z 25/25/17, Minute by Sir Orme Sargent to Secretary of State, 31 Dec. 1946.

14. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 322/273/72/G, 7 May 1947.

15. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 322/273/72/G, Bevin's comments on draft treaties, 3 June 1947. See also *Cab 128* (10) f. 38, *Cab 54* (47) 2, Secret, 17 June 1947: ff. 43–4, *CAB 55* (47) 5, Secret, 19 June 1947: f. 47, *Cab 56* (47) 3, Secret, 24 June 1947.

16. As note 15; see also Memorandum on renewed approaches from the Belgians, 4 July 1947.

large-scale starvation, declining confidence in local currencies and even, perhaps, revolution. Will Clayton, the American Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, warned the State Department at the end of May that 'without further prompt and substantial aid from the USA, economic, social and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe'.[17] For Bevin, Marshall's implied offer of support in his Harvard speech was therefore 'like a life-line to sinking men'.[18] It was a means by which the 'looming shadow of catastrophe'[19] might be averted, and he moved swiftly to coordinate the West European response.

Having played the major role (together with M. Bidault, the French Foreign Secretary) in helping to organize the West European response to the Marshall Plan, Bevin once again turned his mind to the wider dimensions of Western security. From 1945 to the spring of 1947, despite the emerging difficulties with the Soviet Union, Bevin had gone on searching for a satisfactory peace settlement in agreement with the Russians and the Americans. By the end of the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in April 1947, however, Bevin was no longer prepared to allow the constant Soviet vetoes to maintain a paralysis of Western policy. He continued to hope that the Soviet Union would adopt a more reasonable approach to negotiations right up to the London Council of Foreign Ministers in November and December.[20] From the spring and summer of 1947, however, he was no longer prepared to put complete faith in such hopes. In September, Bevin had talks with M. Ramadier, the French President of the Council, in which he argued that the recent Russian moves had led him to the conclusion that the division of Europe into Eastern and Western camps was now inevitable and 'it therefore became necessary to attempt to organise the Western states into a coherent unity. The time had now come for a return to the political plane.'[21]

Bevin was not alone in thinking that the Western states ought to organize themselves more effectively at this time. The Canadian Foreign Secretary, St Laurent, made an important speech on 18 September arguing that the time might be ripe for the creation of some form of Western security association.[22] St Laurent's speech was the first public suggestion by a member of a Western government that such an association might be considered. Bevin's, however, was the first major initiative.

The failure of the foreign ministers' conference, December 1947

Bevin chose the collapse of the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in London in mid-December 1947 as the occasion on which to launch his plans for an organization of West European states. On the morning of 17 December he had talks with M. Bidault, in which he followed up some of the things he had said to Ramadier in September. The time had come, he argued, to create 'some sort of federation in Western Europe, preferably of an unwritten flexible kind'.[23] Such an

17. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*) 1947, Vol. 3, pp. 230–2.
18. This was a phrase used by Bevin in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington on 1 April 1949.
19. This was a phrase used by Dalton to the Cabinet on 27 March. CM 33[47], 27 March 1947.
20. See Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary: 1945–51* (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 490.
21. *FO 371*, 67673, Z 8579/251/17/G, Memorandum on Mr Bevin's meeting with Sir O. Harvey, Sir E. Hall-Patch, Mr Dening and Mr Hogg on 26 September 1947.
22. See Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope*, p. 33.
23. *FO 371*, 67674, Z 11010/25/17/G, Anglo-French conversations, 17 Dec. 1947.

undertaking would require American assistance, Bevin told Bidault, and care would have to be taken in dealing with the Americans.[24]

On the same evening, Bevin met Marshall and impressed upon him the need for some form of Western democratic system comprising America, Britain, France, Italy and the Dominions. This would not be a formal alliance, but an understanding backed 'by power, money and resolute action'.[25] It would be a sort of spiritual federation of the West. Marshall agreed in general with Bevin's views, but wanted more specific proposals before committing the United States to any formal step. He therefore sent John Hickerson, the Director of European Affairs in the State Department, to the Foreign Office the next day to try to find out more about Bevin's ideas. He was told that Bevin envisaged 'two security arrangements, one a small tight circle including a treaty engagement between the UK, the Benelux countries and France. Surrounding that, a larger circle with somewhat lesser commitments in treaty form bringing in the US and Canada also'.[26] This was the Atlantic pact idea.

Despite earlier public expressions of support for some form of Western collective security pact, it is difficult to disagree with Sir Nicholas Henderson's contention that the broad ideas which Bevin imparted to Bidault and Marshall on 17 December were 'the starting point for the discussions on the security of the Western world which were to begin soon and to last for the following year and a half'.[27] It is also true, however, that despite the elucidation gained by Hickerson in his visit to the Foreign Office on 18 December, Bevin's views were at this stage still somewhat vague. Even within the Foreign Office itself there was a certain amount of confusion about what was meant by 'a spiritual federation'.[28]

The Foreign Secretary attempted to clarify his ideas a little in a group of papers placed before the Cabinet on 8 January 1948 and in a memorandum sent to the British ambassadors in Paris and Washington on 13 January.[29] The Soviet Union, he said, had formed a solid political and economic bloc and there was no prospect in the immediate future of reestablishing and maintaining normal relations between the countries either side of the Soviet line. What was needed was some form of union in Western Europe, either of a formal or an informal character, backed by the Americans and the Dominions: 'In Europe this union should comprise, in addition to the UK: France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Greece, the Scandinavian countries and possibly Portugal. As soon as circumstances permitted, the British Government would also wish to include Spain and Germany, without which no Western system would be complete.'[30] In a practical sense the Foreign Secretary continued to believe that the first step towards this union should involve Britain and France signing separate bilateral treaties with Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg on the lines of the Dunkirk model. On 16 January it was decided to approach the

24. As note 23. In his talk with M. Bidault, Bevin suggested that it would be necessary for the French and the British to advise the Americans 'while letting the Americans say and think that it was they who were acting'.

25. See Nicholas Henderson, *The birth of NATO* (London: Weidenfeld, 1982), p. 1.

26. See Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope*, p. 37.

27. Henderson, *The birth of NATO*, p. 2.

28. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 809/273/72/G. Sir Roger Makins asked for clarification of the term on 21 January 1948.

29. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 273/273/72/G, Telegram Nos. 437 and 438, 13 Jan. 1948.

30. Quoted in Henderson, *The birth of NATO*, p. 3.

Benelux countries with this proposal.[31] This was followed by Bevin's speech to the House of Commons on 22 January, in which he unveiled his plans in public for the first time.[32]

In this speech the Foreign Secretary spelled out to the House more plainly and bluntly than ever before the nature of Soviet tactics to extinguish opposition in Eastern Europe and the techniques of political warfare which were being used to intimidate states around the periphery of the Soviet sphere of influence. It was for this reason, he argued, that the 'free nations of Western Europe must now draw together'.[33] Britain could not stand outside Europe and regard its own problems as quite separate from those of its European neighbours. It was important for Britain and France to take the initiative to rebuild a healthy and self-reliant Europe in order to avoid 'the devils of poverty and disease' which would create the conditions for 'war and dictatorship'.[34] In a reference to Soviet obstruction, especially over the Marshall Plan, Bevin struck a defiant tone in the final words of his speech:

> We shall not be diverted, by threats, propaganda or fifth column methods, from our aim of uniting by trade, social, cultural and all other contacts those nations of Europe and the world who are ready and able to cooperate. The speed of our recovery and the success of our achievements will be the answer to all attempts to divide the peoples of the world into hostile camps.[35]

The speech was well received both in Britain and the United States. At home, *The Economist* talked of the 'boldness, hope and determination' which characterized Mr Bevin's remarks to the House.[36] The Foreign Secretary, it was argued, had 'set the faltering pulse of Western Europe beating more strongly . . . [and] headed British foreign policy in a new direction'.[37]

In the United States the Foreign Secretary's initiative was also 'warmly applauded'.[38] Marshall replied that he was not only very interested in the proposal but 'deeply moved' by it and promised to see that the United States would do everything it properly could 'in assisting the European nations in bringing along this line to fruition'. In a conversation between Marshall and Lord Inverchapel, the British ambassador in the United States, on 19 January, the American Secretary of State said that he was 'turning over in his mind what procedure was likely to be most effective and at what point he could suggest the participation of the United States government in the plan'.[39]

The Rio model

In practice, however, it soon became clear to Bevin that the American position was somewhat more cautious than Marshall's comments suggested. Within the State Department, Marshall himself, together with Under-Secretary Robert Lovett,

31. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 273/273/72/G.
32. See Henderson, *The birth of NATO*, p. 6.
33. Quoted in Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 519.
34. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 520.
35. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 520.
36. *The Economist*, 31 Jan. 1948.
37. *The Economist*, 31 Jan. 1948.
38. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 554/273/72/G, Inverchapel to FO, Telegram No. 304, 20 Jan. 1948.
39. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 554/273/72/G, Inverchapel to FO, Telegram No. 284, 19 Jan. 1948.

Charles Bohlen, the Counseller in the State Department, and George Kennan, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, all regarded the idea of a military alliance with Western Europe as premature. Even John Hickerson, who was strongly in favour of a military alliance, was not in favour of Bevin's plan to conclude treaties based on the Dunkirk model with the Benelux countries. Such treaties, he argued, directed as they were solely against Germany, were 'unreal and inadequate'.[40] They would be likely to upset Congressmen in the United States who were opposed to further dismantling of structures in West Germany and they failed to deal with 'the real threat to Western Europe which came from further East'.[41] What was needed, Hickerson told Inverchapel, was a multilateral defence pact among West European states based on the model of the Inter-American Treaty of Rio de Janeiro.

According to Hickerson, 'the most important thing was that any American contribution should be made only at the clearly expressed wish of the Europeans themselves. . . . Every proof that the free states of Western Europe could give that they were resolved and able to stand on their own feet' would be more likely to secure American assistance.[42] The implication was clear. Even from the most ardent supporter of Bevin's initiative in the administration, the message was that Britain and the West European states would have to organize themselves before any US assistance could be contemplated; and the preferred model was the Rio Treaty, not the Dunkirk Treaty.

For Bevin, this response was not only disappointing, it created a fundamental dilemma. He knew full well the domestic factors in the United States which lay behind the reluctance to make a formal commitment to Western Europe. Traditional reluctance to enter 'entangling alliances' was reinforced by immediate political considerations, with the European Recovery Programme not yet through Congress and with the growing shadow of the Presidential elections. Bevin realized that it was only natural that the US government should evince a certain caution in its approach to 'so historically contentious a question as military commitments on the continent'.[43] At the same time, however, he believed that some form of American commitment was essential for the success of his proposals. In a reply to Inverchapel on 5 February, he explained the dilemma clearly.[44] There was a risk of getting into a vicious circle, he explained: without the assurance of security, which could only be given with some degree of American participation, Britain was unlikely to be successful in making the Western union a going concern. But until such success transpired, the Americans would not discuss participation.

Towards a continental commitment

Bevin's concern to secure an American commitment as early as possible was the result not only of his own conviction but also of both outside and internal pressures. In early February 1948, he had the feeling of being rushed by 'the obsession for security of the Western European states'.[45] He realized that as soon as the treaty negotiations began, they would almost certainly want to know what help they

40. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 561/273/72/G, Inverchapel–Hickerson meeting, Telegram No. 324, 21 Jan. 1948.
41. Telegram No. 324.
42. Telegram No. 324.
43. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 561/273/72/G, Bevin to Inverchapel, Telegram No. 1032, 26 Jan. 1948.
44. *FO 371*, 73046, Z 937/273/72/G, Bevin to Inverchapel, Telegram No. 1473, 5 Feb. 1948.
45. Telegram No. 1473.

could expect in the event of an attack. They would want to know what assistance would be coming not only from the United States but from Britain as well. Here was the rub: for the British government itself 'was not yet in a position to give firm assurances about the role they intended to play in operations on the continent of Europe'.[46] The Chiefs of Staff had met on 23 December 1947 (after Bevin's meetings with Marshall and Bidault) and had been warned by General Ismay that the question of a continental strategy which had so far been neglected by them would have to be broached as a result of the Foreign Secretary's initiative on Western Europe.[47] When the Chiefs met, however, between 29 January and 2 February 1948, General Montgomery's paper advocating a continentalist strategy was rejected by Cunningham and Tedder.[48] According to the Naval and Air Chiefs, what was required was a more traditional maritime/air strategy based on small and highly mobile forces which could be deployed anywhere in the world where they were needed. This was also generally the view of the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. At a meeting later in February to discuss Montgomery's paper, the Prime Minister joined Cunningham and Tedder in opposing the continental strategy. Montgomery, however, found support from the Foreign Secretary and (surprisingly, given their relations) from the Minister of Defence, A. V. Alexander. As a result of this split, the debate between the two strategies raged through March and April, and it was only on 10 May, in a meeting between the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence, that it was finally agreed that Britain should plan to fight a campaign alongside its allies in Western Europe.[49]

In early February, therefore, Britain was seeking to secure a West European defence arrangement without, at this stage, the resources or the will to contribute practically to any security system which might emerge. It was Bevin's recognition of the weakness of this position, should it become known, that led him to push even harder for an American commitment. At this stage what he sought was not a specific commitment of American forces to the continent; this, he thought, was unrealistic. What he wanted was a general commitment by both the British and American governments to go to war against an aggressor. This, he thought, would deter a potential enemy and would 'hearten and fortify' the West European countries.[50]

Difficulties with the United States and Benelux

The Foreign Secretary's determination to secure US participation in his plan continued throughout February and early March. If anything, however, the American support which had been so clearly expressed in January seemed to the British to be waning during this period. In a meeting between Inverchapel and Lovett on 2 February, the American Under-Secretary of State reiterated the view that *when* there was evidence of unity with a firm determination to effect an arrangement under which the various European countries were prepared to act in concert to defend themselves, the United States would 'carefully consider the part

46. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 561/273/72/G, Bevin to Inverchapel, Telegram No. 1032, 26 Jan. 1948.
47. *Cab. 79*, 54 COS (46) 187th meeting.
48. See *Memoirs of Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery* (London: Collins, 1958), pp. 498–500.
49. Montgomery, *Memoirs*, p. 502. Even then, it was not until 23 March 1950 that the Defence Committee agreed to send reinforcements to the continent if Russia attacked. *Cab.* 131, 8 DO (50) 5th mtg.
50. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 561/273/72/G, Bevin to Inverchapel, Telegram No. 1032, 26 Jan. 1948.

it might appropriately play *in support* of such a Western European union'.[51] Previously the term 'participation in a Western Union' had been used. Now it was 'support of' a Western union. This was seen in Britain as indicating that the Americans were now thinking in terms of 'ultimately reinforcing rather than of taking a direct share in whatever European defence arrangements may emerge from the initiative'.[52] The Americans clearly understood the impact which their backtracking had on the British. On 7 February Lovett went out of his way to explain American domestic difficulties to Inverchapel and to ask the ambassador to tell Bevin that Britain should not believe that they were half-hearted or 'coy' about his proposals.[53] From Bevin's point of view, however, the question of what concrete support Britain would get from the United States was crucial.[54]

At much the same time as the Foreign Secretary was facing difficulties with the United States, he was also under pressure from the Benelux countries. Apart from their desire to know what American and British help would be forthcoming in the event of war, they, like the Americans, were not keen on the Anglo–French proposals for bilateral treaties on the Dunkirk model. The Benelux countries welcomed Bevin's speech in parliament of 22 January and expressed their desire to respond as 'sympathetically and as helpfully as possible'.[55] According to M. Spaak, the Belgian Prime Minister, it was 'an epoch-making event of major political and historical importance'.[56] The Benelux countries, however, were clear that the Dunkirk model was inappropriate. That treaty was directed against Germany and as such, in their view, did not correspond to the current realities. Echoing American views, what was required, according to the Benelux countries, was a regional organization of Western Europe under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. The Rio Treaty seemed to be a more appropriate model to them, as well as to the Americans.

In early February 1948, however, the British remained highly critical of the notion of a regional pact.[57] The Foreign Office had four main objections. First, that it was unreasonable to suppose that a regional agreement confined to Western Europe could assure security against Russia. Secondly, continuing their wartime concern, that it was 'unnecessarily provocative to the Russians'. Thirdly, that a Western union had to be built up in stages and that a regional pact meant moving too fast. And finally, that it might encourage American isolationism: 'We do not wish by concluding a regional pact of this character to encourage the American school of thought which believes that Western security can be sufficiently assured by a Western regional pact without American participation.'[58] This was a concern that Bevin himself expressed on a number of occasions in the early part of February.[59] The Foreign Secretary was aware, however, that pressure from both the United States and the Benelux countries on this matter could not be ignored.

51. *FO 371*, 73046, Z 896/273/72/G, Memorandum on Inverchapel's meeting with Lovett, Telegram No. 516, 2 Feb. 1948.
52. *FO 371*, 73046, Z 937/273/72/G, Inverchapel to FO, Telegram No. 517, 2 Feb. 1948.
53. *FO 371*, 73046, Z 1060/273/72/G, Inverchapel to FO, Telegram No. 614, 7 Feb. 1948.
54. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 561/273/72/G, Bevin to Inverchapel, Telegram No. 1032, 26 Jan. 1948. See also R. Ovendale, 'Britain, the USA and the European Cold War, 1945–48', *History*, June 1982.
55. *FO 371*, 73046, Z 814/273/72/G, Brussels to FO, Telegram No. 18, 28 Jan. 1948.
56. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 562/273/72/G.
57. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 814/273/72/G.
58. *FO 371*, 73045, Z 814/273/72/G.
59. *FO 371*, 73047, Z 1308/273/72/G. FO to Paris, Telegram No. 377, 13 Feb. 1948.

As a result, from 13 February onwards more and more attention was given in the Foreign Office to the Rio Pact and other possible collective pacts under Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter.[60]

A number of problems persisted, however, to prevent whole-hearted acceptance by Britain of the regional pact plan. The main difficulty was the attitude of France.[61] The French themselves remained committed to the Dunkirk model and were very sensitive over the question of Germany. A regional pact directed specifically against the Soviet Union, which did not deal with the possibility of a future rearmed Germany, was not one which the French could accept. Neither was concern about Germany confined to French circles. The Foreign Secretary himself was concerned to have a treaty designed as 'a protection against possible German aggression, since this would avoid any risk of the appearance of the countries of Western Europe "ganging up" against Russia'.[62] Even at this stage of the cold war, despite what revisionist historians have argued, Bevin still considered it necessary to 'leave the door open to a Russian conciliation with the West'.[63]

As a result of discussions with the French it was agreed on 16 February that draft treaties on the Dunkirk model should remain the basis of the Anglo-French negotiating position with the Benelux countries. This, however, was seen in Britain as providing a 'basis for discussion' and not an immutable position.[64] By this time it was recognized in the Foreign Office that, on balance, the Treaty of Dunkirk was probably not the best instrument to achieve the Foreign Secretary's objectives.[65] The change in position was largely the result of a growing conviction that a multilateral treaty was much more likely to encourage American participation and prevent a return to isolationism. It would seem also that the Czechoslovakian coup in late February influenced the French in favour of a wider formula for West European security than that provided by the Dunkirk Treaty.[66]

The impact of the Czechoslovak crisis on concentrating the minds of Western leaders at this time cannot be exaggerated. In less than a hundred hours the whole character of the Czech state was transformed.[67] For Bevin the major concern was the effect that these events would have on France and Italy, where morale was deteriorating rapidly. He believed that Western Europe was 'now in the critical period of 6–8 weeks which . . . would decide the future of Europe'.[68] Moreover, Czechoslovakia was not the only problem facing the Western leaders. Concern was also growing in early March about Soviet actions in Berlin; there was fear of

60. *FO371*, 73047, Z 1308/273/72/G; 'FO to Paris', Telegram No. 376, 13 Feb. 1948.

61. Telegram No. 376.

62. *FO 371*, 73048, Z 1400/273/72/G, Brussels to FO, Telegram No. 38, 16 Feb. 1948.

63. Telegram No. 38. The revisionist literature includes: William Appleman Williams, *The tragedy of American diplomacy* (New York: Dell, 1962); D. F. Fleming, *The cold war and its origins* (New York: Doubleday, 1961); David Horowitz, *The free world colossus: a critique of American foreign policy in the cold war* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1971); Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic diplomacy, Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965); Gabriel Kolko, *The politics of war* (New York: Random House, 1968); D. S. Clemens, *Yalta* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of illusion* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970). For a critique of revisionism see John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, *The semblance of peace* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

64. *FO 371*, 73048, Z 1345/273/72/G, FO to Brussels, Telegram No. 157, 18 Feb. 1948.

65. *FO 371*, 73049, Z 1528/273/72/G, Memorandum on a meeting between the Belgian Ambassador and Hector McNeil, 18 Feb. 1948.

66. *FO 371*, 73050, Z 1764/273/72/G, Paris to FO, Telegram No. 190, 1 March 1948.

67. See Dixon to FO, 27 Feb., reprinted as an annex in Bevin's report to the Cabinet. CP (48) 71, 3 March 1948.

68. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 526.

a Prague-style *coup d'état* in Italy; and both Finland and Norway faced Soviet pressure to sign treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union not unlike those signed by Hungary and Romania. As Lord Bullock has aptly remarked:

> We do not know, and perhaps never shall, whether these different Soviet moves formed part of a concerted plan (probably not) or what were the Soviet objectives in making them and following them with the blockade of Berlin. But it was impossible for Bevin and other men in office in Western Europe and the USA not to put the pieces together and act on the assumption that they were facing a calculated challenge by the Russians.[69]

Bevin himself did not believe that the Russians wanted war, but he believed that war was nevertheless a distinct possibility unless the West acted firmly. Resolute action was necessary to prevent the slide from crisis to crisis which had occurred in the 1930s. The Foreign Secretary was anxious lest the period of early March 1948 would be 'the last chance for saving the West'.[70]

Negotiating the Brussels Pact

The effect of these dramatic and dangerous events was to secure acceptance by both Britain and France that a multilateral pact was the way forward for Western Europe. This is not to say that there were no disagreements among the five powers when negotiations began in earnest on 4 March. Two problems in particular preoccupied the negotiators through to 12 March, when the draft Five Power Treaty was agreed. The first concerned attitudes to Germany; the second concerned the future development of the pact.

On Germany, the Benelux countries went out of their way to reject the kind of references to that country included in the Dunkirk Treaty.[71] They urged instead the need to make reference in the new treaty to the possibility of a regenerated Germany entering the European comity of nations. The French, on the other hand, were very much opposed to any reference to the possibility of eventual collaboration with a regenerated Germany and urged that the 'menace of German aggression' should be included in the treaty. The British position was that the German danger could not be ignored and that past German aggression had to be mentioned (as it was, in Article 7). At the same time, Bevin supported the reference to possible German regeneration and its return to the European system of states.[72]

The second disagreement concerned the future expansion of the pact.[73] The Benelux countries saw the pact primarily as a means of tightening up the relations between the five powers. They were not hostile to the idea of it forming the nucleus of a wider organization of Western Europe, but they were not, at this stage, ready to regard other powers 'such as Italy or Portugal, as sufficiently closely allied to them by interest or tradition to participate automatically in the arrangements they would welcome between themselves on the one hand and the UK and France

69. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, p. 528.
70.. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 3, pp. 32–3.
71. *FO 371*, 73051, Z 1934/273/72/G, Brussels to FO, 7 March 1948.
72. *FO 371*, 73051, Z 1999/273/72/G, FO to Paris, Telegram No. 619, 9 March 1948; *FO 371*, 73052, Z 2163/273/72/G, Brussels to FO, Telegram No. 159, 12 March 1948.
73. *FO 371*, 73051, Z 2003/273/72/G, Brussels to FO, Telegram No. 129, 9 March 1948.

on the other'.[74] Bevin's position, however, was that the pact should be seen as being 'very much wider in scope than a defensive military agreement between the Five Powers'.[75] He saw the treaty as being the basis for the organization of Western Europe as a whole which could be expanded to include other West European states. He also saw it more in terms of a convenient device to convince the Americans that West European states were prepared to stand on their own feet. That, he hoped, like his initiative after Marshall's Harvard speech, would encourage direct American participation.

Bevin's attitude towards the pact is seen very clearly from his reaction to the crisis generated over Soviet pressure on Norway to sign a defence pact. On 11 March 1948 he suggested to the Americans and Canadians that time was running out if the Soviet Union was to be contained.[76] What was needed was a Regional Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance (under Article 51 of the UN Charter) which would include all those countries threatened by a Russian thrust to the Atlantic—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Spain (when it embraced democratic government). For Bevin, the Brussels pact was not enough.

By 12 March the minor differences facing the delegates to the five power conference were resolved, and on 17 March Bevin travelled to Brussels via Paris with M. Bidault to sign the Brussels Treaty. For the British Foreign Secretary the Treaty was an important achievement, but, as he told Bidault, there was still an urgent need to get the United States to underwrite the pact: 'The object should be to ensure that if there was a war, the US should be in from the first day and that we should not have to wait another Pearl Harbour . . . we must bring the US to face up to their responsibilities.'[77] The reaction in the United States to the signing of the pact was therefore comforting to the British. President Truman told a special meeting of Congress on 17 March that the developments in Europe deserved the full support of the United States. 'I am confident', he said 'that the US will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations, the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them do so'.[78]

Conclusions

It was not absolutely certain after the Brussels Treaty was signed that the United States would make a firm commitment to guarantee West European security. Indeed, American prevarication prevailed for a number of months. The pact did, however, fulfil one of the essential prerequisites for such an Atlantic system from the American point of view: it demonstrated clearly that the West European states were prepared to organize themselves and attempt to stand on their own feet, even before the guarantee of American assistance was forthcoming. Without the Brussels Pact, therefore, it is difficult to imagine that NATO would have become a reality.

74. Telegram No. 129.
75. *FO 371*, 73051, Z 2023/273/72/G, Bevin to Warbey, 10 March 1948.
76. Henderson, *The birth of NATO*, p. 12.
77. *FO 371*, 73055, Z 2559/273/72/G, Memorandum of conversation between Bidault and Bevin on the train from Paris to Brussels, 17 March 1948.
78. Quoted in Henderson, *The birth of NATO*, p. 14.

As the main body of this article demonstrates, Britain's contribution to the formation of the pact was crucial. Britain had given considerable thought to the formation of a European security group during the war, even in terms of whether bilateral treaties or a multilateral pact constituted the better option. It is true that the decisive initiative for the Anglo-French alliance (which was seen as the cornerstone of a West European security system) was taken by M. Blum of France rather than by Ernest Bevin. It is also true that Britain was initially committed to a series of bilateral treaties with the Benelux countries based on the Dunkirk model and had to be convinced of the value of a multilateral treaty based on the Rio model by Belgium and the United States. Furthermore, there is some evidence that Bevin flirted for a time with the idea of a West European group independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union.[79]

Overall, however, there can be no doubt about the British Foreign Secretary's foresight or the importance of his initiatives. As early as August 1945 he was telling officials of the importance of 'clearing up' relations with France first and then developing further cooperation with Britain's Western neighbours. In May 1947 he was contemplating treaties with Belgium and Holland and in September he was telling the French of the need to organize the Western states into a coherent unity. The major initiatives, however, came in December 1947 in his talks with Bidault and Marshall and the approach to the Benelux countries in January 1948. Throughout the latter part of 1947 and the early part of 1948 he kept his eye very firmly fixed on the need to achieve American support for the West European security group and to secure eventual US participation in a wider Atlantic framework. As Nikolaj Petersen has argued:

> Bevin's continued prodding of the US government in the spring of 1948 served to keep the question salient in the eyes of US officials, and that the urgent tone of British and other European messages was an important factor in the timing of the American agreement to enter the [Washington] talks.[80]

It may be that at the end of the day the United States was not pulled, dragged or lured into the Atlantic Pact with its eyes closed, but Bevin's role in helping to convince American policy-makers that it was in their interests as well as those of Western Europe for the United States to join (at times when hesitation prevailed) was of major importance.

It is true that what emerged in the form of the Brussels Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty differed considerably in detail from the views advanced by Bevin between December 1947 and January 1948. It would be wrong, however, to underrate Bevin's contribution. His ideas were often vague and ill-defined, but what mattered for him was the initiative itself, not the specific arrangements. In Sir Nicholas Henderson's words: 'He did not think it necessary, before striking, to work out the details; he believed that the essential thing over this, as over the ERP, was to unleash an idea and back it with vigour at the start, letting the final mould be determined in subsequent discussions.'[81] Bevin clearly had no grand design in the sense of a detailed blueprint. What he did have was a clear view of

79. *FO 371*, 67673, Z 8579/25/17/G, Meeting in the FO, 26 Sept. 1947.
80. See Petersen, 'Who pulled whom', p. 109. It was these Washington exploratory talks on security in the summer and autumn of 1948 which led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.
81. Henderson, *The birth of NATO*, p. 3.

what he wanted to achieve and a reasonably coherent step-by-step vision of how to proceed. The Brussels Pact and Britain's continental commitment were very much his achievement. Others, such as George Marshall, Dean Acheson and John Hickerson of the United States, M. Bidault of France, M. Spaak of Belgium and St Laurent of Canada played their part; but it was Ernest Bevin's contribution alone which was truly decisive.[82]

82. Alan Bullock makes the point very clearly that one of Ernest Bevin's major achievements as Foreign Secretary was to secure American support which enabled Britain and Western Europe to preserve their independence. He sees Bevin's initiatives on the Brussels Pact and NATO as being particularly important in this respect. See Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, pp. 530, 857.

The sanctions problem in international economic relations: reflections in the light of recent experience*

JAMES MAYALL†

Recollected in tranquillity, as an abstract problem in international relations, the continued willingness of governments to employ economic sanctions in international disputes is undoubtedly puzzling. The conventional wisdom, after all, is that they do not work. Since 1945 they have been repeatedly imposed by individual states, by alliances, by regional organizations and by the United Nations itself and in virtually no case have they been unambiguously successful. The standard academic explanation runs roughly as follows: to be effective, sanctions generally require universality of application and a high degree of dependence in the target state; although they raise costs to the target state, the increase is seldom sufficient to purchase compliance and is often greater for the country imposing the sanction; and they frequently have perverse effects, creating out of the siege mentality a sense of national cohesion and determination to triumph in adversity that was previously lacking, while dividing the sanctioning nation within itself and from its allies. Nor is this view confined to the academic community;[1] over a period of thirty years West European politicians and officials have regularly employed similar arguments in debating with the United States about the wisdom and the necessity of the strategic embargo against the Soviet Union and its allies. And, in a different context, the United States itself has taken the same line in its resistance to consistent Afro-Asian pressure at the United Nations for the imposition of mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

But if scepticism about the utility of sanctions is widespread, it has never acted as a *general* constraint against their use in particular circumstances. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in the modern world the standard reaction to a crisis is the imposition of a whole range of economic sanctions and energetic diplomacy to persuade other countries to follow suit. In four recent crises—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the American hostage crisis in Iran in 1979–80, the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in April 1982—the imposition of sanctions and the attempt to concert a common sanctions policy both within Europe and across the Atlantic has played a prominent part in Western diplomacy. In all four cases the sceptical argument was vigorously deployed by interested parties on all sides; in two of them at least, possibly three, it seems likely that, in

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1. For a balanced account of the problems and possibilities of sanctions by a practitioner, see Robin Renwick, *Economic sanctions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1981).

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terms of the declared objectives of the sanctions—to get the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan; to restore human and civil rights in Poland; to secure the release of the American hostages—historians will conclude that the conventional scepticism was broadly vindicated. But this is an area in which governments seem reluctant to learn from experience. It seems more likely than not, therefore, that in future crises essentially the same pattern—that is, use despite scepticism—will be repeated; hence the puzzle.

A superficial solution might take the following form. In international relations there are neither abstract problems nor tranquillity; crises erupt and governments have to react to them. Moreover, two features of the contemporary international environment make it easier for governments to react by employing economic sanctions than by other means.

The first is the paradoxical strengthening of the state, despite the fact that states in general are increasingly locked together in a complex international division of labour. This paradox has several aspects. Interdependence may make it more difficult for the governments of the industrial democracies to deliver what they promise, since so much on which they rely lies outside their own jurisdiction, but they promise a great deal and therefore have to maintain a capability for intervention in the economy. In a recession, when domestic pressures for protection are politically at their most compelling and in consequence the industrial states find themselves almost permanently involved in a whole range of trade policy disputes, liberal objections to political interference in foreign trade generally are likely to be weakened.[2] Finally, theoretical objections to the use of sanctions, which are invariably advanced by commercial organizations and even governments whose interests are likely to be adversely affected, may also seem inappropriate in the light of the alternatives: while it is relatively easy for the major powers to engage in economic warfare—and in political terms relatively cheap also—in a nuclear world it remains very dangerous for them to engage in any other kind. Economic sanctions, in other words, may be a largely symbolic but still not wholly ineffective way whereby adversaries in a conflict can signal their position and intentions.

The second feature of the contemporary environment which is conducive to economic warfare is the decay of the Western institutional order which was developed under American leadership after 1945 as a framework for international relations. In one sense, of course, the rot set in almost at once. Within the original scheme, economic sanctions had a definite but carefully circumscribed place as part of the machinery with which the five permanent members of the Security Council were to enforce the peace and uphold the norms of international society under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.[3] The onset of the cold war and the liberal use of its veto by the Soviet Union quickly undermined the use of sanctions 'as part of a constitutionally authorised decision process',[4] but so did the one major international experiment with sanctions outside the cold war context, namely, those imposed on Rhodesia between 1966 and 1979. This was partly because they failed to end the

2. Most states maintain legislation under which they can interfere in trade for reasons of national security, i.e. to prevent the export of items of direct strategic value. Under the Export Administration Act of 1979 the United States in addition provides for government controls for foreign policy reasons, a wider and less precisely defined category, the use of which is disputed even within the US government.

3. For a general discussion of sanctions within the United Nations system, see Margaret Doxey, *Economic sanctions and international enforcement* (London: Macmillan for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1980).

4. Doxey, *Economic sanctions*, p. 9.

rebellion and partly because it was clear from the beginning that Britain had sought their imposition as a substitute for force regardless of their efficacy. It was only possible to impose sanctions on Rhodesia, moreover (and the same goes for the more limited arms embargo imposed on South Africa by the Security Council in 1977), because they were supported by the Western powers, accepted as the best that could be achieved in the circumstances by the African states and did not adversely affect the interests of the Soviet Union.

This coincidence of interests has not been repeated. When the United States proposed to the Security Council that the international community should impose sanctions on Iran, following the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the taking of American hostages by a group of Islamic fundamentalist students, the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Since the United States was simultaneously sanctioning the Soviet Union and attempting to persuade its allies to do likewise over the invasion of Afghanistan, this veto was predictable. Nevertheless, for those who clung to the idea of sanctions as an expression of the international rather than the national interest—the British, for example, initially insisted that they could only restrain their own commercial interests with the aid of an international mandate[5]—it provided evidence of the increasing futility of attempting to resolve crises, or even to reinforce the alleged norms of international society, by invoking Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. In 1982, during the Falklands crisis, the British government, having obtained a resolution condemning the Argentinian invasion of 2 April, deliberately decided *not* to seek a further resolution imposing sanctions in case it should invite a Soviet veto, alienate the Third World, and prejudice British diplomacy with its allies. It is possible to think of future crises in which UN sanctions could once again be a major issue—Namibia perhaps has an outside chance—but for the present the trend is clearly towards using sanctions as a symbol of 'alliance', European or even Third World solidarity rather than as an instrument of international order.

So much for what can be taken in about the recent history of sanctions on a first glance. But if it is clear that some of the constraints on their use have weakened, the deeper political puzzle remains. Why should governments continue to use an instrument of foreign policy which they believe to be ineffective merely because there are no obstacles to their doing so? One answer has already been suggested: that it is a relatively safe way of signalling hostile intentions to an adversary. But intentions to do what, exactly? In the case of the sanctions imposed on Argentina during the Falklands crisis, the answer is fairly clear: Britain demonstrated that it could mobilize diplomatic support and declared from the outset that if Argentina would not withdraw, the islands would be retaken by force. Here sanctions were at once an offer to Argentina to withdraw, admittedly under duress, but without loss of life, and a traditional accompaniment to military action. But what could President Carter hope to achieve by banning the sale of grain to the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan? Clearly the embargo was not intended as a prelude, let alone an accompaniment, to military action. Various answers have been suggested to this question but for present purposes the point to note is that although the embargo was lifted by President Reagan as a concession to mid-Western farmers who had lost out when Argentina had refused to line up with other major grain exporters behind the United States, the experience

5. *The Times*, 19 Dec. 1979.

did not prevent him from threatening to suspend the negotiations for a new long-term grain agreement after the imposition of martial law in Poland,[6] or from attempting, with only partial success, to persuade America's European allies to respond to the Polish crisis by imposing sanctions of their own on both the Polish and Soviet governments.

Two conclusions emerge from these preliminary considerations. The first is that the imposition of sanctions raises different issues (although it also raises all the traditional ones) in the context of East–West relations than in other cases. The second is that these differences are often more important to the US government than to its European allies. More fundamentally, they reflect a wider political and indeed philosophical debate about the use of sanctions in international relations generally, and more particularly, about whether they are to be regarded primarily as an instrument of international order rather than as a legitimate instrument of an independent foreign policy. Some light may be thrown on the transatlantic division of opinion on their use in the East–West context, therefore, by first reviewing the argument under these two heads.

Sanctions and international order

In essence the problem of sanctions arises from a contradiction, or at least an ambiguity, in liberal political theory. Liberal theorists have always tended to oppose war to commerce, the former being viewed as a fundamentally irrational and anachronistic activity which interrupts trade, destroys peaceful enterprise and resolves nothing, and the latter as both rational and progressive, a way of securing international harmony by weaving states into a network of mutual interests. This was the vision of Adam Smith and, even more strongly, of Richard Cobden, who saw free trade as a necessary support of a peaceful international order. It was also an essential part of the world view of the men who drafted the League of Nations Covenant and of the American administration which had the decisive voice in designing the international institutional order after 1945.

It follows from the view of war as essentially irrational that a rational alternative must be found. It also follows from the view of war as anachronistic that an alternative can be found within the rational, commercial world. Liberal theorists, of course, occupied a disenchanted world within which considerations of honour, responsibility and prestige gave way before calculations of interest and advantage. If the state's dependence on international society, like that of the individual on national society, meant that every state had its price, just as every man had his, then the denial of the benefits of free commerce to any state which threatened the peace would quickly force it to comply. For liberal theorists, faith in this improbable logic was strengthened by their conviction that the existence of the state could *only* be justified as a rational scheme for the common good of the citizens. What held for one state, moreover, held also, according to the principle of the harmony of interests, for all. A belief in the utility of sanctions and of their potential efficacy as an alternative to force is thus an understandable outgrowth, if not a necessary entailment, of liberal rationalism.

The ambiguity arises because there are at least two ways of interpreting the liberal logic. The first, prevalent in those societies (primarily, of course, the United States) where competition is still viewed as essentially a collaborative enterprise

6. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 30 April 1982.

and which in addition are lucky enough to be 'resource-rich', generally favours resolving conflicts by economic means. The problem with this approach is that in practice it tends to politicize trade when in theory the liberal harmony of interests requires both national and international markets to be treated as autonomous. The imposition of sanctions immediately returns international relations to the mercantilist zero-sum world from which the liberal internationalists were so anxious to escape. (Mercantilist states engaged in economic warfare all the time, since the prevailing view was that wealth was finite and the winner took all.[7]) The second interpretation, which is prevalent in liberal societies which happen also to be 'trade-dependent', accordingly tends to oppose any interference by the government with market forces, particularly for non-economic reasons. On this view, in the long run the harmony of interests will draw the deviant back into the fold automatically.

This ambiguity in liberal theory is fundamental.[8] In practice it has been reinforced in both its manifestations by the growth of 'welfare' capitalism. It cannot be resolved theoretically; not, at least, so long as the world fails to correspond in reality to the liberal scheme. In certain circumstances, however, it can be resolved pragmatically. As we have already noted, with the crucial exception of East–West relations, this was the case between 1945 and about 1973, the period of more or less undisputed American liberal ascendancy. During this period there emerged in effect a division of labour between the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Sanctions were to be reserved for exceptional cases when deviant states that threatened international peace and security were to be forced back into line by the measures set out in Article 41 of the Charter; but as a rule, states were to pursue the goal of commercial disarmament, that is to say, trade liberalization, within GATT, by respecting the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination on which the agreement was based.

This pragmatic resolution of the liberal dilemma could only work so long as, first, the exceptions remained genuinely exceptional and did not merge back into the mainstream of international relations; and secondly, states accepted any constraints on their freedom voluntarily. This was so because both the United Nations and GATT are organizations of sovereign states, and formally, therefore, their members could still look to their own security and commercial interests. Article 51 of the UN Charter reserved to them the right of individual and collective self-defence, while Article 21 of GATT similarly gave the contracting parties rights to take any action (not excluding actions which were inconsistent with their obligations under the agreement) considered necessary for the protection of essential security interests.[9] The rights of self-defence and collective defence have been exercised repeatedly by the United States, sometimes with and sometimes without the support of its regional and NATO allies, to justify the imposition of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam as well as in some relatively minor cases, such as the Dominican Republic or Uganda under General Amin. The same rights have also been implicitly invoked by the Arab and African states in justification of their more symbolic economic warfare

7. On mercantilist attitudes to economic warfare see Michael Heilperin, *Studies in economic nationalism* (Geneva: Droz, 1960), chap. 2.
8. For an attempt to argue otherwise, see M. Heilperin, 'The economic foundations of collective security' (1943) reprinted as Appendix 1 in *Studies in economic nationalism*.
9. For a discussion of the background to Article 21 of GATT, see John H. Jackson, *World trade and the law of GATT* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp. 748–52.

against Israel and South Africa, since most of them regard both these states as imperial outposts whose existence, regardless of their policies, constitutes a form of 'permanent aggression'. Only recently, however, as the postwar liberal consensus has weakened, has controversy over sanctions invaded the deliberately de-politicized GATT framework.

In both the Falklands and the Polish crises, the intrusion of the sanctions debate into GATT failed to have any discernible impact on the course of events. Yet the very fact of the intrusion was symptomatic of a major shift in the context of international politics, the result on the one hand of the weakening of the hegemonic US position in international relations and the collapse of detente, and on the other of the hardening, at least for diplomatic purposes, of the North–South divide.

Indeed, some insight into the recent resurgence of economic warfare in international relations can be gained by viewing the postwar era as framed by the two major cases, a generation apart, when Article 21 of GATT was invoked. The first of these occurred at the beginning of the cold war, when the United States had justified its refusal to issue export licences for coal mining equipment ordered by Czechoslovakia by reference to Article 21. The Americans claimed that the equipment was intended for mining uranium and hence for military purposes. The Czech delegation complained in GATT about a breach of the agreement but the charge was rejected.[10] The second occasion was in May 1982 when Australia, Canada and other EEC member states joined Britain in imposing sanctions on Argentina. On this occasion Argentina complained in the GATT Council that trade restrictions had been imposed for non-economic reasons, that GATT had not been notified by the countries concerned and that the imposition of sanctions represented 'a concerted action against a developing country by a group of developed countries of which only one was engaged in a direct conflict with Argentina'.[11] Between the Czech complaint in 1949 and that of Argentina in 1982, the division of labour between the United Nations and GATT on the sanctions issue was gradually eroded by two developments, the implications of which were not immediately apparent. The first concerned East–West, and the second North–South relations.

Although Czechoslovakia had signed the agreement before the 1948 coup, it played no significant part in GATT proceedings until the period of detente, when various formulae were worked out for granting 'most favoured nation' status to East European countries which sought admission. The impact of detente on the international economic order has been viewed in two ways. First, during the early 1970s, it was seen as a politically desirable means of normalizing East–West relations according to commercial rather than strategic criteria. So, indeed, it may have been; but since the granting of MFN status to the socialist countries is a discretionary political matter rather than a question of prescribing by law the terms under which foreigners may participate in an open domestic market, the effect was inevitably to weaken GATT's position as an apolitical mechanism for trade liberalization and the resolution of disputes on the basis of the accepted norms of mutual surveillance and consensus-building.

It has often been claimed that such success as GATT has enjoyed in basing the framework of commercial diplomacy on law rather than on power-political

10. Irving Kravis, *Domestic interests and international obligations* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1975), p. 115.
11. GATT CN 159, 10 Aug. 1982.

considerations rested on the deliberate avoidance of contentious foreign policy questions. From this second point of view, involving GATT in East–West trade offered a hostage to fortune. Take, for example, the case of Poland. Although the Polish government was undoubtedly correct in claiming that US withdrawal of its most favoured nation status in October 1982 was politically motivated, the US government was able to reply with equal validity that Poland had never fulfilled the conditions under which it had been admitted to GATT in the first place.[12] In such circumstances GATT could do little to prevent an essentially political dispute spilling over into the field of economic relations.

If East–West relations clearly form the most important foreign policy issue threatening the postwar division of labour with regard to sanctions, the North–South conflict, in which the GATT system has often been a major target for criticism, has sometimes rivalled it. The Argentinian attempt to use GATT not only to question the legality of Britain's EEC and Commonwealth partners imposing sanctions in the absence of a Security Council mandate, and hence perhaps to weaken their resolve, but also to mobilize Third World support, was not wholly successful. But nor was it a complete failure: an Argentinian proposal for a detailed study of the interpretation of Article 21, which was strongly opposed by all the Western powers, was not only, predictably, supported by all the Latin American countries but also, among others, by India, Romania, Nigeria and Yugoslavia. Even after the re-taking of the Falklands and the lifting of sanctions, Brazil repeatedly insisted on including the question of trade restrictions imposed for non-economic reasons as one of the major restraints on trade to be considered by the Ministerial Conference in November 1982, and succeeded in having a reference to it included in the Declaration.[13]

At a time when there are already numerous trade restrictions on Third World exports which threaten to undermine both the spirit and the letter of GATT, the danger of additional non-economic restraints may not seem very great. The significance of the Argentinian debate, however, does not lie in the probability of effective controls to limit the freedom of action of the contracting parties in this regard. Rather, its significance is as an indication of the breakdown of any broadly-based consensus on the rules of the sanctions game in North–South relations. In the present climate, should a similar case arise, it seems unlikely that either the United Nations or GATT will play the roles originally envisaged for them.

Sanctions and foreign policy

If the theory of sanctions as an instrument of international order is incoherent, that of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy is virtually non-existent. The denial of economic resources to the enemy by siege and blockade has an honoured place in the theory of war, but sanctions without military backup are undermined

12. For the exchange of mutual recriminations by the United States and Poland see GATT L/5390, 22 Oct. 1982, L/5396, 28 Oct. 1982, L/5396/add. 1, 28 Oct. 1982, L/5396/add. 2, 28 Oct. 1982 and L/5396/add. 3, 29 Oct. 1982. In the course of these exchanges the United States first requested consultations on the subject of Poland's performance with respect to its rate of imports commitment under GATT Schedule LXV (the instrument of its accession) and then when the invitation had been accepted proceeded to suspend Poland's most favoured nation status unilaterally.

13. For the text of the Declaration see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, May 1983, 32169A. The relevant section reads as follows: 'In drawing up the work programme and priorities for the 1980s, the contracting parties undertake individually and jointly, . . . (iii) to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures for reasons of a non-economic character, not consistent with the General Agreement.'

by precisely that condition, namely economic interdependence, which at first sight makes them seem attractive as a form of non-violent coercion. Only in circumstances where the target state is virtually totally dependent on the market of the opposing state, which can itself easily survive any counter-sanctions, are they likely to be effective in persuading an adversary to modify its policy. These circumstances are so rare as to be theoretically uninteresting.

It is evident, however, that the absence of a plausible theoretical foundation for sanctions as an instrument of state policy has not dissuaded governments from using them. Professor James Barber has argued that this is because the objectives for which they are imposed are much more varied than attention merely to their ostensible purpose might indicate.[14] Indeed, he suggests that there are three levels of objective: 'primary', concerned with the behaviour of the target state; 'secondary', referring to the position and reputation of the imposing state; and 'tertiary', concerned with the structure and behaviour of the international system. The widespread consensus about the inability of sanctions to achieve their objectives, referred to at the beginning of this article, applies to the primary objectives. But governments can clearly still be attracted to sanctions as a means of satisfying public opinion at home, symbolically underwriting a commitment abroad or expressing adherence to a particular conception of international morality. Thus, for example, the imposition of sanctions against Cuba was partly a move in the 1960 Presidential elections in the United States and partly a signal to the Soviet Union about the costs of attempting any further penetration of the Western hemisphere. Similarly, the decision by the British Labour government to impose sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965 was aimed partly at limitation of the damage to its reputation within the African Commonwealth and partly at protection of its flank against critics from both parliamentary parties. And the African states and their allies continued to press for sanctions against South Africa (just as they continued to support sanctions against Rhodesia even while urging more forceful action) largely as a means of expressing support for the principles of racial equality and majority rule as the basis of international legitimacy.

It is impossible to assess with any confidence the success of sanctions in terms of the open-ended and idiosyncratic motives of the imposing governments. But it need not be assumed that the record is entirely negative. Whether or not the Soviet Union was deterred by US sanctions against Cuba from seeking further allies in the Caribbean and Latin America, it was deterred. Similarly, while few would argue that sanctions were the decisive element in ending the Rhodesian rebellion in 1980, there is little doubt that they played a part. Having initiated the sanctions, the British could not repeal them unilaterally. Thus, Mrs Thatcher discovered in 1979 that she was bound by the actions of her predecessors to seek an internationally acceptable settlement. And this check on any tendency by the British government to define its interests without reference to international opinion was certainly in part a consequence of the success of the African and Asian states in their campaign for racial equality; the Western powers may continue to veto the sanctions against South Africa, but they have to justify this by disputing the appropriateness of the means, not the end of racial equality itself.

14. James Barber, 'Economic sanctions as a policy instrument', *International Affairs*, July 1979, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 367–84.

No doubt governments would like to believe that they can control events by their own actions; but they know that this is not the case. Hence, any decision to impose sanctions will be presented in terms of the almost certainly unattainable primary objectives but will also reflect more urgent short-term domestic and international imperatives. Moreover, any government which acts in this way will also know that the objectives with which it embarked on the exercise will change and may be quite different from those which require it later on either to abandon or to maintain the sanctions. A single example will illustrate this very general point. The reason for the United States continuing its almost total embargo on Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam is not the hope that this will bring about a change of regime in these countries, nor that protection of national security, the grounds on which they were first imposed, requires the sanctions to be maintained, but that to lift them would send the wrong foreign policy signals.[15] On this view, it follows that for the imposing government, the action, making its presence felt, is as important—if not more so—than the final outcome, which remains a question of speculation and contingency.

The action itself, however, is not a sufficient justification, whatever the expectation of the imposing government. The decision to impose sanctions has the necessary corollary that the imposing party does what is possible to ensure that those sanctions are effective, or at the very least that they are taken seriously by the target government. The decision to impose sanctions is, therefore, inseparable from diplomacy to persuade other states, particularly allies, to follow suit. If this diplomacy fails, moreover, not only will sanctions fail, but in addition the imposing government's international prestige may be damaged. It is perhaps some indication of the importance of domestic political considerations in decisions regarding sanctions that this possibility is so regularly overlooked. It has not, for example, restrained the United States in its determination to apply sanctions against the Soviet Union over Afghanistan and Poland, despite the enormous difficulties it faced in persuading its European allies of their necessity and the damage that was inflicted on the Atlantic alliance as a result.[16]

The generic problem of all sanctions diplomacy is how to reconcile conflicts of interest. Even where there is a Security Council mandate, as in the Rhodesian case, the policing of the sanctions will fall on national governments, not on the United Nations, and not all of those governments will have an equal interest in the energetic pursuit of sanction-breakers. Where there is a powerful moral case for sanctions but no mandate, the situation is even worse. Thus, when in response to UN pressure the United States and Britain unilaterally imposed embargoes on arms sales to South Africa in 1963 and 1964, this was to the advantage of France, which quickly established itself as South Africa's major arms supplier.

The existence of an alliance within which there is a permanent, if generally implicit, process of diplomatic horse-trading across issues,[17] provides a more promising context within which to rally support, but still serves to focus rather than to resolve the generic problem. Thus, even though the Europeans and the Japanese were anxious to demonstrate solidarity with the United States during the

15. See US Export Administration, *Annual Report*, 1980 (Washington, D.C.: International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce), p. 144.

16. Robert Paarlburg, 'Lessons of the grain embargo', *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980, pp. 160–1.

17. On this question see William Wallace, 'Issue linkage among Atlantic governments', *International Affairs*, April 1976, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 163–79.

hostage crisis, they were extremely reluctant to follow the Americans in imposing sanctions once the Soviet Union had vetoed the US draft resolution in the Security Council on 13 January 1980. Some states pointed to the absence of the legislative base which would enable them to interfere with the commercial activities of their citizens; others, France and Italy for example, had specific economic and political interests which would be damaged; while Japan (which relied heavily on Iran's oil supplies and was deeply involved in joint projects in the energy field[18]) was understandably afraid that the West would suffer more than Iran. In the end it took five months of heavy American pressure, and some unusually explicit hinting that the American commitment to the alliance could not be taken for granted,[19] before the allies fell into line. Even then they deliberately avoided making the sanctions retroactive. Britain faced similar difficulties in securing the support of its European allies in the Falklands crisis, particularly with Italy, which retained strong links with the large Italian community in Argentina, and Ireland, which was fearful of compromising its neutrality.

Sanctions and East–West relations

Such difficulties as those described above are unavoidable. Apart from the fact that the burden of imposing sanctions is unlikely to fall equally on all states involved and may well hurt those on the periphery of the dispute more than those at the centre, there are also likely to be genuine disagreements about the wisdom of the strategy being pursued. The diplomatic problem inherent in the imposition of sanctions under any circumstances is compounded when the target is the Soviet Union and its allies and the focal issue raises the question of the status and form of East–West relations.

A study commissioned by the United States Congress, *Technology and East–West trade*,[20] identified three schools of thought about the use of trade for non-trading objectives. The first, typified at present (though not historically) by France and Japan, disapproves of any attempt to exercise political leverage through the manipulation of trade. The second school of thought, represented by America's other allies, holds that trade can be used to strengthen the ties of interdependence and mutual restraint between East and West. Finally, there is the position held by the United States itself, which contrasts with both these schools and comes in a mild and a strong version. In the mild version, trade is viewed as an instrument which can be used to obtain specific policy concessions from the other side; in the strong version it is argued that trade should be denied as an act of economic warfare, that is to say, with the aim of weakening and if possible bringing about the disintegration of the other side.

18. Even while the United States was attempting to rally support among its allies for the draft UN resolution, Japan asked for the exclusion of a joint Japanese–Iranian petrochemical project for which the Japanese government had already committed finance to the proprietor, Japan Mitsui: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 Jan. 1980.

19. President Carter stepped up the public pressure on his European allies in a television interview and during a speech at the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in which he was unusually outspoken about European foot-dragging: 'They ask for leadership but at the same time they demand independence of action . . . They ask for understanding . . . yet they often decline to understand us in return.' Dr Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, went even further: 'We cannot accept the proposition that either genuine detente or our common security is divisible. Especially in the context of the challenge which may affect allied interests more rapidly and drastically than our own.' *Sunday Times*, 13 April 1980.

20. *Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress* (Aldershot, Hants: Gower, 1981), pp. 67–72.

These summaries probably give only a caricature of each of the positions. But they nevertheless encapsulate the essence of the debate within the Atlantic alliance over the use of sanctions in East–West relations. Nor is this debate recent in origin. Almost from its inception in 1950 there were transatlantic differences within the NATO Coordinating Committee (COCOM) which monitors the strategic embargo. These differences were intensified with the recovery of the European economy and the desire of European businesses to exploit East European and Soviet markets, where proximity gave them a comparative advantage over the United States. The specific issue was European pressure for the relaxation of the embargo which had originally included a very wide range of non-strategic goods. During the mid-1960s, by which time this pressure had been largely successful, the focus had shifted to American attempts to extend US jurisdiction extraterritorially in order to prevent the export of items from Europe, the export of which from the United States was still forbidden and which could be manufactured in Europe only with American components. The fact that the latter question was to resurface in the 1980s in the dispute over the Siberian gas pipeline suggests that the underlying argument was not so much about the particular goods included on the list as about the very appropriateness of economic sanctions as a cold war weapon.

The progressive relaxation of the strategic embargo was achieved in part because the liberal establishment in the United States shared much of the scepticism about its futility displayed by their European counterparts. As early as 1961 President Kennedy asked for increased discretion 'to use economic tools to reestablish ties of friendship between the United States and East Europe', a theme which was reiterated by President Johnson after the 1963 Battle Act Report had noted that economic sanctions had served only as a 'marginal restraint on Soviet aggressive capability during the Stalin and post-Stalin years'.[21] But even then the American attitude remained far more interventionist and instrumental than the European. This was no doubt partly because foreign trade was relatively unimportant to the American economy until the mid-1970s, when it became heavily dependent on imported energy, and partly because the American Congress exercises a more direct control over trade policy than is the case with any of the European legislatures. In any event, by the time Henry Kissinger sought to extend most favoured nation treatment to the Soviet Union as part of his strategy of making non-strategic concessions in return for 'responsible' Soviet behaviour, East–West trade was already firmly established as an inherent part of the structure of 'normalized' intra-European relations that had been established between 1969 and 1973; it could no longer easily be turned on or off at will for political reasons, even had the West Europeans been willing—which they were not. In the United States, by contrast, even the attempt to translate its traditional negative sanctions into positive inducements to the Soviet Union to cooperate aborted when Senator Jackson successfully attached an amendment to the Trade Bill making the granting of most favoured nation status conditional upon the Soviet Union allowing free emigration of Soviet Jews.

The enthusiasm for economic sanctions which has characterized both the Carter and Reagan administrations in the United States (despite Mrs Kirkpatrick's statements to the contrary when justifying the withdrawal of the grain embargo) has been a major cause of friction within the alliance. Within Europe generally, and

21. Doxey, *Economic sanctions*, p. 18, note 11 (p. 134).

even in Britain, whose government under Mrs Thatcher has been closest to the Reagan administration, there is no enthusiasm for a wholesale return to the economic cold war. This is partly because to engage in economic warfare after the long struggle to abandon it seems anachronistic. If the Soviet Union would not modify its behaviour in response to the strategic embargo of the 1950s, why should it do so now merely because it needs cattle feed and lags behind the West in high technology? But it is also because under these two administrations the struggles between the executive and the Congress, and among the various agencies of the government, which often seem to be running rival foreign policies, have reduced European confidence in American leadership to its lowest point since 1945.

The collapse of European confidence in the United States has perhaps been most marked in West Germany, the country which has most to lose by the imposition of sanctions and most at stake in the maintenance of detente. But in varying degrees it has affected all the major European capitals. Since sanctions in East–West relations cannot realistically be expected to weaken Soviet military capability and seem unlikely to modify Soviet behaviour, their imposition must be intended to signal Western hostility in an area where detente has offered constructive diplomatic possibilities.

In the end, the fact that the Europeans themselves needed to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to the Polish crisis, together with the fact that they also needed to retain American support, eventually led the member countries of the EEC to coordinate their response. Lacking the diplomatic resources of the Americans, who if they so chose could harass the Russians over a very wide front, they too opted for the symbolic use of the sanctions weapon. But in both of these cases they did so with extreme difficulty and barely concealed impatience with the American position. On the evidence reviewed here, it seems unlikely that the pattern will be very different in any future East–West crisis.

Europe's agricultural policy: progress and reform

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At breakfast-time on 31 March 1984, ten ministers emerged wearily from the Charlemagne building in Brussels. The European Community's Council of Ministers had just completed another all-night session of negotiation, and had reached agreement on a wide-ranging package of decisions on agricultural policy. What had these ten ministers of agriculture decided, how was it decided, why was it necessary, and did it constitute a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy? This article tries to give plain answers to those questions.

Plain language is important, for one of the problems of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is that its operations are too often couched in impenetrable jargon. For most political commentators, and for many professional economists, it is a territory where the language cannot be understood, and which therefore provokes hostility or distrust. Since the issues at stake are important not only for agriculture but for the future of the Community as a political enterprise, the territory deserves to be better mapped and better understood.[1]

The roots of the problem

The agricultural policy has always been, and remains, a central feature of the Community's activity. Since farming's share of Europe's employment and economic output is steadily decreasing, it is worth considering why it continues to occupy such a large part of the Community's time and money. The reasons are many and deep-seated and include the following four factors. First, the political importance in most, if not all, member states of the concept of the family farm as the embodiment of certain social values, an appreciation shared by many parties from the left to the right of the political spectrum. Secondly, the acceptance by all member states of the need for intervention in the agricultural sector, because of the desire on the one hand for security of food supplies for consumers, and on the other hand for protection of the incomes of agricultural producers against the fluctuations of market prices. In this respect, the aims of the CAP, as set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, are not so different from those of other industrialized countries such as the United States and Japan. Thirdly, the existence

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1. Recent publications which help to fill the gap for English readers include: Joan Pearce, *The Common Agricultural Policy*, Chatham House Papers No. 13 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), which gives analysis of the political context at the time of the Commission's 'Mandate' report of June 1981; Michael Tracy, *Agriculture in Western Europe: challenge and response 1880–1980*, 2nd edn (London: Granada, 1982), a historical survey of the development of agricultural policy; Simon Harris, Alan Swinbank, and Guy Wilkinson, *The food and farm policies of the European Community* (Chichester: Wiley, 1983), a comprehensive description of the workings of the CAP, including the commodity regimes and many other aspects of the policy; Conrad Caspari, *The Common Agricultural Policy: the direction of change*, EIU Special Report No. 159 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1983), giving the background at the time of the Athens summit of December 1983; and Edmund Neville-Rolfe, *The politics of agriculture in the European Community* (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1984), which studies national political attitudes and their influence on the CAP's development since 1953.

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of a common market for agricultural products, in parallel with the common market for industrial goods, was part of the original political pact to reconcile the agricultural interest of France and the industrial interest of Germany. With a free flow of agricultural products between member states, common prices and common rules for intervention in the agricultural markets imply common finance, and thus it is that the budgetary cost of agricultural price support has been fully transferred from the national level to the Community level. Last, but not least, is the failure so far of the Community to develop common policies and common decision-making in other sectors to the same extent as in agriculture.

These general considerations show why agricultural policy continues to attract so much attention at the European level. But other specific factors explain why in recent years the pressure for change and reform in the agricultural policy has become so strong. As early as December 1980, the European Commission had sounded a warning. In its memorandum *Reflections on the CAP*[2] it observed that whereas the increase in European food consumption was practically nil, the increase in agricultural production in Europe was still continuing because of improvements in the yields of crops and livestock. For most major agricultural products, the Community had passed from deficit to more than self-sufficiency. The Commission concluded that 'in the present state of agricultural technology, it is neither economically sound nor financially feasible to guarantee price or aid levels for unlimited quantities'. Thus, by the end of the 1970s, a continued improvement in productivity, combined with guarantees of prices and markets, had led to the emergence of surpluses whose disposal within the Community or on world markets was becoming very expensive. Expenditure on market price support from the Guarantee Section of the Community's Agricultural Fund[3] grew at an average of 23 per cent a year in the period 1975–9, a rate of increase which was hardly sustainable, and which threatened to bring the Community's spending beyond the limits of its budgetary resources.

Reflections on the CAP was the political testament of Finn Gundelach, the Commissioner for Agriculture, whose untimely death came within a few weeks of its publication. Seeing clearly the need for adaptation of the policy in such a way as to control the financial consequences of agricultural surpluses, he proposed to introduce the principle that 'any production above a certain volume, to be fixed taking into account the internal consumption of the Community and its external trade, should be charged fully or partially to the producers'. It was not entirely a new idea. The Community market regulation for sugar had always included a system of production quotas under which levies were charged on sugar in excess of certain quantities. Since 1977 the milk regulation included a flat-rate levy of 1·5 per cent (later raised to 2·5 per cent) known as the 'co-responsibility' levy. Finn Gundelach argued that the principle of co-responsibility should be generalized, so that—while maintaining all the existing features of the CAP—there would be 'two stages of financial responsibility: a first stage in which Community responsibility would be total, and a second in which it would be shared in proportions to be defined between the Community and producers'.

2. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 6/80 (Commission communication to the Council, presented on 8 Dec. 1980).

3. Its full title is European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), but it is more generally known by its French acronym FEOGA (*Fonds Européen d'Orientation et de Garantie Agricole*).

The new Commission which took office in January 1981 under the Presidency of Gaston Thorn, and in particular the new Commissioner for Agriculture, Poul Dalsager, were to find it difficult to persuade the Council of Ministers to make such changes in the farm policy. On the one hand, agricultural incomes fell in real terms in 1979, and again in 1980, partly because of the rather low increases in price support decided in 1979 and 1980. On the other hand, several factors checked the rate of increase in budgetary expenditure: the recovery of world market prices for cereals, sugar and milk products; the slower growth of milk production in the Community; and the decline in expenditure on Monetary Compensatory Amounts. As a result, expenditure from the Guarantee Section increased by only 8 per cent in 1980 and even fell by 3 per cent in 1981.

It is not surprising that, in these circumstances, the Council of Ministers was inclined to treat proposals for reform with circumspection. Nevertheless, the Commission persevered with its efforts. In its overall report in June 1981 on the development of Community policies—the so-called 'Mandate' report[4]—the new Commission made an important declaration of its aims for the CAP. These included 'a price policy based on a narrowing of the gap between Community prices and prices applied by its main competitors' and 'production targets in terms of volume for every sector at Community level', aims expanded more fully in October 1981 in the memorandum *Guidelines for European agriculture*.[5] The Commission concluded that it was principally for cereals that the price gap should be narrowed, and that the production targets should be based on a long-term view of forecasts of supply and demand using a five-year horizon.

At this point it is worth remarking on two important features of decision-making for agriculture in the European Community. The first is the tradition that decisions on the CAP are taken by the ministers of agriculture. According to the Treaty of Rome, there is only one Council of Ministers, but in practice it meets in different and specialized compositions: as well as the Council of Ministers (General Affairs), there is the Council of Ministers (Agriculture), the Council of Ministers (Transport) and so on. Of course, whatever the composition of the Council, ministers represent their governments, and are therefore deemed to be acting with full authority from their colleagues in the capitals. But nevertheless the criticism is sometimes made that the Agriculture Council in its decisions takes insufficient account of other considerations such as the budget or external trade, and from time to time it is suggested that the finance ministers, or the foreign ministers, should have a greater say; or even that the prime ministers (or more correctly, the heads of state and government) meeting in the European Council should take the basic decisions on reform of the CAP.

A second feature of Community farm decisions is their annual rhythm. The market years for the principal animal products (milk and beef) begin in April, and for other products at later dates (for example, August for cereals). This means that in practice the Council has to take a decision before 1 April on the common prices for the new market years—or, in default of a decision, to prolong the existing prices for some weeks until agreement is reached. Since the annual price decisions have become a kind of locomotive, to which other important decisions affecting

4. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/81 (Commission report to the Council, presented on 24 June 1981, pursuant to the Mandate of 30 May 1980).

5. Commission of the European Communities, *Guidelines for European agriculture*, document COM(81) 608 final (Commission communication to the Council, presented on 23 Oct. 1981).

the agricultural policy tend to become attached, the tradition has grown up of big package deals on agriculture, negotiated in the Council in the early months of the year. This means that in practice the Council does not take a specific decision on the reform of the CAP, but rather includes some (not necessarily all) of the Commission's proposals in its annual package. Thus it was that, following the Mandate report, the Commission linked to its annual farm price proposals a series of measures for reform of the agricultural policy. The concept of production objectives was refined in two ways: different means of applying them were proposed for different agricultural sectors, and the expression 'guarantee thresholds' was introduced. This addition to the jargon of the CAP was a response to a fear in agricultural circles that the policy was designed to impose absolute limits on agricultural production.

Some progress was made: the Council introduced a guarantee threshold for cereals of 119·5 million tonnes for the 1982–3 marketing year, with provision that the common price would be reduced in the following year by 1 per cent for each 1 million tonnes by which the threshold was exceeded. It also agreed that, if milk production in 1982 increased by more than 0·5 per cent, appropriate measures would be taken to offset the additional costs to the budget. However, the practical effect of these decisions was limited, for when the thresholds were in fact exceeded, the common prices for cereals and milk were not reduced in absolute terms, but rather in relation to the other common prices. Thus it was that for 1983–4 the cereals price was increased by 3 per cent and the milk price by 2·3 per cent, in both cases an abatement of the 5·5 per cent 'norm' applied for farm prices in general. Moreover, the guarantee threshold for cereals was to be automatically increased in line with any increase in the import into the Community of cereal substitutes.

Also important during this period was the effect on agricultural prices of the agri-monetary system—known more simply as 'green money'. An analysis of Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) and their ramifications is outside the scope of this article, but a brief explanation must be given Common prices for agriculture have to be defined by reference to some common unit of value, and since the introduction of the European Monetary System in 1979 this has been the European Currency Unit (ECU). Because most member states of the Community do not accept that depreciation or appreciation of their currency against the ECU should result in an immediate change in the national level of agricultural price support, the CAP provides for artificial 'green' rates, rather than official exchange rates, to be used for converting from ECUs into national prices.[6]

However, since this cushioning of farm and food prices from the normal effects of exchange rate adjustments is supposed to be temporary, the green rates are progressively adjusted so as to reduce the monetary gap. Thus, the change in agricultural price support in each member state from year to year depends not only on the decisions on common prices, but also on the adaptation of green rates decided by the Council. In general, it has proved easier for the Council to agree

6. Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) are the border charges, corresponding to the difference between green rates and official exchange rates, which are necessary to maintain price support at the desired level in national currency. Positive MCAs are additional charges on imports, and subsidies on exports, applied by countries whose currency has revalued (for example, Germany); negative MCAs are reductions in the import charges and in export subsidies for countries whose currency has depreciated (for example, Italy).

on devaluations of green rates (which lead to increases in agricultural prices in national money) than revaluations (which lead to decreases). Consequently, although the average increases in Community agricultural price support in ECUs for the 1981–2, 1982–3 and 1983–4 years were 9·2, 10·4 and 4·2 per cent respectively, the average increases in national money terms were 10·9, 12·2 and 6·9 per cent. It may be noted, by way of comparison, that the average rates of inflation in the Community in this period were 10·6, 9·0 and 6·3 (calendar years 1981, 1982, 1983).[7]

During this period, the underlying trends of production and consumption for many products within the Community continued to diverge. The annual rate of increase in milk production, for example, which had been about 2·6 per cent in the 1970s, fell briefly to 1 per cent in 1981, but then accelerated to 3 per cent in 1982 and 4 per cent in 1983; meanwhile, the rate of increase in the Community's consumption of milk and milk products was no more than 0·5 per cent a year. As long as demand on world agricultural markets remained strong, and exports increased in volume, it was possible for the Commission to dispose of the increased production, though in some cases at the cost of friction with its trade competitors. In the period 1973–81, the Community's agricultural exports increased in value by 17 per cent a year on average. But as world economic recession began to produce its effects on trade, agriculture did not escape unscathed; in 1982, while the value of world agriculture trade fell by 9 per cent, the Community's agricultural exports fell by 2 per cent. These trends began to cause serious concern among the managers of the CAP as public stocks grew.

From summit to summit: agriculture and the budget

The plan for changes in the agricultural policy, launched by the Commission in its Mandate report of June 1981, was not left to agriculture ministers alone. It formed part of the agenda of the meeting of heads of state and government in the European Council in London in November 1981, together with the British budget problem and the development of Community policies in sectors other than agriculture. This summit, prepared for by foreign ministers and by a special group of senior diplomatic representatives in the second half of 1981, was the first occasion for many years that agricultural policy had been treated in detail in a Council forum other than a gathering of agriculture ministers or their experts. The outcome was not too encouraging, for although a lengthy set of draft conclusions on agriculture was prepared, the summit ended in disagreement not only about the budget but also about several agricultural items, including the question of small milk producers. Although this last point was resolved by an informal meeting of foreign ministers some weeks later, no formal conclusions on agriculture were reached at or after the London summit. Thus the responsibility for taking decisions on agriculture fell back into the hands of the agriculture ministers, according to their annual cycle; and the desire of most governments to leave it there was signalled by the vote on the 1982–3 agricultural prices which the agriculture ministers' council took on 16 June 1982, against the will of the British, who had wished to maintain a link between the CAP and their still unresolved budget problem.

By the time of the Stuttgart summit of June 1983, the rate of increase in agricultural expenditure had begun to cause fresh alarm. In 1982 the budget of the

7. Figures are taken from *Common agricultural prices 1983/84*, Green Europe Newsletter No. 23 (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities), Annex 3.

Agriculture Fund had shown a rise of 13 per cent, and the revised budget for 1983 required another 28 per cent; with the need for expansion of other Community policies, and the payment of refunds to Britain, it was clear that the limit of the Community's budget resources would soon be reached. Accordingly, the summit demanded an urgent report from the Commission. The resulting document, *Common Agricultural Policy—proposals of the Commission*[8] restated, but also sharpened, the theses which the Commission had been deploying. It was a key document; indeed, such was its impact that the need for a shorter title manifested itself in the name 'Document 500', derived from its internal reference number COM(83)500. The Commission insisted that 'the Community has no choice but to adapt its policy of guarantees for production. If agriculture is to succeed, as it should, in expanding its exports and maintaining its share of world markets, it must increasingly accept the market disciplines to which other sectors of the economy are subject. The accent must be placed more and more on production at a competitive price. Hitherto, the price guarantees for most products have been unlimited in nature. This situation cannot continue, if the CAP is to develop on a rational basis.'

The Commission proposed a variety of measures for different products, of which the most important were: production quotas as a means of applying guarantee thresholds for milk; the rationalization of aids for butter, sheepmeat, fruit and vegetables, olive oil and tobacco; and a tax on oils and fats other than butter. It reinforced its warnings about price policy, speaking of the possibility of reducing common prices in ECU and national money terms. It proposed an automatic and more rapid adjustment of green rates, so as to dismantle the MCAs.

Perhaps the most delicate aspect of this plan was its budgetary consequences. The Commission insisted that the adaptation of the CAP could not be made 'according to exclusively budgetary criteria, but rather with the aim of fulfilling the fundamental objectives in the most cost-effective way. A cost-cutting exercise, conducted without regard to the social and economic consequences, would render no service to the development of the Community. It would lead to the fragmentation of the common policy and the reappearance in national budgets of expenditure now assumed by the Community'. Nevertheless, a financial evaluation was given—subject to the usual reserves about the uncertainty of forecasts of budgetary expenditure for agriculture—that if all the proposals were adopted they would 'reduce agricultural expenditure below what it would otherwise have been' by an order of magnitude of 2,500 million ECUs in 1984–5. This evaluation was made against the background of a proposed budget of 16,500 million ECUs for 1984, with the expectation of substantial (but unspecified) increases in later years.

The procedure adopted by the Council for the treatment of these proposals was a special one. From the outset, it was recognized that the agricultural dossier was destined to go to the summit meeting at Athens in December 1983; but unlike the other dossiers, its preparation was carried out not in the framework of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (the member states' ambassadors in Brussels) but by a high level group of agricultural experts from capitals. This group—which consisted of top officials from ministries of agriculture, mostly at the level of State Secretary, Permanent Secretary or Director General—performed

8. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 4/83 (Commission communication to the Council, presented on 29 July 1983).

a crucial task of negotiation, with discreet but generally flexible instructions. Indeed, it sometimes appeared that the ministers of agriculture themselves were content not to become too publicly involved in the 'reform' dossier, but to leave it to the summit.

At Athens, however, nothing was decided on the CAP; not so much because of problems intrinsic to agriculture, although they were numerous, but once more because of lack of progress on the budget questions. Consequently the matter fell back into the hands of the agriculture ministers, who in the following months were obliged to prepare their annual price decisions for the 1984–5 market year. The Commission, for its part, put on the table a price proposal which fulfilled the warnings already given in Document 500 that a 'restrictive' policy would be needed. An increase of only 0·8 per cent on average in common prices, in ECU terms (including a price freeze for cereals, milk, wine and olive oil) was accompanied by adjustments in green money such as to lead to an average decrease in price support of 0·5 per cent for the Community as a whole. The green revaluation proposed for Germany, for example, implied a price reduction of 5·7 per cent in agricultural prices in Deutschmarks, a proposition which was promptly described as 'unacceptable' by the Bonn government.

It also became apparent that the budgetary situation for agriculture was more alarming than had been thought. The Commission reckoned that the downturn in the agricultural markets would lead to overspending of the order of 800 million ECUs compared with the 1984 budget, while the savings to be expected from the reform measures would be of the same order of magnitude. In other words, in order to remain within the budget, the agriculture ministers would have to accept *all* the proposals in their full rigour. But the chances of this coming about rapidly diminished, as multiple objections were raised by ministers, not only to the level of prices, but to the quotas for milk and many other specific measures. The tax on oils and fats, proposed by the Commission as a means of rebalancing the price ratio between butter and other fats, but perceived by many as a way of increasing revenue for the Community budget, was so strongly opposed that the agriculture ministers refused even to continue to discuss it.

The failure of the Brussels summit of 19–20 March 1984 to unblock the complex of questions including Britain's budget contribution created a dramatic situation in the Community. Agriculture had not been the reason for this failure—despite the much-publicized walk-out of Ireland's Prime Minister after the refusal of other participants to accept special treatment for his country over milk quotas. With the date of 1 April, the traditional deadline for farm price decisions, now at hand, the capacity of the Council to respect the deadline began to be seen as a test of the Community's ability to survive. Moreover, the prolongation of the agricultural status quo for a period of weeks or months would imply not a saving for the budget, but increased expenditure. Thus were created the conditions for an intensive effort on the part of the agriculture ministers to reach conclusions—a 'window' skilfully exploited by France's minister of agriculture, Michel Rocard, as President of the Council.

A series of Council meetings culminated in the all-night session of 30–1 March, for which the way was opened by Ireland's acceptance in the course of 30 March of the application of milk quotas, with a generous figure for Ireland. This left a number of less important problems, on which other delegations had reservations, to be overcome in the course of the night: not least among these problems was

the insistence of Britain's minister on retaining the variable premium (a kind of deficiency payment) for beef producers in the United Kingdom.

An important question during this phase—but a question which was not put to the final test—was whether the Council should reach a settlement by a majority vote, as it had done two years before. Probably on three strands of reasoning, the Council held back from this ultimate solution: first, it was by no means clear that, in the event of a vote, there would be a sufficient majority for some of the key measures such as milk quotas, where several member states strongly disliked the concessions proposed for Ireland; secondly, it was not believed that the objections of the British minister were linked, as had been the case in 1982, to the question of Britain's budget contribution; and thirdly, there was a feeling that it would be a political error to take decisions in the face of dissent at a stage when financial solidarity within the Community was particularly desired. In the end, there was a vote by the Greek minister against certain measures on fruit and vegetables, and the Dutch minister declared that he would have preferred to vote against the milk quota for Ireland; but it may nevertheless be said that the package as a whole was adopted unanimously.

The four main elements in the package agreed by the ministers were: confirmation of the principle of guarantee thresholds and their extension to other products; control of milk production by means of quotas; rapid adjustment of the green rates, so as to dismantle MCAs; and decisions on farm prices for the coming year. In addition, three other elements were either included in the package or linked to it: revision of the aids and subsidies paid on various products; measures affecting external trade; and financial guidelines for future agricultural expenditure. Each of these components merits a brief commentary.

Guarantee thresholds

The Council had already (since 1981) extended the principle of limitation of the price guarantees to four sectors (milk, cereals, oilseed rape, processed tomatoes) in addition to those where analogous measures already existed (sugar, cotton). It now not only decided to extend guarantee thresholds to three more sectors (sunflower seeds, durum wheat, dried raisins) but in an important political declaration emphasized the need to introduce this instrument generally for products in surplus, or those on which expenditure may increase rapidly. Thus the lines of reform first advocated by the Commission in 1980 and 1981 were finally accepted by the Council.

Milk quotas

The Council reluctantly accepted that the limitation of the guarantee for milk should be implemented by means of production quotas. To do it by reductions in the milk support price, as had originally been envisaged, proved unrealistic: the Commission calculated that, to compensate for the 4 per cent increase in milk deliveries in 1983, a price cut of 12 per cent would be needed. The effects of this on the incomes of milk producers would have been so severe that quotas were the only alternative. Not that quotas were without pain: the Commission had proposed a total of 97·2 million tonnes, equivalent to 1981 deliveries of milk plus 1 per cent: although this figure was lower than the 103 million tonnes delivered in 1983 (and even lower than the 105–6 million tonnes forecast for 1984) it was higher than the

Community's consumption level of about 86 million tonnes, and therefore left a substantial margin for exports or other disposal at Community expense. The Council finally fixed a basic quantity of 98·4 million tonnes for five years, but with a reserve and other special arrangements bringing the total to 99·6 million tonnes for the 1984–5 market year.

There can be no doubt that, in terms of the political consequences, this decision was the most difficult part of the package. The reaction from milk producers throughout the Community was bitter. Many had to abandon plans for improving their incomes by expanding production. Confusion was created by the Council's decision to permit member states a choice between applying quotas at the level of the individual farm, or at the level of the dairy; and only experience will tell what the effects of one or other system will be on the level of production.

The introduction of quotas was also the aspect most criticized by independent commentators on the CAP. As one group of economists put it, in a memorandum on reform of the CAP adopted at Siena in February 1984: 'production quotas have well-known and serious disadvantages; they tend to freeze the pattern of production, reducing the efficiency and the income capacity of agriculture (unless enhanced by higher prices); they prevent the capacity of the sector to improve income through structural adjustment; and they tend to solve the income problems of the present generation of farmers, creating rents which will be capitalised on the land value or quota rights.'[9] Nevertheless, these problems were evidently considered by the Commission and Council to be less important than those which would be associated with a large reduction in prices. Rapid adjustment of the structure of milk production was not a primary objective of ministers; although some provision was made for flexibility in the reallocation of milk quotas, it was not accepted that quotas should be freely bought and sold separately from the land.

Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs)

The Commission had proposed that existing MCAs be phased out in two stages, and that any future MCAs created by changes in exchange rates should also be phased out according to an automatic timetable. The Council was not prepared to accept such rigour, and concentrated its efforts on the positive MCAs, the dismantling of which (resulting in a decrease in agricultural prices in national money) is more difficult to obtain than dismantling of negative MCAs (resulting in price increases). The solution chosen was largely the idea of the German government, which was under pressure from its partners, particularly France, to remove its positive MCA of 9·8 per cent. On the one hand, Germany accepted that it should make a large cut, of five points, by revaluing the green Deutschmark at the beginning of 1985, provided that the loss of income to German farmers could be compensated for through the value-added tax system. On the other hand, for the beginning of the 1984–5 market year, Germany refused to make a revaluation of its green money, proposing instead a complex manoeuvre with MCAs, which in economic and budgetary terms had the same effect as an increase of 3·6 per cent in common prices accompanied by the dismantling of three points of positive MCAs.[10] This was finally accepted by the other partners, and a phased programme

9. *The Siena memorandum on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy* (conclusions of a workshop held on 17–18 February 1984 at the University of Siena).

10. Technically, this operation consisted of the conversion of three points of positive MCAs into negative MCAs, with the immediate dismantling of the negative MCAs thus created.

was agreed for abolition of the positive MCAs, to a large extent by the beginning of 1985, and completely by the 1987–8 market year.

Equally important was the decision to alter the green money system so that future parity adjustments in the EMS cannot lead to the creation of positive MCAs, but only of negative MCAs. This move again reflected Germany's reluctance to accept any commitment to reduce agricultural support prices in Deutschmarks, for it meant that the strongest money (which for many years had been the Deutschmark) would in future determine the value of common agricultural prices. Although this does not represent the *explicit* creation of a special 'green ECU' for agricultural purposes, *implicitly* that is in fact the result of applying a new 'corrective coefficient' for the calculation of MCAs. The consequences for the future are difficult to estimate, because it is difficult to forecast the extent to which parities within the EMS will be adjusted; but clearly the new system introduces a risk of upward pressure on agricultural prices, if future negative MCAs are too rapidly eliminated by green devaluations. Therefore, the system is to apply only for three years in the first place, and the Commission is to make a report in 1986 on its operation.

Prices

As has already been indicated, the Community's decisions on common prices need to be appreciated in conjunction with its decisions on green money. Although the common prices for several products (cereals, meat, wine, and olive oil) were reduced by 1 per cent—that is, they were fixed at even lower levels than the Commission proposed—the prices in national money were still higher than those proposed by the Commission, as a result of the manoeuvre with MCAs already described. What happened is illustrated in Table 1.[11]

Table 1: Percentage change in agricultural support prices, 1984–5 and 1983–4 market years compared

	Commission's proposal		*Council's decision*		*Inflation*
	Prices in ECU	Prices in national money	Prices in ECU	Prices in national money	1984 forecast
Germany	+ 0·8	− 5·4	− 0·6	− 0·6	+ 2·8
France	+ 0·6	+ 3·2	− 0·6	+ 5·0	+ 7·1
Italy	+ 0·8	+ 0·8	− 0·4	+ 6·4	+ 11·0
Netherlands	+ 0·8	− 3·1	− 0·5	− 0·5	+ 2·0
Belgium	+ 1·0	+ 2·3	− 0·6	+ 3·9	+ 5·8
Luxembourg	+ 0·7	+ 1·9	− 0·5	+ 4·0	+ 7·4
United Kingdom	+ 0·8	− 3·2	− 0·6	− 0·6	+ 5·3
Ireland	+ 0·9	+ 2·1	− 0·6	+ 3·9	+ 7·8
Denmark	+ 0·7	− 0·4	− 0·7	+ 1·5	+ 4·9
Greece	+ 1·4	+ 3·4	+ 0·4	+ 17·6	+ 19·8
Community average	+ 0·8	− 0·5	− 0·5	+ 3·3	+ 5·1

For the first time in the history of the CAP, the Council decided common prices which represented on average a reduction in prices in ECU terms; however, taking

11. Figures are from *Agricultural prices 1984/85 and rationalisation of the CAP*, Green Europe Newsflash No. 27 (Brussels, Commission of the European Communities), Annex 2.

account of the green money, the price support level was increased by an average of 3·3 per cent in national money. Compared with an average rate of inflation of 5·1 per cent, these decisions demonstrate the wish of the Council to pursue a more restrictive price policy than in previous years.

Aids and subsidies

The Commission in its reform plan wanted to reduce or abolish many aids and subsidies, the economic justification for which was no longer obvious in a time of financial stringency. The Council followed these ideas only to a limited extent: for example, it made little change to the regulations for beef and sheepmeat, which include expensive direct payments to producers from the Community budget.

External trade

It was no surprise that the Commission's reform plan included a number of measures for the 'observance of Community preference', an expression referring to the degree of protection against agricultural imports from outside the Community. Nor was it surprising that non-Community countries affected by these proposals complained that Europe was trying to solve its agricultural problems at the expense of others. In reality, the measures of additional protectionism proposed were modest, and the decisions of the Council generally went less far than the proposals. For example, for sheepmeat the decision was simply to open discussions with third countries on the establishment of a minimum import price, and for cereal substitutes the Commission obtained a mandate to open negotiations for the stabilization of the level of imports. The volume of imports of beef, and of butter from New Zealand, was slightly reduced. The proposed tax on oils and fats other than butter, although presented in a non-discriminatory form applicable both to imported and domestic products, provoked opposition in the Council because of fear of reactions from major external suppliers such as the United States, and was effectively shelved.

Agricultural expenditure

Under this heading, it is necessary to distinguish between the principles to govern future agricultural spending, and the financial consequences of the package decided on 31 March 1984. The latter was the result of decisions by the agriculture ministers, while the former was the subject of negotiations at other levels.

The question of budgetary limits on agricultural expenditure was one on which the positions of member states naturally diverged sharply. On the part of member states with a relatively large agricultural sector, heavily dependent on payments from the Community's Agricultural Fund, there was a reluctance to accept constraints on spending; in this group were to be found Denmark and Ireland, both major exporters of agricultural products to non-Community countries (for which their farmers benefit from Community-financed export restitutions) and also Italy and Greece. On the other hand, the British and the Germans, both net importers of food and net payers into the Community budget, wanted a firm control of agricultural expenditure, an objective enshrined in the phrase 'strict financial guidelines' frequently used by British ministers in connection with the CAP; the Netherlands also, although a large beneficiary from the Agricultural Fund, supported the idea of such controls, aware no doubt of the risks to the agricultural policy and to the Community itself of an uncontrolled increase in farm expenditure.

An unspoken link existed between this question of limits on farm expenditure and the matter of 'budgetary imbalances', the diplomatic euphemism for the problem of Britain's net payments to the budget. Although the British government insisted that these two problems were independent of each other, and required separate solutions, most observers believed that the more generous the solution on the latter, the less would be the need for rigour on the former. After all, was it not precisely the fact that Britain's receipts from the agricultural policy were proportionally much less than its payments to the budget, and that agricultural expenditure was relatively so large in the budget, that lay behind its perennial demand for revision of the financial arrangements? For this reason, among others, the question of limits on agricultural spending was discussed by the prime ministers and foreign ministers rather than by agriculture ministers.

The Commission at an early stage defined a basis for agreement. On the one hand, it rejected the idea of arbitrary annual limits on agricultural expenditure, since the facts of agricultural life defy such fine tuning (the weather and world markets, important determinants of spending, are still outside the control of forecasters and policy-makers); and it refused to enter into a debate on the absolute level of Community agricultural expenditure (running at about 0·5 per cent of the Community's gross national product, it is arguably not excessive). On the other hand, it accepted the need to regulate the rate of increase over a period of years. Thus, in the Mandate report it concluded that, if the agricultural guidelines were agreed by the Council, 'their application will mean that agricultural spending in the years ahead will grow less rapidly than the Community's own budgetary resources'. This formula was discussed, and nearly agreed, at the London summit of November 1981.

In January 1984, a fresh nuance was added. The idea of limits on agricultural expenditure was subsumed in a broader framework of improvements in discipline and procedures for managing all elements of the Community budget. The text on 'budgetary discipline' finally promulgated by the Commission in March 1984 included the following remarks on agriculture: 'The Commission will give the European Council an undertaking to adopt a qualitative guideline with respect to its own management, namely that the rate of growth of agricultural expenditure, as an average calculated over several years, is to remain below the rate of the growth of the Community's own resources . . . The Commission suggests that the European Council expressly request the Council to adopt the same qualitative guideline in the decisions falling within its competence.' Although the European Council of March 1984 did not ratify this text—indeed, it reached no formal agreement on anything—it did not dispute it; and it was implicitly agreed by the European Council at Fontainebleau in June 1984 that budgetary disciplines would be applied.

Meanwhile, on 31 March 1984 the Agriculture Council proceeded to adopt a reform package which already had financial implications for the CAP—and it was a package which did not include all the economy measures proposed. The Commission estimated that, far from staying within the limits of the 1984 budget of 16,500 million ECUs, the Council's decisions would add nearly 200 million ECUs to the budget. Moreover, it reckoned that, as a result of the deterioration of agricultural markets since the budget was drawn up, and because of the postponement of agricultural expenditure from 1983 to 1984, up to 2,000 million ECUs more would be needed in any case for 1984. Consequently, the Commission was obliged to

request additional finance, going even beyond the limits of the Community's normal resources, to cover the shortfall. The reluctance of the Council to accede to this request, and the resulting financial difficulties in which the CAP may find itself in the later months of 1984, assume a more immediate political significance than the longer-term guideline for expenditure over a period of years.

Conclusions

In the light of the above analysis, to what extent can it be said that the CAP has been reformed? Plainly it was not to be supposed that the European Community would, from one day to the next, abandon its existing agricultural policy in favour of another, based on different principles. Indeed, the Stuttgart summit of June 1983 gave instructions that the basic principles were to be preserved in keeping with the objectives of Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome. Nor should it be supposed that the decisions of the Council of 31 March 1984 have concluded the process of reform.[12] As the Commissioner for Agriculture, Poul Dalsager, said immediately after the decisions, 'it would be an illusion to suppose that our task is completed, but the Council's decisions have at last put the CAP on the right path'. What the decisions do represent is not merely a set of annual decisions, but the acceptance by the Council of three points which have longer-term implications. These three points are: the principle that agricultural guarantees can no longer be unlimited in nature; an effective control of milk production by means of quotas; and a restrictive price policy, including cuts in nominal price support for several products in several countries. It must also be remarked that, in addition to these concrete points, the atmosphere has been significantly changed. One example is linguistic. It is no exaggeration to say that the word 'reform' itself has now become acceptable to policy-makers and ministers of agriculture, whereas its use was previously reserved to hostile critics of the CAP. The need for change—and for *continued* change—is generally accepted.

What will be the pace and direction of that change? It is clear from what has already been said concerning the budgetary situation of the Community in 1984 that financial problems will oblige the Community to continue to adapt the agricultural market regulations. Grave problems exist in the beef, wine and olive oil sectors, where supply exceeds demand in the Community—and in the case of the last two products, the accession of Portugal and Spain will increase the difficulties. The potential for increased production of cereals is such that, unless the Community acts vigorously to balance the market through price policy, other measures will have to be considered. The farm price packages in coming years are likely to be at least as difficult politically as in 1984, unless some quite unexpected changes occur on world markets. The decision to increase the Community's budget resources, taken at the Fontainebleau summit in June 1984, will not relax the pressure on agricultural spending, for the CAP will have to compete with other developing Community policies for the new, and still limited, financial resources. As the Commission's Director-General for Agriculture, Claude Villain, put it: 'agriculture cannot expect to take an increasing share of public resources; in the rich sixties, we could perhaps afford that, but in the lean eighties, we cannot'.[13]

12. *The Common Agricultural Policy and the prospects for reform*, Agra Briefing No. 2 (Tunbridge Wells: Agra Europe, June 1984) describes the package as a 'partial reform'.
13. Speech at European Agricultural Outlook Conference, London, 8 Feb. 1984.

At the same time, the Community will have to beware of the risk of renationalization of agricultural spending. It would be a tragic paradox if curbs on the CAP, inspired by financial considerations, were to result in member governments going down the path of increased national subsidies. That is why the Commission has insisted on 'rationalization' rather than 'renationalization' of the agricultural policy. The social and economic objectives of the Community's member governments for their rural regions will continue to temper any purely budgetary approach.

Two factors will therefore be critical in the future long-term development of the policy. The first factor will be the capacity of the Community to develop other instruments within the framework of the CAP for assisting the incomes of the agricultural population, to complement the price and market policy. Measures of price policy, or limitation of guarantees, have little chance of continued application if the consequences for agricultural incomes become intolerable. Therefore, structural and other non-market measures in agriculture should become more important, and a more detailed analysis of the incomes of different categories of farmers will be necessary. The second factor will be the progress of other Community policies for the development of rural regions. That means not merely agricultural development, but attention to infrastructure in general and the development of sectors other than agriculture. The plans already launched for Integrated Mediterranean Programmes are an indicator of this movement, which will become indispensable with the arrival of Portugal and Spain. It is the recognition that agriculture must become more integrated into the overall economy, and that likewise the Common Agricultural Policy must find its place alongside other policies of the Community, that is the key to future changes. As Michel Rocard has put it: 'The CAP will remain at the centre of the European construction, but the benefits which it gives to farmers will perhaps no longer be so exclusive, so wonderful, and so unlimited, as in the past. What is needed now, if the European adventure is to continue, is for the construction of agricultural Europe to be accompanied by common policies in the fields of industry, money, research and even defence.'[14]

14. Interview in *Libération* (Paris), 9 April 1984.

Taking stock of the seven-power summits: two views

JOHN HUNT AND HENRY OWEN*

Hanging together: the seven-power summits. By Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne. London: Heinemann for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1984. 263pp. Index. £16.50.

1. JOHN HUNT

There have been ten seven-power summits, and although the results have sometimes seemed incommensurate with the attendant media ballyhoo, they have survived the departure from office of all the original participants and become part of the annual scene. This is therefore an appropriate moment to take stock of the summit's role, and both Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne deserve congratulations on their painstaking research in tracing the path to the 1984 London summit via Rambouillet, Puerto Rico, London, Bonn, Tokyo, Venice, Ottawa, Versailles and Williamsburg. They also offer interesting ideas about future summitry.

Hanging together is an absorbing book and should be required reading for all serious students of summitry. Joint authorship—division of work is a better phrase since some chapters are written by Putnam and some by Bayne and neither is bound by what the other has said—had two major advantages. First, it facilitated the wide range of interviews (nearly 300 in all) with former summit participants and close observers of summitry. Secondly, it brought different approaches to the subject. Putnam is an American political scientist interested more in the theoretical relationship of summitry to the international political economy. Bayne is a British diplomat interested more in the substantive issues discussed and in the lessons for future summits. Given this different background it is encouraging that they discovered 'remarkably few differences between us, either in interpretation or in assessment'. Nevertheless, differences of style constantly remind one of the author of each chapter and differences of emphasis do peep through.

As a serious attempt to piece together the story of the events surrounding previous summits it largely succeeds. It is not investigative journalism and there are no sensations or revelations. Equally, the authors clearly do their best to allow for the element of *ex post facto* rationalization that afflicts so many of us in describing our past actions. As the British sherpa for Rambouillet, Puerto Rico, London, Bonn and Tokyo I found nothing that greatly surprised me. Except perhaps for Tokyo—where Bayne acknowledges that 'reports of the proceedings are unusually confused and contradictory and the account which follows seeks to reconcile several mutually inconsistent stories'. The chaos and disarray in the first afternoon's discussion of energy was if anything even greater than Bayne says, but this was not the sherpas' fault. The OPEC decision to raise official oil prices by a further 25 per cent on top of the severe increases of the previous six months only became known that day; and in any case summit resistance to pre-cooked texts by officials was already growing. The trouble arose from the circulation of different texts by heads of government during the course of the meeting and the inability of the chair to concentrate attention on one of them as a basis for argument. Hence, the all-night sherpa session, given firm instructions to produce a single text as a basis for proper discussion. Nevertheless, I think the achievement of Tokyo was greater than is suggested. Admittedly, the decision about national oil import targets left some loose ends, and, admittedly, those targets were later seen to have been set

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too high to bite of themselves. The agreement about oil imports ought, however, to be seen in the context of the morning's macroeconomic discussion. The summit has reaffirmed the OECD view that governments should not 'accommodate' the earlier oil price increases, and when the news of the further 25 per cent increase arrived in Tokyo it resulted in a very significant strengthening of the leaders' determination about this. Under no circumstances would they spend their way out this time; or, as the Declaration put it more elegantly, 'attempts to compensate for the damage by matching income increases would simply add to inflation'. The rigour with which this deflationary policy was subsequently pursued was largely responsible for restraining demand, and consequently the requirements for imported energy fell short of the oil import targets. Thus, the success of Tokyo was at least as much in concerting macroeconomic policy generally as in setting national oil import targets. It also showed that the leaders are better at dealing with the broad thrust of policy than in settling the details of it.

The main theme of the book is, however, the contrast between what are called the 'Library Group' and the 'Trilateralist' attitudes to the summit. The original concept of the summit was that it should be small, informal, and private: and it was significant that of those at Rambouillet in 1975 Giscard, Schmidt and Shultz (the first American sherpa) had been founder members of the Library Group of Finance Ministers (later the Group of Five) which met informally in the margin of international monetary negotiations. Their desire to recreate at the highest level the same sort of direct and informal exchange was founded in the belief that progress might be made on some thorny issues if the leaders of the countries with the greatest economic influence could have an unfettered and private discussion away from the restraining and negative voices of officialdom and diplomacy. Hence their original insistence that the preparations should be confined to a single personal representative chosen by and working directly for the head of government concerned. They did not see the summit as a decision-taking body but as one which would work for broad political consensus, to be taken further in more formal and larger multilateral bodies. Despite resentment from those excluded, and concern from those who saw dangers in impromptu discussion at the highest level, Rambouillet was an undoubted success. Puerto Rico in 1976 attempted to preserve the same format but there was less substance to the discussions and already the bureaucracy was getting in on the act. The arrival of the Carter administration at the start of 1977 brought a quite different approach on the American side, dubbed 'Trilateralist' because a number of key posts in the administration were filled by people associated with the Trilateral Commission. They wished to reform the international processes to secure genuine international policy coordination involving the adoption of domestic economic policies which would mutually reinforce each other; and they believed the key to this was greater consultation between internationally-minded senior domestic (i.e. non-diplomat) officials. They believed the development of the sherpa group could be their main tool. Summits should be thoroughly prepared, should cover a wide field of interlocking policies, should be results-orientated and should have a mechanism for follow-up. The need for political will was recognized but the role of the summit should be to 'cap a process of intensive consultations among officials'. Inevitably, therefore, the sherpa group grew in size and was underpinned with other groups; and each sherpa came with his shopping list. The summit was well on the way to becoming institutionalized, although the Trilateralists always wanted summit preparations to be of a different character from normal international negotiations. Linkage and trade-offs were the order of the day. So were communiqué language and 'specifics'. This approach reached its apogee with the locomotive theory and the Bonn summit of 1978. Indeed there were even suggestions for a permanent summit secretariat.

Thereafter, reaction began to set in. The Bonn accords seemed less good in the light of hindsight. In most of the summit countries, demand management gave way to monetarism. The Trilateralists lost office in the United States. Summits no longer aimed at interlocking cooperative actions, but rather at mutual encouragement and support. Above all there was a determined attempt by the leaders to 'debureaucratize' the summit, which became less structured and less extensively prepared. By London in 1984 the wheel had almost turned full cycle.

This study of the ebb and flow between institutionalization and informality is both informative and interesting, but political theory cannot demonstrate that either approach is

right. As Bayne points out, 'a personal instrument like the summit will also change its nature as the participating leaders change', and there is no doubt that, for example, Reagan and Mrs Thatcher see the summit differently from Carter and Callaghan. This is a fact of life which theorists and officials have to live with. In this connection it is perhaps a pity that the authors felt they had to be discreet, not merely about the identity of their interlocutors, but also about the give and take in the summits themselves. A few anecdotes would not only have given greater colour to the book but would have shown how much personalities and personal relations—both at the top level and among the sherpas—can affect such a unique international forum.

Despite—or even because of—their occasional differences, it must be good that the leaders of the main democracies can meet regularly in circumstances where they feel comfortable with one another and can speak freely. The summit has notched up some significant achievements and, in particular, has been largely responsible for bringing Japan into much closer consultation with North America and Europe. It has been a flexible body and has spread in a somewhat make-shift way into the political and security fields. While there have been fruitful summits and some rather empty ones, the initial one at Rambouillet was arguably the most successful. Looking back over the last ten years and reflecting on the interesting analysis contained in this book, I would draw two main conclusions. The first is that the seven-power summit is different in kind from any other multilateral meeting by virtue of its regularity, its intimacy and the influence of its participants. It is not a suitable forum for detailed negotiations, and it would be unwise to expect concrete decisions from it. It can, however, give a quite special impetus to policies provided the leaders themselves are sufficiently engaged and believe the issues sufficiently important. Its role, then, is not so much to lift the wrangling of the bureaucracies to a superior level of argument, as to provide political will and direction. But such occasions for major summit initiatives will not occur at convenient annual intervals, and we must accustom ourselves to summits which are routine as well as those which show results. Hanging together needs regular contact as well as major initiatives. The second conclusion is to stress the limited time available for substantive discussion. There is seldom time to talk substantively about more than one or two subjects and an agenda overloaded by the sherpas to include everyone's shopping list is no help at all. It is essential to make the agenda broad and selective. For example, a single summit devoted to the problems of the developing world might make much more sense than touching briefly on this subject at annual intervals.

No doubt the balance of the argument lies somewhere between the Trilateralists and the Librarians, but personally I lean more towards the latter group. The Trilateralist approach was an ambitious one, but we are a long way from the concept of managing the world economy as a whole. In general, the special contribution and impetus which the summit can give is likely to be diminished by too much paper and too much official preparation, which cause both overload and frustration. Nevertheless, the summit must be more than a house-party. The most useful role that the sherpas can play is in identifying the one or two main themes on which a summit might give broad political direction, and the final chapter of this interesting book contains a number of important suggestions for this.

2. Henry Owen

Someone observed that economic summitry is like sexual intercourse; unless you've done it, it's pretty hard to describe. The two authors of *Hanging together: the seven-power summits* disprove this observation. Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne are largely innocent of direct experience with summitry. Yet they have written a book on the subject that is accurate and full of wisdom.

Economic summitry began in 1975 when French President Giscard d'Estaing invited the heads of government of the main industrial democracies to Rambouillet to deal with international economic problems. Although this was not intended to give rise to a series of annual meetings, it turned out that way when President Ford called a summit meeting at Puerto Rico in 1976 to promote his re-election. The meeting was ill-prepared and

accomplished little, but it did establish a precedent for annual economic summits which continues to this day.

The 1977 economic summit, held in London, pushed the Tokyo Round trade negotiations towards success, induced Japan and Germany to adopt modest stimulus measures, and helped Robert McNamara, the president of the World Bank, to secure needed replenishment pledges from the rich countries. This record was topped at the 1978 Bonn summit, where the United States decontrolled oil prices (arguably the single most important step taken by the industrial countries to address the world energy problem), which President Carter could only have done as part of an international economic bargain which also included stimulus and trade pledges from other countries. The 1979 and 1980 Tokyo and Venice summits pledged specific efforts to guarantee energy supply and conservation; but their impact on the world energy situation was dwarfed by the effects of the US price decontrol and the
1 subsequent world recession.

The 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984 summits at Ottawa, Versailles, Williamsburg and London respectively marked a break with the decision-making pattern established by the 1977–80 meetings. Mrs Thatcher, President Reagan, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand preferred intimate, free-flowing discussion which left them free to make economic decisions without undue pressure from other governments. These meetings were useful for the participants; it is not clear whether they influenced world economic prospects—although the London meeting is too recent to permit a confident judgement on this point.

In analysing the record of the ten economic summits, Messrs Putnam and Bayne focus on each of the main areas the summits have traditionally addressed: monetary policy, macroeconomic policy, trade, North–South affairs, and energy.

As the authors point out, only one of the summits took decisions on monetary policy: Rambouillet put the seal of approval on an agreement that had been worked out beforehand, in other forums, between French and American negotiators. The French withdrew their objections to adopting flexible exchange rates, and the Americans accepted (although they never achieved it) greater coordination of domestic economic policy with those of other countries. Other summits proved too brief, too highly publicized, and too politicized to deal with sensitive and technical monetary issues.

In reviewing the summits' record on macroeconomic policy, the authors tend to understate the extent to which German and Japanese stimulus actions were influenced by the 1977 London summit. But they do recognize the crucial role of later German (and, to a lesser extent, Japanese) stimulus commitments in making possible the 1978 Bonn bargain. Since then, they point out, national macroeconomic decisions have not been made at the summit—or in any other international forum. The current heads of government have convictions about national macroeconomic policy too strong to make international discussion of these policies very fruitful, except as an opportunity to exchange information about decisions that have already been taken. Macroeconomic decision-making will probably not again take place at a summit until the United States is willing to put the real issue in this field—its large structural budgetary deficit—on the bargaining table.

One of the summits' greatest but least celebrated triumphs has been in the trade policy field. Robert Strauss, the chief US trade negotiator, has said that without the 1977 and 1978 London and Bonn summit trade commitments, the Tokyo Round trade negotiations could not have achieved the deep, wide-ranging tariff cuts that were secured. The French, Italians, and British were in favour of a more modest agreement; without the push of the summits they might have had their way—or the disagreement might have produced a stalemate. The authors bring this out, although perhaps with less emphasis than is deserved.

The authors are implicitly critical of the summits' record in the North–South field. They point out that summits have made little contribution to North–South negotiations. This is the wrong measure. North–South negotiations are doomed to failure by the fact that the developing countries' spokesmen are compelled to ask for more than they can get—and to focus on areas of high visibility, such as commodity stabilization, instead of on critical trade and finance issues. But the summits, in contrast, have focused on these critical issues. They have encouraged increases in World Bank lending to developing countries, and a reduction in trade barriers to open the industrial countries' markets to imports—from developing countries, among others. If you look at the real world—that is, what happens to poor people in developing countries—rather than at the make-believe world of UN negotiations,

the economic summits did well. Robert McNamara has said that their endorsement of World Bank replenishment at a rate which permitted the Bank's lending to rise annually in real terms helped him greatly in the replenishment negotiations. Their effect on trade negotiations has already been described.

Energy, the fifth issue, was crucial at Bonn but now seems to have dropped out of summitry. Price changes and a world recession have brought energy demand and supply into reasonable balance. Only if a resumption of high growth in the industrial world or war in the Middle East threatens this balance is energy likely to return to the summit agenda.

After reviewing the summits' record, the authors turn to their future. They consider first the change that has taken place in summitry since 1980: the shift from intensely prepared decision-making summits to those which leave more opportunity for free-flowing discussion among the heads of government. While they acknowledge some advantages in this shift, the authors point out that summits are more likely to affect the world recovery if they do make decisions than if they don't, and that effective decision-making requires thorough preparation. They are surely right. Preparation is the job of the heads of governments' personal representatives. They need to involve the principal national ministries concerned; a summit secretariat would only get in the way.

The authors argue for focusing each future summit on a single issue. But while they may be right to suggest that some past summits were 'too cluttered', in that they dealt with too many issues, this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that addressing a single issue will suffice. In the present state of the world economy, a summit would be hard pressed to be effective and to ignore macroèconomic policy (the US budget deficit), the North–South issue (the need for strengthening the World Bank and the IMF in dealing with the international debt problem), or trade (pushing the new round of negotiations pledged at the recent London summit toward success). A package agreement, involving progress on several fronts, will be needed.

Messrs Putnam and Bayne consider the role that political issues should play at summits. They conclude that if the heads of government wish to address political issues, they should do so in a way which still leaves two full days over for the economic issues. These issues cannot be effectively addressed in a shorter period.

In conclusion, the authors offer what is perhaps their most striking comment: that the full potential of economic summitry has yet to be exploited. They are right. If the world economy is still in trouble, it is not because past summits went too far towards decision-making, but because they didn't go far enough. It is becoming increasingly apparent that threats to the prosperity of the summit countries can only be dealt with by international measures; and in certain key fields, agreement on these measures will only be achieved at the heads of government level. But the summits can only fulfil this role if the heads of government wish such major international agreement to happen. The current crop of leaders of the industrial countries do not now appear to do so. If change occurs, the United States will have to lead the way. It can do so only if it is prepared to commit itself to the drastic measures that the other summit countries wish it to take to reduce its budgetary deficit, in return for trade and macroeconomic policy concessions from other countries. Such a wide-ranging summit economic agreement would be an event of the greatest importance.

Messrs Putnam and Bayne have performed a great service in drawing attention to an institution that has done some good and could do a great deal more. Hopefully, their work will be widely read—and its lesson will be taken to heart.

US policy towards the Caribbean and Central America

George Abbott*

Grenada: revolution, invasion and aftermath. By Hugh O'Shaughnessy. London: Hamish Hamilton/*The Observer*. 1984. 258pp. Index. £12·95.

Grenada: whose freedom? London: Latin America Bureau. 1984. 128pp. Pb.: £2·95.

Guyana: fraudulent revolution. London: Latin America Bureau. 1984. 106pp. Pb.: £2·.95.

The crisis in Latin America: strategic, economic and political dimensions. Edited by Howard J. Wiarda. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 1984. 33pp. Pb.

The Caribbean challenge: US policy in a volatile region. Edited by H. Michael Erisman. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1984. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 208pp. Index. £19·75. Pb.: £9·75.

Inevitable revolutions: the United States in Central America. By Walter Lafeber. New York, London: Norton. 1984. 357pp. Index. £14·95; $22·95.

I

The tiny Caribbean island of Grenada made the international headlines in 1979 when Maurice Bishop deposed Eric Gairy in a bloodless coup. The shock waves which this coup set off reached as far as Washington. Among other things, they signalled the arrival of revolutions at an area which had traditionally been known for its political stability, parliamentary democracy and respect for the rule of law. Within the Caribbean itself, the revolution had an ambivalent effect on Grenada's neighbours, most of whom were fed up with Gairy's antics and would have welcomed a change of leader. They could not, however, condone the revolution, for a number of obvious reasons. Grenada thus became, and very much remained, a maverick within the region.

The overthrow of Gairy was generally welcomed by the majority of Grenadians, and for a time all went well for Bishop, who, by all accounts, was a very popular and charismatic leader. He seems, though, to have interpreted the general feeling of relief which Grenadians expressed at the removal of Gairy, and his own popularity with the masses, as a mandate for turning Grenada into a Marxist state, which is precisely what he set about doing. Over the next four years, he systematically dismantled all the forms and functions of parliamentary democracy and replaced them with the various trappings and bureaucratic functionaries of a Marxist state.

However, by October 1983, Grenada was back in the news. The revolution had turned on itself and destroyed its leader, or as one sympathetic observer put it, the revolution had imploded. What caused it to self-destruct and set off the train of events leading to the landing of American troops on the island is the subject of *Grenada: revolution, invasion and aftermath*, by Hugh O'Shaughnessy of *The Observer* staff.

Mr O'Shaughnessy was well placed to observe the dénouement of the revolution. He was there when the American troops landed and he remained on the island until they completed their mopping-up operations. He clearly felt he was on to something big, and being one of the first foreign correspondents on the scene, 'the scoop' was worth a book, a sort of instant replay of history in the making.

The book itself is written in a clear, pithy and journalistic style. It is interesting, and racy in spots, with a goodly sprinkling of local anecdotes, characters and incidents to capture the true essence of the Grenadian scene. In a word, it makes for good bedside reading. One rather gets the impression, though, that the author had something a bit more ambitious than a book at bedtime in mind. If that is so, then he has only himself to blame for a failure to use to the full the material at his disposal. There is in fact a vast difference between reporting events and analysing and identifying their wider significance. This author chose

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the former. He reports on the battle for Grenada, the course of the revolution, the split within the party, and offers a judgement on the events of those fateful days in October 1983. However, he wears his heart too openly on his sleeve, and allows his personal likes and dislikes to cloud his powers of reason and dispassionate analysis. He undoubtedly is sympathetic to Bishop, who was obviously a likeable personality. But was that enough to legitimize, let alone to run a revolution? Bernard Coard, Bishop's deputy, is a baddy. O'Shaughnessy does not actually characterize him as such, but this is clearly the tenor of his treatment of the split within the party. Coard is the guy who quietly plots and manoeuvres himself into a position to depose Bishop. When Bishop realizes the game is up, he plays his last card. He attempts to arm the masses to defend the revolution, or was it himself? Coard and his supporters, incidentally, claimed to be defending the revolution as well.

The reader needs to be led through this particular morass. He needs also to be told what actually went wrong with the revolution, apart from personal ambitions. Could it, for example, have succeeded? Otherwise, he cannot be blamed for concluding that it was not a revolution at all, but a sordid personal squabble which started between Gairy and Bishop and ended between Bishop and Coard. This puts an altogether different interpretation on the landing of American troops on the island. Was it an invasion or a rescue operation? Those who see it as an invasion and a violation of international law, and O'Shaughnessy is one of them, must also bring their respect for the sanctity of the rule of law to bear on the legitimacy of the revolution and all that was done in its name. This is not mere sophistry. It is the logical extension of their position.

The other book on Grenada asks the question *Whose freedom?*, which is a very good question indeed. Unfortunately, it makes no attempt to answer it. What it gives instead is a party political broadcast to the dispirited troops and abandoned partisans. It starts from the premise that the US invasion of Grenada was a flagrant violation of international law and an attempt to suppress the right of the Grenadian peoples to sovereignty. It considers the invasion was mounted because Grenada posed a threat to the United States in that it stubbornly remained independent and sought to develop its tiny society on its own terms. It also considers that the substantial advances made by the 1979 'peaceful revolution' were repugnant to Washington and the Thatcher government: all pretty strong stuff. Where, then, is the evidence, and who is making those claims?

The Latin America Bureau, under whose auspices this book appears, is an independent non-profit organization which was set up in 1977. It aims, through research, publications and publicity, to raise public awareness of social, economic, political and human rights issues in Latin America, especially in relation to European involvement in the region; to enlist the involvement of trade unions, political parties, churches and others in those issues; and to provide support for those in Latin America working against injustice and exploitation in their own countries. It can hardly claim, therefore, to be presenting a dispassionate view of events in Grenada. In fact, it covers virtually the same ground as O'Shaughnessy's book, but with a lot less flair and grace. It is riddled with inconsistencies and non sequiturs. For example, it accuses Gairy of failing to introduce any programmes for social reform and the restructuring of Grenadian society. At the same time, it accepts that Bishop's revolutionary government also failed to make an impact on the problem, though it does not say why. Its talk of substantial advances is clearly at odds with the facts. The main discussion within the party during the last days, weeks, months even, of its existence was of lack of progress and the deep crisis which existed between the party and the populace.

Guyana: fraudulent revolution is another of the Latin America Bureau Special Briefs. This one is aimed specifically at Forbes Burnham. It traces his rise to power, his consolidation of that power and the suppression of the opposition, and the establishment of a personalist and authoritarian regime. Again, the picture is painted in very stark terms. It talks of a gigantic fraud being perpetrated with violence against the people of Guyana and stresses the process of social disintegration which has taken place in Guyana since Burnham came to power. It has also enlisted the support of the Guyana Human Rights Association, which is no less caustic in its condemnation of Burnham. It holds him responsible for transforming Guyana from a country with much economic potential, cultural achievement and progressive politics into one of the most tension-ridden: desperate and repressive in terms of social decay and economic decline.

The three essays published in *Crisis in Latin America: strategic, economic and political dimensions* grew out of a conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute in December 1982. They highlight the difficulties which the US government faces in devising a coherent and realistic foreign policy strategy for Latin America. The reasons why this state of affairs exists range from too little regard for the history of the region to trying to impose solutions and managing, or stifling, change in Latin America.

Mark Falcoff, in his essay on 'Latin America as a military and strategic theater', argues that the United States has lost its capacity to influence decisively the course of events. One wonders about this, especially as he himself concludes that 'the US is still seen as immensely, indeed at times infinitely, powerful' (p. 8). Surely this says something about its capacity to influence events? In essence, the three essays call for greater understanding both in the United States and Latin America. Wiarda goes a bit further, and offers a 'prudence model' of US–Latin American policy which turns out to be nothing more than 'a reorientation of policy towards greater prudence, modesty, empathy and restraint in our attitudes and actions towards the area' (p. 30). Such a policy, he feels, makes good sense in the long run and is based on the new realities of Latin America and US relations with the region. One cannot help recalling President Carter's policy of high moralism and human rights, and the grief that came to.

Events are moving so fast in the Caribbean that it would be unwise, if not naive in the extreme, to base a policy on anything as nebulous and insubstantial as prudence and modesty. It would be equally unwise of the US government to pretend that nothing has changed, and that the good old Monroe Doctrine, for example, is alive and well. One needs a more realistic assessment of the challenge which US policy faces in the region, how it responds to these challenges, and, above all, an assessment of what actions, responses and initiatives the various countries in the region expect from the United States. *The Caribbean challenge: US policy in a volatile region* attempts to move in this direction, though, like the majority of books on this theme, it does not get around to answering the last question. What one does get, therefore, is an assessment of US policy based on Washington's perceptions of the region's needs and priorities and, most important of all, how these affect the United States' own national interests. The sort of questions one really needs to ask in order to provide the missing pieces of this massive jigsaw puzzle are, what exactly do the Caribbean countries want and expect of the United States? Do they look for a 'hands-off' policy, massive economic and military aid with no strings? If not, what are the alternatives?

The Caribbean challenge is a collection of essays which, with the exception of the final piece by Abraham Lowenthal, were presented at a convention of the Caribbean Studies Association in 1982. They concentrate on recent developments and, in particular, President Reagan's policy initiatives. In the opening chapter, Michael Erisman, the editor, spells out the contemporary challenges confronting US Caribbean policy. These are perceived basically as a number of dubious assumptions concerning, for example, the role of the Kremlin and the 'surrogate' thesis. The real challenges, as Erisman sees them, are developmental, and to do with the rise of nationalism. There follow three macroanalytical studies which deal, respectively, with the ideological and idiosyncratic aspects of US–Caribbean relations, the military and security dimensions, and the economic dimensions of American policy in the Caribbean. There are no surprises here, though Budhoo does make one serious factual error when he states that a colony was never intended to be self-sufficient (p. 73). Isn't he confusing mercantilism with self-sufficiency? The reason why there were no development schemes in the heyday of colonialism and economic liberalism was precisely that colonies were expected to finance their economic development from their own resources.

The latter half of the book is given over to case studies of US policy in Cuba, El Salvador, Mexico and Jamaica. The whole thing is tied together in a concluding chapter by Lowenthal on the insular Caribbean as a crucial test for US policy, making it, all in all, a useful little book, though one might have wished it were a bit more positive in its criticisms of American policy. There are, after all, no prizes for getting it right after the event. Perhaps, too, if the authors of the respective pieces had stood back a bit from the immediate events and taken the long view they might have got a better feel for the problems. This particular saga has been going on for a very long time.

This is what the author of *Inevitable revolutions: the United States in Central America* has in fact done. Walter Lafeber takes the long view, and surveys the whole gamut of

American policy, stretching back to the days of Jefferson, in this sensitive and very volatile region. He spares no details, and highlights the inconsistencies, policy reversals and dead ends which US policy has experienced in this part of the world. He also incorporates the local dimensions of the problems: the extent to which local politicians, dictators, the military and other vested interest groups have conspired to frustrate the more positive aspects of US policy—social progress, land reform, for example. He shows, too, how US security and commercial interests have created a system of dependency in these republics. In other words, he tells the whole story, warts and all, which is why it makes such fascinating and compelling reading.

The basic dilemma facing the United States is that its need for peace, political stability and national security on its southern flank requires it to support military regimes and authoritarian rulers who then use their position not only to consolidate their hold on the country but also to enrich themselves. The United States is then blamed for 'backing the wrong horse'. But if the right horse did ever emerge on the local scene, Congress would probably not back it. So the circle continues, and each President in turn gets bogged down in a battle he cannot win. Walter Lafeber writes with feeling and authority on these matters.

Book reviews

Chatham House books

The uneasy relationship: Britain and South Africa. By James Barber. London: Heinemann for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 142pp. Index. £13·50.

THE role the British connection has played in the domestic debate of South African politics has been well documented in scholarly work on the Republic's foreign policy during the last two decades. By contrast, our understanding of South Africa's significance for the conduct and formulation of British domestic and foreign policy has been less well served, and this is especially true of the role that pressure groups, for example, have played in determining the scope and substance of British relations with South Africa.

Dr Barber's book is therefore welcome. It is a serious and relatively detached attempt to fill an important gap in a literature which is often partisan and unhelpful to those with the responsibility for making policy on the South African issue. This is particularly so in the sphere of economic relations with a state which—probably more than any other—arouses such passionate and contradictory feelings. Dr Barber is concerned to demonstrate that there is 'justification for the amount of attention that is given to South Africa . . .' (p. 1). By looking closely at the international environment in which Britain has to operate, the economic stakes involved and the variety of pressure groups concerned, he shows with skill and perception how Britain has continued to retain its ties with the Republic but 'tries to keep the relationship at arm's length' (p. 5).

The chapter on British economic interests in South Africa is revealing in its analysis of the conflicting views of both professional economists and antagonistic pressure groups on the 'strength of the South African economy, and how it responds to broader economic and political developments' (p. 26). The implications of this debate for trade, investment, banking and mineral imports are explored in illuminating detail while the difficulties involved in evaluating the British economic stake are stressed. In particular, he notes the problems facing the analyst in search of objective judgements, 'both about the relative importance of different aspects of the economic relationship, and about the emphasis that is placed on economic aims in relation to others' (p. 39).

Perhaps the most original aspect of Dr Barber's analysis is that dealing with the ideological conflict with Britain over the moral and political status to be accorded a state so peculiarly placed as South Africa. He identifies three strands of opinion: 'conservative', 'liberal', and 'radical'; each is dissected in turn with the author concluding that 'the debate about South Africa [has become] a touchstone of broader political commitments—an indicator of where an individual or a group stands on a range of social issues' (p. 46). There follows an account of the role played by the media and an outline of the attitudes of the political parties. Dr Barber points to the paradox that 'although South Africa is frequently a topic of attention for the parties—reflecting the conflict of values and the media coverage—it has not been an election issue' (p. 50). And this despite the activities of a variety of pressure groups concerned with the South African issue, the nature and performance of which Dr Barber discusses in convincing and helpful detail.

The book concludes with a discussion of the role of decision-makers (politicians as well as civil servants) in policy-making towards the Republic, and the argument does much to explain British hesitancy and ambivalence on the question of relations with South Africa. Finally, an appendix prepared by Christopher Hill examines French and West German relations with South Africa, and this, too, provides data of a kind not easily found elsewhere.

In short, this is a valuable study, and an important monograph of the sort required to help us understand British foreign policy in general by concentrating in detail on one important, if hitherto neglected, area.

University of Leicester J. E. SPENCE

The troubled alliance: Atlantic relations in the 1980s. Edited by Lawrence Freedman. London: Heinemann for National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Policy Studies Institute and Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 170pp. Index. (Joint Studies in Public Policy No. 8.) £16·50. Pb.: £6·50.

NOT only a troubled alliance, but a troubled book. It consists of the papers presented at a small conference on US–European relations held at Chatham House in June 1983, papers

subsequently amended in the light of the two-day debate they engendered. They fall into three groups: the perceptions of the United States and Europe in regard to each other over the postwar period, the economic dimensions of the alliance and, of course, the security dimension. The most satisfying group is the first: David Calleo and David Watt both look back to 1945 and, without in any way indulging in NATO-speak, leave the reader with a sense of assurance. While Catherine McArdle Kelleher uses words where statistics would be more appropriate to describe her analysis of opinion polls, essentially she reinforces the soothing attempts of her colleagues to put current malaises into perspective. The last group has Josef Joffe asking whether Europe can live with its defence, and Peter Foot relating Western security to that of the Third World. For the man on the Clapham omnibus, their essays raise troubling issues; but not as troubling as those raised in the middle section. Here Stephen Woolcock on Atlantic trade relations and, especially, Andrew Britton on world finance and national monetary problems are frankly disturbing, not least because to the non-specialist the issues they raise seem so very technical. John Pinder on interdependence is more comprehensible in spite of the intangible nature of his theme.

Which prompts the reflection that what may be both stimulating and illuminating to a small group of specialists risks being considered slight when read in cold print by the uninvited savant, and arcane by those who never attend small-scale conferences at all. This sounds unfair and may be unjust: *quand un vicomte rencontre un autre vicomte, qu'est-ce qu'ils se racontent? Des histoires de vicomte.* And when one has gone to the trouble of mounting a conference, the pressure to publish is readily understandable. Nevertheless, the fact that the most satisfying part of this particular publication is that which looks at the past rather than the present suggests that its value lies in what it lays down for future commentators. Certainly at the end of the 1980s it will be interesting to have such an account of the problems as seen early on in the decade.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

Islam in foreign policy. Edited by Adeed Dawisha. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 191pp. Index. £17·50. $24.95.

THIS volume is a collection of papers presented in 1982 to a Chatham House conference concerned with the possible repercussions of the fundamentalist power-seizure in Iran.

The Qur'an bids Muslims form a community transcending tribe and nation. Muslim public opinion everywhere demands friendly relations with other Muslim states and support for wronged Muslim peoples, above all for the Palestinians (less so for the Afghans, and still less so for the Kashmiris). In the Arab countries, aspirations for Muslim solidarity and Arab unity are often intermingled. Although relations with non-Muslim states generally have greater practical importance—for example for trade and for arms procurement—economic ties between Muslim states have in recent years been considerably strengthened by investment and migration, made possible through oil wealth. And although there are some real grounds for dispute between Muslim states, for instance over territorial and river problems, most of these could be solved with a modicum of good will.

As A. Hourani observes, the popular desire for Muslim solidarity and Arab unity can be a factor for peace, in so far as it is a constraint on Muslim rulers, but can also be a source of conflict. A Muslim ruler with radical ambitions normally adduces Qur'anic justification for his policies and seeks popular legitimation not only in his own but in other Muslim or Arab countries; he therefore works for the overthrow of other Muslim rulers whose policies differ from his own.

Anyway, Iraq is at war with Iran, Algeria and Libya wage a proxy war against Morocco, and Libya has made attacks on the Sudan and Tunisia. The Egypt–Syria, Egypt–Yaman, and Pakistan–East Bengal unions broke up. Jamal Abd al-Nasir plotted assassination attempts against Nuri al-Sa'id and King Sa'ud, and the example has been followed. Between 1958 and 1975, most of Iraq's rulers harboured and helped Iranian revolutionaries, and the Iranian government retaliated by giving aid to Iraqi Kurdish rebels.

The papers in this volume are on methodology by A. Dawisha, Iran by R. K. Ramazani, Saudi Arabia by J. P. Piscatori, Libya by B. Scarcia Amoretti, Pakistan by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Egypt by A. E. Hillal Dessouki, Morocco by I. W. Zartman, Iraq by A. Dawisha,

Nigeria by S. C. Nolutshungu, Indonesia by M. Leifer, and the Soviet Union by Karen Dawisha and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, with a conclusion by A. Hourani. The upshot is that the Islamic nuance of each state's foreign policy depends primarily on the nature of the Muslim factor in its internal politics. Hourani points out that technocrats and military officers generally play a key role and are not inclined to fundamentalism. (Those who remain in Iran are apparently still needed to keep the machine running.)

All the articles are valuable. Only a few points can be raised here. A. Dawisha notes that the secular Arab nationalist ideology of Saddam Hussain is meant to appeal equally to Iraq's Sunni and Shiite Arabs; also that under the pressure of the war with Iran, a combined appeal to religious and national feeling is now being attempted, for instance by emphasizing that Ali and Hussain were Arabs. He thinks that Khomeini's call for Islamic revolution in Iraq made the war inevitable (p. 122), but does not mention that Saddam Hussain initially declared the war's purpose to be liberation of the Arabs of Khuzistan (regardless of the fact that these Arabs are a minority and much intermixed with the Iranian element in the highly urbanized province). By so doing, Saddam united pro- and anti-Khomeini Iranians in defence of their fatherland during the first phase of the war.

Anwar al-Sadat, once a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, frequently used Islamic language but decided to make peace with Israel and to arrest leaders of militant Muslim groups as well as the Coptic Patriarch. A. E. H. Dessouki dismisses the Islamic language as window-dressing, but does not discuss two of the probable reasons for the decisions: namely to relieve Egypt's economy of the war burden and to stop militant anti-Copt agitation from damaging Egypt's national unity.

After the break-up in 1971, Pakistan might have been expected to find a new unity as an Indus valley state, but under Zia it has moved towards a greater Islamic emphasis. Shirin Tahir-Kheli does not consider whether fear of Sindhi, Pathan, and Baluchi particularism helped to prompt this move.

M. Leifer notes that national unity has been the basic concern of all Indonesian regimes. In addition to the diversity of the islands, there is a great difference between the syncretistic culture of Central and East Java and the more purely Islamic culture prevalent in certain other regions and among the merchant or shopkeeping class (once represented by the Sarekat Islam and Masyumi parties). Suharto, like Sukarno, is Javanese. The Panca Sila, which acknowledge God but specify no religion, remain the official ideology. After national unity, the Suharto regime's main concern has been economic development. A wide range of modern industries has been established with the help of foreign investment and expertise, and work has been found thereby for large numbers of people. Islamic emphasis in either home or foreign policy is avoided for fear that it might cause internal dissension or upset the Japanese, American, and European economic partners. Leifer thinks that the economic development has brought few benefits to the Muslim merchant class and that 'Islam in Indonesia has become a bitter, beleaguered force with a sense of denial of rightful political entitlement' (p. 157).

In the paper on the Soviet Union, policy aims since the invasion of Afghanistan are identified as the prevention of unrest in Central Asia and Caucasia, exploitation of anti-Western feeling in Muslim countries, and presentation of Central Asia and Caucasia as development models for Muslim countries. Karen Dawisha and Mme Carrère d'Encausse find these aims mutually inconsistent and potentially risky.

There are misprints: al-Jujurat [Hujurat] (p. 24); rigidly [rapidly] expanding (p. 30); Qa'ba (p. 86); Qaddisiya (p. 122 and *passim*); Baqr [Baqir] (p. 124); Ulamma (p. 147); Soviet Cultural [Central] Asia (p. 162); hypocracy (p. 171). Abbas (brother of Hussain) was not an Imam (p. 125).

F. R. C. Bagley

International relations and organizations

On duty: a Canadian at the making of the United Nations, 1945–1946. By Escott Reid. Toronto: McLelland and Stewart. 1983. 181pp. Index. $16·95.

Mr Escott Reid was one of a group of brilliant and dedicated young men and women who came into the Canadian Foreign Service during and after the Second World War under

the leadership of four remarkable men: Norman Robertson, Mike Pearson, Hume Wrong and Dana Wilgress. They created one of the best foreign services in the world. In this book, which describes Mr Escott Reid's experience as a middle-ranking official at the San Francisco Conference which drew up the United Nations Charter and established the UN, at the Preparatory Commission and its predecessor, the Executive Committee, and, finally, at the first General Assembly, he illustrates those qualities of hard work, sound judgement, idealism and intelligence which characterized that service.

The book is largely compiled from extracts from letters to his wife interspersed with comment and memorandums written at the time. The technique has its advantages in giving a sense of immediacy and reflecting the atmosphere of the time, but many of the personal details which would be interesting to one's wife at the time tend forty years later to interrupt what might be called the narrative. And the author is very conscious of how right he always was.

Nevertheless, the book gives a good picture of the intense and exhausting grind required to produce first a charter and then the operating procedures to enable that charter to work. Every step had to be fought against unrelenting, and usually unreasoning, Soviet opposition, with other powers putting in their oars from time to time. It became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union was not interested in the United Nations except as a vehicle for promoting narrow Soviet interests. A UN and a Secretary General capable of independent action was not acceptable. This is still true forty years on.

Mr Escott Reid was a fine technician and thanks to the work that he and his colleagues like Sir Kenneth Bailey and Mr Hasluck of Australia put in, the UN is better than it might have been as an instrument and in its English language. But, alas, many of the problems he grappled with are no nearer solution—indeed they are further from it—than in those early days: questions of equitable geographical representation over against competence in the appointment of committee chairmen and officials, independence for the Secretary General, weighted voting. All admirable ideas but impracticable for reasons of politics and human nature.

Mr Escott Reid was an idealist and, like all idealists, he was bound to be disappointed. He was up against the Soviet Union, the other powers, his own government, even some of his own colleagues. In the crunch, the techniques, the questions of drafting, of rules of procedure and such like, important though they were for the effective working of the UN had to take second place to power and politics.

COLIN CROWE

Politics and process in the specialized agencies of the United Nations. By Houshang Ameri. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1982. 284pp. Index. £18·50.

THE specialized agencies, that bewildering range of acronyms like WHO, ILO, FAO and UNESCO, play important social, economic, humanitarian, technical, administrative and political roles in international relations. Yet they seldom receive widespread publicity in the United Kingdom or the broad scholarly treatment that would make them attractive to undergraduate study or to the publishers' elusive general reader. There are of course exceptions: Evan Luard's *International agencies* and Cox and Jacobson's *Anatomy of influence* are important studies; but generally there is a paucity of good material in this area. It was hoped, therefore, that Mr Ameri's interpretative essay might fill an important gap: a reasonably brief, general text on the origins, evolution and workings of the specialized agencies.

The picture, however, is mixed. The first section, which explores the nature of the agencies, their functions, institutional structures, problems of coordination and 'empire-building' and their web of relations with the United Nations, still bears the hallmarks of the lectures Mr Ameri once delivered at the University of Tehran.

The second and third parts are more interesting and substantial. They are based on primary and secondary sources and interviews with delegates and Secretariat officials. Mr Ameri considers the general attitudes of the underdeveloped countries and of the United

States and the Soviet Union towards the agencies; and in two cases he studies their specific attitudes towards and their behaviour in the International Labour Organization and the International Monetary Fund.

He makes useful points about some of the defects in functionalist thinking, about the range of actors and factors that influence institutional decision-making and about the United States' sensitivity to politicization in the agencies. He attributes politicization—the prominence given to controversial political items rather than to functional tasks, which varies from agency to agency—to ideological disputes between important members and groupings, to the UN's inability to solve intractable political problems, to the importation of the group voting system into agency decision-making, to the different degrees of technical proficiency among delegates, to the degree of specificity of an agency's tasks, and to the different skills of secretariats in containing or deflecting the intrusion of political issues.

But even these two sections are not free from defect. There is a surfeit of extensive quotations; excessive summaries of the work of authors, and in the analysis of the Soviet attitude, an absence of contemporary material. Although there are parts of this book that will be useful to students, regrettably there is little that will be of interest to the specialist.

University of Lancaster DAVID TRAVERS

Defence and disarmament

Russia, America, the bomb and the fall of Western Europe. By Brian May. London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1984. 248pp. Index. £11·95.

ANY book by a liberal Western European which can praise the ailing Leonid Brezhnev's allusions to spiritual life, his exhortations to make work more creative, and his aspirations for a better type of man (p. 225) is singular to say the least. Not that Brian May, a sometime foreign correspondent, is a public relations officer for the Politburo. Far from it. He is in fact an ardent European, although a very disappointed one to date. What he wants is for Western Europe to 'show the way forward' to both superpowers by developing a 'new socio-economic structure with a moral foundation'. Rejecting consumerism, and most other habits of our time, May looks forward to the emergence of a new breed of 'philosopher kings' who will free us from our predicaments by taking the first steps towards creating a new civilization. The source of this inspiration, he believes, will be found in the Green movement and in the anti-nuclear sections of our churches. The bomb is central to his thesis. He believes that the weapon which threatens to destroy whatever degree of civilization we enjoy also provides the challenge which could lead to an evolutionary shift in our civilization. The moral force that would be strong enough to abolish the bomb would also be strong enough to inspire the serious tackling of the many other problems with which Europe is confronted (pp. 221–6).

In May's opinion, Western Europe is threatened more by disintegration than by aggression, and is imperilled rather than protected by its alliance with the United States. He argues that the United States is not fit to lead the Western alliance, and that it should have been allowed to do so indicates the depth of the decline of Western Europe (p. 22). Both superpowers, he argues, are guilty of anachronistic thinking: they are trying to answer tomorrow's problems with yesterday's solutions, and these solutions threaten us with nuclear catastrophe. If this is to be avoided, May insists that what he calls the 'old order' has to go, as well as nuclear weapons. The challenge for the future will have to be answered, if anywhere, in Western Europe. Nuclear weapons cannot save us, he argues: what is needed is 'nothing less than a regeneration of the socially creative spirit that, virtually in a single bound, set it [Western Europe] apart from the rest of the world only a few centuries ago' (p. 3). If Western Europe is to survive, May believes that it must change its ways and find the moral strength to stand on its own two feet.

Whatever one thinks of May's overall thesis, which is based on an uncritical Toynbeean view of history, much of this book is unsatisfactory, if not downright cranky, from the

viewpoint of the serious student of world affairs. The author makes his mind up too readily on complex issues, he does not go into counterarguments, and he appeals too readily to a few convenient authorities. But alongside the superficial judgements there is also some sensible stuff. Such a mixture of results is hardly surprising in a book whose subject matter is as varied as its title is rambling. Brian May has written an ambitious book. He has attempted to step out of history and produce an integrated thesis about the state of our world and how to change it. Its scope is therefore a novelty when compared with the narrowly-focused literature with which the international relations specialist is normally confronted. Undoubtedly this book will infuriate most readers at some point, for reasons either of its scope or its substance, but May is to be congratulated for his brave decision to jump where few academics would tread. What is more, by so doing, and trying to clear his own mind about the biggest questions of the day, he should provoke his readers into trying to clear their own.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

Nuclear war and nuclear peace. By Gerald Segal, Edwina Moreton, Lawrence Freedman and John Baylis. London: Macmillan. 1983. 162pp. Index. £17·50. Pb.: £5·95.

THE debate over nuclear weapons in the early 1980s brought forth a vast outpouring of books and pamphlets. Inevitably much of the argument was polemical. Furthermore, the protagonists often talked past one another. The disarmers emphasized the dangers from nuclear weapons, while government spokesmen responded by reiterating familiar arguments about the threat posed by the Soviet Union. As a result, the debate, in certain respects at least, was rather sterile. This is not to deny that there were valuable contributions from both sides to our understanding of deterrence and its dangers. The analyses of Dan Smith, for example, combine a passionate concern for peace and disarmament with shrewd insights into the deterrence system and its operation. The authors of *Nuclear war and nuclear peace* offer an equally illuminating study, albeit from a different vantage point. Although there are differences of emphasis and nuance among the four authors, they all belong to a school of thought which combines a pragmatic realism and acceptance of the major features of the deterrence system with a concern to ensure that the system is as safe as possible. If the book can be criticized, it is because there is a tendency in places to err on the side of complacency (as, for example, in the argument that weapons are simply a symptom of political differences rather than a cause of conflict—a thesis which ignores the way in which the deployment of new weapon systems by both blocs can exacerbate tension). Nevertheless, this is a sober and knowledgeable treatment which, for the most part, avoids the excesses of alarmism on the one side and indifference to danger on the other.

The individual essays are uniformly good. Gerald Segal offers a balanced appraisal of the Soviet threat, suggesting that although it has to be taken seriously Moscow and the Western powers nevertheless have a common interest in ensuring that their competition is regulated and controlled. This theme is further developed by Edwina Moreton, who not only examines the arms control experience of the 1970s in a manner which highlights both achievements and pitfalls, but also suggests ways in which the process might be reinvigorated. Lawrence Freedman's chapter, dealing with the specific problems of European security, adopts a similar approach, combining a historical survey of NATO strategy with proposals for reducing the dependence of the Atlantic alliance on the early first use of nuclear weapons. During the course of the chapter Freedman also attacks some of the more far-reaching schemes for European nuclear disarmament. Although the analysis takes on a somewhat strident tone at times the author's critique of the assumptions underlying many of the proposals put forward by the peace movement is both penetrating and persuasive. The chapter by John Baylis has a more sedate quality but offers an equally illuminating and useful presentation of the arguments for and against British retention of a strategic deterrent. Although Baylis accepts that at least some of the rationales offered for a UK deterrent have a certain validity, he also casts doubt on Trident as the most appropriate replacement for Polaris. In a sense this sums up the book. While its acceptance of the main features of nuclear deterrence makes it unpalatable to the disarmers, President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher would find parts of it almost equally distasteful. This is to the credit of the authors, who reject both E. P. Thompson's 'logic of exterminism' and the simple platitudes offered by

governments. As a result, their analysis is not a particularly comforting one, identifying as it does many of the enduring dilemmas of the nuclear age. But it is precisely because of this that *Nuclear war and nuclear peace* will still repay attention when many of the other contributions to the nuclear debate have become irrelevant.

Chatham House PHIL WILLIAMS

Nuclear strategy and strategic planning. By Colin S. Gray. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 1984. 130pp. Index. Pb.: $5·95.

HEAVEN forbid the day when Colin Gray wires himself up to a word processor. Already, like many of my colleagues in strategic studies, I seem to spend more time keeping up with Gray's phenomenal output than I do anybody else's, or preparing my own. The trouble is, whether or not one agrees with what he writes, it is always challenging.

Gray's aim in this study is to 'shed light' on the realities of strategic planning and on the range of choice over nuclear strategy which is 'theoretically' available. Densely packed, tough-minded and logical, the monograph rewards careful reading. Gray forces one to confront one's own ideas and attitudes with more rigour than one otherwise might. He is particularly scornful of those who purport to think about nuclear strategy but who only wring their hands and say that we have a problem, and do not commit themselves to making the hard choices which planners face daily. The ultimate test of one's seriousness, in Gray's opinion, is targeting. How should we (and 'we' means Americans) fight a nuclear war if deterrence fails?

Gray's own views on this matter are well known, and this study breaks no new ground. Attempting to bring strategy back to first principles and encourage Americans to think strategically, he argues that war planning must be guided by a 'theory of victory' (p. 18). He dubs his strategy 'damage limitation for deterrence and coercion', and describes it as an evolution of the current US posture. It offers, he argues, 'a multifaceted homeland defense' capability and an ability not only for deterrence, but also 'compellence', to discourage 'adventure and risk-taking' on the Soviet part (p. 79). This strategy, Gray believes, meets some of the more telling charges which can be levelled against current US defence policy, which he awkwardly labels a strategy of 'counterforce and countercontrol preeminence with recovery denial'. This posture has been on the right lines under the Reagan administration, in his opinion, but has not gone far enough.

Gray examines three other theoretical options for the United States, but considers them neither desirable nor feasible. One is the old idea of 'mutual assured vulnerability', which he shows has always been more important in public debate than in US war plans. This is followed by 'mutual assured vulnerability with targeting flexibility'—'the thinking person's version' of mutual assured vulnerability. The final option is 'damage limitation with defense dominance', the idea associated with Donald Brennan. Gray sympathizes with the motives of those who favour this option, and has an open mind about its technical feasibility and strategic desirability; but as of the 1980s he believes that there are still some major questions to ask about it (pp. 81–92).

Gray submits all these options to searching analysis, and this forms the core of the monograph. In the process he offers many robust points and sophisticated arguments. Gray rightly reminds his readers that there are no easy ways out of our predicament. Unlike some of his critics, I understand and respect his arguments, while remaining unconvinced that his prescriptions offer any way out. The trouble with his own approach is that he has the vice of his virtues. In trying to combat all the admitted weaknesses of other ways of thinking about strategy, in trying to overcome the American failure to think strategically, in trying to fight the woolly-minded, in doing battle against the disinclination of academic strategists to contemplate operational strategy, and in rejecting those whose minds have been turned too much by the novelty of the nuclear predicament, Colin Gray now tends to think too strategically. He places too much emphasis on the military contribution to security, and upon the operational dimension of strategy. Furthermore, he risks becoming too tough-minded (in offhandedly arguing that 'catastrophe can come in different sizes', he sounds suspiciously like somebody who has accommodated nuclear war into his norms of international politics).

The irony revealed in this monograph is that its author has become too much of a 'classical' strategist. In a narrowly strategic sense Colin Gray has earned the right to be called the 'Clausewitz' of our time. But is this the age of Clausewitz? Would Clausewitz himself be Clausewitzian?

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

Nuclear weapons in Europe. Edited by Andrew J. Pierre. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1984. 118pp. Pb.

Nuclear weapons and European security. Edited by Robert Nurick. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1984. 142pp. Index. £13·95.

EACH of these two books consists of several essays written from different viewpoints. This treatment, appropriate to such a controversial subject, works well in conference or seminar when the speakers stay to discuss each other's contentions. In book form it can require some firm editorial direction, especially so when the various contributions were written at different times and places. In this respect the reader has been better served by the Council on Foreign Relations of New York than by the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London.

Nuclear weapons in Europe is in any case a new work and therefore deserves the lion's share of this review. It is the first volume in a programme sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, whose chairman is Cyrus Vance. He explains that the series will aim to identify and clarify the issues 'most likely to create friction' in the European–American relationship (p. iii). The subject clearly meets this criterion and is entrusted to two Americans—William Hyland, who worked for Henry Kissinger in and out of government, and Paul Warnke, President Carter's chief arms control negotiator—and to Lawrence Freedman of Britain and Karsten Voigt of West Germany's Social Democratic Party.

Hyland, whose views are closest to those of the Reagan administration, is the most critical of European attitudes. He tends to assume that there is a predominant European view on nuclear weapons, that represented by Voigt and many on the political left: an over-simplification of the problem which does not make it easier to find solutions. But he makes telling points about the serious split between Europe and the United States over the role of arms control; the Europeans generally attach more importance to it but, without an obvious part to play in a field dominated by the superpowers, are liable to be left stranded by Washington's policy changes. Voigt makes a strong case for detente and advocates as a long-term objective the replacing of deterrence by a 'security partnership' between East and West. Freedman takes a more pragmatic view of the basic issues. He is clear that the American nuclear guarantee is central to Europe's security, and believes the concern of some Americans about European attitudes is excessive. Warnke comes closer to Voigt, notably in his criticism that cruise and Pershing II deployments were not militarily justified and, if anything, detracted from the aim of 'coupling' the United States more closely to Europe's defence.

All four writers search for a 'rationale' for the missile deployments. None claims that there was a really convincing military necessity, although Freedman suggests that Soviet anxiety about the weapons indicates that they may be making a useful contribution to deterrence. There is general agreement that the weapons' significance is mainly political, and that their importance for Western security has been over-dramatized. Among other conclusions agreed upon are the desirability of merging future negotiations about strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons, and the necessity for NATO to build up its conventional strength and reduce its battlefield nuclear weapons.

The editor, Andrew Pierre, contributes an introduction amounting to more than a tenth of the book. He briefly sets the debate in context as things stood at the end of 1983, offers an agenda of 'fundamental questions which badly need to be re-examined by NATO governments and their concerned citizenry' (p. 2), and provides a useful summary of the arguments of the four authors which actually encourages one to read them in full. Altogether, readable and stimulating.

Nuclear weapons and European security consists of five essays published by the IISS at intervals between spring 1980 and summer 1982. Peter Nailor and Jonathan Alford, writing on 'The future of Britain's deterrent force', came down against the expected choice of

Trident, which duly followed a few months later. Their cool analysis is still well worth reading, although many of their assumptions, such as impending ratification of SALT II, have since gone by the board.

Gregory Treverton's mid-1981 essay covers ground similar to the Council on Foreign Relations volume. He provides a convincing assessment of likely Soviet objectives and strategy. The longest and most recent contribution (mid-1982) is by Anthony Cordesman, dealing with the concept of extended deterrence and related US weapon programmes, with emphasis on 'worst case scenarios' and 'escalation domination'. A 1981 piece by Christopher Makins has some sensible things to say about cruise and Pershing II.

This book also includes a short essay by a senior French official, François de Rose. He hints at a need for closer integration of French defence policy with that of its allies but, like most of his countrymen, has no doubts about the importance of the French nuclear forces. (Cordesman is brave enough to challenge that view explicitly, although most writers in both these books handle the British and French nuclear deterrents with a delicate touch indeed).

This volume is surely a case where the IISS could usefully have given their well-qualified editor more scope. The five essays are of durable quality and justify their republication in one volume. But the only new material is a short introduction and an index. Otherwise, we have exact reproductions of the originals, mostly reduced to a smaller size of print with misprints, admittedly few, intact. The de Rose essay has been left in an obviously rather crude translation, and we are given no help with his 1981 complaint about 'recent statements by President Reagan' (p. 125): just one illustration of the need to set such studies clearly in their historical context. The subject matter has, to say the least, been somewhat affected by events over the last few years.

JOHN EDMONDS

Future war: armed conflict in the next decade. Edited by Frank Barnaby. London: Michael Joseph. 1984. 192pp. Index. £9·95.

FRANK BARNABY, although the editor of this book, has been responsible for, or had a direct hand in, nine of the fifteen chapters. The six remaining have been on topics related to modern war fighting techniques or preparation, subject areas where he has, presumably, felt less competent. These in turn have been written, in all but two instances, by journalists, a fact which serves as an indicator of the thrust of the book and its target readership.

It is in no way the intention here to deprecate the contribution of journalists to our understanding and analysis of contemporary strategic and defence issues—indeed Andrew Wilson, one of the contributors, by way of example performed an invaluable service with his powerful study of *Wargaming* (London: Penguin, 1970)—and they have done much to cut through the fat and obfuscation of military and strategic gobbledygook. But in making the issues and the problems intelligible to the layman, much of importance by way of sober synthesis and judgement and serious questioning of assumptions and analysis becomes either diluted or distorted. The non-specialist or concerned layman generally requires categorical statements expressed simply and clearly; journalists have the professional skills to meet this need, and this is precisely what has been done in *Future war*.

To some extent the book comes within the genre of Professor Lawrence Martin's earlier volume *Arms and strategy* (New York: McKay, 1975) though it is not as outwardly impressive on the coffee table. Inside, it is replete with photographs, tables and diagrams, and for quick referral to the instant (lay) pundit it will have considerable though relatively short-term value; it will afford a good return on investment in providing a quick, easily recallable, handle to the main artefacts of modern warfare, in all its many guises.

In this, the book is good on major weapons, technologies, and techniques though the real pundit will find, even here, the tendency to overgeneralization a source of irritation. It is less good when the questions are of a more fundamental sort—why do we have wars? Will there be nuclear war? Why can we not reduce overall military spending? These and other questions cannot be answered simply in terms of a not-too-well disguised environmental determinism, coupled with a latent militarism and spurred on by international competition which has gone out of control.

The book claims to lay bare the facts and to be biased neither to the right nor the left. Nevertheless the message is very clear, and one which is worth stating and repeating: the world is a dangerous place, military spending imposes an unacceptable opportunity cost, and security need not become so narrow or consuming a preoccupation. Disarmament and arms control should be at the top of the world agenda, along with legitimate demand for security, and all governments should work towards this objective. But the question whether this end will be furthered or achieved just through popular pressure armed with the data arrayed in this layman's guide must remain open to doubt.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

Politics, economics and social

The spellbinders: charismatic political leadership. By Ann Ruth Willner. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1984. 212pp. Index. £13·95.

World revolutionary leaders. By Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips. London: Pinter. 1984. 236pp. Index. £18·50.

THE SPELLBINDERS was worth writing and is worth reading. Ann Ruth Willner's prime area of research was Indonesia and she became fascinated by the spell which Sukarno succeeded in casting over his people. She studied the theories of Max Weber on charisma and examined them against a number of examples. Three of her main subjects, Sukarno, Hitler and Mussolini, came to a sticky end. The other two, Roosevelt and Gandhi, saw their aims achieved and lived on to a revered old age. She deals more briefly with Castro and Khomeini, probably wisely, because it is too early to pass a final judgement on them.

Her selection was interesting. Of course it would have been wrong to try to write an encyclopaedia and she explains why some obviously successful leaders were omitted, including Lenin, Mao, Churchill and de Gaulle. Though her reasons vary from one to the other, all these four seemed to have one characteristic in common: they were not primarily concerned with casting spells; they knew what they wanted, were patently seen by their followers to be achieving it and appeared sufficiently confident in themselves and in what they were doing not to have to turn to magic, though all were well able to inspire people when this was necessary. They were therefore probably greater men than the spellbinders—though it may be that Roosevelt and Gandhi might really belong more in their category than with Sukarno, Hitler and Mussolini.

About those three she leaves the reader in little doubt. They were performers, skilfully playing on the emotions of their audience; they were unscrupulous, self-indulgent (Hitler in different ways from the others) and dishonest. Though Roosevelt and Gandhi could cast spells with the best, they were more honourable men than the other three.

Professor Willner summarizes Max Weber's theories, as her signposts, very clearly: the spellbinder enunciates a 'mission' and calls on his people to follow and obey him to achieve it; he gains recognition by producing a proof, sign or miracle; he plays upon enthusiasm or sometimes on despair and hope; he surrounds himself with disciples rather than administrators; he abhors a judicial system as it is usually understood, adjudicating by inspiration rather than by laws and precedents; he rejects rational economic conduct and relies on 'extortion' and 'booty'; he inspires in his followers an emotional response, quite separate from their routine lives with their work or their families; to endure he must repeatedly prove his powers afresh to his followers; to do this he must periodically reorient his values in new directions, as Hitler did in 1934 in discarding the socialist aspects of National Socialism epitomized by Strasser and Röhm. Eventually, says Weber, charismatic authority proves transitory and unstable and becomes 'routinized' or transformed into some combination of other types of authority.

The author looks at some of the myths on which her chosen models based their appeals. Mussolini evoked the pride of the Italians in ancient Rome. Sukarno was identified with Bima, a legendary warrior and lover, so the more vigorous Sukarno could make his sex life appear the better. Castro invoked the cult of Jose Marti, who had been exiled by the Spaniards, returned to join a guerrilla band and died in battle. Except for the dying, there were many parallels with Castro's own life history. Khomeini was hailed as the Hidden

Imam who, according to Shia doctrine, will emerge one day to bring justice to the world. Professor Willner also gives examples of the impact of appearing to achieve the impossible, as Hitler did when he got away with reoccupying the Rhineland.

Because it is constantly reinforced by practical examples, her thesis is convincing and really does help the reader to understand the nature of the (often transient) success of her charismatic leaders.

World revolutionary leaders is not in the same class. It records, largely in tabular form, a mass of characteristics or experiences of no less than 135 revolutionary leaders from Cromwell, Hampden and Pym through Jefferson and Washington, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, Ho and Castro to Mugabe and Nkomo and 123 others. The number of tables is 42, the number of characteristics beyond my patience to count. Some are significant (but often obvious); others seem irrelevant or obscure. The book may be useful for other researchers to quote as secondary material but the chances are that with so many bald statements (usually a plain yes or no to a characteristic, or an unsupported classification) the researcher will be able to pick whatever evidence he needs to prove whatever point he is trying to make. If that is what you want I wish you luck with this book.

University of Exeter RICHARD CLUTTERBUCK

Reluctant rebels: comparative studies of revolution and underdevelopment. By John Walton. New York: Columbia University Press. 1984. 230pp. Index. $36·50. Pb.: $10·00.

Revolution and international politics. By Peter Calvert. London: Pinter. 1984. 222pp. Index. £15·00.

THE relationship between revolution and the international political system is an important theme in both these books, yet so different are the approaches of the authors that the books have virtually nothing else in common. The contrast between the practical and historical bias of British political studies and the theoretical bent of American political science has been widely criticized as a misleading and exaggerated stereotype. However, in this instance, the stereotype fits. The American book, John Walton's comparatively based analysis of revolution, happens to be by far the better of the two. Walton examines three cases of national rebellion in some depth: the Huk rebellion in the Philippines between 1946 and 1953; the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya in the 1950s; and *la violencia* in Colombia in the same period. At first sight, it might seem that this approach would limit the scope and space for theorizing about revolution in general. However, the actual chapters on the individual countries take up less than half the book and Walton relates his analysis of each case closely to the theoretical framework he establishes in the opening chapter. The disadvantage is that he does not provide anything like a complete overview of the conflicts themselves.

Walton's choice of cases might also seem odd since none would usually be thought of as a revolution. However, this is quite deliberate. It underlines an important distinction he emphasizes between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. It also enables him to demonstrate the non-trivial nature of the changes brought about through rebellion even when it fails as in the Philippines. On a theoretical level, Walton teases out the interplay of global and local factors in the causation of national revolts through a synthesis of existing theories. A fundamental proposition that emerges from the case studies is that national revolts are in the first instance triggered off by the preemptive violence of the state against popular movements rather than by a desperate assault from below on the *status quo*. Walton argues that what causes revolt is a miscalculated use of violence by an elite in circumstances in which the elite is not trying to preserve the old order but attempting 'to consolidate the new political and class bases of uneven development within a weak state' (p. 159). Revolt starts as a defensive reaction by a popular movement to an attack on its existence. Hence, reluctant rebels.

Peter Calvert's discursive study is much harder to describe succinctly. The title is used as a peg for a very wide-ranging discussion of strategies of political violence within the state and a loose consideration of some of the international implications. The fact that he finds space to touch on the relationship of diet to aggressive behaviour and to reproduce Hobsbawm's classification of bandits shows just how wide-ranging. The conclusions arrived

at are prescriptive rather than analytical. For example, he counsels strongly against superpower intervention in internal conflicts, arguing that 'intervention does not stop revolutions, it helps cause them' (p. 199). The book reads as if it has been rather hurriedly put together and it is clear that some sections have not been adequately researched. There are a few startling errors of fact. The Tet offensive in Vietnam in February 1968—which did so much to undermine President Johnson is put forward to February 1972 and advanced as a factor in the failure of the Nixon administration's policy. The Portuguese revolution of 1974 is dated as occurring in 1975.

There is much else that is highly contestable, to put it mildly. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is given as an example of intervention on behalf of an incumbent and hence legitimate under existing international law. It is argued that there are 'relatively few significant national minorities in countries other than Africa' (p. 174). It is suggested that before Zimbabwe's independence Mugabe 'may have dreamt' (p. 63) of revolution throughout southern Africa. Fortunately, there are also some interesting and substantial passages in the book. These include a cogent analysis of the tactics of urban insurrection which is based on an examination of a 1928 Comintern manual on the subject and there is a subtle exploration of the issue of diplomatic recognition of revolutionary governments, supported by interesting historical illustrations of the arguments. However, there is little to connect Calvert's interest in the mechanics of political violence with Walton's quest for fundamental causes. While there is clearly room for both approaches, a comparison of these two books does suggest that conscious theory-building facilitates greater coherence and more rigorous analysis.

Queen's University, Belfast ADRIAN GUELKE

On the brink: defense, deficits and welfare spending. By James L. Clayton. New York: Ramapo for National Strategy Information Center. 1984. 153pp. Pb.: $8·95.

THIS is a clear, concise and overall very useful general summary of the problems surrounding the effects on public policy of the growing budget deficit in the United States. Dr Clayton seeks to dispel some of the misconceptions that he believes have entered the discussion of current fiscal policy problems, especially over the interrelationships between budget deficits, defence requirements, and spending on welfare. He argues that the deficits are serious, but that attempts to deal with the problem should not be seen simply in traditional guns versus butter terms. In short, the United States needs '*both* a muscular defense program and a robust welfare program' (p. 5), and these can be afforded and the deficit crisis alleviated if certain action is taken.

Dr Clayton sees the current budget deficit as the product of a sustained increase in both defence and welfare spending by government, without any corresponding increase in available national revenue. After developing this argument, supplemented by a valuable appendix of charts and tables, Clayton offers a series of policy proposals designed to maintain a strong defence posture and a viable social welfare sector while reducing the rising budget deficit. He recommends that there should be a fixed but realistic annual increase in defence spending, financed if necessary by a series of tax measures which might include a special tax surcharge for defence purposes levied on all tax returns. The United States should also encourage other countries in NATO, and Japan, to increase their spending on defence, and perhaps threaten to withdraw some troops from Europe. On welfare spending, he argues for reforms of the current cost of living indexing of entitlement programmes, and some reductions in veterans' benefits.

The problem of all government budgeting, and it is especially the case in the United States, is that too many politicians are concerned only about those funds which affect them and their constituents directly, and so they rarely consider the aggregate situation. Until the emphasis is shifted in the United States from the existing position, where special interest groups pursue their own maximum advantage, to one in which more attention is given to the common good, annual battles over the detail of budgets will remain incremental in nature. It will therefore continue to be difficult to achieve a commitment to cut spending without weakening the constitutional obligation to provide for the common defence and the general welfare. The major virtue of this monograph is that the nature of the problem in the United States is presented in a way which is instructive and helpful. It must also be

said that the remedies advanced to deal with the problems, while sensible, may be too controversial to be acceptable to any current or new occupant of the White House.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

Industry in a changing world: special issue of the Industrial Development Survey for the Fourth General Conference of UNIDO. New York: United Nations. 1983. 369pp. Pb.

THIS study was prepared as a background document for the Fourth General Conference of UNIDO. Its purpose was to explain the low share of developing countries in world manufacturing value-added (MVA) and to seek ways of raising it. To this end, a welter of statistical data were collected, analysed and clearly presented. The result is a work of reference which will be of value for some years to come. Whether it should also be regarded as a blueprint for recommendations of policy depends on how far any argument about percentage shares can be taken as more than a first approach. Inevitably, any such argument is self-constrained by zero-sum reasoning. The developing countries' share in MVA is less than their share in world population, and may be less than earlier UNIDO conferences may have regarded as realistic targets. Given further that, for developing countries, changes in technology are still largely exogenous and cannot be perceptibly influenced by any actions of their own, the zero-sum approach is probably valid as far as policies by developing countries themselves are concerned. But it is less helpful when it comes to their relationship with developed countries. For instance, it is shown that, in absolute terms, the developing countries have done best when the developed ones have done well. This was proved negatively in the 1970s, when the developing countries' share in MVA increased, but most of them appear to have suffered more from the slowing down in activity than the majority of developed countries. Again, in the chapters on the electronic and petrochemical industries, it emerges that the developing countries' best hope is initially to concentrate on labour—or other local resource-intensive parts of production—and that this is most likely to be of long-term benefit to the majority of developing countries when the reason is a transfer to more skill- and capital-intensive activities in the developed countries.

Where technology comes largely from outside, not only is a zero-sum approach legitimate, but so is one of its concomitants, namely neoclassical theory. The latter has been a good guideline to the postwar growth of developing countries' trade. Their industrial development led to increasing specialization and complementarity between them. As such, these developments have led to a more harmonious world order. Yet to argue from this that the emergence of a greater similarity of trading structures among developed countries may be a source of conflict misses intra-trade and everything else that has to be taken into account where R & D is endogenous and the zero-sum approach irrelevant.

These comments are not meant to detract from the merits of this work as a basis for the developing countries' case. But it is not a blueprint for a more harmonious world order, which would require a different approach to the developed countries and developed–developing countries relations.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

An introduction to the multinationals. By Michel Ghertman and Margaret Allen. London: Macmillan for Institute for Research and Information on Multinationals, Geneva. 1984. 143pp. Index. £15·00. Pb.: £5·95.

THE aims of any introduction to a subject as complex and diffuse as the multinational firm must be to structure and summarize the huge volume of extant literature in a comprehensive and readable fashion and to serve as an aperitif to a fuller digestion of the best of that literature. This book cannot be said to succeed in either objective. The reading and presentation of the literature is highly selective, at times even eccentric. The data is presented in a tortuous manner, with accompanying text which unnecessarily complicates rather than illuminates the findings. Finally, a reader unfamiliar with the literature is given no guidance on how to pursue an interest in the subject.

The genesis of this book is a translation of Ghertman's *Les multinationales,* which was rewritten and revised by Margaret Allen under Ghertman's supervision. This accounts for the welcome inclusion of some of the French literature on multinationals and perhaps also for some stylistic infelicities. Four main chapters examine the history of the development of multinationals, the organization and functioning of the firms, the role of multinationals in national economies and the international economy, and multinationals and society. The book's approach is not theoretical and it suffers throughout from a consequent lack of structure.

The first chapter, 'How multinationals developed', examines the history of multinationals in three phases and nine pages: the first multinationals, the American phase, the growth of European and Japanese multinationals. Sectoral diversity is conveyed by examining three prototypical examples, petroleum, automobiles and banks, to illustrate raw materials, manufacturing and service multinationals. The short cases illustrate a theme of the book, the reactive nature of multinationals, particularly in response to government policies.

'How multinationals function' is the weakest of the chapters. Short sections on objectives, on organization, on budgeting and planning and particularly on decision-making, only serve to show how little can usefully be said in two pages. The impression given is misleadingly simple. The bulk of this chapter is taken up with a laboured discussion on the size and economic importance of multinationals. The analysis of growth and economic concentration requires careful and precise marshalling of secondary data with a leavening of primary data, but this is not achieved.

'The role of multinationals in the economy' briefly examines conflicts between multinationals with home and host countries, the multinationals' contribution to development and their importance in the world economy. This last section is dominated disproportionately by a long discussion on speculation. The development section deals exclusively with the transfer of technology and transfer pricing. The non-Anglo-Saxon origin of the book is signalled by the chapter on 'Multinationals and society' which is refreshing, if not altogether successful. The impact on politics, the likely outcome of codes of conduct, social and cultural implications of multinationals and a discussion of the relevance of dependency analysis end the chapter. The book promises to separate myth from reality. Despite its many failings, it does illustrate the enormous impact of government policy on multinationals and on world development patterns.

University of Bradford PETER J. BUCKLEY

Governments and multinationals: policies in the developed countries. By A. E. Safarian. London: British–North American Committee. 1983. 118pp. Pb.: £4·00; $8·00.

WHILE over three-quarters of the total stock of international direct investment is in developed countries, most studies of policy towards such investment deal with developing countries. Safarian's short appraisal, an interim report in advance of a promised comprehensive forthcoming book, is therefore most welcome. It analyses the national policies of six host countries (Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) in summary with shorter notes on seven other developed countries and on developing countries. Part two then compares national policy instruments and examines problems and possible solutions.

Policies of governments are taken to include not only legislation but also administrative processes and policy positions. Consequently, the book is not just a dull recitation of legislative revisions but is also a review of case law, inconsistencies and *ad hoc* governmental manoeuvres. Four groups of policies are examined. First, industries which are partially or wholly closed to foreign investment by government fiat. This 'key sector' approach includes defence and high technology industries, privately owned public services, other closely regulated industries such as broadcasting or banking, areas identified with the maintenance of national culture(s), some natural resource sectors and publicly owned sectors. Safarian notes, however, that Japan is an exception to the rule that such designated key sectors are not the ones where multinationals tend to concentrate (p. 59). Second, policies used for screening the establishment of foreign firms are examined, of which the most comprehensive are in Australia, Canada, France and Japan. 'Clearly defined objectives with explicit and

consistent evaluation criteria and procedures over time are rare in this area' (p. 2). Vague and ill-defined criteria such as the effects on employment, on the balance of payments, regional development, competition effects, research and the nationality of key decision-makers may all be invoked for screening purposes. Third, investment incentives are analysed. Many general incentives are in fact specifically geared to attracting foreign investment. Such incentives are often linked to performance criteria such as employment creation, local value added and exports. Fourth, Safarian points out areas of differential treatment, based on ownership, in the operating period. Restrictions on entry into prescribed sectors, exchange control regulations, preferential public purchasing for nationally owned firms, denial of work permits, restriction of shareholder voting rights to nationals and the use of administrative discretion to favour locally owned firms are all weapons in this arsenal.

Two important general issues are raised. First, from a national perspective, the optimality of policies must be questioned and feasible alternatives for attaining policy goals examined. Second, the negative impact of national policies on other countries and on the international economy must be recognized. Safarian's answer to the latter issue is an expansion of GATT to include trade–related investment issues. The former requires greater clarity on the part of governments in defining their aims and objectives. This book is a step towards clarifying such issues on a comparative basis.

University of Bradford PETER J. BUCKLEY

Oil supply disruptions in the 1980s: an economic analysis. By Karim Pakravan. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1984. 85pp. Index. Pb.: $9·95.

ALTHOUGH some may think its roots run wider, Dr Pakravan is emphatic that 'the source of the worldwide oil security problem is the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf nations to internal and external destabilizing influences' (p. 62). Given so narrow a focus, his programme for addressing the topic is apparently reasonable. Preliminary chapters describe the international political background and explain the elementary economics of oil supply. A central section then investigates how conflicts in the Gulf—ranging up to a year-long Soviet maritime blockade—could affect the international oil market in the later 1980s. Finally, policies for averting those conflicts or, at least, their effects are recommended to governments in the OECD and the Gulf alike.

Sadly, this short essay does scant justice to such an agenda. Part of the problem is its very brevity: too many assertions are left unsupported by argument and too many arguments by evidence. Another difficulty lies in the corpus of data used, too much of which was already out of date when the text was written (April 1983). But the most serious difficulties derive from the analytical methods the author has chosen and the way he has applied them.

The heart of Dr Pakravan's study, which deals with economic costs, is an attempt to model the impact, at four future dates, of four alternative contingencies, each embodying a major reduction in Gulf oil supply. The impact of each contingency is measured against a disruption-free projection of the world oil market. This projection is selected, in turn, from six scenarios, which vary in their expectations of how oil prices will develop. Unfortunately, the implied relationships between demand, supply and price are frankly incredible, the choices of a market projection and of disruption contingencies are apparently arbitrary, and the processes by which all are combined to generate values for GNP losses in the OECD and the Third World remain largely unexplained.

After reading his economic analysis, it is hard to give due weight to the author's policy prescriptions. It should, however, be recorded that his attitude to political intervention in energy markets is delicately balanced. Internationally, he wants OECD governments to impose oil import tariffs, build larger strategic stockpiles and release oil from them to hold down world prices. Domestically, in the case of the United States, he opposes fuel price regulation and rationing in supply emergencies, along with all other forms of government interference. As to the Gulf, his goal is full integration of the region's national economies, beginning with the collation of all its hydrocarbon-based industries.

Dr Pakravan's prescriptions lack nothing of ambition. Yet he would persuade more if he promised less. For an author to announce a slender booklet as 'a general and integrated international analysis of the oil security problem' (p. xiv), or for his editor (Dr Peter

Duignan) to add that it provides 'a long-term solution to the oil security question' (p. xii), is bound to seem audacious. By the end it also seems rash.

IAN SMART

Crisis in economic relations between North and South. Edited by Norman Schofield. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1984. 439pp. Index. £18·50.

THIS book, which seems to be essentially a tidied up version of the papers given at a research seminar at the University of Texas in 1979, offers some interesting if somewhat dated material on various aspects of the economic and political relations between North and South. On the whole the contents do not justify the rather melodramatic title, and the quality of the various chapters is rather uneven. However, those which have a precise focus, on GATT and the Tokyo Round or on STABEX, will certainly be of value to students of international economics. There are also a large number of tables which will provide a mine of interesting factual information.

The chapters on different commodities are perhaps the most interesting, since they shed light upon the limited possibilities of organizing really effective producer cartels in the countries of the South. In the case of copper and aluminium, this is because the financial and technological power of multinational companies based in the advanced countries has proved to be consistently more formidable than the effects of joint political action by CIPEC or the International Bauxite Association. As Hirschman and Schofield put it in the relevant chapter, 'the capacity of the multinational corporations to adapt to, as well as to influence, their environment far outweighs the increased social, economic and political returns made possible by marketing, production and pricing control by the underdeveloped exporting nations' (p. 261). In the case of rice, this is because the percentage of total production traded on world markets is so small (about four per cent) and the United States is such a decisive marginal supplier at times of scarcity or buoyant consumer demand. In the case of coffee, the explanation is that both exporters and importers have considerable power within the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) which has largely nullified such attempts as the major producers have made to exploit the strength of their market position.

The only chapter which really justifies the use of the word 'crisis' in the title of the book is the one by Meeks on the political responses by advanced industrial countries to the international economic crisis. This makes it very clear that since the early 1970s the combined effects of the international recession, the rapid rise in the price of some commodities (notably oil) and the competitive challenge from the newly industrialized countries have posed severe problems of economic and social adjustment in many of the advanced countries with which their entrenched political structures have often seemed ill-equipped to cope. However, some may regard such a view as somewhat self-indulgent, especially when it is recalled that our problems of adjustment in the north pale into insignificance as compared with the problems of survival faced by millions of people in the non-oil-developing countries of the south. The fact is that we can afford the sort of 'crisis' described in this book, whereas the poorest parts of the south cannot.

House of Commons, Westminster NIGEL FORMAN

Talking about development. Edited by Altaf Gauhar. London: Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies. 1983. 324pp. Index. Pb.: £4·95.

THIS book is based on sixteen interviews originally published in *Third World Quarterly* between 1978 and 1981. These embrace the work of the Brandt Commission, the Commonwealth (the most space is devoted to two wide-ranging interviews with Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal), UNCTAD, the Common Fund, OPEC national politics in Third World states, and almost every conceivable North–South issue. The editor has rendered valuable service in bringing together contributions by many important political figures.

The failure of efforts to restructure the international economic order meant that by 1978 some Third World leaders, as Mr Brandt tells us, were initially uneasy about his Commission (p. 4). Continuing refusal to implement proposals on indexation, the inadequacy of the

Common Fund, inability to involve the socialist states more closely in the North-South dialogue, increasing protectionism, low levels of aid, lack of progress towards disarmament and possible release of resources for development, the failure to effect meaningful international monetary reform, organizational weaknesses facilitating continued division and domination of the Third World, exclusion of the masses from the benefits of development and Western over-attachment to 'the privileged consumption society' (p. 107); these were but few of the difficulties engendering that profound sense of pessimism and impending crisis (presaging ultimately the possible use of force) experienced by Prebisch, Manley, Dahrendorf, Milos Minic and others (p. 113, pp. 131–2, p. 158, p. 160, pp. 168–9). The problem, despite talk of 'mutual interests' and 'interdependence' has remained one of structural change (p. 207), an objective which, as Dahrendorf recognizes, 'presupposes world action' in a situation where 'the world as one society does not yet exist' (p. 150). In a similar vein Minic argues that 'new norms and new institutions' would be the basis of the new order (p. 166). But he sheds little light on the scope and content of such new norms, their status when the major powers object to them; and the role and powers of any new institutions.

A sense of urgency runs throughout the text. But what is less clear is the sense of direction—perhaps inevitably so, given the differences of emphasis and opinion among those interviewed. Although many favour 'democracy' there remain conflicting views about the effectiveness of Western-style democracy in handling modernization (pp. 121–5, p. 158, p. 253). Similarly, despite frank recognition of UN weaknesses as a negotiating forum (pp. 119–23, p. 150) and the futility of global negotiations complicated by divisions within both North and South (p. 236), continued support for the UN is well-nigh universal (pp. 42–3, p. 125, pp. 171–2, p. 201, p. 315).

The interviews vary in quality, perhaps the more gripping featuring Ramphal, Manley Dahrendorf, Jan Pronk and Olof Palme. The editor rightly criticizes Lee Kuan Yew's theory of change engineered by a few people at the top (p. 102) as liable to 'create a non-participatory society' (p. 5), inherently unstable. Pronk repeats the view that the North–South stalemate stems from the lack of political will, shortsightedness, erosion of the West's political system and the absence of any built-in mechanism of change (p. 198). The solutions are familiar: cultivation of sympathetic Western movements, educating Western societies that change is in their long-term interest and essential (p. 199). Others stress self-reliance and ECDC, especially between OPEC and the rest. The concluding interviews with Nyerere, Mugabe and Waldheim seem an anticlimax.

One criticism is that it is not clear exactly how Gauhar's book is organized. Again, much well-known diagnosis is repeated. The book is thus long in reflection but short in positive recommendation. In sum, this collection appears more in the nature of contributions to a continuing debate knitted together by a comprehensive introduction, inevitably neither strong nor consistent in any overall theory; any special arguments seem to have lost their force and become muffled in the general debate. The book's main virtue is that it provides instant access to a variety of opinions by major figures and limited insight into official thinking at a particular time. Perhaps one drawback is that it provides only a single view from the North reflecting the liberal, social democratic persuasion. It is however marked by a refreshing extemporaneity, even if it does not reveal much that is new.

Caleb Pilgrim

The antinomies of interdependence: national welfare and the international division of labor. Edited by John Gerard Ruggie. New York: Columbia University Press. 1983. 506pp. Index. $45·50. Pb.: $19·50.

This book is about the consequences of pursuing policies resulting in what is now widely referred to as interdependence. It is an edited version of papers delivered at a colloquium on the impact of international divisions of labour on national welfare organized by the Institute for World Order in New York. The reader has to cope with some pretentious language. Apart from the title, the editor tells us in his preface that the 'aim . . . was to contextualize the economism of this debate in broader institutional frameworks . . .". Once this barrier is overcome, the nine contributions taken together turn out to be an excellent commentary on a complex and often bewildering contemporary issue.

Part one sets out the variety of experience which has accompanied what the editor calls 'associative development'. By this he means the generation of economic growth with the help of others. Robert Keohane's essay on the experience of the United States from independence to civil war is outstanding; he concludes that the economic success of that new nation was in spite of its political failure. It was the openness of the economy and lack of state initiatives which, in the author's opinion, underlay the extraordinary transformation which took place. There follows an analysis of the economic growth strategies of the small European states (Kalzenstein), of South Korea (Haggard & Chung-in Moon), of Venezuela (Hart), of Ivory Coast (Mytelka). Each of them struggles with the dilemma of the political nature of a nation state on the one hand, and on the other with the desire of its political leaders for economic success. They record the frustration of being unable to induce growth, either without the help of outsiders or at an intolerable risk to their leadership because of the requirement for freedom of association and enterprise.

There follow three contributions on the problems which result from a policy of self-reliance in Third World countries. Technological dissociation is competently surveyed by Helge Hveem. She concludes that while access to technology is central to any development strategy, close association with others can yield as large a welfare loss as does complete disassociation. David Laitin looks at linguistic association in Africa and why it has remained largely unaltered since its colonial origins. He argues (not altogether convincingly) the case for severing these links: it 'helps policy planners plug the brain drain' (p. 368). As culturally attractive as this may be, it will do little for the welfare of the majority any more than teaching through the medium of Irish did much to enhance the lot of the Irish peasant in Connemara. Barry Buzan's essay on security strategies for dissociation is a clear description of the immense problems to small nations posed by pursuing an independent strategy, not least because of the necessity for keeping a creditable (and expensive) military presence and because of the constant threat from external predators as well as internal disaffection.

The final chapter by the editor moves away from the comparative approach to the more global issue of the North–South dimension. He compares national political structures with that of the international economic order. It is a realistic assessment of the arguments for changing the system to maximize the welfare of the poorer nations and introduces what is often missing from the literature: an assessment of the political structures which in the author's opinion shape the international economic order.

This book makes a considerable contribution to one of the central questions of contemporary international political economy: how dependent on others must a nation become to produce sustainable welfare gains for its people? Aspiring leaders of the newer nations and their advisers will find this book invaluable.

British–North American Research Association, London SIMON WEBLEY

Reality and rhetoric: studies in the economics of development. By P. T. Bauer. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1984. 184pp. Index. £11·95.

THIS latest volume by Professor (Lord) Bauer contains ten essays, eight of which have been previously published (although they have been revised and amended for the present volume). Those previously published deal with the market order and state planning in economic development (a very favourable view of the former and unfavourable view of the latter); foreign aid, overall and multinational (a very unfavourable view, especially of the latter); ecclesiastical economics (a very unfavourable view of two of Pope Paul VI's pronouncements); Africa, and especially West Africa (blaming British policy in the dying days of colonialism for contributing to a climate of despotism and corruption; debating Professor Kilby's book on post-war industrialization in Nigeria; and criticizing immigration policy in British West Africa in the immediate postwar pre-independence years as being incompatible with the emergence of competitive multiracial society); and a general defence of his earlier book, *Dissent on development*, against criticism from Professor Nicholas Stern (both in the *Journal of Development Economics*).

A rich menu, but this still leaves the two new contributions. The first, opening the book, represents Professor Bauer's 'pioneer lecture' in the series recently organized by the World Bank. This lecture, entitled 'Remembrance of studies past: retracing first steps', reviews his

work over a decade in the 1940s and 1950s on the rubber industry of Malaysia and the organization of trade in pre-independence Nigeria and Ghana. The main amendment he adds in retrospect is the 'pervasive significance of the politicization of economic life in ldcs'; this is a theme which pervades all the other essays in this volume, making up for its admitted neglect in the author's pioneer work. This opening pioneer lecture—to the reviewer much the best part of this book—is also available to the interested reader with comments by my colleague Michael Lipton and by T. N. Srinivasan of Yale University, in a volume containing the whole series of World Bank pioneer lectures, published under the editorship of G. M. Meier and D. Seers by Oxford University Press.

The other previously unpublished essay is the last in the book. This will be of special interest to readers taking up this book because of the author's proclaimed position as the lone voice in the wilderness against the pernicious 'mainstream' of development economics. Now that he has clearly emerged as an establishment figure, at least in this country and for the present, even to the extent of a takeover of *The Times*, the posture of the underdog may need some revision. Moreover, many 'mainstream' development economists would describe the 'mainstream' position as outlined in this essay as a caricature of their views. Moreover, it is not always clear where the author stands. For example, after first criticizing Keynes' famous dictum that the world is ruled by the ideas of economists, he himself a couple of pages later mentions 'a great increase in the influence of intellectuals including academics . . .', as part of the deplored 'politicization of life'.

This reviewer feels critical about a number of statements and positions taken in this volume. But it would be fair neither to the author nor to the reviewer to express such criticism in the context of a brief review rather than a review article. This has already been done by others, and the reader who wants to study the extended views of critics can consult Amartya Sen in the *New York Review of Books*, March 1982, Meghnad Desai in the *Third World Quarterly*, April 1982 and most recently John Toye in *The Journal of Development Studies*, October 1983 (all three dealing with the author's previous (1981) book on *Equality, the Third World and economic delusion*), as well as the already-mentioned comments by Nicholas Stern, Michael Lipton and T. N. Srinivasan. The reviewer has also had a chance of a previous debate with Professor Bauer in the columns of the *Lloyds Bank Review*. One man's reality is another man's rhetoric!

If there were the space to renew the debate, the reviewer would concentrate on the essay on multinational aid which seems to him the weakest of the book. It will be startling news to the IMF and World Bank that international organizations have a 'received doctrine' not to make their aid allocations contingent upon the policies of the recipients (p. 65). Or that it is a defence of national aid to say that 'tying simply reduces the real value of the aid below the nominal value' (p. 66): that surely is precisely the case for multinational aid. But we must not get started on a debate for which there is no space; the temptation illustrates Peter Bauer's function as the gadfly of development economics. A valuable function, but it does not exhaust his contribution. There remains the scholar, and the pioneer lecture as well as the studies on pre-independence Africa bring out this part of his contribution. One would like to hear more from the scholar and perhaps less from the gadfly.

University of Sussex H. W. SINGER

Law

The standard of 'civilization' in international society. By Gerrit W. Gong. Oxford: Clarendon. 1984. 267pp. Index. £19·50.

THIS book will be very useful to anyone who is trying to understand how much reality there is in international law and in moral judgements upon international affairs. Dr Gong is a Fellow in Sino-Soviet Affairs at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, and prepared this work in Oxford under the supervision of Hedley Bull, who provides an approving foreword. The aim is to comprehend historically 'the standard of civilization' which is implicit when foreigners are judged to have behaved barbarically, and is therefore a focus of many doubts about the legitimacy of judging alien states by 'European' standards. Gong argues in considerable historical detail that the standard was implicit in European states' dealings with one another for centuries but became explicit only at the end of the nineteenth century when the Europeans strove to articulate the terms on which they could treat with radically alien cultures, such as those of China, Japan and Siam. It

represented a deep challenge to the non-Europeans in that it was an expression of basic tendencies in European society, and by the same token was flatly contrary to basic tendencies in the civilizations that were being forced to come to terms with Europe. This did not mean that it was unwelcome to everyone in the societies under challenge: Dr Gong is clearly aware that political life is rarely, if ever, so homogeneous, and that for some within non-European countries the European standard was very congenial. But he is equally emphatic that Europe subjected ancient and proud civilizations to deep and insulting humiliation when it declared them barbarian or savage in terms that they were constrained to accept. Dr Gong considers that this affront is still a factor in international relations, and would have us understand Third World attempts to alter international law partly in terms of it.

The book's case studies will be of considerable interest to historians. For a wider audience, one of the book's merits is to demonstrate the shallowness of cynicism about international law and morality, without losing sight of historical realities. Dr Gong emphasizes that the struggle between Europe and non-European civilizations was much deeper than an application of naked force. Adapting Clausewitz, he suggests that 'many of the nineteenth century's military engagements, for example, the Opium Wars, were extensions of conflicting standards of "civilization" by other means' (p. 8). He considers that Europe prevailed sufficiently for it to be appropriate to say that there are no barbarians any longer, since all now espouse the same values and are hypocrites by the same code. But, he argues, there were limits to Europe's triumph in that a large part of Third World politics is about the continuing tensions between the old European standard and indigenous conceptions of civility. 'What is international law' is a large question with which we all have to struggle. Dr Gong argues convincingly that an important part of the answer is to be found in the light which the late nineteenth century sheds upon the present and the foreseeable future.

King's College, London BARRIE PASKINS

Law, morality, and the relations of states. By Terry Nardin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 350pp. Index. £30·40. Pb.: £12·60.

As the author of this book sees it, the society of states, in its most fundamental aspect, consists of entities which are not only in competition with each other but are also markedly different in terms of culture and ideology. This lack of a common nature and overriding shared purpose means, he argues, that international law is even more important than it would otherwise be in providing a basis on which states can associate with each other. For 'regular international relations presuppose general rules. Whether they recognize it or not, statesmen act on the premise that international transactions—the exchange of diplomatic representatives, trade, regulated warfare, cooperation through international organizations—are impossible except on the basis of shared practices and procedures according to which agreements are concluded and interpreted, judgments of conduct formulated, and claims advanced, rebutted, and judged' (p. 185). Professor Nardin also asserts that international morality helps to provide a unifying bond between states, and the last third of his book discusses this subject. But its most valuable part focuses on the character and role of international law, and in so doing says many extremely important things.

Nardin makes the point, for example, that to speak of the enforcement of law presupposes the validity of the law in question (and he might have added that the same point applies to discussion of the breaking of law). He cogently argues that the authoritative determination of disputes is not a necessary feature of a rule-based association—but adds that centralized institutions are not essential for authoritative determination, and that in fact there are international procedures for the settlement of disputes on the basis of rules. He draws attention to the deficiencies of the claim that the international legal system is primitive in nature. He very ably exposes the inadequacy of the instrumentalist or policy-oriented approach to international law which has been so popular in the United States in recent decades. And his discussion of the United Nations' cavalier approach to international law is typically cool.

None of this can be said to be novel, especially to those who in one way or another have been influenced by the late Professor C. A. W. Manning. But the arguments which Professor Nardin sets out are not often encountered in print, and here they have been excellently deployed. For this book is not only clearly written and makes good sense but is also

intellectually impressive: the author has a very sharp eye for necessary distinctions, and develops his points in a careful and thorough way. He also, in the book's early chapters, displays a wide-ranging acquaintance with the history of ideas about international society (a phrase he would like to see more widely used) and the legal nature of international law, and of proposals for the better organization of international relations. Altogether it is a work which should be very widely read, and its central chapters should certainly be required reading for every student of international relations.

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

Property rights and sovereign rights: the case of North Sea oil. By Peter D. Cameron. London: New York Academic Press. 1983. 210pp. Index. £19·50; $32.00.

WERE it not for the revenues from North Sea oil, the British government could hardly avoid raising the rate of income or other taxes, in order to find the huge sums now required for unemployment benefit. The subject of this book therefore touches us all closely in the wallet. It is also a subject of considerable intellectual fascination and richness for economists, political scientists, politicians and lawyers. Dr Cameron's book analyses and reviews the system of petroleum production licensing as it has operated and been amended by successive British governments. To what extent have the pressures of nationalism and socialism limited the scope of the companies involved in exploiting and marketing North Sea oil? For various reasons, touched on in the chronological account and analysed in more depth in chapters seven, 'The British National Oil Corporation' and eight, 'The new property,' the answer is 'not much'. The crucial features of the new type of property right created by the licences were set even before the enactment of the Continental Shelf Act 1964, by earlier legislation (pp. 52–6, 76–80).

Arguments to support the thesis that licence holders have acquired a type of property right include the relationship between legal rights and economic power. The licences contain many regulatory clauses, but they also clearly transfer to the licensee a kind of *profit à prendre*, a right exercised over property of the Crown, and a right to participate in the profits flowing from such exercise. The Crown's property in the oil *in situ* under the seabed becomes the property of the licensee in oil at the wellhead (see pp.49–53, 145–6).

As well as subjecting the licensing regime to legal analysis, Dr Cameron examines the controversial and legally complicated episode of the mid-1970s when the Labour government sought to amend the terms of existing licences to redress the balance in favour of the national interest, as they saw it. Arguments drawn from international law principles of compensation for expropriation or other forms of taking were used with skill by the companies and by the opposition. Chapters five and six, 'The crisis of legality' and 'Renegotiation and legislation', tell the story fully with balance and lucidity. The final element in the relationship between government and companies in the period was the creation of BNOC and, through it, state participation in the oil produced. The participation agreements, or 'option deals' as they were termed, derived from negotiations which were voluntary in form only, the government having made clear that in future all licensees would have to agree to some form of state participation. Sovereign rights in this context could be defined and enlarged through the sovereignty of parliament.

Altogether, this is an instructive and stimulating analysis of a brief but densely-packed period in the history of the exploitation of a key resource, situated within the jurisdiction of a developed state with a sophisticated legal system and mature political institutions. Dr Cameron has penetrated the record to expose the major issues, and has produced a valuable account, ending with privatization in 1982 and the issue of shares in Britoil, the new independent Scottish company which controls BNOC's production and exploration interests. BNOC Trading, renamed BNOC, still exercises the state's right to buy 52 per cent of crude produced from the UK shelf and to market this 'participation oil', and so continues to influence oil prices.

University of Manchester GILLIAN WHITE

Guide to international human rights practice. Edited by Hurst Hannum. London: Macmillan for International Human Rights Law Group. 1984. 310pp. £30·00.

THIS is the second important book to be published recently directed to human rights practitioners, following Mr Sieghart's *International law of human rights.* This collection of essays is directed to the procedures of institutions for the protection of human rights rather than to the substance of human rights law. The book is addressed to an American audience, so that the chapters on domestic proceedings are of somewhat limited utility (though they are not short of interest). The international chapters are brief but very clear and they are also directed to the informal processes which supplement the formal procedures of international bodies. Although one may have reservations about the effectiveness of international measures for the implementation of human rights, there is no shortage of avenues of potential redress. Indeed, as Mr Van Boven's chapter on the United Nations points out, the selection of the appropriate channel is the initial problem facing the human rights advocate. Several of the contributions emphasize the importance of considering carefully what objective is sought and what resources are available before embarking upon an application. In an ambitious chapter, Professor Weissbrodt sets out alternative strategies, not only for pursuing individual complaints, but for how organizations may attack institutionalized violations of human rights. The emphasis on the practical aspects of the procedures marks the book from other available alternatives, and it is broader in scope than them too. Besides the familiar examples of the Human Rights Committee, the ILO and UNESCO and the regional systems of the Americas and Europe, there are chapters on the Res. 1503 procedure, on intervention by non-governmental organizations in the Commission of Human Rights and the Sub-Commission and on Reporting Systems (this by Professor Fischer, being especially good). There are essays also on the prospective African Commission on Human Rights and on the various UN codes of practice. A healthy scepticism prevails: Professor Norris notes that 'as a general rule applicable to any international procedure, a petitioner should not rely entirely on the assumption that the petition will be processed with a high degree of competence or care'. A composite form to counteract this for making effective applications is provided in a series of helpful appendixes.

The book is only an introduction to human rights procedures, and anyone wanting to proceed with a particular claim or campaign would need to go on to consult the exact rules of the institution. What this book does do effectively is to enable these next steps to be taken, to remove a little of the mystery that goes with human rights bodies. It should go towards encouraging those 'good cases' which Mr Van Boven suggests will be important in securing the wider effectiveness of the schemes reviewed in the book. I should add that the essays can be read with profit by academics as well. They are a valuable addition to the literature on the implementation of human rights standards.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

Deepsea mining and the Law of the Sea. By A. M. Post. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1983. 358pp. Index. DFl 160.00.

Internationalizing the seabed. By Roderick Ogley. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1984. 256pp. Index. £16·50.

WHEN the great ceremony for signing the Law of the Sea Convention at Montego Bay in December 1982 confirmed that, after all, the United States and several of its allies would not become parties to the treaty because of objections to some of its provisions on deep-seabed mining, it was clear that a major setback for international law and diplomacy had occurred and would need to be examined and explained. Each of the books reviewed here applies the results of its author's years of study to offer an analysis of what went wrong, and what might happen next.

Dr Post's volume is the eighth in Nijhoff's well-regarded *Publications on ocean development* series under the general editorship of Shigeru Oda. It can be distinguished from Dr Ogley's

particularly with regard to Dr Post's rather more extensive treatment of the technical material (a treatment on which Dr Ogley himself relies to some extent), supplemented by a number of helpful and interesting illustrations and tables, and filled out with a historical examination of the legal concepts applicable to the debate on deep-seabed mining. Dr Ogley, though not ignoring the technical and legal background, concentrates more directly on the political and diplomatic mechanisms and processes in the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that helped produce the present situation.

Given that, as Dr Post comments, in the new Law of the Sea Convention's provisions for an International Seabed Authority to control undersea mining activities in the area designated 'the common heritage of mankind', 'an intergovernmental entity has been blueprinted with potentially vast political and economic power', it was to be expected that opposition would develop in UNCLOS III. But a theme of Dr Ogley's book is that the long and difficult negotiations that were carried on at the Law of the Sea Conference from 1973 to 1980 came so close to producing an agreement that the remaining points of disagreement could, and should, have been resolved without the confrontation and bitterness which the tactics of the Reagan administration generated at the very end of the negotiating process in 1981–2.

He agrees with another expert's judgement that the United States was demanding 'virtually autocratic ruling powers over the Sea-bed Authority' and he criticizes some of the Reagan proposals as 'extreme and illogical' ones whose 'timing virtually ensured that they failed, which perhaps they were intended to'. Despite this veiled implication that the Reagan administration was not negotiating in good faith at that point, Dr Ogley apparently believes that the American attempt to sabotage a unanimous agreement at the Conference was helped by several other factors. He suggests that the so-called 'Group of 77' developing countries were not well-placed to be flexible in the face of the new American demands because those states had already made considerable concessions in the course of previous negotiations to produce a 'package deal' between themselves and the West. In addition, the Reagan blow fell just at the point when the conference managers had set their faces against the sort of prolongation of negotiations which a determined effort to get round the new American obstacles would have required. Thus, the Conference 'was unfortunate in having to encounter one of the more dramatic reversals of American political history, which has reverberated throughout world politics ever since', in a situation in which the 'odds were stacked against adjustment to such a tremor'.

For Dr Ogley, this failure has far-reaching significance. The possibility of creating an international regime of the kind envisaged in the Law of the Sea Convention, in a 'unique unrepeatable moment in world history', would, if successful, 'enlarge the positive incentives for global co-operation beyond any that now exist'. 'If', he continues, 'a Sea-bed Authority mines the sea-bed, we shall all, through our states, if not otherwise, be shareholders; and that, politically, could give us a new conception of ourselves'.

But Dr Ogley believes that this major advance may yet take place, as the Western mining states who are at present holding out against the Convention may in the end conclude that they themselves need the security of the generally-recognized legal regime which the Convention offers. In the last analysis, the 'attempt of UNCLOS III to give shape to the eloquent notion of the "common heritage of mankind", has set a test . . . of the prudence and statesmanship of contemporary governments and above all those of ocean mining states'.

University of Aberdeen DAVID H. OTT

The evolution of the Law of the Sea: a study of resources and strategy with special regard to the polar areas. By Bo Johnson Theutenberg. Dun Laoghaire: Tycooly International. 1984. 261pp. £16.50; $25.00. Pb.: £8.50; $12.50. Developing country rate $8.30.

IN THE wake of the conclusion of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) there has been a natural tendency to examine its implications for other international questions, especially as certain delegates utilized the signing ceremony held at Montego Bay in December 1982 to identify other areas—for example, Antarctica—suitable for the implementation of the common heritage principle embodied in article 136 of the Convention. In turn, the Malaysian government performed a vital role during 1982–3 in placing the question of Antarctica before

the UN in order to secure a more equitable form of international control, perhaps modelled upon the International Sea-Bed Authority, in place of the allegedly 'unjust' and restricted Antarctic treaty system. In this manner the oft-ignored Antarctic region has emerged as a more significant international problem, a trend accentuated by other factors, including the 1982 Falklands War.

Hitherto, most linkages have been drawn between the LOSC and Antarctica, but it is clear that the new law of the sea possesses major consequences for the Arctic, and hence Theutenberg's book must be regarded as timely in its effort to assess the effects of the LOSC for the polar regions in general. The author, who appears to be a legal expert in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (no affiliation is given in the book), offers a clear and brief survey of both the UNCLOS negotiations and the LOSC itself, including such aspects as EEZs, in order to serve as the foundation for an assessment of their implications, in conjunction with other new trends in international law, for the Arctic and Antarctic, with particular emphasis upon strategic, sovereignty, resource, scientific research and environmental considerations. And in places, his approach is qualified by a deliberate concentration upon the Scandinavian perspective, such as his stress upon the Swedish view of innocent passage.

In many respects, Theutenberg provides a range of insights into such aspects as the strategic and resource position in the Arctic after the LOSC or the 'mechanism of creeping jurisdiction' (p. 4), according to which the rights over EEZs might be extended in time to include the air space above the zone. There are also some debatable sections, such as the view that the Falklands War was 'to some extent due to the new law of the sea' (p. 26, pp. 72–3). However, in general the book fails to pursue the Law of the Sea's polar dimension in sufficient depth, and readers in need of more detail will have to refer to such studies as C. Archer and D. Scrivener's article on the Arctic in *International Affairs* (Winter 1983/4, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 59–76), F. O. Vicuna's *Antarctic resources policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), or R. Wolfrum's *Antarctic Challenge* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984).

On the surface this book appears to be an academic monograph with documentary appendixes, whereas in reality the textual inadequacies of depth, the lack of an index, the inclusion of a bibliography of variable quality (for example, it omits the Archer article referred to above) and the fact that nearly two thirds of the book are used for the reproduction of such documents as the LOSC and the Antarctic Treaty, inclines one to interpret the book as a documentary volume. However, the relative accessibility of the documents diminishes the book's value in this respect. Therefore, in attempting to meet two objectives in the same book, Theutenberg falls between the two stools, and leaves one wishing for the detailed elaboration of the analytical portions of this book as well as for the removal of the superfluous documentary material.

Kingston Polytechnic PETER J. BECK

Law of the Sea: US policy dilemma. Edited by Bernard H. Oxman, David D. Caron and Charles L. O. Buderi. Oxford: Clio for Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco. 1983. 184pp. Index. £17·50. Pb: £6·50.

THE 'US policy dilemma' referred to in the title of this work, one shared by the United Kingdom, is whether or not to become a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. One of the differences between the responses of the two countries to this dilemma is that a well-informed and spirited public debate has been taking place in the United States for some time, whereas in the United Kingdom there has been a virtual conspiracy of silence on the part of the government and the debate, such as it has been, has been conducted among a few interested specialists. If only for this reason, this collection of essays deserves a warm welcome in the United Kingdom. Its nine chapters offer a balanced mixture of the arguments deployed in the American debate for and against the Convention, ranging from the provocatively partisan to the objectively informative. It is impossible in a brief review to do justice to all of the nine papers included in this collection but each of them contributes to our understanding of the issues and particularly of the question of the regime of sea-bed mining.

Dr Pardo, who played a seminal role in introducing and promoting the notion that the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction and its resources are the 'common heritage of mankind', is rather sadly reduced to grieving over 'an opportunity lost' in the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. That the 'father' of the common heritage principle should reach the conclusion that 'it is likely that the common heritage system as implemented in the Convention will prove to be an enduring economic burden on the international community' (p. 23) is a fair measure of the degree to which the idealists have been disappointed by the Convention.

The hardline opponents of the Convention are well represented by W. Scott Burke's and Frank S. Brakaw's paper on 'Ideology and the Law of the Sea' and by R. A. Goldwin's contribution on 'Common sense vs. "the common heritage"'. Whether or not the reader is persuaded by their arguments, they do provide revealing insights into the thinking of an influential, and at present predominant, faction in United States industry and government circles.

It is useful, too, to have Leigh Ratiner's paper on 'The costs of American rigidity' reproduced in this volume. Adapted from his well-known essay published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1982, this paper provides the reader with an insider's fascinating account of the US administration's policy-making process in relation to the Convention, and a thoughtful warning from a well-informed conservative Republican on the costs which might be incurred by the administration's failure to negotiate a realistic compromise on the sea-bed mining issue.

Two of the most helpful papers are included in part three on 'Practical differences: seabed mining'. The first, 'Incentives for ocean mining under the Convention' by L. M. Antrim and J. K. Sebenius, draws upon the MIT computer model of the costs and profitability of an ocean mining operation to provide a useful comparison of the commercial feasibility of operating under the Convention regime or the alternative regimes based upon national legislation. Lewis I. Cohen's paper on 'International cooperation on seabed mining' offers a useful review of the attempts made by both industry and the industrialized, 'like-minded' group of states to establish workable reciprocal arrangements outside the Convention regime.

For the uninitiated, Bernard Oxman rounds off this stimulating collection by providing a 'Summary of the Law of the Sea Convention' in a 14-page appendix.

University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology, Cardiff E. D. Brown

The law of the sea. By R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1983. 321pp. Index. £19·50.

Teachers of international law will welcome this useful introduction to the law of the sea. The need for such a book has long been felt. However excellent Daniel O'Connell's *The international law of the sea* may be in Ivan Shearer's edition (Vols. I & II, Oxford, 1982 & 1984), it is far too detailed for the average student. Other standard works, like Colombos, *The international law of the sea*, are since long out of date. Again, other works which have appeared on the law of the sea during or after the Third Law of the Sea Conference have either dealt with limited specific topics or, which appears to have been the case in numerous cases, have been written by authors who are basically not international lawyers and who therefore have had no firm grasp of the subject as a whole.

The objections one may raise to Churchill and Lowe's book are nearly all on the formal plane. It seems a pity that an 'introductory survey' which is most useful in itself should necessarily imply that most references and authorities are deleted. The book would have been far more useful to teachers, to those students who wish to pursue further studies and probably also to the average student who may wish to write an essay on a specific topic, if the work had been better documented. There are not even references to cases: the reader will have too look these up in a table of cases, a procedure which surely will put off all but the most ardent students. Once a case has been looked up in the table it is, of course, impossible to have a reference to anything but the first page of the report, so a Court's statement on any one point cannot be traced without further investigation. Furthermore, there are, for example, no references at all for various claims to the continental shelf by states following the Truman Declaration (pp. 110–2). We are only told that the Declaration was followed by 'similar claims on the part of many other States' (p. 110). However,

knowing the quality of well-substantiated articles published elsewhere by both authors, one may only assume that the deletion of footnotes is due to the need to save on costs when publishing the work.

Occasionally one may disagree with the viewpoint of the authors: was sixty-seven states ratifying the 1954 Pollution Convention a 'relatively low number' of States? (p. 222). There is also the odd slip: while referring to the Soveit submarine immobilized on a shoal in Swedish waters in 1981 the authors remark that 'it seems that no notification was given or authorization sought before the submarine entered Swedish waters' (p. 70), although it is a well-known fact that it was a question of illicit intrusion into the internal waters of a state.

In substance, however, the authors deal competently with the modern law of the sea, setting out relevant rules in their geographical context, i.e. in the territorial sea, various zones and on the high seas, as well as dealing with certain functional issues, such as fisheries, navigation, pollution and research. There is also a chapter on military uses of the sea, as well as one on land-locked states. It is particularly valuable to have a chronological survey of the development of the law of the sea coupled with examples from state practice.

The book is provided with a useful list of Conventions and an appendix setting out various claims to maritime zones. The index, however, is somewhat unsatisfactory as it fails, for example, to list a keyword for 'pollution' which is extensively dealt with in the book (pp. 212–53). Few teachers or students will have the imagination to search for this topic under 'marine pollution' where it is listed.

In other respects the book is well produced. It might be another incentive to students to purchase their own copy if there was a paperback edition at a lower price. It is otherwise a book that many teachers will recommend to their students.

London School of Economics and Political Science
St. Antony's College, Oxford INGRID DELUPIS

History

Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's place 1900–1975: a study of the Anglo-American relationship and world politics in the context of British and American foreign-policy-making in the twentieth century. By D. Cameron Watt. The Wiles Lectures given at the Queen's University of Belfast. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. 302pp. Index. £22·50.

THE replacement of Great Britain as a world power by the United States of America is the subject of Professor Watt's Wiles Lectures. His analysis is ordered upon a central premise: that it is the perceptions of motives and interests developed by the policy-making elites in the two countries which have regulated Anglo-American diplomatic relations. He is not concerned with the linkages—books read, visits paid—which can be subjected to crude measurement; and he is, in addition, scathing about those American commentators who confuse the study of foreign policy with the study of domestic public opinion. He suspects sociology, but cherishes prosopography. The composition of elites, and the mixing together of different generations of policy-makers (political generations much shorter in span than conventional demographic generations) with their varying ideas and experiences, offers a way of comprehending the difficulties and misunderstandings which have so often bedevilled relations between the two powers. In his notably gloomy reading of the record, Professor Watt seems particularly harsh with the Americans. The structure of decision-making in the United States lacks the tidy cohesion of cabinet responsibility and professional expertise found in Britain. Congress, bureaucracy, amateur advisers, and the foreign policy 'establishment' compete to influence decisions; only in the United States could, for example, the admirals of the Navy Board attempt, as they so often did between the two World Wars, to subvert the policies of the Presidency and the State Department. More important, the American elites frequently held a view of the world both naive, in its unawareness of external reality, and populist, in its reflection of domestic prejudices. The result was a policy of 'moral imperialism', much more damaging in its consequences than the economic expansionism and ideological rigidity identified by the revisionist historians, of whom Watt is rightly sceptical. Woodrow Wilson, of course, is censured here; but the real villain turns

out to be Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt's stubborn dislike of the British (and French) empires led him into dreadful miscalculations which, not merely over the Soviet Union, but over India, Indonesia and Indo-China as well, left the postwar settlement damaged and insecure. Upon this same misunderstanding Eden foundered in his turn. Since 1945, only in that period in which Harold Macmillan's 'Greeks within the Roman Empire' experiment coincided with the rise to power in Washington of a generational elite brought up in an atmosphere of Anglo-American cooperation during the war did the special relationship briefly emerge as more than myth.

Professor Watt argues his case with impressive vigour, but that does not mean that his conclusions command total assent. Limitation of time, in what was originally a set of lectures, prevented him from analysing in depth the origins, values and arguments of participants in policy-making. His passionate denunciation of American foolishness over decolonization obscures the main point: colonialism bowed before indigenous protest rather than external pressure. And his 'melancholy conclusion' that the United States played a major part in bringing about the decline of Britain is a rather tendentious way of describing America's failure to prop up, in the role of great power, a country whose resources no longer allowed her to play that part.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

The Russian Bureau: a case study in Wilsonian diplomacy. By Linda Killen. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press. 1983. 202pp. Index. £18·70.

MUCH has been written on the American response to the Russian revolutions of 1917, but Linda Killen's carefully researched book is the first study of a hitherto neglected theme—the War Trade Board of the United States Russian Bureau. The agency was created in October 1918 as a public corporation with a budget of five million dollars to encourage trade between the United States and Russia. The Bureau was to help in two key areas: currency stabilization, and restoration of the transport system. Economic aid, it was believed, would encourage Russia to follow democratic ways. Heralded as an ambitious project to help the Russians to help themselves, the agency was in reality no more than a gesture of support. After the Versailles treaty in June 1919 the Bureau was dissolved. Its budget was transferred to the Trans-Siberian railroad to buy new equipment—ironically benefiting the Bolsheviks once they seized Siberia. The story of the short-lived agency is worth telling for the light it throws on the flawed diplomacy of Woodrow Wilson and his advisors. Even assuming for argument's sake that extensive trade might have helped to democratize Russia, many millions of dollars would have been required. The meagre budget of the Russian Bureau reflected Wilson's vagueness of purpose and his ambivalence towards Russia and the world at large. It is not clear whether his main aim was to help the Russians or hurt the Bolsheviks. Linda Killen argues convincingly that the Bureau might have played a valuable role as 'a ready-made vehicle . . . to deradicalize Bolshevik Russia through outside contact' (p. 162). However, Wilson was his own worst enemy. The rejection of Bolshevism made it impossible to help the Russians help themselves.

Loughborough University ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

Anglo-French relations, 1934–36. By Nicholas Rostow. London: Macmillan. 1984. 314pp. Index. £20·00.

THIS book is an admirable piece of diplomatic history that shows the genre to be alive, well, and valuable, despite frequent reports of its demise. Dr Rostow declares that his main preoccupation is political, arguing that economic problems were peripheral to foreign policy in his chosen period. He concentrates on the discussions and decisions of ministers and civil servants, on their conceptions of the national interest, and on their fears, memories, and prejudices. Domestic political issues are not ignored (for example, the British general election of 1935 makes a number of appearances); but primarily this is a study of foreign policy and its makers in their own right.

The period 1934–6 has received less attention than the more dramatic crises of 1938–9, and it is good to have the balance redressed here. The central issue was the French and British response to German rearmament, which was at first clandestine and then, from March 1935, open. Reactions were confused. The French tried negotiations with Italy and the Soviet Union to set up anti-German alliances, though with the hope that they might do a deal with the Germans in the long run. The British tried the meaningless but high-sounding idea of an 'Air Locarno', and made their own deal with Germany in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. (Dr Rostow is particularly strong on the consequences of this agreement for Anglo-French relations.) In the middle of all this, the Italians attacked Ethiopia, forcing agonizing choices on men whose stock in trade was to avoid decisions if at all possible. Dr Rostow makes a clinical analysis of these events, using British and French government archives, and to a lesser extent private papers. There are no dramatic revelations, but even the most knowledgeable specialist will find some nuggets among the carefully accumulated detail.

As the author indicates, his sources are fuller on the British side than on the French, and the analysis of British policy is correspondingly more satisfying. The opening chapter, on the British search for a policy in 1934, should be required reading for all students of British policy in the 1930s. The author's views on British policy are severe: it was muddled, indecisive, and given to fudging issues by playing with words. Simon appears as an ineffectual muddler. Among the ambassadors, even Phipps comes under severe criticism. Vansittart emerges with much credit until the end, when Dr Rostow suggests his judgement broke down under the strain of the Ethiopian crisis. The treatment of French policy is more sympathetic, and there is an interesting discussion of Laval, attempting to get back to contemporary views of his personality. It will be salutary for many British readers to have the French case stated so clearly.

The book comes to a rather ragged end with a hasty discussion of the Rhineland crisis, and it is to be hoped that Dr Rostow will continue his researches. He writes with clarity, verve, and wit, and may be read with pleasure as well as profit.

University of Liverpool P. M. H. BELL

The great powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire. Edited by Marian Kent. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1984. 273pp. Index. £18.00.

'NO STATE', Winston Churchill opined, 'plunged into the [First] World War so wilfully as Turkey.' No other state, it might be added, had been more consistently the object of attention of all the major powers of Europe during the previous sixty years. And although, as Marian Kent asserts in her introduction to this collection of essays, there was at the turn of the century a 'general desire' on the part of the powers to see the Ottoman empire survive as a political entity 'for its total disintegration was a worse alternative' (p. 1), few of them felt able for long to ignore the question of what they might lay claim to in the event of the empire's collapse.

With the exception of the first chapter, in which Feroz Ahmad analyses the Porte's predicament in trying to hold together a country which lacked most of the characteristics necessary for cohesion, each of the contributors explores the policies pursued by individual great powers towards Ottoman Turkey in its declining years and seeks to assess their responsibility for its demise. Five of the authors are already well-established authorities in their respective spheres, and their chapters tend either to summarise, or to supplement, their previous writings. Thus, F. R. Bridge argues that while the destinies of the Habsburg and Ottoman monarchies appear to be inextricably mixed, their interests were in practice far from identical; R. J. B. Bosworth reasons that despite the Libyan war, Italy was 'not an initiator, but simply the power which did not wish to be left out' (p. 57) of the scramble for influence in Turkey; Ulrich Trumpener maintains that the only discernible constant in Germany's Turkish policies was the advancement and protection of her commerce and investments; and Marian Kent emphasises Britain's desire to preserve her political, and therefore her economic, influence in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. In chapters on the roles played by Russia and France in helping to determine Turkey's fate, Alan Bodger insists on the predominant interest of the Russians in preventing any other power from gaining

control of the Straits, and L. Bruce Fulton surveys the response of the French to Germany's economic challenge to their immense financial stake in Turkey.

While all of the contributors have coped admirably with the difficulties involved in dealing briefly with complex issues, it is doubtful whether in a book intended primarily for specialists quite so much space need have been given in some of the essays to providing details of the careers of well-known politicians and diplomats of the period. Nevertheless, researchers in this area may have much to learn from this book. It will certainly be of value to undergraduates and to others who wish to understand the processes by which the Near Eastern question of yesterday gave way to the Middle Eastern problems of today.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEITH A. HAMILTON

Germany, Russia and the Balkans: prelude to the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact. By Marilynn Giroux Hitchens. Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs. 1983. (Distrib. by Columbia University Press, NY.) 350pp. Index. $36·00.

THE publishers claim that East European Monographs consist of scholarly books but this is a most illiterate one. Misprints abound. Some are remarkable—Rebecca West's Yugoslav book appears as *Black Lombard Grey Falcon* (p. 319)! Others result in nonsense: 'the Greeks were frightened, believing that the Axis approach . . . would bid strong attraction for . . . Bulgaria to join the Axis'. Words appear which are unknown to dictionaries: 'ascerbation', 'obstinance', 'seatbed'. We are told on page 11 what the German Minister in Prague wrote in 1937; we are told it again on page 19 without any cross-reference. The meaning of some sentences is clearly not that intended by the author; what she intended by others is hard to divine—'The Nazis were the architect in that the witches brew had already been done with sufficient impunity to destroy the British efforts at East European collaboration' (p. 54).

It is a thousand pities that the book was not revised by someone familiar with the American language. For when one has surmounted these obstacles to comprehension, one discovers a thoughtful study of a subject which has not been covered in just this way, at any rate recently. Mrs Giroux Hitchens' research has included Russian as well as Western and German sources and she has a good grip of the way in which the policies of the various countries interacted.

Her main theme is that, after the rape of Czechoslovakia, Britain by its offer of guarantees sought to create a defence system including Poland, the Balkans and Turkey, more to act as a deterrent to than as an alliance in war. It failed because the feuds between the nation states of the Balkans made them incapable of combining for defence. They preferred neutrality on the basis of the status quo, a policy which suited the German desire to go on drawing supplies from them and to have a secure rear during the wars against Poland and France. But their rejection of Britain's approaches left Britain with no way of rendering that rear insecure unless it sought Soviet support. The bid for that support, although lukewarm, gave Moscow the lever it needed to exact from the Germans not merely a promise of neutrality but also permission to expand into Eastern Europe as the reward for that neutrality (a price which Britain and France refused to pay).

The Russo-German Pact did not deal with the Balkans, because the conflicting interests of the parties in that area made agreement impossible. It suited both sides to keep things as they were for the time being. But no sooner had Germany won its French war than the Soviet Union implemented the permission given it in the Pact to grab Bessarabia. This set in motion a chain of changes in the Balkans which ended in their total occupation by Germany and the replacement of Germany by Russia four years later. But although the Balkan states may have lost their freedom, they kept their nationhood.

MICHAEL BALFOUR

British policy towards Greece during the Second World War, 1941–1944. By Procopis Papastratis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics. 1984. 274pp. Index. £25·00; $49·50.

IN recent years, English-speaking students of events in Greece in the 1940s have been excellently served by the works of Iatrides, Woodhouse, Wittner, Clogg, Loulis and

Alexander. Many facets of the fate of that unhappy country have been illuminated by the thorough research of these and other authors.

The present work is another major contribution to our knowledge. It covers the period from the withdrawal of the British, together with the Greek monarch and government, from the Greek mainland in April 1941, up to the return there of another Greek government with its British allies in October 1944. The author's main source material comes from the British government documents at the Public Records Office. This information is supplemented by unpublished Greek sources, in particular the diary of Tsouderos, the Greek prime minister during most of the period, as well as the growing published literature.

Dr Papastratis's work does not radically revise the broad picture of Anglo-Greek relations in this period. What it does do is provide the most detailed survey of the events that we are likely to obtain. It clarifies previously disputed points, such as Zervas's contacts with the Germans, and adds meat to matters which have previously been left bare-boned, such as the Lebanon Conference.

The central theme is the client status of Greece, epitomized by the relationship of the Greek king and government to the Foreign Office, and also charted in the attitude of the British military to their Greek counterparts. In form, the 'British connection' ranged from a preference for constitutional nicety to a readiness for force when necessary. Woven into this broad pattern are such complexities of the particular situation as the divisions between the Foreign Office and SOE; the institutional question; the Venizelist-Populist legacy; the double-edged nature of the Greek resistance; and American and Soviet policy.

The reader is guided skilfully through this labyrinth. The writing is precise, the chronology clear, the presentation of subordinate themes in separate sections facilitates our understanding, and the research is first-rate. This is a very important study, which can be read with benefit by students of British wartime foreign policy, those seeking to understand the disasters which befell Greece in the 1940s, and those sceptical of the concept of 'sovereignty', particularly when applied to a government-in-exile.

TONY SHARP

Balkan economic history, 1550–1950: from imperial borderlands to developing nations. By John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. 1982. 728pp. Index. $37·50.

THIS book is not only a welcome complement to Barbara Jelavich's *History of the Balkans* (reviewed in *International Affairs*, Spring 1984), but contains much general history in itself; in the case of Romania it presents a chapter of Jewish history. John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, two American scholars, have managed to assemble an amazing abundance of not easily accessible facts and figures for four centuries. They know how to combine historical knowledge with professional economic expertise—there is no other comparable comprehensive publication in existence.

Part one of the book deals with the time from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, part two with the period 1860–1914, while part three is devoted to the two world wars and the inter-war period. There are few factual mistakes. (In 1945, Yugoslavia did not gain from Italy 'only the small Istrian Peninsula' but likewise the important harbour towns of Rijeka, or Fiume, and Zadar, or Zara.) Some of the unearthed statistics are highly illuminating. So is the economic backwardness of the Balkan countries reflected in the fact that in 1911 the independent states of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia each exported less *per capita* than the grossly neglected territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina under Habsburg domination. The Austrian province of Slovenia—*Krain* or Carniola (today Yugoslavia's most prosperous republic)—exported more than the whole of Romania.

Unfortunately, the profound changes from German domination to—with the exception of Greece—Soviet hegemony in the period 1945–50 are given only about ten out of a text of 600 pages. Soviet attempts after 1948 to strangle Tito by an economic boycott are not

mentioned at all. One would have liked the inclusion of figures showing the extent of UNRRA deliveries to the Balkan countries. (They are only perfunctorily mentioned in regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, which received $428 million between 1945 and 1947.) The omissions are partly compensated by the conclusion, extending the story to the 1950s and 1960s.

J. W. BRUEGEL

Mao Zedong: a preliminary reassessment. By Stuart R. Schram. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. 1983. 104pp. $17·50.

Chou: the story of Zhou En-lai, 1898–1976. By Dick Wilson. London: Hutchinson. 1984. 349pp. Index. £14·95.

THE works under consideration deal with the two most important personalities in the development of Chinese communism. Stuart Schram's study is based on the interrelationship between Mao Zedong's character and the theoretical and practical evolution of communism in China. Dick Wilson pursues a straightforward biographical approach in discussing the career of Zhou En-lai.

Professor Schram has written extensively on Mao in previous works; the present study comprises the text of lectures delivered in 1982 at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, accompanied by a reproduction of the questions and answers at the end of each lecture. Mao's career is divided into the formative years (1917–37), a quarter century of achievement (1937–62), and the final phase. Schram's assessments are always sharply defined, stimulating, and provocative, infused by many years of close examination and reflection upon 'the great helmsman'. Mao came early to identify the peasantry as the key to revolutionary success but he was not unmindful of the problems involved; his somewhat uncritical praise in 1926 was to be qualified subsequently. Mao's maverick qualities emerge clearly, and the extent to which he took an independent line, notably in the 1930s. He seized his opportunity in 1935 and assumed the leadership from the discredited Moscow-inspired clique. It took nine years to establish his control of the party effectively.

Schram is admirable in elucidating the finer points in Mao's thinking. In the original draft of *On new democracy* Mao placed the peasants alongside the urban petty bourgeoisie and referred to them under the latter name. He emphasized the importance of tradition in Chinese history and stressed that comrades should not just concentrate on the interpretation of Marx, Engels, and Lenin; but that it was vital to inculcate ideas over and over again until they were embraced by the masses. Mao was ready for qualified cooperation with the Guomindang from 1933 onwards, but not to the degree urged by the Comintern in 1935. On the eve of taking power in 1949 Mao stated: 'China can develop steadily under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party from an agricultural into an industrial country, and from a new democratic into a socialist and communist society, abolish classes and realize the Great Harmony'. He recognized that the education of the peasantry was the most crucial challenge facing the communist state. They must be persuaded and encouraged but they alone could not determine the pace of the developing communist state. Mao is sometimes interpreted as desiring a rural utopia, but Schram underlines the point that Mao was always interested in achieving swift economic progress. At the same time, he was caught in an inescapable dilemma: how to reconcile concrete advancement with the realities of the Chinese situation.

Schram regards Mao broadly as a positive figure for Chinese development as far as the Great Leap Forward. Thereafter, setbacks and dissent within the party embittered Mao and brought out to the full the malevolent side of his character, present but not so marked hitherto. The waste, destruction, and savagery of the cultural revolution ensued, while Mao went into a decline amidst the strident assertiveness of Jiang Qing and her supporters. This is an excellent work to which one can profitably return in the sure knowledge that new light on the subject will emerge.

Dick Wilson provides a clear, convincing portrait of Zhou En-lai. His is a difficult task, since the sources are scattered with areas of appreciable obscurity, leaving room for legitimate speculation. Zhou emerges as astute, subtle, masterly, but not so consumed by ambition for the top post as to end by suffering the fate experienced respectively by Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. Zhou was always a consummate actor: the author remarks on the skill with which the young Zhou used to perform in female dramatic roles. Zhou survived as a principal leader of the party from the late 1920s to the mid-1970s because of his ability to discern the trend of events so that he did not commit himself irrevocably to a losing cause; he was a talented administrator and made himself indispensable to Mao. Zhou faced his greatest difficulties in the 1960s. He has sometimes been termed a moderate; but Wilson rightly reminds the reader of Zhou's ruthlessness, his contribution to the mass slaughter of the early 1950s, and of his support for the original call to renew revolutionary ardour that sparked off the catastrophic course of the cultural revolution. As it intensified, Zhou sought to sustain his position through a mixture of concession and rebuke to the youthful extremists. The limits to his power were shown when he was unable to defend his adopted daughter, killed during the cultural revolution. Zhou contributed much to the rapprochement with the United States but he recognized that the decline in his health was such that the end was near. In October 1972 he read an ancient poem to American guests: 'Though it lives longer than most, The tortoise, too, comes to an end . . .' Zhou's life explains the constructive side of communism in power and why the reverses it suffered, although serious, were not far worse. Dick Wilson's account is a lively, if perhaps unduly anecdotal, guide to the career of the great survivor of Chinese communism.

University of Manchester PETER LOWE

Western Europe

The European Community transport policy: towards a common transport policy. By Jürgen Erdmenger. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1984. 155pp. Index. £14·50.

ANY attempt to create an effective common market in Western Europe has to grapple with the question of transport. This was recognized by the Treaty of Rome which spoke of the need for a common transport policy and also took up certain issues such as the rules to govern transport between members and the application of the rules of establishment, competition and the like. Whilst we do not yet have a common transport policy, enough Community action has occurred over specific issues, often deriving from the Treaty, to prevent transport being written off as a Community failure. It is a field which demonstrates a familiar story: limited technical progress, vast preparatory work by the Commission to establish a Community policy which is constantly frustrated by national interests in the Council of Ministers, lack of money due to the budget imbroglio with sporadic forays by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice to keep the Community interest alive.

With the passage of time the question of a common transport policy becomes more urgent. The integration of the market both requires, and is dependent upon, simple, free passage of both goods and people and the growing volume of intra-Community trade makes this increasingly obvious whilst enlarging the problems such a policy must tackle. Increased traffic flows create more congestion, more environmental stress and require more investment. Motorways and airways have come to challenge the traditional supremacy of canals, rail and road. New members have meant the geographical extension of the market and brought new interests in shipping. Non-members are also affected. Much Community traffic passes across Switzerland and Austria on its north-south route whilst Yugoslavia has become a transit path between Greece and her Community partners. It is not surprising that Austria has requested Community aid for motorway financing.

Whilst the Community has to offer the possibility of policy development to meet the needs of the economy, traditionally policy has been built up by member states for their own reasons which have resulted in different mixes of transport systems. It would be foolish to deny that there are often good reasons for these varying priorities. Long-distance rail transport of goods is more appealing in France and Germany than in the Netherlands or the United Kingdom where hauls are shorter and access to the ports quicker. Thus any

Community policy cannot mean the preference for one mode of transport over another but an work to integrate the various systems, prevent national policies standing in the way of narket integration, open national systems up, help with investment and negotiate interationally on a world-wide or continental basis.

This study reflects these issues admirably, dealing with all main forms of transport. It nakes it plain that a few enlightened bureaucrats, struggling to present transport needs from he Community point of view, will achieve little and that political will is the vital but nissing ingredient.

Jniversity of Leeds DOREEN COLLINS

A singular state: Irish neutrality in the 1980s. By Patrick Keatinge. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. 1984. 162pp. Index. £11·95. Pb.: £4·95.

THE title is highly suggestive of what emerges clearly from this interesting book, namely hat an important element of Irish foreign policy, its apparent neutrality, is *sui generis.* Keatinge is clear that in joining the European Community the Irish 'definitely parted ompany' (p. 45) with the continental neutrals, and that their security and economic policies lso contain significant differences. In establishing the nature and evolution of this singular tance, the work is interesting and a valuable contribution to an understanding of Irish oreign policy behaviour. This is important for outsiders given the general neglect of Ireland nd is clearly necessary internally given the 'divergence between the concept of ultimately negotiable military neutrality, as practised by governments whatever their rhetoric, and the oncept of fundamental neutrality' as advanced by some sections of Irish opinion (p. 118). Where one might take issue with the author is in his belief that this divergence is of recent origin, whereas it can reasonably be argued that the tension between pragmatic and principled neutrality dates back to before the foundation of the Irish state in 1922. Nevertheless, this book is a very good introduction to the somewhat tangled and ambiguous nature of the rish position.

It is the re-emergence of neutrality as an issue in Irish politics that prompted this book, nd it does contribute significantly to informed discussion of the issue. It deals briefly with elevant concepts, the Irish historical context, which Keatinge argues is crucial since it is in his context that 'most Irish people, but few others see it' (p. 7), a comparative European nalysis, the military and diplomatic challenges to the Irish position, and very helpfully for foreign audience, Irish domestic attitudes and positions. All of these issues are dealt with briefly, perhaps too briefly.

This is particularly the case in the section 'Neutrality: a word and its meanings' (pp. –9). Given the author's objectives of aiding understanding and clarifying concepts, this ection is disappointing, with little more than a nod at definitions of, and distinctions between, neutrality, neutralization, neutralism and non-alignment. Whilst there is some ecognition that there are rights and duties associated with neutrality, the essence of neutrality s described as 'not being involved in wars between other states' (p. 3). This may be a factor n neutrality, but it ought not to be regarded as synonymous with neutrality since it also lescribes a position of non-belligerence. Indeed a case can be made for seeing Irish policy s non-belligerence rather than neutrality, particularly since in 1981 the Irish Minister of Defence referred to Ireland's 'non-belligerency status' (p. 65). There is also insufficient ecognition that if 'ultimately negotiable' (p. 118), this is a fatal flaw in a neutral policy, as s the lack of effective defence.

What does emerge strongly is the fundamental ambiguity in the Irish position as evidenced learly during the Falklands episode. Initially the Irish supported Community sanctions, but after the sinking of the General Belgrano did not, with the leader of the government uggesting sanctions were imcompatible with neutrality and the opposition leader suggesting otherwise.

Whilst making no judgement upon the validity or otherwise of the Irish policy of neutrality, Patrick Keatinge does believe that the challenges to it do not 'add up to a critical hreat' (p. 98). That may be too sanguine.

Jniversity of St Andrews TREVOR C. SALMON

What kind of country: modern Irish politics 1968–1983. By Bruce Arnold. London: Cape. 1984. 241pp. Index. £12·50. Pb.: £3·95.

FOR a political journalist who has had his telephone tapped with government connivance, Arnold's survey of modern Irish politics is remarkably without rancour, and never vituperative. His long involvement in Irish political journalism is reflected in a close affinity with the events and personalities he describes. At the end we are left wondering, as the title does, what kind of country Ireland is today; but the underlying purpose is serious enough: Arnold does not feel that the Irish political system has matured during the past twenty years or so. He is understandably anxious that the real questions of the economy and of civil liberties go unanswered and that the green mists of irredentism divert attention from the more urgent issues. The latter part of the book is marked by the emergence of two very different politicians: Charles Haughey and Garret Fitzgerald. The former Arnold depicts as evasive, better at fending off questions than answering them; the latter as actively seeking the media and being, if anything, too garrulous in interviews. On the question of Northern Ireland, the approaches of the two politicians are poles apart: Haughey can be relied upon to 'play the green card', to arouse atavistic national sentiments, to erect verbal ambiguity into a political principle. Fitzgerald, on the other hand, seems more sensitive to northern unionists, more willing to compromise, less likely to confront Britain.

The Northern Ireland conflict rumbles in the background through most of the book. Nowhere is the interplay between events in the two parts of Ireland made more apparent than in the author's treatment of the Sunningdale experiment which brought five months of power-sharing government to the North. Not only were splits in unionism responsible for whittling away the fledgling Executive's authority, but Arnold shows how maverick voices on the margins of Fianna Fail caused the Dublin Government's support for Sunningdale to be eroded. Arnold demonstrates how southern politicians have, on more than one occasion, been able to exploit the Northern crisis as a lever to advance their own republican credentials without having to bear the consequences. With some relish, he shows how this competitive republicanism sets up strains within Fianna Fail. Jack Lynch is embarrassed by a speech from Sile de Valera, invoking her dead grandfather's authority without fear of contradiction; and Charles Haughey is embarrassed (one assumes) by a speech from his Defence Minister castigating Britain as the 'aggressor now' after the sinking of the *General Belgrano.* Haughey's response to the latter outburst is to describe it as 'spontaneous . . . personal . . . understandable' but to leave aside the crucial question of whether he was supporting or disowning his Cabinet colleague.

For anyone who has lived in Ireland through these events, there is little that is new or startling in this book. For the outsider, the book is written with a light touch and a dry wit. It could be argued that the tone is too light for the topic. Ireland is a country where there are great disparities between rich and poor; it is a country where the dangerous illusion that Britain can be blamed for almost anything precludes a serious attempt to grasp the nettles of economic decay and social deprivation; and in a land where many minority groups look forward to a more pluralist society, the reaction is so often to look the other way or deal in rhetoric. All these sad facets of Irish life are implicit in Arnold's text, but his fascination with the comic opera aspects of politicians strutting on their tiny stage tends to submerge, and obscure from view, the deeper wounds that scar the body politic.

Queen's University, Belfast E. MOXON-BROWNE

The Mediterranean region: economic interdependence and the future of society. Edited by Giacomo Luciani. London: Croom Helm. 1984. 333pp. Index. £16·95.

THE Atlanticism which has so often dominated British attitudes invariably leads to an underestimation of the importance of other regions. The Mediterranean is no exception despite its significance as the confluence of East and West, North and South. Even the fact that the UK, through the colony of Gibraltar and the sovereign bases on Cyprus, has some claims to be a Mediterranean coastal state does not often impinge on the British consciousness. The problems of those below the 'olive tree line' tend to be overlooked; there seems to be a mental void—only sometimes filled by wayward or obstreperous individuals such as Mr

intoff or Colonel Qadhafi—until one reaches 'The Middle East'. Geographically such a osition is a nonsense; politically and strategically as well, it often makes sense to treat the vhole of the Middle East, including the Gulf, as bound up with the Mediterranean.

The publication of *The Mediterranean region* is thus important (and it is a pity that the ublishers did not think it worth a better format). The focus of the book is particularly nteresting: the impact of new developments relating to the Sea itself. It concentrates on hree areas: the economic interests of coastal states and their control over the Sea and its esources; the evolving international legal regime of the Sea; and the technological progress n weapon systems and their diffusion among Mediterranean states. These changes give rise o new pressures for cooperation, not least by creating the danger of new conflicts.

Chapters one and two provide an excellent background, covering the Mediterranean and ts resources, its place in the energy picture and the moves made towards controlling and rotecting its environment. Chapters three and four on general legal considerations—the xtension and delimitation of national sea boundaries and the Arab states and major sea ssues—are less good. Both suffer from a lack of self-discipline on the part of their authors. ligh standards (and some splendidly racy writing) are returned to in chapter five on Aaghrebi politics and they are maintained in the chapters on terrorism or sub-national onflicts, and the military capabilities of the coastal states. These capabilities have changed he character of security in the region; high technology weapons are becoming increasingly ommon making surface naval vessels (including, of course, those of the super-powers) nore vulnerable while at the same time adding to the temptation to indulge in a certain mount of gunboat diplomacy on the part of the non-super-powers.

The arrangement of the book then goes somewhat awry, for the discussion of defence nd security issues is interrupted by a chapter on the perceptions of the essentially civilian ower of the European Community. The chapter itself is a typically thorough review of he various options confronting the Community; it simply fits in a little oddly. However, a vider discussion of Soviet and American objectives and strategies is then resumed. The 'ariability of standards within any collection of papers is nowhere more clearly marked than n these last two chapters. The chapter on Soviet policy is particularly poor.

The strength of the book (Luciani himself suggests it is its peculiarity) is that complex ssues are dealt with from different angles and disciplines. One can only applaud and endorse he editor's hope that "As one who finds great enjoyment in wandering over and around he Mediterranean, I . . . hope that this modest effort will contribute to a peaceful, sensible olution to the many conflicts that plague it."

avid Davies Memorial Institute, London GEOFFREY EDWARDS

pain: change of a nation. By Robert Graham. London: Michael Joseph. 1984. 327pp. ndex. £14·95.

ROBERT GRAHAM provides a comprehensive account of the background to the so-called transition to democracy' in Spain, and an intelligent commentary on the political dilemmas of trying to build an open and pluralist society after forty years of dictatorship. While he lenies that his intention is to write a history, his argument ranges from the far historical to he topical, and combines historical vignettes on matters economic, political, cultural and biographical with contemporary comment and colour in what is mostly a successful amalgam of shorthand history and personal insights.

The author was the *Financial Times* Madrid correspondent from 1977 to 1982, and I think t fair to say that the strengths and weaknesses of his book are journalistic ones. Thus the ccount is enlivened by its concentration on the conspiracies and the corruption which have xercised public opinion during the past few years, and by its informative presentation of he main personalities—which sometimes seems to make us privy to the political gossip of pain's capital city. The author is especially good on the King and his role and, as might e expected from a correspondent of his calibre, on the mass media and the banking sector. The latter he correctly identifies as the key to an understanding of Spain's political economy.

Against these strengths we have to set the anecdotal approach of the author, which occasionally confuses by including unconnected titbits of information which appear to contribute little to the development of the argument. Such an approach is less worrying in his analysis of the contemporary context than in some of the historical passages, such as

that on the birth and consolidation of the 'workers' commissions' (pp. 108ff), where it can be seriously misleading. To some degree this betrays merely a simple lack of historical reading (to which the author freely confesses). But there are also signs of over-hasty, and sometimes contradictory, historical judgements: 'The Spain of these early years was a fascist dictatorship', we are told categorically (p. 16); but less than two pages later we learn that 'the opposition seriously misjudged the durability of Franco. The regime was dismissed too simplistically as a fascist dictatorship'.

To press this kind of criticism, however, would be to demand a different kind of book—more compendious, more academic—from the one the author wanted to write. He did not want a book weighed down with scholarly scruples, but has rather worked to achieve an informed political analysis in the same style and at the same level of sophistication as the editorials in *El Pais*, the flag-bearer of the newly liberal and newly independent press in Spain, and a newspaper which he refers to more than once with (well-deserved) respect and admiration. There is no doubt that he has largely succeeded in his task.

University of Essex JOE FOWERAKER

Political parties in Turkey: the role of Islam. By Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdaği. New York: Praeger. 1984. 176pp. Index. $25·95.

IN discussions of the 'Islamic resurgence' in Middle Eastern politics of recent years, Turkey tends to get separate treatment. The distinction is, in many respects, a reasonable one. In the first place, Turkey is the only state in the middle east which is formally committed to secularist principles. This commitment is repeated in the most recent Constitution (of 1982) as in its predecessors. From the Atatürk era, Turkey has inherited legal, educational and governmental systems squarely based on Western, not Islamic, traditions. In the second place, the Islamic re-entry into politics has been far more muted and, to all appearances, less influential than in most other Muslim countries. As Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdaği concludes, 'there has been a long-term trend of secularization despite some short-term religious upheavals . . . Present conditions as well as future prospects favour the perpetuation of this trend' (p. 156).

As it is, his book does not confine itself to the role of Islam in Turkish politics. In effect, what he offers us in a survey of the country's political development since the late nineteenth century, in which the religious question is brought in at suitable points in the narrative, rather than an exclusive concentration of Turkish Islam. Most of what he has to say is not particularly original, but may be useful to newcomers to the subject. By going back to the Young Turk era, he draws attention to the evolution of secularism before the Ataturk period, which often gets ignored. There are useful summaries of the Ataturk reforms, the post-war political liberalisation, the rise and fall of the Democrat Party and the see-saw alternations between military and civilian rule since 1960. The attitudes towards Islam of each of Turkey's major parties are discussed in an informative, straightforward manner. Economic and social changes are also brought into the story, to illustrate the point that they have probably have had as much if not more influence in shaping popular attitudes as formal legal or constitutional provisions. In general, the author is a strong supporter of secularism, but resents its occasional exaggeration and degeneration into an aping of western consumerism.

On the debit side, it could be argued that Dr Geyikdaği's wide ranging approach leaves out too much of the important detail. For example, the division between the Sunni and Alevi is occasionally referred to, but there is no proper evaluation of its recent political role. The dervish orders are also missing from the picture. In his historical discussion, the author refers briefly to popular opposition to Ataturk's secularism (such as the Seyh Sait rebellion of 1925) but tells us very little about it. All these topics are sensitive ones in Turkey, and it would be interesting to know more about them.

University of Durham WILLIAM HALE

Interest groups and political development in Turkey. By Robert Bianchi. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1984. 426pp. Index. £38·80. Pb.: £15·20.

THE clue to this book and, in a sense, its problem, is revealed in the first sentence of the preface. It is intended both 'to use certain social science concepts to learn about politics in

Turkey' and 'to use evidence from Turkey . . . to improve the concepts'. The two aims do not always combine harmoniously. Professor Bianchi analyses in considerable detail the attitude of successive Turkish regimes, from Ottoman times onwards, to freedom of association, or rather the degree of control and regulation to which associations have been subjected. This is without doubt a curious and interesting strand in Turkish constitutional and social history. What is not so clear is whether it played so important a part in shaping political developments as the author would have us believe.

Nevertheless, for the student of Turkish politics who is not a social scientist, it is well worth wading through, or skipping, the jargon (what is a 'vertically structured, quasi-monopolistic peak association', p. 142?) for the sake of remarkable insights into ancient and modern history. The Ottoman social orders were divided not by class, as in the West, but by occupation. Each was directly dependent on the state, not in a graduated hierarchy as in the feudal system, and the rewards of each order were determined by the differing contribution which each could make. The tradition was continued through the Kemalist revolution with its insistence on populism, etatism and corporatism. The State Economic Enterprises, now widely seen as the bane of economic progress, were due as much to the idea of avoiding the creation of class antagonism between capitalists and workers, as to the absence of local sources of capital which is generally given as the main reason for their creation.

Class-based parties made a comparatively late appearance in the Turkish political scene, and labour legislation has followed an uneven course between an earlier paternalism and more recent attempts sometimes by the parties, sometimes by the unions, to establish linkages which might win votes for politicians and constitutional concessions for the workers. It is in this respect and many others a pity that practically the whole of this book appears to have been written before the turning point of 1980. Indeed, much of the statistical evidence is derived from even earlier periods, e.g. the distribution of credits by Turkish banks from a World Bank publication of 1975 (p. 60), tables of ownership (on p. 63) from 1963–73 statistics, and planning data from the third five year plan, when the fifth has now just been published. This information may be useful for refining comparative social science concepts, but needs to be brought up to date in order to sharpen our perspective on Turkey's future.

BERNARD BURROWS

USSR and Eastern Europe

Soviet decisionmaking for national security. Edited by Jiri Valenta and William Potter. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1984. 319pp. Index. £27.50. Pb.: £12.50

THE editors of this substantial work set out to assess and further Western understanding of how the Soviet decision-making system works on defence-related issues, making the point in several places that the limited nature of our knowledge of Soviet policy at large and specific decisions in particular stems more from a failure to apply Western decision-making models properly than an over-enthusiastic application of Western concepts to a totally alien Soviet polity. The book contains chapters surveying the 'state of the art' in Soviet defence decision-making modelling (Alexander, Meyer, Potter), outlining the evolution of institutions and their interactions under Stalin (Aspaturian) and Brezhnev (Simes) and assessing the role of the military in weapons development (Hough), defence research and development (Ellen Jones) and SALT (Garthoff). Valenta deals with decision-making in the 1968 Czech and 1979 Afghan crises, Golan examines key decisions in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and Ross reflects on Soviet risk taking and risk aversion propensities in general. Each chapter is of the highest quality in terms of the command of sources and analytical dexterity.

The chapters by Aspaturian, Hough, Simes and Ellen Jones, taken together, bring out the factors promoting continuity and change in the balance of institutions and individuals and the processes that shape Soviet military posture. Garthoff, indeed, points to ways in which the SALT experience, through the broader diffusion of strategic information within the USSR, created the prospect of some slight erosion of the traditional policy compartmentalization affecting military policy-making.

In the section of the book dealing with foreign policy decision-making, Valenta repeats his application of the bureaucratic politics approach to policy formulation, comparing the Czech and Afghan episodes. Golan, on the other hand, tends toward the rational actor approach, given the well-known difficulties involved in accurately inferring high-level policy conflicts from differing nuances in the Soviet press. Rather, she concentrates on depicting the manner in which Soviet decisions over the Yom Kippur War reflected the dilemmas Moscow faced in reconciling contradictory global and local interests. Ross's chapter on Soviet risk aversion complements the case studies well, arguing that the demands of coalition maintenance in the ruling Soviet oligarchy require the eschewal of major innovation and the avoidance of high-risk action unless the need to prevent or preempt policy failure itself is perceived as a risk-avoiding option by insecure leadership figures. Overall, the imperative to avoid failure has played a much greater role in promoting the Soviet use of force than any desire to 'create big successes' (p. 237).

The three chapters devoted specifically to the conceptualization of Soviet decision-making are perhaps the most challenging and instructive. Meyer's critique of the predominant Western schools of thought makes some incisive points about the often implicit, untested assumptions lying behind various models of Soviet behaviour, and provides a comprehensive bibliography at the end. He constructs a composite model seeking to employ the strengths of each approach and apply their insights at the appropriate level of analysis. Potter builds upon Alexander's observations about the different modes of behaviour of high and low-level actors, urging a sequential view of the decision-making process that would recognize the varying relevance of the range of Western models to its several partially distinct phases.

The greatest value of this book—and there are many—lies in the impression the reader gets that much *is* known and understood about the processes behind Soviet defence and foreign policy, and that the key to future progress may lie initially in an intellectual stocktaking of the kind offered here, to be followed by more rigorous and discriminating application of each of the Western models in their own proper contexts. It is a most timely addition to the literature on Soviet defence decision-making, and it will be of use to academic researchers, those in government, and the more informed general public in their search for insight into why the Soviet Union does what it does in the military realm.

University of Aberdeen DAVID SCRIVENER

Soviet political scientists and American politics. By Neil Malcolm. London: Macmillan, for the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham. 1984. 225pp. Index. £25.00.

THIS is a timely and informative book. Among Western students of Soviet foreign policy-making there has been much recent interest in the development, over the past twenty-five years, of Soviet research on capitalist political systems and international relations; and particularly that emanating from the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada. But no major attempt has been made hitherto systematically to examine and interpret the flood of scholarship produced by these institutes, nor to assess what influence it has, if any, on the decision-making process. Neil Malcolm's detailed analysis of the specialist literature, which he has supplemented by interviews with members of the institutes, helps to bridge the gap in our knowledge.

The book begins by tracing the historical development of IMEMO and the USA Institute, focusing on the ideological environment and setting in which they operate, the personnel who head them and their relationship with the political leadership. Chapter two examines Soviet theoretical debates on the nature of the state in capitalist society—debates which have recently led to innovations in interpreting the relationship between business and government in the United States. Malcolm argues that in spite of institutional and ideological restrictions on theorizing, some Soviet scholars are nevertheless deviating in their work from the traditional conception of 'state monopoly capitalism'.

Chapters three and four are the most informative of Malcolm's study: they highlight the obvious confusion and difficulty Soviet scholars have experienced in trying to understand the domestic roots of American international practice. They also draw attention to the

seriousness which Soviet Americanists display in seeking to comprehend the complexity of American politics. Chapter three looks at Soviet research on the ideological orientations of American political parties and the political attitudes of the masses. Early works on these subjects showed that the Republican and Democratic parties shared the same dominant ideology and political attitudes, with only slight variations; but recent works have formulated more complex typologies and recognize mass influences on the formulation of both domestic and foreign policies. Chapter four deals with Soviet Americanists' views of the institutional setting in which US foreign policy is made, and draws attention to the revised evaluation of Presidential supremacy. Although Malcolm did not find unanimity regarding the political function of Congress, there does seem to be in the Soviet scholarly community a frustration with the bureaucratic, institutionalized conflict between the different branches of US government in formulating foreign policy.

In summary, this book can be recommended as an overview of the development of American studies in the Soviet Union from the 1940s to the present. But anyone hoping for a resolution of the debate as to how much influence scholars in IMEMO or the US Institute have on political leadership and the making of Soviet foreign policy will be disappointed. This subject is touched on only briefly in the concluding chapter, and we are simply told that this '. . . must continue to be a matter of educated guesswork' (p. 164).

University of Essex PETER J. SHEARMAN

Soviet policy toward Western Europe: implications for the Atlantic alliance. Edited by Herbert J. Ellison. Seattle, London: University of Washington Press. 1984. (First publ. Washington, 1983.) 322pp. Index. £25.50. Pb.: £12.70.

COMPLAINTS that Soviet foreign policy gets less than its fair share of expert academic attention must sound rather odd to the University of Washington, whose Center for Contemporary Chinese and Soviet Studies has been providing evidence to the contrary for some considerable time. In 1982 came the superb set of conference papers on the USSR and China, which was published under the title *The Sino-Soviet conflict: a global perspective.* Now, in another attractive volume, comes an equally worthwhile batch on Russia and Western Europe.

While almost anything new on Soviet attitudes towards Western Europe might seem to be worth reading, eight of the ten contributions included here deserve particular praise. Robert Legvold's on Franco–Soviet relations, with its painstaking dissection of President Mitterrand's complex feelings about the Russians, and Gerhard Wettig's on West Germany make one wish for something of similar substance about the British; but the Washington Center is not yet convinced, apparently, that Britain forms part of Western Europe. One has to make do instead with incidental references inside Joan Barth Urban's essay on the Soviets and West European communist parties and in what I found to be the most absorbing piece of all, Michael Sodaro's review of Soviet studies of the Western Alliance.

The emphasis throughout in this collection is on developments since 1964, which makes the omission of the British Labour Party, both in government and in opposition, from Trond Gilberg's excellent essay on the Soviets and the non-communist Left all the more surprising.

The least satisfactory part of the book is the first, where an attempt is made to link Soviet policy towards Western Europe with Soviet attitudes to the West as a whole. The editor and Professor William Griffith are responsible for this, but their essays seem curiously dated. Dr Ellison would seem to belong to the 'Soviet master plan' school of historical writing, and under him Lenin's well documented expectations of imminent revolution are translated into a set of Soviet policy initiatives, to be followed by Stalin as well as Lenin. Stalin's own views on revolution, his 'percentages' agreement with Churchill and his consequent cavalier attitude to the Greek, French and Italian communist parties have no place in Dr Ellison's or Professor Griffith's scheme of things. Instead the crushing of ELAS, the removal of communist ministers from the French and Italian governments and the crippling of the Chinese communist party are represented as Soviet defeats. Certainly Professor Griffith's 'overview' (one sometimes wonders if American publishers will ever tire of this word) is less one-sided, but even with him Stalin makes all the moves while the

West simply reacts. Moreover, Soviet aims include 'hegemony, if possible, over Western Europe' (p. 29), and no suggestion that such as Foreign Secretary Bevin or Secretary of State Byrnes had somewhat different views is allowed to obtrude. Throughout, these two are unmentioned and, it would seem, unmentionable.

Polytechnic of North London BRIAN THOMAS

Dezinformatsia: active measures in Soviet strategy. By Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson. New York, Oxford: Pergamon/Brassey's. 1984. 210pp. Index. £13.30. Pb.: £8.60.

New lies for old. By Anatoliy Golitsyn. London: Bodley Head. 1984. 412pp. Index. £12.50.

BOTH these books deal with Soviet efforts to influence opinion, and in particular with Soviet efforts to confuse and mislead people in the West. Both books stress that, in Soviet eyes, the world is divided into two camps, Communist and 'Western', between which conflict is inevitable until the Western camp disintegrates and *pax Sovietica* prevails. Both books seek to show how disinformation fits into the Soviet armoury of opinion-influencing weapons.

The subject is not new, but it is clearly more important than Western opinion generally concedes. Soviet measures impinge on our daily lives—through Western communist parties, front organizations, agents of influence and a variety of publications, ostensibly produced by non-governmental people and agencies, designed to denigrate Western values and institutions. The books advertise this uncongenial subject from which most people in the West prefer to avert their gaze. The Americans have systematically written into the congressional record the testimony of several Soviet defectors anxious to tell the unsuspecting West of the malignancy and scale of the Soviet effort to mislead and confuse the Western camp. The British government, at the instigation of Ernest Bevin, made significant efforts to study, expose and counter Soviet efforts to mislead and confuse, but the effort he initiated has lapsed.

Both books rely mainly on the testimony of Soviet defectors, familiar with the workings of the Soviet opinion-influencing machinery. The two American professors make a neat job of condensing much of what is known about the Soviet effort, using in particular the testimony of defectors Bittman and Levchenko. The authors ask whether Western governments should seek to expose publicly what the Russians are up to (p. 191), and whether the West should not only counter Soviet efforts but also promote 'democracy'. The professors conclude that, having achieved considerable successes, the Kremlin will go on seeking to prevail by subversion and disinformation in preference to risking armed conflict.

Golitsyn, in *New lies for old,* covers much of the same ground. At the time of his defection in 1961 he knew, from the inside, about the scale and methods of the Soviet opinion-influencing effort. He mentions, for example, that the staff of the KGB element in Vienna in 1954 numbered seventy officers. He knew that Shelepin expanded KGB efforts in the late 1950s, and that the Politburo's International Department, its International Information Department and the KGB's dirty tricks organization all had top-level representation and coordination within the Politburo.

Golitsyn's book was largely written by 1968. He has since been helped by four Western officials to get it ready for publication now. His first-hand descriptions are useful. His theory that the Kremlin inspires dissent within the Soviet bloc to lull the West into thinking that the Soviet bloc is less formidable than it really is, seems too far-fetched for most readers. Of course it uses its apparatus to reduce the damage done by dissent, but the idea, for example, that Solidarity is part of an immensely subtle campaign to confuse the West seems almost ludicrous. The Kremlin was presented by Stalin with a defensive bastion of mainly unwilling satellite states between the Soviet Union's western border and the West's eastern border, and dissent within the bastion has produced a succession of embarrassments. The artificial creation of Solidarity in Poland is the last thing which the Kremlin would consider. The Polish Communist Party has done its best to run Poland on modified communist lines and keep in step with its Warsaw Pact neighbours. There is every indication that, when dissatisfaction with conditions boiled over in 1980 in the form of Solidarity, neither the Kremlin nor the Polish Communist Party saw clearly how to cope with the social forces released in Poland. Golitsyn's theory that Solidarity and other such manifestations in

the Communist world were contrived by the Kremlin in order to confuse the West does not make sense.

The Politburo can turn its propaganda on and off like a tap. Neither book analyses the difficulties of making the best of independent Western media; nor does either book say much about American and British efforts to counteract the Soviet propaganda attacks unleashed immediately after the war. Ernest Bevin is not mentioned; nor is the Congress for Cultural Freedom which was proving so successful in the 1950s and 1960s that the Russians set about exposing and destroying it, while creating, openly, the Soviet Peace Fund to finance pro-Soviet activities. The professors at least mention radio broadcasting as a means of vaulting over the Iron Curtain. Golitsyn stresses the value of addressing the peoples of the Communist bloc (p. 365) without analysing how the BBC External Services and the various American radios can help.

Briefly, both books advertise correctly the scale of Soviet active, opinion-influencing measures (without mentioning some of their more interesting inspired publications and films), but neither spells out coherently what the West has done and should do to counter the Soviet effort. In the West we reluctantly spend vast sums on arms, but top people generally give a minimum of attention to the information, broadcasting, aid and cultural efforts which are the most useful countermeasures. Seldom do Western research groups, discussion centres, war colleges and other such bodies seriously consider Soviet efforts to influence opinion in the West, let alone what we in the West are or should be doing to offset their effectiveness. The Think-Tank report of 1977 recommended a *cut* in the budget of the BBC External Services. Senator Fulbright doubted whether the American radios broadcasting to Eastern Europe were worth spending money on!

NORMAN REDDAWAY

Terrorism: the Soviet connection. By Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander. New York: Crane Russak for Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. 1984. 162pp. Index. Pb.: $9.75.

THE authors are well qualified to write on the notoriously slippery and controversial theme of Soviet links with terrorism. A former Deputy Director for Intelligence for the CIA, Ray Cline has written authoritatively on the problems of intelligence as well as on geostrategy and revolutionary warfare. Yonah Alexander is one of the leading American experts on the study of terrorism; and he is Editor of *Terrorism: an international journal.*

The main value of their book is that for the first time it brings together all the various pieces of evidence of the long-standing Soviet involvement in support of international terrorism, much of it obtained from Soviet and Arab media. In an appendix the authors include English translations of seventeen documents relating to the PLO found in Lebanon in the Israeli invasion of June, 1982: these add powerful support to the case study in chapter five describing the activities of the PLO up to 1982 as a transmission belt for Soviet bloc aid to international terrorism.

The opening chapter takes a broad look at the exploitation of revolutionary warfare by the Soviet Union and its allies and clients. While admitting that 'the scope and nature of Soviet involvement in terrorist activity is still obscure in the minds of many observers because it is fundamentally a secret or covert action program', the authors argue that 'the pattern of Soviet sponsorship of violence is becoming clearer and clearer'. The first two chapters explore the ideological and strategic rationale for this activity, while chapter three usefully summarizes the 'charges and counter-charges' made by each superpower against the other, concerning involvement in terrorism. The authors are particularly impressed by the findings of Senator Jeremiah Denton's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, but 'Unfortunately, the ordinary citizen seldom encounters the congressional findings . . . and accordingly suspends judgement on the cacophony of charges and counter-charges'.

For Cline and Alexander the case of Soviet bloc assistance to the PLO is clearly the centrepiece. They show that the bases in the Lebanon served as a major training and organizational centre for a whole variety of international terrorist groups, until they were put out of business in 1982. All this is generally accepted by the academic specialists and

intelligence experts who are familiar with these developments. Newcomers to the field will find this guide a cool and lucid synthesis.

However, in three major respects the specialist reader will find the book disappointing. First, although it is often mentioned in passing, there is insufficient emphasis on the fact that a great deal of contemporary international terrorism is firmly rooted in indigenous conflicts and ideologies. The book sometimes tends to fall prey to the illusion that all significant international terrorism emanates from a single ideological-political source—Moscow. The authors are far too erudite and sophisticated to believe this, but unfortunately the rather brief analysis in their book may perpetuate this idea. Second, how has the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon affected Soviet policy on low-level violence and terrorism? What alternative conduits, if any, are being adopted and used? How far has the rupture in the PLO affected Soviet and Soviet allies' perceptions, tactics and practical support for terrorism? Finally, but perhaps most frustrating of all for the specialist reader, Cline and Alexander fail to give adequate space to a discussion of the problems of US and Western response against Soviet-inspired revolutionary violence and terrorism. Their concluding remarks strike a positive note, but are only very general recommendations: 'In this field of low-intensity conflict the United States should focus the skills of its conventional military forces and such covert-action intelligence work as are needed to counter Soviet-sponsored forward thrusts. Such efforts are strategically defensive—not provocative as is often alleged . . . They must be undertaken vigorously and with technical virtuosity if the tide is to be turned . . .' Perhaps the authors may devote their next book to the search for the Holy Grail, the secret of *how* such success can be achieved.

University of Aberdeen PAUL WILKINSON

The faces of contemporary Russian nationalism. By John E. Dunlop. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Sponsored by Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Calif.) 1983. 363pp. Index.

IT is one of the paradoxes of twentieth century history that communism and nationalism have been as closely associated in practice as Marxism and internationalism have been in theory. The paradox is old enough and interesting enough for the simple view that the spokesmen of communist governments are thereby revealed to be mere charlatans and hypocrites to have waned somewhat in its appeal. Communism, since a very early date, has been about development—specifically national development. The ideology of communist parties derives clearly enough from Marx, but the accretions deriving from a developmental situation are so prominent and so anchored in the communist movement's history that it is no longer easy to sift out what belongs to Marx and what belongs to other sources. There appears to be room in the ideology of ruling communist parties for both nationalism and internationalism. A result of this situation is that nationalism is both a major fact in the experience of communist parties and one of their major problems.

John Dunlop's book on contemporary Russian nationalism deals with a particularly interesting and topical aspect of this problem. In the past, discussion of nationalism and nationality in the Soviet Union has concentrated chiefly either on the nationalism of the Soviet state or on ethnic problems within the Soviet state. But treatments of the latter have tended to ignore strivings to assert the identity of the largest ethnic group in the land: the Great Russians themselves. Usually cast as the villains of the piece, the oppressor and russifier of smaller peoples, they themselves have seen their traditional culture swept away in the regime's drive for modernization.

Dunlop traces the fight back against this process, in all its now considerable ramifications. The book is detailed, thorough and well-organized. It situates individuals extremely well in clearly-constructed categories. Dunlop shows how this movement for the assertion of a Russian national identity exists on both sides of the ever-shifting boundary which separates the official from the unofficial, the establishment from the dissident. He relates Russian nationalism both to the nationalities problem in general in the Soviet Union and to the Russian national past and the chief articulators of its tradition. Altogether the book is a very valuable contribution to the literature of the contemporary Soviet Union. It is also well got together and very readable.

Given the great service which the book does there is little point in dwelling on blemishes. The author does, however, show throughout the work a rather simplistic view of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's ideology, in which 'ideology' is opposed to nationalism, as if areas of overlap and contradiction could not exist. He also offers at the end some 'policy recommendations' (for the US government, presumably). One recommendation is that Congress should accord the Russians 'captive nation' status, thus showing that the United States 'deems its antagonist to be Marxist-Leninist ideology and not Russia herself'. One wonders why, then, Presidents Nixon and Reagan should be so willing to sup with other Marxist-Leninists south of Irkutsk. But the author is presumably merely doffing his hat to the book's sponsors—the Hoover Institution—a gesture which only slightly mars a valuable piece of work.

University of Manchester MICHAEL WALLER

Soviet law. By W. E. Butler. London: Butterworths. 1983. 374pp. Index. £19·50.

THIS volume, the first in a new series on legal systems of the world, edited by Professor Butler, is the closest thing imaginable to an encyclopedia without being one. Its approach is that of a 'lawyer's lawyer', rather than being designed for the broader social scientist with an interest in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it ought to be a regular work of reference for all professional students of Soviet society. It is salutary to be reminded of the scope and comprehensiveness of the legal system in a country about which it has been usual to stress the repressive nature of legislation, the lack of independence of the legal profession (including the judiciary), the disregard for the provisions of the law where political expediency required it, and the secrecy of certain legislation and of legal proceedings. Leaving aside 'anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda', there simply *has* to be some legal provision for the case when a new ballpoint pen fails to work, or a marriage breaks down, or a river becomes polluted.

Professor Butler comprehensively outlines the relevant legislative position in these and other areas, giving a brief history of Soviet legislation and detailing the currently valid enactments. These surveys of substantive law are prefaced by a succinct history of pre-revolutionary legal developments, a sketch of the philosophical principles underlying the Soviet legal system, and a depiction of the legal profession. A brief account of legal proceedings and punishment methods concludes the book. The author's style is somewhat dry, but the material is there for the conscientious reader.

The area of state law is given relatively light treatment, so students of the Soviet Union, its deputies, its apparatus and other legally determined aspects of its functioning will be disappointed if they look to this volume for a summary of that area of legal provision (one, moreover, which has been paid considerable attention since the 1950s). Furthermore, as a reference work, this book could have been given a somewhat more comprehensive index: the concept of 'analogy', much used in the early years of the regime and discussed on p. 261 and elsewhere, is absent; so too is the notion of 'precedent', which is likewise discussed in the text. A similar lacuna is the absence from the bibliography (chapter twenty) of reference to the important works of the 1970s by Peter H. Juviler (*Revolutionary law and order*, 1976) and Peter H. Solomon (*Soviet criminologists and criminal policy*, 1978), although both are recorded on p. 281 in footnote 3.

There are rather curious, and misleading, translations of Russian terms. For example, the translation of the word *kafedra* as 'chair' is technically correct; but what actually meets to discuss the merits of candidates for law degrees is the equivalent of a department in a British or American university. The odd word 'decret' (which ought to be transliterated as *dekret* or translated as 'decree', pp. 191–2, 202) is potentially puzzling to readers. Elsewhere, the reader of Russian would have benefited from the provision of the relevant Russian term.

Only a barren reviewer concentrates on curiosities and idiosyncracies, and these do not undermine the undoubted value of this book. Its scope is massive, it contains a vast amount of information, its author's judgements are by and large sound—and it will prove of great benefit to all serious students of Soviet society.

Trinity College, Dublin RONALD J. HILL

The Soviet Union and revolutionary Iran. By Aryeh Y. Yodfat. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1984. 168pp. Index. £15·95.

THE Iranian revolution has produced an extremely ambivalent change in the Soviet Union's view of the world. It has been a boon in that, without having to play any role in the fall of the Shah, Moscow derived substantial strategic benefits from his departure. US influence was terminated in Iran itself, the Shah's regional role was ended too, and CENTO was dissolved. On the other hand, the Islamic republican regime has proved to be hostile to the Soviet Union and an unpredictable factor in what remains, for the Soviet Union, the most important part of the Middle East. Iran's involvement in Afghanistan in support of the rebels, the appeals to the Muslims of Central Asia over Tehran radio, the (in Soviet eyes) 'provocations' of the United States in the hostage affair, and persistent Iranian intransigence in the war with Iraq have all given the Soviet leadership enough headaches. The persecution of the Tudeh Party, which began in early 1983, has only added to Moscow's problems.

Aryeh Yodfat's analysis of this relationship is therefore a study which can serve to chart and dissect this complex and important relationship. It begins with an overview of Soviet–Iranian relations before the fall of the Shah, and follows this with four chapters on specific phases of post-revolutionary Iran. Among its more interesting passages are those where Yodfat shows how Soviet policy has been on several occasions divided about Iran, and where he documents how the Islamic government has tried to repudiate the 1921 Treaty under which the Soviet Union has the right to intervene in Iran if its own security is threatened.

Unfortunately, the sober approach and careful research underlying this study are not always matched by cogency of analysis. No Persian-language sources are used, and a number of questionable statements are made for which no authority is adduced: for example, that the Tudeh Party controlled the streets of Tehran in 1953 (p. 147); that Cuban has supplied the new regime with arms (p. 97), or that Soviet Politburo member Aliyev has called for a unified Azerbaijan (p. 130). The summaries of pre-1979 history are too abbreviated to make sense. The fact that Russia was attacked via its Caucasian frontier in the First World War is not mentioned, nor is the 1944 crisis over a Soviet oil concession in northern Iran, nor is the Shah's systematic attempt to weaken Iraq, as a way of lessening Soviet influence, from 1969 to 1975. The shift in Soviet policy towards Iraq dates not so much from the death of Andropov in November 1982, as Yodfat implies, as from the Iranian decision to prosecute the war into Iraq, in July of that year.

Despite the importance of the topic, and the value of much of the empirical material gathered here, this is a rather less satisfactory book than Yodfat's earlier work, *The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula.*

London School of Economics and Political Science FRED HALLIDAY

The economies of Eastern Europe in a time of change. By Adam Zwass. London: Macmillan. 1984. 170pp. Index. £20·00.

IF one had briefly to characterize the essence of this book one might be tempted to say that it consists of six variations on one theme. The 'theme' is the imposition of the Soviet-type economic system and the associated strategy of development on the countries of Eastern Europe, while the 'variations' consist of the details and circumstances under which this was undertaken in each European member country of Comecon. In addition to the processes of the system's implantation, the author also discusses the processes of attempted rejection and adaptation to indigenous conditions: that is, each country's history of economic reforms and their present-day outcomes.

The book starts with Hungary which, for many, is the most interesting case because of its relative success with a market-oriented reform. Next in the line are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, who might be said to have suffered most from the imposition of the Soviet-style system because of their relatively high level of development.

The relatively prosperous and orthodox Bulgaria is characterized as a 'planned economy in harmony and conflict with the Soviet model', and finally there are the chapters dealing with Romania and Poland. In the case of Romania Zwass stresses its search for independence while preserving its orthodox system at home. The Polish case is clearly the one in which the crisis affecting all Comecon economies has become the most acute. The source of the crisis is to be found in the inability of the systems to adjust to the needs of the intensive strategy of growth, but it has been made more severe by the past errors and Western recession.

The book does not bring anything dramatically new, but Zwass's approach is valuable because it treats the Eastern European economies in a consistent and systematic fashion and is thus capable of providing the reader with interesting comparative insight. It is written with authority—the author held posts in Polish and Soviet central banks and served as a Counsellor in the CMEA Secretariat—and in a highly readable style. The present book is an abridged translation of the German original *Planwirtschaft im Wandel der Zeit* which includes a more detailed discussion, in part one, of the 'theme' of the problems common to all centrally planned economies.

V. Sobell

The Soviet and East European political dictionary. By Barbara McCrea, Jack C. Plano and George Klein. Oxford: Clio. 1984. 367pp. Index. £23·95. Pb.: £11·60.

This substantial volume is one of a series of political dictionaries whose avowed aim is to facilitate an understanding of political science through the formal elucidation of its key concepts. As one of its co-authors notes, the political and social sciences have been particularly beleaguered by conceptual problems. It would appear that with the help of such a dictionary, these could be largely eliminated.

However, the notion that this kind of publication could constitute a really significant contribution to increasing our understanding of social and political phenomena is probably too optimistic. It is not so much a lack of dictionaries which prevents our understanding of the social world from advancing in a fashion comparable to that of the natural world, but rather the specific nature of conceptual disputes in the social sciences. A dictionary of this kind is useful as a learning tool in helping to obtain a preliminary basic notion concerning significant events and phenomena and cannot be expected to further one's understanding of more profound conceptual issues. One should, after all, keep it in mind that significant conceptual debates within the social sciences are not soluble simply through the citation of a dictionary definition, for concepts in this field are essentially contestable. The problem is that to accept the concepts of one social scientific tradition inevitably necessitates buying its fundamental outlook, the terms in which it conducts its disputes, its mode of discourse. Hence, the appeal to a dictionary definition only begs the question. The elimination of unwarranted 'semantic confusion' by offering clearcut definitions of the central concepts, institutions and events may, therefore, entail the risk of promoting clarity at the price of underestimating the complexities of the philosophical foundations of social science.

However, the dictionary is, undoubtedly, useful in a more modest way. It provides a very substantial reference guide and a source of up-to-date information concerning the political systems, histories, economies and foreign relations of the Soviet Union and Eastern European states. The guide to countries, placed at the beginning of the volume, and the index, placed at the end, enable the reader to find the required information quickly, while the overall arrangement of the contents into eight major sections makes good sense, and facilitates making comparisons and drawing contrasts between the different countries.

Institute of Education Janusz J. Tomiak
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London

Djilas: the progress of a revolutionary. By Stephen Clissold. London: Temple Smith. 1983. 343pp. Index. £15·00.

It needs courage to write the biography of a living person, especially one as controversial as Milovan Djilas. Stephen Clissold, who died in 1982, never lacked courage. He was also

well equipped to meet the challenge. He knew Yugoslavia well, from teaching English in Zagreb up till the Axis invasion, from his political intelligence work in Cairo and his attachment to a British mission in Croatia in 1944, and from his work as Press Attaché in Belgrade in the immediate postwar years. After that he always kept a close and lively interest in Yugoslavia. The book *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939–1973*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1975, was a monument to his scholarship: he collected and annotated a wide array of documents and wrote a 90-page survey of wartime and postwar Yugoslav–Soviet relations as an essential key to their understanding.

His own wartime admiration for the achievements of Tito's national liberation movement was followed by disillusionment caused by the harshness of the one-party rule established by Tito to consolidate his new federal state in the post-liberation phase. But Clissold always strove for balance and fairness; his critical faculty was keen but he also had a deep understanding of the special problems of Yugoslavia. It was natural that he should be especially fascinated by Djilas, the Montenegrin who started as a fanatical and dogmatic communist and one of Tito's closest wartime comrades, but who then experienced an internal revulsion against the ways in which postwar power affected—and, he felt, degraded—the Yugoslav communist leadership. At the same time, his earlier idolatry of Stalin and the Moscow establishment was dispelled by first-hand contact with both.

Clissold's book is both a political biography and a psychological study of an extremely interesting man, both as an individual and as typical of certain aspects of the age in which he has lived. He fought with utmost courage and blind devotion for a political cause but, when that cause triumphed, could not tolerate the compromises, the lapses from political morality, that followed. (Djilas's last book, which appeared too late for Clissold to make use of it, is called simply *Vlast*, or *Power*, and deals with what he sees as the corruption which power brings.)

Obviously, the psychological make-up of such a revolutionary is a big factor. Clissold quotes what Jennie Lee wrote about the close friendship which grew up in the 1950s between Djilas and Aneurin Bevan: 'They were both poets, romantics, unrestrainable individualists, strong unpredictable mountain types' (p. 219). This explains Djilas well. The exhilaration, as well as the hardship and danger, of the war years obviously was a very powerful stimulus. But once the war was over, Djilas lost this external stimulus, all the more since Tito allotted him control of 'Agitprop', or overall control of propaganda and the press, but no down-to-earth administrative responsibilities. Djilas then felt more and more strongly the need to find himself and express himself as an individual, through writing. His writing—and his individualism—carried him to such lengths that Tito at last applied the brakes, in a way which humiliated Djilas but could not stop him or silence him. The result was political ostracism, and two periods in prison totalling nine years.

Although Djilas's books are not allowed to appear in his own country, they have been published outside it and have won praise in many countries. There has been particular interest in his 'inside story' of his relations with Tito, also with Stalin, as well as in his wider analysis of Yugoslavia's wartime struggle and postwar development, as also of the problems of world communism.

Djilas's writings inevitably form the chief source material for Clissold; but he never uses them uncritically. He collates them with other sources: Yugoslav and British memoirs, American and British academic studies, the Yugoslav, American and British press, British official documents in the Public Record Office, and such scant material from Soviet sources as is available. He has also, in telling the story of Djilas, written what is in effect a very lucid, perceptive and extremely readable history of wartime and postwar Yugoslavia up till Tito's death. His book has much to offer both to the specialist and the non-specialist reader.

ELISABETH BARKER

Poland between the superpowers: security vs. economic recovery. By Arthur R. Rachwald. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 154pp. Index. Pb.: £14·75.

DR RACHWALD's objective in this slim volume is to examine Poland's foreign and domestic policies since the Second World War in the light of the country's relations with the Soviet

Union and the West, particularly the United States. His thesis is that centuries of pillage and dismemberment by foreign powers left Poland with one overriding goal—security and territorial integrity, including recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. His purpose is to demonstrate that Poland's rulers have pursued this goal at the expense of all else, including 'the domestic system preferred by most Poles' (p. 9), and the economic prosperity that could have resulted from closer ties with the West.

As it turned out, this longed-for independence was to be of a circumscribed nature. At the end of the war the Western allies displayed only limited concern for the country whose plight had triggered their entry into the fray, and geographical proximity and the pattern of events made it inevitable that the Soviet Union should assume the role of 'protector'. This 'protector' wanted a buffer state against the West, rather as the West in its turn would come to regard West Germany as a buffer against the East. In these circumstances, says Rachwald, the Yalta vision of an independent Poland peacefully coexisting with the Soviet Union was unrealistic; Poland could never attain the kind of neutrality Austria was to enjoy.

Dr Rachwald presents a whirlwind tour of Poland's foreign policies since the Second World War, from the diplomatic miscalculations of the London Poles, through Rapacki's proposals for a nuclear-free Central Europe, and the regularization of relations with West Germany by means of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. It is a useful summary of the way in which Poland fell under Soviet tutelage and the extent to which this limited the development of Poland's contacts with the West. He continues with an outline of domestic affairs, concentrating on economic matters. According to Rachwald, Gomulka was weakened by the pro-Soviet policies that terminated Polish–American detente. 'Gomulka appreciated the economic importance of American credits, but he had to weigh their value against his country's security needs' (p. 90). Gierek was later hampered by the influence of Soviet-inspired hardliners in the Politburo who were 'successful in staving off even minor attempts to diminish the central control of the economy' (p. 103). Ironically it was the links that Gierek did establish with the West, or rather the loans he negotiated, that contributed to his downfall, the rise of Solidarity, and the uncertainty and distress that currently envelopes Poland; the Soviet-inspired system was insufficiently flexible to cope with the strains of rapid modernization. On Dr Rachwald's reckoning the outlook for Poland is gloomy, for although Poland may have won territorial integrity of a sort, Poland's economic problems have not been erradicated, and it has been economic crises that have so regularly and catastrophically rocked the country.

Elizabeth Balsom

Poland. Compiled by Richard C. Lewanski. Oxford: Clio. 1984. 267pp. Index. (World Bibliographical Series Vol. XXXII.) £36·95.

This is a new addition to an already substantial series of volumes in the World Bibliographical Series published by Clio Press which should eventually cover all countries. Richard Casimir Lewanski, associate professor of Polish language and literature and deputy directory of the Institute of East European Languages and Literatures at the University of Udine, Italy, has already published guides to Polish libraries and archives and to West European archival and library resources on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Professor Lewanski's *Poland* is a selective and annotated bibliography dealing with a very large range of aspects of Poland's life and culture. Among the cornucopia of material, which covers subject areas extending from Poles abroad to agriculture and fishing, folklore, customs, cuisine and sport, there are sections on Polish libraries outside Poland, Polish bookstores and subscription services for Polish periodicals outside Poland, on encyclopedias and directories, bibliographies, newspapers and journals (published in English and in Polish), libraries, archives and museums. Altogether there are 901 entries, which in itself makes this volume a useful book of reference.

In the introduction, the author portrays what he takes to be the characteristic features of Polish life and history through the ages, which is essential, considering the highly unique nature of Polish culture and politics. Beyond that, the main problem a compiler of any bibliography has to face lies in choosing the system of keys to use in making it useful and relevant to the needs of the principal categories of users. As these are expected to be English-speaking scholars and readers, the volume naturally includes (with very few exceptions)

books, articles and chapters in books written in English. Of a large number of possible entries, Lewanski has selected those which he has judged to be more consequential and significant in terms of their quality and general availability. The decision on what to include and what to omit could not have always been easy. Walerian Krasinski's *Historical sketch of the rise, progress and decline of the reformation in Poland* (published in 1838–40) is a very important source indeed, but certainly not generally available. As this has, however, been included, in the company of John Bowring's *Specimens of Polish poets* (1827), and *The papers relating to the Scots in Poland* (1915), should not other, very important books, concerned with Poland and written in the early twentieth century by English or American historians, such as W. R. Morfill, Lord Eversley, Monica Gardner, Ninian Hill, J. H. Harvey, Julia Smith Orvis, Walter Alison Phillips and F. E. Whitton also be included? One ought, however, to accept the author's decision that the main stress must be upon the most recent publications. Great efforts have been made by the author to include all the more significant of the latter, but there are some omissions. The following are not mentioned: Jerzy Pietrkiewicz's *The third Adam*; W. S. Kuniczak's *The thousand hour day*; Eva Fournier's *Poland*; Bernard Newman's *Portrait of Poland*; A. Attman's *The Polish and Russian markets in international trade (1500–1650)*; G. Blazynski's *Flashpoint Poland*; and *War through children's eyes*, edited by Irena and Jan Gross.

A more serious weakness seems to be listing only very few of the numerous articles on Polish matters in such periodicals as *The Polish Review* of New York, *Foreign Affairs* and *The Slavonic and East European Review* of London, or *Soviet Studies* of Glasgow; and failing to list *Wiadomości*, one of the most important literary periodicals published in London in Polish between 1939 and 1983. There is also no reference to a very substantial bibliography of books on Polish themes in English by Norman Davies, *Poland, past and present* (Newtonville, 1977), which includes over 1800 entries. As Professor Lewanski intimates that he would welcome suggestions for the inclusion of additional items in the next edition of the volume, the above-mentioned shortcomings will, no doubt, be taken into account by him.

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JANUSZ J. TOMIAK

Middle East

Begin: a biography. By Eric Silver. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1984. 278pp. Index. £12·50.

MENACHEM BEGIN is the most controversial Prime Minister in Israel's history, with Golda Meir running him a close second. He survived eight successive electoral defeats to become Israel's longest-serving Prime Minister after the founding father, David Ben-Gurion. During his six years of autocratic rule, Begin exacerbated the ethnic conflict within Israeli society; contributed to an erosion of its democratic and liberal values, presenting to the outside world the ugly and vengeful face of Zionism; and he presided over a catastrophic mismanagement of the national economy which brought the country to the verge of economic disaster. In foreign affairs, the mismanagement of the peace process with Egypt, the escalation of the fight against the Palestinian people and the ill-conceived and ill-fated invasion of Lebanon stand out as his most monumental failures. With such a consistent record of botching up virtually anything he touched, it is not surprising that Begin felt he 'cannot go on' and faded from the Israeli political scene, not with the usual bang but a whimper. Behind him, this fiercely nationalistic and proud Jew left a country in a state of material and psychological exhaustion, incurred in pursuit of his illusions of grandeur and geopolitical fantasies.

It cannot be too strongly stressed, however, that this was not just the failure of one individual, but of a school of thought in Israeli politics, the school of thought which seeks to secure the whole of the ancient homeland west of the Jordan for the Jewish people, regardless of all the practical consequences. Eric Silver, in this timely biography, does indeed present Begin as Israel's first ideological Prime Minister. But he does not recognize that

Begin's greatest failures are the inevitable product of a bankrupt ideology. Silver sees Begin as a complex character, full of contradictory impulses: 'an unrepentant terrorist who won the Nobel Peace Prize, then launched another war. A democrat and an autocrat. A courtly rabble-rouser, Polish gentleman and Levantine cult hero. A man of honour with whom it was wise to read the small print. A conspirator who found it hard to keep a secret' (p. 253). Though not an admirer of Begin, Silver tends to keep his opinions to himself and refrains from passing harsh judgements on his subject. Implicitly, Silver is guided by the motto that 'the historian is not a judge, still less a hanging judge'. The result is a sober and balanced biography but a singularly uninspired one. Silver traces, interestingly, the roots of Begin's assertive Jewish nationalism to the impact of Zeev Jabotinsky, to the trauma of the holocaust and to the revolt against British rule in Palestine. But when it comes to Begin's years in power, which Silver was in a position to observe at close quarters as the *Guardian* correspondent in Israel, the narrative becomes unaccountably bland and superficial. Consequently this can be regarded as no more than an interim biography. Begin is too important and too controversial a figure in modern Jewish history to escape having his biography written by an historian who is not just a judge but a hanging judge.

University of Reading AVI SHLAIM

Abandonment of illusions: Zionist political attitudes towards Palestinian Arab nationalism, 1936–1939. By Yehoyada Haim. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 173pp. Index. Pb.: £14·75.

THIS study in the evolution of Zionist political attitudes towards Palestinian Arab nationalism in the 1930s must provoke the question: could a conflict have been avoided? In terms of official Zionist thinking the answer is 'yes'. It did not attribute Arab hostility to nationalism; second, it assumed that such hostility would diminish by virtue of the economic benefits brought by the Zionist enterprise; third, with the growing achievement of a Zionist *fait accompli*, the Arabs would have no choice but to accept the inevitable. But the disturbances of 1929 and still more those of 1936 denied these expectations, and the reality of Palestinian Arab nationalism became unmistakeably evident. How Zionist opinion evolved from this point does not make happy reading, for Dr Haim's thesis eventually discloses the inevitability of conflict. He is primarily concerned of course with Zionist opinion—secondarily with British—and the Arab viewpoint is relatively undocumented. But it is certainly not unrepresented or overlooked and its presence, even in a somewhat shadowy form, gives this book as much objectivity and impartiality as may be expected from any author dealing with this contentious topic. The heart of the conflict was clearly diagnosed by the Peel Commission of 1937, which proposed partition as the only resolution to a conflict in which conflicting political aspirations were pitted against each other. But although the partition scheme was, with qualifications, accepted by majority Zionist opinion, it was rejected by the Arabs. Only Ben-Gurion, it seems, grasped the full weight of Arab opposition. 'He believed', writes Haim, 'that the Arab states did want to help their Palestinian Arab brothers, and that they opposed partition from Pan-Arab motives which aimed at the establishment of an Arab federation that included an Arab Palestine' (p. 132). But majority Zionist opinion took a more sanguine view. Ben-Gurion was not proved wholly correct, of course, in so far as conflicts among the Arab states precluded any notion of an Arab federation. Yet he was more right than wrong. In his concluding remarks Dr Haim makes it clear that all the Zionist parties and groupings were in varying degrees subject to illusions and mistaken perceptions. The Revisionists best understood the basic national conflict but their proposed solution was the most impractical. The official Zionists were pragmatic but refused to acknowledge Arab political rights. The Binationalists understood that without Arab consent only force could solve the conflict but refused to accept minority status for the Jews in Palestine—which was a *sine qua non* for the Arabs. Hashomer Hatzair must fail in its endeavour to bring together the Jewish and Arab working class, for nationalist emotions had priority over the notion of class solidarity. On the Hebrew and Jewish side this book is excellently documented from published and unpublished sources. It is indeed a masterly analysis of Zionist opinion at a crucial stage of its development.

University of Warwick LIONEL KOCHAN

The PLO and Palestine. By Abdallah Frangi. London: Zed. 1983. 256pp. Pb.: £5·95.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation: people, power and politics. By Helena Cobban. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. 305pp. £22·50. Pb.: £6·95.

AFTER the welcome arrival on the scene of two such excellent studies on the PLO, it seems ironic to regret, in one way, their timing. Both authors cover the beginnings, the development, aims and resilience of the PLO up to the early part of 1983, narrowly missing the rebellion within the PLO of the summer of that year, the nature and implications of that rebellion and the effects on the PLO's unity, approach and tactics which are still as yet unclear. At least both these books contribute to an understanding as to why those events occurred and by their nature assist a projection of their true effects.

Although dealing with the same subject, the PLO, both studies are refreshingly different. Abdallah Frangi, the PLO representative in Bonn, is the insider looking out of the PLO at the wider spectrum of the regional and international arenas of events and opinions and gleaning from them those that directly affect the PLO, its aims and the nature of its activities. His first six sections are devoted to the pre-Hebrew history of the people of the region of Palestine through to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. They are an impressively well-researched, balanced and presented part of the work. As Mr Frangi progresses through the rise of Zionism, the creation of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli wars, the historical details steadily become sharply summarized as they give way in favour of an examination of the effects of those events on the Palestinian people and their consequent reactions. Mr Frangi makes no apologies and offers no justification. He simply contextualises, quite successfully, the development of the PLO, the motives behind its varied approaches and its role in major events which have for more than fifteen years been examined out of context. Mr Frangi has been personally close to so many of those events but he keeps a tight rein on subjective reaction with only the occasional lapse into a political or emotive cliché. Mr Frangi, in his role as a PLO representative, is a diplomat par excellence, and an accomplished academic dedicated to the belief in the ultimate triumph and rewards of understanding. Mr Frangi's book makes an excellent introduction to the whole Palestine question in context with maps, graphs of the PLO structure and suggestions for further reading. He draws on a number of German sources, and this in itself is of value to students of Middle East politics. Apart from the few typographical errors that need correcting in this edition, a 'to be continued' insert at the end would be welcome.

Helena Cobban as a journalist has witnessed a number of events in the Middle East and has been close to the Palestinian people and in touch with their leadership frequently during those events. She is, in contrast to Abdallah Frangi, the outsider looking in, and her study of the PLO is scholarly, lucid, carefully researched and documented, and written in the style of a journalist, which makes otherwise heavy details absorbing and memorable. In her chapter headings Ms Cobban likens the history of the PLO to the rise of the phoenix, which, as she indicates in her closing chapter in part one, is now suffering from a broken wing. She also takes the most useful step of examining the birth and development of Al Fateh as a key to understanding the PLO and its weaknesses and strengths as an umbrella for conflicting Palestinian groups. Part two deals with non-Fateh groups and the nature of resistance in the occupied territories. Part three covers external relations, mainly with Arab countries, and international relations, in which the United States is a dominant feature. Her conclusion chapter is not in fact a conclusion, but it is an excellent summary of her own book. Her appendixes are few but very useful, and her chapter notes and bibliography an excellent reference guide for even the most accomplished scholars of Middle East politics. Her research into the PLO in all its dimensions, incorporates research studies, interviews and personal experience. Quotes from her interviews and from her own and other journalists' articles punctuate her detailed study with a human dimension. Ms Cobban wastes no time in challenging myths or rebuilding distorted images of the PLO or offering her own criticisms. Instead, she more usefully examines the PLO as clinically and as accurately as a laboratory experiement. Myths and distortions might happen to be exploded on the way as a bonus, such as the true nature of Arafat's leadership, the fact and fantasy of well known PLO activities, the role of the PLO's own maturing membership structure in the PLO's decision and timing to pursue a diplomatic approach and the extensive civilian dimensions of health, education and social welfare of the PLO solely known in many parts of the world as a purely military organisation. Helena Cobban has removed the Khaffiya from the PLO

and shown what is behind it. It would be no exaggeration to welcome Ms Cobban's study as one of the most authoritative and observant to date on the PLO. *The Times*'s strike of 1979 has to be commended for forcing Ms Cobban to write it. I would suggest that, although both Mr Frangi and Ms Cobban are ostensibly dealing with the same subject, they are different in approach and emphasis and their studies are, to a large extent, complementary. If one were to liken the PLO to the human body, Mr Frangi is the experienced, concerned doctor, Ms Cobban the pathologist.

KATE E. MAGUIRE

Palestinians over the Green Line: studies on the relations between Palestinians on both sides of the 1949 Armistice Line since 1967. Edited by Alexander Schölch. London: Ithaca. 1983. 207pp. Pb.: £5·25.

THIS book consists of an introduction and six papers presenting some of the results of a research project, financed by the Volkswagen Foundation, on the interdependence of the Arab population of Israel and the West Bank. Two of the papers are by Ibrahim Dakkak, the president of the Arab Thought Forum in Jerusalem, and the rest by scholars from the Universities of Essen and Bir Zeit.

Professor Schölch, of the University of Essen, criticizes in his introduction the four main current conceptualizations of the socio-historical situation of Palestinians in Israel. First, the perception, common among Israeli sociologists, of the Arabs as members of a 'traditional society' being 'modernized' by contact with the Jewish 'modern society'. Second, the description of the Arabs' situation as a colonial one, in which they are seen as the victims of an 'internal colonialism'. Third, the perception of Israeli society as a plural society consisting of three different segments: Western Jews at the top, Oriental Jews in the middle, and Arabs, as something approaching an untouchable caste, at the bottom. Fourth, the Arabs are seen through the Zionist state system controlling them.

Schölch rejects the first analysis as 'inadequate and evasive' (p. 14); but accepts that the three others present the facts in ways that are 'complementary and partially identical' (p. 14). He maintains, however, that a broader framework is necessary to understand the position of Arabs in Israel. On the one hand we must consider the effect of the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, and the World Zionist Organization, which he believes are international organizations whose primary function is to 'safeguard the exclusion of the Palestinian Arabs from Israeli society and to uphold its Zionist spirit' (p. 17). On the other hand it must be recognized that the future position of Israeli Arabs will be affected crucially, for good or ill, by what happens to their brothers and sisters in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Since 1967 Arabs in Israel have no longer been isolated, and the main question the researchers hoped to answer was whether this development had initiated a 'mutually reinforcing relationship on the socio-political level between the Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line' (p. 19).

In the first of the six papers, Reinhard Wiemer presents an interesting survey of the change and development of ideas among Zionists about how they could best deal with the 'Arab question'. These ideas have fluctuated over a wide range, as the fortunes of Zionism have waned or waxed; but the basic Zionist contention that Palestine belongs to the Hebrew nation has ensured that they have never included any recognition of the legitimacy of Palestinian as opposed to Arab Nationalism. In the second, Ibrahim Dakkak studies the re-emergence of Palestinian identity in the West Bank after 1967. He sees two trends of thought and action which, in retrospect, can be seen to govern the activities on both sides of the conflict. 'The one which worked against the assimilation of the Jews in (Gentile) societies, and the other which acted against the emergence of a Palestinian national identity out of the newly crystallizing Arab Nationalism. Scrutiny of both reveals their contradictory nature at the surface, and their convergence on the purpose of eliminating the Palestinian radical from any further settlement' (pp. 66–7). The third paper is a short and very useful account of the geographical distribution of the Palestinians within Israel proper. The fourth presents the results of a questionnaire aiming to elicit the attitudes of Palestinian wage-earners on both sides of the armistice line; and the fifth records those of another questionnaire seeking to establish the political attitudes of members of the Palestinian elite in the West Bank and in Israel. Perhaps the most interesting finding of these polls, which were necessarily based on small samples, was

this: the political future expected for Israeli Palestinians divided the respondents along the pre-1967 borders. Respondents in Israel, both elite and workers, believed that, in the long run, they would remain citizens of Israel; while respondents from the West Bank thought their fellow Palestinians in Israel would choose to join a Palestinian state if and when it came about. The sixth and last paper is a study of political influences across the Green Line. It concludes that political influence from the West Bank is more important than that crossing the Line in the opposite direction.

This is a very useful little book even though it makes hard reading and requires unremitting concentration from the reader.

J. C. B. RICHMOND

Palästina-Chronik 1883 bis 1914: Deutsche Zeitungsberichte von der ersten jüdischen Einwanderungswelle bis zum ersten Weltkrieg. By Alex Carmel. Langenau-Ulm: Armin Vaas Verlag. 1983. 376pp. Index. DM36·00.

THE present volume is the second collection of German newspaper reports on Palestine to be selected, arranged and annotated by Professor Alex Carmel of the University of Haifa. It features extracts from the weekly paper *Die Warte des Tempels* (later *Jerusalemer Warte*) published by the German settlers known as the Templers, who migrated to Palestine from Wurtemburg in 1868 in order to await the Second Coming, and settled in Jaffa and Haifa where they became established in trade and agriculture. In his previous writings Professor Carmel has described the activities of the Templers; his first collection of newspaper reports (*Palästina-Chronik 1853 bis 1882*, Langenau-Ulm, 1978) also contains a lengthy introduction explaining their situation and the value of their reports.

The reports contain much miscellaneous information concerning various aspects of Palestinian life during the period, including the activities of Christian communities and missions, Jewish immigration and settlement, Muslim groups, developments in communications, trade, the Ottoman governmental system and personalities, Syrian nationalism and various incidents including the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898 and of the *Goeben* in 1914. The reports will have some value to those interested in the political, social and economic development of Palestine during the period 1882 to 1914. The general picture is of a sleepy backwater of the Ottoman Empire, preoccupied with its own local problems but gradually beginning to respond to stronger and more numerous contacts with events in a wider world.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London M. E. YAPP

The struggle for South Yemen. By Joseph Kostiner. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's. 1984. 195pp. Index. £14·95.

KOSTINER's broad-ranging bibliography does not disguise his heavy reliance on leftist Arab 'nationalist' sources, mostly in Arabic, but some in English, such as Bujra (not an impartial writer). He makes much use of the *Summary of World Broadcasts*. It was the all-pervasive Sawt al-'Arab that fanned discontents into flame and was perhaps the major factor promoting unrest in the Yemen and Federation. David Ledger's first-hand *Shifting sands* doubtless appeared too late to consult, but Kostiner ignores Robin Bidwell's *Two Yemens*. His book swarms with errors: personal and place names are mutilated; his complete lack of experience and understanding of south Arabia lead him to misappreciations of both sources and situations. Much of his information is available more reliably elsewhere. But though not well done his book does convey something of the confused and naive thinking of the time, that of the National Liberation Front in particular and their cloud cuckoo notions.

Erroneous statements include the following: that an agreement was reached with the Imam in 1934 to delineate the frontier between north and south Yemen; that the Hadrami (Bedouin) Legion was established in 1928; and that the Al Kaf road was opened in 1958 and 'paved' (it was opened many years before). His assertion that the British found in the Sayyids a loyal group to absorb reforms is nonsense. The Al Kaf, as stated to me by Sir Bu Bakr,

admired British justice in Malaya and wished to see it in Hadramawt. The Tarim Sayyids of his house wished relief from the insecurity and robbery of tribal anarchy, but many Sayyid houses did not wish a Christian power in their country. It is nonsense that almost the whole of south Yemen's land was owned by Sultans and Sayyids who controlled vast religious donated *waqf* lands. This theme of anti-Imamic propaganda was taken up in their turn by the NLF. From personal investigation the reviewer knows that this is not true—in many areas land was mainly owned by tribal farmers. Land troubles are perennial and the rise in its value due to the British promoted agricultural development exacerbated them.

Pace Kostiner, a good deal is now known about the early history of the NLF and its association with Palestinian extreme left-wing groups—an Adeni exile even remarked to me that Hitler took it out of the Jews, so they took it out of the Palestinians who did the same to the southern Arabs! FLOSY leaders in Aden were a sort of elite, but an analysis I made in 1968 of the newly emerged NLF leaders revealed they had virtually all been failures. Qahtan al-Sha'bi was not highly regarded by his superiors, and his cousin Faisal, reputedly the son of an Indian mother, a waif, had failed to get onto the educational ladder. Kostiner tells us 'Sha'bi's and other leaders' views were exaggerated'. He notes 'the passive support [given to the regime] of large social groups unsympathetic to insurgent movements'; but the NLF knew how to harness grievances to further its own struggle. It is a pity he repeats the slander that Sharif Husain fled from Baihan.

R. B. Serjeant

Africa

Nkomo: the story of my life. By Joshua Nkomo. London: Methuen. 1984. 270pp. £9·95.

There is an air of anticipation in turning to this personal account from one of Africa's best known and liked nationalist figures. However, the book is something of a disappointment. It is clearly written, it has an air of honesty about it, and there is some spice from the insights into the interplay of personality—such as the antagonism between Mr Nkomo and president Julius Nyerere. Yet in general terms it never stops us short to say: 'I had not seen it that way before'; or 'Now I understand what was happening then'. In describing his part in the transformation of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo leads us along a well known track.

The overwhelming impression drawn from the book is one of sadness. It is sad first in the way that Mr Nkomo now perceives his own position and that of his country. He, as 'the Father of Zimbabwe', believes that he has been pushed aside in the power struggle; that he has been abused; and (with justification) that his life has been in danger. As for Zimbabwe in general he accuses Robert Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party of intimidating voters at the time of the election, and now of trying to suppress all legitimate opposition. Following the long independence struggle, Nkomo says the government's role should be to bring the people together. Instead, it has antagonized large sections of the population and split the country apart through its narrow sectarian policies. Nkomo argues that Robert Mugabe should recognise the distinction between a party leader (in which Mugabe has no more rights than Nkomo) and the leader of the whole country in which he should be above party and faction. Perhaps the descent into tribal rivalry in Zimbabwe was always on the cards once the binding cement of the common white enemy had been removed (and there were already signs of tribal splits in the liberation armies). Perhaps it was always improbable that Joshua Nkomo, who comes from a minority group, would become the national leader. However, he genuinely did seek to avoid tribal divisions and many must share his regret that such divisions have surfaced in the new Zimbabwe. Yet he finishes on an optimistic note, when in the final chapter after noting the corruption and inefficiency that has plagued some of the new African states, he says that 'patience [will] triumph in the face of injustice' (p. 247).

Running alongside the broader, statesmanlike approach, are strands of personal bitterness. Nkomo claims that he always 'acted trustingly, and have found out too late when I have been betrayed' (p. 8); and frequently he refers to Robert Mugabe's subordinate position during the long years of struggle. This element of personal bitterness leads into the second sad aspect of the book, in which Nkomo reveals himself as a man who forgets nothing, but

learns nothing. There is an air of unreality in some sections, as for example when he says that at the time of the Lancaster House settlement ZIPRA (the military wing of Nkomo's ZAPU party) was preparing a major conventional assault on Rhodesia. If the settlement had not come, says Nkomo, ZIPRA would have implemented 'the turning point' strategy—involving the use of tanks, armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers, and aircraft flown by ZIPRA pilots freshly trained in the USSR. Surely Mr Nkomo must realize that it would have been suicide to launch such an attack against the battle-hardened Rhodesian forces? Earlier small-scale conventional attacks, supported by the ANC of South Africa, had been disasters. Nkomo seems unwilling to face the fact that it was Mugabe's ZANLA army operating a guerrilla war out of Mozambique that turned the tide of war against the Rhodesians, and he fails to mention that it was only after ZIPRA had turned down the offer to operate from Mozambique that ZANLA, with its inferior arms, was given the option.

Another thread of unreality is in Nkomo's judgement of other political figures. Personally, Nkomo has the admirable qualities of keeping to his principles (as his long period of imprisonment demonstrates) but being prepared to consider compromise. That is not true of many others—including Ian Smith and Robert Mugabe. Concessions have to be forced out of them. Yet Nkomo never seems to appreciate that, and so he is continually shocked and hurt when such men impose their wills impervious to the views of others. That may be alien to Nkomo but it is the stuff of the political context in which he has operated. To add to Nkomo's perplexity is his failure to recognize fellow-compromisers when he meets them. For instance, he writes unsympathetically of Garfield Todd's premiership, and describes Edgar Whitehead as a 'hardliner'. Yet, as Prime Minister in 1962, Whitehead predicted that the compromise constitutional path he proposed would lead to black majority rule in 15 years. Of course it is impossible to know whether Whitehead would have been as good as his word, or whether what he proposed was politically possible in Rhodesia. However, Nkomo consciously refused to try that path, and instead chose to operate in a political framework shaped by men like Mugabe and Smith. For all his likeable qualities, it is not suprising that Joshua Nkomo turned out to be a political loser.

University of Durham JAMES BARBER

ECOWAS and the economic integration of West Africa. By Uka Ezenwe. London: Hurst. 1983. 210pp. Index. £13·50.

ONLY ONE chapter and an appendix in this book are specifically about the Economic Community of West African States and, useful as they are, they do not reflect original research into the negotiation of the Treaty of Lagos or the performance of the organizations it established. Other sections of the book describe, not always accurately, the evolution and structures of West African economies, and reiterate the familiar theoretical points that are made about customs unions of developing countries and the familiar practical difficulties that arise in distributing the benefits (or costs) of these unions equitably among their members. There is also a long, somewhat dated, account of schemes of international economic cooperation in West Africa other than ECOWAS, and a chapter on the recent and prospective export performance of the region which leans heavily on the Berg report of the World Bank.

Dr Ezenwe recognizes the marginal character of schemes of economic union in a region where only a few per cent of recorded external trade takes place among the constituent countries (and where, it may be added, most of the unrecorded intra-trade goes on precisely because neighbouring countries are not economically integrated). He also recognizes that a common market of West Africa must be illusory so long as transport costs remain as high and communications as poor within the region as they are at present. That he nevertheless thinks customs unions relevant to the future development of West Africa is testimony to his conviction that import-substituting industrialization under cover of protection (the costs of which may be reduced by enlarging the protected market) represents economic gain. It is a conviction less commonly entertained nowadays than it was a generation ago, and a critical examination of its basis would have been salutary.

Wishful thinking influences much of Ezenwe's presentation. Because he wants West African governments to cooperate in a customs union for the benefit of all their peoples,

he readily believes that the strains that would be created by implementing the Treaty of Lagos could be relieved by sufficient 'checks and balances', that the constraint of high internal transport costs can be removed, that fears of Nigerian hegemony are groundless, and that the alternative growth pattern of increasing exports to markets outside Africa is not available. A dispassionate analysis would have allowed for the possibility that these assumptions are wrong.

The most illuminating passages of the book are those in which Ezenwe shows that members' contributions to the operational budget of the ECOWAS Secretariat and to the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development are years in arrears; that after eight years the Fund had yet to finance its first project; and that only one of the protocols agreed by the Community Authority has received sufficient ratification to become effective (ironically, in view of the wholesale expulsion of aliens from Nigeria early in 1983, it was that on the free movement of persons). Little has been done to accomplish the manifest purposes of ECOWAS. As to the latent purposes, they did not arouse Ezenwe's curiosity.

University of Birmingham DOUGLAS RIMMER

Change in South Africa: blind alleys or new directions? By Christopher R. Hill. London: Collings. 1983. 224pp. Index. £12·50.

CHRISTOPHER HILL has produced a timely and illuminating volume on the progress—such as it is—of South Africa towards constitutional reform. The analysis is well-researched, and scholars and politicians alike will find much of interest in the detailed account the author provides of the incentives and constraints governing the attitudes and policies of decision-makers. The tone throughout is detached and cautious, and the book deserves a wide audience.

The first four chapters focus on the theory and practice of separate development, the role of liberalism as an ideology for promoting reform and the prospects for revolution as the instrument of fundamental change in the economic and political structures of South African society. The Marxist interpretation of past and present developments is given a close and critical reading, with special emphasis on the differences between the African National Congress and the Black Consciousness Movement. Hill's conclusion is interesting (especially in the aftermath of the Komati Agreement between South Africa and Mozambique): 'But to remember the ANC is not necessarily the same as preparing revolution, and from the demands made by strikers in South Africa it appears that many are simply seeking proper wages and representation through trade unions chosen by themselves, rather than revolutionary upheaval' (p. 46).

The core of the book provides precisely the analysis required by those wishing to understand the political and economic background to the new constitution promulgated in 1983 and providing for a tricameral parliament representing whites, Coloureds, and Asians, but excluding blacks. Hill eschews grand theories of constitutional change and rightly concentrates on providing a detailed account of, for example, the role of business pressure groups and the structure and process of trade union activity. In this context he displays an impressive grasp of the implications of the reports of the Wiehahan and Riekert Commissions on labour relations and the future utilization of manpower. He stresses that the 'fundamental question is whether or not the Wiehahan and Riekert reports mark the beginning of an irreversible process of change, the end of which is not yet discernible to the outsider and perhaps not even clearly imagined by the South African powers that be. If the answer to that question is "yes", then a degree of patience is justified. If it is "no", and the so-called reforms are no more than a flash in the pan, then desperation or despair may be more apt responses' (p. 107).

The author also provides a novel case-study, in which a mythical company is seen at work coping with the demands of both white and black workers against the backdrop of changes in trade union legislation introduced by the government during the last five years. In this context, Hill concludes that 'progress might not be as rapid as the more enlightened senior managers believed it must be if South Africa was to solve its manpower problems, but the direction of change was clear enough, and seemed irreversible' (p. 85). The account of the way in which black trade unions have developed since the Durban strike of 1982–3 is excellent, combining the perceptive criticism of 'bourgeois' and Marxist theories of the

role of unions in promoting 'progressive change' with an informative account of how black aspirations and their translation into union activity prepared the ground for the establishment of the Wiehahan and Riekert Commissions.

The concluding chapters deal effectively with the influence of Afrikaner academics on the constitutional debate; the reflection of this debate in student politics, especially at the Afrikaans universities; and an analysis of the variety of constitutional proposals that surfaced after 1980 and including those which aspired to establish 'a constellation of states' involving South Africa's black neighbours. Hill's conclusion seems sensible enough: 'Changes have been taking place in South Africa in recent years; they are cautious, grudging, hampered by the strength of right-wing white opinion and, above all, slow, but they do provide evidence of a new climate of thought among sections of the elite . . . If the end of apartheid is to be negotiated in tolerably peaceful conditions, it is the pace of change which must drastically increase' (p. 207).

In short, the author deserves congratulation for providing a sensible and scholarly guide to a subject which will preoccupy scholars and practitioners alike over the next decade.

University of Leicester J. E. SPENCE

Mozambique: the revolution and its origins. By Barry Munslow. London, New York: Longman. 1983. 195pp. Index. Pb.: £5·95.

IN this comprehensive and illuminating account of the development of modern Mozambique, Dr Munslow emphasizes the importance of South Africa as a world power and the consequences this has had for Portugal's former colony. The very weakness of Portugal as a political and economic power opened its African colonies to foreign influence, first by the British and then increasingly by South Africa. Salazar's 'closed-door' economy could not survive the postwar changes which were sweeping Africa. Portugal began to pursue in its colonies a more systematic exploitation of the country, to bolster the metropolitan economy, utilizing repressive labour policies which Dr Munslow describes as a continuation of coercive or forced labour practices supposedly outlawed in the modern world. Dr Munslow argues that Portugal's much vaunted 'civilizing mission' and racial harmony was in fact a myth. The assimilation programme had produced only a tiny minority of educated Africans, and by 1959 the illiteracy rate in the colony was still an alarming 97·8 per cent.

In a climate in which other imperial powers were facing the winds of change, Portugal resolutely refused to enter into negotiations with the nationalists over independence. Mozambique has a history of resistance to foreign domination which clearly demonstrates the strong national character and resolution of its people. Demonstrations, uprisings and general strikes had consistently made the economic stability of the country uncertain. The book charts the rise of Frelimo, its internal struggles and its evolution towards a protracted guerrilla war against the Portuguese. Dr Munslow clearly outlines how patterns of unrest changed in direct relation to the political economy as Portugal sought to build an industrial base at home at the expense of her colonies. The outbreak of guerrilla war forced some changes in Portuguese policy and the economy became, increasingly, part of South Africa's sub-system. As a result of Portugal's inherent weakness, the South African economy absorbed Mozambique and still maintains that power today.

The book argues that Frelimo's radical nature made it different from other nationalist movements by the adoption of a revolutionary programme. This combination of a markedly radical ideology and practice with Mozambique's dependency on South Africa created a troublesome legacy after independence in 1975. The fall of the Portuguese regime in a military coup on 25 April 1974 had taken the world by surprise. The new Frelimo regime stepped into power and direct confrontation with its powerful neighbour. Portugal's abdication of military strength in southern Africa obliged South Africa to assume responsibility for its own security against the tide of nationalism in the region.

In the light of recent events it would have been extremely valuable to have a more detailed analysis of Mozambique's relationship with Pretoria after independence. The section on 'War and reconstruction' in Dr Munslow's book can only be an appetizer for a further account of what has taken place since Portugal abdicated power in Africa, and the widespread consequences this has had for the continent.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London. L. M. DENNY

North Africa: contemporary politics and economic development. Edited by Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1984. 283pp. Index. £16·95.

DESPITE the richness of the existing literature on North Africa (Werner Ruf in the introduction, p. 1), material in English is limited, and an attempt to embrace the region's political structures and economic development is welcome, enriched as it is by its multidisciplinary authorship. The aim of the editors was to discuss the contemporary politics and divers political systems of the four countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya), and to trace events since their respective independence, especially emphasizing the last fifteen years. In a second group of chapters the changing economies of the countries are analysed, their varying factor endowments evaluated and the impact of planning reviewed in so far as employment and income distribution have been affected. The approaches are diverse in that the methods of the economist, the political scientist, the sociologist and the geographer are deployed, and if the book lacks the structure which would come from the use of a common methodology it is marked by the many opportunities taken by its authors to address those aspects seen by them to be important.

In general the treatment is sufficiently comprehensive to provide chapters with useful, and sometimes very useful, introductory material on the individual countries, and in most cases the particular problems of the economies are explained. Superpower involvement and economic dependency are familiar themes, and the recent political and economic history of the region is shown to be rich in examples of the constraints which such circumstances impose.

Most of the analysis is professional, and usually readable—but the chapter on Libya's politics is ill-balanced, with much too much theoretical context and little reference to the case. There is also too much on the monarchy without the extended treatment providing a basis for understanding recent political events in Libya. There is little feel here for the country's political and economic experience, a feel which might have come from closer, first-hand observation. However, one would not disagree with the conclusion of Glavanis that the Libyan revolution is an ephemeral form and that the underlying accommodations being made by the Libyan economy and people must be seen partly in an international context and not just in the idiosyncracies of the Qadhafi initiatives.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London J. A. ALLAN

The African political dictionary. By Claude S. Phillips. Oxford: Clio. 1984. 245pp. Index. £25·25.

THIS is the sixth in the Clio series of *Dictionaries in political science*, with a further four announced as forthcoming. The 'political' rubric covers both area studies—e.g. Latin America, Europe, the USSR and Eastern Europe, the Middle East—and disciplinary themes, for example, constitutional law, political analysis, Presidential–Congressional, and, as regular readers of this journal will well know, international relations.

The Africa volume is organized so that entries and supplementary data can be located in one of two ways. The first is by the 'dictionary' approach, by reference to the alphabetical list of items contained in one of ten subject-matter chapters. These chapters include such general themes as 'Political culture and ideology', 'Governmental institutions and processes', 'Intra-African law, organization, and relations', 'Africa and the world'. Taking the two last-named topics, as being of likely principal interest to students of international affairs, we find a page or so on such entries as African Defense [sic] Force, African Development Bank, Cubans in Africa, diplomatic relations, divestiture in South Africa, refugees, Soviet policy in Africa, SADCC and UDI. Each entry is divided into a concise definition-cum-historical statement and a paragraph labelled 'significance'.

The second technique is to consult the general index. Here there are over two thousand entries, often already cross-referenced within the 'dictionary' entries of the subject chapters themselves. An important supplement to this index, although it appears at the beginning and not the end of the book, is the 'Guide to Countries', comprising a further thousand-plus entries on a country–by–country basis: for instance, the twenty-five entries under Ghana start with Anglophone, Ashanti resistance, Ashanti vs. Fante, British colony, Casablanca Group, Commonwealth, Conflict with Togo, Convention People's Party, and so on through to restoration of civilian rule, Tallensi, and urbanism.

Nor is the information offered by this joint dictionary and reference guide yet exhausted. There are four maps of Africa (and they include the showing of the incidences of coups, Islam and European languages); eight tables, ranging from GNP and estimated population to a calendar of political instability, diplomatic relations, and what is called selected political data. Sensibly, the bibliography is limited to the few references cited in the text and to *recent* books and articles of a general nature or on individual African countries.

Professor Phillips modestly informs us that this dictionary is the fruit of his frustration in trying to teach African politics to students who lacked any historical, economic, geographical or cultural context in which to cultivate such knowledge. His chosen vehicle can serve as an introductory guide to basic information relating to the study of African politics as well as a complement to many general texts. It also lends itself to easy—and inevitably necessary—updating. But it is Professor Phillips' peers and colleagues in African studies, as well as his fortunate students at Kalamazoo, who will gratefully stand to gain from this staggering labour of love.

St Antony's College, Oxford A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE

An atlas of African affairs. By Ieuan Ll. Griffiths. London, New York: Methuen. 1984. 200pp. Index. Pb.: £4·95.

THIS volume, perhaps better titled a guidebook than an atlas, is subdivided into five main sections (environmental, historical, political, economic and the south), each of which is split into a number of topics. There are three appendixes.

At a basic level such volumes are always useful, particularly for hard-pressed teachers who haven't got time to consult FAO yearbooks or can never quite remember which states are land-locked, and so on. For such purposes, this reviewer found those things where map presentation is especially helpful—land-locked states, railway systems (including maps showing the actual gauges), regional economic groupings, river systems—of particular utility. The same applies to the appendixes, which cover such matters as dates of independence, changes of government, population and GNP statistics. The volume also provides a number of striking quantitative comments of the kind which are always useful in teaching, e.g. that 'not one African economy is as large as the annual turnover by Exxon' (p. 116) or that 'If the Seychelles played Wales at rugby football, their entire population could give support in the Cardiff Arms Park, and still leave room for several thousand Welsh supporters to keep them in tune' (p. 56).

Beyond this basic level, every reader will have quarrels with particular emphases or absences. This is not, presumably, a book for professional geographers, yet such remarks as 'almost the entire continent is a geologically stable land mass of pre-Cambrian basement rocks overlain in part by later sedimentary cover' (p. 4) is going to leave the average reader (this one at least) less than enlightened. There is surely room in a book like this for a little more old-fashioned geography with appropriate translations of technical terminology for the layman, and which juxtaposes the basic science with more modern concerns—for example, in this text agricultural production and waterways are treated quite separately from the 'environment'. In addition, it would have been nice to have some graphic comparison of Africa's size with other continents, and it also seems unfortunate that a geographical volume almost entirely neglects the islands of the African continent.

By contrast, some of the more substantive sections of the book (even allowing for constraints of space) seem unacceptably slack. The section on Ghana and the Ivory Coast seems singularly unilluminating and, along with the Kenya–Tanzania comparison, requires some quantitative evidence. Similarly, economists would grumble about the rather loose references to trade questions and motions of dependence. But, as a package, the book comprises a great deal of information, often extremely well presented, and this greatly outweighs any minor complaints one might have.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London THOMAS YOUNG

Asia and Australasia

In the kingdom of the blind: a report on protectionism and the Asian–Pacific region: report of a study group chaired by Lydia Dunn. London: Trade Policy Research Centre. 1983. 134pp. £3·00.

THE Asian–Pacific region, which I take to mean the Asian side of the Pacific basin and not the 'Asian *and* Pacific' region, has seen the greatest economic growth of the postwar period.

If present trends continue, Japan will be the world's largest exporter of capital by 1990. The technical level of other East Asian states is rapidly catching up with Western Europe. This region has become a primary focus of United States' attention. *The Economist*, in a series of articles, has argued that this shows a shift in American attention away from Europe, and the theme has been most competently explored in a Radio 4 series, 'People of the Pacific century', by the distinguished journalist Mary Goldring. In this study the Trade Policy Research Centre has turned its attention to the region, taking it as the basis for an argument on the TPRC's special concern, trade protection. The study group argues that trade protection has failed as an instrument, and has had harmful effects. These are shown most especially in the failures of the European Community. The GATT trading regime needs restoring and beefing up. The more liberal minded countries of the Asian–Pacific region, which have so profited from open trading policies, should be seen as the model for the future. They should seize the banner of free trade from the weak and woolly Europeans, cooperate together, and repair and protect the international institutions on which free trade can be held fast.

The report is an attempt to present a case in reasonably concise form. It is written in a style which will be accessible to a businessman or policymaker. Evidence is marshalled briefly, and policy recommendations are well summarized.

But *In the kingdom of the blind* is a disappointing report and a weak treatment of the issues its authors want to raise. The first three chapters cover some violent criticisms of the present trading regime. These three chapters essentially summarize arguments which the TPRC has been making for years. They repeat the findings of two other recent TPRC study groups without adding anything to them. This is a pity, because the study group draws on great expertise on the East Asian area, but only devotes forty pages to looking specifically at that region. And the report is also dangerously misleading in at least three ways.

In the first place, to argue that the East Asian countries are virtuous free traders in their external policies without looking at their internal arrangements and culture is foolish. Japan may arguably be organized institutionally for free trade, but her society, founded on patterns of understood obligation rather than on atomistic individualism, denies the ethic of free trade. And the tyrannies of Taiwan and South Korea manage their domestic systems in a way which keeps labour cheap and submissive. Secondly, the report as a whole takes a very simplified view of the effects of free trade. So, for example, it is argued that the difficulties of freeing trade for some Western industries would be balanced by gains in others without unemployment, and that the process of adaptation would be smooth (p. 21). Such ignorance of the time lags associated with trade adjustment is perverse: if free trade were to work in the long run, the short-run difficulties of adjustment in moving towards it have always been severe. Thirdly, the members of the study group were unable to agree a political basis for future Asian–Pacific cooperation. Which countries would be included? What would their relations be with the United States, Europe and Latin America? How would they not become a powerful exploiter of their poorest neighbours? The political and ideological implications of Asian–Pacific bloc formation are profound, but are largely unrecognized in this report, which treats them as technical economic problems.

The argument that GATT should be overhauled is a powerful one, and there may well be very good grounds for economic collaboration among Asian–Pacific countries (or among some of them). But this argument is not well put in this report, and the grounds for collaboration are obscured by political naivety and a certain amount of posturing. The TPRC has elsewhere argued its case in a far more effective way than this, and *In the kingdom of the blind* is more likely to harm than to promote the cause its authors so passionately advocate.

Trent Polytechnic, Nottingham CHRIS FARRANDS

Nuclear proliferation, world order and Korea. By Young-Sun Ha. Seoul: Seoul National University Press. 1984. 208pp. Index.

GIVEN the present instability of the Korean peninsula and the relatively advanced technological capabilities of the two states thereof, this analysis of the likely domestic nuclear dimensions of the Korean confrontation is most timely.

Following some introductory remarks on method, Ha reviews the history of the concentration and subsequent proliferation of nuclear arms and technology. Though the technique employed might be criticized as an excessively refined attempt to quantify the obvious, the author makes it evident that the world has passed through two major stages, nuclear monopoly and nuclear duopoly, and is presently entering a new and hazardous third stage, proliferation. The subsequent chapters on the position of Korea show that the Republic of Korea has the technological capacity to amass in a short time sufficient fissile materials for a small number of weapons, either diverted from existing commercial nuclear reactors or via the development of dedicated facilities, the latter probably by building a chemical reprocessing plant.

Ha's discussion of the route by which South Korea has reached this capability throws a good deal of light on the domestic and international politics of the Korean peninsula. From the beginning, the Seoul government has been in complete control of the Korean research and commercial nuclear programmes. The Korea Electric (now the Korean Electric Power) Company which is the owner of all Korean commercial nuclear reactors is a government instrument, and though Korea Heavy Industries and Construction, which was responsible for much of the early engineering, was backed by private capital (being an amalgamation of subsidiaries of Hyundai and Daewoo), its formation was government-ordered and, under President Chun, it has been placed directly under government control. It is also noteworthy that the US Congress has closely monitored the sale of nuclear technology to Korea, in 1975 blocking credit for two reactors to be bought from Westinghouse until Seoul had cancelled an agreement with France to acquire a pilot nuclear fuel reprocessing plant which would have laid an early foundation for the production of an independent South Korean nuclear force. But the author fails to discuss, though it is mentioned in a footnote, the decision by Seoul in late 1980 to purchase two nuclear reactors from Framatome of France. This is a development of the greatest significance since it places the South Korean nuclear programme on a more independent footing and may portend the acquisition of more sensitive nuclear technology from the same source.

The final section of the work offers an account, employing marginal analysis, of the advantages and disadvantages accruing to South Korea of the possession of nuclear arms. This is less than fully successful, given the difficulty of attaching comparable values to the national and international costs and benefits of nuclear proliferation, and thus Ha's preference for a free market in such weaponry is not well supported. Whereas it can be agreed that neither unilateral control nor benign neglect has limited nuclear proliferation, it is not apparent that a 'market solution' would bring greater world stability, let alone cause nations to place international over national interests and thus create genuine global institutions.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JAMES COTTON

The US–South Korean alliance: evolving patterns in security relations. Edited by Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-joo Han. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1984. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 241pp. Index. £22·50.

THIS is a selection from a group of 'analytical and policy papers' presented at a conference in Seoul in October 1981, and updated for publication in 1983. The conference was jointly organized by the East Asian Institute of Columbia University and the Asiatic Research Centre of Korea University. It was funded by the Luce Foundation and the Korea Traders Scholarship Foundation. Both the analyses and the policy recommendations reflect the attitudes to be expected in the sponsoring organizations. Much useful information is presented, particularly in the series of twenty-seven statistical tables accompanying the various essays on the history, strategy and dynamics of the United States–South Korea alliance.

There is general agreement among the authors on a number of analytical aspects: the Korean 'nation' has never enjoyed in the past a truly independent existence, and is unlikely to achieve such independence in the future. Although the great powers—China, the USSR and the United States—are all formally committed to the goal of a free and united Korea, the best interests of each are served by the present division of the peninsula into two fiercely antagonistic states, each dependent to a greater or less extent on the patronage of a stronger external power. While none of the governments concerned is likely to gain by a renewal of

the war between North and South Korea, any relaxation of tension between them would be disadvantageous, certainly to both Korean governments, and probably to the interests of the three great powers as well.

Serious strains threaten the effectiveness of the alliance. South Korea is understandably concerned chiefly with its own survival; the United States has global interests, and at times regards the Korean problem as both marginal and irritating. Each partner has a regrettable tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of the other: the US, for example, by exerting intermittent pressure on South Korea to promote civil rights or political stability; South Korean agents by attempting to influence US policy through misleading propaganda or by direct bribery. The rapid expansion of South Korean exports, assisted by American and later by Japanese finance, has adversely affected exports and employment in the USA. The consensus here is that the common interests of the two partners far outweigh any incidental friction generated within the Alliance.

The policy recommendations would appear to reflect a similar agreement among the conferees. There is general support for increased expenditure on military preparedness, to meet a possible (if unlikely) threat to South Korea from China or the Soviet Union, or from North Korea itself. There are several suggestions that the burden of defence should be shifted to some extent from the two alliance members to Japan. Japan has a clear interest in regional stability, but was not represented at this conference. Another recommendation calls for a vigorous propaganda effort to improve public attitudes towards the alliance: 'a private, non-governmental body devoted to promoting exchange, understanding and greater appreciation' and 'another institutional creation . . . a body specifically geared to providing accurate and up-to-date information on trade relations, economic issues, and an array of related subjects and data needed for the daily conduct of business and investment' (p. 87).

Generally, the attitude of the contributors is complacent. 'Sources of potential tension remain despite the appearance of drastic improvement in the US–Korean relationship under the Reagan administration. On the whole, however, the US–Korean alliance is thriving, at least for the time being' (p. 229).

C. S. Burchill

Security in East Asia. Edited by Robert O'Neill. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1984. 195pp. Index. £13·95.

This is a compilation from several hands (eight, to be precise) rather inadequately edited by Robert O'Neill, which appears as Volume IX in the Adelphi Library, under the auspices of the IISS. The geographical expression 'East Asia' is here stretched to embrace Afghanistan and the western Pacific and everything between. This no doubt reflects the global implications of security for the major powers engaged in this great game. For instance, there could hardly be a more strategic lifeline than that which runs from the Persian Gulf to the Japanese home islands through the Straits of Malacca.

Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States and China are the four major powers whose complicated interrelationships, and relations with fringe states, form the substance of this book. Unfortunately, most of the contributions here appear to have been written, or presented to other audiences, some years previously. None of the information on which they are based is later than 1982, and most of it, as the sources make clear, relates to the period 1978–81. Cobbled together in this careless fashion, without updating, we are sometimes treated to cold porridge. For example, there is a reference to Li Xiannian in 1980, described as 'a crucial economic policy-maker said to have close ties to Hua Guofeng' (p. 80). Li is now President of China, and Hua is nowhere. Important developments after 1982, like Prime Minister Nakasone's outspoken assumption of increased Japanese defence responsibilities over a 1000-mile radius, receive no mention here.

At least the notes on contributors might have been straightened out. In Gerald Segal's first chapter, on 'China's nuclear posture', we are told that he is a Lecturer in Strategic Studies at Aberystwyth, and in his second, on 'China's security debate', that he is a lecturer

in politics at Leicester University, which, at the time this collection was published, was correct. (He is now at the University of Bristol.) In Michael Leifer's first chapter, on 'Conflict and regional order in South-East Asia', one of the most penetrating analyses in the book, there is no word about the author where one might have expected it, and only in his second chapter, on 'The security of sea-lanes in South-East Asia', is the reader informed that he is in fact Reader in International Relations at the LSE. When it comes to the two Japanese contributors, Yukio Satoh on 'The evolution of Japanese security policy', and Takashi Tajima on 'China and South-East Asia', we are left completely in the dark as to who they are. More fortunate are Paul Dibb of the ANU, Canberra, on the Soviet Union; Scalapino of Berkeley on the United States; Adelman of SRI International (what's that? he is, in fact, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in President Reagan's administration) on Japan; and William Tow, at the University of Southern California, on ANZUS.

Whatever the shortcomings in presentation, there can be no underrating the importance of the themes discussed in this volume. Whether or not one feels that the centre of gravity in world affairs is shifting away from Europe, eastwards to Asia and the Pacific basin, the Editor is surely correct to emphasize the potential for movement in this part of the world, and in his warning not 'to take for granted the continuance of the present state of affairs, both in terms of regional relations in East Asia and the impact of East Asia generally on the global balance' (p. ix).

University of Hull VICTOR FUNNELL

Armed communist movements in southeast Asia. Edited by Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 1984. 204pp. Index. £15·00.

THIS volume is the first collaborative product inspired by a group of south–east Asian academics who inaugurated a regional strategic studies programme based at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. The initial focus of their programme is on socio-economic issues affecting regional security, and to this end a workshop was held in Singapore in November 1982 which discussed the condition of armed communist movements in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand.

Missed opportunity and failure has been the striking common experience of armed communism in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and for this reason accounts of more recent activity tend to be shadowy. Doradjatun-Kuntjoro-Jakti and Donald Weatherbee provide sound complementary accounts of the inability of Indonesia's Communist Party to overcome fundamental problems of limited cultural constituency and unsuitable terrain for insurgent action. In effect, during its hey-day, Indonesia's Communist Party was never an armed movement and never a match for the organized strength of the armed forces. In Malaysia, whose experience is discussed by Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Zakaria Hamid, armed struggle has been peripheral to the political process since 1960. Indeed, from the outset the communal identity of the Malayan Communist Party permitted only a circumscribed appeal, while recent internal schism has weakened further any ability to challenge national government. Lee Ting Hui looks specifically at the practice of open and unarmed united front by communists in Singapore between 1954 and 1966, and recounts their inability to make a decisive impact on the legal political process. Failure has also been the most recent experience of the Communist Party of Thailand, depicted by many as a greatly weakened and disintegrating force from the late 1970s on. Kanok Wongtrangan, however, provides an alternative view and suggests that account should be taken of its facility for adaptation, especially given the unwillingness of Thailand's military establishment to share power in response to social change. He does not see the strength of the Communist Party of Thailand so reduced that it becomes no more than a marginal protest group. The Communist Party of the Philippines is unique in this company. It has not only experienced failure but also regeneration. It is described by Francisco Nemenzo in an illuminating profile as the only

communist party in the ASEAN region which has 'any prospect of bursting into the corridors of power'. He explains its process of regeneration from the late 1960s, and how its leadership skilfully adapted Marxist theory to archipelagic conditions through a policy of decentralization. Whether or not its goal of simultaneous insurrection will be attained is left open, but the analysis is marked by doctrinal prescription by Nemenzo as to how the Philippines might break out of 'a vicious cycle of repressive authoritarianism and ineffectual constitutionalism.' Chandran Jeshurun provides a clear summary of this fruitful exercise in collaboration, and ponders on the prospect of indigenization of Marxist ideology with a strongly nationalist character, along the lines of the relatively successful Filipino model.

London School of Economics and Political Science MICHAEL LEIFER

Australia and the European communities in the 1980s. By Alan Burnett. Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. 1983. 255pp. Index. Pb. (Canberra Studies in World Affairs 12.)

THIS book is written primarily for an Australian audience. There is a good deal of interesting material about a range of issues concerning Australia's relations with the European Community. However, half of the book also presents some basic facts about the European Community obviously aimed at non-specialists. Inevitably, agricultural disputes loom large. The author argues that the troubled relationship between Australia and the European Community stems almost exclusively from the external consequences of the Common Agricultural Policy; that Community export surpluses have depressed world prices; and that if, initially, the adverse effects for Australia of British accession to the Community were not apparent, by the late 1970s the consequences for Australian primary exports of European Community export surpluses were dire, nowhere more so than in the sugar sector. While agriculture remains vital to Australia's economic prosperity, it has declined relative to mineral and manufactured exports. These are the themes Burnett emphasizes in the second part of the book. The first part, by contrast, gives a synopsis of the European Community's development since the 1950s, and brief sketches of Commission-Council decision-making and problems faced by the Community in the 1970s and 1980s. It covers much familiar ground. There are some errors.

Examining the bilateral relationship between the European Community and Australia (mainly from 1976 to 1982), Burnett condemns the Community for omitting, in the relevant trade statistics, invisible trade. In visible trade, the Community's share of the Australian market has declined in tandem with the decrease in British exports to Australia.

EC–Australian confrontation and compromise in GATT is outlined, but it merits more detailed treatment. Burnett notes the dilemma faced by Australia in condemning the European Community over the Common Agricultural Policy while seeking to increase Community investment in Australian resource projects (not least because of the market potential offered by the Community, which, he notes, imports 75 per cent of its raw materials compared with Japan's 90 per cent and the USA's 15 per cent). The rest of the book concentrates on agricultural problems and the often very strained relations between the European Community and Australia arising mainly in this area. Burnett concludes, rightly, that both Australia and the Community need to reform their diplomacy. On the one hand, Australia is exonerated from blame for world trade problems, and is asked to coordinate its diplomatic resources to enable it to help solve European Community–US tensions 'which are symptomatic of a disequilibrium in world agricultural production and trade' (p. 227). Less ingenuously, Burnett echoes a common lament against the European Community: 'Regrettably the EC is likely to be deprived for many years by the will of the mediocre leaders of its member states from exercising the governmental role the rest of the world needs and increasingly expects from it' (p. 226).

The book presents a largely Australian view of relations with the European Community but criticism of the latter is tempered, in parts, by condemnation of Australian errors in diplomacy. The book provides an introduction to questions that have plagued European Community–Australian relations, notably since 1973.

University of Hull JULIET LODGE

Australian federalism: future tense. Edited by Allan Patience and Jeffrey Scott. Melbourne, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. 217pp. Pb.: £12·00.

THIS collection of eleven papers, although written in the mode of a future tense, now represents the debate of 1980–1 in suspension. The delay in publication is not explained; nor is the provenance. Was it a conference, a series of seminars or a publisher's venture? The editor's introduction is primarily a piece of historiography on federal writings, all using a lot of American terminology. Nothing has been included that is later than the southern hemisphere Spring of 1981, as the postscript (pp. 151–8) to chapter nine indicates. There are footnotes, but no bibliography and no index.

The context of the debate which the main contributors embody was a general disenchantment with the 'new federalism' of the Liberal–Country Party coalition under Mr Malcolm Fraser which came to power in 1975. Although the constitutional conventions of 1973–6 and the constitutional referendums of 1974 and 1977 are described, the authors emphasize the revival of the powers of the states after the demise of the Labour federal government. The four professional politicians who contribute are openly partisan. The premier of Queensland seems particularly in the 'past tense', welcoming the Governor-General's dismissal of a Labour Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam. The latter presents a paper on the high administrative costs of the federal system. All the papers are suffused with concern about the built-in bias of the federal system against the development of socialism.

The projection of a future tense does not anticipate Bob Hawke's Labour Party victory at the polls in 1983. But the papers contributed by seven academics nevertheless put forward all the issues which are still on the agenda. The key contributions are by Sawer, West, Wettenhall and Groenewegen. Geoffrey Sawer writing about the 'constitutional crisis' explains why the composition of the Senate ('a party house', p. 99), the ties between the states and Britain, and the composition of the High Court are issues of importance. Although Katherine West does not anticipate the floating of the Australian dollar and the removal of exchange controls, her explanation of the 'two conflicting economies' (p. 108) in Australia, the unprotected resources exporters and the protected domestic manufacturers, is still at the heart of Mr Hawke's attempts to bring in trade liberalization without straining Commonwealth–states relations. Roger Wettenhall outlines the function of mechanisms for 'inter-governmental relations' in the reduction of tension, but Peter Groenewegen shows why the declining growth rates of the sources of taxation which the states can exploit are making them more dependent on the Commonwealth. Although these essays seem somewhat dated, they underline the essential continuity of problems which arise when the imbalance of economic development in different regions is set against the political advantages built into the constitution.

University of Bristol J. M. LEE

Without honor: defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. By Arnold R. Isaacs. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1983. 559pp. Index. £15·00; $23.00.

ARNOLD ISAACS, a war correspondent in south-east Asia for the Baltimore *Sun* from 1972 to 1975, was evacuated from Saigon the day before the final collapse of the last South Vietnamese government. Before the signing in Paris of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, which supposedly came into effect on 28 January 1973, he saw the tragedy, the corruption, the degradation and the heroism of war at first hand. He is an experienced reporter and a vivid writer, his style combining an emotional expressionism with detailed precision. Travelling in Quang Tri province in 1972, he counted 400 wrecked vehicles in the space of two miles. Material waste fed an orgy of consumption and destruction. In the months before the ceasefire, as the United States sought to enhance the military capability of the South, he was reminded of Peking duck, 'force-fed until they could not even waddle and were fit only to be devoured' (p. 49). After the ceasefire, southern units fired howitzer shells faster than the US could make them. Isaacs travelled all

over South Vietnam that spring, and reports that he was 'seldom beyond the sound of gunfire' (p. 84). Although the US forces stopped most of their ground operations, the bombing of Laos and Cambodia continued until Congress called a halt in August 1973: villages were obliterated, the land was blackened, and it 'was as if the bombers had sought to destroy the earth itself' (p. 218). The South Vietnamese government, 'authoritarian enough to be unpopular, democratic enough to be inefficient' (p. 119) finally fell in April 1975. Thousands fled by sea and air, and the last Americans left the Embassy roof by helicopter, leaving behind Vietnamese whom they had promised not to desert.

Isaac's story is powerfully told, and his title indicates his interpretive stance. The American President called the ceasefire an agreement that secured peace with honour, but Isaacs sees a history of failure. He is particularly severe on Henry Kissinger, whom he accuses of deception, and insensitivity to the Indo-China situation which led him to reiterate expectations which were impossibly high and contributed to ultimate disaster. Although he acknowledges the impact of the Congressional cutback in American aid, he does not believe that it was responsible for the final collapse of Thieu's government or the capitulation by Big Minh.

Isaacs has used all available sources, including the Defense Attachés' reports, congressional hearings, radio transcripts and newspapers from North Vietnam and China as well as from the West. Through his direct experience he has sought to convey something of mood, texture and setting. This he has done superbly well, and his judgements on policies and policy-makers reveal a deep personal concern about the ethics of external intervention in the affairs of distant and different nations.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

North America

Caveat: realism, Reagan and foreign policy. By Alexander M. Haig, Jr. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1984. 367pp. Index. £12·95.

THE author's reputation will not be enhanced by these rather premature and distasteful memoirs, with their bitter attacks on his many enemies in Washington DC, and their dismaying account of foreign policy-making there. Haig's choice as Secretary of State was welcomed in Europe, yet owing to his style and manner, his replacement by George Shultz came as a relief. This book shows the reasons: a combative and quarrelsome personality and, except on subjects directly involving European allies, views as crude and reckless as any Californian's.

Haig blames all the world's ills since 1945 on probes against the West by the Soviet Union or its 'proxies': Cuba, Libya, North Vietnam, Ethiopia—and international terrorism. No local problems or grievances in any disturbed country obtrude to complicate his picture. Defenders of human rights are scorned: their doubts about the Shah's regime are 'inexplicable' (p. 96); 'the military' in El Salvador are (unqualified) 'the guarantors of a democratic solution' (p. 126); and the best hope for Argentine democracy was—Galtieri (p. 275, 278). One loathsome protégé does cause him disquiet (the communist Pol Pot). Surprisingly, however, protestors against nuclear arms are defended by Haig—against the unjust attacks of his most hated opponents, 'the President's more dogmatic advisers' (p. 235).

Somewhat unconvincingly, he disavows the presidential ambitions for which the White House staff distrusted him—though he admits to his nickname CINCWORLD (Commander-in-Chief of the World) and to Cabinet complaints of his 'steamroller tactics' (pp. 92, 148). He retaliates vigorously; yet his scathing criticisms of individuals alternate uneasily and inconsistently with warm words of praise for them. The Secretary of Defense was ignorant and obtuse, and would keep 'blurting out locker-room opinions in the guise of policy' (pp. 87–8), undermining Haig's efforts by taking a different line at delicate moments. The Vice-President consistently abetted him. The first National Security Adviser was 'irrelevant', the next (despite his 'limited experience and limited understanding' (p. 339)) ran 'a second foreign policy, using separate channels of communication' (p. 306). The Ambassador to the UN kept encouraging the Argentine junta—though the ones to blame were the presidential aides who had institutionalized discord.

The policy-making machinery worked poorly in many ways. Chinese intentions were for years misunderstood because of Washington's ignorance resulting from two decades without communications, compounded by reliance on technological intelligence instead of informed human analysis (little regarded by superiors, and hard to come by since McCarthyism). Decisions with major repercussions were taken, unknown to those nominally responsible, by low-level bureaucrats in the Departments of Defense (over AWACS planes for Saudi Arabia, and over denying obsolete computers to China) and even of Commerce (over retrospective sanctions to stop the pipeline). For two years interdepartmental rivalries blocked coherent negotiable US proposals on nuclear arms talks. Urgent messages could not penetrate 'the incoherent NSC [National Security Council] system' (p. 335).

The real problems, however, came from the top. The Secretary of State had no direct access to the President, did not get the regular weekly discussion hour for which he asked, found even his phone calls blocked by the staff (which Haig calls the 'apparat', p. 307). Public policy statements were 'a sort of Babel' (p. 86); behind the scenes policy was determined by 'schoolboy scuffles for personal advantage', in which press leaks were 'a way of life . . . a way of governing . . . the authentic voice of the government', and the media became 'White House bulletin boards' (pp. 17–18). Haig spoke more freely to the Chinese Minister of Defence than he did in Washington. The White House aides, who saw themselves from the start as superior to the Cabinet, began by thinking foreign policy was unimportant, and tended throughout 'to regard government as a campaign for re-election' (pp. 356–7). As 'managers of the Presidency' they manipulated Reagan, deciding who he should see, what he should read, which policies and people should flourish or fail (pp. 149–50). But 'the White House was as mysterious as a ghost ship; you heard the creak of the rigging and the groan of the timbers' but could never know who had the helm (p. 85)—not even by using 'kremlinology' to penetrate 'this steaming mess of startling indiscretion, sly innuendo, and half-truth' (p. 94). Yet no individual is ever unmasked as the demon helmsman—only an anonymous collective, manipulating the figurehead President who keeps deferring decisions, offering meaningless reassurances of support, until the day Haig accepted in writing 'a letter of resignation that I had not submitted' (p. 314).

Nuffield College, Oxford P. M. WILLIAMS

The nuclear delusion: Soviet-American relations in the atomic age. By George F. Kennan. 5th ed., updated and expanded. London: Hamish Hamilton. 1983. 264pp. Index. £12·50.

To many students of international politics George Kennan is something of an enigma. The man who wrote the long telegram in February 1946 and the famous 'X Article' arguing for a policy of containment and an end to the naive optimism of American policy-makers towards the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar period, is the same man who argued against the formation of NATO and has subsequently become a leading critic not only of US nuclear policy but of the whole containment strategy pursued by successive administrations towards the Soviet Union.

Professor Kennan has been at pains over the years (especially in his memoirs) to argue that there has been nothing contradictory or inconsistent about the positions he had adopted. The present volume, containing 31 articles and speeches produced between 1950 and 1982, is designed to re-emphasize that essential consistency as well as to reinforce his profound concern with the contemporary problems of Soviet–American relations and the dangers inherent in the nuclear arms race between the superpowers. The contributions contained in the volume, not surprisingly, vary enormously in length and quality. The message which comes through, however, is Professor Kennan's conviction that the United States has never really understood the true nature of the Soviet Union. The over-optimism of the war-time and immediate postwar periods has given way to the opposite extreme of intractable opposition and an over-militarization of relations with the Soviet Union (pp. xii, xxiii). This, he argues, has given rise to an uncontrollable arms race which has brought the world to the edge of the 'abyss of total nuclear catastrophe'.

There is no doubting Professor Kennan's sincerity. His plea to the leaders of both superpowers sums up the feelings of many who have become anxious in recent years about the nuclear arms race: 'For the love of God, of your children, and of the civilization to which you belong, cease this madness' (p. 144). Nor can Professor Kennan's arguments be

dismissed as the emotionalism of the uninformed. His State Department experience and his expertise as a Soviet scholar and diplomatic historian make his arguments hard to dismiss on the grounds that he does not understand the Soviet Union or the realities of international politics. The various essays in the book on the history of Soviet–American relations, in particular (although a little repetitive), demonstrate the quality of his scholarship.

The interesting question which arises is whether Professor Kennan's professional expertise makes his judgements on nuclear issues any more authoritative than anyone else's. Kennan himself is quite explicit that he is writing as an ordinary citizen and not as an academic. There is, however, an implicit assumption that his views of Soviet behaviour (based on a long study of the Soviet Union) are correct and that, if only Western governments would accept his analysis, the world could be led away from catastrophe. Although he is very critical of the Soviet system, he sees Soviet leaders as essentially defensive and cautious, preoccupied with their own domestic problems and with no interest in world domination or invading Western Europe. Clearly Professor Kennan is to be listened to, given his experience and scholarship, but there is no way of proving whether he is right or not. Other Soviet scholars have come to somewhat different interpretations of Soviet behaviour based on the study of much the same kind of evidence.

Professor Kennan's prescriptions, however, do not stand or fall on his views of the Soviet Union. In his view, the Western approach to the Soviet Union should be based on two fundamental appreciations. First, that 'there is no issue at stake in our political relations with the Soviet Union . . . which could conceivably be worth a nuclear war'. Secondly, that there is 'no way in which nuclear weapons could conceivably be employed in combat' without the probability of 'escalation to a general nuclear disaster' (pp. 194–5). Bearing this in mind, he urges cuts by half in long, medium and short range nuclear missiles, the complete denuclearization of central and northern Europe, a complete ban on testing, and the adoption by NATO of 'a no-first-use strategy' (pp. 194–5). This he sees as the first step to the complete elimination of the weapons of mass destruction (p. 160).

For Professor Kennan, the multilateralism of recent years has largely failed. What is needed is 'a bold and sweeping departure' to cut surgically through 'the exaggerated anxieties, the self engendered nightmares and the sophisticated mathematics of destruction' (p. 180). Professor Kennan criticizes the present stress on nuclear deterrence with its obsession with military balances and argues that 'the preposterous quantities of overkill' render the relative sizes of arsenals meaningless. Although he rejects unilateral disarmament, he seems to be arguing for a return, at least temporarily, to a minimum deterrent situation. One is reminded here of Henry Kissinger's reported comment 'What on earth is superiority anyway?'

As an alternative approach on such a vital question, Professor Kennan's prescriptions have to be considered seriously. For the present reviewer there are, however, a number of important weaknesses in the arguments presented in the book. Besides the questionable assumptions about whether the world is a more dangerous place today than in the past, and whether nuclear war is inevitable if we carry on as we are, the major deficiency is that Professor Kennan fails to consider in any detail the consequences of his 'solutions' to the world's problems. Nor does he discuss what should be done if the Soviet Union fails to respond to the initiatives he proposes. Despite his rejection of complete unilateral nuclear disarmament, the logic of the argument presented is that the United States would be perfectly safe with one-fifth of its present level of forces irrespective of what the Soviet Union does. That would be enough to deter. He fails, however, to consider the psychological (and therefore the political and strategic) effects of such inferiority on the American population and on the Western alliance. To persuade (or 're-educate') the American people and their Western allies that 'the whole concept of relative advantage is illusory' (p. 179) would suggest a degree of sophistication among Western publics which seems unrealistic even with 'enlightened statesmanship'.

Professor Kennan's arguments dismissing the dangers of nuclear blackmail are also rather weak and highly questionable. He argues that 'no one in their right senses gives in to such blackmail' and that 'states do not behave like that anyway' (p. 71). The Hitlers of this world are an exception, he argues. So they are, but the exception in international politics has a habit of occurring. What then?

There is also the problem associated with Professor Kennan's argument on the need for 'a no-first-use strategy'. He is right to stress the need for conventional improvements and

the need to be prepared to pay for them. He goes on to argue, however, that 'a no-first-use concept' can and should be adopted even before the conventional improvements take place. There is no real discussion, however, of the political (and in the case of West Germany, the strategic) implications of this policy. What if the populations of Western Europe cannot be persuaded to pay the bills—for whatever reason?

Nevertheless, it must be said that this is overall a stimulating and provocative book. It is to be hoped that one of its messages, that there is an urgent need for 'serious, consistent and determined efforts . . . to eliminate war', especially through improved dialogue with the Soviet Union, will not be ignored because of the radical and often questionable proposals put forward by the author.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth JOHN BAYLIS

A covenant with power: America and world order from Wilson to Reagan. By Lloyd C. Gardner. London: Macmillan. 1984. 251pp. Index. £20·00.

PROFESSOR GARDNER describes his work thus: 'Each chapter is really an essay, or "think-piece", and together they form a cluster around the principal themes of the liberal state, its supporters, and the use of power' (p. 235). He writes elliptically, allusively, and often obscurely. Even his title, though borrowed from Wilson, is hard to interpret, and one must hope that an analogy between President Reagan and Melville's Captain Ahab is not seriously meant. He compounds the offence by omitting almost all references to the many illuminating and stimulating quotations he incorporates. Readers should not, however, be put off by a difficult text, for Professor Gardner's view of American foreign policy is (if this reviewer has followed him correctly) one which has been gaining ground and which may yet become a new orthodoxy. It deserves to do so, for it is much more persuasive and satisfactory than either eulogies of democratic foreign policy or the harsh criticisms of Professor W. A. Williams and his followers.

The central proposition is that a liberal capitalist nation, such as the United States, has a conception of world order which it is entitled to—and indeed must—try to foster. For many years Americans were excused from duty, both by their geographical position and by the belief that the world was inevitably going their way. They could be, so to speak, inactive radicals. Things changed somewhere around the end of the nineteenth century. The first great expositor of the change and its implications was, of course, Woodrow Wilson; and later discussion of American policy, when not simply misguided, has been a series of variations on Wilsonian themes. The Wilsonian world order is one in which governments exercise restraint, while allowing the maximum freedom of action to their citizens on a basis of international reciprocity. Unhappily for the United States, many other countries reject such an order, whether out of dogmatic hostility to capitalism or simply because their peoples want their governments to provide instant prosperity. The United States, disposing of great power and wealth, must then choose whether to retreat into a defensive managed economy of its own (for Americans too can demand protection and privilege) or to try to advance the desired world order—to intervene, paradoxically, on behalf of non-intervention. Americans become active antiradicals.

Such a stance does not offer much guidance for policy-makers facing a variety of disparate problems, some arising from a process of change which owes nothing to the United States, some from past American errors such as exaggerated support for Israel. It need cause no surprise that the United States has often failed and often blundered. Inconsistency between ends and means is easy for critics to point out, but both the legitimacy of the purpose and the difficulty of attaining it should be acknowledged. And behind the first paradox lies another. If American foreign policy is now in essence conservative, or at least responsive, what the rulers of America need are the conservative virtues of patience, moderation, scepticism, restraint; just as these are the virtues they would like other governments to show. Yet not only does action seem necessary abroad—that is the dilemma—it is demanded at home. Peoples create governments in their own images, and conservative virtues are not highly valued by a competitive, energetic, ambitious people. It is one thing to believe, as Americans once did, that very little government is necessary; it is quite another to value a government which is, or which ought to be, working against the very grain of American life. Neither Americans nor anyone else should think there is some easy way out.

University of Birmingham A. E. CAMPBELL

Maritime strategy or coalition defense? By Robert W. Komer. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books. 1984. 116pp. Index. $19.00.

ROBERT KOMER has long deserved well of his country; a career of some thirty years at the hub of American political and military affairs has given him a very wide range of experience, and a succession of important positions in the last twenty years has given him a salience that makes him a familiar figure in NATO and most European capitals. McGeorge Bundy, in the foreword to this book, refers wryly to Komer's instinct for the jugular; but his body-punching has left bruises all over the alliance too. To see him steaming into action in a committee or at a conference, pipe clenched between his teeth, and all closed up for boarding by reasoned, combative arguments makes him resemble one of the high-value maritime units designed for the projection of force (or, as we used to call them, ships) that, in this book, he so much deplores.

The book is an extension of the case which he has previously sketched out in an article in the *Washington Post* in February 1982 and then in the *Foreign Affairs* issue for Summer 1982. It was supplemented by pamphlets for the Center for National Policy in 1983. The basis of the argument is, first, that the United States needs to rethink and re-form its national strategy: this will call for institutional change, not least at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, and intellectual reassessments of both the priorities and the purposes to be served. Next, and given that a new strategy will have to accept the necessity to select priorities in the face of an inability to provide for them all by itself, the United States must persuade its allies to improve their performance, in terms both of resources and efficiency. There is an urgent need to improve non-nuclear defence capabilities in Europe and to agree how the burdens of defence—tasks as well as budgets—can be more effectively shared. Thirdly, there is a need for the United States to show a more imaginative and cohesive example to its friends, in order to encourage them to do more for themselves.

The bare bones of the argument are supplemented by wide reading, careful thought and a belief in the power of reason. Komer's case is a part of a range of current concern, as his citations show, not only in the United States but also in Europe; but it is addressed primarily to the United States predicament and to the opportunity which a presidential election offers to inject new thoughts and another chance to do better. It is part of Komer's value as a good public servant that he has both the energy and the persistence to go round the buoy yet one more time: for it has to be said that a great deal of the material is, in detail, fairly familiar. The general case for reform and for reassessment is not new, either in the United States or in the wider alliance context; but Komer is right (and the other critics whom he cites and offers comment on are right, too) to emphasize how much recent developments have lent force to their urgings that the case must be taken seriously.

The doubt I have about it all is whether anything really significant will happen. It is usual in these matters to talk about the essential presence of 'political will'; and Komer does. But political will, in the sorts of contexts he is talking about, goes beyond declarations of intent in communiqués and exhortations about Brownie percentage points; it means the sort of continual political attention to performance, and the sensitive political appreciation of approval and benefit, that is traditionally more evident on the domestic political agenda. This, after all, is the arena in which our political leaders learn their craft and from which they derive their institutional skills. It seems that Komer is asking for a level, not merely of enlightenment, not merely of dominance in the political process, but also of persistence, that all add up to what, in the trade, we would call an ideal state. Even though so many of the changes he is adumbrating are, by themselves, relatively small, the orchestration of the whole is much greater than the sum of the parts.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

US military power in the 1980s. By Christopher Coker. London: Macmillan for Royal United Services Institute. 1984. 163pp. Index. £17·50.

THIS book is derived from the major theme pursued by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in their 150th year, 1981–2. In its second half it reproduces seven of

the formal presentations made to RUSI audiences during the year, all of them by very distinguished office-holders and commentators; and the first half is an interpretation and commentary, as well as a brisk and lively exposition of the issues, by Christopher Coker.

As Michael Howard says in his foreword, it is a rather depressing account of the difficulties encountered by the United States in maintaining a military establishment adequate to the needs of a global power in the late twentieth century. He goes on to make the points that there is much more to effective political influence than military power, and that a comparable analysis of Soviet problems would be needed to set the rather exaggerated commonplaces of an American decline into perspective.

However, taking the book as it is, the evidence of weaknesses abounds: 'too much money has been spent in the past on sophisticated equipment, too little on the wherewithal to maintain it in the field' (p. 19) is, for example, a major thread in the analysis of the record of the 1970s, and a major preoccupation for the 1980s, which finds its most up-to-date expression in Mr Weinberger's latest report (FY 1985) to the Congress. Without in any way detracting from the seriousness of the position, or indeed from the major efforts that are proving necessary to ameliorate it, the fact of the matter is that the running down of stores and supplies either to save money (or, what is quite a different matter, to produce economies quickly) or to shield other expenditure programmes is neither a novel nor a specifically American problem. The causes seem to vary over time. Budgetary pressure is very often present; but inflated expectations about the performance of novel technological changes, simple ignorance of the facts, neglect of logistics and wrong guessing all have a place too. And, in recent times, the dominance of logically based forecasting over the human tendency to be both wasteful and militarily prudent has played a role.

Many of these sorts of factor come out in Dr Coker's survey, which is organized in a broadly chronological development. It is vigorously presented and he clearly knows his way through the thickets of Congressional Committee reports. There are a small number of irritating errors in the commentary: the Eisenhower commitments to defend Europe and East Asia are thirty rather than twenty years old (p. 15) and the multilateral nuclear force was in its prime much more than ten years before the cruise missile and Pershing II modernization plan (p. 26). It is all a bit technicoloured, and reflects the phenomenon that the confession of inadequacy is a necessary prerequisite to additional funding, in the general Western mode as well as the specifically American condition.

Although the book has been produced fairly quickly, as publishers manage these things, the picture that has been painted is, however, already somewhat dated. What the Reagan administration has done in the last two years has been quite substantial; but, equally, the cost of doing it has now induced a change of mood, in the government and, it seems, in the public mind.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

US international broadcasting and national security. By James L. Tyson. New York: Ramapo for National Strategy Information Center. 1983. 153pp. Pb.: $7·95.

MR TYSON has had long experience of the American information services, and particularly of the Voice of America and the German-based Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. He produces a well-researched and factual account of the birth of all these services during the Second World War and the immediate postwar period. He describes their ups and downs from the Roosevelt to the Reagan era. His main thesis is that the unrelenting hostility and expansionism of the Soviet regime has been the main factor in persuading Americans that the radio stations are important for American security. He makes no bones about the difficulty of interesting Americans in spending their dollars on addressing the people of other countries about the issues of the day. He thinks that the radio stations would have withered away after the armistice had it not been for Russian dedication to propaganda of all sorts, and in particular to radio propaganda. Tyson describes how the cold war kept American external broadcasting alive; how after Stalin's death a reduced effort seemed to be justified; how the Kennedy era sharpened American interest in broadcasting to other countries; how interest lapsed in the post-Kennedy era, 1964–80; how the arrival of Mr Reagan and Mr Charles Wick, both professional broadcasters, has led to renewed interest and to additional support for external broadcasting.

The second half of the book provides useful details about equipment, personnel and programming. The reader is left with the impression that resources and interest are likely to increase so long as Mr Reagan is in office.

The problem which occupies Mr Tyson's mind above all is that of 'propaganda versus dispassionate information', or 'the message versus the facts'. Is it enough for the American voices to produce a news service, or should they seek positively to influence the opinions of their listeners? Tyson appears to be in favour of using the radios more positively than the 'straight information' school would like. He returns repeatedly to the rival merits of robust commentaries designed to persuade and of straight information designed to inform. Like Mr Reagan he feels that the radios should avoid a 'warts and all' news service and should speak up for the merits of the American democratic way of life.

The British reader might well ask why Mr Tyson does not consider why the BBC External Services are held in higher esteem worldwide than the American radios. One reason is that the BBC is not racked with doubt about the 'news and commentary' issue. Its External Services are built round an impeccable news service, considered throughout most of the world to be factual and reliable. To be believed by millions is the BBC's reward for its techniques. Its postbag from all over the world, and costly Russian jamming, testify to the effectiveness of its 'news as seen from Britain'. BBC commentaries are generally not particularly controversial. They rank well behind the news bulletins in importance. The news bulletins are the long-term persuaders; the rest of the programmes, well devised, are less important for influencing opinion.

Second, the BBC External Services have a huge advantage over the American radios in that they have roots. They derive their news from the same central newsroom as supplies the BBC's domestic service and are thus able to draw sustenance from the rich soil of British society. The American radios, by contrast, are enforcedly separate from domestic broadcasting. They are like cut flowers compared with the BBC's rooted plants.

Third, BBC External Broadcasting enjoys support from a large and active lobby which protects it from the regular onslaughts of the Treasury and makes representations in favour of its meagre resources being increased rather than reduced.

Fourth, the BBC has not had to suffer from constant argument about the role of the External Services in relation to Government. The formula which ensures editorial freedom but stipulates that broadcasters keep in touch with Whitehall 'so that their programmes can be drawn up in the national interest' has given BBC people an easier ride than their American colleagues have had.

Mr Tyson does not go deeply into the covert funding issue which complicated the early days of the German-based radios, or into the potential of satellite TV broadcasts. But his main point is well and firmly made: that if the Russians put a huge effort into influencing opinion by all forms of propaganda, including broadcasting, then United States national security demands an effective American response to the challenge.

Despite intensive jamming by the Russians, the broadcasters vault over the Iron Curtain and are heard in countless homes throughout the communist world. There is ample evidence that truthful broadcasting is well worth doing. As President Truman said, 'Always speak the truth . . . you will please some people and astonish the rest'.

NORMAN REDDAWAY

United States oil policy and diplomacy: a twentieth century overview. By Deward W. Chester. London: Greenwood. 1984. 399pp. Index. £30·95.

THERE is no doubt about the importance of oil as an influence on the American economy and on national politics. The objective of Professor Chester is to 'furnish a conceptual or structural framework' that will enable those who read his study 'to think and act in a more intelligent manner about questions relating to the international aspects of petroleum' (p. xii). What in fact he provides is a detailed survey of United States diplomacy abroad in implementing oil policy in response to specific situations. The presentation is essentially a narrative chronology of events as they relate to different countries, after an initial overview of the historical evolution of United States oil policy. These chapters are detailed but rather

dull. It is only in the penultimate chapter that an attempt is made to indicate what is significant. It would have helped the reader immeasurably, and achieved more successfully the intentions of the author, had the central points of these conclusions been presented earlier. It would have supplemented the worthy attempt to be scrupulously objective. There may be too many subjective or poorly researched books on the politics of oil as it relates to the United States, but the success of this authoritative overview is weakened by the lack of guidance given to the reader until the end as to what factors are distinctive in the detailed evidence presented. Such caution is understandable, but unfortunate.

What, then, does Professor Chester conclude from his detailed examination of American petroleum diplomacy in different parts of the world, until the 1973 Arab oil embargo changed the ability of American petroleum companies to maintain a continuous flow of oil from abroad despite the challenges of nationalism and nationalization, reform and revolution, and global rivalries? Though sceptical of the argument that government has been dominated by the oil giants, he concedes that Democratic and Republican administrations alike have on numerous occasions tried to safeguard the position of American oil companies abroad, not only through diplomatic representations but with sanctions and even military shows of force. Such actions and protests, however, have not been universally successful, nor have they deterred other nations from risking a confrontation. The United States government has been inconsistent in its reponse to the seizure abroad of the properties of American oil companies. The various policies and diplomatic activities have in turn been influenced by the rivalries and competing interests and institutions within government in Washington, just as different regional attitudes (oil-hungry versus oil-producing states, for example) have affected issues such as the imposition of import regulations or production limitations. The government has also been prepared to take positive steps to make oil available to other countries in times of crisis, or provide funds for oil projects.

Chester believes that on balance the oil companies are no better or worse than other businesses in their influence on the people and the economies of other countries. Now, however, oil-producing countries inevitably put their own national interest first, with American companies more the client than the patron. Chester adds a short epilogue on post-1973 developments, and there is a good bibliographical essay and chronology of key events.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

Canadian–American relations: the promise and the challenge. By Kenneth M. Curtis and John E. Carroll. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. 1984. 107pp. Index. £18·50.

CURTIS and Carroll call upon the United States to formulate 'a New Canada Policy', by which they mean a new policy for the federal government in its relations with Canada. They make a number of specific recommendations, including the creation of a deputy assistant secretaryship on Canadian affairs in the State Department, a sub-committee on Canada in Congress, and two new commissions on economic affairs and on sea and shore boundaries, modelled on the existing International Joint Commission. They also believe that the latter could accomplish much more than it does.

They write from direct experience in New England, an area they describe in terms of 'regional pull' towards Canada. Curtis as the Governor of Maine pioneered a number of agreements during the 1970s after meetings between New England governors and Eastern Canada premiers. He was also responsible for talks with Quebec about the culture of Franco-Americans who constitute nearly twenty per cent of Maine's population. Carroll, an associate professor in New Hampshire, studied proposals to divert the south-flowing waters of the Missouri river across a watershed in North Dakota into the north-flowing waters of the Souris river so that dry prairies might be irrigated, but at the expense of Manitoba and at the cost of polluting Lake Winnipeg. He therefore became an expert on 'transboundary environmental relations', including such issues as the production of hydroelectricity, the exploitation of natural gas, and the effects of acid rain. This expertise was then made available to New England governors.

This book is partly an extension of his interests from environmental questions to the broader issues. Its theme is that the problems of 'continental concerns' about resources are

getting increasingly serious. Since the early 1970s there has been a massive increase in 'state–province interactions' across the border which entail 'agreements, arrangements and understandings'. The 'promise' in the book's sub-title is the opportunity to solve problems more systematically than the present plethora of *ad hoc* decisions; the 'challenge' is the danger which might arise if American–Canadian relations deteriorate.

But it is not clear to which audience the authors' arguments are directed. Their style is fairly dead-pan, and their presentation unlikely to arouse opinion in Washington. Pierre Trudeau in 1969 described the Canadian experience of America as 'sleeping with an elephant', John Holmes in 1981 as 'life with Uncle'. The authors do not help the average American general reader to understand Canada more fully, except with a few basic statistics, although they regularly acknowledge the woeful ignorance of the American people about Canada. They fail to explain the Canadian reaction against Lester Pearson's 'quiet diplomacy' or Pierre Trudeau's drive for an articulation of foreign policy objectives, expressed in 1970 papers.

They convey no real sense of Canada's cultivation of 'counter-weights' to the American presence or of NATO as a focus in which to escape from bilateral discussions. Their bibliography is hardly a basis for further reading to improve the American mind. The book should perhaps be regarded primarily as an expression of anxiety at the state level about federal government indifference.

University of Bristol J. M. LEE

Canada as a principal power: a study in foreign policy and international relations. By D. B. Dewitt and J. J. Kirton. Toronto: Wiley. 1983. 478pp.

THE authors examine three perspectives on Canadian foreign policy since 1947. They argue that the two established schools of interpretation, 'liberal internationalism' and 'peripheral dependence', have failed as frameworks of analysis particularly since the start of the Trudeau era. Instead, they offer a third perspective, 'complex neo-realism' which, they argue, offers a better understanding of the subject and integrates it more closely with the study of international politics generally. By this they mean the realist tradition of H. J. Morgenthau and a 'neo-realist' successor to that tradition typified by the works of Stanley Hoffmann.

From the latter, the authors argue that the international system is more orderly than is generally supposed and that this order is sustained by the hegemony of a 'principal power' or group of such states rather than by a balance of forces. Principal powers are identified by ranking criteria, acting for themselves and acting to establish international order(s). Canada, West Germany, France and perhaps Japan (but not Britain for some reason), have been in the process of becoming such powers since the early 1960s, pursuing their interests through shifting alliances, but operating on the assumption that the construction of international regimes, orderly procedures for international interaction, are in their best interests.

Their emergence has been made possible by a decline in the hegemonic capacities of America. This assertion, unfortunately, does not receive the elaboration it requires, particularly as it appears to go beyond the familiar interdependence image of Gulliver enmeshed in a web of relationships to a sense of absolute decline.

Neither do the authors take us much beyond the impasse they identify between the established perspectives regarding the significance of Canada's foreign policy. Do the latter and the government doctrines designed to impose coherence on it matter much? The 'peripheral dependence' answer is 'no' and the injunction is to elaborate why this is the case. The 'liberal-internationalists' have recognized the constraints and advise governments to do their best anyway. The authors ignore the former and discount the latter in a way which comes close merely to reflecting the doctrinal shifts of Canadian governments from Pearsonian internationalism to Trudeau's conception of the national interest. Their own examples of Canada's new significance, its role in western economic summits, the North-South dialogue and the Namibia contact group, suggest anything but an orthodox sense of what is important in international relations.

Despite these problems, this book has a meatiness which renders it promising as an advanced text, both in its introduction to perspectives and its extensive bibliography on the subject. The case studies, however (refugee, energy, space and Middle East policy), while suited to their own argument, are not as useful for a text as an examination of more familiar

issues would be. Preoccupied as it is with interpreting Canada's role and status in the world, this work takes its place in a tradition of concern with that problem. One suspects that this preoccupation itself tells us more about the subject than any of the particular conclusions reached by the authors.

Queen's University of Kingston, Ontario PAUL SHARP

Latin America and Caribbean

The new Cuban presence in the Caribbean. Edited by Barry B. Levine. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1983. 274pp. Index. £21·75. Pb.: £9·75.

DESPITE, or because of, the collapse of the Grenadian revolution and, with it, Cuba's outpost in the Eastern Caribbean, this book should be required reading for all professionals involved in Western hemispheric affairs. The range and quality of the essays present a composite picture of the continuing Cuban revolution which has both reshaped hemispheric politics and created a force which straddles, however uncomfortably, the East-West and North-South complexes of the present world.

Although the quality of the various essays is largely even (barring the tortuous style of Antonio Jorge's 'How exportable is the Cuban Model?'), there is a good deal of repetition. The book mainly reprints a special issue of *Caribbean Review* and little editing appears to have been done. To read the same historical analysis of Cuban foreign policy four times, and that of Cuba's critical role in uniting the various Nicaraguan groups in mid-1978 three times, jars the reader's patience. But the variety of attitudes is refreshing; only that of ex-NSC staffer Robert Pastor, in 'Cuba and the Soviet Union' comes near to jibes in an otherwise well-argued discussion. Whatever the degree of autonomy of foreign policy decision-making enjoyed, 'the Soviets probably feel a vicarious thrill that Castro is carrying forward the revolutionary torch of Lenin' (p. 201). Jorge runs second with some hyperbolic hostility. 'Cuba', he writes, 'possesses the repressive efficiency of its post-Stalinist ancestry' and 'appears as a ready and willing abettor and supporter of assorted discontent and disgruntlements throughout the Third World' (p. 229).

Three messages come clearly through. First, that Cuba is ready to support 'progressive' (for which read anti-American) regimes, no matter how state power was achieved. Indeed, Barry Levine stresses in an outstanding introduction that Cuba has 'dissuaded the radical left from overthrowing these regimes', in contrast to 'no such strategic constraint' being shown toward the 'pro-US and anti-communist' (p. 11). Secondly, Castro's abject failure to lead the Non-Aligned Movement and, by so doing, to redefine non-alignment itself. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, done without warning to Castro, barely four months after the NAM summit in Havana in September 1979 assured that. But Michael Erisman's informative contribution on the subject makes it clear that the Cuban leader's command of the leadership before that disastrous event was at best tenuous. Thirdly, there is the thesis of Gordon Lewis, the doyen of Caribbeanists. To him, the failure of contemporary Marxism to dissociate itself from authoritarianism and militarism, and to come to terms with nationalism in the region, flows from the 'mould of hardline Stalinism' in which 'much of the Caribbean left is set' (p. 236).

Of the other essays, covering Cuba's relations with Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the United States and Latin American communist parties, only that of Tony Maingot on the Commonwealth Caribbean is muddied by hints of conspiracy theory. It is nevertheless sensitive. Warning that 'the down-to-earth savvy of many West Indian politicians is not to be minimized', he details how the 'Cuban card' has been played in domestic politics, where the masses are 'politically radical but sociologically conservative' (p. 22). He is harsh in his judgement of the Grenadian revolutionary leadership. Their attitudes were traditionally West Indian middle class, not socialist, amounting to a policy of 'authoritarian state capitalism, not by the people but for the people' (p. 28). A greater over-simplification can hardly be imagined.

Other highlights of the collection include details of Soviet aid to Cuba (US $3 billion per year or 25 per cent of GNP, plus massive military assistance), an analysis of the attractiveness of Cuba to African states and a plea to consider the regional role of the exiled Cuban right

as well as the Cuban left. Levine imaginatively labels them respectively as the 'Phoenicians' and the 'Spartans' of the Caribbean. After such a feast, perhaps the most enduring conclusion is that the Cuban model, whatever its positive features (and there are many), has been demythologized. Would that its competitors were!

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TONY THORNDIKE

The future of Central America: policy choices for the US and Mexico. Edited by Richard R. Fagen and Olga Pellicer. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1983. 228pp. Index. $20·00. Pb.: $11·95.

US–Mexico relations: economic and social aspects. Edited by Clark W. Reynolds and Carlos Tello. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1983. 375pp. Index. $25·00.

THESE two volumes are the first in a series derived from binational conferences sponsored by the Project on United States–Mexico Relations. 'The Project on United States–Mexico Relations is fully binational in conception, support and membership, though it by no means excludes participants from countries other than the United States and Mexico', says the foreword to the first volume (p. xi). 'The objective of the Project is threefold: to explore jointly development prospects of both countries in an historical perspective; to further the process of mutual understanding; and to provide a framework for formulating binational policies that respect the cultural, political, and economic autonomy of each country, and yet also recognize the reality of ever-increasing interdependence.' It is a measure of how far understanding has already progressed that it results in joint work of such quality.

The two books under review are, as one would expect, rather different in style and approach. The first, *The future of Central America*, is topical, deriving as it does from the urgency of the crisis in the region and the widely differing views of the governments of the United States and Mexico on what are the best policies to contribute to peace and stability there. The scholars, it appears, are much more of a mind. The root problems are not military but economic, as the first two papers on 'The dimensions of economic policy space in Central America', by Isaac Cohen and Gert Rosenthal, and 'Economic factors in the evolution of Central American societies', by Pedro Vuskovic, make clear. The Nicaraguan revolution, argues Xabier Gorostiaga, Director of the Institute for Economic and Social Research in Managua, confronts 'the tensions, paradoxes, contraditions, and errors experienced by a country trying to overcome underdevelopment and a dictatorial heritage, to survive in the international and regional economic crisis, and to create national independence in a small country situated in a strategic area of US hegemony' (p. 47). To him it seems that 'the Reagan administration wants the Nicaraguan Revolution increasingly to align itself with the socialist bloc, in an attempt to delegitimize its originality and to prevent the success of this model of a mixed economy and political pluralism' (p. 65). The Mexicans, as Luis Maira makes clear in his discussion of the US debate on the Central American crisis, also see the roots of conflict in the area as indigenous, and the Reagan administration's strategic concept as disastrously misguided. However, as Mario Ojeda points out, US–Mexican relations initially improved after Reagan's inauguration because of the indifference to Mexican sensibilities of his predecessor's administration; and, given the realistic appraisal of the Mexican government of its chances of bringing about at best only a limited amelioration of the conditions of confrontation, Mexico does, as Olga Pellicer points out, have a role to play as a regional power and, in alignment with the Contadora Group, it has in fact continued to play it. Above all, Mexico has a special relationship (although seldom friendly) with Guatemala; and the two most valuable papers, by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser ('Mexico and the Guatemalan crisis') and Piero Gleijeses ('Guatemala: crisis and response') are of great importance for the way in which they illuminate a most important, but otherwise often neglected dimension of the structure of the Central American crisis.

US–Mexico relations deals by contrast primarily with economic issues in the relationship between the two countries, and does so in a way that is fully comparative, US and Mexican views being juxtaposed on each issue. Major areas covered are economic and social perspectives by each of the other, trade, and industrial structure; and energy, national security, food agriculture and rural development, employment and migration, and the long-term future for relations between the United States and Mexico are analysed in contributions by Mario Ojeda, Richard R. Fagen and E. V. K. FitzGerald, Professor of Development

Economics at the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague. It is essential reading for any student of modern Mexico, and the joint coordinators of the Project, Carlos Tello Macias, Professor of Political Economy at UNAM, and Clark W. Reynolds, Professor of Economics at the Food Research Institute at Stanford University, are to be congratulated with their contributors on the excellent start they have made.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

In search of policy: the United States and Latin America. By Howard J. Wiarda. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 1984. 147pp.

Rift and revolution: the Central American imbroglio. Edited by Howard J. Wiarda. Washington, DC, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1984. 392pp. Index. $19.95. Pb.: $10.95.

HOWARD WIARDA—surely one of the most prolific of writers on Latin America—has given us a further two volumes to consider. *In search of policy* is a series of his own essays, in the *pensée* mode. Three of them are concerned with current issues (Nicaragua, El Salvador and the Caribbean Basin), the other five with the more general context of US policy-making towards Latin America.

The main preoccupation behind *Policy* is the assumption that while the USA and Latin America are becoming increasingly interdependent, this process has been accompanied by a decline in US influence. This tendency, Wiarda suggests, probably cannot and need not be reversed, but perhaps it could be slowed and turned to greater US advantage if a new approach to policy-making were adopted. His argument takes the form of criticizing previous policies and their assumptions and, more positively, advancing an alternative of his own. His criticism of previous policies has less to do with the policies themselves than their domestic political context and their intellectual underpinnings. He rejects what he describes as the artificially polarized options of 'realism' and idealism. Realism roughly corresponds with the approach made famous by Jeane Kirkpatrick: abandoning 'moralistic' prescriptions, supporting governments friendly to the US regardless of their political complexion, and being ready to use force in the pursuit of the US national interest. Idealism, popularly identified with the Carter era, is (equally crudely) identified with persuasion, with a concern for ethical issues, and with optimism about the potential for political development in Latin America.

Wiarda is in no doubt that the contrast between these approaches is overdrawn and that this has much to do with US partisan considerations and their associated rhetorics. He makes it clear that human rights issues under Carter were neither as dominant nor as effectively pursued as Carter's critics claimed. Equally, such concerns have not in practice been wholly abandoned by the Reagan administration. The complexity of the issues, the multiplicity of US interests and the inertia of the policy-making apparatus leads, Wiarda suggests, to rather more continuity in policy than partisans are willing to admit.

It is this very continuity and its intellectual assumptions for which the harshest criticism is reserved. Three points are stressed. First, Wiarda condemns the ignorance of and lack of empathy for Latin America both among policy-makers in Washington and the 'informed' American public. Second, he attacks the 'can do' tradition which suggests that engineering social and economic change is a straightforward matter. Finally, he dismisses the linear thinking associated with 'modernization' doctrine: that economic development will lead to social pluralism, which will lead to democracy, which will lead to stability. This critique is convincing, though it is not novel.

Producing alternatives is more difficult. Wiarda advances one which he calls a 'prudence model'. This calls for more empathy, more restraint, more consistency and more realism. Accordingly, the United States is advised to continue to promote democracy and human rights but in a low-key fashion. It should continue and, if necessary, expand military aid. It should launch a Marshall Plan (with a stress upon trade liberalism) for Central America, emulate Cuban field practice in the social welfare arena, and significantly increase its cultural and educational investment in Latin America. Above all, it should abandon the ideological prescriptions which have led in the past to inflated expectations and, inevitably, disappointment.

But this prudence model itself is a disappointment, for it is not clear how it differs from current practice. By implication it accepts that US goals are primarily the keeping-out of foreign powers and the maintenance of sea lanes, markets, and raw materials supplies, and only secondarily social and economic development. This may make sense in Washington, but it does not seem to be an example of the empathy which is apparently so vital in US dealings with Latin America.

Rift and revolution is more substantial, comprising twelve chapters, of which five deal with the historical unfolding of the regional crisis, and two the opposing military forces, while the remainder are concerned with the role of external forces such as the Soviet Union, Mexico, and of course the United States. After an introduction by Wiarda to the characteristics of the regions (institutional informality, nationalism, the rise of petit bourgeois power contenders etc) Karnes and Anderson provide brief reviews of historical developments from the failure of union to the present. Gary Wynia then concentrates on economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s and the decay of the 1970s, his theme being the familiar one of economic modernization without institutionalization (plus relative deprivation) as the motor of social revolution. Roland Ebel, in a particularly interesting essay, then elaborates on this in the context of the decline of what he calls the Central American city state system. Throughout this introductory section, the intellectual debt to Charles Anderson and Samuel Huntington is clear, but the essays themselves tend to be rather too synoptic and to overlap too much.

The analyses of the role of the military and their revolutionary opponents which follow (by McDonald and Evans respectively) give us more telling detail and are more complementary. Though neither stresses explicitly the extent to which each of these forces is internally divided the combined conclusion—that the situation is one of civil war, not mere insurgency, and that the revolution may well triumph—seems undeniable. Evans, in particular, stresses the extent to which the FSLN and the FMLN represent a new kind of popular armed challenge, and concludes that the drift towards direct US military embroilment is likely to incur much higher risks and costs than has been traditionally the case.

Given their size, strategic location and economic vulnerability, the role of external powers in the affairs of central American states is especially important. The analysis of the parts played by European socialism (Mujal-Leon), Mexico (Williams), and dissenting groups within the US itself (Falcott) are timely and useful though the absence of any consideration of the Contadora initiative is puzzling.

But the most controversial issue is the extent to which the Soviet Union is behind the current impasse, a theme which informs the essays by Jeane Kirkpatrick and the Valentas. Kirkpatrick's views are as clear as they are well known: the USSR is on a course of worldwide expansion; Latin America and the Caribbean is a target of this; US policies in the post Vietnam era—naive, utopian—gave the Soviets a toe-hold in Central America; the process must and can be reversed by all means possible. Unlike Kirkpatrick, the Valentas feel constrained to offer some evidence for this interpretation, and their analysis of Soviet–Cuban policy in the region is accordingly more sophisticated and less apocalyptic. So are their policy recommendations, with their stress upon the combined use of economic leverage, naval deployment, and more discrimination than Kirkpatrick would accept in the choice of proxies.

What the collection fails to cover is as interesting as what it does encompass. Though passing reference is made to it, the responsibility of the United States itself for the imbroglio—the overthrow of Arbenz, the penetration of sun-belt money into the regional economy, military backing for the Contras are all instances—is never really confronted. Such a recognition would be dismissed by many, if not all, of these contributors as mere liberalism.

University of Liverpool WALTER LITTLE

Bibliography and reference

International security yearbook 1983–84. Edited by Barry Blechman and Edward Luttwak. London: Macmillan for Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. 1984. 337pp. Index. £25·00. Pb.: £7·95.

THIS is the first issue of a projected series to be published annually. The volume deals with analysis and interpretation of those events of the past year that affect western security. An

analysis of the East–West military balance worldwide is complemented by a section dealing with regional political and military conflicts which constitute a threat to western security. A third section examines the twin long-term threats of nuclear proliferation and increased large-scale arms production in the Third World. There is a very short list of abbreviations and an index.

This volume constitutes an interesting American addition to the growing literature on the problems of international security. Its present format, however, in which 'tables' and 'figures' (i.e. diagrams) are interspersed in the narrative, make it very difficult to use as a reference work.

It is regrettable that neither the Korean airliner disaster, nor the US-led intervention in Grenada, nor the suspension of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate range nuclear missiles, all essential elements in the changing international security scene, could be included and taken into account in the assessment of the year under review.

Chatham House Library N.G.

Royal United Services Institute & Brassey's defence yearbook. London: Brassey's. 1984. 405pp. £25·00; $50·00.

THE 94th edition of this annual follows the pattern established in recent issues. Part one 'Strategic review', surveys the world scene, and examines the various frontiers of the NATO alliance, and Soviet aims and priorities as a superpower. The political aspects of recent confrontations in the Middle East, Britain's Irish problem, post–Falklands Argentine politics and the US defence debate are analysed. Part two covers the technological developments in warfare at sea, on land and in the air, and includes a section on 'remotely piloted vehicles' and cruise missiles. Eighteen pages of tables list categories and vital statistics of NATO and Warsaw pact weapons. Part three provides a select bibliography of recent defence literature under broad subject headings.

Chatham House Library N.G.

Africa guide 1984. 8th edn. 1984. 382pp. Index. Pb. **Asia and Pacific 1984. 5th edn.** 1984. 340pp. Pb. **Latin America and Caribbean 1984. 5th edn.** 1984. 248pp. Pb. **Middle East review 1984. 10th edn.** 1984. 310pp. Pb. Saffron Walden, Essex: World of Information. £19·00 each.

THESE annual guides continue to follow a common pattern. Brief signed articles on regional topics are followed by alphabetically arranged country studies within the region covered. Each study, preceded by a basic, uncluttered map, provides essential economic political and touristic information. Advertising material, useful to the businessman, has been kept to a reasonable level, the presentation is attractive, the binding stands up well to use, and the clear lettering on the spine is an appreciable advantage to the library user.

Chatham House Library N.G.

European yearbook 1981. Vol. XXIX. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1983. 768pp. Index. £81·25.

THE yearbook keeps to the pattern of its predecessors. Four articles, in English or French, on the Council of Europe and the Communities are followed by annual surveys of the work of seventeen international bodies, including the OECD. A forty-page bibliography concludes the volume.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

European yearbook 1982. Vol. XXX. The Hague, London: Nijhoff. 1984. 863pp. Index. $129·00; £87·75.

APART from an unhelpful change in the method of pagination, the yearbook's format remains much as before. Of the four preliminary articles, one deals narcissistically with developments

as mirrored in the history of the yearbook itself; the rest cover the environment, Mediterranean policy and 'the necessity of democracy'. The main section is devoted to the structure and recent activities of European intergovernmental organizations, including the OECD and regional bodies; texts of documents and lists of publications and officers increase its usefulness. Both of these sections are in French and English. Besides the usual bibliography, this edition of the yearbook includes a cumulative index to earlier volumes.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Yearbook of European law 1982. Edited by F. G. Jacobs. Oxford: Clarendon. 1983. 381pp. Index. £40·00.

THE yearbook provides articles, annual surveys, and books reviews relating to the legislative activities of the European Communities and the Council of Europe. This issue includes specific material on contractual obligations, nationality law and the protection of human rights.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

International organizations: a dictionary and directory. By Giuseppe Schiavone. London: Macmillan. 1984. 321pp. Index. £25·00.

THE main feature of this work is the 'dictionary', an alphabetical listing of intergovernmental organizations. The entries, often of several pages in length, cover structure, activities, history and addresses, and sometimes include evaluative comments and brief bibliographies. The 'directory' gives brief factual information on other, functional official bodies, grouped by subject; it is hard to see why it was not integrated into the dictionary. Also provided are an introductory account of the development of international cooperation; a table of United Nations and GATT membership; a chronology of dates of foundation; and an index which includes initials and acronyms.

This is a useful, concise book, which goes a little beyond the bounds of the pure work of reference.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Middle East contemporary survey. Vol. IV: 1979–80; Vol. V: 1980–81. Edited by Colin Legum *et al.* New York, London: Holmes & Meier. 1981; 1982. 854pp; 896pp.

THE survey is a basic reference tool for the study of the Middle East. Articles on interregional topics and the involvement of outside powers are followed by surveys of all countries except Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The emphasis is on domestic politics and foreign relations rather than on economic issues.

Contributors are mainly Israeli, but include British and American scholars.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Southeast Asian affairs 1983. Aldershot, Hants.: Gower for Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 1984. 324pp. £15·00.

FOR the first time this useful yearbook has a British publisher. Four regional studies, two of which cover relations with the Americas, are followed by country studies of political and economic developments. This is a fundamental reference tool for all those concerned with the ASEAN countries, Indochina or Burma.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Erratum

In the Summer 1984 issue of *International Affairs*, note 39, p. 413, Ronald Asmus's article 'The GDR and Martin Luther' was incorrectly cited as appearing in the Summer 1984 issue of *Survey*. The article will in fact appear in the Autumn 1984 issue of *Survey* (Vol. 28, No. 3).

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